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PETITIONER: MANGALORE ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1978

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) DESAI, D.A. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1272            1978 SCR  (3) 913  1978 SCC  (3) 248  CITATOR INFO :  R          1982 SC 149  (231,249)

ACT: Income Tax Act, 1922, S. 12 B(1)-Whether the word ’transfer’ occurring,  in  S. 12 B(1) of the Act  refers  to  voluntary transfers only-Whether the word transfer should be construed ejusdem  generis  with  the  words  ’sale’,  ’exchange’  and requisitions’.

HEADNOTE: In  exercise  of  its power under Section 4  of  the  Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1954, the Government  of Madras acquired the  appellants’  undertaking and  its properties were taken over on the date  of  vesting viz.  October 15, 1956.  As per the option exercised by  the _appellant   under   S.  6,  the,  appellant  was   paid   a compensation  of Rs. 18,42,312/ applying Basis  ’A’  method. In the course of the appellant’s assessment for the  assess- ment  year  1957-58, corresponding to  the  accounting  year commencing on April 1, 1955 and ending on October 14,  1956, the  Income Tax Officer considered the question whether  the compensation  received by the appellant for the  acquisition of  its  undertaking  was in the nature of  a  capital  gain within  the meaning of S. 12 B of the Income Tax Act,  1922. Deducting a sum of Rs. 6.45,710/- representing the value  of fixed  assets  from  the  compensation  paid  by  the  State Government to the appellant, the Income Tax Officer  treated the sum of Rs. 11,95,602/- as capital gains which was liable to be brought to tax.  The appellant’s contention before the appellate   Assistant  Commissioner  that   the   compulsory acquisition of its undertaking was riot a ’transfer’  within the meaning of S. 12 B (1) of the Act and therefore, it  was not  liable  to capital gain tax failed.   The  Tribunal  in further  appeal and the High Court on a reference  confirmed the  said  view.   The High Court on  an  application  under Section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, decided  against the   appellant  on  the  question  whether  part   of   the compensation was paid towards good-will and therefore exempt from tax. Dismissing the appeals by certificate the Court, HELD  :  1.  The word ’transfer’  is  comprehensive  and  is

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regarded   generally  as  comprehending  within  its   scope transfers  both  of  the voluntary  and  involuntary  kinds. Without more, therefore there is no reason for limiting  the operations  of  the  word ’transfer’ to  voluntary  acts  of transfer  so  as  to  exclude  compulsory  acquisitions   of property. [917 G-H] 2.   (a)  The  word ’transfer cannot  be  construed  ajusdem generis with the words sale’.’exchange’ or  relinquishment’. [918 A] (b)  There is no room for the application of ejusdem generis doctrine unless one finds a category and where the words are clearly  wide  in  their  meaning,  they  ought  not  to  be qualified  on  the ground of their  association  with  other words. [918 C-D] In  the instant case, in the absence of a distinct genus  or category, no presumption can arise that the word  ’transfer’ must  be  construed’  in the sense of  a  voluntary  act  of transfer since ’sale’, exchange’ or ’relinquishment’ are  in the  normal acceptation of those terms voluntary acts.   The words  (a)  sale, (b) exchange, (c) relinquishment  and  (d) transfer  must accordingly be given their plain and  natural meaning  and there is no justification for  restricting  the wide  comprehension  of  the  last  of  the  four  words  to voluntary  transfers  by  the  application  of  the  ejusdem generis rule. [918 E] 914 Provest, etc. of Glasgow v. Glasgow Tramway Co., [1898] A.C. 631,  634 and N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corpn., [1943]  A.C.  166 quoted with approval. (c)The  proviso to S. 12B of the Income Tax Act, 1922.  as it  stood prior to its amendment by the Finance Act (No.  3) 1956  shows that the word ’transfer’ which occurred in  sub- section  (1)  was intended to include  transfer  of  capital assets by reason of the compulsory acquisition thereof under an  law  for  the  time  being  in  force  relating  to  the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes.  The object  of the proviso, clearly, was to take away  transfers by  way  of compulsory acquisition from the  scope  of  sub- section  (1).  It is impossible on any other hyprothesis  to give intelligible meaning to the exception carved out by the proviso.  After the amendment of S. 12B by the Act of  1956, the  exception  carved  out  by the  proviso  in  favour  of ’transfer  of  capital assets by reason  of  the  compulsory acquisition  thereof  was  deleted.   The  deletion  of  the particular  clause  of  the proviso  contains  an  indelible reflection of the true legislative intent which is, that the transfer   of  capital  assets  by  reason   of   compulsory acquisition are comprehended within the meaning of the  word ’transfer’.  If an existing title is extinguished and a  new one is created, there is within the, meaning of section  12B (1)  of the Act of 1922, transfer of a capital  asset.   The fact  that the divestiture of title takes place under a  law relating to compulsory acquisition of property would make no difference  to  that position.  The  word  ’transfer’  which occurs in section 12B (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, is an expression  of  wide comprehension and includes  within  its sweep  both voluntary and involuntary transfers.[918 F,  919 B-H] Commissioner  of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh v.  Shriikrishan Chandmal  and Anr., 47 I.T.R. 833, Wilfred Perera   Ltd.  v. Commissioner   of  Income  Tax,  Madras,  53   I.T.R.   747, Commissioner  of  Income-Tax, Madras v.  United  India  Life Assurance  Company Ltd., 62 I.T.R. 610 and Vadilal Soda  Ice Factory v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat II 80  I.T.R. 711 approved.

