Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 973 of 2007

Manohar Lal (D) by Lrs.        ….Appellants  

Versus

Ugrasen (D) by Lrs. & Ors.                   ...Respondents

With  

Civil Appeal No. 974 of 2007

Ghaziabad Development Authority ….Appellant  

Versus

Ugrasen (D) by Lrs. & Ors.               ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Both  these  appeals  have  been  preferred  by  the  appellants  

being aggrieved of  the judgment  and order  of  the Allahabad High  

Court dated 22nd July, 2003 passed in C.M.W.P. No.6644 of 1989 by  

which  the  High  Court  has  allowed  the  Writ  Petition  filed  by  

respondent  No.1-Ugrasen quashing  the  allotment  of  land  made in

favour  of  appellant-Manohar  Lal  and  further  directed  to  make  the  

allotment of land in favour of the said respondent-Ugrasen.  

2. In  these  appeals,  three  substantial  questions  of  law  for  

consideration of this Court are involved, they are, namely:

(a) As to whether the State Government – a Revisional Authority  

under the Statute, could take upon itself the task of a lower  

statutory authority?;

(b) Whether  the  order  passed  or  action  taken  by  a  statutory  

authority in contravention of the interim order of the Court is  

enforceable?; and    

(c) Whether Court  can grant relief  which had not been asked  

for?  

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that  

lands  owned  and  possessed  by  predecessor-in-interest  of  private  

appellant Manohar Lal and respondent Ugrasen were acquired under  

the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred  

to as the ‘Act’). Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on  

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13.08.1962 covering about 32 acres of land in the Revenue Estates  

of  Kaila  Pargana Loni  Dist.  Meerut  (now Ghaziabad).   Declaration  

under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the said land was made on  

24.05.1965 along with Notification under Section 17(1) invoking the  

urgency clause.  Possession of the land except one acre was taken  

on 13.07.1965 and award under Section 11 of the Act was made on  

11.05.1970.   

The  Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh  had  framed  Land  Policy  

dated  30/31.07.1963 to  the  effect  that  where  a  big  chunk of  land  

belonging to one person is acquired for planned development, except  

the land covered by roads, he shall be entitled to the extent of 40% of  

his total acquired land in a residential area after development in lieu  

of  compensation.   The  High-Powered  Committee  dealing  with  the  

issue laid down that applications for that purpose be filed within a  

period of one month from the date of taking the possession of the  

land which was subsequently changed to within one month from the  

date of completion of acquisition proceedings.    

4. Both the private parties, i.e. Manohar Lal and Ugrasen  

claimed  that   they had  made applications  to  claim the  

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benefit  under the said policy within time.  Shri Ugrasen  

claimed  that  he  had  submitted  the  application  on  

31.12.1966  but  no  action  was  taken  on  the  said  

application.  Therefore,  he  filed  another  application  on  

7.9.1971.   Manohar  Lal-appellant  claimed to  have  filed  

application for  the said purpose on 22.6.1969 and was  

allotted land bearing plot Nos. 5, 7 to 16 and 25 to 33 in  

Sector  3N  vide  order  dated  27.12.1979  as  per  the  

direction  of  the  Chief  Minister  of  Uttar  Pradesh.   Shri  

Ugrasen  filed  Writ  Petition  No.  1932  of  1980  before  

Allahabad  High  Court  challenging  the  said  order  dated  

27.12.1979.   Subsequently,  vide  order  dated  7.3.1980,  

the land allotted to Manohar Lal was changed to Plot Nos.  

25 to 33.  At the time of consideration of application of  

Ugrasen  by  the  State  Government,  the  Ghaziabad  

Development  Authority  (hereinafter  called  GDA)  vide  

letter  dated  18.3.1980  pointed  out  that  submission  of  

application  by  Shri  Ugrasen  was  surrounded  by  

suspicious circumstances as it was the last entry made on  

31.12.1966 and signature of the receiving clerk had been  

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made by a person who joined service only in 1979.  In the  

meanwhile, Shri Manohar Lal filed Writ Petition No. 4159  

of 1980 and the High Court restrained the authorities from  

making allotment to anyone else from the land allotted to  

him as per letter dated 7.3.1980.   

