REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3495 OF 2001

Marabasappa (D) by LRs. & Ors.             .........….. Appellants

versus

Ningappa (D) by LRs. & Ors.        ..............Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. DATTU, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order of the  

High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bangalore,  dated  30th March  1999  in  

R.F.A. No. 385 of 1993, R.F.A. No. 258 (sic.) of 1994 and R.F.A. No.  

775 of 1995 (sic.), wherein the High Court has modified the Decree of  

the  Trial  Court  and  has  held  that  the  properties  described  in  ‘A’  

Schedule to the suit are joint family properties and the parties to the  

suit  are  entitled  for  1/3rd share  in  those  properties.   The  other  

observations and directions of the Court is not relevant for the purpose  

of this appeal.    

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2. The question that is contested by the parties and has fallen for  

our consideration is whether the properties in dispute are the personal  

acquisitions of Parwatevva, or, as held by the High Court, a part of the  

joint family property.  

3. The factual matrix in brief is as follows:-  

Siddappa and Parwatevva got married in 1924 and at the time  

of the marriage, the father of Parwatevva gifted her land in Survey  

No. R.S.  No. 271/1 measuring 8 Acres 16 Guntas under registered  

Gift Deed dated 30th April 1924 [“A7”].  Siddappa, after his marriage,  

continued  to  reside  in  his  in-laws  house.   During  his  life  time,  

Siddappa had no other  source  of  income except  from the tenanted  

lands  which  was  only  a  small  extent  and  was  totally  dry  lands.  

Parwatevva purchased lands in R.S. No. 91 measuring 19 Acres 13  

Guntas under a registered Sale Deed from the income of the land that  

was gifted to her by her father on 5th October, 1944 [A(4) – A(6)].  

Thereafter,  on 2nd June, 1951, with the income from the above two  

lands,  Parwatevva  purchased  another  land  being  R.S.  No.  143  

measuring 28 Acres 23 Guntas [A(8)-A(12)].  Siddappa died in the  

year  1951.   The  couple  had  four  sons  and  one  daughter  –  

Marabasappa  (appellant-defendant),  Ningappa (respondent-plaintiff),  

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Bhimappa  (deceased  –  legal  heirs  are  on  record),  Sangawwa  and  

Channappa (pre-deceased without any heirs).  

4.  In her life time  Parwatevva  relinquished  her  share in R.S. No.  

91  in  favour  of  the  present  appellant  (Marabasappa).  Thereafter,  

subsequent to an oral partition, she gave one part of the other property  

bearing  R.S.  No.  143/1  and  R.S.  No.  143/2  to  the  respondent  

(Ningappa)  and the  heirs  of  Bhimappa  respectively.  In  June  1984,  

Parwatevva  executed  a  will  of  ‘stridhana’  land  to  her  daughter,  

Sangawwa.  Parwatevva died on 08.07.1984. The present dispute is  

between her children and their heirs.  

5. The respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit bearing O.S. No. 40/1990  

before the Court of the Civil Judge, Gadag [hereinafter referred to as  

“the  Trial  Court”],  inter  alia alleging  that  the  entire  property  

mentioned above is the joint family property and the same was not the  

personal property of Parwatevva, and hence, a prayer for partition and  

separate possession of 1/3rd share was made in respect of Schedule ‘A’  

to  ‘C’  properties.   Schedule  ‘A’  properties  consist  of  agricultural  

lands, Schedule ‘B’ properties consist of houses and open places and  

Schedule ‘C’ properties consist of movables of all the properties held  

by  the  defendants-appellants  except  the  plaintiffs’  properties.   The  

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Trial Court negatived this contention of the respondents-plaintiffs on  

the basis of the oral and documentary evidence and found, inter alia,  

that the said properties were self acquired properties of Parwatevva,  

accordingly,  has partly  decreed the suit  in  favour of  the  plaintiffs-

respondents.     

6. Being aggrieved, the parties to the suit preferred Regular First  

Appeals.  The High Court, by the impugned Judgment and Order, set  

aside the Judgment of the Trial Court and took the view that apart  

from the stridhana land, the rest of the property was a part of the joint  

family  property  purchased from the income and funds  of  the  joint  

family property and, therefore, the decree, as sought by the plaintiffs,  

requires  to  be  granted.   Against  this  finding  and  the  conclusion  

reached by the High Court, the appellants-defendants are before us.  

7. Shri. Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel, appears for the appellants  

and  Shri.  Gireesh  Kumar,  learned  counsel,  appears  for  the  

respondents.  

