REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7318    OF 2007 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18201 of 2007}

Mantoo Sarkar ….. Appellant

Versus

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others ….. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Interpretation  and/or  application  of  Section  166  (2)  of  the  Motor

Vehicles  Act,  1988  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’  for  the  sake  of

brevity)  in  regard  to  territorial  jurisdiction  of  a  Tribunal  is  the  question

involved herein.    

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The said question arises in the following factual matrix.   

3. Appellant  had  been  travelling  as  a  passenger  in  a  bus,  bearing

registration No.MP-04-7915, belonging to Madhya Pradesh Road Transport

Corporation.  It met with an accident in the town of Faridpur in the District

of  Uttar  Pradesh  having  collided  with  truck  bearing  No.HR-38-E-5554.

Appellant  suffered  grievous  injuries.   A  First  Information  Report  was

lodged against the driver of the said truck under Sections 279, 338 and 427

of the Indian Penal Code.  

Indisputably  the  said  truck  belonged  to  respondent  No.2  and  was

registered  at  Faridabad.   It  was  insured  with  respondent  No.1-company.

Appellant was working as a skilled migrant seasonal agricultural labourer.

He had been earning his livelihood at the relevant time by performing his

job as a labourer in the work of extracting sand gravel from a river named

‘Hola River’ near Beri Pada, Lalkuan, Distt.  Nainital,  Uttaranchal.   He is

said to have been living for  a long time at  Pilibhit  in  the  State  of Uttar

Pradesh.  Indisputably, after he remained in the district Hospital at Bareilly

as  an  indoor  patient  upto  28th July,  2003,  he  was  shifted  to  Prabhakar

Hospital in Pilibhit.  He underwent several operations.   

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4. Appellant  filed  a claim petition  before  the  Motor Accident  Claims

Tribunal,  Nainital  (for  short  ‘the  Tribunal’)  claiming  a  sum  of

Rs.23,90,000/- (Rupees twenty three lakh ninety thousand only) alongwith

interest  @ 18% per annum from the date  of  the  accident  till  the date  of

actual payment.   

5. Respondent No.1 has a branch office at Nainital.   

The  conductor  of  the  bus  and  the  driver  of  the  truck  examined

themselves  before  the  Tribunal  as  witnesses.   No  oral  evidence  was,

however, adduced on behalf of the first respondent.  One of the questions

which, only the first respondent raised and no other, was lack of territorial

jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal.   

The learned Tribunal  inter  alia  on the  premise that  the jurisdiction

conferred on it, having regard to sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Act is

wide and the insurance company having a branch office at Nainital, it had

territorial jurisdiction to determine the claim petition.  It made an Award of

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Rs.2,40,000/  (Rupees  two  lakh  forty  thousand  only)  in  favour  of  the

claimant.

6. The High Court, however, on an appeal preferred thereagaisnt by the

first respondent, opined –

“It is a well settled position of law that the claim petition can only be entertained and filed before a court having the territorial jurisdiction to hear the matter.   The  claimant  cannot  take  the  matter  to different State on the pretext that his case would be  disposed  of  expeditiously  in  that  State  or District without having the territorial jurisdiction. The  learned  counsel  for  the  claimants  submitted that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that the  Tribunal,  Nainital  had  got  no  territorial jurisdiction to dispose of the matter, the claimants may be given liberty to file a fresh claim petition before the competent Tribunal.”

On the  basis  of  the  said  finding  it  was  held  that  Motor  Accident

Claims Tribunal, Nainital had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said

claim petition.

7. Mr.  Shailendra  Singh,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

appellant would contend that the High Court committed a serious error in

passing  the  impugned  judgment  in  so  far  as  it  failed  to  take  into

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consideration the evidence of the appellant (PW-1) wherein he clearly stated

that he had been working at Beri Pada, Lal Kuan in the District of Nainital,

although he had not given his Lalkuan’s address in his claim petition having

been doing his work as a labourer.  The evidence of the said witness having

been  accepted  by  the  learned  Tribunal,  the  High  Court  should  not  have

interfered therewith.   

