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PETITIONER: MANGAL ORAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/01/1977

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1456            1977 SCR  (2) 666  1977 SCC  (2)  46

ACT:             Land  acquisition--Land  acquired  "for  development  of         industries  namely establishment of a steel plant and allied         and ancillary industries"--Establishing Rourkela Steel Plant         and a civil township around it, whether outside the  defini-         tion  of words "development of industries" in ss,  2(c)  and         3(1)---Orissa  Development of Industries, Irrigation,  Agri-         culture, Capital construction and resettlement of  Displaced         Persons  (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (Orissa Act  XVIII  of         1948) read with Notification dated 20-2-54,’

HEADNOTE:             Section  2(c) of the Orissa Development  of  Industries,         Irrigation, Agriculture, Capital construction and  Resettle-         ment   of  Displaced  persons" (Land Acquisition) Act,  1948         (Act  XVIII of 1948), defines development of  industries  to         mean and include the construction of Hirakund Dam and  other         dams and reservoirs, Hydro Electric Projects and such  other         schemes or property as the State Government may by a notifi-         cation specify in this behalf.  By a notification dated 20th         February,  1954  it  was stated that "the  project  for  the         establishment  of  a steel plant and  allied  and  ancillary         industry in the block of villages round about Rourkela shall         be  included within the meaning of the expression  "develop-         ment  of  industries" as defined in cl. (c) of s. 2  of  the         Act.             By notification dated 22nd February, 1954 and 9th Febru-         ary, 1955 82 sq. miles of land was acquired for the  "devel-         opment  of industries, namely  establishment of steel  plant         and allied and ancillary industries".  The above land vested         absolutely  in  the State Government free  from  all  encum-         brances  on the dates of the above notifications.  The  writ         petitions filed by some owners of some of the acquired lands         challenging  the validity of the acquisition were  dismissed         in limine.             In  appeal to this Court, the appellants  contended  (a)         the  State Government was not competent to acquire the  land         in  question under the Act for the establishment of a  steel         plant  as it cannot be said to be for the  purpose  of   the         development of industry; (b) the acquired land could only be         used  for  the steel plant and ancillary industries and  not

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       for a civil township; (c) the transfer of 3.21 acres of land         by the Railway authorities long after 14 years of the acqui-         sition  to the Notified Area Committee for  construction  of         taxi-stand,  busroad etc. in and around the Railway  Station         is bad.         Dismissing the appeals to this Court,             HELD:  (1)  In the face of the notification  dated  20th         February, 1954 and 2(c) of the Orissa Development .of Indus-         try,  Irrigation,  Agriculture,  Capital  Construction   and         Resettlement  of Displaced Persons (Land  Acquisition)   Act         1948, the establishment of steel plant and ancillary  indus-         tries  at  Rourkela answers to the definition of development         of industries as given in the Act.                                                            [668 G-H]             Clause (c) of Section 2 confers wide powers on the State         Government to notify any scheme or project as it may consid-         er appropriate for the  development of industries and  there         is nothing in that clause that the scheme or project can  be         the  subject  matter of a notification must  be  similar  to         Hirakund  Dam or other dams or reservoirs or hydro  electric         projects.  [669 A-B]             (2) The contention that the acquired land could only  be         used  for the steel plant and ancillary industries  and  not         for  the civil  township  is  devoid  of force.  A  township         is  a necessary adjunct and concomitant  of  a   big   steel         plant.   The  establishment  of a  steel  plant  necessarily         postulates the construc-         667         tion  of  residential  quarters for  the  workmen,  shopping         areas,  schools,  hospitals,  post-offices  etc.   The  fact         therefore that part of the land which was acquired has  been         used  for civil township would not affect the  validity  of"         the acquisition of the land.  [669 C-D]             (3)  There  is  no principle of law by  which  a  valid,         compulsory  acquisition stands void because long  later  the         requiring authority diverts it  to  a  public purpose  other         than  the  one stated in the declaration.   In  the  instant         case, the transfer of 3.21 acres of the land by the Railways         is  to  the Notified Area Committee who is  the  appropriate         body to construct and maintain the link roads, bus and  taxi         stands  and shop surrounding the Railway Station.  The  land         is   not being used for a purpose extraneous from  that  for         which the land was initially acquired.  [669 G-H. 670 A-B]             Gulam  Mustafa  & Ors. v. State of  Maharashtra  &  Ors.         [1976] I SCR 875 applied.

