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PETITIONER: MANEKA GANDHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/01/1978

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BHAGWATI, P.N. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. UNTWALIA, N.L. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  597            1978 SCR  (2) 621  1978 SCC  (1) 248  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC1514  (12)  E&R        1978 SC1548  (4,10,23)  R          1978 SC1594  (6,15)  E&R        1978 SC1675  (53,55,57,127,167,171,197,227,  E&R        1979 SC 478  (90,91A,129,159)  D          1979 SC 745  (20,30,36,37,52,77)  RF         1979 SC 916  (15,54)  R          1979 SC1360  (2,5)  R          1979 SC1369  (6)  R          1979 SC1628  (21)  R          1979 SC1725  (25)  R          1979 SC1803  (7)  R          1979 SC1918  (14)  E          1980 SC 470  (2,10)  R          1980 SC 847  (4)  R          1980 SC 882  (7)  RF         1980 SC 898  (11,41,46,47,57,63,135,136)  E          1980 SC 962  (116)  RF         1980 SC1535  (3,21,30)  RF         1980 SC1579  (30)  RF         1980 SC1632  (26)  RF         1980 SC1762  (12)  F          1980 SC1992  (12)  F          1980 SC2147  (39,63)  RF         1981 SC 487  (16)  R          1981 SC 613  (9)  RF         1981 SC 674  (6)  RF         1981 SC 679  (20)  R          1981 SC 746  (3,5,8)  R          1981 SC 814  (5,6)  R          1981 SC 818  (19,25,37,39,92)  RF         1981 SC 873  (10)  R          1981 SC 917  (22,23)  RF         1981 SC1621  (10)  RF         1981 SC1675  (1)  RF         1981 SC1767  (10)  R          1981 SC1829  (96)  RF         1981 SC2041  (8,9)  RF         1981 SC2138  (16,27,30,31)  R          1982 SC 710  (63)

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RF         1982 SC1315  (29)  MV         1982 SC1325  (2,11,16,18,73,75,80)  RF         1982 SC1413  (13,38)  R          1982 SC1473  (11,14)  R          1982 SC1518  (21)  R          1983 SC  75  (7)  R          1983 SC 130  (10,13,14)  R          1983 SC 361  (2,12,13,14,15)  RF         1983 SC 465  (5)  R          1983 SC 473  (6,24,25)  R          1983 SC 624  (8)  D          1983 SC1073  (22,23)  F          1983 SC1235  (6)  RF         1984 SC1361  (19)  RF         1985 SC 231  (2)  RF         1985 SC 551  (35)  E&R        1985 SC1416  (81,93,100,101,102,103,104)  RF         1985 SC1737  (13)  R          1986 SC 180  (39)  RF         1986 SC 555  (6)  RF         1986 SC 872  (71)  RF         1986 SC1035  (11)  RF         1986 SC1370  (101)  RF         1988 SC 157  (9)  RF         1988 SC 354  (15)  R          1988 SC1531  (64)  D          1988 SC1737  (87)  F          1989 SC1038  (4)  E&D        1989 SC1335  (52)  F          1989 SC1642  (25)  R          1990 SC 334  (104)  R          1990 SC1031  (12)  R          1990 SC1277  (46,48)  R          1990 SC1402  (29)  R          1990 SC1480  (109)  R          1991 SC 101  (31,32,34,65,157,223,239,257,2  RF         1991 SC 345  (6)  RF         1991 SC 564  (4)  RF         1992 SC   1  (133)  D          1992 SC1020  (23,28)  RF         1992 SC1701  (21,26,27,28)  F          1992 SC1858  (19)

ACT: Constitution   of  India  Articles  14,  19  (1)   (a)   and 21--Personal liberty--Whether right to go abroad is part  of personal liberty--Whether a law which Complies with  Article 21  has still to meet the challenge of   Article  19--Nature and ambit of Article 14--Judging validity with reference  to direct  and  inevitable  effect--Whether  the  right   under Article 19(1) (a) has any geographical limitation. Passports   Act,  1967-Ss.  3,5,6,10(3)(c),   10(5)--Whether s.10(3)(c)  is  violative of Articles 14, 19(1)  (a)  (b)  & 21--Grounds  for  refusing to  grant  passport--Whether  the power  to  impound passport  arbitrary--"in  general  public interest" if vague. Principles of Natural Justice--Whether applies only to quasi judicial   orders  or  applies  to   administrative   orders affecting  rights of citizens--When statute  silent  whether can be implied--Duty to act judicially whether can be  spelt out--In  urgent cases whether principles of natural  justice can apply.

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HEADNOTE: The  petitioner was issued a passport on June 1, 1976  under the  Passport  Act,  1967.  On the 4th  of  July  1977,  the petitioner received a letter dated 2nd July, 1977, from  the Regional  Passport Officer Delhi intimating to her  that  it was  decided  by  the Government of  India  to  impound  her passport under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act "in public  interest". The petitioner was required to surrender her passport within 7  days  from the receipt of that  letter.   The  petitioner immediately  addressed  a letter to  the  Regional  Passport Officer requesting him to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the order as provided in s.10(5). A reply was  sent by the Government of India, Ministry  of  External Affairs  on  6th  July  1977 stating  inter  alia  that  the Government  decided "in the interest of the general  public" not to furnish her copy of the statement of reasons for  the making  of  the order.  The petitioner thereupon  filed  the present  Writ Petition challenging action of the  Government in-  impounding her passport and declining to  give  reasons for doing so.  The Act was enacted on 24-4-67 in view of the decision of this Court in Satwant Singg Sawhney’s case.  The position  which obtained prior to the coming into  force  of the  Act was that there was no law regulating the  issue  of passports for leaving the shores of India and going  abroad. The  issue of passport was entirely within the unguided  and unchannelled  discretion  of  the  Executive.   In   Satwant Singh’s  case,  this  Court  bell by  a  majority  that  the expression  ’personal liberty’ in Article 21 takes  in,  the right  of locomotion and travel abroad and under Art. 21  no person  can  be deprived of his right to  go  abroad  except according  to  the  procedure  established  by  law.    This decision  was accepted by the Parliament and  the  infirmity pointed  but  by it was set right by the  enactment  of  the Passports Act, 1967.  The preamble of the Act shows that  it was enacted to provide for the issue of passport and  travel documents  to regulate the departure from India of  citizens of India and other persons and for incidental and  ancillary matters.   Se ction 3 provides that no person  shall  denart from or attempt to depart from India unless he holds in this ’behalf  a valid passport or travel document.  Section  5(1) provides  for  making  of  an application  for  issue  of  a passport  or travel document for visiting  foreign  country. Sub-section  (2) of section 5 says that on receipt  of  such application  the  Passport  Authority,  after  making   such enquiry,  if  any, as it may consider necessary,  shall,  by order  in writing, issue or refuse to issue the passport  or travel  document or make or refuse to make that passport  or travel document endorsement in 622 -respect  of one or more of the foreign countries  specified in  the application.  Sub-section (3) requires the  Passport Authority  where it refuses to issue the passport or  travel document  or to make any endorsement to record in writing  a brief  statement  of  its reasons  for  making  such  order. Section  6(1)  lays down the grounds on which  the  Passport Authority  shall refuse to make an endorsement for  visiting any foreign country and provides that on no other ground the endorsement  shall be refused.  Section 6(2)  specifies  the grounds on which alone and on no other grounds the  Passport Authority  shall  refuse  to issue the  Passport  or  travel document  for  visiting  any  foreign  country  and  amongst various  grounds  set  out there the last  is  that  in  the opinion  of the Central Government the issue of passport  or travel  document to the applicant will not be in the  public

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interest.   Sub-section  (1)  of  section  10  empowers  the Passport  Authority to vary or cancel the endorsement  on  a passport  or travel document or to vary or cancel it on  the conditions  subject to which a passport or  travel  document has been issued having regard to, inter alia, the provisions of s. 6(1) or any notification under s. 19. Sub-section  (2) confers  powers on the Passport Authority to vary or  cancel the  conditions  of the passport or travel document  on  the application of the holder of the passport or travel document and  with the previous approval of the  Central  Government. Sub-section  (3)  provides that the Passport  Authority  may impound  or  cause to be impounded or revoke a  passport  or travel  document on the grounds set out in cl. (a)  to  (h). The order impounding the passport in the present, case,  was made by the Central Government under cl. (c) which reads  as follows :-               "(c)  If  the  passport  authority  deems   it               necessary  so  to do in the  interest  of  the               sovereignty   and  integrity  of  India,   the               security of India, friendly relations of India               with the foreign country, or in the  interests               of the general public." Sub-section  (5) requires the Passport Authority  impounding or  revoking  a passport or travel document  or  varying  or cancelling an endorsement made upon it to record in  writing a  brief statement of the reasons for making such order  and furnish to the holder of the passport or travel document  on demand a copy of the same, unless, in any case, the Passport Authority  is  of  the opinion that it will not  be  in  the interest  of  the sovereignty and integrity  of  India,  the security  of  India, friendly relations of  India  with  any foreign country, or in the interest of the general public to furnish  such  a copy.  The Central Government  declined  to furnish  a copy of this statement of reasons for  impounding the passport of the petitioner on the ground that it was not in  the interest of the general public to furnish such  copy to the petitioner. The petitioner contended. 1.The  right to go abroad is part of  "personal  liberty" within the meaning of that expression as used in Art. 21 and no one can be deprived of this right except according to the procedure   prescribed  by  law.   There  is  no   procedure prescribed by the Passport Act, for impounding or revoking a Passport.  Even if some procedure can be traced in the  said Act  it is unreasonable and arbitrary in as much as it  does not  provide for giving an opportunity to the holder of  the Passport to be heard against the making of the order. 2.Section  10(3) (c) is violative of  fundamental  rights guaranteed under Articles 14,19(1) (a) and (g) and 21. 3.The  impugned  order is made in  contravention  of  the rules  of natural justice and is, therefore, null and  void. The  impugned  order has effect of placing  an  unreasonable restriction  on  the  right of free  speech  and  expression guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 19(1) (a) as also on  the  right to carry on the profession  of  a  journalist conferred under Art. 19 (1) (g). 4.   The impugned order could not consistently with Articles 19(1)(a) and (g)be  passed on a mere information of  the Central  Government that the presence of the  petitioner  is likely  to  be required in connection with  the  proceedings before the Commission of Inquiry. 623 5.In  order that a passport may be impounded under s.  10 (3) (c), public interest must actually exist in present  and mere likelihood of public interest .arising in future  would

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be no ground for impounding the passport. 6. It was not correct to say that the petitioner was  likely to  be  required  for  .giving  evidence  before  the   Shah Commission. The  respondents  denied  the  contentions  raised  by   the petitioner. BEG, C. J., (Concurring with Bhagwati, J.) 1.The  right of travel and to go outside the  country  is included in the fight to personal liberty. [643 G] Satwant  Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam Assistant  Passport Officer, Covernment of India, New Delhi & Ors. [19671 3  SCR 525  and Kharak Singh v.  State of U.P. & Ors. [1964] 1  SCR 332 relied on. 2.Article  21  though  framed as to appear  as  a  shield operating  negatively  against executive  encroachment  over something covered by that hield, is the legal recognition of both the protection or the shield as well as of what it pro- tects which lies beneath that shield. [644 B] A.K.  Gopalan  v.  State of Madras,  [1950]  SCR  88  and Additional  District  Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S.  S.  Shukla [1976] Suppl.  SCR 172 @ 327 referred to. Haradhan  Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.  [1975]  1 SCR 778, Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal  [1973] 1  S.C.R. 856 and R. C. ,Cooper v. Union of India  [1973]  3 SCR 530 referred to. 3.The view that Articles 19 and 21 constitute  watertight compartments has been rightly over-ruled.  The doctrine that Articles  19 and 21 protect or regulate flows  in  different channels, was laid down in A. K. Gopalan’s case in a context which  was very different from that in which  that  approach was displaced by the counter view that the constitution must be  read as an integral whole, with possi, ble  overlappings of the subject matter, of what is sought to be protected  by its various provisions, particularly by articles relating to fundamental  rights.  The ob. servations in A. K.  Gopalan’s case  that  due  process  with regard  to  law  relating  to preventive  detention  are  to be found in Art.  22  of  the Constitution  because it is a self-contained code for  laws. That  observation was the real ratio decidendi of  Gopalan’s case.   Other observations relating to the  separability  of the  subject  matters  of Art. 21 and 19  were  mere  obiter dicta.   This Court has already held in A. D. M.  Jabalpur’s case  by reference to the decision from Gopalan’s cast  that the  ambit of personal liberty protected by Art. 21 is  wide and   comprehensive.   The  questions  relating  to   either deprivation or restrictions of per sonal liberty, concerning laws falling outside Art. 22 remain really unanswered by the Gopalan’s  case.   The field of ’due process’ for  cases  of preventive detenu tion is fully covered by Art. 22 but other parts  of that field not covered by Art 22 are  ’unoccupied’ by  its specific provisions.  In what may be  called  unoccu -pied  portions of the vast sphere of personal liberty,  the substantive  as well as procedural laws made to cover  them must satisfy the requirements of both Arts 14 and 19 of  the Constitution. [646 E-H, 647 B-D, 648 A-B] Articles dealing with different fundamental rights contained in  Part HI of the ,Constitution do not  represent  entirely separate  streams  of rights which do not  ,mingle  at  many points.   They are all parts of an integrated scheme in  the Constitution.   Their  waters must mix  to  constitute  that grand   flow  unimpeded  .and  impartial  justice   (social, economic  and  political),  freedom (not  only  of  thought, expression,   belief,  faith  and  worship,  but   also   of association,  movement vocation or occupation as well as  of acquisition  and  possession  of  reasonable  property),  or

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equality (of status and of opportunity, which imply  absence of    unreasonable   or   unfair   discrimination    between individuals,   groups  and  classes),  and   of   fraternity (assuring  dignity-of  the individual and the unity  of  the nation) 624 which  our  Constitution visualfses.  Isolation  of  various aspects of human freedom, for purposes of their  protection, is  neither realistic nor beneficial but would  defeat  very objects of such protection. [648 B-D] Blackstone’s theory of natural rights cannot be rejected  as totally  irfelevantIf we have advanced today towards  higher civilization  and  in a more enlightened era we  cannot  lag behind  what,  at  any  rate,  was  the  meaning  given   to ’personal. liberty’ long ago by Blackstone.  Both the rights of personal security and personal liberty recognised by what Blackstone  termed ’natural law’ are embodied in Act. 21  of the Constitution. [649 A-C, 650 H, 651 A-B] A.D. M. Jabalpur vs.  S. S. Shukla [1976] Supp.  S.C.R.  172 relied on. The  natural law rights were meant to be converted into  our constitutionally recognised fundamental rights so that  they are  to  be found within it and not outside it.  To  take  a contrary  view would involve a conflict between natural  law and our constitutional law.  A ’divorce between natural  law and  our constitutional law would be disastrous.   It  would defeat  one of the basic purposes of our Constitution.  [652 B-C] The  total  effect and not the mere form  of  a  restriction would determine which. fundamental right is really  involved in  a  particular case and whether a restriction.  upon  its exercise   is  reasonably  permissible  on  the  facts   and circumstances of that case. [652 H, 653A] If  rights under Art. 19 are rights which inhere  in  Indian citizens,  individuals  carry  these  inherent   fundamental constitutional rights with them-wherever they go, in so  far as  our  law applies to them, because they are part  of  the Indian National just as Indian ships, flying the Indian flag are  deemed  in international law to be  floating  parts  of Indian  territory.   This  analogy, however,  could  not  be pushed   too  far  because  Indian  citizens,   on   foreign territory,  are  only  entitled by virtue  of  their  Indian Nationality  and Passports to the protection of  the  Indian Republic  and  the  assistance of  its  Diplomatic  Missions abroad.   They cannot claim to be governed abroad  by  their own  constitutional  or personal laws which do  not  operate outside India. [653 A-C] In  order to apply the test contained in Arts. 14 and 19  of the  Constitution we have to consider the objects for  which the exercise of inherent rights recognised by Art. 21 of the Constitution  are  restricted as well as  the  procedure  by which  these  restrictions are sought to  be  imposed,  both substantive and procedural laws and actions taken under them will  have  to pass the test imposed by, Arts.  14  and  19, whenever facts justifying the invocation of either of  these Articles  may  be disclosed, for example,  an  international singer  or  dancer  may  well be  able  to  complain  of  an unjustifiable restriction on professional activity by denial of  a passport.  In such a case, violation of both Arts.  21 and 19(1)(g) may be put forward making it necessary for  the authorities concerned to justify the restriction imposed  by showing  satisfaction of tests of validity  contemplated  by each of ’these two Articles. [653 F-H] The  tests of reason and justice cannot be  abstract.   They cannot be divorced’ from the needs of the nation.  The tests

