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PETITIONER: MARTIN BURN LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/08/1965

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  529            1966 SCR  (1) 543

ACT: Calcutta  Municipal Act, 1923-Valuation of premises  wrongly made  under  s. 127(b) instead of s. 127(a)-In  appeal  High Court  remanding cam for valuation by lower court-If  remand valid-Whether case one of cancellation within s. 131  (2)(b) or of revision within ss. 147 & 164.

HEADNOTE: The  annual  value  of  certain  premises  occupied  by  the appellant  was ascertained by the methods prescribed in  cl. (b)  of s. 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923,  with  a view  to  assess  the  municipal rates  payable  in  of  the premises.   The  appellant lodged objections  under  s.  139 claiming,inter alia, that the basis of valuation was  wrong as it should have beenmade  by the method  prescribed  in cl. (a) of s. 127 and that the valuationwas   in    any event  excessive.   The  Deputy  Commissioner  rejected  the objections,  except that he reduced the valuation  slightly; but an appeal under s. 141 to the Court of Small Causes  was allowed  and that court directed that a fresh valuation  had to be made under cl. (a) of s. 127 by the Executive Officer, starting  from the proceeding mentioned under s.  131(2)(b). The respondent thereupon appealed to the High Court. but the contentions raised by it were rejected; however, in view  of the  fact  that  the time-limit for  an  assessment  by  the Executive Officer under s. 131(2)(b) having expired he could no  more make the valuation which the Court of Small  Causes directed  him to make and to prevent the  Corporation  being deprived  of its rates as a result of such expiry  of  time, the High Court made an order remanding the case to the Court of  Small  Causes  and directed it  to  make  the  valuation itself. In  the appeal to this Court it was contended on  behalf  of the  appellant  that  as the  original  valuation  had  been cancelled because of an irregularity, the present case  fell within  s.  131(2)(b), and the High Court had  no  power  to remand  the  case for a valuation by the lower  court-.  and that  in  any event the order of  remand  was  unjustifiable because it converted the appellant’s appeal to the Court  of Small  Causes into a proceeding wholly alien to what it  was originally  meant for. in that it went beyond the  scope  of

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the  objection made by the appellant under s. 139.   On  the other  hand,  it wag the respondent’s  contention  that  the present  case  was  one  of revision  and  alteration  of  a valuation  contemplated  in ss. 147 and 164 and not  one  of cancellation  of  a  valuation  within  the  meaning  of  s. 131(2)(b). HELD:(per Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal JJ.) The  High Court’s order remanding the case to the  Court  of Small Causes with a direction to ascertain the annual  value could not be sustained. The  liability for rates is a statutory liability under  the Act and for such liability to arise the valuation had to  be made  as  provided  in  the  statute.   The  Act  does   not contemplate  that  rates  may be fixed on  the  basis  of  a valuation  made by a court such a valuation would create  no statutory  liability.  It would be fruitless to  direct  the Court of Small Causes to make a fresh valuation. [548 C-E] 544 The direction of the High Court to the Court of Small Causes was  not to revise or alter a valuation but to make a  fresh valuation  and is such the High Court’s Order could  not  be upheld  as  directing  a  revision  or  alteration  of   the valuation under s. 147 or 164 of the Act. [548 F, G] Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal v. Corporation of  Calcutta, 58 C.W.N. 537; disapproved. Governor  General  of  India in Council  v.  Corporation  of Calcutta,   51  C.W.N.  517;  North  British  &   Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta (Calcutta High Court  Case  No.  6 of  1943,  unreported);  Corporation  of Calcutta  v.  Chandoo  Lal Bhai Chand Modi  57  C.W.N.  882; referred to. (per Ramaswami J. dissenting) (i)The  High Court having remanded the case to  the  lower court  with a direction to ascertain the annual value  under s.  127(a)  after  allowing  the  parties  to  give  further evidence, the valuation had not been finally determined, but was  awaiting  final  adjudication.  It  was  not  therefore correct  to  say that there had been a cancellation  of  the valuation  within the meaning of s. 131(2)(b).  The  present case was one of the revision of valuation and fell under the purview  of  s.  147, so that  the  revised  valuation  when finally  determined would take effect  retrospectively  from the point of time mentioned in that section. [557 H-558 B] (ii)Though  the objection made by the appellant  tinder  s. 139  was  an  objection to the valuation,  whatever  be  the ground of objection, the primary object of the appellant was to  get the valuation set aside.  It could not therefore  be said  that  the order of remand made by the High  Court  was beyond the scope of the appeal. [558 D, G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   Civil Appeal Nos. 247 and 248 of 1963. Appeal  by Special Leave from the judgment and  order  dated the  August  3. 1959 of the Calcutta High Court  in  Appeals from original order Nos. 124 and 125 of 1956. Niren  De  Additional Solicitor-General, S. R. Banerjee  and S.   N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. A.V. Vishwanatha Sastri and P. K. Mukherjee, for the res- pondent. The Judgment of Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal, JJ. was delivered by Sarkar J., Ramaswami J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. Sarkar  J.  These two appeals arise out of  proceedings  for

