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PETITIONER: MANI SUBRAT JAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJA RAM VOHRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/11/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  299            1980 SCR  (2) 141  1980 SCC  (1)   1  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC2001  (1,6)  R          1987 SC 248  (4)

ACT:      East Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction Act,  1949 Section 2(1), 3,-Tenant"- Meaning of-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant,   an  Advocate,  tenanted  a’  building belonging  to   tho  respondent.  The  respondent  sued  the appellant  for   possession  of   the  premises   and  by  a compromise, the Appellant agreed to vacate the premises by a certain date. A decree in terms thereof was passed. Then the Act came  into being  which by  extension of  its  operation applied to Chandigrah with effect from 4-11-1972.      It was  contended that  (i) had  the decree been passed but  a  few  days  later,  the  Act  would  have  admittedly interdicted the  eviction because of Section 13 thereof; and had the  decree been  made and  executed a  day  before  the extension   of    the   Act,   the   years   of   litigative procrastination of  eviction might have been impossible. The salvation of  the appellant  is certain  if he be a "tenant" within the meaning of the Act and his eviction is certain if the definition of tenant does not cover him in its amplitude and (ii)  that the  effect of  compromise decree is that the tenancy of the appellant has been terminated.      Accepting the appeal, ^      HELD: An  advocate,  under  this  Act,  enjoys  special protection. lt  is  too  platitudinous  to  preach  and  too entrenched  to  shake  the  proposition  that  rent  control legislation in  a country of terrible accommodation shortage is a  beneficial measure  whoso construction must be liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purpose and met frustrate it. So construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to the potential  evictee unless  the  language  is  plain  and provides   for    eviction.   That   intendment   must,   by interpretation, be  effectuated. This is the essence of rent control jurisprudence. [143 E-G]      The expression  ’tenant includes  a ’tenant’ continuing in possession  after the  termination of  the tenancy in his favour’. It  thus includes,  by express provision, a quondam

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tenant whose  nexus with  the  property  is  continuance  in possession. The  fact that  a decree  or any  other  process extinguishes the  tenancy under  the  general  law  of  real property does not terminate the status of a tenant under the Act having  regard to  the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Subudhi’s case  [1968] 2  S.C.R.. 559  related to  a statute where the  definition in  s.  2(5)  of  that  Act  expressly included "any  person against  whom a  suit for ejectment is pending in  a court  of  competent  jurisdiction"  and  more pertinent to  the point specially excluded "a person against whom a  decree or order for eviction has been made by such a court." [144 E-G]      (ii) The text, reinforced by the context, especially of section 13,  convincingly includes  ex-tenants against  whom decrees for eviction might have been passed, 142 whether on  compromise or  otherwise. Nobody has a case that the  appellant   is  not  continuously  in  possession.  The conclusion is  inevitable that  he remains tenant and enjoys immunity under  section 13  (1) of  the Act.  The  execution proceedings, must  therefore  fall,  because  the  statutory road-block cannot  be removed.  [A conflict is best resolved by the  parties as  both sides  in  the  present  case  have produced an  enlightened settlement  by an agreement to sell the property  in dispute by the respondent to the appellant. [144 G-H]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 818 of 1978      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 10-4-1978  of the  Punjab and  Haryana High  Court  in Civil Revision No. 458 of 1978 (O & H)      G. L.  Sanghi, B.  Datta, K.  K. Manchanda  and  Ishwar Chand Jain for the Appellant.      P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-The Holmesian homily that the life of the law  is not  logic but  experience  directs  our  humane attention, in  this appeal against an order in execution for eviction of  an advocate  in Chandigarh,  affirmed by  court after court,  to a  reading of  the  textual  definition  of ’tenant’ [s.2  (i)] in  the context  of the broad embargo on ejectment of  urban dwellings  in s.  13 of  the East Punjab Rent Restriction  Act, 1949  (hereinafter referred to as the Act).      Chandigarh, a  blossom in the desert, has served as the capital of two States; and, with explosive expansion, thanks to the  marvellous human  resources  of  Punjab  &  Haryana, become a  crowded, though not yet chaotic, city with chronic accommodation scarcity.  Consequently, laissez faire law, in the matter  of landlord’s  right to  evict his  tenant,  was subject to the act with effect from 4-11-1972. From then on, tenant could be dispossessed except on the ground set out in s. 13.  But if  a landlord had already obtained a decree for eviction earlier  to this  dateline, was he to be restrained by s.  13 which  forbade even  execution of  decrees against tenants, or  was he  free from the statutory fetters because the defendant  had ceased  to be  a tenant on the passing of the decree,  having forfeited  his status by the destructive effect of a com promise, as in this case?      An advocate,  under this  Act, belongs to a ’scheduled’ class of  tenants whose  dwellings enjoy special protection.