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have  to  be  pragmatic otherwise they  would  cease  to  be reasonable.  The discretion left to the authority to impound a  passport  in Public interest cannot  invalidate  the  law itself.   We  cannot, out of fear, that such power  will  be misused,  refuse to permit Parliament to entrust  even  such power   to  executive  authorities  as  may  be   absolutely necessary to carry out the purposes of a validly exercisable power.  In matters such as, grant, suspension, impounding or cancellation  of  passports,  the  possible  dealing  of  an individual  with nationals and authorities of  other  States have  to  be  considered.   The  contemplated  or   possible activities  abroad  of the individual may have to  be  taken into account.  There may be questions of national safety and welfare  which transcend the importance of the  individual’s inherent  right  to  go  where he  or  she  pleases  to  go. Therefore, the grant of wide discretionary power to the exe- cutive authorities cannot be considered as unreasonable  yet there must be procedural safeguards to ensure that the Power will not be used for purposes extraneous to the grant of the power.   The procedural proprieties must be  insisted  upon. [654 A-E] 625 A bare, look at the provisions. of s. 10(3) shows. that each of the orders which- could be passed; under s. 10(3) (a) and (b)  requires  a satisfaction of the Passport  Authority  on certain  objective  conditions which must exist  in  a  case before it passes an order to impound a passport or a  travel document.  Impounding or revocation are placed side by  side on the same footing in the provisions [654 G-H] It  is clear from the provisions of the Act that there is  a statutory   right  also  acquired,  on  fulfilment  of   the prescribed conditions by the holder of a passport, that  it should continue to be effective for the specified period  so long  as no ground has come into existence for  either  its revocation   or  for  impounding  it  which  amounts  to   a suspension of, it for the time being.  It is true that in  a proceedings. under Art. 32, the Court is concerned only with the,  enforcement of fundamental constitutional  rights  and not  with  any  statutory  rights  apart  from  fundamental. rights.  Article 21 , however, makes it Clear that violation of all law whether statutory or of any other kind is  itself an infringement of the guaranteed fundamental right. [655 B- D] The  orders under s. 10(3) must be based upon some  material even  if that material concerns in some cases of  reasonable suspicion  arising from certain credible assertions made  by reliable   individuals.   In  an  emergent  situation,   the impounding  of a passport may become necessary without  even giving an opportunity to be heard against such a step  which could  be  reversed  after an opportunity is  given  to  the holder of the passport to show why the step was unnecessary. However,  ordinarily no passport could be reasonably  either impounded  or revoked without giving a prior opportunity  to its  holder to show cause against the proposed action.  [655 D-E] It  is  well-settled  that even when there  is  no  specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for  showing case  against  action  proposed  to  be  taken  against   an individual,  which affects the right of that individual  the duty  to  give reasonable opportunity to be  heard  will  be implied from the nature of the function to be perform,,,’ by the  authority  which  has the power  to  take  punitive  or damaging action. [655 G] State  of  Orissa  v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei  &  Ors.   AIR [1967] SC 1269 @ 1271 relied on.

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Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, [1863] 14 C.B. (N.  S.) 180 quoted with approval. An   order  impounding  a  passport  must  be  made   quasi- judicially.   This  was not done in the  present  case.   It cannot be said that a good enough reason has been shown  too exist  for impounding the passport of the  petitioner.   The petitioner had no opportunity of showing that the ground for impounding  it given in this Court either does not exist  or has  no  bearing on public interest or that the  public  in- terest can be better served in some other manner.  The order should  be quashed and the respondent should be directed  to give an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause  against any proposed action on such grounds as may be available.                          [656 E-G] There were no pressing grounds with regard to the petitioner that  the  immediate action of impounding her  passport  was called  for.   The  rather cavalier  fashion  in  which  the disclosure of any reason for impounding of her passport  was denied  to  the petitioner despite the fact  that  the  only reason said to exist is the possibility of her being  called to  give  evidence before a Commission of Inquiry.   Such  a ground is not such as to be reasonably deemed to necessitate its concealment in public interest. [656 G-H] Even executive authorities when taking administrative action which involves any deprivation of or restriction on inherent fundamental  rights of citizens must take care to  see  that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be  done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the   appearance  of  arbitrariness,   unreasonableness   or unfairness.  They have to act in a manner which is  patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice [657 A-B] 62 6 As the undertaking given by the Attorney General amounts  to an offer to deal with the petitioner justly and fairly after informing  her of any ground that may exist  for  impounding her passport, no further action by this Court is  necessary. [657 C-D] The impugned order must be quashed and Passport  Authorities be  directed  to  return the  passport  to  the  petitioner. Petition allowed with costs. [657D] Chandrachud, J. (concurring with Bhagwati, J.) The power to refuse to disclose the reasons for impounding a passport  is  of an exceptional nature and it  ought  to  be exercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the  exigencies  of an uncommon situation.  The  reasons  if disclosed, being open to judicial scrutiny for  ascertaining their  nexus  with the order impounding  the  passport,  the refusal  to disclose the reasons would also be open  to  the scrutiny  of  the court; or else the wholesome  power  of  a dispassionate judicial examination of executive orders could with impunity be set at nought by an obdurate  determination to  suppress  the reasons.  The disclosure  made  under  the stress  of the Writ Petition that the petitioner’s  passport was  impounded  because,  her  presence  was  likely  to  be required  in  connection  with  the  proceedings  before   a Commission of Inquiry, could easily have been made when  the petitioner  called upon the Government to let her  know  the reasons why her passport was impounded. [658 A-D] In  Satwant  Singh  Sawhney’s  case  this  Court  ruled,  by majority, that the expression personal liberty which  occurs in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes the right to  travel abroad  and  that no person can be deprived  of  that  right except according to procedure established by law.  The  mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot even meet  the

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mandate of Article 21.  The procedure prescribed by law  has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary.  The question whether the procedure prescribed by law  which  curtails  or takes  away  the  personal  liberty guaranteed  by  Art.  21  is reasonable or  not  has  to  be considered   not   in  the  abstract  or   on   hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full-dressed hearing as  in a court room trial but in the contest, primarily,  of the  purpose  which the Act is intended to  achieve  and  of urgent situations which those who are charged with the  duty of  administering the Act may be called upon to  deal  with. Secondly, even the fullest compliance with the  requirements of  Art.  21 is not the journey’s end because  a  law  which prescribes  fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing  or taking  away  the personal liberty granted by  Art.  21  has still  to meet a possible challenge under the  other  provi- sions of the Constitution.  In the Bank Nationalisation case the  majority  held that the assumption in A.  K.  Gopalan’s case  that certain Articles of the Constitution  exclusively deal  with specific matters cannot be accepted  as  correct. Though the Bank Nationalisation case was concerned with  the inter-relationship  of Arts. 31 and 19 and not of  Arts.  21 and  19, the basic approach adopted therein as  regards  the construction   of  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  in   the different  provisions  of  the  Constitution   categorically discarded  the  major premise of the  majority  judgment  in Gopalan’s case. [658 D-G, 659 A-B] The  test  of directness of the impugned law  as  contrasted with  its consequence was thought in A. K. Gopalan  and  Ram Singh’s case to be the true approach for determining whether a   fundamental   right  was   infringed.    A   significant application  of  that  test may be perceived  in  Naresh  S. Mirajkar’s  case  where an order passed by the  Bombay  High Court prohibiting the publication of a witness’s evidence in a  defamation  case was upheld by this Court on  the  ground that  it was passed with the object of affording  protection to  the  witness in order to obtain true  evidence  and  its impact on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed by  Art.  19 (1) (a) was incidental.  N. H. Bhagwati  J.  in Express  Newspapers Case struck a modified note by  evolving the  test of proximate effect and operation of the  Statute. That  test saw its fruition in Sakal Paper’s case where  the Court  giving precedence to the direct and immediate  effect of the order over the form and object, struck down the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960, on the ground  that it  violated  Article  19(1)(a) of  the  Constitution.   The culmi- 627 nation  of  this  thought process was reached  in  the  Bank Nationalisation  case  where it was held  by  the  majority, speaking  through  Shah  J, that the  extent  of  protection against the impairment of a fundamental right is  determined by  the direct operation of an action upon the  individual’s rights  and not by the object of the Legislature or  by  the form  of  the action. In Bennett Coleman’s  case  the  Court reiterated the same position.  It struck down the  newsprint policy restricting the number of pages of newspapers without the  option to reduce the circulation as  offending  against the provisions of Art. 19(1)(a). [659F-H, 660 A-C] Article 19(1)(a) guarantees to Indian Citizens the right  to freedom  of speech and expression.  It does not delimit  the grant  of  that right in any manner and there is  no  reason arising  either out of interpretational dogmas or  pragmatic considerations why courts should strain the language of  the Article  to  cut down amplitude of that  right.   The  plain

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meaning   of  the  clause  guaranteeing  free   speech   and expression is that Indian citizens are entitled to  exercise that  right wherever they choose regardless of  geographical considerations. [661 A-D] The Constitution does not confer any power on the  executive to prevent the exercise by an Indian citizen of the right of free   speech   and  expression  on   foreign   soil.    The Constitution guarantees certain fundamental freedoms  except where    their   exercise   is   limited   by    territorial considerations.  Those freedoms may be exercised wheresoever one  chooses  subject to the  exceptions  or  qualifications mentioned  in Art. 19 itself.  The right to go out of  India is  not  an integral part of the right of  free  speech  and expression.   The  analogy  of the freedom  of  press  being included  in  the  right of free speech  and  expression  is wholly  misplaced  because  the  right  of  free  expression incontrovertibly  includes  the right of freedom  of  press. The  right  to go abroad on one hand and the right  of  free speech and expression on the other are made up basically  of constituents so different that one cannot be comprehended in the  other.  The presence of the due process clause  in  the 5th  and 14th amendments of the American Constitution  makes significant difference to the approach of American Judges to the definition and evaluation of constitutional  guarantees. This Court rejected the contention that the freedom. to form associations or unions contained in Article 19(1)(c) carried with  it the right that a workers , union could do all  that was  necessary  to  make that right effective  in  order  to achieve the purpose for which the union was formed. [See the decision in All India Bank Employees Association. [661 F, H, 662 A-13, E] Bhagwati,  J. (for himself Untwalia and Murtaza  Fazal  Ali, JJ) The  fundamental  rights  in Part III  of  the  Constitution represent  the basic values cherished by the people of  this country  since  the Vedic times and they are  calculated  to protect the dignity of the individual and create  conditions in  which every human being can develop his  personality  to the  fullest extent.  But these freedoms are not and  cannot be  absolute, for absolute and unrestricted freedom  of  one may  be  destructive of the freedom of another.  In  a  well ordered  civilised  society, freedom can only  be  regulated freedom.   It is obvious that Article 21 though  couched  in negative  language  confers fundamental right  to  life  and personal   liberty.    The   question   that   arises    for consideration  on the language of Art. 21 is as to  what  is the  meaning and content of the words .personal liberty’  as used  in  this Article.  In A. K. Gopalan’s  case  a  narrow interpretation  was placed on the words ’personal  liberty.’ But  there was no definite pronouncement made on this  point since  the  question before the court was not  so  much  the interpretation of the words ’personal liberty’ as the inter- relation  between Arts. 19 and 21. [667 G-H, 668 D-E, G,  H, 669 A] A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 and  Kharak Singh v. State of U. P. & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 332 referred to. In Kharak Singh’s case the majority of this Court held  that ’personal  liberty’ is used in the Article as a  compendious term to include within itself all varieties of Tights  which go to make up the personal liberties of man other than those dealt  with  in  several  clauses  of  Article  19(1).   The minority however took the view that the expression  personal liberty is a comprehensive one and the right to move  freely is an attribute of personal liberty.  The minority  observed that  it was not right to exclude any attribute of  personal

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liberty from the scope 628 and  ambit of Art. 21 on the ground that it was  covered  by Art.  19(1)       It was pointed out by the,  minority  that both Articles 19(1)and   21  are  independent   fundamental rights though there is a certain amountof overlapping;  and there is no question of one being carved out of another. The minority view  was upheld as correct and it was pointed  out that it wouldnot be tight to read the expression ’personal liberty’ in Art. 21 in a narrowand  restricted sense  so as to exclude those attributes of personal liberty which are specifically  dealt with in Art. 19(1).  The attempt of  the Court  should  be  to expand, the reach  and  ambit  of  the fundamental  rights rather than attenuate their meaning  and content   by  a  process  of  judicial  construction.    The wavelength  for  comprehending the scope and  ambit  of  the fundamental  rights  has been set by the Court  in  R.    C. Cooper’s    case  and  the approach of  the  Court  in,  the interpretation of the fundamental rights must now be in tune with this wave length.  The expression ’personal liberty’ in Art.  21 is of the widest amplitude and covers a variety  of rights  which go to constitute the personal liberty  of  man and some of them have been raised to the status of  distinct fundamental,  rights and given additional  protection  under Art.  19(1).   Thus Articles 19(1) and 21 are  not  mutually exclusive. [669 B-670 A-H] R. C. Cooper v. Union of India [1973] 3 SCR 530 relied on. Shambhu  Nath  Sarkar  v. The State of West  Bengal  &  Ors. applied. Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. followed. This  Court  held  in case of Satwant  Singh  that  personal liberty  within  the meaning of Art. 21  includes  with  its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person  can be  deprived  of this right except  according  to  procedure prescribed  by  law.   Obviously, the  procedure  cannot  be arbitary, unfair or unreasonable.  The observations in A. K. Gopalan’s  case  support  this view  and  apart  from  these observations, even on principle, the concept of  reasonable- ness must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Art. 21,  having regard to the impact of Art. 14 on Art.21.  [671 A, D, G-H] The  decision  of  the  majority in  A.  K.  Gopalan’s  case proceeded  on  the assumption that certain Articles  in  the Constitution  exclusively  deal with  specific  matters  and where  the  requirements  of an  article  dealing  with  the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is  no infringement  of  the fundamental right guaranteed  by  that Article,  no  recourse  can be had to  a  fundamental  right conferred by another article.  This doctrine of  exclusivity was  overruled by a majority of the Court in R. C.  Cooper’s case.  The ratio of the majority judgment in R. C.  Cooper’s case was explained in clear and categorical terms in Shambhu Nath Sarkar’s case and followed in Haradhan Saha’s case  and Khudi Ram Das’s case. [672 B-C, G, 673 A] Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [1973] 1 SCR 856 referred to. Haradhan  Saha v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [1975]  1  SCR 778  and  Khudiram Das v. The State of West  Bengal  &  Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 832 relied on. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled  that Article  21  does not exclude Article 19 and  that  even  if there is a law prescribing procedure for depriving a  person of  personal liberty and there is consequently no  infringe- ment of the fundamental right conferred by Art. 21, such law ill  so  far as it abridges or takes  away  any  fundamental

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right  under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge  of that Article.  Equally such law would be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14 and the procedure prescribed by it would  have to answer the requirement of that Article.  [673 A-G] The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] SCR  284 and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra [1952] SCR 435 referred to. Article  14 is a founding faith of the Constitution.  It  is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation  of our democratic republic and, therefore, it 62 9 must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach.   No  attempt should be made to truncate  its  all embracing  scope  and  meaning, for to do  so  would  be  to violate  its magnitude.  Equality is a dynamic concept  with many  aspects  and dimensions and it  cannot  be  imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. [673 H, 674 A] E.P.  Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another  [1974]  2 SCR 348 applied. Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the  rule of law in a republic while the other to  the  whim and  caprice of an absolute monarch.  Article 14 strikes  at arbitrariness  in  State  action and  ensures  fairness  and equality  ,of  treatment.  The principle  of  reasonableness which  legally as well as philosophically, is  an  essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omni-presence and the procedure contemplated by  Article  21 must answer the test  of  reasonableness  in order to be in conformity with Article 14.  It  must be right and just and fair and not  arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. [674 B-C] It  is  true  that the Passports Act does  not  provide  for giving reasonable opportunity to the holder of the  passport to  be heard in advance before impounding a  passport.   But that is not conclusive of the question.  If the statute make itself clear onthis point, then no more question arises but even when statute is silent the lawmay in a given  case make an implication and apply the principle. Naturaljustice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law  with fairness  and  to secure justice and over the years  it  has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas  of administrative  action.  [674  F-G,  675  A-B]  Wiseman   v. Borneman [1971] A.C. 297 approved. Schmidt  v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs  [1968]  112 Solicitor General 690 approved. There  can  be  no  distinction  between  a   quasi-judicial function  and an administrative function for the purpose  of principles   of   natural   justice.   The   aim   of   both administrative inquiry as well as the quasi-judicial enquiry is  to  arrive at a just decision and if a rule  of  natural justice  is  calculated  to  secure justice  or  to  put  it ’negatively,  to  prevent  miscarriage  of  justice,  it  is difficult  to  see  why it should be  applicable  to  quasi- judicial enquiry and not to administrative enquiry.  It must logically  apply  to  both.   It cannot  be  said  that  the requirements  of  fairplay in action is any the less  in  an administrative   enquiry  than  in  a  quasi-judicial   one. Sometimes  an unjust decision in an  administrative  enquiry may have far more serious consequences than a decision in  a quasi-judicial  enquiry and hence rules of  natural  justice must  apply,  equally  in an  administrative  enquiry  which entails civil consequences. [676 G-H, 677 A] Rex v. ElectricityCommissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171 referred