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3.(a)   The  High  Court  has  correctly  negatived   the appellants’  contention  that  goodwill  should  be   valued separately and a part of the compensation attributable to it should be deducted from the compensation. [920 G] (b)Since  the  question  as  to  whether  a  part  of  the compensation   is  attributable  to  the  goodwill  of   the appellant’s business is a mixed question of law and fact and since not only was the question not raised by the  appellant before  the  Income-tax Officer or the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner but, having raised it before the Tribunal,  the appellant placed no material before it on the basis of which good-will could be evaluated and a part of the  compensation properly  apportioned to the goodwill of the  business,  the appellant  cannot  be  allowed  to  raise.  the   contention involved in two questions raised before the High Court under S. 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. [921 D-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2160  and 2006 of 1972. From the Judgment and Order dated 25th August, 1971 and 19th November  1977  of  the Calcutta High Court  in  Income  Tax Reference No. 106 of 1969 and 138/69. Y.S. Desai, S. R. Agrawal, A. T. Patra and Praveen Kumar for the Appellant in both the, appeals. G.C. Mathur and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent  in both the appeals. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-The appellant, the Mangalore Electric Sup- ply  Company  Limited,  was carrying  on.  the  business  of distribution  of  electricity  in  Mangalore,  South  Kanara District, under a licence granted  915 by  the Government of Madras in favour of  Messrs  Octavious Steel  &  Company Limited.  The licensee  had  assigned  its right  to  the appellant with the previous  consent  of  the State Government.  Under section 4 of the Madras Electricity Supply  Undertakings  (Acquisition)  Act,  1954,  the  State Government  had  the  power to  take  over  any  electricity undertaking, declaring that it shall vest in the  Government on  the date specified therein.  In exercise-of that  power, the Government of Madras passed an order declaring that  the appellant’s  undertaking  would vest in  the  Government  on December 31, 1956, which date was later advanced to  October 15,  1956.   The  appellant’s  undertaking  was  accordingly acquired  by  the Government and its properties  were  taken over  on the date of vesting.  Mangalore was then a part  of the State of Madras. Section 5 of the.Acquisition Act, 1954, provided for payment of  compensation to a licensee whose undertaking  was  taken over  by  the  Government.   Three  modes  of  fixation   of compensation were provided for by that section, called Basis A,  Basis B and Basis C. Section 6 gave to  the  undertaking concerned the option to choose any one of these three modes. According  to Basis A, the licensee was entitled by  way  of compensation  to the payment of an amount equal to 20  times the average net annual profits of the undertaking during the period  of  five consecutive  accounting  years  immediately preceding  the  date of vesting.  The, appellant  opted  for compensation  on Basis A, one of the consequences of  which, ’as provided by the, Act, was that      the entire  property belonging to the undertaking, includingthe  fixed   assets, vested in the State Government under section C.Applying

