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PETITIONER: MANGOO SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL, BAREILLYAND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/09/1957

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1957 AIR  871            1958 SCR  418

ACT:        Election  dispute-Municipal  election-Disqualification   for        membership-Arrears  of  tax-Payment  after  nomination   but        before  poll-"For being chosen as", "Demand", meaning  of-U.        P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.P. 11 of 1916), ss. 13-D, cl.        (g),  166, 168 U. P. Municipalities (Conduct of Election  of        Members) Order, 1953, para.22(2).

HEADNOTE:        The  appellant was elected to the Municipal Board under  the        U.   P. Municipalities Act, 19i6.  He was in arrears in  the        payment of     Municipal tax in excess of one year’s demand,        to which s. 166 of  the  Act  applied, at the  time  of  the        filing of nominations, but made the payment before the  date        of  the  poll.   Under section 13D, cl. (g) of  the  Act  "a        person  shall be disqualified for being chosen as,  and  for        being,  a member of a board if he is in arrears in the  pay-        ment of Municipal tax or other dues in excess of one  year’s        demand to which s. 166 applies, provided that the  disquali-        fication shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid." On an        election  petition filed by a defeated candidate, the  elec-        tion  was set aside by the Election Tribunal on  the  ground        that  the appellant was not entitled to the benefit  of  the        proviso  to s. I3-P. cl. (g) of the Act.  It  was  contended        for  the appellant that the relevant date for the  operation        of  the disqualification was the date of the poll and  that,        in  any  case, he did not come within the  mischief  of  the        disqualification  clause  in  that section, as  a  bill  for        payment of the tax was not presented to him, nor a notice of        demand served on him under s. 168.        Held:(1)  that  if a person is disqualified on the  date  of        nomination,  he cannot be chosen as a candidate  within  the        meaning  of s. 13-D of the U. P. Municipalities  Act,  19i6,        because  the disqualification attaches to him on  that  date        and  the process of choosing consists of a series  of  steps        starting with nomination and ending with the announcement of        the election.  The wiping off of the        419        disqualification  has no retrospective effect, and the  dis-        qualification which subsisted on the date of the  nomination        cannot  cease to subsist on that day by reason of  a  subse-

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      quent payment of the arrears of Municipal tax.        Chatturbhuj  Withaldas  jasani v.  Moreshway  Parashram  and        Others, (1954) S.C.R. 817, N. P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning        Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, (1952) S.C.R. 218        and Harford v. Linskey, (1899) 1 Q.B. 852, relied on.        Ahmed  Hossain  v. Aswini Kumar, A.I.R. 1953 Cal.  542,  ap-        proved. -        (2)that the expression "to which s. 166 applies" in s. 13-D,        cl.  (g) of the Act merely describes the nature or  type  of        dues  mentioned in that section and that the effect is  that        the  demand referred to in s. 13-D, cl. (g) must be of  that        nature or type.        (3)that  the  word ’demand" in s. 13-D, cl. (g) of  the  Act        means  "claim"  or "due" and only refers to  the  amount  of        arrears  or dues on which the disqualification  depends  and        does not attract the operation of s. 168.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPFLLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1957.        Appeal  from the judgment and order dated the  30th  August,        1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 8 of        1955  arising out of the judgment and order dated  the  10th        December,  1954, of the Single Judge of the  Allahabad  High        Court in Civil Misc.  Writ No. 1245 of 1954.        R.   S. Narula, for the appellant.        B.   B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta, for the respondent.        1957.   September 17.  The following Judgment of  the  Court        was delivered by        S.   K. DAS, J.-This appeal has been preferred to this Court        on  the strength of a certificate granted by the High  Court        of  Allahabad  on February 3, 1956, to the effect  that  the        case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Art.        133(1)(c) of the Constitution.  The question that falls  for        decision is the true scope, meaning and effect of cl, (g) of        s. 13-D of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.  P. II  of        1916), hereinafter referred to as the Act.        The relevant facts, which are not now in dispute, are these.        There was a general election to the Municipal 54        420        Board  of Bareilly in October, 1953.  The appellant,  Mangoo        Singh, and respondent No. 3, Imdad Husain, along with sever-        al  others, were candidates at the said election  from  Ward        No. 15.  The date fixed for filing  nominations was  October        5, 1953, and the date for scrutiny of the nominations  filed        was  October  7, 1953.  The appellant and respondent  No.  3        both  filed  their nominations on the due date, and  at  the        time  of  scrutiny lmdad Husain raised an objection  to  the        nomination  of the appellant on the ground that  the  latter        was  disqualified  under cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the  Act  for        being chosen as a member of the said Municipal Board because        he was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in  excess        of one year’s demand.  This objection was dismissed, and the        nomination  of the appellant was accepted by  the  Assistant        Returning Officer.  The poll took place on October 26, 1953,        and  the  counting of votes was done on  October  29,  1953.        Four persons were to be elected from the said Ward, and  the        appellant was the third in the list by reason of the  number        of  votes which he had obtained.  Imdad Husain was fifth  in        the list.  Accordingly, the appellant was declared as one of        the returned candidates, and lmdad Husain was at the top  of        the  unsuccessful  candidates. lmdad Husain  then  filed  an        election  petition to set aside the election of the  present        appellant on various grounds.  The only ground with which we