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to. Rex v. LegislativeCommittee of the Church Assembly  [1928] 1 K. B. 411 and Ridge v. Baldwin[1964] A. C. 40  referred to. Associated  Cement  Companies Ltd. v. P. N.  Sharma  &  Anr. [1965]  2 SCR 366, State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani [1967]  2 SCR  625 and A. K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India  &  Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 457 relied. The duty to act judicially need not be superadded but it may be  spelt  out from the nature of the power  conferred,  the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights of  the person affected and where it is found to exist the rules  of natural  justice  would be attracted.   Fairplay  in  action requires   that  in  administrative  proceedings  also   the doctrine  of natural justice must be held to be  applicable. [678 B-C] In  re : H. K. (An Infant) [1967] 2 Q.B. 617 and Schmidt  v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs referred to. D  F.O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh [1973] 3 S.C.C.  864 relied on  630 The  law is not well settled that even in an  administrative proceeding which involves civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. [680 A] The power conferred on the Passport Authority is to  impound a  passport  and the consequence of  impounding  a  passport would be to impair the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad during the time that the  passport is impounded.  The passport can be impounded only on certain specified grounds set out in section 10(3) and the  Passport Authority  would  have to apply its mind to  the  facts  and circumstances of a given case and decide whether any of  the specified  grounds exists which would Justify impounding  of the passport.  The authority is also required by s. 10(5) to record  in  writing  a brief statement of  the  reasons  for making  the order impounding a passport and save in  certain exceptional situations, the authority is obliged to’ furnish a  copy  of the statement of reasons to the  holder  of  the passport.  Where the Passport Authority which has  impounded a  passport is other than the Central Government a right  of appeal against the order impounding the passport is given by section  11.   Thus,  the power conferred  on  the  Passport Authority  to impound a passport is a  quasijudicial  power. The  rules of natural justice would in the circumstances  be applicable  in  the exercise of the power  of  impounding  a passport even on the orthodox view which prevailed prior  to A.  K. Kraipak’s case.  The same result must follow in  view of  the decision in A. K. Kraipak’s case, even if the  power to  impound  a passport were regarded as  administrative  in character,   because  it  seriously  interferes   with   the constitutional  right  of the holder of the passport  to  go abroad and entails adverse civil consequences.  The argument of  the Attorney General however was that having  regard  to the  nature  of the action involved in the impounding  of  a passport,  the audi alteram partem rule must be held  to  be excluded because if notice were to be given to the holder of the  passport and reasonable opportunity afforded to him  to show cause why his passport should not be impounded he might immediately  on the strength of the passport make  good  his exit  from  the country and the object of  impounding  etc., would be frustrated.  Now it is true that there may be cases where,  having  regard  to the nature of the  action  to  be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory   provision,  fairness  in  action   may   warrant exclusion  of the audi alteram partem rule.   Indeed,  there

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are  certain wellrecognised exceptions to the  audi  alteram Partem  rule  established  by  judicial  decisions.    These exceptions, do not in any way militate against the principle which requires fair play in administrative action.  The word exception is really a misnomer because in these  exceptional cases the audi alteram partem rule is held inapplicable  not by  way  of an exception to fairplay in action  but  because nothing  unfair  can  be  inferred  by  not  conferring   an opportunity to present or meet a case.  The life of the  law is  not  logic  but  experience.   Therefore,  every   legal proposition  must in the ultimate analysis be tested  on  Me touch-stone of pragmatic realism. [680 B-F, H, 681 C-F] The  audi  alteram  partem  rule  may,  therefore,  by   the experiential test, be excluded, if importing the right to be heard  has  the  effect  of  paralysing  the  administrative process  or the need for promptitude or the urgency  of  the situation  so  demands.  But, at the same time, it  must  be remembered  that this is a rule of vital importance  in  the field  of administrative law and it must not  be  jettisoned save  in  very exceptional  circumstances  where  Compulsive necessity  so demands.  It is a wholesome rule  designed  to secure the rule of law and the Court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case.  The  Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to  the maximum  extent  permissible  in a  given  case.   The  audi alteram  partem  rule  is  not cast in  a  rigid  mould  and judicial decisions establish that it may stiffer situational modifications.   The  core  of  it  must,  however,  remain, namely,  that  the  person  affected  must  have  reasonable opportunity’  of  being  heard and the hearing  must  be  a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations  exercise. It  would, not therefore be right to conclude that the  audi alteram partem? rule is excluded merely because the power to impound a passport might be frustrated, if prior notice  and hearing  were  to be given to the  person  concerned  before impounding his passport.  The passport Authority may proceed to impound the passport without giving any prior opportunity to  the  person concerned to be heard, but as  soon  as  the order impounding 631 the Passport is made, an opportunity of hearing, remedial in aim, should be given to him so that he may present his  case and controvert that of the Passport Authority and point out why his passport should not be  impounded  and the order impounding it  recalled.   This should  not  only be possible but  also  quite  appropriate, because the reasons for impounding the passport are required to be supplied by the Passport Authority after the making of the order and the person affected would, therefore, be in  a position to make a representation setting forth his case and plead for setting aside the action impounding his  passport. A fair opportunity of being heard following immediately upon the order impounding the Passport would satisfy the  mandate of natural justice and a provision requiring giving of  such opportunity  to the person concerned can and should be  read by  implication in the Passports Act.  If such  a  provision were  held  to  be  incorporated in  the  Act  by  necessary implication   the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  Act   for impounding  a  passport would be right, fair  and  just  and would  not  suffer from  arbitrainess  or  unreasonableness. Therefore, the procedure established by the Passport Act for impounding a passport must be held to be in conformity  with the  requirement of Art. 21 and does not fall foul  of  that Article. [681 G-H, 682 A-C, E-H, 683 A-B] In  the  present case, however, the Central  Government  not

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only  did  not  give  an  opportunity  of  hearing  of   the petitioner  after making the impugned order  impounding  her passport but even declined to furnish to the petitioner  the reasons for impounding her passport despite requests made by her.   The  Central  Government was  wholly  unjustified  in withholding the reasons for impounding the passport and this was  not only in breach of the statutory provisions  but  it also  amounted  to denial of opportunity of hearing  to  the petitioner.   The  order  impounding  the  passport  of  the petitioner was, therefore, clearly in violation of the  rule of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem and  was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed  by the  Act.   The learned Attorney General,  however,  made  a statement  on  behalf of the Government of  India  that  the Government  was agreeable to considering any  representation that  may  be  made  by the petitioner  in  respect  of  the impounding of her passport and giving her an opportunity  in the matter, and that the representation would be dealt  with expeditiously  in  accordance  with  law.   This   statement removes the vice from the order impounding the passport  and it can no longer be assailed on the ground that it does  not comply with the audi alteram partem rule or is not in accord with the procedure prescribed by the Act. [683 C-G] The  law is well settled that when a statute vests  unguided and unrestricted power in an authority to affect the  rights of  a  person without laying down any  policy  or  principle which is to guide the authority,, in exercise of the  power, it would be affected by the vice of discrimination since  it would leave it open to the authority to discriminate between persons  and  things  similarly situated.   However,  it  is difficult  to  say  that the  discretion  conferred  on  the passport  authority is arbitrary or unfettered.   There  are four grounds set out in section 10(3)(c) which would justify the making of an order impounding a passport. [684C-D] The words "in the interest of the general public" cannot  be characterised as vague or undefined.  The expression "in the interest  of the general public" has clearly a well  defined meaning and the Courts have often been called upon to decide whether  a particular action is in the interest  of  general public  or  in public interest and no  difficulty  has  been experienced  by  the Courts in carrying out  this  exercise. These  words are in fact borrowed ipsissima verba  from  Art 19(5) and it would be nothing short of heresay to accuse the constitution makers of vague and loose thinking.  Sufficient guidelines  are  provided by the Act itself  and  the  power conferred  on the Passport Authority to impound  a  passport cannot  be said to be unguided or unfettered.  Moreover  the exercise  of  this  power  is  not  made  dependent  on  the subjective opinion of the Passport Authority as regards  the necessity of exercising it on one or more grounds stated  in S.10(3)(c), but the Passport Authority is required to record in  writing a brief statement of reasons for impounding  the passport  and  save in  certain  exceptional  circumstances, supply  a  copy of such statement of reasons to  the  person affected  so  that the person concerned  can  challenge  the decision of the Passport Authority in appeal and the  Appel- late Authority can examine whether the reasons given by  the Passport Autho- 632 rity  are correct and if so whether they justify the  making of the order impounding the passport.  It is true that  when the  order  impounding the passport is made by  the  Central Government  there is no appeal against it.  But it  must  be remembered that in such a case the power is exercised by the Central Government itself and it can safely be assumed  that

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the  Central Govt. will exercise the power in  a  reasonable and  responsible  manner.  When power is vested  in  a  high authority like the Central Government abuse of power  cannot be  lightly assumed and in any event, if there is  abuse  if the power the arms of the Court are long enough to reach  it and to strike it down.  The power conferred on the  Passport Authority  to  impound a passport under  section  10(3)  (c) cannot be regarded as discriminatory. [684-D-H, 685 A-C] The  law on the point viz. the proper test or yard-stick  to be  applied  for determining whether a statute  infringes  a particular   fundamental   right,   while   adjudging    the constitutionality   of  a  statute  on  the  touchstone   of fundamental  rights has undergone radical changes since  the days  of  A.K.  Gopalan’s  case [1950]  SCR  88,  which  was followed in Ram Singh and Ors. v. State of Delhi [1951]  SCR 451 and applied in Naresh Shridhar Mirajikar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [1966] 3 SCR 744, [685 D-G, 686-B] According to these decisions, the theory was that the object and form of state action determine the extent of  protection which  may be claimed by an individual and the  validity  of such  action has to be judged by considering whether  it  is "directly   in  respect  of  the  subject  covered  by   any particular  article of the Constitution or touches the  said article  only incidentally or indirectly".  The test  to  be applied for determining the constitutional validity of state action  with fundamental right therefore was : what  is  the object  of the authority in taking the action : What is  the subject matter of the action and to which fundamental  right does it relate ? This theory that "the extent of  protection of important guarantees, such as the liberty of persons  and right  to property, depend upon the form and object  of  the state  action  not  upon  its  direct  operation  upon   the individual’s freedom" held sway, in spite of three decisions of the Supreme Court in Dwarkadass Srinivas v. The  Sholapur Weaving Co. Ltd. [1954] SCR 674; Express Newspaper (P)  Ltd. JUDGMENT: Ltd.  & Ors. v. Union of India [1962] 3 SCR 842  formulating the test of direct and inevitable effect or the doctrine  of intended  and  real  effect for  the  purpose  of  adjudging whether  a statute offends a particular  fundamental  right. However, it was only in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1973] 3 SCR 530 that the doctrine that the object and form of  the State  action alone determine the extent of protection  that may  be claimed by an individual and that the effect of  the State  action on the fundamental right of the individual  is irrelevant  as  laid  down in  Gopalan’s  case  was  finally rejected.  This doctrine is in substance and reality nothing else  than the test of pith and substance which  is  applied for  determining the constitutionality of legislation  where there is conflict of legislative powers conferred on Federal and State legislatures with reference to legislative  lists. [685 H, 686 A-B, D-H, 687 A-E, F-G] The test applied since R.C. Cooper’s case was as to what  is the  direct  and  inevitable consequence or  effect  of  the impugned  state  action  on the  fundamental  right  of  the petitioner.   It is possible that in a given case  the  pith and substance of the State action may deal with a particular fundamental  right but its direct and inevitable effect  may be on another fundamental right and in that case, the  state action  would  have  to meet the  challenge  of  the  latter fundamental  right.  The pith and substance  doctrine  looks only  at the object and subject matter of the state  action, but  in  testing  the  validity of  the  state  action  with reference  to  fundamental  rights,  what  the  Courts  must consider  is  the direct and inevitable consequence  of  the

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State  action.  Otherwise the protection of the  fundamental rights would subtly but surely eroded. [690 B-D] A.   K.  Gopalan  v. State of Madras [1950] 2  SCR  88;  Ram Singh  &  Ors.  V. State of Delhi  [1951]  SCR  451;  Naresh Sridhar Marajkar & Ors. V. State of     Maharashtra  &  Anr. [1966]  3  SCR 744 referred to.  R. C. Cooper  v.  Union  of India [1973] 3 SCR 530; Dwarakadass Srinivas v. the Sholapur and  Weaving Co. Ltd. [1954] SCR 674; Express Newspaper  (P) Ltd.  & Anr. v. Union of India, [1959] S.C.R. 12  and  Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of 633 India [1962] 3 SCR 842; quoted with approval, Bennet Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [1973] 2 SCR 757 applied. The test formulated in R. C. Cooper’s case merely refers  to "direct operation" or "direct consequence and effect" of the State action on the fundamental right of the petitioner  and does  not use the word "inevitable" in this connection.   If the test were merely of direct or indirect effect, it  would be  an open-ended concept and in the absence of  operational criteria for judging "directness" it would give the Court an unquestionable discretion to decide whether in a given  case a  consequence  or  effect is direct  or  not.   Some  other concept-vehicle  would be needed to quantify the  extent  of directness or indirectness in order to apply the test.   And that   is   supplied  by  the  criterion   of   "inevitable" consequence  or effect adumbrated in the  Express  Newspaper case  (1959) SCR 12.  This criterion helps to  quantify  the extent of directness necessary to constitute infringement of a fundamental right.  Now, if the effect of State action  on a  fundamental  right  is  direct  and  inevitable,  then  a fortiorari it must be presumed to have been intended by  the authority  taking  the  action and hence  this  doctrine  of direct  and  inevitable  effect is described  aptly  as  the doctrine  of  intended and real effect.  This  is  the  test which must be applied for the purpose of determining whether section  10(3)(c),  or the impugned order made under  it  is violated of Art. 19(1)(a) or (g). [698 C-F] Prima  facie, the right which is sought to be restricted  by s. 10(3)(c) and the impugned order is the right to go abroad and that is not named as a fundamental right or included  in so  many  words in Art. 19(1)(a) of the  Constitution.   The right to go abroad, as held in Satwant Singh Sawhney’s  case [1967]  3 SCR 525, is included in "personal liberty"  within the  meaning  of  Art. 21 and is thus  a  fundamental  right protected by that Article.  This clearly shows that there is no  underlying principle in the Constitution  which,  limits the fundamental right in their operation to the territory of India.   If  a  fundamental  right  under  Art.  21  can  be exercisable outside India, there is no reason why freedom of speech and expression conferred under 19(1)(a) cannot be  so exercisable. [690 H, 694 C-D] Satwant  Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam,  Asstt.   Possport Officer, Govt. of India, New Delhi & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 525; Best  v.  United States, 184 Federal Reporter  (ed)  p  131, referred  to.   Dr. S. S. Sadashiva Rao V.  Union  of  India [1965] Mysore Law Journal p. 605 approved. There  are no geographical limitations to freedom of  speech and  expression  guaranteed under Art. 19(1)  (a)  and  this freedom  is exercisable not only in India but  also  outside and  if  State  action sets up  barriers  to  its  citizens’ freedom of expression in any country in the world, it  would violate  Art.  19(1)  (a) as much as if  it  inhibited  such expression  within the country.  This conclusion would on  a parity of reasoning apply equally in relation to fundamental right  to  practise  any  profession  or  to  carry  on  any