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ascertainment  of  the  annual value  of  premises  No.  12, Mission  Row,  Calcutta,  occupied by  the  appellant.   The annual  value  was  ascertained with a view  to  assess  the municipal  rates  payable in respect of the  premises.   The appeals raise a common question of law making it unnecessary to  deal with them separately, that question  being  whether the order of remand made by the High Court at 545 Calcutta  to  the  Court  of  Small  Causes,  Calcutta   for ascertaining the annual value was justified.  The  annual  value  was  ascertained  under  the   Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.  This Act was repealed and replaced  by the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 as from May 1, 1952, but as the  valuation  had originally been made by  the  respondent Corporation  under the repealed Act it is that Act by  which the question that arises will have to be determined. We  may  at  this  stage profitably refer  to  some  of  the sections  in  Ch.  X of the Act for giving an  idea  of  its scheme  regarding  the ascertainment of  the  annual  value. Section 124 provides that a ’consolidated rate not exceeding twenty-three  per  cent on the annual  valuation  determined under  Ch.  X of the Act may be imposed by  the  Corporation upon  all lands and buildings in Calcutta.  Clauses (a)  and (b)  of s. 127 lay down two mutually exclusive  methods  for ascertaining the annual value.  The method prescribed in cl. (a)  is  applicable where a building had  been  erected  for letting  purposes  or was ordinarily let and  under  it  the valuation  has  to be based on the rent which  the  land  or building  might reasonably fetch.  Clause (b), on the  other hand, covers all other cases and provides for the  valuation being based on the cost of construction of the building  and the  value  of the land.  Section 131(1) provides  that  the valuation  made  under the preceding  Municipal  Acts  shall remain in force for the assessment of the consolidated  rate under the Act until such time as the Executive Officer makes a  fresh  valuation under the Act and that  fresh  valuation shall  have  effect  for a period of six years  ind  may  be revised thereafter at the termination of successive  periods of six years.  The Executive Officer mentioned is one of the officers  of  the  Corporation  appointed  under  the   Act. Section  131(2)  (b) states that "any land or  building  the valuation  of  which  has been cancelled on  the  ground  of irregularity  may be valued by the Executive Officer at  any time during the currency of the period prescribedby     sub section(1). and such valuation shall remain in force for the unexpired  portion of such period." Sections 136 to 138  lay down  the procedure for the making of the valuation  and  of giving notices in respect thereof to the rate-payers.  Under s. 139 a rate-payer dissatisfied with the valuation made  by the   Corporation  may  lodge  with  the   Corporation   his objections  to it.  Section 140 provides for an order  being made  by  the Executive Officer on  these  objections  after investigation  on  notice to the  rate-payer.   Section  141 gives the rate-payer dissatisfied with the order made  under s.  140 a right to appeal against it to the Court  of  Small Causes.  Under s. 142(3) 546 an  appeal lies to the High Court from the decision  of  the Court of Small Causes under s. 141.  Section 147 is in these terms: When the valuation of any land or building is revised in  consequence  of an objection made under section  139  or section  146,  sub-section (2), or an  appeal  is  preferred under  section 141, the revised valuation shall take  effect from  the  quarter in which the  first  mentioned  valuation would have taken effect, and shall continue in force for the

