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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  7253 of 2002

PETITIONER: Manik Lal Mazumdar & Ors.

RESPONDENT: Gouranga Chandra Dey & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/02/2004

BENCH: Shivaraj V. Patil        

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

SHIVARAJ V. PATIL J.

       Few facts, which are considered necessary and  relevant for disposal of this appeal, in short and  substance, are the following:         The respondent No. 1 filed a petition for eviction  under Section 12 of The Tripura Buildings (Lease and  Rent Control) Act, 1975 (for short ’the Act’) on the  grounds of bona fide requirement and default in payment  of rent.  The Rent Control Court held that the claim of  bona fide requirement was not proved.  However, it  found that the appellants were defaulters in payment of  rent and directed the appellants to hand over the  possession of the building in question to the  respondent No. 1.  The appellants filed R.C.C. Appeal  4/1995 under Section 20 of the Act before the Civil  Judge (Senior Division), West Tripura against the said  order of the Rent Control Court.  The learned Civil  Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal  holding that the appellants failed to deposit the  arrears of rent as directed by the Rent Control Court  and the appeal filed by them without making deposit of  arrears of rent was not maintainable in view of Section  13(1) of the Act.  Thereafter, the appellants filed  revision petition in the court of the District Judge,  Tripura, assailing the order passed by the learned  Civil Judge in appeal.  The learned District Judge  allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of  the Civil Judge in appeal and remanded the case to the  appellate court for considering the petition for  adducing additional evidence and for deciding the  appeal afresh.  The respondent No. 1, aggrieved by this  order passed in the revision petition, filed a petition  as Civil Rule No. 466 of 1997 under Article 227 of the  Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court.  A  learned single Judge of the High Court, after hearing  the parties, finding some conflict in the decisions of  this Court in Chinnamma vs. Gopalan and others  and of  Division Bench of the High Court in Binapani Roy & two  others vs. State of Tripura and two others , felt that  the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in  Binapani Roy case required reconsideration by a larger  bench to decide the following question: - "Whether in view of Section 13 of the  Act, 1975, the appellate Court is  prohibited from entertaining an appeal

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unless the tenant has paid or pays to  the landlord or deposit with the Rent  Control Court or the appellant  authority, as the case may be, all  arrears of rent admitted by the tenant  to be due in respect of the building up  to the date of payment of deposit and  continue to pay or deposit any rent  which may subsequently become due in  respect of the building until  termination of the proceedings before  the Rent Control Court or the appellate  authority, as the case may be?"

The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the  parties, concluded that the judgment of the Division  Bench in Binapani Roy case (aforementioned) did not  require any reconsideration and no reference to a  larger Bench was called for.  It also held that no  appeal against the order made under Section 12 of the  Act is competent and maintainable under Section 20 of  the Act unless provision of Section 13(1) of the Act is  complied with; that fulfillment of the requirement of  Section 13(1) is a sine qua non for preferring appeal  under Section 20.  Hence, aggrieved by the same, the  appellant-tenants have assailed the impugned judgment  of the Division Bench of the High Court in this appeal.         The learned Senior counsel for the appellants  contended that the High Court was not right and  justified in taking a technical view in the matter; as  in the case of contesting the proceedings before the  Rent Controller, opportunity could be given by the  appellate court for making payment of admitted rent due  or depositing before the appeal is heard; saying that  appeal itself could not be preferred without paying or  depositing admitted arrears of rent may not be correct  in view of Section 13(3) of the Act; if Section 13 is  read as a whole, it will be clear that appeal preferred  without payment or depositing of admitted arrears of  rent, it could not be dismissed.  On the other hand,  further proceedings in the appeal could be stopped in  case admitted arrears of rent were not paid or  deposited.  He placed reliance on the judgment of this  Court in Chinnamma case (supra).         Per contra, the learned counsel for the  respondents-landlord made submissions supporting the  impugned judgment.  It was urged that Section 13(1) in  clear and unambiguous terms states that no appeal can  be preferred against any order of Rent Controller  without paying or depositing of arrears of rent  admitted.         Before proceeding to deal with the respective  contentions urged on behalf of the parties it would be  useful to reproduce the provisions of Sections 12, 13  and 20 of the Act to the extent they are relevant for  the immediate purpose: - "12.    Eviction of tenants \026 (1) Not- withstanding anything to the contrary  contained in any other law or contract a  tenant shall not be evicted excepted in  accordance with the provisions of this  Act.         Provided that nothing contained in  this section shall apply to a tenant  whose landlord is the State Government