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The appellant  advocate tenanted a building belonging to the respondent. The  latter sued  for possession and the former, with refreshing  realism,  entered  into  a  compromise  and agreed  to  vacate  by  a  certain  date  on  certain  terms regarding rent which do not bear upon the dispute before us, 143 A decree in terms thereof was passed on 9-10-1972. Then came the Act,  which by  extension of  its operation,  applied to Chandigarh with  effect from  4-11-1972. Had the decree been passed but  a few  days later, the Act would have admittedly interdicted the  eviction because  of s.  13. Had the decree been made  and executed  a day  before the  extension of the Act, the  years of  litigative procrastination  of  eviction might have  been impossible. These mystic ’might-have-beens’ are gambles  of time which spill beyond our jurisdiction and statutory cognisance.  The salvation  of  the  appellant  is certain if  he be  a ’tenant’ within the meaning of the Act. His eviction  is certain  if the definition of ’tenant’ does not ensconce him in its amplitude.      Decisions of  peripheral relevance,  but  of  different kernel, have been cited on both sides, and the one which has tilted the  scales in  the Chandigarh jurisdiction in favour of decree-holder-landlord  is Subudhi’s case. Precedents are law’s device  to hold  the Present  prisoner of the Past and must bind  only if  squarely covered. Subudhi’s case decided under the  Orissa House-Rent  Control Act,  1958, is not one such. The  key word  is ’tenant’  and if  under the  Act the appellant fills  the bill  definitionally he  is immune from eviction when  read with  s. 13.  Subudhi (supra) turns on a significantly different  definition which cuts down the wide connotation by  a tail-end qualification. The semantic sweep of s.  2 (i)  in our Act, by clear contrast takes in a wider group and  we have  no indication in that judgment whether a provision like  s. 13 which makes the restriction applicable also to  decrees was  present  in  the  Act  there  debated. Therefore, we side-step those rulings and go straight to the two provisions and their meaning in the statutory setting.      It is too platitudinous to preach and too entrenched to shake, the  proposition that  rent control  legislation in a country of  terrible accommodation  shortage is a beneficial measure whose  construction must be liberal enough to fulfil the statutory  purpose and  not frustrate  it. So construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to the potential evictee unless  the  language  is  plain  and  provides  for eviction.  That   intendment  must,  by  interpretation,  be effectuated.  This   is  the   essence   of   rent   control jurisprudence.      Section 2(i) reads:           "tenant" means  any person  by whom  or  on  whose      account rent  is payable  for a building or rented land      and included  a tenant  continuing in  possession after      the termina- 144      tion of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include      a person  placed in  occupation of a building or rented      land by  its tenant, unless with the consent in writing      of the land lord, or a person to whom the collection of      rent  or   fees  in  a  public  market,  cart-stand  or      slaughter house  or of  rents for shops has been farmed      out or  leased by  a municipal,  town or  notified area      committee:      (emphasis added) In this  context, we  may also  read  s.  13  (1)  which  is integral to  and makes  impact upon  the meaning  of s. 2(i) even if there be any marginal obscurity.

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    13. Eviction of tenants-(1) A tenant in possession of a building or  rented land  shall not  be evicted therefrom in execution  of   a  decree   passed  before   or  after   the commencement of  this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the  termination of  the tenancy, except in accordance with the  provisions of  this Section, or in pursuance of an order made  under  section  13  of  the  Punjab  Urban  Rent Restriction Act, 1947, at subsequently amended.      (emphasis added) The expression  ’tenant’ includes  ’a tenant  continuing  in possession after  the termination  of  the  tenancy  in  his favour’. It  thus includes,  by express provision, a quondam tenant whose  nexus with  the  property  is  continuance  in possession. The  fact that  a decree  or any  other  process extinguishes the  tenancy under  the  general  law  of  real property does not terminate the status of a tenant under the Act having  regard to  the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Even here,  we may  mention by way of contrast that Subudh’s case (supra) related to a statute where the definition in s. 2 (5)  of that  Act expressly  included "any per son against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction" and  more pertinent  to  the  point  specially excluded "a  person against  whom  a  decree  or  order  for eviction has  been  made  by  such  a  court."  We  feel  no difficulty in  holding that  the text,  rein forced  by  the context, especially  s. 13, convincingly includes ex-tenants against whom  decrees or  eviction might  have been  passed, whether on  compromise  or  otherwise.  The  effect  of  the compromise decree,  in counsel’s  submission,  is  that  the tenancy has  been terminated.  No body  has a  case that the appellant is  not continuously in possession. The conclusion is inevitable  that he  remains a tenant and enjoys immunity under s.  13(1). The execution proceedings must, there fore, fail because  the statutory  road-block cannot  be  removed. Indeed, an  application under  the  Act  was  filed  by  the landlord-defendant which 145 was dismissed because the ground required by the Act was not made out.      We have  been told by counsel, and supporting citations have been  brought to  our notice,  that the  High Court  at Chandigarh has  taken the contrary view for some time. It is better to be ultimately right rather than consistency wrong. The interpretation  we have given in s. 2(i) is strengthened by our  conviction that  a beneficial  statute  intended  to quieten a burning issue affecting the economics of the human condition in  India should  be so interpreted as to subserve the social justice purpose and not to subvert it. Even apart from this  value-vision, the construction we have adopted is sustainable.      We have  laid down  the law  on the  disputed questions raised before  us, but  we are  not called  upon to make any decree pursuant  to our  decision because,  taking the  clue from certain  observations of the court in the course of the arguments, the parties have come together and reached a fair solution of  the problem revolving round the house property. A conflict  is  best  resolved  by  the  parties  pursuading themselves to  see the  ability  of  continued  dispute  and enlightened by  the law  settled the controversy in a manner that promotes the interests of both. We find that both sides in the  present case  have produced  an enlighten settlement and put  in the  court an  agreement to  sell  the  property covered by  the appeal by the landlord to the tenant. A copy of the agreement has been put in the record which is annexed as appendix to this Judgment.

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    In this  view we  dispose of  the  appeal  by  formally dismissing it  because there  is no longer any relief needed in this appeal.                            ORDER      The Judgment  having been  delivered  counsel  for  the respondent represented  that the  Agreement, which  has been made and  appendixed  to  the  Judgment  be  treated  as  an undertaking mutually  between  the  parties  to  the  Court. Counsel on  both sides  have no objection to this course and so we  record the  Agreement incorporated in the judgment as an undertaking to the Court made by the parties in regard to their respective obligations. N.K.A.    Appeal dismissed 146