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period  for  which the said  first-mentioned  valuation  was made,  and no longer." Section 146 is not material  for  our purposes.  Section 164(1) states that "When an objection  to a   valuation   has  been  made  under  section   139,   the consolidated rate shall, pending the final determination  of the  objection,  be paid on the previous  valuation."  Under sub-s. (2) of this section "if, when the objection has  been finally determined, the previous valuation is altered", then any  sum paid in excess shall be refunded or allowed ’to  be set  off against any demand of the Corporation  against  the rate-payer  and  any  deficiency shall be deemed  to  be  an arrear of rate and recoverable as such.  There are  sections which  provide  how  the rates are to  be  realised  but  no reference  to them is necessary.  It is enough to  say  that the rates duly assessed impose a legal liability to pay them which  can  be enforced by distress or by proceedings  in  a court of law. Now  in  the present case the Corporation had  assessed  the annual value of the premises at a certain figure by applying the  method prescribed in cl. (b) of S. 127.  The  appellant lodged  various  objections  to it under  S.  139.   We  are concerned only with two of these objections which were  (1), the  valuation had been made on a wrong basis as  it  should have been made by the method prescribed in cl. (a) of s. 127 and  (2),  the  valuation  was  in  any  event  unfair   and excessive.   The  Deputy Commissioner  of  the  Corporation, being the officer under the new Act which had then come into force  who had replaced the Executive Officer under the  Old Act,  rejected all these objections except that  he  reduced the   valuation  slightly  presumably  on  the   ground   of excessiveness.   The  appellant then  appealed  against  the Commissioner’s  decision  to  the  Court  of  Small  Causes, Calcutta  under s. 141.  The only point that  the  appellant raised  in that Court was that the valuation was illegal  as it  had  been made under cl. (b) of s. 127 while  it  should have been made under cl. (a).  It did not raise a contention that the valuation as reduced was still excessive and should in any event be further reduced.  The Corporation  contended that  the valuation had properly been made under cl. (b)  of S. 127 and also that the appeal was incompetent as necessary court-fees  had not been paid.  The Court rejected both  the points and allowed the appeal 547 making  the following order : "The appeal  must,  therefore, succeed; and the assessments as made by the respondent  body have to be wholly set aside and fresh valuations have to  be made in respect of the premises in accordance with the  mode prescribed  under clause (a) of section 127,  starting  from the proceedings prescribed in clause (b) of sub-section  (2) of section 131 of the Act." The Corporation then appealed to the High Court at  Calcutta under s. 142(3) of the Act against the judgment of the Court of Small Causes and raised the same two points it had  taken in that Court.  Both these points were rejected by the  High Court  also and the order of the Court of Small  Causes  was maintained.   These  points  no  more  survive  because  the Corporation  has not taken any proceeding to  challenge  the judgment  of the High Court.  We are not, therefore,  called upon  to  examine the merits of the decision of  the  Courts below  on  the  applicability of cl. (a) of s.  127  to  the present  case  or as regards the court-fees payable  by  the appellant. In view of its decision that the valuation should have been, made  by the method laid down in cl. (b) of s. 127 the  High Court  held  that  "the learned Judge of  the  Small  Causes

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Court,   Calcutta,   therefore,   rightly   cancelled    the assessment".   Having done this, it observed that the  order of the Court of Small Causes directing a revaluation by  the Corporation  was however infructuous.  It is not in  dispute that the Corporation could only make a revaluation under  s. 131 (2) (b), as indeed the Court of Small Causes directed it to  do, and that the time limit for doing so  prescribed  by that section had expired.  To prevent the Corporation  being deprived of its rates the High Court made an order remanding the  case to the Court of Small Causes and directing  it  to make  the valuation itself’ thereby intending to  avoid  the difficulty  arising out of the application of s.  131(2)(b). It also gave certain consequential directions for the filing of  a valuation before that Court by the Corporation and  of objections  thereto by the appellant and so on.  It is  this order of remand that the appellant challenges in this Court. It  is not contended that the High Court had  any  statutory power  to make the order of remand but it is said  that  the High Court had an inherent power to do so.  Whether the High Court had the inherent power in a case like this may well be doubted.   Learned counsel for the appellant contended  that in  any  case the order of remand was  unjustifiable  as  it converted  the  appellant’s  appeal to the  Court  of  Small Causes into a proceeding wholly alien to what it  originally was  meant  for.   It was said that the  inherent  power  of remand  could  be exercised only for deciding  the  disputes that 548 arose in the case as it stood; it could not be exercised for the decision of a matter which the proceedings in the Courts below  did not raise, namely, the making of a new  valuation on  a  wholly different basis.  These  contentions,  in  our view, deserve serious consideration. We think that there are other more fundamental objections to the  order  of remand.  The order was made so that  a  legal liability for rates assessed on the valuation made under  it might  fasten  on  the appellant.   Indeed  the  High  Court expressly  stated that it was making the order so  that  the Corporation  might.  not  be deprived  of  its  rates.   The liability  for rates is however a statutory liability  under the  Act;  it is not a liability to be imposed by  order  of Court.  So much is clear and not in dispute.  In order  that the,  statutory liability might arise, the valuation had  to be  made  as provided in the statute.  Now the  Act  nowhere states  that rates may be fixed on the basis of a  valuation made by a court; it does not at all contemplate a  valuation made  by  a  Court on its own.  Such a  valuation  would  be futile and would create no statutory liability.   Therefore, the High Court’s order, sending the case "back to the  Small Causes  Court,  Calcutta, with directions to that  Court  to ascertain the annual value," if it was intended to allow the Court to make an independent valuation itself, was  useless; the valuation made under it would give rise to no  liability for  rates  fixed on the basis of it.  It would  not  be  an order which can be sustained. Though the Act does not empower a Court to make a  valuation itself,  it  does seem to contemplate in ss. 147 and  164  a valuation  made  by  the Corporation  being  revised  and  a previous  valuation altered, by a Court in an  appeal.   If, therefore,  it  could be said that the valuation  which  the Court  of  Small Causes was to make under the order  of  the High  Court  would be a revised  valuation,  that  valuation would have been within the statute and the order of the High Court  would then have been an effective order.  We do  not, however, think that valuation can be said to be a revised or