5. In spite of the said interim order in force,  the State  

Government vide order dated 12.12.1980  directed GDA  

to make the allotment of land in favour of Shri Ugrasen  

and thus, in compliance of the same, GDA issued letter of  

allotment dated 22.12.1980 in his favour.  Shri Ugrasen  

submitted  letter  dated  1.1.1981  to  GDA  to  give  an  

alternative land as the land covered by Plot Nos. 5 to 16  

had been subject matter of the interim order of the High  

Court in a writ petition filed by Shri Manohar Lal.  

6. Shri  Ugrasen  withdrew  his  Writ  Petition  No.1932  of  

1980  on  6.3.1981  and  deposited  the  compensation  

amount, i.e. Rs.32,010.60 on 3.3.1981. GDA allotted the  

land to Shri Ugrasen in Plot Nos. 36, 38, 39, 44, 46 and  

47 vide order dated 02.01.1985, though it  was also the  

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land in dispute i.e. covered by the interim order passed by  

the High Court.  Shri Ugrasen refused to take those plots  

as  is  evident  from  letter  dated  7.1.1985  as  certain  

encroachment  had  been  made  upon  the  said  lands.  

GDA, vide letter dated 27.3.1989, allotted Plot Nos. 5, 7  

to 16 to Shri  Manohar Lal.  Thus, being aggrieved, Shri  

Ugrasen filed Writ Petition No. 6644 of 1989 before the  

High Court for quashing of the said allotment in favour of  

Shri Manohar Lal.  

7. Parties exchanged the affidavits and after hearing the  

parties and considering the material on record, the High  

Court allowed  the said Writ Petition vide judgment and  

order dated 22nd July, 2003. Hence, these appeals.  

8. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior counsel appearing  

for  the  appellant-Manohar  Lal  and  Shri  Vijay  Hansaria,  

learned  Senior  counsel  appearing  for  GDA  have  

contended that Shri Ugrasen had never filed application  

for  allotment  in  time.  There  had  been  manipulation  in  

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registration  of  the  said  application  and  it  has  been  

surrounded  with  suspicious  circumstances.  The  

application of Shri Ugrasen had been considered directly  

by the State Government-the revisional authority, though  

the  State  Government  could  not  take the  task  of  GDA  

upon itself.  Land of Shri Ugrasen had been acquired for  

roads, thus, as per the Land Policy he was not entitled for  

any benefit of the same.  Shri Ugrasen in his writ petition  

had asked only  for  quashing the allotment  in  favour  of  

Manohar Lal and there was no prayer that the said land  

be allotted to him. Therefore, while issuing a direction for  

making the allotment in favour of Ugrasen, the High Court  

has exceeded its jurisdiction.  Thus, appeals deserve to  

be allowed.  

9. On the other hand, Shri Debal Banerji, learned Senior  

counsel appearing for the respondent-Ugrasen and Shri  

Pramod  Swarup,  learned  Senior  counsel  appearing  for  

the State of U.P. have vehemently opposed the appeals  

contending that once a decision has been taken as per  

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the entitlement of the respondent-Ugrasen and the High  

Court has examined each and every fact, question of re-

appreciation  of  evidence  etc.  is  not  permissible   in  

exercise  of  the  discretionary  jurisdiction  by  this  Court.  

Manohar Lal  had also been allotted the land by the Chief  

Minister and not by GDA, thus no fault can be found with  

allotment in favour of  Shri  Ugrasen. Appeals lack merit  

and are liable to be dismissed.  

10. We have considered the rival submissions made  

by  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  perused  the  

records.  

11. In Rakesh Ranjan Verma & Ors.  Vs.  State of Bihar & Ors.,  

AIR  1992  SC  1348,  the  question arose  as  to  whether  the  State  

Government,  in  exercise  of  its  statutory  powers  could  issue  any  

direction  to  the  Electricity  Board  in  respect  of  appointment  of  its  

officers and employees. After examining the statutory provisions, the  

Court came to the conclusion that the State Government could only  

take the policy decisions as how the Board will carry out its functions  

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under  the  Act.  So  far  as  the  directions  issued  in  respect  of  

appointment of its officers was concerned, it fell within the exclusive  

domain of the Board and the State Government had no competence  

to issue any such direction.  The said judgment has been approved  

and followed by this Court in U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Ram  

Autar and Anr. (1996) 8 SCC 506.  

12. In  Bangalore  Development  Authority  and  Ors.  Vs.  R.  

Hanumaiah and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 508, this Court held that the  

power  of  the  Government  under  Section  65  of  the  Bangalore  

Development  Authority  Act,  1976  was  not  unrestricted  and  the  

directions which could be issued were those which were to carry out  

the objective of the Act and not those which are contrary to the Act  

and further held that the directions issued by the Chief Minister to  

release the lands were destructive of the purposes of the Act and the  

purposes for which the BDA was created.