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Basis  A, the appellant was paid compensation in the sum  of Rs. 18,42,312/-. In  the  course  of  the  appellant’s  assessment  for   the assessment  year  1957-58, corresponding to  the  accounting year  commencing  on  April 1, 1955 and  ending  on  October 14,’1956,  the  Income-tax Officer considered  the  question whether  the compensation received by the appellant for  the acquisition  of  its  undertaking was in  the  nature  of  a capital  gain  within  the, meaning of section  12B  of  the Indian  Income-tax  Act,  1922.   Deducting  a  sum  of  Rs. 6,46,710/-, representing the value of fixed assets, from the compensation paid by the State Government to the  appellant, the  Income-tax Officer treated the sum of Rs.  11,95,602/as capital  gains which was liable to be brought to  tax.   The appellant appealed to the Assistant Commissioner  contending that the compulsory acquisition of its undertaking was not a ’transfer’   within  the  meaning  of  section  12B(1)   and therefore  it  was not liable to capital  gains  tax.   That argument  was rejected by the Assistant  Commissioner  whose judgment  was confirmed in a further appeal, by the  Income- tax   Appellate  Tribunal.   On  the  application   of   the appellant, the Tribunal referred the following question  for the opinion of the High Court               "Whether,   on   the   facts   and   in    the               circumstances  of  the case,  the  acquisition               under    the   Madras    Electricity    Supply               Undertakings  (Acquisition)  Act,  1954   came               within the scope of section 12B of the  Indian               Income-tax  Act, 1922 so as to  render  liable               any  surplus arising from such acquisition  to               tax under section 12B of the Act?" 916 By its judgment dated August 25, 1971, the High Court upheld the view taken by the Tribunal but granted to the  appellant a  certificate of fitness, to file an appeal to this  Court. That has given rise to Civil Appeal No. 2160 of 1972. The  appellant  had  asked the Tribunal  to  refer  for  the opinion  of  the  High  Court  four  other  questions.   The Tribunal having declined to do so, the appellant applied  to the High Court under section 256 (2) of the Income-tax  Act, 1961,  requesting  it  to  call for  a  reference  from  the Tribunal.  The High Court agreed and called for a  reference on  the four points, the 3rd and 4th out of which  were  not pressed by the appellant when the reference was heard by the High Court.  Before the High Court the appellant limited its argument to the following two questions               (i)   Whether   on  the  facts  and   in   the               circumstances  of  the case and  on  a  proper               interpretation   of  the  Madras   Electricity               Supply  Undertakings (Acquisition)  Act,  1954               the  Tribunal was justified in law in  holding               that   no   part  of  the   compensation   was               attributable to the goodwill of the company;               (ii)Whether  the Tribunal was  justified  in               law   in   not  determining  the   amount   of               compensation attributable to the goodwill  and               in further not determining the Capital  Gains,               if any, arising out of such acquisition", By  its  judgment dated November 19, 1971,  the  High  Court answered  both  the  questions  against  the  appellant  but granted  to  it a certificate of fitness to appeal  to  this Court,  which  has given rise to Civil Appeal  No.  2006  of 1972. We will take up Civil Appeal No. 2160 of 1972 first for  her consideration the involves for consideration the decision of

