22 July 2010
Supreme Court
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MANNU SAO Vs STATE OF BIHAR

Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN,SWATANTER KUMAR, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001165-001165 / 2009
Diary number: 36130 / 2008
Advocates: AMBHOJ KUMAR SINHA Vs GOPAL SINGH


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1165 of 2009

Mannu Sao       … Petitioner

Versus

State of Bihar       …Respondent

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. On 14th December, 1985 at about 11.00 A.M. a fardbeyan  

was recorded by Sub-Inspector of the Police Station, Nalanda  

at the behest of Manu Sao who informed that he is living with  

his wife Bimla Devi in his cabin at his agricultural lands in  

village Mohanpur.  He was carrying on agricultural activity as  

he was possessed of agricultural land.  On that very date at  

about 9.00 A.M., he had gone over to Nalanda for some personal  

work and after he returned to his cabin at about 10.00 A.M.,  

he  found  his  wife  Bimla  Devi  lying  in  burnt  condition  in  

amidst chilly plantation in front of his cabin.  There were  

serious burn injuries on her body, however, Manu Sau found her  

somewhat alive at that time and he asked one Bhola Babu for  

help to take her to a doctor for treatment.  By the time, she  

could be lifted to be taken for treatment, she died.  In these  

circumstances,  while  he  was  planning  to  go  to  the  police  

station, the Sub-Inspector Hirdya Narain Singh came there who  

was subsequently examined as PW4.  The Investigating Officer

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started the inquest proceedings and the dead body was sent for  

postmortem to Sadar Hospital, Biharsharif.  The postmortem was  

conducted and the report Ex.4 was prepared on 14th December,  

1985.   It  was  noticed  that  she  had  suffered  from  burn  

injuries,  both  her  eyes  were  closed  and  the  tongue  was  

protruding.   Keeping  in  view  the  postmortem  report,  the  

Investigating Officer had a suspicion in mind and thereafter  

an FIR was recorded with reference to the postmortem report,  

it was found that Bimla Devi had died on account of throttling  

and  ante-mortem  injuries  and,  with  an  intention  to  cause  

disappearance of evidence, the body was burnt.  The F.I.R. was  

Ext.5 and a case under Section 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal  

Code (herein after referred to as ‘IPC’) was registered.  The  

suspect of commission of this crime was found to be Mannu Sao  

himself,  the  appellant  herein.   The  Investigating  Officer  

recorded the statement of the witnesses including that of the  

doctor  and  presented  the  charge-sheet  before  the  Court  of  

competent jurisdiction.  The appellant was charged with both  

the  afore-stated  offences.   He  pleaded  innocence  and  was  

subjected  to  trial.   The  prosecution  only  examined  four  

witnesses  PW1  and  PW2  co-villagers,  PW3  Dr.  Bidhu  Bhushan  

Singh and PW4 Hirdya Narain Singh, Investigating Officer.  The  

learned Trial Court, vide its judgment dated 21st December,  

1987, convicted the accused for both the offences and awarded  

the punishment rigorous imprisonment for life under Section  

302, IPC and three years rigorous imprisonment under Section

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201 IPC.  Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.  

This judgment of the Trial Court was challenged before the  

High Court of Patna, though unsuccessfully.  The High Court  

concurred with the finding of facts recorded by the Court and  

it sustained the finding of guilt as well as order of sentence  

awarded by the Trail Court.  Vide judgment of the High Court  

dated  11th September, 2008  thus giving  rise to  the present  

appeal.

2. While  impugning  the  judgment  under  appeal,  the  

contention raised before us is that the case being that of  

circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has not established  

complete  chain  of  events  and  circumstances  leading  to  the  

commission of the crime and involvement of the appellant.  It  

was further contended that there was no motive as to why the  

appellant should have committed the crime and lastly, that it  

was a clear case of suicide by the deceased and there was no  

material evidence on record to arrive at the conclusion stated  

in the judgments under appeal.

3. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that it is a  

case of circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness to  

the occurrence.  It is a settled principle of law that an  

accused can be punished if he is found guilty even in cases of  

circumstantial evidence, provided, the prosecution is able to  

prove beyond reasonable doubt, complete chain of events and  

circumstances which definitely points towards the involvement

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and guilt of the suspect or accused, as the case may be.  The  

accused will not be entitled to acquittal merely because there  

is no eye-witness to the case.  It is also equally true that  

an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial  

evidence  subject  to  satisfaction  of  accepted  principles  in  

that regard.

4. Three Judge Bench in the case of Sharad v. State of  

Maharashtra, [AIR 1984 SC 1622] held as under:

“152.  Before  discussing  the  cases  relied  upon  by  the  High  Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,  character  and  essential  proof  required  in  a  criminal  case  which  rests  on  circumstantial  evidence  alone.  The  most  fundamental and basic decision of this Court is  Hanumant v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh1. This  case  has  been  uniformly  followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later  decisions  up-to-date,  for  instance,  the  cases  of  Tufail  (alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ramgopal v. State  of Maharashtra. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J.  has laid down in Hanumant case:

“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of  a  circumstantial  nature,  the  circumstances  from  which  the  conclusion  of  guilt  is  to  be  drawn  should  in  the  first  instance  be  fully  established,  and  all  the  facts  so  established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of  the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be  of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as  to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved.  In  other  words,  there  must  be  a  chain  of  evidence  so  far  complete  as  not  to  leave  any  reasonable  ground  for  a  conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it  must be such as to show that within all human probability the  act must have been done by the accused.”

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the  following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against  an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to  be drawn should be fully established.

It  may  be  noted  here  that  this  Court  indicated  that  the

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circumstances  concerned  “must  or  should”  and  not  “may  be”  established.  There  is  not  only  a  grammatical  but  a  legal  distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be  proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade  v. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made: [SCC  para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be  and not merely  may be guilty before a court can convict and  the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and  divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with  the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,  they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except  that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and  tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the  one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to  leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with  the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human  probability the act must have been done by the accused.

154.  These  five  golden  principles,  if  we  may  say  so,  constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on  circumstantial evidence.”

5. In the cases of circumstantial evidence, this Court  

has even held accused guilty where the medical evidence did  

not support the case of the prosecution.  In Anant Lagu v.  

State of Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 500] where the  deceased died of  

poisoning, the Court held that as there were various factors  

which militate against a successful isolation of the poison  

and  its  recognition.  It  further  noticed  that  while  

circumstances often speak with unerring certainty, the autopsy  

and  the  chemical  analysis  taken  by  them  may  be  most  

misleading.  No doubt, due weightage must be given to the  

negative  findings  at  such  examination  which  the  man  of

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medicine performs and the limitations under which he works,  

his failure should not be taken as an end of the case, for on  

good and probative circumstances an irresistible inference of  

guilt can be drawn.  

6. Similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court in the  

case  of  Dayanidhi  Bisoi  v.  State  of  Orissa,  [AIR  2003  SC  

3915], where in a case of circumstantial evidence the Court  

even  confirmed  the  death  sentence  as  being  rarest  of  rare  

cases.  The Court clearly held that it is not a circumstance  

or some of the circumstances which by itself, would assist the  

Court to base a conviction but all circumstances put forth  

against  the  accused  once  are  established  beyond  reasonable  

doubt  then  conviction  must  follow  and  all  the  inordinate  

circumstances would be used for collaborating the case of the  

prosecution.