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or the Central Government or any other  public authority notified under this  Act.         Provided further that where the  tenant denies the title of the landlord  or claims right of permanent-tenancy the  Rent Control Court shall decide whether  the denial or claim is bonafide and if  it records a finding to that effect, the  landlord shall be entitled to sue for  eviction of the tenant in a civil court  and such court may pass a decree for  eviction on any of the grounds mentioned  in this section, notwithstanding that  such court finds that such denial does  not involve forfeiture of the lease or  that the claim is unfounded. (2)(a)  A landlord who seeks to evict  his tenant shall apply to the Rent  Control Court for a direction in that  behalf.         (b) If the Rent Control Court, after  giving the tenant a reasonable  opportunity of showing cause against the  application, is satisfied that the  tenant has not paid or tendered the rent  due by him in respect of the building  within fifteen days after the expiry of  the time fixed in the agreement or  tenancy with his landlord or in the  absence of any such agreement by the  last day of the month next following  that for which the rent is payable and  such default has continued for three  months within a period of twelve months,  it shall make an order directing the  tenant to put the landlord in possession  of the building, and if it is not  satisfied it shall make an order  rejecting the application thereof by  him.         Provided that an application under  this sub-section shall be made only if  the landlord has sent a registered  notice to the tenant intimating the  default and the tenant has failed to pay  or tender the rent together with  interest at six per cent per annum and  postal charges incurred in sending the  notice within fifteen days of the  receipt of the notice or of the receipt  of the notice or of the refusal thereof.         (c)     The order of the Rent Control  Court directing the tenant to put the  landlord in possession of the building  shall not be executed before the expiry  of one month from the date of such order  or such further period as the Rent  Control Court may in its discretion  allow; and if the tenant deposits the  arrears of rent with interest and cost  of proceedings within the said period of  one month or such further period, as may  be, it shall vacate that order."

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xxx             xxx             xxx             xxx

"13. Payment or deposit of rent during  the pendency of proceedings for  eviction. \026 No tenant against whom an  application for eviction has been made  by a landlord under section 12 shall be  entitled to contest the application  before the Rent Control Court under that  section, or to prefer an appeal under  section 20 against any order made by the  Rent Control Court on the application,  unless he has paid or pays to the  landlord, or deposit with the Rent  Control Court or the appellate  authority, as the case may be, all  arrears of rent admitted by the tenant  to be due in respect of the building  upto the date of payment of deposit, and  continues to pay or to deposit any rent  which may subsequently become due in  respect of the building, until the  termination of the proceedings before  the Rent Control Court or the appellate  authority as the case may be. (2)     The deposit under sub-section  (1) shall be made within such time as  the Rent Control Court may fix and in  such manner as may be prescribed and  shall be accompanied by the fee  prescribed for the service of notice  referred to in sub-section (4):         Provided that the time fixed by the  Rent Control Court for the deposit of  the arrears of rent shall not be less  than forty-five days from the date of  the order and the time fixed for the  deposit of rent which subsequently  accrues due shall not be less than two  weeks from the date on which the rent  become due. (3)     If any tenant fails to pay or to  deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent  Control Court or the appellate  authority, as the case may be, shall  unless the tenant shows sufficient cause  to the contrary, stop all further  proceedings and make an order directing  the tenant to put the landlord in  possession of the building. (4)     When any deposit is made under  sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court  or the appellate authority, as the case  may be, shall cause notice of the  deposit to be served on the landlord in  the prescribed manner and the amount  deposited may, subject to such  conditions as may be prescribed, be  withdrawn by the landlord on application  made by him to the Rent Control Court or  the appellate authority in that behalf. xxx             xxx             xxx             xxx