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the  question  whether compulsory  acquisition  of  property falls within the scope of section 12B of the Indian  Income- tax Act, 1922, so as to render any surplus arising from such acquisition liable to tax under that section. Capital gains were charged for the first time by the Income- tax  and  Excess Profits Tax (Amendment)  Act,  1947,  which inserted section 12B in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.  It taxed capital gains arising after March 31, 1946.  The  levy on  capital  gains  was, however, abolished  by  the  Indian Finance  Act, 1949, which confined the operation of  section 12B to capital gains arising before April 1, 1948.  The levy of tax on capital gains was revived by the Finance (.No.  3) Act, 1956, with effect from April 1, 1957, which substituted the following section with which we are concerned.  It  read thus :               "12B(1)  The  tax  shall  be  payable  by   an               assessee  under  the head ’capital  gains’  in               respect  of any profits or gains arising  from               the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer               of a capital asset effected after the 31st day               of  March  1956, and such  profits  and  gains               shall  be  deemed  to be  the  income  of  the               previous  year  in which the  sale,  exchange,               relinquishment or transfer took place :                917               Provided  that  any  distribution  of  capital               assets  on the total or partial  partition  of               Hindu  undivided  family or under  a  deed  of               gift,  request  or  will  shall  not  for  the               purposes of this section be treated as a sale,               exchange,  relinquishment or transfer  of  the               capital assets........" Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that if a  subject  is  deprived of his property  by  the  State  in exercise  of  its  power  of eminent  domain,  there  is  no ’transfer’ of property within the meaning of section 12B(1), the  reason  being  that  a  transfer  cannot  be  effected, according to the ordinary connotation of that word,  without the concurrence of the transferor and the transferee.  It is urged  that  a compulsory divestiture of title  against  the volition  of the owner cannot amount to transfer,  howsoever lawful  the  act  may  be  as  a  statutory  acquisition  of property.   The justification for this submission is  stated to be that the word ’transfer’ occurs in the collocation  of three  other words ’sale’, ’exchange’  and  ’relinquishment’ which are essentially volitional or voluntary acts,  leading to  the  conclusion that the word ’transfer’ must  take  its colour from the three other words in association with  which it is used.  ’Transfer’, therefore, according to the learned counsel,  means a voluntary transfer and cannot include  the compulsory acquisition of property. We  find  it impossible to accept this submission.   In  the first  place  if it was intended  that  voluntary  transfers alone should fall within the meaning of the section, it  was unnecessary  for  the  legislature  to  use  the  expression ’transfer’,  an expression acknowledged in law as  having  a vide  connotation  and  amplitude.   Earl  Jowitt,  in  ’The Dictionary of English Law’ says               "In the law of property, a transfer is where a               right  passes  from  one  person  to  another,               either  (1)  by virtue of an act done  by  the               transferor with that intention, as in the case               of  a conveyance or assignment by way of  sale               or gift, etc.; or (2) by operation of law,  as               in   the  case  of   forfeiture,   bankruptcy,

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             descent, or intestacy". Roland  Burrows on Words and Phrases’, volume V, contains  a statement  under the caption ’Transfer on Sale’ at page  331 that  even a transfer of land under compulsory powers  is  a transfer  ’on sale’.  It is unnecessary for us  to  consider the question whether a compulsory acquisition of property is a ’sale within the meaning of section 12B(1) and indeed,  it is needless for the present purpose to go that far.  We  are concerned  with the narrower question whether  a  compulsory acquisition  of property can amount to a  ’transfer’  within the  meaning of section 12B(1) and upon that question it  is important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  word  transfer  is comprehensive  and is regarded generally  as  cormprehensing within  its  scope  transfers  both  of  the  voluntary  and involuntary  kinds.   Without more, therefore, there  is  no reason for limiting the operation of the word ’transfer’  to voluntary  acts  of  transfer so as  to  exclude  compulsory acquisitions of property. 918 The  argument  that the word ’transfer’  must  be  construed ejusdem   generis   with  the  words   sale,   exchange   or relinquishment  has  to, be rejected because  as  stated  in Craies on Statute Law (7th edition, page 181);               "the ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied               with caution and not pushed too far, as in the               case  of  many decisions, which  treat  it  as               automatically  applicable, and not  as  being,               what it is, a mere presumption, in the absence               of  other indications of the intention of  the               legislature.  The modern tendency. of the law,               it was said, is ’to attenuate the  application               of  the rule of ejusdem generis’.   To  invoke               the  application of the ejusdem  generis  rule               there  must be a distinct geneus or  category.               The specific words must apply not to different               objects of a widely differing character but to               something which can be called a class or  kind               of  objects.  Where this is lacking, the  rule               cannot apply". Thus,  unless you find a category there is no room  for  the application of ejusdem generis doctrine and where the  words are  clearly  wide in, their meaning they ought  not  to  be qualified  on  the ground of their  association  with  other words.  (See Provost, etc. of Glasgow v.  Glassgow  Tramway) Co.(1). In N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corpn.(2), it was held  that "the ejusdem generis rule is often useful or convenient, but it is merely a rule of construction, not a rule of law".  In the  instant  case, in the absence of a  distinct  genus  or category, no presumption can arise that the word  ’transfer’ must  be  construed  in  the sense of  a  voluntary  act  of transfer since ’sale’, ’exchange’ or ’relinquishment’ are in the  normal acceptation of those terms voluntary acts.   The words  (a)  sale, (b) exchange, (c) relinquishment  and  (d) transfer  must accordingly be given their plain and  natural meaning  and there is no justification for  restricting  the vide  comprehension  of  the  last  of  the  four  words  to voluntary  transfers  by  the  application  of  the  ejusdem generis rule. The  legislative  history  of section  126(1)  furnishes  an important  clue   to the question raised by the  appellant’s counsel.  Prior to its amendment by the Finance (No. 3) Act, 1956, which came into force on April 1, 1957, section 12B(1) of the Act of 1923 read thus :               "12B.   Capital  gains.-(1) The tax  shall  be               payable by an assessee under the head ’Capital