7. It is of similar significance for the Court to examine  

whether  the  requirements  to  be  established  in  a  case  of  

circumstantial evidence are satisfied in the case  before it  

or not.   The cases of circumstantial evidence  have to be  

dealt with greater care and by microscopic examination of the  

documentary and oral evidence on record.   It is then alone  

that the Court will be in a position to arrive at a conclusion  

upon  proper  analysis  of  the  evidence  in  relation  to  the  

ingredients of an offence.   In the case of circumstantial  

evidence,  particularly,  besides  the  entire  case  of  the

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prosecution,  even  the  statement  of  the  accused  made  under  

Section 313 of  Cr.P.C. can be of substantial help.

8. Let us examine the essential features of this Section  

313  Cr.P.C.  and  the  principles  of  law  as  enunciated  by  

judgments,  which  are  the  guiding  factors  for  proper  

application  and  consequences  which  shall  flow  from  the  

provisions of Section 313 of the Code.  As already noticed,  

the object of recording the statement of the accused under  

Section 313 of the Code is to put all incriminating evidence  

against the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to  

explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him  

in the evidence of the prosecution.  At the same time, also to  

permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so  

chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the  

crime.  The Court has been empowered to examine the accused  

but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It  

is a mandatory obligation upon the Court and besides ensuring  

the compliance thereof the Court has to keep in mind that the  

accused gets a fair chance to explain his conduct.  The option  

lies  with  the  accused  to  maintain  silence  coupled  with  

simplicitor  denial  or  in  the  alternative  to  explain  his  

version  and  reasons,  for  his  alleged  involvement  in  the  

commission of crime.  This is the statement which the accused  

makes  without  fear  or  right  of  the  other  party  to  cross-

examine him.  However, if the statements made are false, the  

Court  is  entitled  to  draw  adverse  inferences  and  pass

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consequential orders, as may be called for, in accordance with  

law.  The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue  

between the Court and the accused and to put to the accused  

every important incriminating piece of evidence and grant him  

an opportunity to answer and explain.  Once such a statement  

is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by  

the Court is to what extent and consequences such statement  

can be used during the enquiry and the trial.  Over the period  

of time, the Courts have explained this concept and now it has  

attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal  

jurisprudence.  The statement of the accused can be used to  

test the veracity of the exculpatory of the admission, if any,  

made by the accused.  It can be taken into consideration in  

any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in  

the  case.   The  provisions  of  Section  313  (4)  explicitly  

provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken  

into  consideration  in  such  enquiry  or  trial  and  put  as  

evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for  

any other offence for which such answers may tempt to show he  

has committed.  In other words, the use is permissible as per  

the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations.  The  

Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused  

and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence  

against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements  

made under this       Section should not be considered in  

isolation  but  in  conjunction  with  evidence  adduced  by  the

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prosecution.  Another  important  caution  that  Courts  have  

declared  in  the  pronouncements  is  that  conviction  of  the  

accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under  

Section  313  of  the  Code  as  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  

substantive piece of evidence.  In the case of Vijendrajit  

Ayodhya Prasad Goel v State of Bombay, [AIR 1953 SC 247], the  

Court held as under:

“3. …….As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the  godown,  further  evidence  was  not  led  on  the  point.   The  Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring  to  the  statement  of  the  accused  under  Section  342  as  supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of  the godown.  The contention that the Magistrate made use of  the inculpatory part of the accused’s statement and excluded  the  exculpatory  part  does  not  seem  to  be  correct.   The  statement under Section 342 did not consist of two portions,  part inculpatory and part exculpatory.  It concerned itself  with two facts.  The accused admitted that he was in charge of  the godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was found in  that godown.  He alleged that the rectified spirit was found  outside it.  This part of his statement was proved untrue by  the prosecution evidence and had no intimate connection with  the statement concerning the possession of the godown.”

9. On  similar  lines  reference  can  be  made  in  quite  a  

recent judgment of this Court in the case of Ajay Singh v.  

State of Maharashtra, [(2007) 12 SCC 341] where the Court held  

as under:

“11. So far as the prosecution case that kerosene was found on  the accused’s dress is concerned, it is to be noted that no  question in this regard was put to the accused while he was  examined under Section 313 of the Code.