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occupation,   trade  or  business,  guaranteed  under   Art. 19(1)(g). [694G-H, 695 A] Freedom to go abroad incorporates the important function  of an ultimum refunium liberatis when other basic freedoms  are refused.   Freedom  to go abroad has much social  value  and represents a basic human right of great significance.  It is in fact incorporated as in alienable human right in  Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  But it  is not specifically named as a fundamental right in Art.  19(1) of the Constitution. [696 C-D]  Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116 : 2 L.ed 2d, 1204 referred to. Even  if a right is not specifically named in Art. 19(1)  it may  still be a fundamental right covered by some clause  of that  Article,  if  it  is  an  integral  part  of  a  named fundamental  right or partakes of the same basic nature  and character as that fundamental right.  It is not enough  that a  right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from  a named fundamental right or that its existence, is  necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective.  Every activity which  facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended  in  that  fundamental right,  nor  can  it  be regarded  as  such  merely because it may  not  be  possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right. 634 What  is necessary to be seem is and that is the test  which must be applied, whether the right claimed by the petitioner is  an,  integral  part  of a  named  fundamental  right  or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental,  right is in reality and substance nothing  but an instance of the exercise of, the named fundamental right. If  this be the correct test, the right to go abroad  cannot in  all circumstances be regarded as included in freedom  of speech and expression. [697 D-G] Kent  v.  Dulles,  357 US. 116. 2 L.ed 2d.  1204  :  Express Newspapers  (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.  [1959] SCR  12;  Sakal  Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v.  Union  of  India [1962]  3 SCR 842; Bennet Coleman & Co. & Ors. v.  Union  of India  [1973] 2 SCR 757; Ramesh Thappar v. State  of  Madras [1950] SCR 594 referred to.  Apthekar v. Secretary of  State 378 US 500 : 12 L.ed 2d 992; Zamei v. Rusk 381 USI : 14 L.ed 2d 179 explained. The  theory  that a peripheral or  concomitant  right  which facilitates  the  exercise of a named fundamental  right  or gives  its  meaning  and substance  or  makes  its  exercise effective, is itself a guaranteed right included within  the named fundamental right cannot be accepted. [701 B-C] All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal [1962] 3 SCR 269 applied. The  right  to  go abroad cannot therefore  be  regarded  as included  in  freedom of speech  and  expression  guaranteed under   Art.  19(1)(a)  on  the  theory  of  peripheral   or concomitant right.  The right to go abroad cannot be treated as  part  of  the  right to  carry  on  trade,  business  or profession  or calling guaranteed under Art.  19(1)(g).  The right  to go abroad is clearly not a guaranteed right  under any  clause of Article 19(1) and Section 10(3) (c)     which authorises  imposition  of restrictions on the right  to  go abroad  by impounding of passport cannot be held as void  as offending  Article  19(1)(a)  or  (g),  as  its  direct  and inevitable  impact is on the right to go abroad and  not  on the  right  of free speech and expression or  the  right  to carry on trade, business, profession or calling. [702 C-E]      But  that does not mean that an order made under s.  10 (3)  (c)  may not violate Article 19(1)(a) or (g).  Where  a

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statutory  provision empowering an authority to take  action is constitutionally valid, action taken under it may  offend a fundamental right and in that event, though the  statutory provision is valid, the action may be void. Therefore,  even though section 10(3)(c) is valid, the question would  always remain   whether   an  order  made  under  it   invalid   as contravening a fundamental right. The direct and  inevitable effect  of  an order impounding a passport may, in  a  given case,  be  to  abridge or take away freedom  of  speech  and expression  or the right to carry on a profession and  where such  is the case, the order would be invalid, unless  saved by Article 19(2) or Article 19(6). [702F-H]      Narendra   Kumar   &   Ors.  v.  Union   of   India   & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 375 referred to.      Though the impugned order may be within the terms of s. 10(3)   (c),  it  must  nevertheless  not   contravene   any fundamental  right  and if it does, it would be  void.  Now, even  if  an  order impounding a passport  is  made  in  the interests   of  public  order  decency  or   morality,   the restriction  imposed  by  it  may  be  so  wide,   excessive disproportionate to the mischief or evil sought   to      be averted  that it may be considered unreasonable and in  that event, if the direct and inevitable consequence of the order is to abridge or take away freedom of speech and expression, it  would be        violative of Article 19(1)(a) and  would not be protected by Article 19(2) and the same would, be the position  where  the order is in the interests  of       the general  public but it infringes directly and inevitably  on the freedom       to carry on a profession in which case  it would  contravene Article 19(1) (g) without being  saved  by the provision enacted ion Article 19(6). [705 D-E] 6 3 5 The  impugned order, in the present case does  riot  Violate either  Art. 19(1)(a) or Art. 19(1)(g).  What  the  impugned order does is to impound the passport of the petitioner  and thereby prevent her from going abroad and at the date,  when impugned  order was made, there is nothing to show that  the petitioner  was  intending to go abroad for the  purpose  of exercising her freedom or speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession as a journalist.  The direct  and inevitable  consequence of the impugned order was to  impede the exercise of her right to go abroad and not to  interfere with  her freedom of speech and expression or her  right  to carry on her profession. [706 F-G] The  petitioner  is not justified in seeking  to  limit  the expression  "interests  of the general  public"  to  matters relating  to  foreign affairs.  The argument that  the  said expression could not cover a situation where the presence of a person is required to give evidence before a commission of Inquiry_  is plainly erroneous as it seeks to cut  down  the width  and  amplitude of the expression  "interests  of  the general  public," an expression which has a well  recognised legal  connotation  and which is found in Article  19(5)  as well as Article 19(6).  It is true that that there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate, but  that does not justify reading of a statutory  provision in a manner not warranted by the language or narrowing  down its scope and meaning by introducing a limitation which  has no  basis  either in the, language or in the  context  of  a statutory  provision  Clauses (d), (e) and (h) of  S.  10(3) make it clear that there are several grounds in this section which do not relate to foreign affairs. [709 B-F] Moreover  the  present  case  is not  one  where  the  maxim "expressio  unius exclusio ulterius has any  application  at all. [710-B-C]

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Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. O. Agarwal & Anr., [1969] 3 SCR 108 @ 128 referred to. OBSERVATION It  is  true that the power under s. 10(3) (c) is  rather  a drastic  power  to interfere with a basic human  right,  but this  power has been conferred by the legislature in  public interest  and  there is no doubt that it will  be  sparingly used and that too, with great care and circumspection and as far  as  possible.  the passport of a  person  will  not  be impounded  merely  on the ground of his  being  required  in connection  with  a proceeding, unless the case  is  brought within s. 10(3)(e) or sec. 10(3)(b). [710G-H] Ghani v. Jones [1970] I Q. B 693 quoted with approval. An  order impounding a passport can be made by the  Passport Authority  only  if it is actually in the interests  of  the general  public  to  do so and it is  not  enough  that  the interests  of the general public may be likely to be  served in future by the making of the order.  In the present  case, it was not merely on the future likelihood of the  interests of the general public being advanced that the impugned order was made by the Central Government.  The impugned order  was made  because,  in  the opinion of  the  Central  Govt.  the presences  of  the  petitioner  was  necessary  for   giving evidence  before the Commission of Inquiry and according  to the report received by the Central Government she was likely to  leave India and that might frustrate or impede  to  some extent the inquiries which were being conducted by the  Com- missions of Inquiry. [711-C-D] Krishna lyer, J. (concurring with Bhagwati, J.) British  Raj  has  frowned  on  foreign  travels  by  Indian patriotic  suspects  and instances from the  British  Indian Chapter may abound.  In many countries the 636 passport  and  visa  system has been used  as  potent  paper curtain   to   inhibit  illustrious   writers,   outstanding statesmen,  humanist churchmen and renowned  scientists,  if they are dissenters, from leaving their national  frontiers. Things  have  changed,  global awareness  has  dawned.   The European   Convention   on  Human   Rights   and   bilateral understandings have made headway to widen freedom of  travel abroad  as  integral  to liberty of  the  person.   And  the universal  Declaration  of Human Rights  has  proclaimed  in Article  13,  that  every one has the  right  to  leave  any country   including his own, and to return to  his  country. This human planet is our single home, though  geographically variegated,  culturally diverse, politically  pluralist   in science and technology competitive and co-operative in  arts and  life-styles a lovely  mosaic and, above  all,  suffused with   a  cosmic  unconsciousness  of  unity   and    inter- dependence. [717 B, C, D, E-F] Viewed  from  another  angle, travel abroad  is  a  cultural enrichment  which enables one’s understanding of  one’s  own country  in better light.  Thus it serves national  interest to  have its citizenry see other countries and  judge  one’s country on a comparative scale. [718 B] The  right of free movement is a vital element  of  personal liberty.   The  right  of free movement  includes  right  to travel  abroad.  Among the great guaranteed rights life  and liberty  are  the first among equals, carrying  a  universal connotation  cardinal to a decent human order and  protected by  constitutional  armour.   Truncate liberty  in  Art.  21 traumatically  and  the  several  other  freedoms  fade  out automatically. [720 A-B] Personal  liberty makes for the worth of the  human  person. Travel  makes  liberty  worthwhile. life  is  a  terrestrial

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opportunity  for  unfolding personality rising to  a  higher scale  moving  to fresh woods and reaching  out  to  reality which  makes  our earthly journey a true fulfilment,  not  a tale  told  by an idiot full of sound  and  fury  signifying nothing, but a fine frenzy rolling between heaven and earth. The spirit of Man is at the root of Art. 21 Absent  liberty, other freedoms are frozen. [721 C-F] Procedure  which  deals with the modalities  of  regulating, restricting  or even rejecting a fundamental  right  falling within  Article  21 has to be fair, not  foolish,  carefully designed  to  effectuate, not to  subvert,  the  substantive right  itself.  Thus, understood, ’procedure’ must rule  out anything   arbitrary,   freakish  or   bizarre.    What   is fundamental is life and liberty.  What is procedural is  the manner  of  its exercise.  This quality of fairness  in  the process  is emphasised by the strong word "establish"  which means  ’settled firmly’," not wantonly or whimsically.  [722 H, 723 A-B] Procedure  in Article 21 means fair, not  formal  procedure. Law  is reasonable law, not any enacted piece.  As  Art.  22 specifically  spells  out  the  procedural  safeguards   for preventive and punitive detention, a law providing for  such detention  should conform to Art. 22.  It has  been  rightly pointed  out that for other rights forming part of  personal liberty, the procedural safeguards enshrined in Art. 21  are available.    Otherwise,   as  the   procedural   safeguards contained  in  Art. 22 will be available only  in  cases  of preventive  and punitive detention the right to  life,  more fundamental than any other forming part of personal  liberty and  paramount  to the happiness, dignity and worth  of  the individual,   will  not  be  entitled  to   any   procedural safeguard,  save such as a legislature’s mood chooses.  [723 F-H] Kochunmi’s case (AIR 1960 SC 1080, 1093) referred. Liberty  of  locomotion  into  alien  territory  cannot   be unjustly   forbidden  by  the  Establishment  and   passport legislation  must  take processual provisions  which  accord with  fair norms, free from extraneous pressure and, by  and large,   complying   with   natural   justice.    Unilateral arbitrariness,  police dossiers, faceless affiants,  behind- the-back materials oblique motives and the inscrutable  face of an official sphinx do not fill the ’fairness,’ bill. [726 D-E] Article 21 clubs life with liberty and when we interpret the colour  and  content of ’procedure established by  law’,  we must be alive to the deadly peril of 637 life  being  deprived without  minimal  processual  justice, legislative   callousness   despising   hearing   and   fair opportunities of defence. [726 F] Sections  5,  6 and 10 of the impugned legislation  must  be tested even under Art. 21 on canons of processual justice to the people outlined above.  Hearing is obligatory-meaningful hearing, flexible and realistic, according to circumstances’ but  not ritualistic and wooden.  In exceptional  cases  and emergency  situations,  interim measures may  be  taken,  to avoid  the mischief of the passportee becoming  an.  escapee before  the  hearing begins.  "Bolt the  stables  after  the horse has been stolen" is not a command of natural  justice. But soon after the provisional seizure, a reasonable hearing must  follow, to minimise procedural prejudice.  And when  a prompt final order is made against the applicant or passport holder   the  reasons  must  be  disclosed  to  him   almost invariably save in those dangerous cases, where  irreparable injury  will ensue to the State.  A government which  revels

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in  secrecy in the field of people’s liberty not  only  acts against  democratic decency but busies itself with  its  own burial.   That  is the writing on the wall if  history  were teacher,  memory our mentor and decline of liberty  not  our unwitting  endeavour.   Public power must  rarely  hide  its heart in an open society and system. [727 F-H] Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and  versatile quality,   equalitarian   in  its  soul  and   allergic   to discriminatory  diktats.   Equality  is  the  antithesis  of arbitrariness. [728 A] As  far  as question of  extra-territorial  jurisdiction  in foreign  lands is concerned, it is a misconception.   Nobody contends  that India should interfere with  other  countries and their sovereignty to ensure free movement of Indians  in those  countries.  What is meant is that the  Government  of India  should not prevent by any sanctions it has  over  its citizens  from  moving within in any other country  if  that other  country has no objection to their  travelling  within its territory. [728 C] In  Gopalan’s  case  it was held that Art.  22  is  a  self- contained Code, however, ’this has suffered supersession at. the hands of R. C. Cooper. [728 D] Sakal Newspapers [1962] 3 SCR 842, Cooper [1973] 3 SCR  530. Bennet  Coleman  [1973]  2 SCR 759 and  Shambu  Nath  Sarkar [1973] 1 SCR 856 referred to. The  law  is now settled that no article in Part III  is  an island  but Part of a continent, and the conspectus  of  the whole  part  gives the direction and correction  needed  for interpretation  of  these  basic  provisions.   Man  is  not dissectible  into  separate limbs  and,  likewise,  cardinal rights in an organic constitution, which make man human have a  synthesis.  The proposition is indubitable that  Art.  21 does  not,  in  a given situation exclude Art.  19  if  both rights  are  breached.  It is a salutary  thought  that  the summit  court  should not  interpret  constitutional  rights enshrined in Part III to choke its life-breath or chill  its elan vital by processes of legalism, overruling the enduring values   burning  in  the  bosoms  of  those  who  won   our independence  and drew up our founding document.  [728  F-G, 729 A-B] High   constitutional  policy  has   harmonised   individual freedoms   with  holistic  community  good   by   inscribing exceptions to Art. 19(1) in Art 19(2) to (6).  Even so, what is fundamental is the freedom, not the exception.  More  im- portantly,  restraints  are permissible only to  the  extent they have nexus with the approved object.  No verbal  labels but  real  values are the governing  considerations  in  the exploration and adjudication of constitutional prescriptions and  proscriptions.   Governments  come  and  go,  but   the fundamental  rights of the people cannot be subject  to  the wishful value-sets of political regimes  of the passing day. [729 C-D, 730 F] Locomotion in some situation is necessarily involved in  the exercise    of  the  specified  fundamental  rights  as   an associated  or integrated right.  Travel,   simpliciter,  is peripheral  to  and not necessarily fundamental in  Art.  19 Free   speech is feasible without movement  beyond  country. [731 B]  The  delicate,  yet  difficult, phase  of  the  controversy arrives  where free speech and free practice  of  profession are inextricably interwoven with travel abroad. 638 One,  has  to  view the proximate and  real  consequence  of thwarting  transnational  travel through the  power  of  the State exercised under s. 3 of the Passport Act read with ss.