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      are  now concerned is the disqualification under cl. (g)  of        s. 13-D of the Act.  This election petition was heard by the        Election  Tribunal  and by its judgment  dated  October  20,        1954,  the Election Tribunal held that the appellant was  in        arrears  in  the payment of municipal tax in excess  of  one        year’s demand to which s. 166 of the Act applied and, there-        fore, came under the disqualification in cl. (g) of s.  13-D        of the Act It further held that the payment of a sum of  Rs.        115-3-0 on October 10, 1953, five days after the date  fixed        for  the filing of nominations, did not wipe off  that  dis-        qualification,  and  the appellant was not entitled  to  the        benefit of the second proviso to s. 13-D of the Act.  It may        be here stated that the Election Tribunal also held that  no        bill for payment of the tax was presented to the appellant        421        as  required by s. 166, nor was any demand notice served  on        him  as required by s. 168 of the Act.  On the  above  find-        ings, the Tribunal allowed the election petition, set  aside        the election of the appellant and declared a casual  vacancy        under  cl.  (a)  of sub-s. (2) of s. 25 of  the  Act,  which        vacancy  was subsequently filled up by the election  of  the        third  respondent on April 5, 1955.  The next general  elec-        tion in the Municipality is due in October, 1957.        Against the decision of the Election Tribunal, the appellant        moved  the High Court of Allahabad for the issue of  a  writ        under Art. 226 of the Constitution.  The main point urged by        the appellant was that the Election Tribunal was in error in        its  interpretation of cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act.   Cha-        turvedi J. who dealt with the application of the  appellant,        agreed with the view of the law as expressed by the Election        Tribunal and dismissed the application.  The appellant  then        preferred  an  appeal to a Division Bench of the  said  High        Court.  This appeal was also dismissed by Agarwala and Sahai        JJ. by their judgment dated August 30, 1955.  The  appellant        then moved and obtained a certificate of fitness under  Art.        133(1)(c) of the Constitution from the said High Court.        Learned  counsel for the appellant has not contested any  of        the findings of fact arrived at by the Election Tribunal and        has  confined  his submissions to the question of  the  true        construction  of cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act.   Therefore,        it  is  necessary to read that section, in so far as  it  is        relevant for our purpose:        "  13 -D.  Disqualifications for membership.-A person,  not-        withstanding  that he is otherwise qualified, shall be  dis-        qualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of  a        board if he-        (a) ........................................................        (b)........................................................        (c)........................................................        (d)........................................................        (e) ........................................................        (f)........................................................        422        (g)  is in arrears in the payment of municipal tax or  other        dues  in  excess of one year’s demand to which  section  166        applies:        Provided  further that in the case of (g) the  disqualifica-        tion shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid."        The  first contention of learned counsel for  the  appellant        relates  to  and arises out of the expression  "  for  being        chosen as " occurring in the section.  The argument is this.        It  is submitted that a person is "chosen as a member  of  a        board  " when the poll takes place and a majority of  voters        vote  for  him as their chosen candidate  ;  therefore,  the        relevant  date for the operation of the disqualification  is