12. The purpose of Section 313 of the Code is set out in its  opening  words  –  “for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  accused  personally  to  explain  any  circumstances  appearing  in  the  evidence against him”.  In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of  Madhya Bharat it has been laid down by Bose, J. (AIR p. 469,  para 8) that the statements of the accused persons recorded  under Section 313 of the Code “are among the most important

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matters to be considered at the trial”.  It was pointed out  that:  “8…The statements of the accused recorded by the committing  Magistrates and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to  take the place of what in England and in America he would be  free to state in his own way in the witness box [and that]  they have to be received in evidence and treated as evidence  and be duly considered at the trial.”

This position remains unaltered even after the insertion of  Section 315 in the Code and any statement under Section 313  has to be considered in the same way as if Section 315 is not  there.

13. The object of examination under this section is to give  the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against  him.   This  statement  can  be  taken  into  consideration  in  judging his innocence or guilt.  Where there is an onus on the  accused  to  discharge,  it  depends  on  the  facts  and  circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the  onus.”

10. The statement made by the accused is capable of being  

used in the trial though to a limited extent.  But the law  

also  places  an  obligation  upon  the  Court  to  take  into  

consideration the stand of the accused in his statement and  

consider  the  same  objectively  and  in  its  entirety.   This  

principle of law has been stated by this Court in the case of  

Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [AIR 1953 SC  

468].

11. Let us now examine the relevant part of the statement  

made by the accused under Section 313 of the Code as it would  

to some extent narrow the controversy before the Court.  The  

appellant had clearly and in unambiguous terms admitted that  

the deceased was his wife and she died of burn injuries.  The  

questions  put  to  the  accused  were  very  few  and  the  two

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important questions which were put to the accused by the Court  

and his answers read as under:

“Question:-  It  is  the  case  of  the  prosecution  that  after  committing murder you in order to disappear the evidence of  the  murder  set  the  dead  body  on  fire  and  also  tried  to  disappear the same to screen yourself from punishment.

Ans:- No.

Question:- You had stated in the information that your wife  Bimla Devi had died being burnt due to fire.  In postmortem  examination it has been found that her death has been caused  by throttling her neck.  What have you to say?

Ans:- I  had  given  information  to  the  police  regarding  burning.   She  has  not  been  murdered.   Her  death  has  been  caused due to throttling her neck is wrong.”

12. As already noticed from the above answers, it is clear  

that the appellant does not dispute the factum of the deceased  

being  his  wife  and  had  died  because  of  burn  injuries.  

However,  his  version  is  that  she  committed  a  suicide  by  

pouring kerosene on her and burning herself.  While according  

to the prosecution primarily relying upon the statement of  

PW3,  it  was  a  case  of  causing  death  of  the  deceased  by  

strangulating and then burning the body of the deceased.  Even  

the learned Trial Court had noticed and discussed these facts  

and  as  well  as  noticed  the  admission  and  argument  of  the  

learned Counsel appearing for the accused before that Court.  

It will be useful to refer to those findings in paragraph 8  

and 9 of the Trial Court Judgment:-

“8. This case is based on circumstantial evidence as there is  no eye witness of the occurrence, which had taken place in the  cabin belonging to the accused.  So far the occurrence is  concerned, the stand of the accused had been in the beginning  that  his  wife  Bimla  Devi  had  committed  suicide  during  his

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absence by sprinkling K.Oil.  Before I proceed to discuss the  evidence brought on the record by the prosecution as well as  the  circumstances,  I  find  it  necessary  in  the  outset  to  mention some of the facts which are not denied nor disputed in  this case.  The learned defence counsel has not disputed the  fact that the deceased, Bimla Devi was the wife (concubine) of  the accused, Manu Sao, and that the accused was living with  her in his cabin at village Mohanpur.  It is also not disputed  that the woman had died and had burnt injury on her person.  U.D.  case  on  the  statement  of  Manu  Sao  as  informant,  was  institute  which  was  converted  into  a  case  under  section  302/301 I.P.C. on the written report of the officer-in-charge  on the receipt of the post-mortem report (Ext.2) on the dead  body of Bimla Devi.