8. The original appellants and respondents have all died during the  

pendency of  the  Suit  and the  Regular  First  Appeal  and their  legal  

representatives have been brought on record with the permission of  

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the Court.  Since, it is a family dispute between the brothers and their  

heirs, it was suggested to the parties through their learned counsel that  

the course of mediation be adopted to settle the dispute. This Court  

[G.S. Singhvi and A.K. Ganguly, JJ.] passed the following order on  

the 9th of December, 2010:

“During  the  midst  of  arguments,  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  agreed  that  their   clients may be given an opportunity to make  an attempt to amicably settle their dispute by  negotiations.

In view of the statement made by the learned   counsel, we direct both the parties to appear  before the Mediation Centre, Karnataka High  Court,  Principal  Bench  at  Bangalore,  on   17.01.2011.

The  Incharge,  Mediation  Centre,  Karnataka  High  Court,  Principal  Bench,  Bangalore,   shall send a report to this Court within next   four weeks.

List the case in the first week of March 2011.”

9.  The learned counsel for the parties has reported to us that there  

is no settlement reached between the parties.

10. Shri. Mahale, learned counsel, submitted that the Trial Court,  

after appreciating the evidence on record, had reached the conclusion  

that  the  properties  in  question  are  the  self  acquired  properties  of  

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Parwatevva. It is submitted that the High Court, while considering the  

evidence on record and the conclusion reached by the Trial Court, has  

erroneously come to the conclusion that the property in dispute is a  

joint family property and therefore, the findings of the High Court are  

perverse and further, the High Court has committed serious error in  

law in holding that the disputed property is a joint family property.  

Shri.  Gireesh  Kumar,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents,  has  

supported the findings of the High Court.  

11.  The sum and substance of the allegations in the suit are that out  

of the tenanted land, 2 Acres, 10 Guntas, late Siddappa acquired all  

the other properties including the land in R.S No. 271/1 and R.S. No.  

91 and R.S. No. 143.  Therefore, all the properties are joint family  

properties, though they stand in the name of Parwatevva.  The Trial  

Court  has relied upon the registered Gift  Deed [Ex. D.60] and has  

come to the conclusion that the property marked A7 was the stridhana  

property of Parwatevva, and by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu  

Succession  Act,  1955 read  with  the  Explanation,  was  the  absolute  

property of Parwatevva and could not be blended in the joint family  

property. The Trial Court, while considering the nature of the lands  

A(4) to A(6), has taken into consideration the certified copy of the  

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sale  deed  in  respect  of  that  land  [Ex.D.8],  and  has  come  to  the  

conclusion  that  there  is  no  evidence  adduced  by  the  respondents-

plaintiffs  to  deny  the  fact  that  the  lands  A(4)  to  A(6)  were  not  

purchased  from  the  independent  income  of  the  Parwatevva,  and  

hence, negatived the contention of the respondents-plaintiffs that the  

lands were joint family property, and has also held that these lands  

were  purchased  by  Parwatevva  from the  income derived  from the  

stridhana lands, i.e., A7.  With regard to the lands A(8) to A(12), the  

Trial Court, relying on the certified copy of the sale deeds of the said  

lands [Ex.D. 45], has again found that there was no proof that the said  

property was acquired out of the income of the joint family property  

as asserted by the respondents-plaintiffs, and concluded that the same  

was purchased from the income derived from the aforementioned two  

properties by Parwatevva.  

12.  The High Court has found fault with the finding of the Trial  

Court and has held:  

“21.  Coming  to  the  properties  said  to  have  been  purchased  in  the  name  of  Parvatewwa  under  the   registered sale deed dated 5-10-1944, twenty years   after the Gift deed, the learned Judge find that R.S.   No. 91 which lands in A(4) to A(6) was purchased   under  Ex.D.  8.  Now  the  reasoning  given  by  the   learned  Judge  that  if  Siddappa  is  the  protected   