JUDGMENT:             CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals  Nos.  1237         and 1238/72.             From the Judgment and Order dated 8-11-71 of the  Orissa         High Court in O.J.C. Nos. 339 and 385 of 1968.         AND         Civil Appeal No. 1730 of 1973.             Appeal  by  Special Leave from the  Judgment  and  Order         dated  the 26th February, 1973 of the Orissa High  Court  in         O.J.C. No. 130 of 1973.             Gobind  Das, (Mrs.) S. Bhandare, M.S.   Narasimhan,   A.         K.  Mathur,  A.K. Sharma and (Miss) Malini Paduval  for  the         Appellants in all the appeals.             D.P.  Singh and G.S. Chatterlee for Respondent No. 1  in         CAs. 1237-38/72.             Santosh  Chatterjee and G.S. Chatterjee  for  Respondent         No. 2 in C.As. 1237-38/72.

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       B. Parthasarthi for Respondents 1, 3, and 4 in CA 1730/73.             L.N.  Sinha,  Sol. Gen. of India and  Vinoo  Bhagat  for         Respondent 7 in CA 1730/73.             Nemo for Respondents 2, 5, 6. in C.A. 1730/73.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KHANNA,  J.  This judgment would dispose of three  civil         appeals Nos. 1237 and 1238 of 1972 and 1730 of 1973  against         the  judgment of Orissa High Court.  The first  two  appeals         have  been filed on certificate, while the third appeal  has         been filed by special leave.             We may first deal with civil appeals 1237 and 1238.   On         February  22, 1954 a notification was issued under  sub-sec-         tion  (1) of section 3 of the Orissa Development  of  Indus-         tries,   Irrigation,  Agriculture, Capital Construction  and         Resettlement  of Displaced  Persons (Land Acquisition)  Act,         1948 (Orissa Act XVIII of  1948)  (hereinafter         668         referred to as the Act) by the Government of Orissa for  the         acquisition of 78 square miles of land for the  "development         of  industries,. namely, establishment of a steel plant  and         allied and ancillary industries".  The steel plant mentioned         in  the notification subsequently’ came to be known  as  the         Rourkela  steel plant.  Another notification! was issued  on         February 9, 1955 for the acquisition of further  four square         miles  of land for the above purpose.  It may  be  mentioned         that according to section 5 (1) of the Act, when a notice of         acquisition  is served or is published under section 4,  the         land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from         all  encumbrances on the date the’ notice is served or  pub-         lished  in the gazette.  The appellants, who were owners  of         some of the acquired lands, filed writ petitions before the’         High  Court  challenging the validity of  the   acquisition.         The  High Court dismissed both the petitions.             In  appeal  before us, Mr. Gobind Das on behalf  of  the         appellants has contended that the State Government  was  not         competent  to acquire the land in question under the Act for         the establishment of a steel plant.  Our attention is invit-         ed  in this connection to sub-section (1 ) of section  3  of         the  Act which provides inter alia that whenever it  appears         to  the ’State Government that it is necessary or  expedient         to acquire speedily any land for the purpose of  the  devel-         opment  of industry, a notification to that effect shall  be         published in the gazette stating the area and the boundaries         of  the land proposed to be acquired.  The argument  of  Mr.         Gobind  Das  is  that the acquisition of the  land  for  the         establishment of a steel plant cannot be said to be for  the         purpose  of  the  development of the industry.   It  is  not         denied by the learned counsel that a steel plant constitutes         an industrial undertaking and that the object of  establish-         ing  a steel plant is not different from the purpose of  the         development  of the industry as ordinarily  understood.   It         also  cannot be disputed that Rourkela steel  plant  consti-         tutes  a big milestone in the industrial development of  the         country.  The contention of Mr. Gobind Das, however, is that         the words "development of industries" have a limited meaning         as defined in the Act and the establishment of a steel plant         cannot  be considered to be for development  of  industries.         The definition of "development of industries" has been given         in  section 2(c) of the Act.  According to  the  definition,         development  of industries means and includes the  construc-         tion  of  the  Hirakud Dam and other  dams  and  reservoirs,         Hydro-Electric  Projects and such other schemes or  projects         as  the  State Government may by notification from  time  to         time,  specify in this  behalf.  We  have already  mentioned         above  that  the first notification for the  acquisition  of