13. In Bangalore Medical Trust  Vs.  B.S. Muddappa & Ors.  AIR  

1991 SC 1902, this Court considered the provisions of a similar Act,  

namely,  Bangalore  Development  Authority  Act,  1976  containing  a  

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similar provision and held that Government was competent only to  

give such directions to the authority as were in its opinion necessary  

or  expedient  and  for  carrying  out  the  purposes  of  the  Act.  The  

Government could not have issued any other direction for the reason  

that Government had not been conferred upon unfettered powers in  

this regard.  The object of the direction must be only to carry out the  

object  of  the  Act  and  only  such  directions  as  were  reasonably  

necessary or expedient for carrying out the object of the enactment  

were contemplated under the Act. Any other direction not  covered by  

such powers was illegal.  

14. In Poonam Verma & Ors. Vs. Delhi Development Authority,  

AIR 2008 SC 870, a similar view has been re-iterated by this Court  

dealing with the provisions of Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957.  

In the said case, the Central Government had issued a direction to  

make allotment of flat out of turn. The Court held as under:

“......Section  41  of  the  Act,  only  envisages  that  the  respondent would carry out such directions that may be  issued by the Central Government from time to time for  the efficient administration of the Act. The same does not  take within its fold an order which can be passed by the  Central Government in the matter of allotment of flats by  the Authority.  Section 41 speaks about  policy decision.  Any direction issued must have a nexus with the efficient  

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administration of the Act. It has nothing to do with carrying  out of the plans of the authority in respect of a particular  scheme……….Evidently, the Central Government had no  say in the matter either on its own or under the Act. In  terms of  the brochure,  Section  41 of  the  Act  does not  clothe any jurisdiction upon the Central  Government  to  issue such a direction.”

15. In  State of U.P. Vs. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. (2006) 1 SCC  

667, this Court held as follows in context of Government directions:

“36. Such a decision on the part of the State Government  must be taken in terms of the constitutional scheme, i.e.,  upon compliance of the requirement of Article 162 read  with Article 166 of the Constitution of India. In the instant  case, the directions were purported to have been issued  by an officer of the State. Such directions were not shown  to have been issued pursuant to any decision taken by a  competent  authority in  terms of  the Rules of  Executive  Business  of  the  State  framed under  Article  166  of  the  Constitution of India.”

16. In  The  Purtabpore  Co.,  Ltd.  Vs.  Cane  Commissioner  of  

Bihar and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 1896,  this Court has observed :

“The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under  Clause 6(1)  is  a statutory power.  He alone could have  exercised  that  power.  While  exercising  that  power  he  cannot  abdicate his responsibility  in favour of  anyone -  not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief  Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have  interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner.  In this case what has happened is that the power of the  Cane  Commissioner  has  been  exercised  by  the  Chief  

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Minister, an authority not recognised by Clause (6) read  with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those  orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner.

     The  executive  officers  entrusted  with  statutory  discretions  may in  some cases be obliged to  take into  account  considerations  of  public  policy  and  in  some  context the policy of a Minister or the Government as a  whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy  but this will not absolve them from their duty to exercise  their personal judgment in individual cases unless explicit  statutory provision has been made for them to be given  binding instructions by a superior.”

17. In  Chandrika Jha Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1984 SC  

322, this Court while dealing with the provisions of Bihar and Orissa  

Co-operative Societies Act, 1935,  held as under:

“The  action  of  the  then  Chief  Minister  cannot  also  be  supported by the terms of Section 65A of the Act which  essentially  confers  revisional  power  on  the  State  Government.  There  was no  proceeding  pending  before  the Registrar in relation to any of the matters specified in  Section 65A of the Act nor had the Registrar passed any  order  in  respect  thereto.  In  the  absence  of  any  such  proceeding or such order, there was no occasion for the  State Government to invoke its powers under Section 65A  of the Act. In our opinion, the State Government cannot  for itself exercise the statutory functions of the Registrar  under the Act or the Rules.”