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tenant of the said land, there is no reason for him to   purchase  the  said  land  under  Ex.D.  8  cannot  be  appreciated.  In  any  event,  whenever  a  mother  is   there and the properties are purchased in the name  of the mother, the presumption is that it  is for the   benefit  of  the  family.  It  is  nobody’s  case  that  the   lands  purchased  is  for  the  intention  and  for  the   benefit  of  the  mother  alone  and  she  also  did  not   differentiate between her sons and daughters. This is   a  natural  and  human  aspect  which  has  not  been  considered  by  the  trail  court.  The  finding  that   Siddappa  do  no  continued  (sic.)  as  tenant  or  protected  tenant  of  all  the  lands  as  mentioned  in  Ex.P.  20  except  1  acre  20  guntas  of  land  in  R.S.   274/3  and  A(3)  land  in  R.S.  No.:9/3A  is  not   sustainable.  Why  should  valuable  tenancy  rights   given up and then the purchase made in the name of   the  mother  is  not  understandable  nor  it  is  not   explained;  probably  in  confirmation  of  tenancy   rights and make it clear that the properties does not   go out of the family.  The sale is taken in the name of   the mother. Therefore, in my opinion, the purchase  made  by  the  mother  is  only  from  and  out  of  the   income from the family and there is no evidence to   show  that  she  had  any  independent  or  individual   income from the gifted  property  to  purchase these   properties. Therefore, irresistible inference shall be   drawn that  the property purchased in the name of   the mother is for the benefit of all the members of the   family. Now no doubt the plaintiff came forward with   the  case  that  suit  lands  A(4)  to  A(6)  and  A(8)  to  A(12)  were  purchased  from and  out  of  the  family   income and the income from the A(1) to A(3) lands.   But  once  it  is  seen  that  the  1st defendant  was  managing  the  affairs  of  the  family  as  ‘karta’,  the   burden  shifts  on  him  to  prove  that  the  properties   purchased was not for the benefit of the family, but   they were exclusively belong to the mother. In those   days  income  from  3  acres  30  guntas  cannot  be   considered as thin nucleus as has been wrongly held   

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by  the  trial  court.  Having  held  that  applying  the   dictum  in  I.L.R.  1990  Kar  Pg-1182,  the  initial   burden lies upon the plaintiff. But once such burden   is discharged and shifts on the defendant, the trial   court  should  have  considered  that  whether  the   defendant  has proved that  the purchase was made  from  any  other  source  of  income  excepting  the  income  from  A(1)  to  A(3).  In  the  absence  of  any   positive  evidence  spoken  to  by  D.W.  2  or  the   witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant that   the mother was trying to save the property either for   herself  or not for the benefit  of the everybody, the   irresistible conclusion is that the mother is always   mother  and the  properties  purchased in  her  name  shall be the properties of the family. There is a clear   evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the suit lands   in A(1) to A(3) were the basis the income of which   was utilized for acquisition of the lands in A(4) to   A(6) and A(8) to A(12) lands. But the trial court has   relied upon the gift in question and left it not been   considered  on  erroneous  approach.  The  mere  fact   that the mother has the son and ip-so-facto that the  mother is cultivating the land when there admittedly   sons who is professional agriculturist and whether it   is  mother  alone  or  father  himself  cultivating  the  lands; everybody contri-butes (sic.)  their right and  labour to cultivate the land. It is nobody’s case that   Parwatevva  kept  her  income  separately  or  that   income  was  not  occrued  (sic.)  by  the  father   Siddappa. When it is found by the court below that   the plaintiff was only 16 years of age in 1944, and  defendant no. 1 was about 22 or 23 years of age, the   burden should have been shifted to 1st defendant to  explain as to what really happened and what is the   necessity for purchase of the property in the name of   the  mother.  This  has  not  been done.  Having  been   found  that  during  the  lifetime  of  Siddappa,   Parwatevva could not have being (sic.) the karta of   the  family.  That  defendant-1  alone  would  have  become ‘karta’ of the family, the court below ought   

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to have placed the burden on the defendant and the  defendant has not proved or discharged that burden  at all. The learned judge would embarked upon the  surmises and imagination regarding the income and  came to  wrong conclusion  that  the  family  did  not   have nucleus to acquire the properties mentioned in   ‘B’ and ‘C’ Schedule.”

13. As is clear from the above conclusion, the High Court has not  

accepted the findings and conclusion reached by the Trial Court.  The  

High Court has, in our opinion, wrongly shifted the burden of proving  

that  the  said  lands  were  a  part  of  the  self  acquired  property  of  

Parwatevva  and  not  a  part  of  the  joint  family  property  of  the  

appellants-defendants,  when  there  was  no  affirmative  proof  of  

anything contrary.  In our view, the High Court has erred in shifting  

the  burden  of  proof  on  the  appellants-defendants,  especially  when  

there was nothing on record either by way of oral  or  documentary  

evidence produced by the respondents-plaintiffs before the trial court.  