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       land was issued on February 22, 1954.  Two days before  that         notification,  on February 20. 1954 the Governor  of  Orissa         issued a notification in pursuance of clause (c) of  section         2 of the Act.  In that notification, it was stated that  the         project  for the establishment of a steel plant  and  allied         and  ancillary  industries in the block  of  villages  round         about  Rourkela.  shall be included within the  meaning   of         the  expression "development of industries", as  defined  in         clause  (c)  of section 2 of the Act.   In the face of  this         notification,  we are of the opinion that the  establishment         of  the  steel plant and ancillary  industries  at  Rourkela         should  be held to answer to the definition of  "development         of industries", as given in the Act.  We are unable to subs-         669         cribe  to the submission of Mr. Gobind Das that the  schemes         and projects which could be the subject-matter of a  notifi-         cation  under  section 2(c) must be such as are  similar  to         Hirakud Dam or other HydroElectric projects.  Clause (c)  of         section  2  confers wide powers on the State  Government  to         notify any scheme or project as it may consider  appropriate         for  the  development of industries and we find  nothing  in         that  clause  that the scheme or project which  can  be  the         subject  matter  of a notification must be  one  similar  to         Hirakud  Dam or other dams or reservoirs  or  hydro-electric         projects.             It  is  then argued by Mr. Gobind Das that part  of  the         lands which were acquired for the purpose of-steel plant and         ancillary industries are being used as a civil township.  It         is  contended that the acquired land could only be used  for         the steel plant and ancillary industries and not for a civil         township.   This contention is equally devoid of force.  The         establishment  of a steel plant necessarily  postulates  the         construction  of residential quarters for the workmen to  be         employed  in  the’ plant.  In addition to that, lands  would         be  needed for shopping areas, for schools for the  children         of  the employees, for  play-grounds, for hospitals and  for         residential quarters of persons opening their  shops  cater-         ing  to  the needs of the employees of  the   steel   plant.         Lands would likewise be need for post offices, banks, clubs,         parks, cinemas, roads, police stations as also for cremation         and  burial of  the  dead. Land would also be needed  for  a         variety  of other purposes and civic amenities.  A  township         is a necessary adjunct and concomitant of a big steel plant.         The  fact,  therefore, that part of the land which  was  ac-         quired  has been used for civil township would not,  in  our         opinion, affect the validity of the acquisition of the land.             In  civil appeal 1237 of 1972, Mr. Gobind Das  has  also         advanced  an  argument that possession of the land  was  not         taken from the appellant.  We, however, find that the  judg-         ment  of  the High Court shows that no such  contention  was         advanced before the High Court when the writ petition giving         rise  to this appeal was argued.  In the  circumstances,  we         are  not  inclined  to permit the appellant  to  raise  this         contention for the first time in appeal before us.           Civil  appeal  1730  of  1973 arises out of writ petition         to  challenge  the  validity of  a notification dated  march         19,  1958  under  section ’4  of  the Land  Acquisition  Act         for the acquisition of 31.06 acres of land for expansion  of         rail  facilities  to serve the steel plant at  Rourkela.   A         writ  petition to challenge  this notification was filed  on         February 3, 1973.  The contention  which was advanced before         the  High Court and has been repeated before us with a  view         to challenge the validity of the acquisition of this land is         that  fourteen years after the acquisition of the land,  the         railway  authorities  for whom the land  was  acquired  have

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       transferred 3.21 acres of land to the Notified Area  Commit-         tee,  Rourkela.  The  above  submission, in our opinion,  is         without  merit.  According to the affidavit filed on  behalf         of the respondents, the above mentioned area is sought to be         transferred  to  the  Notified Area  Committee  because  the         Notified Area Committee is the appropriate body to construct         and maintain the         670         link  road, bus and taxi stands and shops  surrounding   the         railway  station.  The averments contained in the  affidavit         thus  go to show that 3.21 acres of land is not  being  used         for  a purpose extraneous from that for which the  land  was         initially  acquired.   Apart from that, we  find  that  this         Court has recently held in the case of Gulam Mustafa &  Ors.         v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1) that there is no  princi-         ple  of law by which a valid, compulsory acquisition  stands         voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it         to a public purpose other than  the one stated in the decla-         ration.             All  the  three appeals consequently fail and  are  dis-         missed but in the circumstances without costs.         Appeals dismissed.         671