18. In  Anirudhsinhji  Karansinghji  Jadeja  &  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  

Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 2390,  it was observed :

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“This is a case of power conferred upon one authority  being  really  exercised  by  another.  If  a  statutory  authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to  exercise  it  according  to  its  own  discretion.  If  the  discretion  is  exercised  under  the  direction  or  in  compliance with some higher authority's instruction, then  it  will  be  a  case  of  failure  to  exercise  discretion  altogether.”    (Emphasis added)

19. In K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 898, this  

Court has de-lineated the functions of the State Government and the  

Development Authority, observing that :  

“59.  Both  the  State  and  the  JDA have  been  assigned  specific  functions  under  the  statute.  The  JDA  was  constituted for a specific purpose. It could not take action  contrary to the scheme framed by it nor take any action  which  could  defeat  such purpose.  The State  could  not  have  interfered  with  the  day-to-day  functioning  of  a  statutory authority. Section 72 of the 1973 Act authorizes  the State to  exercise superintendence and control  over  the acts and proceedings of the officers appointed under  Section 3 and the authorities constituted under the Act but  thereby  the  State  cannot  usurp  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Board  itself.  The  Act  does  not  contemplate  any  independent function by the State except as specifically  provided therein….   the State in exercise of its executive  power could not have directed that lands meant for use  for  commercial  purposes  may  be  used  for  industrial  purposes…..  the power of the State Government to issue  direction to the officers appended under Section 3 and the  authorities constituted under the Act is confined only to  matters  of  policy  and  not  any  other.  Such  matters  of  policy yet again must be in relation to discharge of duties  by  the  officers  of  the  authority  and  not  in  derogation  

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thereof….    The  direction  of  the  Chief  Minister  being  de'hors the provisions of the Act is void and of no effect.”   

20.   In Indore Municipality Vs. Niyamatulla (Dead through L.Rs.)  

AIR 1971 SC 97,  this Court  considered a case of  dismissal  of  an  

employee by an authority other than the authority competent to pass  

such an order i.e. the Municipal Commissioner, the order was held to  

be without jurisdiction and thus could be termed to have been passed  

under  the relevant  Act.   This Court  held that  “to such a case the  

Statute under which action was purported to be taken could afford no  

protection”.

21. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs. State of Punjab  

&  Ors. (2001)  6  SCC  260,  this  Court,  after  placing  

reliance  upon  a  large  number  of  its  earlier  judgments,  

observed as under:

“In  the  system  of  Indian  democratic  governance  as  contemplated  by  the  Constitution,  senior  officers  occupying  key  positions  such  as  Secretaries  are  not  supposed  to  mortgage  their  own discretion,  volition  and  decision-making  authority  and  be  prepared  to  give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead at  the behest of politicians for carrying out commands  having no sanctity in law. The Conduct Rules of Central  Government  Services  command  the  civil  servants  to  

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maintain  at  all  times absolute  integrity  and devotion  to  duty  and  do  nothing  which  is  unbecoming  of  a  government servant. No government servant shall in the  performance of  his  official  duties,  or  in  the  exercise  of  power conferred on him, act  otherwise than in his best  judgment except when he is acting under the direction of  his official superior.” (Emphasis added)  

22. Therefore, the law on the question can be summarised to the  

effect  that  no  higher  authority  in  the  hierarchy  or  an  appellate  or  

revisional authority can exercise the power of the statutory authority  

nor  the superior  authority can mortgage its wisdom and direct  the  

statutory authority to act in a particular manner.  If the appellate or  

revisional Authority takes upon itself the task of the statutory authority  

and passes an order, it remains unenforceable for the reason that it  

cannot be termed to be an order passed under the Act.   

23. In Mulraj Vs. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj, AIR 1967 SC 1386,

this  Court  considered  the  effect  of  action  taken  subsequent  to  

passing  of  an  interim order  in  its  disobedience and held  that  any  

action taken in disobedience of the order passed by the Court would  

be illegal. Subsequent action would be a nullity.

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24. In  Surjit  Singh Vs. Harbans Singh, AIR 1996 SC 135, this  

Court while dealing with the similar issue  held as under:  

“In  defiance  of  the  restraint  order,  the  alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as  such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent  public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of  affairs to exist while it  is in seisin of a lis, that state of  affairs  is  not  only  required  to  be  maintained,  but  it  is  presumed  to  exist  till  the  Court  orders  otherwise.  The  Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the  right,  to  treat  the  alienation/assignment  as  having  not  taken place at all for its purposes.”