8. Mr.  Ashish  Wad, learned counsel  for  the respondent,  on  the other

hand, would contend that the accident having taken place at Bareilly, the

bus  belonging  to  Gwalior  depot  of  the  Madhya Pradesh  Road  Transport

Corporation, the office of the owner of the truck being at Gurgaon, office of

the insurance company being at Delhi, the Tribunal at Nainital did not have

any territorial jurisdiction.

9. Section 166(2) of the Act reads as under :-

“166 - Application for compensation  

(2) Every application  under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in  which  the  accident  occurred  or  to  the  Claims Tribunal  within  the  local  limits  of  whose jurisdiction  the  claimant  resides  or  carries  on business  or  within  the  local  limits  of  whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in

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such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:

Provided  that  where  no  claim for  compensation under section 140 is made in such application, the application  shall  contain  a  separate  statement  to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.”

10. The said  Act  is  a special  statute.   The jurisdiction  of  the Tribunal

having regard to the terminologies used therein must be held to be wider

than the civil court.   

A  claimant  has  a  wide  option.   Residence  of  the  claimant  also

determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

11. What would be a residence of a person would, however, depend upon

the fact situation obtaining in each case.   

12. Appellant had been a resident of Pilibhit.  It is in the State of Uttar

Pradesh.   He being a migrant  labourer  accepts  job wherever he gets  and

resides  there.   He,  admittedly,  had  been  working  in  Nanital  district  and

residing there during the period of accident.   The fact that he was thus a

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resident  of  Nainital  in  the  State  of  Uttaranchal  is  neither  denied  nor

disputed.

13. The High Court unfortunately in its judgment did not assign sufficient

or cogent reason as to why the Tribunal committed any illegality in holding

that he had the jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition.

14. No doubt the Tribunal must exercise jurisdiction having regard to the

ingredients laid down under sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Act.  We

are not unmindful of the fact that in terms of Section 169 of the Act, the

Tribunal,  subject  to any rules,  may follow a summary procedure and the

provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  under  the  Act  has  a  limited

application but in terms of the rules ‘save and except’ any specific provision

made in that behalf, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would

apply.   Even  otherwise  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  Code  of  Civil

Procedure may be held to be applicable in a case of this nature.   

15. We say so  because  ordinarily  an  appellate  court  shall  not,  having

regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the

Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  entertain  an  appeal  on  the  ground  of  lack  of

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territorial  jurisdiction  on the  part  of  the  court  below unless  he  has  been

prejudiced  thereby.   Other  respondents  did  not  raise  any  question  of

jurisdiction.  Although one witness each had been examined on behalf of the

truck owner and owner of the bus, neither a question of lack of territorial

jurisdiction was raised nor the question of any prejudice had been argued.

It  is  only  the  first  respondent  who  raised  the  question  of  territorial

jurisdiction.   However,  no  prejudice  was  caused  to  the  appellant  by the

claim petition being tried by the MACT at Nainital.

16. The  liability  of  the  insurance  company  arises  for  the  purpose  of

reimbursement of the amount of compensation found to be payable by the

owner of the vehicle insured.  It is only in exceptional cases and as provided

for under Section 170 of the Act, the insurance company can defend a claim

petition.   Only  on  limited  grounds  it  may  be  permitted  to  question  the

quantum of compensation.   

17. The Tribunal  is  a court  subordinate to the High Court.   An appeal

against  the  Tribunal  lies  before the High Court.   The High Court,  while

exercising its appellate power, would follow the provisions contained in the

Code of  Civil  Procedure  or  akin  thereto.   In  view of  sub-section  (1)  of

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Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on

the part  of the appellate court to pose unto itself  the right question, viz.,

whether  the  first  respondent  has  been  able  to  show  sufferance  of  any

prejudice.  If it  has not suffered any prejudice or otherwise no failure of

justice had occurred, the High Court should not have entertained the appeal

on that ground alone.   