9. From Ext.6, it appears that the officer-in-charge, P.W.4,  had gone to the place of occurrence on hearing rumour after  making station diary entry regarding a woman lying burnt at  village Mohanpur near the cabin of the accused.  P.W.4 Hirdya  Narain Singh, the officer-in-charge, who had gone to the place  of occurrence had found the dead body of a woman lying in a  chilly field near the cabin of the informant and she had burnt  injury.  Manu Sao, accused, had maintained that till 9.30 A.M.  and when he returned at 10.30 A.M. he found his wife Bimla  Devi lying burnt in a chili field near his cabin and had also  seen trace of K. oil. extending from well near the cabin up to  the door of the cabin……..”

13. In light of the above undisputed position, now let us  

proceed to examine whether complete chain of events has been  

established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.   

14. This aspect of the case was also squarely dealt with  

by the learned Trial Court which had the benefit of recording  

the  entire  evidence  noticed  the  demur  and  conduct  of  the  

witnesses as well as the expert witnesses satisfactorily.  In  

para 19 and 20, these circumstances have been noticed by the  

Trial Court in an appropriate manner.  We may refer to them:

“19. It is true that there is no eye witness account but there  are circumstances which prove beyond doubt that the accused  had killed his wife and in order to escape punishment and in  order to disappear the evidence of death set fire to the dead  body and gave out that his wife committed suicide by burning

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in between 9 A.M. to 10.30 A.M. on 14.12.1985.

20. The following circumstances clearly show that the accused  committed the crime:

(1) He  was  found  in  the  cabin  with  his  wife  when  the  throttling  was  done.   The  evidence  of  throttling  according to P.W.3 taken place in the right (sic) of  13/14.12.1985.

(2) The accused furnished false information in his fardbeyan  propounding a case of suicide of his wife by setting  fire, on the basis of which an U.D. case was instituted.  The deceased Bimla Devi had died due to throttling which  can be attributed to the accused and not due to burn  injury which was post-mortem.

(3) The accused did not give any information to the police  about the occurrence and police on its own information  had  gone  to  the  place  of  occurrence  where  Manu  Sao  (accused) gave out that his wife has committed suicide.  If  this  be  so,  then  he  ought  to  have  immediately  informed the police.  The fact that he had informed one  Bhola Paswan about it also cannot be believed because he  has not been examined to prove this part of the defence  version.

(4) From the inquest report as well as from the evidence of  the  doctor,  P.W.  3  it  is  clear  that  tongue  of  the  deceased was found protruding and swollen.  There was  fracture of right parietal skull bone and the Larynx and  treachea  congested.   There  was  no  possibility  of  pressing of neck by the deceased herself as P.W. 3 has  negatived such a situation.

(5) The motive for the occurrence is also not far to seek.  It is in the evidence that the castmen of the accused  were against the keeping of Bimla Devi by the accused.  It is urged by the learned counsel for the defence that  the  possibility  of  the  hand  of  the  father  of  the  deceased woman and his family member cannot be ruled  out.  There is nothing on the record to show that there  was at any time protest by the father of the deceased  rather there is evidence on record to show that the  accused  conduct  was  constantly  opposed  by  his  own  castmen.

(6) If  the  woman  had  burnt  herself  for  which  evidence  created  by  the  husband  (accused)  then  how  could  she  inflict injury on her person and how there could be  trolling (sic) which the doctor had found during the  post-mortem examination.