14. The genealogical relation between the parties is not in dispute.  

Propositor Siddappa died in the year 1951 and he was survived by his  

wife Parwatevva, plaintiffs and defendants.  He was the tenant of the  

suit lands A(1) to A(3).  It is claimed that Siddappa had purchased  

lands in R.S. No.91 under a Registered Sale Deed dated 05.10.1944  

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out of the joint family income and funds but in the name of his wife  

Parwatevva.  The lands in R.S. No. 91 is further divided as A(4) to  

A(6).  It is also claimed that lands in R.S. No.143 was purchased out  

of joint family funds in the name of Parwatevva.  These lands are sub-

divided as Serial Numbers A(8) to A(12).  Lands in R.S. No.271/1,  

which was gifted to Parwatevva by her father, was claimed that it got  

blended and treated with the other joint family property.  Marbasappa,  

defendant No.1, being the eldest in the family had applied to the Land  

Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights of tenanted lands A(1) to A(3)  

and  the  same  has  been  granted  in  his  name  and  conferment  of  

occupancy  rights  would  enure  to  the  benefit  of  the  joint  family.  

Plaintiffs  assert  that  the  Suit  Schedule  properties  are  joint  family  

properties  and,  therefore,  the  same  requires  to  be  partitioned  

according  to  their  shares  by  a  decree  of  partition  and  separate  

possession.   The claim of the plaintiffs is  denied by the contesting  

defendants.   Parties  have  led  in  copious  oral  and  documentary  

evidence.

15. At  present,  we  are  mainly  concerned  with  ‘A’  Schedule  

properties.   The  parties  to  the  appeal  have  no  grievance  so  far  as  

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decree  passed  in  respect  of  ‘B’  and  ‘C’  Schedule  properties  are  

concerned.        

16. In so far as lands shown as A(1) to A(3) are concerned, it is  

claimed by the plaintiffs that the propositor Siddappa was a tenant of  

the  lands  and  continued  as  such  till  his  death  in  the  year  1951.  

Thereafter, the HUF continued to be the tenants of the lands and the  

defendant No.1, being the head of the family, had applied for grant of  

occupancy  rights  in  respect  of  those  tenanted  lands  and  the  Land  

Tribunal had granted occupancy rights in his favour.  On the death of  

Siddappa, the tenancy lands A(1) to A(3) were mutated in the name of  

his sons.  It  is claimed that the occupancy rights so granted would  

enure to the benefit of the whole joint family.  Therefore, it is a joint  

family property and requires to be partitioned among the members of  

the joint family.  The defendants have denied that the lands A(1) to  

A(3) are the joint family tenancy lands.   

17. After perusing the records and the order passed by the Land  

Tribunal, Gadag, it appears to us that defendant No. 1 had applied to  

the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights in respect of land in  

Survey No. R.S. No. 9/3A and R. S. No. 274/3 measuring an extent of  

2 Acres and 10 Guntas and 1 Acre and 20 Guntas respectively.  Land  

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Tribunal  had  granted  occupancy  rights  in  favour  of  the  applicant-

defendant No. 1 in respect of the said two lands.  Shri Mahale, learned  

counsel for the appellants, does not contend contrary to the findings  

and conclusion reached by the Trial  Court.   He admits that though  

occupancy rights are granted by the Land Tribunal in the individual  

name of the appellant-defendant No.1, the said occupancy rights enure  

to the benefit of all the members of the Joint family.    

18. Suit Land A(7) bearing R.S. No.271/1 was ‘stridhana’ property  

of Parwatevva.  This property was gifted to her by her father under a  

registered Gift Deed dated 30th April, 1924.  She was the owner of the  

said land.  She continued to be in possession of the said land till she  

bequeathed the same in favour of defendant No.5 under a will dated  

30.06.1984.  On the death of Parwatevva and on the basis of the said  

Will, the legatee-defendant No.5 claims she has become owner of the  

said land. The same has been noted in the Revenue Records.  The Will  

and the Revenue entries made are questioned by the plaintiffs and has  

successfully  proved  that  the  said  Will  was  not  executed  by  

Parwatevva.  Therefore, defendant No.5 cannot claim title over A(7)  

under a Will Ex. D-51.  Accordingly, this property cannot be brought  

into  the  hotchpotch of  the  joint  family  property  and would not  be  

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available for partition.   Stridhana belonging to a woman is a property  

of which she is the absolute owner and which she may dispose of at  

her pleasure, if not in all cases during coverture, in all cases during  

widowhood.  Since the plaintiffs have proved that Parwatevva had not  

alienated  the  property  by  executing  a  Will  in  favour  of  defendant  

No.  5  during her  lifetime,  the  property  is  the  absolute  property  of  

Parvatevva  and  would  not  be  available  for  partition  among  the  

members of joint family since it does not partake the character of joint  

family property.       