18. We, however, while taking that factor into consideration must place

on  record  that  we are  not  oblivious  of  the  fact  that  a  decision  rendered

without  jurisdiction  would  be  coram  non  juris.   Objection  in  regard  to

jurisdiction may be taken at any stage.  ( See Chief Engineer, Hydel Project

v.  Ravinder Nath , [ (2008) 2 SCC 350 ] ) wherein inter alia the decision of

this Court in  Kiran Singh  v.  Chaman Paswan, [AIR 1954 SC 340] was

followed, stating:

“26. The Court  also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan [AIR 1954 SC 340] and quoted (in Harshad Chiman Lal case {[(2005) 7  SCC  791],  SCC  pp.  804-805,  para  33} therefrom: {Kiran Singh case (supra), AIR p.342, para6

‘6.  …It  is  a  fundamental  principle well established that a decree passed by  a  court  without  jurisdiction  is  a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set  up  whenever  and  wherever  it  is sought to be enforced or relied upon,

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even  at  the  stage  of  execution  and even  in  collateral  proceedings.  A defect of jurisdiction, ...strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree,  and  such  a  defect  cannot  be cured even by consent of parties.”

Though  in  the  aforementioned  decision  these observations  were  made  since  the  defendants before  raising  the  objection  to  the  territorial jurisdiction  had  admitted  that  the  court  had  the jurisdiction,  the force of  this  decision  cannot  be ignored and it  has to be held that  such a decree would continue to be a nullity.”

19. A distinction,  however,  must  be  made between  a  jurisdiction  with

regard  to  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  that  of  territorial  and pecuniary

jurisdiction.   Whereas  in  the  case  falling  within  the  former category the

judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be.  It is not a case

where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of

claim.  As a matter of fact the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the

suit.  If the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition under

the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  in  our  opinion,  the  Court  should  not  have,  in

absence of any finding of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first

respondent, entertained the appeal.   

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In  Bikash Bhushan Ghosh  v.  Novartis India Ltd., [  (2007) 5 SCC

591], this Court has held :

“17. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. If the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal had  no  jurisdiction,  in  view  of  the  provisions contained  in  Section  21  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure,  unless  the  respondent  suffered  any prejudice,  they  could  not  have  questioned  the jurisdiction of the court. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan this Court held: (AIR p. 342,  paras 6-7)

‘6.  ...  If  the  question  now  under consideration fell to be determined only on the  application  of  general  principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that  the  District  Court  of  Monghyr  was ‘coram  non  judice’  and  that  its  judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is  what  is  the  effect  of  Section  11  of  the Suits Valuation Act on this position. 7.  Section  11  enacts  that  notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure  an  objection  that  a  court  which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised  it  by reason  of  overvaluation  or undervaluation, should not be entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section  has  come in—and  deservedly—for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is  obscure  and  confused,  there  is  one

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principle  which  stands  out  clear  and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or  undervaluation,  is  not  to  be  treated  as, what  it  would  be  but  for  the  section,  null and  void,  and  that  an  objection  to jurisdiction  based  on  overvaluation  or undervaluation, should be dealt  with under that section and not otherwise.

The  reference  to  Section  578,  now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section  is  significant.  That  section,  while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal  on account  of the defects mentioned therein when they do not  affect the  merits  of  the  case,  excepts  from  its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore  gives  no  protection  to  decrees passed  on  merits,  when  the  courts  which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of  overvaluation  or  undervaluation.  It  is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  based  on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except  in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete  in  itself,  and  no  objection  to jurisdiction  based  on  overvaluation  or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it.