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5   and  6.  Associated  rights  totally   integrated   with fundamental rights must enjoy the same immunity.  Three sets of   cases  might  arise.   First,  where  the   legislative provision or executive’ order expressly forbids exercise  in foreign  lands  of  the-fundamental  right  while   granting passport.   Secondly, there may be cases where even  if  the order is innocent on its face, the refusal of permission  to go  to a foreign country may, with certainty and  immediacy, spell  denial  of free speech and professional  practice  or business.  Thirdly, the fundamental right may itself  enwomb locomotion regardless of national frontiers.  The second and third often are blurred in their edges and may overlap. [732 H, 733 A-C] Spies, traitors, smugglers, saboteurs of the health,  wealth and  survival  or  sovereignty of the nation  shall  not  be passported  into  hostile soil to work  their  vicious  plan fruitfully.   But  when applying the  Passports  Act,  Over- breadth, hyper-anxiety, regimentation complex, and political mistrust  shall not sub-consciously exaggerate, into  morbid or   neurotic  refusal  or  unlimited  imponding  or   final revocation  of passport, facts which, objectively  assessed, may  prove tremendous trifles.  That is why  the  provisions have to be read down into constitutionality, tailored to fit the  reasonableness test and humanised by  natural  justice. The Act willsurvive  but  the  order  shall  perish   for reasons so fully set out by Shri JusticeBhagwati.   And on  this construction, the  conscience of the   Constitution triumphs over vagarious governmental orders. [734 E-G-H] Kailasam, J. (Dissenting) The preamble to the Constitution provides that the people of India  have  solemnly resolved to constitute  India  into  a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic and to secure  to all its citizens, justice, social,  economic  and political, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, equality of status and of opportunity.  Article  12 defines the State as including the Government and Parliament of  India and the Government and the Legislature of each  of the  States  and of local or other  authorities  within  the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.  Article 13 provides that laws that are  inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights are to that  ex- tent  void.   Article 245(2) provides that no  law  made  by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground  that it  would  have  extra territorial  operation.   In  England section  3  of  the Statute  of  Westminster  declares  that Parliament  has  full  power  to  make  laws  having   extra territorial operation.  The following are the principles  to determine  whether  the provisions of a  Constitution  or  a Statute have extra territorial application. (a)An Act unless it provides otherwise applies only to the country concerned. (b)  An  Act of a Legislature will bind the subjects of  the realm  both within and without if that is the  intention  of the Legislature, which must be gathered from the language of the Act in question. (c)  Legislature normally restricts operation of legislation to  its own territories.  However, on occasions  legislation controlling the activities of its own citizens when they are abroad may be passed. Niboyet v. Niboyet 48 L.J.P.I. at p. 10 and Queen v. Jameson and Others [1896] 2 Q.B. Division 425 at 430 referred to. (d)  In the absence of an intention clearly expressed or  to be inferred from its language, or from the object or subject matter or history of the enactment, the presumption is  that Parliament does not design its statute to operate beyond the

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territorial limit of the country. [738-E-F-H, 739 A, B, E, G-H, 740 A, B, G-H] Governor-General  in Council v. Raleigh Investment Co.  Ltd. A.I.R. (31) [1944] Federal Court 51, referred to. Wallace  Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of  Income-Tax, Bombay,  Sind and Baluchistan [1945] F.C.R. 65 and  Mohammad Mohy-ud-din  v. The King Emperor [1946] F.C.R.  94  referred to. 639 The  application of Article 14 is expressly limited  to  the territory  of  India Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and  22  by their  very nature are confined to the territory  of  India. Articles  23 to 28 are applicable only to the  territory  of India  At any rate, there is no intention in these  Articles indicating extra-territorial application.  So also  Articles 29  and 30 which deal with cultural and  educational  rights are applicable only within the territory of India.   Article 31   does  not  expressly  or  impliedly  have  any   extra- territorial  application.   It is possible  that  the  right conferred  by  Article 19(1)(a) may  have  extra-territorial application.  It is not likely, however, that the framers of the  Constitution intended the right to  assemble  peaceably and  without  arms or to form associations or unions  or  to acquire,  hold and dispose of property, or to  practise  any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, to  have any extra-territorial application for  such  rights would  not-  be  enforced by the State  outside  the  Indian territory.   The  rights  conferred  under  Article  19  are fundamental  rights and Arts. 32 & 226 provide,  that  those rights  are guaranteed and can be enforced by the  aggrieved person by approaching this Court or the High Courts.   These rights  cannot  be  protected  by  the  State  outside   its territory  and, therefore, there is a presumption  that  the constitution makers would not have intended to guarantee any rights which the State cannot enforce. [742 H, 743 A-D-E-F] Virendra v. The State of Punjab and Another, [1958] SCR  308 referred to. It  is  most unlikely that before the declaration  of  human rights  was  promulgated  the framers  of  the  Constitution decided to declare that the fundamental rights conferred  on the  citizens would, be available even outside India.   Even in the American Constitution there is no mention of right to freedom of speech or expressions as being available  outside America.  The law made under Article 19(2) to 19(6)  imposes restrictions  on the exercise of right of freedom of  speech and expression etc.  The restrictions thus imposed  normally would  apply only within the territory of India  unless  the legislation  expressly or by necessary implication  provides for extra-territorial operation.  In the penal code, section 3  and  4  specifically provides that  crimes  committed  by citizens of India outside India are punishable.  In  Article 19,  however,  there is no such provision  expressly  or  by necessary  implication.  Secondly, a citizen cannot  enforce his  fundamental rights outside the territory of India  even if  it is taken that such rights are available  outside  the country.  Therefore, the contention of the petitioners  that by denying the passport the petitioner’s fundamental  rights guaranteed  by Article 19 are infringed cannot be  accepted. [744 H, 745 A-D, 746 F-G, H, 747 A] The  important  question  which arises, is  whether  an  Act passed under Article 21 should also satisfy requirements  of Article 19.  It has been decided by this ,Court in Gopalan’s case  that  the punitive detention for  offences  under  the Penal  Code  cannot  be challenged on  the  ground  that  it infringes fundamental rights under Article 19. [747 E-F]

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The  rights  guaranteed under Article 19(1) are  subject  to restrictions that may be placed by Articles 19(2) to  19(6). The right not to be deprived of life and personal liberty is subject to its deprivation by procedure established ’by law. In Gopalan’s case it was held that Article 19 dealt with the rights of the citizens when he was free and would not  apply to  person  who had ceased to be free and  has  been  either under punitive or preventive detention.  It was further held that  Article 19 only applied where a  legislation  directly hit  the rights enumerated in the Article and not where  the loss of rights mentioned .in the Article was a result of the operation of legislation relating to punitive or  preventive detention.   The aforesaid ratio of Gopalan’s case has  been confirmed  by  this, Court in Ram Singh v. State  of  Delhi. The  view  was  again confirmed in the  State  of  Bihar  v. kameshwar Singh. [749C,750B-G] Ram  Singh  v. State of Delhi [1951] SCR 451  and  State  of Bihar v. Kameshwar ’Singh [1952] SCR 889 relied on. In  Express  Newspapers, the test laid down was  that  there must  be a direct or inevitable consequences of the  measure enacted in the impugned Act and that 640 it  would not be Possible to strike down the legislation  as having that effect and operation. [751 B-C] Express  Newspapers  (P) Ltd. and another v.  The  Union  of India & Ors. [1959] 1 SCR 135 referred to. In  Hamdard Dawakhana’s case it was held that it is not  the form   or  incidental  infringement  that   determines   the constitutionality  of  a  statute but  the  reality  or  the substance. [751 D] Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India [1960] 2 SCR  671  at page 691 and Kochunni v. The  State  of  Madras [1960]  3  SCR 887 referred to.  Sakal Papers (P)  Ltd.  and Ors. v. The Union of India [1962] 3 SCR 842 distinguished. In Sakal Paper’s Case the Court held that the order was void as it violated Article 19(1)(a) and was not saved by Article 19(2).  In that case the impact of legislation under Article 21  on the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) was not  in issue. [752 C-D] Kharak   Singh   [1964]   1  SCR  332   relied   on.    Bank Nationalisation [1970] 3 SCR 530 and Bennet Coleman [1973] 2 SCR 757 distinguished. In Bank Nationalisation case the Court was only  considering the decisions that took the view that Articles 19(1)(f)  and 31(2) were mutually exclusive.  The basis for the conclusion in Bank Nationalisation case is that Articles 19 and 31  are parts of a single pattern and while Article 19(1)(f) enjoins the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, clause 5 of Article 19 authorises imposition of restrictions upon the right.   There must be a reasonable restriction and  Article 31  assures  the  right to property  and  grants  protection against  the  exercise  of the authority of  the  State  and clause  5  of Article 19 and clauses 1 and 2 of  Article  31 prescribe  restrictions  upon the said  action,  subject  to which  the  right to property may be  exercised.   The  case specifically  over-ruled  the view taken in  Gopalan’s  case that the approach and form of the State action alone need to be considered and the fact of loss of fundamental rights  of the  individual  in  general will be  ignored.   The  entire discussion  in  Bank  Nationalisation case  related  to  the inter-relation  between Article 3 1 (2) and Article  19  (1) (f)  Certain passing observations have been made  about  the liberty of persons.  However, there is no justification  for holding  that the case is an authority for  the  proposition that  the legislation under Article 21 should  also  satisfy

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all  the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article  19(1). Article  21 is related to deprivation of life  and  personal liberty  and  it  has been held that it is not  one  of  the rights  enumerated in Article 19(1).  That the  decision  in Bank  Nationalisation case so far as it relates to  Articles 19(1)  and 21 is In the nature of obiter dicta.   The  Court had not applied its mind and, decided the specific question. The observations were general and casual observations on;  a point  not  calling for decision and  not  obviously  argued before it cannot be taken as an authority on the proposition in question.  The Court cannot be said to have declared  the law  on  the  subject  when no occasion  arose  for  it  to, consider and decide the question.  The judgment proceeded on some erroneous assumptions.  It was assumed by the  judgment that  the majority of the Court in Gopalan’s case held  that Article  22  being a complete code  relating  to  preventive detention  the  validity of an order of  detention  must  be determined  directly according to the terms within the  four corners  of that Article.  The said statement is not  borne out  from the record of the judgment in Gopalan’s case.   If the  obiter  dicta based on the wrong assumption  is  to  be taken  as  the  correct position in law  it  would  lead  to strange results. if Articles. 641 19(1)  (a)  to  (e) and (g) are attracted  in  the  case  of deprivation of personal liberty under Article 21, a punitive detention  for  an offence committed under I.P.C.,  such  as theft,  cheating  or  assault  would  be  illegal,  for  the reasonable  restrictions  in the interest  of  public  order would  not  cover  the  said  offences.   There  can  be  no distinction  between the punitive detention  and  preventive detention.  Observation in Bank Nationalisation case that  a legislation  under  Article  21  should  also  satisfy   the requirements  of Article 19 cannot be taken as correct  law. [754 G-H, 756 D-E, 757 C-E, G-H, 758 A-B, C, 759 A, E-F] Chiranjit  Lal Chowdhuri [1950] SCR 869, The State  of  West Bengal  V. Subodh Gopal [1954] SCR 587, State of  Bombay  v. Bhanji  Munji [1953] 1 SCR 777, Dabu Barkya Thakur v.  State of  Bombay, [1961] 1 SCR 128, Smt.  Sitabati Debi & Anr.  v. State of We$ Bengal [1967] 2 SCR 940 and K.  K.     Kochunni [1968] 3 SCR 887 referred to. In S. N. Sarkar’s case also, the majority held that  Article 22  was a self-contained Code.  The view taken in this  case also  suffers from the same infirmities referred to  in  the Bank  Nationalisation case.  In Khudi Ram’s case  also  this Court  erroneously stated that Gopalan’s case has taken  the view that Article 22 was a complete code. [759 F-H, 760 A-B] In  Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur, Chief  Justice Ray held that Article 21 is the ’rule of law regarding  life and  liberty  and  no other rule of law  can  have  separate existence  as a distinct right.  Justice Beg  observed  that Gopalan’s  case  was  merely  cited  in  Cooper’s  case  for illustrating  a  line  of reasoning which  was  held  to  be incorrect  in  determining validity of  law.   The  question under consideration was whether Articles 19(1)(f) and  31(2) were   mutually  exclusive.   The  learned  Judge  did   not understand  the  Cooper’s  case as holding  that  effect  of deprivation  of rights outside Article 21 will also have  to be considered. [760D-F-H] In Bennet Coleman’s case, the Court held that though Article 19(1)  does not mention the freedom of press it  is  settled view  of  the court that freedom of  speech  and  expression includes  freedom  of press and circulation.  In  that  case also  the question whether Articles 21 and 19  are  mutually exclusive did not arise for consideration.  Bennet Coleman’s

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case.   Express Newspapers Case, and Sakai  Newspapers  case were  all concerned with the right to freedom of  the  press which  is  held to form part of the freedom  of  speech  and expression. [761 G-H] Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales  [1950] A.C. 235 referred to. The Passport Act provides for issue of passports and  travel documents  for  regulating  the  departure  from  India   of citizens  of  India and other person.  Since  the  said  Act complies with the requirements of Article 21 i.e. compliance with  procedure established by law, its validity  cannot  be challenged.  If incidentally the Act infringes on the rights of  a citizen under Article 19(1) of the Act, it  cannot  be found to be invalid.  The pith and substance rule will  have to  be applied and unless the rights are directly  affected, the challenge will fail. [763 A-B] The  procedure established by law does not  mean  procedure, however,  fantastic  and oppressive or  arbitrary  which  in truth and reality is no procedure at all.  Section 5 of  the Act provides for applying for passports or travel  documents etc.  and  the procedure for passing  orders  thereon.   The authority  can either grant passport or can refuse  it.   In case  the authority refuses to grant it; it is required  to record in writing a brief statement of his reasons which are to be furnished to the person concerned unless the authority for reasons specified in sub-section (3) refuses to  furnish a  copy.   Section 6 provides that the refusal  to  give  an endorsement  shall be on one or other grounds  mentioned  in sub-sections  (2) to (6).  Section 10 enables  the  Passport authority  to vary or cancel the endorsement on a  passport. Section 10(3) 642 provides the reasons for which a passport may be  impounded. Again  reason’, are required to be furnished to  the  person concerned on demand except if the, Passport Authority is  of the  opinion  that  it  will  not  be  in  the  interest  of sovereignty  and  integrity  of India,  security  of  India, ’friendly relations of India with any. foreign country or in the  interest of the general public to furnish such a  copy. Section  11 provides for an appeal except when the order  is passed by the Central Government. [764 C-E, 765 A-G] The  Legislature by making an express provision may  deny  a person  the  right to be heard.  Rules  of  natural  justice cannot be equated with the fundamental rights.  Their aim is to  secure  justice and to prevent miscarriage  of  justice. They  do  not  supplant the law but  supplement  it.   If  a statutory  provision  can  be  read  consistently  with  the principles of natural justice the court should do so but  if a  statutory  provision that specifically  or  by  necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice  this  Court  cannot  ignore  the  mandate  of   the legislature  or  the statutory authority and read  into  the concerned provision the principles of natural justice.  To a limited extent it may be necessary to revoke or to impound a passport  without notice if there is real apprehension  that the  holder  of  the passport may leave the  country  if  he becomes  aware of any intention on the part of the  Passport Authority  or  the  Government  to  revoke  or  impound  the passport  but  that itself would not justify  denial  of  an opportunity to the holder of the passport to, state his case before  the final order is passed.  The legislature has  not by express provision excluded the right to be heard. [768 F- H, 769 A-B] Purtabpur  v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar [1969] 2 SCR 807  and Schmidt v. Secretary of State, Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149

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referred to. A  passport may be impounded without notice but  before  any final  order  is passed, the rule of  audi  alteram  partem, would  apply and the holder of the passport will have to  be heard.   The  petitioner has a right to be  heard  before  a final order under section 10(3)(e) is passed.  Earlier,  the courts  had  taken  a view that  the  principle  of  natural justice is inapplicable to administrative orders.   However, subsequently,  there  is a change in the  judicial  opinion. The    frontier   between   judicial   and    quasi-judicial determination   on  the  one  hand  and  an   executive   or administrative   determination  on  the  other  has   become blurred.  The rigid view that principles of natural  justice apply  only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts and  not  to administrative acts no longer holds the field.  The court is not  intended  to  sit in appeal over the  decision  of  the Government.   The decision of the Government  under  section 10(3)(c) is subject to a limited judicial scrutiny. [770  A- F, H, 771 A, 772 B-D] H.  K.  (An  infant)  [1967] 2 Q.B. 617  at  p.  630  Barium Chemicals                 Ltd. v.  Company Law Board  [1966] Supp.  SCR 311, Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D.     Agarwal, [1969]  3  SCR 103 and U.P. Electric Co. v.  State  of  U.P. [1969] 3 SCR 865 followed. The provision empowering the Government not to disclose  the reasons  for  impounding etc. is valid.  The  Government  is bound  to  give opportunity to the bolder  of  the  passport before finally revoking it or impounding it.  The 643 cases in which the authority declines to furnish reasons for making an order would be extremely rare.  In case where  the Government itself passes an order it should be presumed that it would have made the order after careful scrutiny.  If an order is passed by the Passport Authority an appeal is  pro- vided.  In the present case, there is no reason in declining to  furnish  to  the petitioner  statement  of  reasons  for impounding the passport. [772 H, 773 A-D, H, 774 A] In  view of the statement of the Attorney General  that  the petitioner  might  make a representation in respect  of  the impounding of passport and that the representations would be dealt  with expeditiously and that even if the imounding  of the  passport is confirmed it will not exceed a period of  6 months,  it  is not necessary to go into the merits  of  the case any further. [776 B-C]

& ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 231 of 1977. (Under  Article  32  of the Constitution  of  India).  Madan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan for the Petitioner. S.V.   Gupte,   Attorney  General,  Soli   J.   Sorabjee, Additional  Sol.  Genl. of India, R. N. Sachthey and  K.  N. Bhatt for the Respondents. Rain  Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga  & Mrs.  S. Bagga for the Intervener. The following Judgments were delivered BEG, C.J. The case before us involves questions relating  to basic  human  rights.   On such  questions  I  believe  that multiplicity of views giving the approach of each member  of this  Court  is not a disadvantage if it clarifies  our  not infrequently  differing  approaches.  It should  enable  all interested to appreciate better the significance of our Con- stitution. As  I  am  in general agreement  with  my  learned  brethren