25. In  All  Bengal  Excise  Licensees  Association  Vs.  

Raghabendra Singh & Ors, AIR 2007 SC 1386, this court held as  

under:

“A  party  to  the  litigation  cannot  be  allowed to  take  an  unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim order  and  escape  the  consequences  thereof.....  the  wrong  perpetrated by the respondents in utter disregard of the  order of the High Court should not be permitted to hold  good.”

26. In  Delhi  Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction  

Co.  (P)  Ltd.  &  Anr.  AIR  1996  SC 2005,  this  court  after  making  

reference to many of the earlier judgments held:

“On principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not  to  be able to  claim that  the fruits  of  their  defiance are  

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good,  and  not  tainted  by  the  illegality  that  produced  them.”

27. In  Gurunath  Manohar  Pavaskar Vs.  Nagesh  Siddappa  

Navalgund,  AIR  2008  SC  901, this  Court  while  dealing  with  the  

similar  issues  held  that  even  a  Court  in  exercise  of  its  inherent  

jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in  

the event of coming to the conclusion that a breach to an order of  

restraint  had taken place,  may bring back the parties to the same  

position as if the order of injunction has not been violated.  

28. In view of the above, it is evident that any order passed by any  

authority in spite of the knowledge of the interim order of the court is  

of no consequence as it remains a nullity.  

29. In Messrs. Trojan & Co. Vs. RM.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar AIR  

1953 SC 235, this Court considered the issue as to whether relief not  

asked for by a party could be granted and that too without having  

proper pleadings. The Court held as under:  

“It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot  be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties  and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without  an amendment of the plaint,  the Court was not entitled to  

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grant  the  relief  not  asked  for  and  no  prayer  was  ever  made to amend the plaint  so as to incorporate in it  an  alternative case.”   

30. A similar  view has been re-iterated by this Court  in  Krishna  

Priya Ganguly etc.etc. Vs. University of Lucknow & Ors. etc. AIR  

1984 SC 186; and Om Prakash & Ors. Vs. Ram Kumar & Ors., AIR  

1991 SC 409, observing that a party cannot be granted a relief which  

is not claimed.

31. Dealing  with  the  same issue,  this  Court  in  Bharat Amratlal  

Kothari  Vs.  Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors.,  AIR 2010 SC  

475  held:

“Though  the  Court  has  very  wide  discretion  in  granting relief,  the court,  however, cannot,  ignoring and  keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of  relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner.”

32. In  Fertilizer  Corporation  of  India  Ltd.  &  Anr. Vs.  Sarat  

Chandra Rath & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2744, this Court held that “the  

High  Court  ought  not  to  have  granted  reliefs  to  the  respondents   

which they had not even prayed for.”  

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33. In view of the above, law on the issue can be  

summarised that the Court cannot grant a relief which has  

not been specifically prayed by the parties.

34. The instant case requires to be examined in the  

light of  the aforesaid certain legal propositions.  

Section  41  of  the  U.P.  Urban  Planning  and  

Development Act, 1973 reads as under:

“41.  Control  by State Government-(1)  The  Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman  shall  carry  out  such  directions  as  may  be  issued  to  it  from  time  to  time  by  the  State  Government for the efficient administration of  this Act.

(2) ……………...........................

(3) The State Government may, at any time, either on  its own motion or on application made to it in this  behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of  or order passed by the authority or Chairman for the  purpose  of  satisfying  itself  as  to  the  legality  or  propriety  of  any  order  passed  or  direction  issued  and may pass such order or issue such direction in  relation thereto as it may think fit:

Provided that the State Government shall not  pass  an  order  prejudicial  to  any  person  without  affording  such  person  a  reasonable  opportunity of being heard.

(4) ………………………………..”   

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35. Clause  (1)  thereof  empowers  the  State  

Government  to  issue  general  directions  which  are  

necessary to properly enforce the provisions of the Act.  

Clause  (3)  thereof  make  it  crystal  clear  that  the  State  

Government  is  a  revisional  authority.  Therefore,  the  

scheme  of  the  Act  makes  it  clear  that  if  a  person  is  

aggrieved by an order of the authority, he can prefer an  

appeal  before  the  Appellate  Authority  i.e.  Divisional  

Commissioner  and  the  person  aggrieved  of  that  order  

may  file  Revision  Application   before  the  State  

Government.   However,  the  State  Government  cannot  

pass an order without giving opportunity of hearing to the  

person, who may be adversely affected.    