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altered valuation.  First, the High Court did not direct the Court  of Small Causes to revise a valuation or to  alter  a previousvaluation; it directed that Court to make a  fresh valuation itself. Secondly, it seems to us, irrespective  of how the High Courtdescribed the valuation to be made under its   order,  that  valuation  cannot  by  any  stretch   of imagination  be  called a revised valuation  or  a  previous valuation  altered.   What  has happened here  is  that  the previous  valuation has been cancelled.  That  valuation  no longer exists.  The Court of Small Causes has now to make  a valuation of its own on a different and on different 549 data.  The valuation has now to be made on the basis of  the letting value of the premises instead of on the market value of the land and the cost of construction of the building  as had  previously  been  done by the  Corporation.   It  would hardly  be appropriate to call such a process, the  revising of  a  valuation or the altering of a  valuation  previously made.   Nothing is here revised or altered; what is done  is to  create a new thin- from the start and this  without  any reference  whatsoever  to  any existing  thing.   We  should suppose  that  a  thing is revised or altered  when  it  is, retained with some modifications.  Thus when the figures  of rent,  cost  or  value on which a  valuation  is  based  are altered  as  excessive, or unfair or a  larger  depreciation than  given  is allowed and the total is  suitably  altered, that  would be a case of revising or altering  a  valuation. The present is a wholly different case.  The valuation which the High Court ordered to be made cannot hence be a  revised or altered valuation. It  is  necessary now to refer to Royal Asiatic  Society  of Bengal  v. Corporation of Calcutta(1).  In that case, as  in the  case in hand, the rate-payer had appealed to the  Court of Small Causes contending that the valuation had been  made by  the Corporation by applying a wrong method, namely,  cl. (a)  of  s. 127.  The contention was rejected by  the  lower Court  but  upheld by the High Court.  The High  Court  then remanded  the  case  to the, Court of  Small  Causes  for  a determination of the annual value in terms of cl. (b) of  s. 127.   The High Court took the view that in such  an  appeal the  Court of Small Causes had the right to make  a  revised valuation as contemplated in s. 147.  Basing itself on  that section  and s. 164 it put its reasoning in this way  at  p. 544  : "the scheme of the Act is that where an  assesses  is aggrieved by a valuation made by the Corporation and prefers an  objection,  till the objection  is  finally  adjudicated upon,  the  consolidated  rate has got to  be  paid  on  the existing  valuation and that after the objection is  finally disposed  of  in  appeal, the  final  valuation  fixed  will determine  the consolidated rate payable and will, in  terms of section 147, remain in force for the period for which the first  mentioned valuation was made." With respect,  we  are unable  to agree that this is the scheme of the Act.   Where the  valuation  is in fact revised, the  observation  quoted would no doubt be fully applicable.  It would not: apply  to other  cases.   The  fallacy of the reasoning  lies  in  the assumption  that once there is an appeal, there must  always be  a  revised  valuation.  There is  no  warrant  for  that assumption.   We have earlier stated that there is no  scope for making a revised valuation where (1)  58 C.W.N. 537. 550 the  appeal  seeks an annulment of the  existing  valuation. Further,  neither s. 147 nor s. 164, on which the  reasoning was based, requires a valuation to be revised nor says  when

