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PETITIONER: MARIYAPPA & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/02/1998

BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T M.JAGANNADHA RAO.J.      Leave granted.      The appellants  have  filed  this  appeal  against  the judgment of  the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Appeal Nos. 8451-53 of  1996 dated  11.6.1997 by  which, the  High Court dismissed the Writ appeals and confirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos. 23657 to 23659 of 1992 dated  23.7.1996. In  so doing, the High Court followed the judgment  of a Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1821 of 1995 dated  10.6.1997 (Iswarappa  & Another  Vs. The  Deputy Commissioner, Dharwar & Others) whereby the judgment in Writ petition No. 16302 of 1987 dated 23.3.1995 was affirmed.      The point concerns the applicability of Section 11-A of the Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (hereinafter  called  the Central  Act,  1984)  for  the  purposes  of  the  Karnataka Acquisition of  land for  House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Karnataka Act, 1972) (Act 18 of 1973). Appellants contend  that   the  new   Section  11-A   is  attracted  to proceedings for  land acquisition  under the  Karnataka Act, 1972 while  the respondents contend that the Section 11-A is not so  attracted. The  High Court  has held,  in the  above decisions  that   Section  11-A  is  not  attracted  to  the karnataka Act, 1972. Facts:      We shall refer to the facts. The appellants claim to be tenants in  regard to  Survey No. 11, Thyamagondalu village, Nelamangala Taluk,  of an  extent of 10 acres 27 guntas. The said land was endowed to Sri Rama Devaru. Under Section 5 of the Karnataka  Land Reforms  Act, 1961, the Land Tribunal is said to have conferred occupancy rights on the appellants on 27.8.1975, Some  issues regarding  cancellation of  the  3rd appellant’s right are said to be still pending. Notification dated 19.12.83 under section 3(1) of the Karnataka Act, 1972 was  published   in  the   gazette  on   9.2.84.  Thereafter notification under section 3(4) was published in the gazette on  14.3.85.  On  17.6.85,  the  3rd  appellant  filed  Writ Petition No.  9079 of  1985 and  stay of  dispossession  was granted on  1.7.1985. Appellants  1 & 2 filed Writ Petitions and similar  orders were  passed on  8.7.85 and 9.7.1985. On

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31.7.90, Writ  petition of  3rd appellant  was dismissed. On 1.2.91, Writ  petitions  of  appellants  1  &  2  were  also dismissed. Thereafter,  fresh Writ Petition Nos. 23657 to 59 of 1992  were filed  on 10.1.1992  and stay of dispossession was again  granted on  1.2.1992 provided that possession was not  taken.   On  23.7.96,  the  said  writ  petitions  were dismissed by  the learned  Single Judge. In the Writ Appeals Nos. 8451-53,  the Court  again ordered  on 30.9.96  stay of dispossession.  On   11.6.1997,  the   Writ   appeals   were dismissed. In case it is to be held that Section 11-A of the Central Act,  1894 is  to be  applied to  the Karnataka Act, 1972, even  if the  period of  stay orders  is excluded. the position is that the 2 years period specified in Section 11- A has expired inasmuch as till now no award has been passed. The appellants are said to be in possession still.    The High Court holds section 11-A not applicable because of doctrine of incorporation’ :      The acquisition  here is under the karnataka Act, 1972. The contention  of the appellants in the High Court is that, because of  section 5  of the  karnataka  Act  adopting  the Central Act  of  1984  in  certain  respects,  section  11-A introduced in  the Central Act in 1984 is applicable and the proceedings must be deemed to have lapsed.      The Division  Bench of  the High Court has followed its earlier  Judgment   in  Iswarappa   &  Another   Vs.  Deputy Commissioner  &   others  (W.A.  No.  1821  of  1995)  dated 10.6.1997 and  held that  section 11-A  of the  Central Act, 1894 cannot  be read  into the  Karnataka Act, 1972, even if the award  was not  passed within  2 years  as stipulated in section 11-A.  The High Court, after referring to sections 3 and 4 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 observed :      "The provisions of sections 3 and r      appear to  be self-contained so far      as the procedure for acquisition of      the   land    is   concerned.   The      provisions of  the Central Act 1 of      1894  have   been  made  applicable      apparently  for   the  purpose   of      determination of the amount payable      in  respect  of  the  land  acquire      under the provisions of the Act and      for making reference to the Court."      The High  Court referred  to section 5 of the Karnataka Act of  1972, which stated that the procedure of the Central Act in respect of inquiry and award by the Dy. Commissioner, the reference  to Court, the apportionment of amount and the payment of amount, applied. Then the High Court observed:      "Such  an  adoption  in  the  legal      sense  of  the  term  is  known  as      legislation     by      referential      incorporation....    Perusal     of      Section 5  however  does  not  show      that the  Central Act  was  adopted      generally with respect to a subject      as genus. As already held, the said      act was adopted by reference to the      statute as  it existed  at the time      of incorporation.  The Central  Act      was adopted, as noted earlier, upto      1961 and  not onwards. Section 11-A      of   the    Act   was    admittedly      incorporated vide  Act  No.  69  of      1984, much  less after the adoption      of the Central Act No. 1/1984".      The High  Court  then  observed  that  this  aspect  is