36. In the instant case, it  is the revisional authority  

which has issued direction to GDA to make allotment in  

favour  of  both  the  parties.   Orders  had  been  passed  

without hearing the other party.   The authority, i.e. GDA  

did not have the opportunity to examine the case of either  

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of the said parties. The High Court erred in holding that  

Clause (1) of Section 41 empowers the State Government  

to  deal  with  the application  of  an individual.  The State  

Government can take only policy decisions as to how the  

statutory provisions would be enforced but  cannot  deal  

with  an  individual  application.  Revisional  authority  can  

exercise its jurisdiction provided there is an order passed  

by the lower authority under the Act as it  can examine  

only legality or propriety of the order passed or direction  

issued by the authority therein.  

37. In view thereof, we are of the considered opinion  

that there was no occasion for the State Government to  

entertain the applications of the said parties for allotment  

of land directly and issue directions to GDA for allotment  

of land in their favour.    

38. Admittedly, the interim order passed by the High  

Court in favour of Shri Manohar Lal in Writ Petition No.  

4159 of 1980 was in force and it restrained the Authorities  

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to  make  allotment  of  the  land  in  dispute  in  favour  of  

anyone else.  Indisputably, the State Government as well  

as  the  GDA  remained   fully  alive  of  the  factum  of  

subsistence of the said interim order as is evident from  

the  correspondence  between  them.  In  view of  the  law  

referred  to  hereinabove,  order  passed  by  the  State  

Government in contravention of the interim order, remains  

unenforceable and inexecutable.   

More so, in the writ  petition filed by Shri Ugrasen relief  

sought was limited only to quash the allotment made in  

favour  of  Shri  Manohar Lal.    No relief  was sought  for  

making the allotment in favour of the writ petitioner/Shri  

Ugrasen.  However,  the  High  Court  vide  impugned  

judgment  and  order  has  issued  direction  to  make  the  

allotment  in  his  favour.  Thus,  we  are  of  the  view that  

issuance of such a direction was not permissible in law.  

Even  otherwise  as  Shri  Ugrasen’s  land  had  been  

acquired  for  roads,  he  could  not  make  application  for  

taking benefit  of  the Land Policy,  particularly, when the  

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Land Policy was not declared to be invalid or violative of  

equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.  

39. The  High  Court  failed  to  consider  objections  

raised on behalf of GDA in its letter dated 19.4.1980 to  

the State Government pointing out as follows:

(a) Application of Ugrasen is entered on 31.12.1966 as the last  

entry in Postal Receipt register.

(b) Entry is at Sl. 15498.

(c) Entry is in different ink.

(d) True  copy  of  application  now  submitted  bears  the  date  

13.12.1966.

(e) There is no signature on the cyclostyled copy.

(f) Application was made in 1971 and was rejected in 1977 by  

Shri Watal. Decision not challenged. Ugrasen kept quiet till  

1980.

(g) Clerk Mr. Jai Prakash was not working before 1979.

40.  It is settled legal proposition that burden lies on the  

person, who alleges/avers/pleads for existence of a fact.  

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Sh. Ugrasen was95 under an obligation to establish the  

fact  of  submission  of  the  application  in  time.   Entry  in  

respect  of  his  application  has  been  made  in  Postal  

Receipt Register.  As said application was sent by post,  

Sh. Ugrasen could explain as to whether the application  

was  sent  by  Registered  Post/Ordinary  Post  or  under  

Postal Certificate and as to whether he could produce the  

receipt, if any, for the same.  In such a fact-situation, the  

application  filed  by  Shri  Ugrasen  could  not  have  been  

entertained at all, even if he was entitled for the benefit of  

the Land Policy.  

41. The  High  Court  committed  an  error  observing  

that if the State Government had allowed the application  

filed  by  Ugrasen  it  was  implicit  that   delay,  if  any,  in  

making the claim stood95 condoned. Such an observation  

is not in consonance with law for the reason that if there is  

a delay in filing application, the question would arise as to  

whether the authority has a right to condone the delay.  

Even if, the delay can be condoned, the authority had to  

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examine  as  to  whether  there  was  sufficient  cause  

preventing the applicant to approach the authority in time.  

But,  once  the  delay  has  been  considered  without  

application of mind, in a fact-situation like  in the instant  

case,  the  question  of  deemed condonation  would   not  

arise.  More  so,  the  High  Court  could  not  examine  the  

question of fact as to whether the application was made  

within time or not, particularly, in view of the fact that the  

authority  had  been  making  the  allotment  though  

application had not been made at all in time and it was  

only manipulation of the record of the authority with the  

collusion of its staff.          