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that  is  to  be done.  They deal only with  cases  where  a valuation has in fact been revised and thereby indicate that there  may be cases where the valuation is not revised.   In Governor-General  of  India  in Council  v.  Corporation  of Calcutta(1) the High Court upheld the order of the Court  of Small  Causes  cancelling a valuation as  having  been  made under  the  wrong clause of s. 127 but did  not  direct  the valuation  to  be made afresh by that Court.   We  may  also observe  here  that  in  the case in  hand  the  High  Court referred  to  the Royal Asiatic Society’s  case(2)  only  to support  the proposition that it had a power of  remand  and for  no other purpose.  It did not say that in  all  appeals the Court must make a revised valuation. In  considering  the scheme of the Act,  the  Royal  Asiatic Society’s  case(3) further overlooked the fact that the  Act required every valuation to be made by the Corporation under ss.  131  and 136 to 138 and that it gave the  rate-payer  a chance  of  attacking that valuation under  s.  139,  before coming  to  a Court for ventilating  his  grievance.   These provisions  would  be ignored if the Court of  Small  Causes were  to make the valuation itself.  They indicate that  the scheme of the Act was not as stated in that case.  There  it was also observed that the view taken received support  from the observations of S. R. Das J. in the unreported  judgment in  North  British  and Mercantile  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  v. Corporation  of  Calcutta (3 ) mentioned in that  case.   We think  however that those observations tend quite the  other way  for they were inter alia that, "If, however, the  Small Causes  Court  only  sets aside the valuation  made  by  the Corporation  but does not itself fix the valuation, then  s. 147  does  not apply...... The matter must in  such  circum- stances  be left to be governed by s. 131(2)(b)." S. R.  Das J.  clearly contemplated that the Court of Small Causes  was not bound to make a revised valuation in all cases.  In  our opinion,  it has not the power to do so in all  cases.   The same  view  of  the judgment of S. R. Das J.  was  taken  in Corporation of Calcutta v. Chandoo Lal Bhai Chand Modi(4 ). If it was intended by the Royal Asiatic Society’s case(5) to hold   that  it  was  the  appellate  court’s  power   after cancelling a valuation to revise it if it liked, that  again would be a view to which we are unable to subscribe. ,  Such a view indeed appears to have been (1)  51 C.W.N. 517. (2)  58 C.W.N. 537. (3)  Case No. 6 of 1943, unreported. (4)  57 C.W.N. 882. 551 taken by the High Court in the case in hand for it made  the order of remand only because the Corporation could not  make a valuation any more, the time limit prescribed for it under s. 131(2)(b) having expired.  If the Corporation could  make the valuation, presumably the High Court would not have made the order of remand.  Now s. 131(2)(b) provides that when  a valuation  is  cancelled on the ground  of  irregularity,  a fresh  valuation may be made by the Executive  Officer.   It would  be an unnatural construction of the Act to  say  that the operation of this provision would depend on the  discre- tion of the appellate court to proceed or not to proceed  to make  a  valuation  itself after  cancelling  the  valuation previously  made by the Corporation.  We think that in  view of  this provision, once a valuation is cancelled,  a  fresh valuation  can  only be made in terms of it and not  in  any other  way.  That is what S. R. Das J. said and with  it  we agree.   That  is  another reason for  saying  that  when  a valuation is cancelled, the Act does not contemplate a fresh

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valuation  being  made by the court, for if it  did  so,  s. 131(2)(b)  would have operation only when the Court  decided it  to  have.  We are not prepared to accept as  correct  an interpretation  of  the  Act leading to  such  an  unnatural result. While  on s. 131(2)(b) we observe that it was not  contended that  a Court had no power to cancel a valuation;  all  that was  said was that after cancellation the Court must or  may proceed to make a fresh valuation.  This we have held to  be an  untenable  view.   A  point was  however  made  that  s. 131(2)(b)  applied only to a cancellation on the  ground  of irregularity, that is, a procedural defect such as,  absence of notice, omission to give a hearing etc.. There is however no  reason  to  restrict the ordinary meaning  of  the  word "irregularity"  and confine it to procedural  defects  only. None,  has been advanced.  Such a contention  was  rejected, and we think rightly, in Corporation of Calcutta v.  Chandoo Lal  Bhai Chand Modi(1).  That word clearly covers any  case where  a thing has not been done in the manner laid down  by the statute, irrespective of what that manner might be.   In principle  there  would  be nothing  to  justify  a  special provision  like s. 131(2)(b) being made to cover a  case  of procedural irregularity only. We  can now deal with the reasoning on which the High  Court in  the  present  case justified its order  of  remand.   It realised  that  by  making the order it  was  depriving  the appellant of one of its chances to object to the  valuation, namely,  the  chance  under  s. 139, but  it  felt  that  by upholding that right of the appellant it would be  depriving the Corporation of its rates wholly as the time (1) 57 C.W.N. 882. L7SUP./65-7 552 limit  prescribed by s. 131(2)(b) had expired.   It  thought that  it  was  faced with two evil-, and that  it  would  be choosing   the  lesser  ,of  the  two  if  it  allowed   the Corporation  a  chance  to collect its  rates.   With  great respect,   we  find  this  line  of   reasoning   altogether unsupportable.  A result flowing from a statutory  provision is  never  an  evil.  A court has no power  to  ignore  that provision to relieve what it considers a distress  resulting from  its  operation.   A statute must of  course  be  given effect  to whether a court likes the result ,or  not.   When the High Court found that s. 131(2)(b) had been attracted to the case,. it had no power to set that provision at nought. It remains to deal with one other argument advanced for  the Corporation.   It  was said that the  entire  proceeding  in connection  with the ascertainment of the valuation was  one and  continuous  and its only object was  to  ascertain  the valuation  and, therefore, the Court annulling  a  valuation made  on  a  wrong  basis, must have power  to  make  a  new valuation itself on the correct basis.  We are not impressed by this contention, The conclusion does not follow from  the premise.   The proceeding for making the valuation,  whether it  is continuous or not, must be in terms of  the  statute. If the statute does not give the Court the power to make the valuation, it cannot be, said to possess that power so  that the supposed object may be achieved.  Further, the object is not to make a valuation anyhow but to make it only in  terms of the Act. We think we have now considered all the different aspects of the matter that were placed before us by learned counsel  on either side.  Our conclusion for the reasons earlier  stated is that, looked from all points of view, the order of remand is  not justifiable in law; it was not within  the  inherent