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covered by  a decision  rendered by the same Court under the Karnataka Development  Act,  1976  in  Krishna  Moorthy  Vs. Bangalore  Development   Authority  (ILR  1996  Karn.  1258) wherein after  referring to  the principle of incorporation, it was  held that  section 11-A  was not  attracted  to  the acquisition under  that Act. The high Court has applied that judgment to  the present  case which  has arisen  under  the Karnataka Act, 1972. In Iswarappa’s case, the High Court has also held  that the  purposes of the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Central  Act, 1894 are different, they are meant to deal with different  situations and  they have provided different modes of  vesting of  the acquired  land in the State. Under the Karnataka  Act, a  house site  vests in the State on the publication of  the notification  under Section 3(5) of that Act whereas land acquired under Central Act, 1894 vests only when the  Collector makes  an award under Section 11 and not otherwise. The  provisions of the special law i.e. Karnataka Act, 1972  prevail over  provisions of  a general law on the subject the  Central  Act. 1894. On the above reasoning, the High Court  in Iswarappa’s  case has held that the principle of   incorporation’ applies  and that  section 11-A  of  the Central Act,  1894 cannot  be read  into the  Karnataka Act, 1972. The  said judgment under appeal. It is the correctness of the above view that falls for consideration before us. Contentions of parties in this Court :      Learned counsel for the respondents-State contends that the Karnataka Act being an Act of 1972, the applicability of the provisions  of the  Central Act, 1894 as modified by the Land Acquisition  (Karnataka Extension  and Amendment)  Act, 1961  (hereinafter   called  the  Karnataka  Act,  1961)  is restricted to  what is  specifically stated  in the  body of Section  5   of  the  Karnataka  Act,  1972  and,  therefore amendments to  the Central  Act of  1894 subsequent to 1961, such as Section 11-A introduced in 1984 are not attracted to the Karnataka Act. 1972.      On the  other hand,  learned counsel for the appellants contends that  Section 11-A introduced into the Central Act, 1894 in  1984 has  also to  be read  into the Karnataka Act, 1972 for the following reasons : (i)  the  words  ‘mutatis  mutatis’  in  section  5  of  the    Karnataka Act,  1972  have  the  effect  of  bringing  in    subsequent changes  of the  Central Act,  1894  into  the    karnataka Act, 1972. (ii) the  Central Act, 1894 is not merely "incorporated" but      it  is   referred  to  in  section  5  as  a  piece  of      referential                                legislation. (iii) even  assuming that the Central Act was "incorporated"      into the  Karnataka Act,  1972, the  case on hand would      fall within  the following well known exceptions to the      said principle, namely,      (a) Karnataka  Act, 1972  does  not  contain  the  full      machinery for  being treated as a complete code and has      to  depend   on  the   Central  Act,   1894  for  being      functional, so  far as  (i) inquiry,  (ii) award, (iii)      reference  (iv)   appointment  and   (v)   payment   of      compensation, are concerned. The provisions of the 1972      act and  the Amendments  introduced by the 1961 Act are      not sufficient  to make the 1972 Act a complete code by      itself.      (b) Karnataka  Act, 1972  and the Central Act, 1894 are      supplemental to each other.      (c) Both  the Acts  are pari  materia inasmuch  as  the      subject matter  of 1972  Act could  have otherwise come      within the  ambit of  the Central  Act.  1894  and  the      Karnataka Act,  1972 does  not deal  with  any  subject

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    other than  acquisition of land.      The Karnataka  Act, 1972:  contains only seven sections and no machinery for inquiry etc:      We shall initially refer to the provisions contained in the karnataka Act, 1972.      It is  an Act  "to provide for acquisition of lands for grant of house sites to weaker sections of the people of the State". The  preamble says:  "whereas  it  is  expedient  to provide for the acquisition of lands for the public purposes of granting  house sites to weaker sections of the people in the State  and for  purposes connected  therewith".  Section 2(2) defines   notification’ as  the notification  published in the gazette. Section 2(3) defines    weaker sections’  as belonging  to   scheduled  Castes   and  Tribes,   ‘landless labourers’ and  such other classes of persons to be notified depending  on  their  economic  backwardness.  Section  2(4) defines   land’ and      person interested’  as  having  the same meaning  given to  those words in the Central Act, 1894 as amended  by the Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961.      Section 3 deals with     acquisition   of   land’   and corresponds to  section 4(1) of the Central Act, 1894. Under Section 3(1)  if the State Government is of opinion that any land is required for the purpose of providing house sites to the weaker sections of people who are house-less, that State Government may, by notification give notice of its intention to acquire  such  land.  