"20. Appeal. \026 (1) (a) The State

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Government may, by general or special  order notified in the Official Gazette,  confer on such officers and authorities  not below the rank of a subordinate  judge the powers of appellate  authorities for the purposes of this Act  in such classes of cases as may be  specified in the order.         (b)     Any person aggrieved by an order  passed by the Rent Control Court may,  within thirty days from the date of such  order, prefer an appeal in writing to  the appellate authority having  jurisdiction.         Note: - In computing the thirty days  in this clause, the time taken to obtain  a certified copy of the order appealed  against shall be excluded.         (2)     On such appeal being preferred,  the appellate authority may order stay  of further proceedings in the matter  pending decision on the appeal.         (3)     The appellate authority shall  call for the record of the case from the  Rent Control Court and after giving the  parties an opportunity of being heard,  and if necessary, after making such  further inquiry as it thinks fit either  directly or through the Rent Control  Court, shall decide the appeal.         Explanation: - The appellate  authority may, while confirming the  order of eviction passed by the Rent  Control Court grant an extension of time  to the tenant for putting the landlord  in possession of the building.         (4)     The appellate authority shall  have all the powers of the Rent Control  Court including the fixing of arrears of  rent. (5)     The decision of the appellate  authority, and subject to such decision,  an order of the Rent Control Court shall  be final and shall not be liable to be  called in question in any court of law,  except as provided in section 22."

(emphasis supplied)

       The short question that arises for consideration  in this appeal is whether an appeal can be preferred  under Section 20 of the Act aggrieved by the order made  under Section 12 of the Act without making the payment  or depositing all arrears of rent admitted as required  under Section 13(1) of the Act.  A landlord can seek a  direction to evict his tenant under Section 12 of the  Act and the Rent Control Court on being satisfied that  the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due in  respect of the building shall make an order directing  the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the  building and if it is not satisfied it shall make an  order rejecting the application.  The order of the Rent  Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord  in possession shall not be executed before the expiry  of one month from the date of such order or till such

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further period as the Rent Control Court may in its  discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the  arrears of rent with interest and cost of the  proceedings within the said period, it shall vacate  that order.         Section 13 makes provision for payment or deposit  of rent during the pendency of the proceedings for  eviction.  In this Section it is clearly stated that no  tenant against whom an application for eviction has  been made by a landlord under Section 12 shall be  entitled to contest the application before the Rent  Control Court under that Section, or to prefer an  appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the  Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has  paid or pays the landlord or deposit with the Rent  Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case  may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to  be due in respect of the building up to the date of  payment or deposit, and continues to pay or deposit any  rent, which may subsequently become due before the Rent  Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case  may be.  Under sub-Section (1) of Section 13 two  situations are contemplated \026 one is contesting the  application before the Rent Control Court and the other  is preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act.   An embargo is placed on the tenant expressly either to  contest the application under Section 12 before the  Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal under Section  20 of the Act without payment or deposit of arrears of  rent.  The second part of the same sub-Section requires  the tenant to continue to pay or deposit any subsequent  rent before the Rent Control Court or the appellate  authority, as the case may be.  From this sub-Section  it is clear that a tenant cannot prefer an appeal under  Section 20 \026 (1) unless the tenant has paid or pays to  the landlord or deposits the arrears of rent admitted  by the tenant to be due in respect of the building and  (2) after preferring an appeal he is required to  continue to pay or deposit subsequent rent before the  appellate authority to prosecute the appeal.         From the plain language and clear terms of Section  13(1) of the Act it follows that payment or deposit of  all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in  respect of the building up to the date of the payment  or deposit is a mandatory requirement for preferring an  appeal under Section 20 of the Act.  The said sub- section declares that no tenant shall be entitled to  contest or to prefer an appeal unless he has paid or  pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control  Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be.   The use of the words "no" and "unless" in sub- Section (1) of Section 13 in the context makes the  position clear that the payment or deposit of all  arrears of rent is a pre-requisite essential condition  for preferring an appeal.         The contentions of the learned counsel for the  appellants that sub-Section (3) of Section 13 provides  opportunity to the tenant to show sufficient cause in  regard to failure to pay or deposit the rent both  before the Rent Control Court and the appellate  authority and by combined reading of Section 13(1) and  13(3) it may be construed that there is no bar for  preferring an appeal without depositing or paying the  arrears of rent; the appeal could be preferred but the  further proceedings could be stopped in the appeal in