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Bhagwati  and Krishna lyer.  I will endeavour to confine  my observations  to  an indication of my own approach  on  some matters  for consideration now before us.  This seems to  me to be particularly necessary as my learned brother Kailasam, who  has also given Us the benefit of his separate  opinion, has a somewhat different approach.  I have had the advantage of  going through the opinions of each of my  three  learned brethren. It seems to me that there can be little doubt that the right to  travel  and  to go outside  the  country,  which  orders regulating issue, suspension or impounding, and cancellation of passports directly affect, must be included in rights  to "personal  liberty"  on the strength of  decisions  of  this Court  giving  a very wide ambit to the  right  to  personal liberty  (see  : Satwant Singh Sawhney  v.  D.  Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, Government of India, New Delhi & Ors.,(1) Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2). (1)  [1967] 3S.C.R.525. (2)  [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332. 644 Article 21 of the Constitution reads as follows:               "Protection of life and personal liberty.   No               person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  life  or               personal liberty except according to procedure               established by law". It,  is  evident  that Article 21, though so  framed  as  to appear  as a shield operating negatively  against  executive encroachment  over something covered by that shield, is  the legal  recognition of both the protection or the  shield  as well as of what it protects which lies beneath that  shield. It  has been so interpreted as long ago as in A. K.  Gopalan v. State of Madras,(1) where, as pointed out by me in  Addi- tional  District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S . S.  Shukla  and others(2)  with  the help of quotations  from  judgments  of Patanjli  Sastri,  J. (from p. 195 to 196), Mahajan  J.  (p. 229-230),  Das  J.  (295 and 306-307).  I  may  add  to  the passages  cited there some from the judgment of Kania  Chief Justice  who  also,  while distinguishing  the  objects  and natures  of articles 21 and 19, gave a wide enough scope  to Art. 21. Kania CJ said (at p. 106-107)                "Deprivation   (total   loss)   of   personal               liberty,  which inter alia includes the  right               to  eat or sleep when one likes or to work  or               not  to  work  as  and  when  one-pleases  and               several such rights sought to be protected  by               the  expression ’personal liberty’ in  article               21, is quite different from restriction (which               is  only  a partial control) of the  right  to               move freely (which is relatively a minor right               of a citizen) as safeguarded by article  19(1)               (d).  Deprivation of personal liberty has  not               the  same  meaning  as  restriction  of   free               movement  in the territory of India.  This  is               made clear when the provisions of the Criminal               Procedure  Code  in Chapter VIII  relating  to               security  of  peace or maintenance  of  public               order  are  read.  Therefore  article  19  (5)               cannot apply to a substantive law depriving  a               citizen  of personal liberty.  I am unable  to               accept   the   contention   that   the    word               ’deprivation’   includes  within   its   scope               ’restriction’  when interpreting  article  21.               Article  22  envisages the law  of  preventive               detention.   So  does article  246  read  with

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             Schedule  Seven,  List I, Entry 9,  and  lList               III,  Entry 3. Therefore, when the subject  of               preventive  detention  is  specifically  dealt               with in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights I do               not   think  it  is  proper  to   consider   a               legislation  permitting  preventive  detention as  in confli ct with the rights mentioned  in               article 19(1).  Article 19(1) does not purport               to cover all aspects of liberty or of personal               liberty.  In               (1)   [1950] SCR 88.               (2)   [1976] Suppl.  SCR 172 at 327.               645               that  article only certain phases  of  liberty               are  dealt  with.   ’Personal  liberty’  would               primarily  mean liberty of the physical  body.               The  rights given under article 19(1)  do  not               directly  come under that  description.   They               are  rights  which accompany  the  freedom  or               liberty  of the person.  By their very  nature               they are freedoms of a person assumed to be in               full  possession of his personal liberty.   If               article  19  is  considered  to  be  the  only               article safeguarding personal liberty  several               well-recognised_ rights, as for instance,  the               right  to  eat or drink, the  right  to  work,               play,  swim  and  numerous  other  rights  and               activities and even the right to life will not               be deemed protected under the Constitution.  I               do not think that is the intention.  It  seems               to  me improper to read article 19 as  dealing               with the same subject as article 21.   Article               19 gives the rights specified therein only  to               the  citizens  of India while  article  21  is               applicable  to all persons.  The word  citizen               is  expressly defined in the  Constitution  to               indicate   only  a  certain  section  of   the               inhabitants    of   India.    Moreover,    the               protection  given  by-  article  21  is   very               general.    It  is  of  ’law’--whatever   that               expression is interpreted to mean.  The legis-               lative  restrictions on the law-making  powers               of the legislature are not here prescribed  in               detail as in the case of the rights  specified               in  article  19.   In  my  opinion   therefore               article  19  should  be  read  as  a  separate               complete article". In that case, Mukherjea J., after conceding that the  rights given by article 19(1) (d) would be incidentally contravened by  an  order  of  preventive detention  (see  p.  261)  and expressing  the opinion that a wider significance was  given by  Blackstone  to the term " personal liberty",  which  may include  the  right to locomotion, as Mr.  Nambiar,  learned Counsel for A. K. Gopalan, wanted the Court to infer, gave a narrower connotation to "personal liberty", as "freedom from physical constraint or coercion" only.  Mukherjea, J., cited Dicey for his more restrictive view that "personal  liberty" would  mean  :  "a personal right not  to  be  subjected  to imprisonment,  arrest  or  other physical  coercion  in  any manner that does not admit of legal justification".  He then said               "It is, in my opinion, this negative right  of               not  being subjected to any form  of  physical               restraint  or  coercion that  constitutes  the               essence  of  personal  liberty  and  not  mere

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             freedom  to  move to any part  of  the  Indian               territory". After  referring to the views of the Drafting  Committee  of our Constitution Mukherjea, J., said : (p. 963) :               "It is enough to say at this stage that if the               report   of  the  Drafting  Committee  is   an               appropriate    material   upon    which    the               interpretation    of   the   words   of    the               Constitution-  could  be based,  it  certainly               goes  against the contention of the  applicant               and  it shows that the words used  in  article               19(1) (d) of the Constitution do not mean  the               same thing as the expression               3-119SCI/78               646               personal  liberty’ in article 21 does.  It  is               well known that the word ’liberty’ standing by               itself  has been given a very wide meaning  by               the  Supreme  Court of the- United  States  of               America.    It  includes  not  only   personal               freedom from physical restraint but the  right               to  the free use of one’s own property and  to               enter into free contractual relations.  In the               Indian  Constitution, on the other  hand,  the               expression   ’personal   liberty’   has   been               deliberately  used to restrict it  to  freedom               from   physical   restraint   of   person   by               incarceration or otherwise".               Fazal Ali, J., however, said (at p. 148)               "To my mind, the scheme of the Chapter dealing               with   the   fundamental   rights   does   not               contemplate what is attributed to it,  namely,               that each article is a code by itself and is               independent of the others. Inmy  opinion  it               cannot be  said that articles 19, 20, 21 and22               do not to some extent overlap each other.  The               case ofa  person  who is convicted  of  an               offence will come under article 20 and 21  and               also under article 22 so far as his arrest and               detention   in   custody  before   trial   are               concerned.   Preventive  detention,  which  is               dealt  with  in article 22,  also  amounts  to               deprivation  of  personal  liberty  which   is               referred to in article 21, and is a  violation               of the right of freedom of movement dealt with               in  article 19(1) (d).  That there  are  other               instances  of overlapping of articles  in  the               Constitution  may be illustrated by  reference               to  article 19(1) (f) and article 31  both  of               which  deal with the right to property and  to               some extent overlap each other". As  has been pointed out by my learned brother Bhagwati,  by detailed  references to cases, such as Haradhan Saha v.  The State  of  West Bengal & Ors(1) and Shambhu Nath  Sarkar  v. State of West Bengal (2) , the view that Articles 19 and  21 constitute water tight compartments, so that all aspects  of personal  liberty could be excluded from Article 19  of  the Constitution,  had to be abandoned as a result of  what  was held,  by  a larger bench of this Court in R. C.  Cooper  v. Union  of India(3), to be the sounder view.   Therefore,  we could  ,neither revive that overruled doctrine nor could  we now hold that impounding or cancellation of a passport  does not  impinge upon and affect fundamental rights  guaranteed, by the Constitution.  I may point out that the doctrine that Articles  19 and 21 protect or regulate flows  in  different

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channels,  which certainly appears to have found  favour  in this Court in A. K. Gopalan’s case (supra), was laid down in a  context which was very different from that in which  that approach  was  displaced  by  the  sounder  view  that   the Constitution  must  be  read  as  an  integral  whole,  with possible  over-lappings  of the subject matter  of  what  is sought  to  be  protected by  its  various  provisions  par- ticularly by articles relating to fundamental rights. (1)  [1975] 1 SCR778. (2)  [1973] 1 SCR 856. (3)  [1973] 3 SCR 530. 647 In  A.  K.  Gopalan’s case (supra), what was  at  issue  was whether  the  tests was valid procedure for  deprivation  of personal  liberty  by  preventive detention  must  be  found exclusively  in Article 22 of the Constitutions or could  we gather from outs de it also elements of any "due process  of law" and use them to test the validity of a law dealing with preventive   detention.   Our   Constitution-makers,   while accepting  a departure, from ordinary norms.  by  permitting making  of laws for preventive detention without  trial  for special  reasons  in exceptional  situations  also  provided quite  elaborately,  in  Article  22  of  the   Constitution itself,’ whit requirements such law, relating to  preventive detention,  must  satisfy.  The procedural  requirements  of such   laws  separately  formed  parts  of  the   guaranteed fundamental  rights.  Therefore, when this Court was  called upon  to  judge  the  validity  of  provisions  relating  to preventive  detention  it  laid  down,  in  Gopalan’s   case (supra),  that  the tests of "due process", with  regard  to such   laws,  are  to  be  found  in  Article  22   of   the Constitution, exclusively because this article constitutes a self-contained code for laws of this description.  That was, in  my  view,  the real ratio decidendi  of  Gopalan’s  case (supra).   It appears to me, with great respect, that  other observations  relating  to the separability of  the  subject matters of Articles 21 and 19 were mere obiter dicta.   They may  have  appeared to the  majority of  learned  Judges  in Gopalan’s  case to be extensions of the logic  they  adopted with regard to the relationship between Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution. But,  the real issue there was  whether, in the face of Article  22 of theConstitution,       which provides all the tests of procedural validity of alaw regulating  preventive  detention other tests could  be  im- ported from Article 19 of the Constitution or elsewhere into "procedure established by law".  The majority view was  that this  could  not  be done.  I think, if  I  may  venture  to conjecture what opinions learned Judges of this Court  would have  expressed on that occasion had other types of  law  or other  aspects  of  personal liberty, such  as  those  which confronted this Court in either Satwant Singh’s case (supra) or  Kharak Singh’s case (supra) were before them,  the  same approach or the same language would not have been adopted by them.   It  seems to me that this aspect of  Gopalan’s  case (supra)  is  important to remember if we  are  to  correctly understand what was laid down in that case. I have already referred to the passages I cited in A. D.  M. Jabaipur’s case (supra) to show that, even in Gopalan’s case (supra), the majority of judges of this Court took the  view that (the ambit of personal liberty protected by Article  21 is  wide  and comprehensive.  It embraces  both  substantive rights  to personal liberty and the procedure  provided  for their  deprivation.  One can, however, say that no  question of  "due  process-of  law"  can  really  arise  apart   from procedural requirements of preventive detention laid down by

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Article 22, in a case such as the one this Court  considered in Gopalan’s case (supra).  The clear meaning of Article  22 is  that the requirements of "due process of law", in  cases of preventive detention, are satisfied by what is,  provided by Article 22 of the Constitution itself.  This article  in- dicates  the pattern of "the procedure established  by  law" for cases of preventive detention. 648 Questions,  however,  relating  to  either  deprivation   or restrictions  of personal liberty, concerning  laws  falling outside  Article  22 remained  really  unanswered,  strictly speaking,  by  Gopalan’s case.  If one may so  put  it,  the field of "due process" for cases of preventive detention  is fully covered by Article 22, but other parts of that  field, not covered by Article 22, are "unoccupied" by its  specific provisions.   I  have no doubt that, in what may  be  called "unoccupied"  portions  of  the  vast  sphere  of   personal liberty, the substantive as well as procedural laws made  to cover them must satisfy the requirements of both Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Articles dealing with different fundamental rights contained in  Part III of the Constitution do not  represent  entirely separate  streams  of  rights which do not  mingle  at  many points.   They are all parts of an integrated scheme in  the Constitution.   Their  waters must mix  to  constitute  that grand flow of unimpeded and impartial Justice (social,economic and political), Freedom (not only of thought, expression,belief, faith  and  worship,  but  also  of  association,  movement, vacationor  occupation  as  well  as  of  acquisition  and possession  of reasonable property), of Equality (of  status and  of opportunity, which imply absence of unreasonable  or unfair   discrimination  between  individuals,  groups   and classes),  and  of  Fraternity  (assuring  dignity  of   the individual  and  the unity of the nation),  which  our  Con- stitution visualises.  Isolation of various aspects of human freedom,  for  purposes  of  their  protection,  is  neither realistic  nor beneficial but would defeat the very  objects of such protection. We have to remember that the fundamental rights protected by Part  III of the Constitution, out of which Articles 14,  19 and  21 are the most frequently invoked, form tests  of  the validity  of executive as well as legislative  actions  when these actions are subjected to judicial scrutiny.  We cannot disable Article 14 or 19 from so functioning and hold  those executive and legislative actions to which they could  apply as unquestionable even when there is no emergency to  shield actions  of  doubtful  legality.  These  tests  are,  in  my opinion,     available   to   us  now   to   determine   the constitutional validity of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act  as well  as  of the impugned order of 7th  July,  1977,  passed against  the  petitioner  impounding her  passport  "in  the interest of general public" and stating that the  Government bad  decided not to furnish her with a copy of  reasons  and claiming  immunity from such disclosure under section  10(5) of the Act.   I  have already mentioned some of the  authorities  relied upon by me in A. D. M. Jabalpur v. S. Shukla (Supra),  while discussing  the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution,  to hold that its ambit is very wide.  I will now indicate  why, in my view, the particular rights claimed by the  petitioner could  fall  within Articles 19 and 21. and the  nature  and origin of such rights. Mukerji  J.,  in  Gopalan’s case  (supra)  referred  to  the celebrated  commentaries  of  Blackstone  on  the  Laws   of England.  It is instructive to reproduce passages from there

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even  though  juristic reasoning may  have  travelled  today beyond the stage reached by it when Blackstone 649 wrote.   Our basic concepts on such matters,  stated  there, have   provided   the  foundations   on   which   subsequent superstructures  were  raised. Some  of  these  foundations, fortunately, remain intact.  Blackstone said :               "This   law  of  nature,  being  coeval   with               mankind,  and dictated by God himself,  is  of               course  superior in obligation to  any  other.               It is binding over all the globe in all  coun-               tries, and at all times : no human laws are of               any validity, if contrary to this; and such of               them  as are valid derive all their force  and               all their authority, mediately or immediately,               from this original." The  identification  of  natural law  with  Divine  will  or dictates of God may have, quite understandably, vanished  at a time when men see God, if they see one anywhere at all, in the highest qualities inherent in the nature of Man himself. But  the  idea  of a natural law as  a  morally  inescapable postulate  of a just order, recognizing the inalienable  and inherent  rights of all men (which term includes  women)  as equals before the law persists.  It is, I think, embedded in our  own  Constitution.  I do not think that we  can  reject Blackstone’s theory of natural rights as totally  irrelevant for us today. Blackstone propounded his philosophy of natural or  absolute rights in the following terms :               "The  absolute rights of man, considered as  a               free  agent, endowed with discernment to  know               good  from  evil, and with power  of  choosing               those measures which appear to him to be  most               desirable,  are  usually  summed  up  in   one               general   appellation,  and  denominated   the               natural  liberty  of  mankind.   This  natural               liberty consists properly in a power of acting               as  one thinks fit, without any  restraint  or               control, unless by the law of nature; being  a               right inherent in us by birth,and one of  the               gifts of God to man at his creation,  when     he               endued him with the faculty of free will.  But               everyman, when he enters into society,  gives               up  a  part of  his natural  liberty,  as  the               price  of  so  valuable a  purchase,  and,  in               consideration  of receiving the advantages  of               mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to               those  laws, which the community  has  thought               proper  to  establish.  And  this  species  of               legal  obedience and conformity is  infinitely               more  desirable  than  that  will  and  savage               liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it.  For               no  man that considers a moment would wish  to               retain the absolute and uncontrolled power  of               doing whatever he pleases; the consequence  of               which is, that every other man would also have               the  same  power, and then there would  be  no               security   to  individuals  in  any   of   the               enjoyments of life.  Political, therefore,  or               civil  liberty, which is that of a  member  of               society, is no other than natural liberty so               far restrained by human laws (and no  farther)               as is necessary and expedient for the  general               advantage of the public.               650