Section  3(2)  requires  the  State Government to  serve notice  on the  owner  or  occupier  or persons known  to be  interested in the land, to show cause, within 30  days of  service, why  the  land  should  not  be acquired. Section  3(3) states  that after  considering  the causes, if  any, shown and after giving an opportunity to be heard, the  Government may  pass such order as it deems fit. Section 3(4)  which  corresponds  to  section  6(1)  of  the Central Act,  1894 states that the Government shall, in case it decides  to acquire, issue a declaration by notification. Under Section  3(5), on  such  declaration  being  published under Section  3(4)   the land  shall vest absolutely in the State Government  free from  all encumbrances. Under Section 3(6), once  the land  is so  vested under  Section 3(5), the Government may,  by notice  in writing, order any person who may be  in possession  to surrender  or  deliver  possession thereof to  the Government  or any  person  duly  authorized within 30  days. Section 3(7) permits possession to be taken by Government,  if the occupant does not surrender the land. Section 4 of the Act deals with "Amount payable". It will be noticed that  to some  extent the  above provisions  deviate from the corresponding provisions of the Central Act, 1894.      We are  mainly concerned  with Section 5. It deals with "Application of Central Act 1 of 1894" and reads as follows:      "Section 5:  Application of Central      Act 1  of 1894:  The provisions  of      the  Land   Acquisition  Act,  1894      (Central Act  1 of 1894) as amended      by the  land Acquisition (Karnataka      Extension and  Amendment) Act, 1961      shall,  mutatis  mutatis  apply  in      respect of enquiry and award by the      Deputy Commissioner,  the reference      to  Court,   the  apportionment  of      amount and  the payment  in respect      of  Land   acquisition  under  this      Act."      Section 6  deals with  power  of  State  Government  to delegate its  powers (except those under Section 7). Section

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7 deals  with rule  making power  and laying the same before the legislative.      From the above, it will be seen that the Karnataka Act, 1972 contains  only seven  sections and  that  it  does  not contain any  independent machinery  or  provisions  for  the purpose of  inquiry, reference,  award and apportionment and payment of compensation. Section 5 of Karnataka Act, 1972 speaks of amendments to the Central Act, 1894 by the Karnataka Act 1961:      Section 5  of the  Karnataka Act,  1972  refer  to  the application of  the Central  Act, 1894  as  amended  by  the Karnataka Act,  1961. These amendments concern the following section of  the Central Act, 1894 - Sections 1(2), Section 3 (aa), (d),  (e), (ee),  (f), proviso  (iii)  (g),  (b);  (1) 4(1A), 4(2),  (3) (4, 5-5A(1), (2), (6) (1A), (2) - (Section 8 is  omitted), 9(2), (3),(4), 10(1), addition of proviso to 11, 12(1)  (2), 12-A,  15-a, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,  26(2), 27(2),  28, 30-A,  34, 35  (1A)  (1B)  (ii), 35(2), 37-A,  45, 46,  50, 54.  We are  not referring to the details of  these amendments  except to  say  that  the  Dy. Commissioner replaces  the Collector,  certain extra details are to  be given in Sections 4, 6 notifications, the Section 4(1) notification  has  also  be  served  on  the  owner  or occupier, report on Section 5-A inquiry is to be approved by the Government,  the State  Government may  revise  the  Dy. Commissioner’s orders, application for reference to Court is to be made within 90 days of service of notice under section 12(2) and the Dy. Commissioner is to make a reference to the Civil Court  in 90 days failing which the affected party can directly move  the civil  Court. In Section 24 certain other factors are introduced for determining market value. Section 28 and 34 are amended fixing a rate of interest of 5% rather than 6%.  There are  a few  other amendments  which are  not material in the present context.      It will  be noticed  that for purposes of the Karnataka Act, 1972  the provisions  in the Central Act (as amended by the Karnataka  Act, 1961) apply in respect of inquiry, award by the  Dy. Commissioner,  in respect  of the  procedure for reference to  a Civil Court and an adjudication by the Civil Court on  the question of compensation and apportionment. On these aspects,  there are  -  as  pointed  out  earlier,  no provisions in the Karnataka  Act, 1972. Do the words   mutatis mutatis’ in Section 5 bring in the latter Central amendments into the Karnataka Act. 1972?      One of  the submissions  for  the  appellant  was  that Section 5 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 states that the Central Act, 1894 (as amended by Karnataka Act, 1961) shall, mutatis mutatis, apply  in respect  of enquiry  and award by the Dy. Commissioner, the  reference to  Court, the apportionment of amount and  the payment  of amount  and that  therefore  the subsequent amendments  in 1984 to the Central Act, 1894 have to be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972.      The words      mutatis mutatis’  have been explained by this Court in M/s Ashok Service Centre Vs. State of Orissa- 1983 (2) SCC 82. It was stated by Venkataramiah, J, (as he then was):      "Ear 1  Jowitt’s The  Dictionary of      English Law (1959) defines    mutat      is mutatis’ as      with  necessary      changes  in   points   in   detail,      meaning that  matters or things are      generally  the   same,  but  to  be      altered  when   necessary,  as   to      names, offices  and  the  like.....      Extension of an earlier Act mutatis