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(7) The learned defence counsel urged that the fard-beyan of  the  accused  recorded  by  police  inadmissible  and  this  cannot be used against him as this statement was made to  a police officer.  This case has not been instituted on  the basis of the fardbeyan of the accused rather on the  statement and written information of the P.W. 4.  The  written  report  of  the  U.D.  case  and  the  information  given  by  Manu  Sao  cannot  be  equated  with  first  information of confession by the accused.  I his (sic)  statement was made by him when he was not accused rather  an informant.  Therefore, I find no substance in the  above argument.  Moreover, accused has also not denied  his earlier statement and has even in this statement  under  section  313  Cr.P.C.  admitted  to  have  given  information  regarding  suicide  by  his  wife  by  setting  fire.”

15. These findings of facts and appreciation of evidence  

by the Trial Court was not interfered by the High Court and in  

fact,  it  recorded  its  occurrence  by  reiterating  these  

findings.

16. Some emphasis was placed on the fact that PW2 a co-

villager, in his evidence, had said that he did not know about  

the occurrence and he had signed on the report Ext.1/1 at the  

behest of the Investigating Officer.  The accused can hardly  

derive any advantage from this because this witness was to  

primarily prove the death of the deceased after she had been  

burnt.  Even according to the prosecution he was not an eye-

witness and there was nothing much which he would contradict,  

as the prosecution had mainly relied upon the statement of PW3  

and PW4.  The most important witness of the present case was  

PW3 Dr. Bidhu Bhushan Singh who had performed the postmortem  

upon the deceased’s body and had written that she had been

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killed  by  throttling  or  strangulating  and  thereafter  she  

suffered the burn injuries.  In the cross-examination of this  

witness, nothing material could be pointed out which would  

help the case of the accused.    The accused has admitted the  

deceased was his wife and was living with him in the cabin.  

On the basis of the record, the High Court has also noticed  

the fact that deceased had separated from her earlier husband  

and was living with the accused who was also staying away from  

his family.  The villagers had objected to the accused living  

with the deceased in that manner.  In these circumstances, the  

onus to explain the cause of death of the deceased was upon  

the  husband.   He  did  offer  an  explanation  that  she  had  

committed suicide by burning herself but this explanation has  

been disbelieved.  Another very material factor is that as per  

his own statement when he noticed that the deceased was still  

alive and her burnt body was lying just outside cabin in the  

chilly plantation, he had taken the help of Bhola Babu.  The  

name of this person he neither referred in his statement under  

Section 313 Cr.PC. nor he examined this person as a witness.  

In the normal course, thus, it  will have to be presumed that  

if this witness was produced and examined in Court, he might  

have spoken the truth which was not suitable or favourable to  

the  accused.   For  reasons  best  known  and  which  remained  

unexplained,  this  witness  was  not  examined  though  in  his  

statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in answer to the last  

question he had stated that he was innocent and would give in

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writing whatever he wanted to say.  Despite this, no defence  

was led by the appellant.  PW1 stated in his examination-in-

chief that the tube well of the accused Manu Sao was located  

north of his khalian in village Mohanpur and that Bimla Devi  

was living with the accused and when about 10.00 A.M. on the  

date of occurrence, he had gone there he had seen Bimla Devi  

in a burnt condition.  According to him, the police had come  

and prepared an inquest report which was signed by him.  The  

statement of this witness is that of the truthful witness and  

he has not tried to add or subtract anything in his statement  

what he stated before the police during investigation.  In  

face of his statement, the relevancy of PW2 being declared  

hostile is hardly of any consequence.  Strangely, even to this  

witness even a question was not posed in his cross examination  

that one Bhola Babu was present at the site from whom the  

accused had sought help to take the deceased to the hospital.  

17. Resultantly  and  in  any  case  nothing  worth  noticing  

much  less  favourable  to  the  accused  came  in  his  cross-

examination.   PW3  Dr.  Bidhu  Bhushan  Singh  expressed  his  

opinion as to the accused of death as follows:

“In  my  opinion  death  was  due  to  xphyxia  (sic)  shock  and  haemarrage (sic) as a result of throttling (sic) and above  mentioned injuries.  Time elapsed since death was 12 to 16  hours.  The bruise on the right forehead region was possible  by hard blunt substance.”