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power of the High Court to remand the case for the doing  of a  thing which the Act did not countenance.  The remand  was futile.   It offended the Act as it ,deprived the  appellant of  one  of its statutory rights.  The order has to  be  set aside. Before concluding we may state that the Corporation had made two  valuations  of  the  premises,  one  called  a  general valuation  for the entire six yearly period mentioned in  s. 131(1)  and the other an intermediate valuation  made  later but  within that period to have effect for the remainder  of the period, on account of certain additional construction in the   premises   put  up  since  the   earlier   assessment. Objections  had  been taken by the appellant to  both  these valuations  tinder  S. 139 by  independent  proceedings  and separate  appeals filed under s. 141 from the order made  in each  of  the proceedings.  As earlier stated,  the  appeals raised the same point. 553 They were, therefore, dealt with in one judgment by both the Courts below.  Hence the two appeals before us. In  the  result  we  allow these.  appeals,  set  aside  the judgment  of  the  High Court in so far as  the  orders  for remand  are concerned and restore the judgment of the  Court of Small Causes.  The Corporation will pay the cost of these appeals. Ramasawami,  J. These two appeals are brought,  by  -special leave,  against the judgment of the High Court  at  Calcutta dated  August  3, 1959 in appeals from  Original  Orders  in F.M.A. 124 and F.M.A. 125 of 1956.  The appeals arise out of two  valuations  made  by the  Corporation  of  Calcutta  in respect of premises No. 12, mission Row, Calcutta under  the provisions  of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 (Bengal  Act III  of  1923).  At the general  revaluation,  the  disputed premises were assessed to an annual value of Rs. 1,45,354/-, to  come into effect from the second quarter  194950,  i.e., from  July  1,  1949.  The assessment  was  made  under  the provision of s. 127(b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act,  1923. The  assessee objected to the valuation, both in  regard  to the  quantum  and  the method of valuation  and  the  Deputy Commissioner  No.  1 of the  respondent-Corporation,  though -affirming  the method of valuation, reduced the  amount  of assessment  to  Rs.  1,28,230/-.   Against  this  order  the assessee  preferred an appeal to the Presidency Small  Cause Court,  Calcutta  under  the provisions of  s.  183  of  the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 which had in the meantime  come into  operation.   This  appeal was  numbered  as  Municipal Appeal  No.  217 of 1954.  The general  revaluation  of  the premises  was followed by an intermediate valuation  because certain  new constructions had been made.  At the  stage  of the, intermediate, valuation, the annual value was  assessed it  Rs.  1,46,992/- with effect from the  first  quarter  of 1951-52, i.e., from April 1, 1951 again following the method prescribed  under s. 127(b) of the Calcutta  Municipal  Act, 1923).  Upon in objection made by the, ass see the valuation was reduced to Rs. 1,29,588/- by the Deputy Commissioner No. 1  of  the  Corporation.  The assessee took  the  matter  in appeal  to the Presidency Small Cause Court under s. 183  of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951.  This appeal was  numbered as Municipal Appeal No. 217 of 1954.  In both these  appeals the Presidency Small Cause Court considered that the  proper procedure  was to assess the premises under cl. (a) and  not cl.  (b) of s. 127 of he Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.   The Presidency  Small  Causes court accordingly  set  aside  the assessments  and, directed fresh Assessments to be  made  in accordance  with  law.  The Corporation look the  matter  in

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appeal to the Calcutta High Court which, by its 554 judgment  dated August 3, 1959, upheld the decision  of  the Presidency  Small Causes Court that the valuation should  be fixed  under  s.  127(a)  and not under  s.  127(b)  of  the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 and that the valuation  already made should be cancelled.  The High Court, however, modified the  direction  of the Presidency Small  Causes  Court  with regard  to  remand.  The High Court ordered  that  the  case should be remanded to the Presidency Small Causes Court  for fixing  the  valuation  itself under the  provisions  of  S. 127(a), of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. The  question  presented for determination in this  case  is whether the High Court was right in sending back the case to the  Presidency  Small  Causes Court  and  directing  it  to ascertain  the annual value under s. 127(a) of the  Calcutta Municipal Act for the periods in question. It  is  necessary  at this stage to  set  out  the  relevant provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.  Section 131 deals  with the assessment of the annual valuation  and  the duration of the assessment.  It reads :               "131 (1)................ the Executive Officer               may  make a fresh valuation of the  lands  and               buildings  in each such ward under  this  Act,               and  the  annual  value  of  such  lands   and               buildings in each such ward shall, after  such               assessment,  has  been made by  the  Executive               Officer, have effect for a period of six years               and may be revised thereafter by the Executive               Officer  at  the  termination  of   successive               periods of six years.               (2)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               subsection  (1)  of the  following  conditions               shall  apply in the several cases  hereinafter               specified, namely-               (a)................................               (b)   any  land or building the  valuation  of               which  has  been cancelled on  the  ground  of               irregularity,  or which for any  other  reason               has no annual value assigned to it under  this               Act,  may be valued by the Executive  Officer,               at any time during the currency of the  period               prescribed in respect of such land or building               by  sub-section (1) and such  valuation  shall               remain  in  force, and the  consolidated  rate               shall be levied               555               according to it, for the unexpired portion  of               such period."               Section 139 provides as follows :               "139(1) Any person who is dissatisfied with  a               valuation made under this chapter may  deliver               at  the  municipal  office  a  written  notice               stating  the grounds of his objection to  such               valuation.               (2)   Such  notice shall be, delivered  within               fifteen  days  after the  publication  of  the               notice referred to in s. 137, or after receipt               of  the notice referred to in section 138,  if               such notice is received after the  publication               of the notice referred to in section 137 :               Provided that the Executive Officer may, if he               thinks fit, extend the said period of  fifteen               days to a period not exceeding one month."               Section 140 states