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             The  absolute  rights  of  every   Englishman,               (which,  taken  in a political  and  extensive               sense, are usually called their liberties), as               they are founded on nature and reason, so they               are coeval with our form of Government; though               subject  at  times to  fluctuate  and  change;               their establishment (excellent as it is) being               still human.               *  *  *  And these may  be  reduced  to  three               principal  or primary articles; the  right  of               personal  security,  the  right  of   personal               liberty,  and the right of  private  property,               because, as there is no other known method  of               compulsion,  or abridging man’s  natural  free               will, but by an infringement or diminution  of               one  or other of these important  rights,  the               preservation of these, involate, may justly be               said to include the preservation of our  civil               immunities in their largest and most extensive               sense.               I.The right of personal security  consists               in   a   person’s  legal   and   uninterrupted               enjoyment  of his life, his limbs,  his  body,               his health and his reputation.               II.Next  to personal security, the  law  of               England  regards, asserts, and  preserves  the               personal   liberty   of   individuals.    This               personal  liberty  consists in  the  power  of               locomotion,  of changing situation, or  moving               one’s  person  to whatsoever place  one’s  own               inclination  may direct, without  imprisonment               or  restraint,  unless by due course  of  law.               Concerning   which  we  may  make   the   same               observations  as upon the  preceding  article,               that it is a right strictly natural; that  the               laws of England have never abridged it without               sufficient  cause; and that, in this  kingdom,               it  cannot  ever  be  abridged  at  the   mere               discretion  of  the  magistrate,  without  the               explicit permission of the laws.               III. The  third absolute right,  inherent  in               every  Englishman, is that of property;  which               consists  in  the  free  use,  enjoyment,  and               disposal of all his acquisitions, without  any               control  or diminution, save only by the  laws               of the land, The original of private  property               is probably founded in nature, as will be more               fully  explained  in the second  book  of  the               ensuing   commentaries;  but   certainly   the               modifications  under which we at present  find               it, the method of conserving it in the present               owner, and of translating it from man to  man,               are  entirely  derived from society;  and  are               some  of those civil advantages,  in  exchange               for which every individual has resigned a part               of his natural liberty." I  have  reproduced from Blackstone whose ideas  may  appear somewhat quaint in an age of irreverence because,  although, I know that modern jurisprudence conceives of all rights  as relative or as products of particular socioeconomic  orders, yet, the idea that man, as man, morally has certain inherent natural primordial inalienable human rights goes back to the very origins of human jurisprudence. 651 It is found in Greek philosophy.  If we have advanced  today

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towards  what we believe to be a higher civilisation and  a more  enlightened  era, we cannot fall behind what,  at  any rate,  was the meaning given to "personal liberty" long  ago by  Blackstone.  As indicated above, it included "the  power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one’s person to  whatsoever  place  one’s  own  inclination  may  direct, without  imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course  of law".   I think that both the rights of "personal  security" and  of cc personal liberty", recognised by what  Blackstone termed  "natural  law", are embodied in Article  21  of  the Constitution.   For this proposition, I relied, in A. D.  M. Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla (supra), and I do so again here, on a  passage from Subba Rao C.J., speaking for five Judges  of this Court in I. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab(1) when  he said (at p. 789) :               "Now,  what are the fundamental rights ?  They               are  embodied in Part III of the  Constitution               and they may be classified thus: (i) right  to               equality,  (ii) right to freedom, (iii)  right               against exploitation, (iv) right to freedom of               religion, (v) cultural and educational  rights               ,  (vi) right to property, and (vii) right  to               constitutional remedies.  They are the  rights               of  the people preserved by our  Constitution,               ’Fundamental  rights’ are the modem  name  for               what have been traditionally known as ’natural               rights’.   As one author puts it :  ’they  are               moral   rights   which   every   human   being               everywhere  at all times ought to have  simply               because of the fact that in  contradistinction               with other beings, he, is rational and moral’.               They  are the primordial rights necessary  for               the  development of human  personality.   They               are the rights which enable a man to chalk out               his own life in the manner he likes best.  Our               Constitution,  in addition to  the  Well-known               fundamental  rights, also included the  rights               of  the  minorities,  untouchables  and  other               backward communities, in such right".               Hidayatullah, J., in the same case said (at p.               877)               "What   I  have  said  does  not   mean   that               Fundamental  Rights are not subject to  change               or  modification.  In the most inalienable  of               such rights a distinction must be made between               possession  of a right and its exercise.   The               first  is fixed and the latter  controlled  by               justice  and  necessity.   Take  for   example               Article 21 :               ’No  person shall be deprived of his  life  or               personalliberty    except   according    to               procedure established by law".     Of all  the rights, the right to one’s life is  the               most    valuable.   This   article   of    the               Constitution,therefore,   makes   the    right               fundamental.  But  the  inalienable  right  is               curtailed  by a murderer’s conduct  as  viewed               under  law.   The deprivation, when  it  takes               place, is not of the right which was immutable               but of the continued exercised of right.,’               (1)   [1967] 2 SCR762.                652 It  is,  therefore, clear that six out of eleven  Judges  in Golak  Nath’s  case  declared that  fundamental  rights  are natural  rights embodied in the Constitution  itself.   This

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view  was affirmed by the majority Judges of this  Court  in Shukla’s case.  It was explained by me there at some length. Khanna,,  J.,  took  a somewhat  different  view.   Detailed reasons were given by me in Shukla’s case (supra) for taking what  I found to be and still find as the only view I  could possibly  take  if I were not to disregard, as I  could  not properly do, what had been held by larger benches and what I myself  consider to be the correct view : that  natural  law rights were, meant to be converted into our Constitutionally recognised  fundamental rights, atleast so far as  they  are expressly mentioned, so that they are to be found within  it and not outside it.  To take a contrary view would involve a conflict between natural law and our Constitutional law.   I am  emphatically of opinion that a divorce  between  natural law and our Constitutional law will be disastrous.  It  will defeat one of the basic purposes of our Constitution. The  implication  of  what I have indicated  above  is  that Article  21 is also a recognition and declaration of  rights which inhere in every individual.  Their existence does  not depend on the location of the individual.  Indeed, it  could be argued that what so inheres is inalienable and cannot  be taken away at all.  This may seem theoretically correct  and logical.   But,  in fact, we are often met with  denials  of what  is, in theory, inalienable or "irrefragible".   Hence, we  speak  of  "deprivations" or  "restrictions"  which  are really  impediments  to the exercise  of  the  "inalienable" rights’ Such deprivations or restrictions or regulations  of rights may take place, within prescribed limits, by means of either  statutory law or purported actions under  that  law. The degree to which the theoretically recognised or abstract right is concretised is thus determined by the balancing  of principles on which an inherent right is based against those on  which  a  restrictive law or orders under  it  could  be imposed  upon  its  exercise.  We have  to  decide  in  each specific  case, as it arises before us, what the  result  of such a balancing is. In  judging the validity of either legislative or  executive state action for conflict with any of the fundamental rights of individuals, whether they be of citizens or non-citizens, the  question as to where the rights are to be exercised  is not  always  material  or even  relevant.   If  the  persons concerned,  on whom the law or purported action under it  is to operate, are outside the territorial jurisdiction of  our country,  the  action taken may be  ineffective.   But,  the validity  of  the law must be determined  on  considerations other  than  this.  The tests of  validity  of  restrictions imposed  upon  the rights covered by article 19(1)  will  be found  in  clauses  (2)  to (6) of  Article  19.   There  is nothing  ther e to suggest that restrictions on right’,  the exercise  of which may involve going out of the  country  or some  activities  abroad are excluded from  the  purview  of tests contemplated by articles 19(2) to (6). 1 agree with my learned brother Bhagwati, for reasons detailed by him,  that the total effect and not the mere form of a restriction will determine which fundamental right is really involved in a 653 particular case and whether a restriction upon its  exercise is  reasonbly permissible on the facts and circumstances  of that case. If rights under article 19 are rights which inhere in Indian citizens,   individuals  concerned  carry   these   inherent fundamental  constitutional rights with them  wherever  they go, in so far as our law applies to them, because they  are, parts of the Indian nation just as Indian ships, flying  the Indian  flag,  are  deemed,  in  International  law,  to  be

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floating parts of Indian territory.  This analogy,  however, could  not  be  pushed too far because  Indian  citizens  on foreign  territory,  are only entitled, by virtue  of  their Indian  nationality and passports, to the protection of  the Indian  Republic  and  the  assistance  of  its   diplomatic missions abroad.  They cannot claim to be governed abroad by their  own  Constitutional  or personal laws  which  do  not operate outside India.  But, that is not the position in the case  before us. So far as the impugned action in  the  case before  us is concerned, it took place in India and  against an Indian citizen residing in India. In India, at any rate, we are all certainly governed by  our Constitution.   The  fact that the affected  petitioner  may not,  as  a  result of a particular order,  be  able  to  do something intended to be done by her abroad cannot  possibly make the Governmental action in India either ineffective  or immune from judicial scrutiny or from an attack made on  the ground  of a violation of a fundamental right which  inheres in an Indian citizen.  The consequences or effects upon  the petitioner’s possible actions or future activities in  other countries  may  be  a factor which  may  be  weighed,  where relevant, with other relevant facts in a particular case  in judging  the merits of the restriction imposed.  It will  be relevant  in  so  far  as  it can  be  shown  to  have  some connection   with   public  or   national   interests   when determining the merits of an order passed.  It may show  how she has become a " person aggrieved" with a cause of action, by a particular order involving her personal freedom.   But, such  considerations cannot curtail or impair the  scope  or operation  of fundamental rights of citizens as  protections against unjustifiable actions of their own Government.   Nor can they, by their own force, protect legally  unjustifiable actions of the Government of our country against attacks  in our own Courts. In order to apply the tests contained in Articles 14 and  19 of  the  Constitution, we have to consider the  objects  for which the exercise of inherent rights recognised by  Article ’21  of  the  Constitution are restricted  as  well  as  the procedure  by  which  these restrictions are  sought  to  be imposed.   Both substantive and procedural laws and  actions taken under them will have to pass tests imposed by articles 14 and 19 whenever facts justifying the invocation of either of  these  articles  may  be  disclosed.   For  example,  an international singer or dancer may well be able to  complain of an unjustifiable restriction on professional activity  by a denial of a passport.  In such a case, violations of  both articles 21 and 19(1) (g) may both be put forward making  it necessary  for  the  authorities concerned  to  justify  the restriction  imposed   by showing satisfaction of  tests  of validity contemplated by each  of these two articles. 654 The  tests of reason and justice cannot be  abstract.   They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation.  The  tests have  to  be pragmatic.  Otherwise, they would cease  to  be reasonable.   Thus,  I think that a discretion left  to  the authority  to impound a passport in public  interest  cannot invalidate the law itself.  We cannot, out of fear that such power  will  be  misused,-refuse  to  permit  Parliament  to entrust  even such power to executive authorities as may  be absolutely necessary to carry out the purposes of a  validly exercisable power.  I think it has to be necessarily left to executive  discretion  to decide whether, on the  facts  and circumstances of a particular case, public interest will  or will not be served by a particular order to be passed  under a   valid  law  subject,  as  it  always  is,  to   judicial

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supervision.    In  matters  such  as   grant,   suspension, impounding  or  cancellation  of  passports,  the   possible dealings of an individual with nationals and authorities  of other  States  have to be considered.  The  contemplated  or possible activities abroad of the individual may have to  be taken  into.  account.  There may be questions  of  national safety  and  welfare which transcend the importance  of  the individual’s inherent right to go where he or she pleases to go.   Therefore, although we may not deny the grant of  wide discretionary  power,  to the executive authorities  as  un- reasonable in such cases, yet, I think we must look for  and find procedural safeguards to ensure that the power will not be  used for purposes extraneous to the grant of  the  power before  we uphold the validity of the power  conferred.   We have  to insist on procedural proprieties the observance  of which  could  show that such a power is being used  only  to serve  what  can  reasonably and justly be,  regarded  as  a public  or  national  interest  capable  of  overriding  the individual’s  inherent  right  of  movement  or  travel   to wherever  he  or she pleases in the modern world  of  closer integration in every sphere between the peoples of the world and the shrunk time-space relationship. The view I have taken above proceeds on the assumption  that there are inherent or natural human rights of the individual recognised  by  and  embodied in  our  Constitution.   Their actual  exercise,  however,  is  regulated  and  conditioned largely  by  statutory law.  Persons upon whom  these  basic rights  are conferred can exercise them so long as there  is no justifiable reason under the law enabling deprivations or restrictions of such rights.  But, once the valid reason  is found  to be there and the deprivation or restriction  takes place for that valid reason in a procedurally valid  manner, the  action  which results in a deprivation  or  restriction becomes  unassailable.  If either the reason  sanctioned  by the law is absent, or the procedure followed in arriving  at the  conclusion that such a reason exists  is  unreasonable, the  order having the effect of deprivation  or  restriction must be quashed. A  bare look at the provisions of S. IO, sub.s. (3 ) of  the Act will show that each of the orders which could be  passed under  section  10,  sub.s.  (3)  (a)  to  (h)  requires   a "satisfaction"   by  the  Passport  Authority   on   certain objective  conditions which must exist in a case  before  it passes an order to impound a passport or a travel  document. Impounding or revocation are placed side by side on the same footing in the provision.  Section 11 of the Act provides an appeal to the Central Government 655 from every order passed under section 10, sub.s. (3) of  the Act.   Hence, section 10, subs. s. (5) makes  it  obligatory upon  the Passport Authority to "record in writing  a  brief statement  of the reasons for making such order and  furnish to the holder of the passport or travel document on,  demand a  copy  of  the  same unless  in  any  case,  the  passport authority  is  of  the opinion that it will not  be  in  the interests  of  the sovereignty and integrity of  India,  the security  of  India, friendly relations of  India  with  any foreign country or in the interests of the general public to furnish such a copy". It seems to me, from the provisions of section 5, 7 and 8 of the  Act,  read  with  other provisions,  that  there  is  a statutory  right also acquired, on fulfilment of  prescribed conditions  by  the  holder of a passport,  that  it  should continue to be effective for the specified period so long as no ground has come into existence for either its  revocation

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or for impounding it which amounts to a suspension of it for the  time  being.   It is true that in  a  proceeding  under article  32 of the Constitution, we are only concerned  with the enforcement of fundamental Constitutional rights and not with  any  statutory rights apart from  fundamental  rights. Article  2  1, however, makes it clear That violation  of  a law,  whether statutory or if any other kind, is  itself  an infringement of the guaranteed fundamental right.  The basic right   is  not  to  be  denied  the  protection  of   "law" irrespective  of  variety of that law.  It need  only  be  a right "established by law". There  can  be  no doubt whatsoever that  the  orders  under section 10(3) must be based upon some material even if  that material  consists, in some cases, of  reasonable  suspicion arising  from certain credible assertions made  by  reliable individuals.  It may be that, in an emergent situation,  the impounding  of a passport may become necessary without  even giving an opportunity to be heard against such a step, which could  be reversed after an opportunity given to the  holder of  the passport to show why the step was unnecessary,  but, ordinarily, no passport could be reasonably either impounded or revoked without giving a prior opportunity to its  holder to  show cause against the proposed action.  The  impounding as well revocation of a passport, seem to constitute  action in  the  nature of a punishment necessitated on one  of  the grounds  specified  in  the  Act.   Hence,  ordinarily,   an opportunity to be heard in defence after a show cause notice should  be  given to the holder of a, passport  even  before impounding it. It is well established that even where there is no  specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for  showing cause  against  action  proposed  to  be  taken  against  an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty  to  give reasonable opportunity to be  heard  will  be implied  from the nature of the function to be performed  by the  authority  which  has the power  to  take  punitive  or damaging action.  This principle was laid down by this Court in the State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei &  Ors.(1) in the following words               "The  rule that a party to whose prejudice  an               order is intended to be passed is entitled  to               a hearing applies alike to               (1)   AIR 1967 S.C. 1269 at 1271.               656               judicial  tribunals  and  bodies  of   persons               invested  with  authority to  adjudicate  upon               matters  involving civil consequences.  It  is               one   of   the  fundamental   rules   of   our               constitutional  set-up that every  citizen  is               protected   against  exercise   of   arbitrary               authority by the State or its officers.   Duty               to act judicially would, therefore arise  from               the very nature of the function intended to be               performed,  it need not be shown to be  super-               ,added.   If  there  is power  to  decide  and               determine  to the prejudice of a person,  duty               to act judicially is implicit in the  exercise               of  such power.  If the essentials of  justice               be ignored and an order to the prejudice of  a               Person is made, the order is a nullity.   That               is  a  basic concept of the rule  of  law  and               importance thereof transcends the significance               of a decision in any particular case." In  England,  the  rule was thus expressed by  Byles  J.  in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works(1)