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    mutatis to  a later  Act, brings in      the idea of adaptations, but so for      only as  it is  necessary  for  the      purpose making  an  change  without      altering the  essential  nature  of      the  things   changed  subject   of      course to  express provisions  made      in the later Act".      If, therefore, the words      mutatis  mutatis’  merely permit the application of the Central Act, 1894 (as modified by Karnataka  Act, 1961)  with necessary changes and without altering the  essential nature of the thing changed then the said principle  is applicable to the Central Act, 1894 as it stood  in   1972  with  the  amendments  brought  about  the Karnataka  Act,  1961.  Therefore  the  contention  for  the appellant that  subsequent changes  made in  the Central Act after 1972  also get into the karnataka Act, 1972, cannot be accepted. That  question  again  depends  upon  whether  the Central Act, 1894 has been    incorporated’     into     the Karnataka Act,  1972 or  falls within  the exceptions to the said principle  or whether  Section 5  is to be treated as a pice of   referential legislation’. Incorporation of  referential legislation  and exceptions to Incorporation -     supplemental legislation-’      As the  case before  us, as  we shall  presently  show, falls within the    exception’ to the rule of     incorporat ion’, we shall refer to the relevant rulings in this behalf.      The leading  case in  which the  broad principles  were laid down  is the one in State of M.P. Vs. M.V. Narasimhan - 1975 (2) SCC 377. On a consideration of the case-law, it was stated by Fazal Ali, J. as follows:      "Where     a     subsequent     Act      incorporates   provisions    of   a      previous  Act,  then  the  borrowed      provisions become  an integral  and      independent part  of the subsequent      Act and  are totally  unaffected by      any  repeal  or  amendment  in  the      previous   Act.   This   principle,      however,  will  not  apply  in  the      following cases:      (a) Where  the subsequent  Act  and      the previous  Act are  supplemental      to each other.      (b) Where  the two Acts are in pari      materia.      (c)  Where  the  amendment  in  the      previous Act,  is not imparted into      the  subsequent   Act  also,  would      render the  subsequent  Act  wholly      unworkable and ineffectual; and      (d)  Where  the  amendment  of  the      previous Act,  either expressly  or      by  necessary  intendment,  applies      the   said    provisions   to   the      subsequent Act."      In that  case, the  position was that the Prevention of Corruption  Act,  1947  adopted  the  definition  of  public servant from  Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code , Question was whether  the subsequent amendments made in 1958 and 1964 to section  21 of the Penal Code enlarging the definition of public servant’,  could  be  read  into  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act,  1947. Though  it was held that the 1947 Act dealt with  a specific offence of criminal misconduct, while the Penal  Code dealt  with bribery’  and were  not in  pari

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materia still,  it  was  held  that  having  regard  to  the preamble and  object of  the prevention  of Corruption  Act, 1947 and  the Penal  code, there  could be no doubt that the former Act  was undoubtedly  a statute  supplemental to  the latter. hence  it was  held that  the amendments of 1958 and 1964 in  the I.P.C.  should be  read into  the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1947, as  the case  fell within  one of the exceptions to the principle of incorporation’.      Similarly,  in   Western  Coalfields  Ltd.  Vs.  S.A.D. Authority [1982  (1) SCC  125], Section  69(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (Act 23/73) stated that the  special Area  Development Authority under that Act would, for  the purpose  of taxation have the powers which a Municipal Corporation  or a  Municipal Council has under the M.P.  Municipal   Corporation  Act,   1956   or   the   M.P. Municipalities Act,  1961, as  the case may be. Chandrachud, C.J. gave  two reasons  as to  why the subsequent amendments made in  the 1956  and 1961 Acts could be read into the 1973 Act. One   reason  was that  the Act  of 1973  did  not,  in Section 69(d),  incorporate any  particular provision of the 1956 and 1961 Act but said that for the      purposes     of taxation’ the  Authority  shall  have  the  powers  which  a Municipal Corporation  or a  Municipal  Council  would  have under the  1956 and  1961  Acts  respectively.  It  was  not therefore a  case where  merely some  provisions of  one Act were bodily  lifted into  another. The other reason was that the 1973  Act did  not provide  for any independent power of taxation or any machinery of its own for the exercise of the power of taxation. Further, the three Acts were supplemental to each other.      Ujagar Prints  Vs. Union of India [1989 (3) SCC 488] is again a  similar case.  