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             gains’  in  respect of any  profits  or  gains               arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of               a capital asset effected after the 31st day of               March, 1946, and before the 1st day of  April,               1948;  and  such profits and  gains  shall  be               deemed  to be income of the previous  year  in               which  the  sale, exchange  or  transfer  took               place...               Provided further that any transfer of  capital               assets by reason of the compulsory acquisition               thereof-  under any law for the time being  in               force relating to the compulsory                (1)  [1898] A.C. 631, 634.               (2)   [1943] A.C. 166.                 919               acquisition of property for public purposes of               any  distribution  of capital  assets  on  the               total   or  partial  partition  of   a   Hindu               undivided  family, or on the dissolution of  a               firm  or other association of persons,  or  on               the liquidation of a company, or under a  deal               of   gift,  bequest,  will  or   transfer   on               irrevocable trust shall not, for the, purposes               of this section, be treated as sale,  exchange               or      transfer      of      the      capital               assets:............": The  proviso  which we have extracted above shows  that  the word  ’transfer’  which  occurred  in  sub-section  (1)  was intended to include transfer of capital assets by reason  of the  compulsory  acquisition thereof under any law  for  the time  being in force relating to the compulsory  acquisition of property for public purposes.  The object of the proviso, clearly,  was  to take away transfers by way  of  compulsory acquisition  from the scope of sub-section (1).  It  is  im- possible  on  any  other  hypothesis  to  give  intelligible meaning to the exception carved out by the proviso. This is in so far as the legislative history of section  12B prior  to  its amendment by Finance (No. 3)  Act,  1956,  is concerned.  After the amendment of section 12B by the Act of 1956,  the exception carved out by the proviso in favour  of ’transfer  of  capital assets by reason  of  the  compulsory acquisition  thereof was deleted.  The rest of  the  proviso was  retained substantially with certain  modifications  and additions  which  are  not relevant for  our  purpose.   The deletion of the particular clause of the proviso contains an indelible  reflection of the true legislative  intent  which is,  that  the  transfer  of capital  assets  by  reason  of compulsory  acquisition are comprehended within the  meaning of the word ’transfer’.  We are, therefore, clear that if an existing  title  is extinguished and a new one  is  created, there is within the meaning of section 12B(1) of the Act  of 1922, transfer of a capital asset. The  fact  that  the divestiture of title takes place under a law relatingto compulsory acquisition of property would make no  difference to that  position. The  High  Court of Madhya Pradesh in  the  Commissioner  of Income-tax,  Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Shrikrishan  Chandmal  and another(1), the High Court of Madras in Wilfred Pereira Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (2 ) and  Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. United India Life Assurance Company Ltd.  (3) and the High Court of Gujarat in Vadilal Soda  Ice Factory v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat(4) have taken the same view, namely, that the word ’transfer which  occurs in  section  12B(1)  of  the  Income-tax  Act,  1922  is  an expression  of wide comprehension  and includes  within  its