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case the tenant fails to pay or deposits arrears of  rent without any sufficient cause and the appeal being  in continuation of the original proceedings, the same  powers could be exercised by the appellate authority in  granting time to a tenant to pay or deposit arrears of  rent even after preferring an appeal, cannot be  accepted.  In the same Section the Legislature  consciously contemplated different situations and  different stages in regard to contesting the  application under Section 12 of the Act and preferring  an appeal under Section 20 and continuing the  proceedings in the appeal after preferring an appeal.   Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 speaks of payment or  deposit of arrears of rent before preferring an appeal  and Sub-Section (3) of the same Section speaks of  stopping all further proceedings by the appellate  authority.         Under Section 13(1) a tenant is not entitled to  contest the application unless he has paid or pays to  the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court  the arrears of rent.  He cannot prefer an appeal  without payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted.   Section 13(3) deals with stopping all further  proceedings unless the tenant shows sufficient cause  for his failure to pay or deposit the rent.  Stopping  of further proceedings would arise only if the  proceedings are pending.  Unless an appeal is preferred  after complying the payment of arrears of rent or  deposit of the admitted arrears of rent due, the  question of either pendency of the appeal or stopping  of further proceedings in such appeal does not arise.   There are two separate aspects in regard to an appeal \026  one is compliance to be made before preferring an  appeal and the other is the tenant has to continue to  pay or deposit the rent, which may subsequently become  due.  Sub-section (3) of Section 13 will come into  operation on the tenant failing to pay or deposit  subsequent arrears of rent arising during the pendency  of the appeal, so as to stop further proceedings in the  appeal. But, it cannot relieve the statutory compulsion  or the mandatory requirement of Section 13(1), viz.,  paying or depositing the arrears of admitted rent  before preferring an appeal. Under Section 20(2) only  after an appeal is preferred under Section 20 after  complying with Section 13(1), the appellate authority  may stay further proceedings.  Under Sub-section (4) of  Section 20, no doubt, the appellate authority shall  have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including  the fixing of arrears of rent.  This sub-section cannot  be read in isolation.  It has to be read along with  Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 13 and Sub-sections  (1) and (2) of Section 20.  Under Section 20(4) the  appellate authority may have the power of fixing of  arrears of rent but that is only in relation to arrears  of rent that may become subsequently due during the  pendency of the appeal.         Payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent  before preferring an appeal under Section 20 is a  statutory requirement as expressly stated in compulsive  language under Section 13(1) of the Act and no  discretion is left to the appellate authority to say  that an appeal could be preferred without satisfying  pre-condition of deposit or payment of admitted arrears  of rent.  Under Section 20(1)(b) any person aggrieved  by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may within

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30 days prefer an appeal.  Under Section 20(2) on such  appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may  order stay of further proceedings.  The appeal could be  preferred only on payment or deposit of arrears of  admitted rent. It also follows that no effective order  of stay of further proceedings can be passed by the  appellate authority unless an appeal is preferred after  such payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent.   This is also a factor to indicate that payment or  deposit of arrears of admitted rent is essential before  preferring an appeal.  It is to command a tenant to pay  or deposit arrears of admitted rent to protect the  interest of the landlord as in other matters certain  provisions are made to protect the interest of the  tenant.  Remedy of appeal is a creation of statute and  it is open to the legislature to provide for an appeal  subject to certain conditions.  Insistence of payment  or depositing of arrears of rent admitted as stated in  Section 13(1) of the Act cannot be diluted or defeated  merely on the ground of hardship to a tenant more so  when tenant already had one opportunity before the Rent  Control Court in regard to making payment or depositing  arrears of rent. Perhaps it was considered unreasonable  or unnecessary to provide again opportunity before  Appellate Authority to a tenant that too to pay or  deposit admitted arrears of rent. A Bench of three  learned Judges of this Court in Nasiruddin & Ors. vs.  Sita Ram Agarwal  while dealing with the question of  deposit of arrears of rent and default in depositing  the rent within the given time, in para 35 has  expressed thus:- "In a case where the  statutory provision is plain  and unambiguous, the court  shall not interpret the same  in a different manner, only  because of harsh consequences  arising therefrom."