42.   In  fact,  such  exercise  by  the  State  amounts  to  

colourable exercise of power.  In State of Punjab & Anr.  

Vs.  Gurdial Singh & Ors. AIR 1980 SC 319, this Court  

dealing with such an issue observed as under:  

“Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity  keeps it separate from the popular concept of  personal  vice.  Pithily  put,  bad  faith  which  invalidates the exercise of power - sometimes  called colourable exercise or fraud on power  and  oftentimes  overlaps  motives,  passions  

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and  satisfaction  -  is  the  attainment  of  ends  beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by  simulation  or  pretension  of  gaining  a  legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for  the  fulfilment  of  a  legitimate  object  the  actuation  or  catalysation  by  malice  is  not  legicidal.  The  action  is  bad  where  the  true  object  is  to  reach an end different  from the  one for which the power is entrusted, goaded  by  extraneous  considerations,  good  or  bad,  but  irrelevant  to  the  entrustment.  When  the  custodian of power is influenced in its exercise  by considerations outside those for promotion  of which the power is vested the court calls it  a  colourable  exercise  and  is  undeceived  by  illusion.”

43.  The State Government, being the revisional authority,  

could not  entertain directly  the applications by the said  

applicants,  namely,  Sh.Ugrasen  and  Sh.  Manohar  Lal.  

The  action  of  the  State  Government  smacks  of  

arbitrariness and is  nothing but  abuse of  power as the  

State  Government  deprived  GDA to  exercise  its  power  

under  the Act,  and deprived the aggrieved party to  file  

appeal  against  the  order  of  allotment.  Thus,  orders  

passed by the State Government stood vitiated.  More so,  

it was a clear cut case of colourable exercise of power.

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44.  So far as the case of allotment in favour of Manohar  

Lal  is  concerned in more than one respect,  it  is  by no  

means  better  than  the  case  of  Ugrasen  as  the  initial  

allotment  had  been  made  by  GDA  in  his  favour  

consequent to the directions of the Chief Minister of Uttar  

Pradesh  who  had  no  competence  to  deal  with  the  

subject under the Statute and he has already been put in  

possession of a part of allotted land in commercial area,  

contrary to the Land Policy.    

45. There are claims and counter  claims regarding  

the dates of Section 6 declaration; taking of possession of  

land;  and   of  making  Awards  so  far  as  the  land  of  

Manohar Lal is concerned.  As per the affidavit filed by  

the  Vice-Chairman,  GDA,  Section  6  declaration  was  

made on 24.5.1965 invoking the  urgency clause under  

section 17(1);  possession was taken on 13.7.1965; and  

Award was made on 11.5.1970.  Manohar Lal preferred  

writ  petition  no.4159/1980  before  the  Allahabad  High  

Court stating that Section 6 declaration in respect of his  

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land was made on 30.1.1969, possession was taken on  

29.5.1969 and Award was made on 11.6.1971.  None of  

the  parties  considered  it  proper  to  place  the  authentic  

documents  before  the  Court  so  that  the  real  facts  be  

determined.   In  such  a  fact  situation,  we  are  not  in  a  

position to decide as to whether Manohar Lal’s application  

was filed in time as he had claimed in the said writ petition  

that he filed the First Application on 22.6.1969.  However,  

one thing is clearly evident from the affidavit filed by Vice  

Chairman,  GDA that  the  land  allotted  to  both  of  these  

parties  has  been  part  of  commercial  area  and  not  of  

residential area.  In view thereof, any allotment made in  

favour  of  Manohar  Lal  so  far,  had  been  illegal  as  the  

application   could not have been entertained by the Chief  

Minister and further appellant could not get allotment in  

commercial  area.   The  Land  Policy  provided  only  for  

allotment of land in residential area.

46. The fact of illegal allotment of land in commercial  

area has been brought to the notice of the Court first time  

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vide  affidavit  of  the  Vice-Chairman,  GDA  dated  

27.5.2010.  Thus, it is crystal clear that such facts had not  

been brought on record before the High Court by GDA at  

any  stage  in  any  of  the  writ  petitions  nor  it  had  been  

pointed out to the State Government when applications of  

both these parties had been entertained directly by the  

Chief  Minister  and  the  State  Government.   Only  

explanation furnished by the Vice-Chairman, GDA, in his  

affidavit is that due to inadvertence it escaped the notice  

of  GDA  that  the  plots  had  been  categorized  as  

commercial in the Master Plan and could not be allotted in  

favour  of  any  applicant.   Even  today,  the  said  plots  

continue to be in commercial area and not in residential  

area.   