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sweep both voluntary and involuntary transfers. (1)  47 ITR 833. (2)  53 ITR 747. (3)   62 ITR 610. (4)  80 ITR 711. 920 The,  judgment  of the, High Court dated  August  25,  1971, leading  to Civil Appeal No. 2160 of 1972 must therefore  be affirmed and the appeal dismissed. In regard to Civil Appeal No. 2006 of 1972, the case of  the appellant  before the Income-tax Officer was only this  that the compulsory acquisition of its undertaking did not amount to a ’transfer’ within the meaning of section 12B(1) of  the Act  of  1922.  No case was made  out  that,  alternatively, goodwill  is  not a capital asset.  The  appellant  did  not contend  before  the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner  also that goodwill is not a capital asset and therefore at  least to the extent to which compensation was attributable to  the goodwill,  the  Capital Gains tax was  not  attracted.   The appellant  did contend before the Tribunal that  apart  from its  tangible assets, the State Government had  taken  over, the  goodwill attaching to the business and the  appellant’s right  to  the management of that business  and  the  amount referable to these items had to be deducted in computing the capital  gains.   The Tribunal answered this  contention  by holding that-               (a)   goodwill  as  understood in law  had  no               real  significance  in the  present  case  and               could   not   have  been   acquired   by   the               Government;               (b)   it  was not one of the assets  shown  in               the balance-sheet;               (c)   there  was  no proof to  show  that  the               Government actually took over any goodwill;               (d)   if  the case of the appellant  was  that               even if it was not shown in the balance-sheet,               payment  therefore  had  to  be  evaluated  or               apportioned,   the   appellant   should   have               produced proof regarding the evolution of  the               goodwill;               (e)   the   appellant  had  not   placed   any               materials before the Tribunal to show  whether               any interference was called for in the  matter               of  computation having regard to the value  of               goodwill as on January 1, 1954; and               (f)   the   right   of  management   was   not               independent  of  the  business  acquired   and               there.  were  no materials to show  that  this               right  could have any value placed upon it  in               the fixation of compensation. The High Court was, in our opinion right in taking the  view that  in  the light of these circumstances  the  appellant’s contention, that goodwill should be valued separately and  a part  of  the  compensation attributable  to  it  should  be deducted from the compensation, could not be accepted.  Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the two  relevant questions  on which the, High Court called for  a  reference from  the Tribunal involved the consideration of  any  legal principle, the questions are mixed questions of law and fact because,  unless it is found that the goodwill, infact,  had some  value,  it cannot be decided whether any part  of  the compensation   is  attributable  to  the  goodwill  of   the business.   921 Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to  the

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grievance  made  by the appellant in his  application  dated February  8, 1972, for leave to appeal to this Court to  the effect that the Tribunal had expressed the view at the  time of hearing of the appeal before it that it would only decide the   point   whether  a  part  of  the   compensation   was attributable  to  the  goodwill of  the  business  and  that thequestion  as  regards the value of the goodwill  as  of January 1, 1954,would be, left to the Income-tax Officer for his determination. The  grievance of the appellant  is that it was misled by the observations made by the  Tribunal during  the course of the hearing of the appeal and that  is why  it did not produce any evidence regarding the value  of the goodwill.  That there is no substance in this contention is  clear  from the order of the Tribunal dated  October  9, 1968,  by which it refused to refer for the opinion of  High Court the question regarding the evaluation of the goodwill. The  Tribunal observes in its order that during the  hearing of  the  appeal it had not expressed any view  of  the  kind attributed to it by the appellant and that no assurance  was held  forth  to the appellant that the question  as  regards goodwill  would be left for determination to the  Income-tax Officer. Since the question as to whether a part of the  compensation is attributable to the goodwill of the appellant’s  business is a mixed questionof  law and fact and since not only  was the question not raised bythe   appellant   before   the Income-tax  Officer or the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner but,   having   raised   it   before   the   Tribunal    the appellantplaced no material before it on the basis of which goodwill could beevaluated and a part of the compensation properly  apportioned  to the goodwill of the  business,  we cannot allow the appellant to raise the contention  involved in  the two questions.  On those questions,  therefore,  the judgment of the High Court, for the reasons mentioned by us, has to be affirmed.  Civil Appeal No. 2006 of 1972 is  also, therefore, dismissed. In  the ultimate result, both the appeals are dismissed  and the  judgment  of  the  High Court  in  both  the  cases  is confirmed.  The appellant shall pay the Commissioner’s costs in the appeals. S.R.                                 Appeals dismissed. 8-329SCI/78 922