Under Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties of  Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 it was said  that the provisions of the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944  and  rules  made  thereunder  -  including  those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty - shall, so far as may  be, apply  in relation to the levy and collection of the additional  duties as they apply in relation to the levy and collocating  of  the  duties  of  excise  on  the  goods specified in  sub-section (1). Now section 3(1) provided for levy and collection of additional duties in respect of goods described in  the First  Schedule to the 1957 Act which were produced or    manufactured’ in  India. It was held that the definition of the term   manufacture’ enacted in the Central Excise and  Salt Act,  1944 - as enlarged by Amendment Act 6 of 1980  - had to be read into the 1957 Act. It was observed that the Additional Duties Act, 1957 was merely supplemental to the  1944 Act.  While the 1944 Act imposed a general levy of excise  duty on  all goods manufactured and produced, the aim of  the 1957  Act was  to  supplement  the  levy  by  an additional duty  of the same nature on certain goods. Unlike the Finance Act, the 1957 Act was incomplete as to the basis of the  charge  and  its  provisions  would  become  totally unworkable unless the concepts of  manufacture’ and    asses sable’ value  as determined  under the 1944 Act were carried into it.      Yet another  case where  the legislation  was  held  by itself to be   unworkable’ and  supplemental to  another Act is the  one in State of Kerala Vs. M/s. Attesee [1989 suppl. (1) SCC  733]. It was there held that the scope of exemption under the head      cotton fabrics’  in schedule  III item 7 of the  Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 would depend upon the definition  in item  19 of  Schedule I to Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 with reference to its amendments upto the relevant date.  hence it was held that the amendments to the

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Central Act were to be read into the Kerala Act.      Two other  rulings  of  this  Court  relating  to  land acquisition and  which arose  from Karnataka are relevant in this context.  In the  State of  Karnataka,  there  are  two statutes,- the  Mysore Improvement Act, 1903 and the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945. In each of these Acts there is a  provision (Section  23 in the former and Section 27 in the latter)  stating that  the  acquisition  under  the  Act "shall be  regulated by  the provisions,  so far as they are applicable, of  the Mysore  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894" and also by  certain other provisions of these Acts. (The Mysore Act of  1894 and the Central Act 1894 are almost identical). Now both  these Acts  of 1903  and 1945 contained provisions which require  compensation to be paid with reference to the second notification which publishes the      declaration’ (i.e. corresponding  to Section  6 of the Central Act, 1894) and not  the one  which corresponds  to  Section  4  of  the Central Act.  However in  1927, the  Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894  was amended  by directing compensation to be paid with reference  to the  first notification (corresponding to Section 4  (1) of  the Central  Act). Question  arose in two cases, one  under each of these Acts, as to whether the said amendment of 1927 would have to be read into the said Acts.      Now so  far as  the Bangalore Act of 1945 is concerned, the  case  was  decided  in  Land  Acquisition  Officer  Vs. H.Narayaniah  [1976  (4)  SCC  9].  This  case  presents  no difficulty because  the said  Act was  passed in 1945 and by that, the  Mysore Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 already stood amended in 1927. The reference in Section 27 of the 1945 Act to the  Mysore Act  of 1894 therefore obviously included all the amendments  made to  the Mysore Land Acquisition 1894 by 1945  including   the  one  made  in  1927  and,  therefore, compensation was  to paid only as per the first notification (i.e. the  one corresponding  to Section 4(1) of the Central Act).      The case  more in  point is  the one  in  Special  Land Acquisition Officer Vs. P. Govindan [1976 (4) SCC 697] which dealt with the Mysore Act of 1903 because the question there was whether  the subsequent  amendment of 1927 to the Mysore Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  shifting the  relevant date for fixing  compensation   from  the   corresponding  Section  6 notification to  Section 4(1) notification, would have to be read into the Mysore Act, 1903. It was held that it should - notwithstanding certain  obiter observation  to the contrary in Naravanaih’s  case. The  provision in  section 23  of the Mysore Act, 1903 read as follows:      "Section   23    The   acquisition,      otherwise than by agreement of land      within or  without the  city  under      this Act, shall be regulated by the      provisions,  so  far  as  they  are      applicable,  of   the  Mysore  Land      Acquisition Act  1894  and  by  the      following    further    provisions,      namely,....."      It was  held by  this Court that the amendments in 1927 to the  Mysore Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 have  to be read into the Mysore Act, 1903. The decision of the Full Bench of the Mysore  High Court  to the  contrary in  Venkatamma  Vs. Special Land  Acquisition Officer, [AIR 1972 Mysore 193] was overruled. In that context Beg J. (as he then was) observed:      "If Section  23(1) of  the (Mysore)      Acquisition Act  (1903) lays  down,      as  we  think  it  does,  the  only      procedure for award of compensation