19. Now coming to Suit Schedule properties Item No.A(4) to A(6),  

it is the case of the plaintiffs that the said properties were purchased  

by Siddappa, father of the plaintiffs and the defendants under a Sale  

Deed dated 05.10.1944, but, in the name of his wife Parwatevva from  

and  out  of  the  income  of  the  tenancy  lands  A(1)  to  A(3)  for  the  

purpose of the joint family for which he was also the Karta of the  

family.  However, it is the case of the contesting defendants that the  

said property is the self acquired property of Parwatevva from and out  

of her income derived from the property gifted to her by her father in  

the year 1924. The defence that is also put up by the defendants is that  

Siddappa was the tenant of the property A(1) to A(3) only from the  

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year 1947 and, therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim that from out of the  

income of the property A(1) to A(3), lands in item A(4) to A(7) were  

purchased.  It has come in evidence of the contesting defendants that  

propositor Siddappa was the tenant of the lands A(1) to A(3) only  

from the year 1947.  The same is not disputed by the plaintiffs by  

leading  any other  cogent  evidence  to  prove that  Siddappa was the  

tenant of the lands A(1) to A(3) even prior to 1944, the date of the  

Sale Deed.  In the absence of any evidence,  much less cogent and  

reliable evidence, it is difficult to accept the version of the plaintiffs  

that the suit schedule A(4) to A(6) should be put into common hotch  

potch and partitioned by meters and bounds.   

20. We may also notice the observations made by the Trial Court,  

which we also agree, in the course of its judgement.   

“61. Now let us firstly take up A(4) to A(6) lands.   Ex.D.8  is  the  certified   copy  of  the  sale  deed  in   respect  of  said  land,  dated  05-10-1944.   It  is   necessary  to  emphasize  that  according  to  the   plaintiffs,  Shiddappa  was  protected  tenant  of  the   lands  mentioned  therein  as  per  Ex.P.20,  which  pertains to 1947.  They have obviously, not produced   any records, such as R.O.Rs. or mutation entries to  show  that  Shiddappa  was  the  tenant  of  those  11   lands, mentioned in Ex.P.20 even prior to 1947.  It is   essential because, we are assessing the productivity   of  nucleus  as  on  the  date  of  Ex.D.8.   Ex.D.8  is   admittedly of 1944.  Since no document is produced  

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by plaintiffs to show that Shiddappa was the tenant   even prior to 1947 of the lands referred to in Ex.P.20,   it cannot be said that he had no `independent source  of  income  at  the  relevant  time  of  1944  (Ex.D.8).   Evidence on record justified that at the relevant time   of  Ex.D.8,  Parvatewwa  was  already  owner  and  possessor of A(7) land, extent of which is 8 acres 16  guntas.  Excepting this land, the family of the parents   of plaintiff No.1, defendant No.1 and Bheemappa, is   not shown to have had any other source of income.  Hence, it  follows that the land in Ex.D.8 could not   have been acauired at all by Shiddappa, out of his   income,  since  he  is  not  shown  to  have  had  any   income at all.  It is too much to say that the income of   the lands at A(1) to A(3) was the source of income for   acquisition of the lands A(4) to A(6) (Ex.D.8).  This   argument pre-supposes that Shiddappa was a tenant   of  A(1) to A(3) lands even prior to 1944 (Ex.D.8).   Absolutely there is no evidence.  Hence, it cannot be  said  that  Shiddappa  had  purchased  A(4)  to  A(6)   lands, which is land in Ex.D.8, out of the income of   the joint family.  Indeed, he was living in the house of   his parents-in-law with Parvatewwa and Ex.D.60 of   1924 shows that he had no financial strength.  Hence,   I am of the definite opinion that the land in Ex.D.8  must have had been acquired by Parvatewwa out of   the income she had derived from A(7) land.  It cannot   be said and it is not acceptable that Shiddappa had   purchased the land mentioned in Ex.D.8 in the name  of his wife Parvatewwa.  I make it clear that it was   purchased by her only out of her income derived from  A(7) land.