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             140. (1)AR   such   objections   shall   be               entered,  in a register to be  maintained  for               the purpose; and, on receipt of any objection,               notice  shall  be given to the objector  of  a               time and place at which his objection will  be                             investigated.               (2)   At the said time and place the Executive               Officer  or a Deputy Executive  Officer  shall               hear  the  objection, in the presence  of  the               objector  or his agent if he appears, or  may,               for    reasonable    cause,    adjourn     the               investigation.               (3)   When the objection has been  determined,               the order passed shall be recorded in the said               register,  together  with  the  date  of  such               order."               Section 141 reads :               "141  (1)  Any person  dissatisfied  with  the               order  passed on his objection may  appeal  to               the Court of Small Causes having  jurisdiction               in  the place where the land or  building,  to               the valuation of which the objection was made,               is situated.               (2)   Such  appeal shall be presented to  such               Court of Small Causes within thirty days  from               the  date  of the order passed  under  section               140, and shall                556               be accompanied by an extract from the register               of  objections containing the  order  objected               to.               (3)   The  provisions of Parts 11 and  III  of               the  Indian Limitation Act, 1908, relating  to               appeals, shall apply to every appeal preferred               under this section.               (4)   No  appeal shall be admitted under  this               section  unless  an objection has  first  been               determined under section 140."               Section 142 states :               "142(1) Every valuation made by the  Executive               Officer  under section 131 shall,  subject  to               the  provisions of sections 139, 140 and  141,               be final.               (2)   Every  order  passed  by  the  Executive               Officer  or  Deputy  Executive  Officer  under               section  140 shall, subject to the  provisions               of section 141, be final.               (3)   An  appeal from a decision made  by  the               Court of Small Causes under section 141  shall               lie to the High Court."               Section 147 provides for the period for  which               the revised valuation is to continue in force.               It is to the following effect :               "147.   When  the  valuation of  any  land  or               building  is  revised  in  consequence  of  an               objection  made under section 139  or  section               146,   sub-section  (2),  or  an   appeal   is               preferred  under  section  141,  the   revised               valuation  shall take effect from the  quarter               in  which the first mentioned valuation  would               have taken effect, and shall continue in force               for  the  period  for  which  the  said  first               mentioned valuation was made, and no longer."               Section  164 makes provisions for the  payment               of  the  consolidated  rate and  how  far  the