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    it has  to be followed as it exists      at   the    time   of   acquisition      proceedings. No  one has  a  vented      right in a particular procedure. It      is a fair interpretation of Section      23 of  the Mysore  Act of  1903  to      hold that  it means  that whichever      may be  the procedure  there,  with      regard   to    matters   regulating      compensation  under   the  (Mysore)      Acquisition Act  (1894) at the time      of  acquisition  proceedings,  will      apply  to   acquisition  under  the      Mysore Act, (1903)"....      "It was  enough  to  lay  down,  as      Section 23 of the Mysore Act (1903)      does, that  the  general  procedure      found in the Acquisition Act (1894)      will apply  except to the extent it      was inapplicable.  This means  that      amendments of  the procedure in the      Acquisition Act,  (1894) will apply      if it  is capable  of  application"      (words in brackets supplied).      From the  above passage (words in brackets supplied) is clear that  when the mysore act, 19903 adopted the procedure under the Mysore Act, 1894, the provisions of the latter Act as they stood "at the time of acquisition" had to be applied for  regulating’ the  acquisition of  land under  the Mysore Act, 1903.  This was  because the Mysore Act, 1903 said that the "general  procedure" under  the Mysore Act, 1894 applied except to the extent it was inapplicable.      In our  view, the  above rulings of this Court are more in point  and are  directly applicable to the Karnataka Act, 1972. But,  before we  draw our  final  conclusions,  it  is necessary to refer to three more rulings, one decided by the Privy Council  and two  decided by  this Court  recently and state   why,   in   our   opinion,   those   decisions   are distinguishable.      The decision  of  the  Privy  Council  is  the  one  in Secretary of  State Vs.  Hindustan Coop.  Society Ltd.  [AIR 1931  PC   148].  There   the  provisions  of  the  Calcutta Improvement Act,  1911 (Act 13/1911) fell for consideration. That Act  coupled with its schedule contained provisions not only  for   issuing  relevant   notification  in  regard  to acquisition but also for reference to a Tribunal for passing an award relating to compensation. By Act 18 of 1911 a right of appeal  was given  to the High Court against the Award of the Tribunal.  Under the  Act, there was no further right of appeal to  the Privy Council. In 1921, the Central Act, 1894 was amended  in two  respects, one  by  introducing  Section 26(2) which  deemed the  award  of  the  reference  Court  a decree’ and  the  reasons  a  Judgment’  and  the  other  an amendment in  Section 54  of the  Central Act, 1894 giving a right of  appeal to the Privy Council from any decree passed by the  High Court from an award of the reference Court. Now the Calcutta  Act, 1911  contained a provision in Section 69 that the  "Board may acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for carrying out the purposes of the Act". Section 70 related  to the  constitution of a Tribunal - as detailed in Section  72 - for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Board under the land Acquisition Act, 1894. However, Section 71 modified the Central Act, 1894 as follows:      "Section 71:  Modification of  Land

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    Act,  1894:   For  the  purpose  of      acquiring land  under the  said Act      for the Board -      (a) the  Tribunal shall (except for      the purpose  of Section  54 of that      Act) be deemed to be the Court, and      the President of the Tribunal shall      be deemed  to be  the Judge,  under      the said Act.      (b) the  said act  shall be subject      to   the    further   modifications      indicated in the schedule.      (c).....      (d) the award of the Tribunal shall      be deemed  to be  the award  of the      Court under  the  Land  Acquisition      Act, 1894." The modification  made by  section 71 (a) was crucial to the case.      Section 77 referred to the passing of the    award’  by the Tribunal  under the  provisions of  the Land Acquisition Act 1894,  for determining  the compensation, apportionment, etc.      The appellant,  the Secretary  of State, contended that the appeal to the Privy Council lay because the amendment to the Central  Act in 1921 by substituting Section 26(2) which deemed the award’ a decree’ had to be read into the Calcutta Act, 1911  and if  that was  done, then an appeal would lie, under Section  54 of  the Central  Act, 1894  to  the  Privy Council. The  respondents contended  that such a telescoping of Section  26(2) of the Central Act, 1894 into the Calcutta Act, 1911 would be repugnant to the express words in Section 71(a): "except  for the  purposes of Section 54 of the Act". The said  contention of  the respondents was accepted by the privy Council.  Their   Lordships also  Lord Wrenbury  in Ex parte St.  Sepulchre (1864)  [33 L.J. Ch. 372] to the effect that it  will not  be possible  to read the provisions of an earlier Act into a latter Act, if the earlier Act      "gives in itself a complete rule on      the subject matter"      It was  also observed  that the  provision  in  Section 70(a) of  the  Calcutta  Act,  1911  deliberately  excluding Section 54 of the Central Act, 1894 was      "an   indication   of   the   local      legislature’s intention  that there      should be,  under the  special Code      applicable   to   the   Improvement      Trust, no  appeals beyond  the High      Court".      In  other  words,  two  reasons  were  given  by  their lordships as  to why  section 26(2) of the Central Act, 1894 could not  be read into the Calcutta Act, 1911. One was that reading Section  26(2) of  the Central  Act, 1894  into  the Calcutta Act,  1911 would  be repugnant  to Section 70(a) of the Calcutta  Act, 1911  which expressly excluded Section 54 of the  Central Act,  1894 from  the purview of the Calcutta Act. The  other was  that  such  telescoping  would  not  be permissible  if   the  latter   statute  which,  in  certain respects, referred  to an  earlier statute,  was otherwise a complete Code  by itself.  This is  clear from the fact that the Calcutta Act, 1911 Contains 177 sections and a schedule, Chapter  III   relates  to   schemes  and   publication   of notifications in  that behalf  and  Chapter  IV  deals  with acquisition and  disposal of  land containing sections 68 to 81; among  these, section  70 deals  with reference  to  the