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      the  date of the poll, and inasmuch as on October 10,  1953,        which  was  several days before the date of  the  poll,  the        appellant  was  no  longer in arrears of  municipal  tax  in        excess of one year’s demand by reason of the payment made on        that date, the disqualification did not attach to him on the        date  of the poll.  We are unable to accept  this  argument.        It is worthy of note that an identical expression "shall  be        disqualified for being chosen as " occurs in Art. 102 of the        Constitution  and s. 7 of the Representation of  the  People        Act, 1951.  This expression occurring in s. 7 of the  Repre-        sentation  of the People Act, 1951, was considered  by  this        Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram        and  Others  (1).  In that case the question  was  when  the        disqualification mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 7 of the  Repre-        sentation  of  the People Act, 1951, arose and it  was  held        that the date for putting in the nominations was one of  the        crucial  dates.  On this point, the  following  observations        made in that case are apposite :        "Now the words of the section are "shall be disqualified for        being  chosen".   The choice is made by a  series  of  steps        starting  with the nomination and ending with the  announce-        ment of the election.  It follows that if a disqualification        attaches  to  a  candidate at any one of  these  stages,  he        cannot be chosen."        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 817, 821.        423        It  was  pointed out in N. P. Ponnuswami  v.  The  Returning        Officer,  Namakkal Constituency and Others (1) that ’  elec-        tion’  is a continuous process consisting of several  stages        and embracing many steps of which nomination is one; nomina-        tion is the foundation of a candidate’s a right to go to the        polls  and must be treated as an integral part of the  elec-        tion.   If a person is disqualified on the date  of  nomina-        tion,  he cannot be chosen as a candidate because  the  dis-        qualification mentioned in s. 13-D  attaches to him on  that        date.        This is also clear from para. 22(2) of the U. P. Municipali-        ties  (Conduct  of Election of Members) Order,  1953.   That        sub-para. states-        " 22 (2)-The Returning Officer shall then examine the  nomi-        nation papers and shall decide all objections, which may  be        made to any nomination, and may, either on such objection or        on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he        thinks  necessary, refuse any nomination on any of the  fol-        lowing grounds:        (a)  that  the  candidate is not qualified to be  chosen  to        fill the seat under the Act; or        (b)  that the candidate is disqualified for being chosen  to        fill the seat under the Act; or        (c)that there has been any failure to comply with any of the        provisions of paras. 16 and 17; or        (d)  that the signature of the candidate or any proposer  or        seconder is not genuine or has been obtained by fraud."        If the disqualification of cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act  is        to come into operation only oil the day of the poll, then it        is  quite unnecessary for the Returning Officer to  consider        that  disqualification at the time of scrutiny ; and  indeed        it  will  be improper for him to refuse  nomination  on  the        ground of such disqualification.  Clause (b) of para. 22 (2)        uses  the same expression "disqualified for. being  chosen"-        showing clearly enough that the starting point of the act of        choosing  is not on the date of the poll only.  The  process        of choosing commences on the date of filing nominations.        (1)  [1952] S.C. R. 218.        424