Sub-section (4) of Section 20 also does not help the  appellants to say that the appellate authority shall  have all powers of Rent Control Court and in that view  an appeal could be preferred without payment or deposit  of arrears of admitted rent. If it is so read or  understood, it will dilute or defeat the clear, express  and mandatory requirement of Section 13(1). As already  noticed above, in view of the specific provision made  in Section 13(1) as regards payment or deposit of  arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal,  the argument based on sub-Section (4) cannot be  accepted. Under sub-section (4), the Appellate  Authority may exercise powers of the Rent Controller as  regards arrears of rent that may become due after  preferring an appeal and during the pendency of it.   But this sub-section cannot render mandatory  requirement under sub-section (1) of Section 13  ineffective or otiose.  It is well settled principle of  interpretation that every part of the provision has to  be given meaning and effect in the context of a  statute.  When there is express provision made in  Section 13(1) in emphatic terms using negative words  indicating mandatory requirements of payment or deposit  of arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal  under Section 20, neither sub-section (3) of Section 13  nor sub-Section (4) of Section 20 are of any avail to

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the appellants.  This view is supported by a decision  of Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in  Nasiruddin & Ors (supra), which after considering  several decisions dealing with the provisions of Rent  Control Acts of different States, expressed that where  statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court  shall not interpret the same in a different manner only  because of harsh consequences arising therefrom; the  Rent Control Act is a welfare legislation not entirely  beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the  benefit of the landlord; scope of legislation or its  intention cannot be enlarged when the language of the  provision is plain and unambiguous.  In para 37 of the  said judgment, it is stated thus:

"37.    The court’s jurisdiction to  interpret a statute can be invoked when  the same is ambiguous.  It is well known  that in a given case the court can iron  out the fabric but it cannot change the  texture of the fabric.  It cannot  enlarge the scope of legislation or  intention when the language of the  provision is plain and unambiguous.  It  cannot add or subtract words to a  statute or read something into it which  is not there.  It cannot rewrite or  recast legislation.  It is also  necessary to determine that there exists  a presumption that the legislature has  not used any superfluous words.  It is  well settled that the real intention of  the legislation must be gathered from  the language used.  It may be true that  use of expression "shall or may" is  not decisive for arriving at a finding  as to whether the statute is directory  or mandatory.  But the intention of the  legislature must be found out from the  scheme of the Act.  It is also equally  well settled that when negative words  are used, the courts will presume that  the intention of the legislature was  that the provisions are mandatory in  character."

(emphasis supplied)

       In the same decision, it is also held that where  the statute does not provide either for extension of  time or condone the default in depositing the rent  within the stipulated period, the court does not have  the power to do so.  

       In E.Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. &  Ors. , this Court has taken the view that benefits  conferred by statutory provisions can be enjoyed only  if such provisions are strictly complied with and  procedure prescribed is followed step by step.  Para 5  of the said judgment reads: -

"5.     Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel  for the appellant argued that since the  appellant tenant had deposited the  arrear of rent in court, it should be

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taken as compliance with Section 8 of  the Act.  This would mean there is no  default on the part of tenant in payment  of rent and therefore, no eviction order  could have been passed against the  appellant on that ground.  According to  the learned counsel, the court should  not take a technical view of the matter  and should appreciate that it was on  account of refusal of the landlords to  accept the rent sent by way of money  orders that the tenant was driven to  move the court for permission to deposit  the arrears of rent.  Since there is a  substantial compliance with Section 8  inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand  deposited in court, a strict or  technical view ought not to have been  taken by the High Court.  We are unable  to accept this contention advanced on  behalf of the appellant by the learned  counsel.  The rent legislation is  normally intended for the benefit of the  tenants.  At the same time, it is well  settled that the benefits conferred on  the tenants through the relevant  statutes can be enjoyed only on the  basis of strict compliance with the  statutory provisions.  Equitable  consideration has no place in such  matters.  The statute contains express  provisions.  It prescribes various steps  which a tenant is required to take.  In  Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to  be followed by the tenant is given step  by step.  An earlier step is a pre- condition for the next step.  The tenant  has to observe the procedure as  prescribed in the statute.  A strict  compliance with the procedure is  necessary.  The tenant cannot straight  away jump to the last step i.e. to  deposit rent in court.  The last step  can come only after the earlier steps  have been taken by the tenant.  We are  fortified in this view by the decisions  of this Court in Kuldeep Singh vs.  Ganpat Lal [(1996) 1 SCC 243] and M.  Bhaskar vs. J.Venkatarama Naidu [(1996)  6 SCC 228]."                  This Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Filip  Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama  opined that the  paramount object in statutory interpretation is to  discover what the legislature intended.  Such intention  is primarily to be ascertained from the text of an  enactment in question and if the strict grammatical  interpretation gives rise to absurdity or  inconsistency, the court could discard such  interpretation and adopt an interpretation, which will  give effect to the purpose of legislation.  In the case  on hand, no such anomaly, absurdity or inconsistency  would arise even if plain and grammatical  interpretation is given to Section 13(1) of the Act  insisting to pay or deposit all the arrears of rent

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admitted before preferring an appeal under Section 20  of the Act.