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Tribunal: Section  77 deals  with passing  of award  by  the Tribunal; Section  71(b) and  the Schedule to the Act (which contains 14  clauses) deals with various matters relating to notifications as  well as  fixation of  market value. On the other hand,  we have no such elaborate machinery provided in the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Act has only seven sections. The Karnataka  Act does  not contain  any separate procedure for inquiry,  award not does it constitute a Tribunal in the place of  the reference Court as done by the Calcutta Act of 1911. That  is why we are of the view that the Privy Council decision is clearly distinguishable.      The other  two recent  decisions of this Court in Gauri Shankar Vs.  State of  up [1994  (1)   92] and UP Avas Vikas Parishad Vs.  Jainul Islam [1998 (1) Scale 185], both relate to acquisition  under the  UP Avas  Vikas Parishad  Adhinyam 1965. We  shall refer  to the  scheme of  the UP  Act,  1965 Chapter III  of that  Act deals  with formulation of schemes and issue  of notifications  (sections 15  to 49); Chapter V deals with  land acquisition etc. Sections 55 to 63, Chapter VI with  constitution of  Tribunal and its purposes, section 55 of the Act reads as follows:      "Section 55(1):  Any  land  or  any      interest therein  required  by  the      Board for  any of  the purposes  of      this Act, may be acquired under the      provisions of  the Land Acquisition      Act, 1894  (Act No.  1 of  1894) as      amended in its application to Utter      Pradesh,  which   for  the  purpose      shall    be    subject    to    the      modifications  specified   in   the      schedule to this Act".      Section 64 (1) says that the Tribunal shall perform the functions of the reference Court under the Central Act, 1894 as modified  by the  Schedule, in  the matter of determining the compensation.  Section 66  says that  the Award  of  the Tribunal shall,  in case  of land  acquisition under Central Act, 1894  as modified   by the Schedule, be deemed to be an award of  the Court under the Central Act and shall, subject to section  54 of  that Act, be final. Section 67 says award of the  Tribunal shall  be deemed  to be a decree and the UP Act, 1965  contains an elaborate machinery like the Calcutta Act, 1911.      In Gauri  Shankar’s  case,  decided  by  K.Ramaswamy  & Sahai, JJ.  the notifications  for acquisition under Section 28 (1)  were of  the year 1973 while the notifications under Section 32 (1) were of 1977. Before 1948, the Allahabad High Court had taken the view that the notification under Section 32 (1)  corresponding to  declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Central  Act need  not be  issued within  3 years of the notification under  Section 28(1)  corresponding to  section 4(1) of the Central Act. In cases arising after 1948, it was also held  by the Allahabad High Court that Section 11-A was not applicable  to the  UP Act. Gauri Shankar’s case related to the  3 year  rule in  the proviso  to Section  6  of  the Central  Act.   K.Ramaswamy,  J.  held  (para  8)  that  the principle of   incorporation’   applied    and   that    the provisions of  Section 28,  32 of  the UP  Act, 1965  were a separate and complete code, that Section 55 read with clause (2) of  the Schedule,  which contained  the need for issuing the preliminary and final notification under sections 28 and 32 of  the UP  Act, formed an integral scheme (para 25). The Schedule amended  Sections 4,  6, 17  and 23  of the Central Act, 1894. It was pointed out that Section 28(2) and Section 32 (1)  related to  the publication of notifications without

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prescribing any  limitation and  that the UP Act 1965 was "a complete code  in itself". It was also held that the Act was not otherwise  unworkable or  ineffectual, though  it may be incompatible with  the provisos  to Section 6(1) of L.A. Act (para 33).  On the  other hand,  sahai,  J.  held  that  the principle of   incorporation’ did  not  apply  but  that  of facts, it  was not  a fit  case for interference inasmuch as the Parishad  had already  taken possession. In that view of the matter, both the learned Judges directed compensation as on the date when the notification corresponding to Section 6 declaration was issued. We shall next to refer to the recent judgment  in  Jainul  Islam’s  case  where  the  opinion  of K.Ramaswamy, J. was accepted.      The question  which arose  in Jainul Islam’s case [1998 (1) SCALE  185] under  the same  UP Act.  1965  was  whether Section 23(1-A), Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Central Act, 1894  as amended in 1984, were attracted to the UP Act. Approving the  view of  K.Ramaswamy, J.  in Gauri  Shankar’s case [1994  (1) SCC 92], Agrawal, J. held that the principle of   incorporation’  applied   and   therefore   the   above amendments of  1948 to  the Central Act, 1894 did not apply. Reference was  also made  to the  Privy Council  Judgment in Secretary  of  State  Vs.  