18. The  above  evidence  clearly  satisfies  the  conditions  

stated by this Court, which need to be satisfied in a case of  

circumstantial evidence in the case of Sharad (supra).  The

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circumstances proved by the prosecution are of a conclusive  

nature and they do exclude the possibility of any other view  

which could be taken rationally and reasonably.  The fact of  

the matter is that the deceased died while living with the  

appellant  and  he  ought  to  explain  his  conduct  and  he  was  

expected  to  render  some  explanation  which  was  reasonably  

possible in the facts and circumstances of the case in regard  

to cause of her death.

19. Lastly, now we should revert to the discussion on as  

to what was the motive of the appellant to kill the deceased.  

It has come in evidence that the deceased had left her earlier  

husband  and  was  living  with  the  appellant,  who  was  also  

staying away from his family in the cabin in his agricultural  

fields,  where  that  incident  occurred.   There  was  definite  

protest raised by the villagers to their living together.  The  

statement of PW4 in this regard is of relevance.  Besides  

this, even the medical evidence had shown that the deceased  

was strangulated or throttled before her body was burnt.  The  

social  embarrassment  could  be  a  plausible  motive  for  the  

appellant to commit the crime.   Furthermore, the appellant  

took an incorrect, if not a false stand before the Court that  

the incident occurred in his absence.   His conduct in naming  

Bhola Babu from whom he had sought help to take the deceased  

to  the  hospital  also  does  not  appeared  to  be  correct.  

Appellant made no effort whatsoever to examine any witness to  

establish this fact.   The appellant has admitted that the

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deceased died in front of his eyes and he did nothing except  

reporting  the  matter  to  the  police  at  a  subsequent  stage.  

With the development of law, now it is a settled principle  

that motive is not absolutely essential to be established for  

securing  conviction  of  an  accused  who  has  committed  the  

offence, provided the prosecution has been able to prove its  

case beyond any reasonable doubt.  In the present case, the  

motive suggested by the prosecution appears to be reasonable  

and is in consonance with the behaviour of a person placed in  

a situation like the appellant and it is also difficult to  

believe  that  a  person  would  commit  suicide  without  any  

provocation or incident immediately preceding the occurrence.  

The explanation rendered by the appellant has correctly been  

disbelieved by both the Courts as we see no reason to take a  

different view. Furthermore, in the case of Bhimapa Chandappa  

Hosamani  v.  State  of  Karnataka,  [(2006)  11  SCC  323],  this  

Court has taken the view that it is not always mandatory for  

the prosecution to establish motive as it is just one of the  

ingredients  for  convicting  an  accused,  the  Court  held  as  

under:  

“13.  The  trial  court  as  well  as  the  High  Court  have  not  accepted the evidence regarding existence of motive as alleged  by PW 1 in the first information report. In fact she herself  in the course of her deposition denied the existence of such a  motive. The High Court has agreed with the view of the trial  court on this issue. It is well settled that in order to bring  home the guilt of an accused, it is not necessary for the  prosecution to prove the motive. The existence of motive is  only  one  of  the  circumstances  to  be  kept  in  mind  while  appreciating the evidence adduced by the prosecution. If the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  appears  to  be  truthful  and  convincing, failure to prove the motive is not fatal to the

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case  of  the  prosecution.  The  law  on  this  aspect  is  well  settled.”

20       In view of the above reasoning, we do not find any  

infirmity in law or otherwise in the judgment under appeal.  

The finding of guilty as well as the order of sentence also do  

not  call  for  any  interference.   Hence,  the  appeal  is  

dismissed.

..................J. [DR.  B.S. CHAUHAN ]

..................J.      [ SWATANTER KUMAR ]

New Delhi July 22, 2010