With reference to  objections  relating to territorial  jurisdiction,  Section 21 of the Civil  Procedure  Code  enacts  that  no objection  to  the  place  of  suing  should  be

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allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless  there  was  a  consequent  failure  of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The  policy underlying  Sections  21  and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is  the same, namely, that  when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be  reversed  purely  on  technical  grounds, unless  it  had  resulted  in  failure  of  justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat  objections  to  jurisdiction  both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless  there  has  been  a  prejudice  on  the merits.  The  contention  of  the  appellants, therefore,  that  the  decree  and judgment  of the  District  Court,  Monghyr,  should  be treated  as  a  nullity  cannot  be  sustained under  Section  11  of  the  Suits  Valuation Act.’ ”

Furthermore in determining as to whether a part of cause of action has

arisen within the territorial  jurisdiction of the court vis-à-vis an appellate

court a large number of factors may have to be taken in consideration.  [See

Ambica Industries  v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769].   

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the appellant herein was a

labourer.  The justness or otherwise of the amount of compensation has not

been disputed before us.  If the High Court judgment is to be complied with,

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appellant would again have to initiate another proceeding either at Bareilly

or Gurgaon or at Delhi or at Jabalpur.  The same evidence would have to be

rendered  once  again.   The  question  of  fact  which  was  required  to  be

determined in the proceeding before the Tribunal, namely whether the driver

of  the  truck  or  the  driver  of  the  bus  had  been  driving  their  respective

vehicles rashly and negligently would have to be determined afresh.  The

factual  finding  recorded  in  this  case  is  that  the  driver  of  the  truck  was

driving the truck rashly and negligently.  In our opinion, in a case of this

nature, we may even exercise our extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article

142 of  the  Constitution  of  India.   In  New India  Insurance Company  v.

Darshana Devi and others, [(2008) 7 SCC 416], this Court held:

“20.  Having said so, we must take notice of the fact that the deceased Baldev Singh was labourer. The  Tribunal  has  found  that  besides  being  a labourer, he also used to deal in Safeda wood. He was  the  owner  of  the  'Safeda'  wood  which  was being transported  to  the market  for  its  sale.  The first respondent, Darshana Devi, in her deposition, stated  that  the  deceased  used  to  purchase  wood from the  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  on  contract basis.  Only  Gurdial  Singh  and  Ravinder  Singh were accompanying him as labourer.  His income was assessed only at Rs. 2,400 per month.”

21.  In  this  view  of  the  matter,  we  are  of  the opinion that  it  is  not  a fit  case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Even in

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Brij Mohan this Court held: (SCC p. 64, paras 13- 14) “13.  However,  Respondent  1  is  a poor  labourer. He had suffered grievous injuries. He had become disabled  to  a  great  extent.  The  amount  of compensation awarded in his favour appears to be on a lower side. In the aforementioned situation, although  we  reject  the  other  contentions  of  Ms Indu  Malhotra,  we  are  inclined  to  exercise  our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to direct that the award may be satisfied by the appellant but it would be entitled to realise the same from the owner of the tractor  and  the  trolley  wherefor  it  would  not  be necessary  for  it  to  initiate  any  separate proceedings  for  recovery  of  the  amount  as provided for under the Motor Vehicles Act. 14.  It  is  well  settled  that  in  a  situation  of  this nature  this  Court  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India read with Article 136 thereof can issue suit  directions for doing complete justice to the parties.”

20. Reliance,  however,  has  been placed on a decision  of  this  Court  in

State of Punjab  v. Rajesh Syal, [ (2002) 8 SCC 158 ], to contend that this

Court  should  not  exercise  its  jurisdiction  under  Article  142  of  the

Constitution of India.  Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article

142 of the Constitution shall be exercised or not would depend upon the fact

of the each matter.  Law in this case does not come in the way of exercise of

such jurisdiction.  

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21. For the  reasons  aforementioned,  the impugned judgment  cannot  be

sustained.   It  is  set  aside  accordingly  and  the  order  of  the  Tribunal  is

restored.   The  appeal  is  allowed  with  costs.   Counsel’s  fee  assessed  at

Rs.10,000/-.

…………………………..J.    [ S.B. Sinha ]

…………………………..J.    [Cyriac Josesph ]

New Delhi December 16, 2008

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