Plaint shows that plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1   were of 62 and 70 years respectively on the date of  

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suit.   It  shows  that  in  1944,  the  year  of  Ex.D.8,   plaintiff  No.1  was  about  16  years  of  age,  and  defendant No.1 was about 22 or 23 years of age.  I   am emphasizing these facts to show that neither of   them  had  independent  source  of  income.   It  must   mean that Parvatewwa was the absolute owner of the   suit lands A(4) to A(6) mentioned in Ex.D.8.  Hence,   it  cannot  be  said  as  joint  family  property.   Joint   family did not have at all, any nucleus to acquire the   land in Ex.D.8.  Hence, said finding is recorded.”

Therefore, the findings contrary to the above view by the High Court  

are erroneous and cannot be sustained.

21. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 clearly mandates  

that any property of a female Hindu is her absolute property and she,  

therefore,  has  full  ownership.  The  Explanation  to  sub-section  (1)  

further  clarifies  that  a  Hindu  woman has  full  ownership  over  any  

property  that  she  has  acquired  on  her  own  or  as  stridhana.  As  a  

consequence, she may dispose of the same as per her wish, and that  

the  same  shall  not  be  treated  as  a  part  of  the  joint  Hindu  family  

property.  

22. This Court has time and again held that there is no presumption  

that of joint family property, and there must be some strong evidence  

in  favour  of  the  same.  In  the  case  of  Appasaheb  Chamdgade  v.   

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Devendra Chamdgade and Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 521, after examining  

the decisions of this Court, it was held:

“17. Therefore, on survey aforesaid decisions,   what emerges is that there is no presumption   of a joint Hindu family but on the evidence if it   is  established  that  the  property  was  joint   Hindu  family  and  the  other  properties  were  acquired  out  of  that  nucleus,  if  the  initial   burden  is  discharged  by  the  person  who  claims  joint  Hindu  family,  then  the  burden  shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to  establish  affirmatively  that  property  was  acquired  without  the  aid  of  the  joint  family   property by cogent and necessary evidence.”

23. Insofar as lands at Item A(8) to A(12) are concerned, it is the  

case of the plaintiffs that on the death of propositor Siddappa, joint  

family continued and during its continuance, agricultural lands in R.S.  

No.143, which is now sub-divided as items A(8) to A(12) came to be  

purchased  out  of  the  joint  family  funds,  but,  in  the  name  of  

Parwatevva, since she was eldest member of the joint family at the  

relevant point of  time.  The oral evidence was led in support of the  

assertion made in the plaint.   The plaintiffs have not produced any  

other evidence in support of the claim so made.  The defence pleaded  

by  the  defendants,  apart  from  others,  is  that  Parwatevva  had  her  

independent source of income from A(7) lands.  She, with the aid of  

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the said income, acquired not only A(4) to A(6) but also A(8) to A(12)  

lands  and  the  tenancy  lands  was  held  by  joint  family.   It  is  also  

contended  by  them  that  propositor  Siddappa,  after  marrying  

Parwatevva, lived in the paternal house of his wife Parwatevva, which  

fact  is  not  denied  by  the  plaintiffs,  and Siddappa  had no personal  

income nor agricultural income which he could utilize for purchase of  

any property, much less A(8) to A(12) properties.  The Trial Court,  

after  considering  the  entire  evidence  on  record  has  come  to  the  

conclusion  that  lands  A(8)  to  A(12)  is  the  absolute  self  acquired  

properties of Parwatevva .  The findings and the conclusion so arrived  

is based on the proper appreciation of the evidence on record and the  

respondents have not brought to our notice anything contrary to make  

a different view.  Therefore, while agreeing with the findings and the  

conclusion  reached  by  the  Trial  Court,  we  reject  the  contention  

canvassed  by learned counsel for the respondents.  Therefore, lands  

in R.S. No. 143, which is now sub-divided as A(8) to A(12) of the suit  

Schedule is not the joint family property but the absolute property of  

Parwatevva, which she has purchased/acquired from the income and  

funds  from  the  lands  A(7)  and  A(4)  to  A(8).   Accordingly,  ‘A’  

Schedule  properties  requires  to  be  partitioned  among  the  family  

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members in accordance with law.     

24. In the light of above discussion, we are unable to accept with  

the reasoning given by the High Court. We are in agreement with the  

reasoning and conclusion reached by the Trial Court.

25. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the Judgment and Order  

passed by the High Court in RFA No. 385 of 1993 dated 30.03.1999 is  

set  aside  and  Judgment  and  decree  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  in  

O.S.No. 40 of 1990 dated 15.07.1993 is restored.  Parties are directed  

to bear their own costs.  

  ..………………………J.                                                                           [G.S. SINGHVI]

..………………………J.                                                                           [H.L. DATTU]

New Delhi, September 08, 2011.  

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