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      We  now turn to the second proviso to s. 13-D.  The  submis-        sion of learned counsel for the appellant is that, as stated        in the proviso, the disqualification is transient and ceases        to operate as soon as the arrears are paid;  Oil October 10,        1953,  the appellant was no longer disqualified and,  there-        fore,  he could be chosen on the date of the poll, that  is,        on  October 26, 1953.  The argument is that in the  case  of        such  a transient disqualification, the second proviso  must        be so read as to mean that a disqualification subsisting  on        the day of nomination can be wiped off completely by  subse-        quent  payment of arrears of tax; otherwise a  disqualifica-        tion  at the time of nomination will disentitle a person  to        stand for election ; even though it ceases to operate before        the day of the poll.  This argument also we cannot accept as        correct;  it  is really the first argument  in  a  different        form.   The  wiping off of the  disqualification  under  the        second proviso has no retrospective effect, and the disqual-        ification  which subsisted on the day of filing  nominations        did  not cease to subsist on that day by reason of a  subse-        quent  payment  of the arrears of municipal  tax.   On  this        point  we  accept  as correct the view  expressed  in  Ahmed        Hossain  v. Aswini Kumar(1), where a similar question  under        the  Bengal Municipal Act (Ben.  XV of 1932), fell for  con-        sideration.   The question was if a person  disqualified  on        the  date  of nomination could shake  off  his  pre-existing        disqualification  by acquiring a new right between the  date        of  nomination and the date of scrutiny.  What  happened  in        that case was this : on the material date, that is, the last        date for submission of nominations, a person was in  arrears        for  more than three months in payment of the tax  which  he        was  liable to pay, and he came within the mischief  of  el.        (g)  of amended a. 22(1) of the Bengal Municipal  Act.   The        contention  was  that  the name of the Press  of  which  the        candidate  was the proprietor and not his name was  recorded        in  the books of the Municipality as the assessee  and  that        the  name  of the candidate was in the  electoral  -roll  by        reason  of his educational qualifications.  This  contention        was repelled and it was        (1)  A.l.R. 1953 Cal. 542.        425        observed  that if a person was disqualified on the  date  of        the  nomination,  he  could not shake  off  his  preexisting        disqualification  by acquiring a new right between the  date        of nomination and the date of scrutiny.  There is also other        judicial  authority  which’,  supports the  same  view.   In        Harford  v. Linskey (1), a similar question arose for  deci-        sion  under  the  Municipal Corporations Act,  1882,  s.  12        whereof  enacted that " a person shall be  disqualified  for        being  elected and for being a councillor " if and while  he        is interested in contracts with the Corporation.  The  peti-        tioner in that case admitted that at the time of his nomina-        tion  he was interested in contracts with  the  Corporation,        but  contended that he could and would have got rid  of  his        disqualification before the day fixed for the poll, and  was        therefore not disqualified for nomination.  The question was        whether  he was so disqualified.  Wright J.  delivering  the        judgment of the Court observed-        "  In the absence of any guide, we think it safest  to  hold        that in cases of elections under the Municipal  Corporations        Acts a - person, who at the time of nomination is  disquali-        fied for election in the manner in which this petitioner was        disqualified,  is  disqualified also  for  nomination.   The        nomination  is  for this purpose an essential  part  of  the        election,  and  if  there are no competitors  it  of  itself        constitutes  the election by virtue of the express words  of