       Yet again in Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana  Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors. , a bench of three leaned  Judges of this Court in para 25 has observed that  "scope of the legislation on the intention of the  legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the  provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words,  statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed  according to its plain meaning and no words shall be  added, altered or modified unless it is plainly  necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being  unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or  totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."                  Judged by what is stated above, it cannot be said  that the provisions of Sections 13 and 20 of the Act  are irreconcilable, unintelligible or absurd so as not  to give effect to plain language of Section 13(1)  requiring a tenant to pay or deposit arrears of  admitted rent before preferring an appeal under Section  20 of the Act.         The decision of this Court in the case of  Chinnamma (supra) does not advance the case of the  appellants for the reasons more than one.  That was a  case wherein the question, which has arisen in this  appeal neither arose nor decided.  No doubt, the  provisions 11 and 12 of Kerala Building (Lease and Rent  Control) Act, 1965 and Sections 12 and 13 of the Act  are similar but the question decided in that case is  altogether different, as is evident from paragraph 4 of  the said judgment, which reads: - "4. We heard counsel. The short  question that arises for our  consideration is what is the amount that  should be deposited by the tenant under  Section 11(2)(c) of the Act to set aside  the order passed under Section 11(2)(b)  of the Act. Should the deposit be only  of that amount which was specified as  payable in the order of eviction passed  under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act or  will it take within its fold even the  arrears of rent that accrued due  subsequent to the said order of eviction  and up to the date of deposit? The Rent  Controller passed the order of eviction  on 22-2-1980. He held that in case the  tenant deposits a sum of Rs. 540 which  is the arrears of rent due as on 1-2- 1980 along with the advocate’s fee Rs.  25 and interest at the rate of 6% per  annum on arrears of Rs. 540, the tenant  will be entitled to get the order of  eviction vacated under Section 11(2)(c)  of the Act. The learned District Judge  has found that the amount of Rs. 750  will cover the amount quantified  specifically by the Rent Controller in  the order dated 22-2-1980. The deposit  made along with the application filed  under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act -  complied with the order dated 22-2-1980.  Really, no other point arose for

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consideration on the facts of this case,  at that stage. But the learned Single  Judge of the High Court held that  deposit to be made by the tenant should  also include the arrears of rent that  accrued due subsequent to the order of  eviction dated 22-2-1980 and should  include the dues till the date of  deposit, i.e., 6-4-1982. The question is  whether the view so expressed by the  learned Single Judge is in accord with  Section 11(2)(c) and the Scheme of the  Act?"

       In paragraph 7 of the same judgment, this Court  has expressed that a mere look at Sections 11 and 12 of  the Kerala Act would show that they operate in  different situations.  Under Section 11(2)(b) the court  passes a final order of eviction directing the tenant  to put the landlord in possession of the building, if  there is a default as provided therein.  The execution  of such final order is statutorily suspended for a  period of one month.  Within that time or such further  time, as the court may allow, the tenant is given an  opportunity to pay or deposit the arrears of rent with  interest and cost and, if payment or deposit is made,  the court shall vacate the order.  Whereas the  provisions of Section 12 are applicable during the  pendency of the proceedings for eviction.  In the same  paragraph it is made clear that for the applicability  of Section 12 the proceedings for eviction should be  pending.         Hence the said judgment, having regard to the  facts of that case and the question that was decided,  does not support the contention urged on behalf of the  appellants in this appeal.  Even the judgment of the  Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in Binapani Roy  case, aforementioned, in a way supports the case of the  respondents.           The Division Bench of the High Court was right in  holding that there was no conflict in the judgments in  cases of Chinnamma and Binapani Roy.         In view of the discussion made and reasons stated,  the question set out above is answered in the negative  meaning thereby payment or deposit of all arrears of  rent admitted is mandatory before preferring an appeal  by a tenant under Section 20 of the Act.  Hence, the  appeal is dismissed finding no merit in it, with no  order as to costs.