Hindustan  Cooperative  Insurance Society Ltd.  [AIR  1931  PC  149].  After  considering  the various  provisions  of  the  UP  Act,  1965,  it  was  held (para 21), that provisions of Section 55 and Schedule to the Act were  "on the  same lines"  as  the  provisions  of  the Calcutta Improvement  Act, 1911 and that the principles laid down by the Privy Council were equally applicable. Adverting to the  exceptions referred  to in  State of  M.P. Vs.  M.V. Narasimhan [1975  (2) SCC  377], it was observed that the UP Act, 1965  and the Central Act, 1894 did not come within the exceptions and  that the provisions of the UP Act, 1965 were not supplemental’  to each other, nor was the UP Act in pari materia with  the Central  Act because  it dealt  with other matters which  did not  fall within the ambit of the Central Act. The  UP Act  was self contained and complete . Agrawal, J. observed (para 23) as follows:      "the  Adhinyam  and  the  L.A.  Act      cannot be  regarded supplemental to      each other.  The Adhinyam  contains      provisions regarding acquisition of      land which  are complete  and self-      contained. Nor  can the  provisions      in the  Adhinyam be  said to  be in      pari  materia  with  the  L.A.  Act      because  the  Adhinyam  also  deals      with  matters  which  do  not  fall      within the ambit of the L.A. Act".      In our  view, these  three rulings, namely Secretary of State Vs.  Hindustan Cooperative  Society Ltd.  [AIR 1931 PC 149], Gauri  Shankar’s case  [1994 (1)  SCC 92]  and  Jainul Islam’s   case   [1998   (1)   Scale   185],   are   clearly distinguishable. As  pointed out  earlier the Karnataka Act, 1972 has  only 7  Sections which  deal with  the issuance of notification corresponding  to Sections  4 and  6, and  9 of Central Act and certain other minor modification relating to acquisition and  payment of  compensation. The  Act  has  no provision for  a separate inquiry or award or reference to a Tribunal, or  a machinery  for payment  of   compensation of apportionment. The Central Act, 1894 alone is to apply in so far as it related to     inquiry and award, the reference to Court, the apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect  of lands  acquired under  the Act’. There are no detailed provisions  as in  the Calcutta  Act, 1911 or as in

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the UP Act, 1965.      We are of the view that the Karnataka Act, 1972 clearly comes within the exceptions stated in M.V. Narasimhan’s case for the following reasons:      Firstly there  being no  detailed machinery  whatsoever in   the Karnataka  Act, 1972, that Act cannot be treated as a self-contained  or complete  Code. Secondly, the Karnataka Act, 1972  and the  Central Act,  1894 (as  amended  by  the Karnataka Act,  1961) are  supplemental to  each  other  for unless the  Central Act  supplements the  karnataka Act, the latter cannot  function. Thirdly,  these acts  are  in  pari materia because  the karnataka  Act,  1972    -  unlike  the Calcutta Act, 1911 and the UP Act, 1965 - does not deal with any other  subject but  deals with  the same subject of land acquisition which  otherwise would  have fallen  within  the ambit of  the Central  Act, 1894. For the aforesaid reasons, we are  of the view that the amendments  made in 1948 to the Central Act,  1894 including  Section 11-A  have to  be read into the  Karnataka Act,  1972, so  far as  enquiry,  award, reference to  Court, apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect of land acquired under the Act.      Admittedly, the  prescribed period  under section  11-A has elapsed and it is stated that even now, the award is not passed. Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  conditions  of section 11-A  are violated, and accordingly, the entire land acquisition proceedings  including the  notifications  under section 3(1)  and 3(4)  of the Karnataka Act, 1972 lapse. We declare accordingly.      Before parting  with the  case, we may say that in this appeal we  are concerned  only with  the question    whether section 11-A  as introduced  by the Amendment in 1984 to the Central Act  1894 could be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972 and we  have held  that it should be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972  because  there  is  not  such  provision  in  the Karnataka Act,  1972 as  amended by the Karnataka Act, 1961. The question  as to  the  telescoping  of  other  amendments brought to  the Central  Act, 1894 by the 1984 amendment and the consequential  impact thereof  is not  before us  and we should not be understood as deciding any such matter. If the question of  applicability of any other amendment brought by the Central Act in 1984 to the Karnataka Act, 1972 arises in Karnataka,  such   a  question   may  have   to  be  decided separately.      Further, in  the  impugned  Judgment,  certain  rulings under  the   Bangalore  Development   Act,  1976  have  been followed. We  have gone  by the  provisions of the Karnataka Act, 1972.  We are  not to  be  understood  as  having  said anything with regard to the Bangalore Development Act, 1976. We are  in fact told that some that some appeals are pending in this Court in regard to the said Act of 1976. In the  result, the  appeals are  allowed and it is declared that the  notifications issued  under the  Act under Section 3(1) and Section 3(4) have lapsed.