47. The  present  appellants  had  also  not  disclosed  

that land allotted to them falls in commercial area.  When  

a person approaches a Court of Equity in exercise of its  

extraordinary  jurisdiction  under  Article  226/227  of  the  

Constitution, he should approach the Court not only with  

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clean hands but  also with  clean mind,  clean heart  and  

clean  objective.   “Equally,  the  judicial  process  should  

never become an instrument of appreciation or abuse or   

a means in the process of the Court to subvert justice.”

Who seeks equity must do equity.   The legal maxim  

“Jure  naturaw  aequum  est  neminum  cum  alterius  

detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem”, means that it is a  

law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss  

or injury to another.   (vide  The Ramjas Foundation &  

Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 852; K.P.  

Srinivas Vs. R.M. Premchand & ors. (1994) 6 SCC 620  

and  Nooruddin  Vs.  (Dr.)  K.L.  Anand  (1995)  1  SCC  

242).  

48.   Similarly, in  Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. Vs.  

State of  Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1236,  this  

Court observed as under:-

“The  power  under  Article  226  is  discretionary.  It will be exercised only in   furtherance of interest of justice and not  merely  on  the  making  out  of  a  legal  point…..the  interest  of  justice  and  the  public interest coalesce.  They are very  often one and the same. ….. The Courts   

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have to weigh the public interest vis-à- vis  the  private  interest  while  exercising….any  of  their  discretionary  powers (Emphasis added).   

49. In  M/s Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. Vs. H.B.  

Munshi & Anr. AIR 1970 SC 898; State of Haryana Vs.  

Karnal Distillery, AIR 1977 SC 781; and Sabia Khan &  

Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2284, this  

Court  held  that  filing  totally  misconceived  petition  

amounts to abuse of the process of the Court.  Such a  

litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as petition  

containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to  

achieve  an  ulterior  purpose  amounts  to  abuse  of  the  

process of the Court.   A litigant is bound to make “full  

and true disclosure of facts.”  

50. In Abdul Rahman Vs. Prasony Bai & Anr. AIR  

2003 SC 718; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs.  

State of Bihar & Ors.  (2004) 7 SCC 166; and  Oswal  

Fats  &  Oils  Ltd.  Vs.  Addl.  Commissioner  (Admn),  

Bareily Division, Bareily & Ors.  JT 2010 (3) SC 510,  

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this  Court  held  that  whenever  the  Court  comes  to  the  

conclusion that the process of the Court is being abused,  

the Court would be justified in refusing to proceed further  

and refuse relief to the party.  This rule has been evolved  

out of need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing  

the process of the Court by deceiving it.   

51. In view of the above, we are of the considered  

opinion that Shri Manohar Lal did not approach the Court  

with disclosure of true facts, and particularly, that he had  

been allotted the land in the commercial area by GDA on  

the instruction of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.   

52. It  is  a  fit  case for  ordering enquiry or  initiating  

proceedings for committing criminal contempt of the Court  

as the parties succeeded in misleading the Court by not  

disclosing the true facts.  However, we are not inclined to  

waste court’s time further in these cases.  Our experience  

has been that the so-called administration is not likely to  

wake-up from its deep slumber and is never interested to  

redeem the limping society from such hapless situations.  

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We  further  apprehend  that  our  pious  hope  that  

administration may muster the courage one day to initiate  

disciplinary/criminal  proceedings  against  such  

applicants/erring officers/employees of the authority, may  

not come true.  However, we leave the course open for  

the State Government and GDA to take decision in regard  

to these issues and as to whether GDA wants to recover  

the  possession  of  the  land  already  allotted  to  these  

applicants in commercial area contrary to the Land Policy  

or  value thereof  adjusting the amount  of  compensation  

deposited by them, if any.   

53.  In view of the above,  Civil  Appeal  No. 974 of  

2007 filed by GDA is allowed.  The Judgment and order of  

the High Court  dated 22.7.2003 passed in Writ  Petition  

No. 6644 of 1989 is hereby set aside.  Civil Appeal No.  

973 of 2007 filed by Manohar Lal is dismissed.  No costs.  

……………………………..J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

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…………………………………..J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, June  3,  2010

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