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      s.  56.  A different construction might produce much  confu-        sion.   On the nomination day no one could know whether  the        persons  nominated will at the poll be effective  candidates        or  not.  It is true that in the case put the  disqualifica-        tion  may be removed before the election is completed ;  but        what  is to be the effect if the disqualification  continues        until  the poll begins, or until the middle of  the  polling        day,  or  until  the close of the poll ?  Will  votes  given        before the removal of the disqualification be valid?  If not        how is the number of them to be ascertained ? it seems to us        unreason able to hold that the Act means to leave the matter        in such a state of uncertainty, and for these reasons        (1)  (1999) 1 Q.B. 852, 858.        426        we  think that this petitioner was disqualified for  nomina-        tion or election."        The  same  state of uncertainty and confusion,  to  which  a        reference has been made in the aforesaid observations,  will        arise  if  the construction which learned  counsel  for  the        appellant  has pressed for our acceptance is adopted in  the        case before us.        Lastly,  it has been argued on behalf of the appellant  that        the  expression ’to which s. 166 applies’ in cl. (g)  of  s.        13-D  means that a bill of the sum due must be presented  to        the  person  liable  for it, as required  by  that  section,        before  he can come within the mischief of the clause;  fur-        thermore, the use of the expression ’demand’ makes it essen-        tial that a demand notice must also be served as required by        s. 168 of the Act.  As on the finding of the Election Tribu-        nal  neither a bill was presented to the appellant, nor  was        he  served  with a demand notice, learned  counsel  contends        that the appellant does not come within the mischief of  the        clause.        Sections 166 and 168 are in these terms-        S.  166.   Presentation  of bill.-(1) As soon  as  a  person        becomes liable for the payment of-        (a)  any  sum on account of a tax, other than an  octroi  or        toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand, or        (b)  any  sum  payable under clause (c) of  section  196  or        section  229  or  section 230 in respect of  the  supply  of        water, or payable in respect of any other municipal  service        or undertaking, or        (c)  any  other sum declared by this Act or or by  rule  (or        bye-law)  to be recoverable in the manner provided  by  this        chapter, the board shall, with all convenient speed, cause a        bill to be presented to the persons so liable.        (2)  Unless  otherwise provided by rule, a person ,shall  be        deemed  to  become liable for the payment of every  tax  and        licence  fee upon the commencement of the period in  respect        of which such tax or fee is payable,"        427        " S. 168.  Notice of demand.-If the sum for which a bill has        been presented as aforesaid is not paid in municipal office,        or  to  a person empowered by a regulation to  receive  such        payments, within fifteen days from the presentation thereof,        the board may cause to be served upon the person liable  for        the  payment of the said sum a notice of demand in the  form        set forth in schedule IV, or to the like effect."        We are clearly of the view that the expression ’to which  s.        166  applies’ cannot bear the meaning sought to be given  to        it  on  behalf  of the appellant.   That  expression  merely        describes  the nature of the demand referred to in cl.  (g).        Section  166 refers to three types of dues; el. (a)  of  sub        -s. (1) refers to any sum on account of a tax other than  an        octroi  or  toll or any similar tax payable  upon  immediate

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      demand;  cl. (b) refers to sums payable under el. (c) of  s.        196  or s. 229 or s. 230 in respect of the supply of  water,        etc.,  and cl. (c) refers to any other sum declared  by  the        Act  or by rule or bye-law to be recoverable in  the  manner        provided by Chapter VI.  The demand to which s. 166  applies        must  be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in one  or        other  of  the aforesaid three clauses, and the  demand  re-        ferred  to in el. (g) of s. 13-D must be of that  nature  or        type;  this, in our view, is the true meaning and effect  of        the expression ’to which s. 166 applies’.        Nor do we think that the word demand’ attracts the operation        of  s. 168.  It may be readily conceded that the  word  ’de-        mand’  ordinarily means something more than what is due;  it        means something which has been demanded, called for or asked        for.   But the meaning of a word must take colour  from  the        context  in  which it is used.  In el. (g)  the  context  in        which the word ’demand’ is used has a very obvious and clear        reference  to  the amount of arrears or dues  on  which  the        disqualification depends; therefore, the expression used is-        ’arrears  in the payment of municipal tax or other  dues  in        excess  of  one year’s demand’.  The word ’demand’  in  that        context and in the collocation of words in which it has been        used can only mean ’in excess of one year’s municipal tax or        other  dues’.  We have been referred to several meanings  of        the word        55        428        ’demand’ in standard English dictionaries and law  lexicons.        When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it        becomes  unnecessary to search for and select  a  particular        meaning  out of the diverse  meanings a word is capable  of,        according  to  lexicographers.   It is  sufficient  for  our        purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and  law        lexicons,  it is well recognised that the word  demand’  may        mean simply a ’claim or ’due’, without importing any further        meaning  of calling upon the person liable to pay the  claim        or due.        For  the  reasons given above, we hold that not one  of  the        contentions  urged on behalf of the appellant is  worthy  of        acceptance.   The election petition was rightly decided,  as        the appellant was disqualified for being chosen as a  member        of  the Municipal Board in question on the day he filed  his        nomination, under cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act.  According-        ly, the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of respond-        ent 3 who alone contested the appeal before us.        Appeal dismissed.