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             payment  is affected by objections  to  valua-               tion.  It states as follows               "164(1 )When  an objection to  a  valuation               has   been   made  under  section   139,   the               consolidated  rate  shall, pending  the  final               determination of the objection, be paid on the               previous valuation.               (2)   If, when the objection has been  finally               determined, the previous valuation is altered,               then-               5 5 7               (a)   any sum paid in excess shall be refunded               or  allowed to be set off against any  present               or future demand of the Corporation under this               Act, and               (b)   any deficiency shall be deemed to be  an               arrear  of the consolidated rate and shall  be               payable and recoverable as such It  is  manifest from these statutory  provisions  that  the consequences   of   the  revision  of   valuation   and   of cancellation  of valuation are different.  Under s. 147  the revised  valuation is to date back from the commencement  of the period of valuation and is to continue in force for  the entire  period  of 6 years for which the revaluation  is  to remain  in force, but when a valuation is cancelled  on  the ground of an irregularity, the Executive Officer may, at any time  during the currency of the period of valuation,  again value  the premises under s. 131 (2) (b) and such  valuation shall be in force and the consolidated rate shall be  levied according  to  it  only for the unexpired  portion  of  such period. On behalf of the appellant-company the Additional Solicitor- General put forward the argument that the present case  fell within  the purview of s. 131 (2) (a) and as the  period  of revaluation  commencing  from  July  1,  1949  was   already complete the authorities of the Calcutta Corporation have no power  to make a fresh revaluation under s. 131.(2)  (b)  of the  Act.  The contrary view was presented on behalf of  the respondent-Cor-poration by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri and it  was contended that the present case falls within the purview  of s.  147 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 and the  revised valuation  will  relate back, tinder that  section,  to  the commencement  of  the,  period of valuation  and  will  take effect  for  the entire period of 6 years during  which  the valuation  remained in force.  In my opinion,  the  argument put forward on behalf of the respondents must be accepted as correct.   In  the present case the valuation has  not  been finally  set  aside either by the  Presidency  Small  Causes Court or by the High Court in appeal.  The order of the High Court  is that the valuation should be set aside because  it was not made on the basis of s. 127(a) which was the  proper sub-section  to be applied.  The High Court accordingly  set aside  the  valuation and ha-, remanded the  matter  to  the Presidency  Small  Causes  Court for  ascertainment  of  the annual  value under s. 127(a) after allowing the parties  to give  such further evidence as they choose.  It is  manifest that the valuation has not yet been finally determined;  the matter is still 558 awaiting final adjudication.  It is, therefore, not  correct to  say that there has been a cancellation of the  valuation within  the  meaning  of  s. 131 (2)  (b)  of  the  Calcutta Municipal  Act, 1923.  I am on the contrary, of the  opinion that  the  case  falls under the purview of s.  147  of  the Municipal  Act,  1923  and the present case  is  a  case  of

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revision of the valuation within the meaning of that section and the revised valuation when finally determined will  take effect  retrospectively from the point of time mentioned  in that  section.   In my opinion,  the  Additional  Solicitor- General is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case. It  was then contended on behalf of the appellant  that  the order  of remand made by the High Court was illegal  because it  was  beyond  the  scope of the  objection  made  by  the appellant under s. 139 of the Calcutta Municipal Act,  1923. It was contended that the appellant has objected only to the basis  of  the  valuation  and  not  to  the  quantum   and, therefore,  the order of remand made by the High  Court  was not  in  accordance  with law. I am unable  to  accept  this argument  as correct.  The objection made by  the  appellant under  s. 139 was an objection to the valuation made by  the respondent and whatever be the ground of the objection,  the primary object of the appellant was to get the valuation set aside.  Before the Deputy Commissioner the objection of  the appellant  was both in regard to the quantum and the  method of valuation and the appellant actually succeeded in getting the  amount  of  valuation  reduced  to  a  certain  extent. Against  the order of the Deputy Commissioner the  appellant filed  an appeal to the Presidency Small Causes Court  under s.  141 of the Calcutta Municipal Act.  Section  142  states that "every valuation made by the Executive Officer under s. 131  shall,  subject to the provisions of ss. 139,  140  and 141,  be final.  It is manifest that the  subject-matter  of the appeal before the Presidency Small Causes Court and also before  the High Court was the question of valuation of  the disputed  premises and not merely in regard to the basis  on which the valuation was to be made.  I am, therefore, unable to  accept the argument on behalf of the appellant that  the order  of remand made by the High Court is beyond the  scope of its appeal. I  am, however, of the opinion that the directions given  by the  High  Court in the judgment under appeal  require  same modification.   In  the operative part of the  judgment  the learned Judges have stated :               "Since  it is the duty of the  Corporation  of               Calcutta to determine the annual’ value at the               initial stage and               559               since  no such determination or  ascertainment               has   as  yet  been  lawfully  made   by   the               Corporation  of Calcutta, we direct  that  the               Corporation of Calcutta shall, after remand in               the  first instance, state in  writing  before               the learned Judge of the Calcutta Small Causes               Court  the valuation ascertained by  it  under               section  127(a) of the Act of 1923.   On  such               statement being made, the assessee shall be at               liberty to amend its ground of appeals in such               manner   as  it  likes.   If   the   amendment               introduced brings the case under item 2 of the               Notification  of  July 3, 1937,  the  assessee               shall  have the liberty to put in the  deficit               Court fee, if any, at all.  The learned  Judge               of  the  Small Causes Court  shall  allow  the               parties  to adduce such evidence as  they  may               like and then determine the cases on  evidence               already on record and such further evidence as               may be adduced." I consider that the direction given in this paragraph should be  set aside and in its place there should be an order  for

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remanding the case to the Presidency Small Causes Court  for ascertainment  by  itself  of the  annual  value  under  the provisions of s. 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act,  1923 after giving the parties adequate opportunity to adduce such evidence  as they may like.  Subject to this modification  I would dismiss the appeals with costs.                            ORDER In  accordance with the majority judgment, the  appeals  are allowed.  Corporation will pay the costs of these appeals. 560