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             "The  laws of God and man both give the  party               an opportunity to make his defence, if he  has               any.  I remember to have heard it observed  by               a  very  learned man, upon such  an  occasion,               that  even God himself did not  pass  sentence               upon  Adam before be was called upon  to  make               his  defence.   "Adam (says God),  "where  art               thou  ?  Hast  thou ? not eaten  of  the  tree               whereof  I commanded thee that thou  shouldest               not  eat And the same question was put to  Eve               also." I find no difficulty whatsoever in holding, on the  strength of   these  well  recognised  principles,  that   an   order impounding  a passport must be made quasi-judicially.   This was not done in the case before us. In  my  estimation, the findings arrived at  by  my  learned brethren  after  an  examination of the facts  of  the  case before  us, with which I concur, indicate that it cannot  be said  that a good enough reason has been shown to exist  for impounding the passport of the petitioner by the order dated 7th  July,  1977.  Furthermore, the petitioner  has  bad  no opportunity  of  showing that the ground for  impounding  it finally given in this Court either does not exist or has  no bearing on public interest or that public interest cannot be better served in some other manner.  Therefore, speaking for myself,  I  would quash the order and  direct  the  opposite parties  to give an opportunity to the petitioner  to  show- cause against any proposed action on such grounds as may  be available. I am not satisfied that there were present any such pressing grounds  with  regard to the petitioner before us  that  the immediate action of impounding her passport was called  for. Furthermore, the rather cavalier fashion in which disclosure of any reason for impounding her passport was denied to her, despite  the  fact that the only reason said  to  exist  the possibility  of her being called to give evidence  before  a commission  of inquiry and stated in  the  counter-affidavit filed in this Court, is not such as to be reasonably  deemed to necessitate, its concealment in (1)  1863 (14) C.B. (N.S.) 180. 657 public  interest, may indicate the existence of  some  undue prejudice  against the petitioner.  She has to be  protected against even the appearance of such prejudice or bias. It appears to me that even executive authorities when taking administrative action which involves any deprivations of  or restrictions on inherent fundamental rights of citizens must take  care  to  see  that  justice  is  not  only  done  but manifestly appears to be done.  They have a duty to  proceed in  a  way  which  is  free  from  even  the  appearance  of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or unfairness.  They  have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice. The attitude adopted by the Attorney General however,  shows that   Passport   authorities   realize   fully   that   the petitioner’s  case has not been justly or  reasonably  dealt with.   As  the undertaking given by  the  Attorney  General amounts to an offer to deal with it justly and fairly  after informing  the petitioner of any ground that may  exist  for impounding her passport, it seems that no further action  by this  Court may be necessary.  In view, however, of what  is practically  an admission that the order actually passed  on 7th  July, 1977, is neither fair nor procedurally proper,  I would, speaking for myself, quash this order and direct  the return of the impounded passport to the petitioner.  I  also

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think that the petitioner is entitled to her costs. CHANDRACHUD, J.-The petitioner’s passport dated June 1, 1976 having been impounded "in public interest" by an order dated July 2, 1977 and the Government of India having declined "in the  interest  of  general public" to  furnish  to  her  the reasons. for its decision, she has filed this writ  petition under  article  32  of the Constitution  to  challenge  that order.  The challenge is founded on the following grounds :               (1)   To the extent to which section 10(3) (c)               of  the  Passport  Act,  1967  authorises  the               passport  authority to impound a passport  "in               the  interests of the general public",  it  is               violative  of article 14 of  the  Constitution               since it confers vague and undefined power  on               the passport authority;               (2)   Section 10 (3) (c) is void as conferring               an  arbitrary power since it does not  provide               for  a hearing to the holder of  the  passport               before the passport is, impounded;               (3)   Section 10(3)(c) is violative of article               21  of  the  Constitution since  it  does  not               prescribe  ’procedure’ within the  meaning  of               that article and since the procedure which  it               prescribes is arbitrary and unreasonable; and               (4)   Section   10  (3)(c)   offends   against               articles  19(1)(a)  and 19 (1 ) (g)  since  it               permits  restrictions  to be  imposed  on  the               rights  guaranteed  by  these  articles   even               though  such  restrictions cannot  be  imposed               under articles 19(2) and 19(6).               658 At first, the passport authority exercising its power  under section  10(5)  of  the  Act  refused  to  furnish  to   the petitioner the reason for which it was considered  necessary in the interests of general public to impound her  passport. But  those  reasons  were disclosed later  in  the  counter- affidavit  filed  on behalf of the Government  of  India  in answer to the writ petition.  The disclosure made under  the stress  of the writ petition that the petitioner’s  passport was  impounded  because,  her  presence  was  likely  to  be required  in  connection  with  the  proceedings  before   a Commission of Inquiry, could easily have been made when  the petitioner  called upon the Government to let her  know  the reasons why her passport was impounded.  The power to refuse to  disclose the reasons for impounding a passport is of  an exceptional  nature  and it ought to  be  exercised  fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation.  The reasons, if disclosed being open to  judicial scrutiny for ascertaining their nexus with  the order  impounding the passport, the refusal to disclose  the reasons would equally be open to the scrutiny of the  court; or  else,  the wholesome power of a  dispassionate  judicial examination  of executive orders could with impunity be  set at  naught  by  an obdurate determination  to  suppress  the reasons.  Law cannot permit the exercise of a power to  keep the  reasons undisclosed if the sole reason for doing so  is to keep the reasons away from judicial scrutiny. In  Satwant  Singh  Sawhney  v.  D.  Ramarathnam,  Assistant Passport  Officer, Government of India, New Delhi &  Ors.(1) this  Court ruled by majority that the expression  "personal liberty"  which  occurs in article 21  of  the  Constitution includes  the right to travel abroad and that no person  can be  deprived  of that right except  according  to  procedure established  by law.  The Passport Act which was enacted  by Parliament  in  1967 in order to comply with  that  decision

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prescribes  the  procedure  whereby  an  application  for  a passport may be granted fully or partially, with or  without any  endorsement, and a passport once granted may  later  be revoked  or  impounded.  But the mere prescription  of  some kind  of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate  of  article 21.   The procedure prescribed by law has to be  fair,  just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary.   The question  whether  the procedure prescribed by a  law  which curtails  or takes away the personal liberty  guaranteed  by article 21 is reasonable or not has to be considered not  in the  abstract  or on hypothetical  considerations  like  the provision  for  a  full-dressed hearing as  in  a  Courtroom trial,  but in the context, primarily, of the purpose  which the  Act  is intended to achieve and  of  urgent  situations which  those who are charged with the duty of  administering the Act may be called upon to deal with.  Secondly, even the fullest  compliance with the requirements of article  21  is not  the journey’s end because, a law which prescribes  fair and  reasonable procedure for curtailing or taking away  the personal liberty guaranteed by article 21 has still to  meet a   possible  challenge  under  other  Provisions   of   the Constitution like, for example, articles 14 and 19.  If  the holding  in  A. K. Gopalan v. State of  Madras(2)  that  the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution are (1)  [1967] 3 SCR 525 (2)  [1950] SCR 88. 659 mutually exclusive were still good law, the right to  travel abroad which is part of the right of personal liberty  under article  21 could only be found and located in that  article and  in no other.  But in the Bank Nationalisation Case  (R. C. Cooper v. Union of India) (1) the majority held that  the assumption in A. K. Gopalan(2) that certain articles of  the Constitution  exclusively deal with specific matters  cannot be  accepted  as correct.  Though the  Bank  Nationalisation case(1) was concerned with the inter-relationship of article 31 and 19 and not ,of articles 21 and 19, the basic approach adopted  therein as regards the construction of  fundamental rights  guaranteed  in  the  different  pro-visions  of  the Constitution  categorically discarded the major  premise  of the majority judgment in A. K. Gopalan (supra) as incorrect. That  is how a seven-Judge Bench in Shambhu Nath  Sarkar  v. State  of West Bengal & Ors.(3) assessed the true impact  of the  ratio of the Bank Nationalisation Case (supra)  on  the decision in A. K. Gopalan (supra) in Shambhu Nath  Sarkar(3) it was accordingly held that a law of preventive  detention has to meet the challenge not only of articles 21 and 22 but also  of article 19 (1 ) (d).  Later, a five-Judge Bench  in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal & Ors.(4) adopted  the same  approach  and  considered  the  question  whether  the Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act,  1971  violated  the right  guaranteed by article 19(1) (d).  Thus,  the  inquiry whether  the right to travel abroad forms a part of any  of the  freedoms mentioned in article 19(1) is not to  be  shut out at the threshold merely because that right is a part  of the guarantee of personal liberty under article 21. 1 am  in entire agreement with Brother Bhagwati when he says :               "The  law must, therefore, now be taken to  be               well settled that article 21 does not  exclude               article 19 and that even if there is  a  law               prescribing a procedure for depriving a               person  of  ’personal liberty’  and  there  is               consequently    no   infringement    of    the               fundamental  right  conferred by  article  21,               such  law, in so far as it abridges  or  takes

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             away  any fundamental right under  article  19               would  have  to  meet the  challenge  of  that               article." The  interplay of  diverse articles  of  the  Constitution guaranteeing various freedoms has gone through  vicissitudes which have been elaborately traced by Brother Bhagwati.  The test  of directness of the impugned law as  contrasted  with its  consequences was thought in A. K. Gopalan  (supra)  and Ram Singh(5) to be the true approach for determining whether a   fundamental   right  was   infringed.    A   significant application  of  that  test may be perceived  in  Naresh  S. Mirajkar(6)  where an order passed by the Bombay High  Court prohibiting  the  publication of a witness’s evidence  in  a defamation case was upheld by this Court on the ground  that it was passed with the object of affording protection to the witness in order to obtain true evidence (1)  [1973] 3 SCR 530. (2)  [1950] SCR 88 (3)  [1973] 1 SCR 856. (4)  [1975] 1 SCR 778. (5)  [1951] SCR 451. (6)  [1966] 3 SCR 744. 660 and  its impact on the right of free speech  and  expression guaranteed  by  article  19(1) (a) was  incidental.   N.  H. Bhagwati J. in Express Newspapers(1) struck a modified  note by  evolving the test of proximate effect and  operation  of the statute.  That test saw its fruition in Sakal  Papers(2) where  the  Court,  giving  precedence  to  the  direct  and immediate  effect  of the order over its  form  and  object, struck  down  the Daily Newspapers (Price and  Page)  Order, 1960 on the ground that it violated article 19(1)(a) of  the Constitution.  The culmination of this thought process  came in  the Bank Nationalisation Case (supra) where it was  held by  the majority, speaking through Shah J., that the  extent of  protection against impairment of a fundamental right  is determined  by  the direct operation of an action  upon  the individual’s rights and not by the object of the legislature or  by  the form of the action.  In Bennett  Coleman(3)  the Court, by a majority, reiterated   the   same  position   by saying that the direct operation of the Act upon the  rights forms  the real test.  It struck down the newsprint  policy, restricting  the number of pages of newspapers  without  the option  to reduce the circulation, as offending against  the provisions  of  article 19(1) (a).  "The action may  have  a direct  effect  on a fundamental right although  its  direct subject matter may be different" observed the Court,  citing an  effective instance of a law dealing with the Defence  of India  or with defamation and yet having a direct effect  on the  freedom  of  speech and  expression.   The  measure  of directness, as held by Brother Bhagwati, is the ’inevitable’ consequence  of  the impugned statute.  These then  are  the guidelines  with  the  help of which one  has  to  ascertain whether  section  10(3)  (c)  of  the  Passport  Act   which authorizes  the passport authority to impound a passport  or the impugned   order   passed   thereunder   violates    the guarantee of free speech and expression conferred by article 19(1) (a).  The learned Attorney General answered the  petitioner’s contention in this behalf by saying firstly, that the  right to  go abroad   cannot be comprehended within the  right  of free speech and expression since the   latter   right   is exercisable  by the Indian citizens within the  geographical limits of India only. Secondly, he contends, the right to go abroad is altogether of a different genre from the right  of

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free  speech and expression and is therefore not a  part  of it. The  first  of these contentions raises a  question  of great  importance  but the form in which the  contention  is couched  is,  in my opinion, apt to befog  the  true  issue. Article  19  confers certain freedoms oil  Indian  citizens, some of which by their very language and nature are  limited in their exercise by geographical considerations. The  right to move freely throughout the ’territory of India’ and the right to reside and settle in any part of the ’territory  of India’ which are contained in clauses (d) and (e) of article 19(1) are of this nature. The two clauses expressly restrict the  operation  of  the  rights  mentioned  therein  to  the territorial limits of India. Besides, by the very object and nature of those rights, their exercise is limited to  Indian territory. (1)  [1959] SCR 12. (2)  [1962] 3 SCR 842. (3)  [1973] 2 SCR 757. 661 Those rights are intended to bring in sharp focus, the unity and   integrity  of  the  country  and   its   quasi-federal structure.  Their drive is directed against the  fissiparous theory  that  ’sons  of the soil’ alone  shall  thrive,  the ’soil’ being conditioned by regional and sub-regional consi- derations.   The other freedoms which article 19(1)  confers are  not so restricted by their terms but that again is  not conclusive, of the question under consideration.  Nor indeed does the fact that restraints on the freedoms guaranteed  by Article  19(1) can be imposed under Articles 19(2) to  19(6) by  the State furnish any clue to that question.  The  State can   undoubtedly   impose   reasonable   restrictions    on fundamental freedoms under clauses (2) to (6) of Article  19 and  those  restrictions,  generally,  have  a   territorial operation.  But the ambit of a freedom cannot be measured by the  right of a State to pass laws imposing restrictions  on that  freedom  which,  in the generality of  cases,  have  a geographical limitation. Article 19(1) (a) guarantees to Indian citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression.  It does not delimit  that right  in any manner and there is no reason, arising  either out of interpretational dogmas or pragmatic  considerations, why the courts should strain the language of the Article  to cut down the amplitude of that right.  The plain meaning  of the  clause guaranteeing free speech and expression is  that Indian citizens are entitled to exercise that right wherever they  choose,  regardless  of  geographical  considerations, subject  of course to the operation of any existing  law  or the  power  of the State to make a law  imposing  reasonable restrictions  in  the  interests  of  the  sovereignty   and integrity  of  India, the security of  the  State,  friendly relations  with  foreign States, public  order,  decency  or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, as provided in article 19(2).  The exercise  of the right of free speech and expression  beyond the  limits  of Indian territory will, of  course,  also  be subject  to the laws of the country in which the freedom  is or  is intended to be exercised.  I am quite clear that  the Constitution  does not confer any power on the executive  to prevent  the exercise by an Indian citizen of the  right  of free speech and expression on foreign soil, subject to  what I  have  just stated.  In fact, that seems to me to  be  the crux  of  the matter, for which reason I said,  though  with respect, that the form in which the learned Attorney General stated  his proposition was likely to cloud the true  issue.

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The Constitution guarantees certain fundamental freedoms and except  where  their  exercise  is  limited  by  territorial considerations, those freedoms may be exercised  wheresoever one  chooses,  subject to the exceptions  or  qualifications mentioned above. The next question is whether the right to go out of India is an integral part of the right of free speech and  expression and is comprehended within it.  It seems to me impossible to answer  this question in the affirmative as is contended  by the petitioner’s counsel, Shri Madan Bhatia.  It is possible to  predicate  of many a right that its exercise  would  be more meaningful if the right is extended to comprehended  an extraneous  facility.  But such extensions do not form  part of the right conferred by the Constitution.  The analogy  of the  freedom  of press being included in the right  of  free speech and expression 4-119SCI/78 662 is  wholly  misplaced because the right of  free  expression incontrovertibly includes the right of freedom of the press. The  right to, go abroad on one hand and the right  of  free speech and expression on the other are made up of  basically different constituents, so different indeed that one  cannot be comprehended in the other. Brother  Bhagwati has, on this aspect considered  at  length certain  American  decisions like  Kent(1),_Apthekar(2)  and Zemel(3)  and  illuminating  though his analysis  is,  I  am inclined  to  think  that the presence of  the  due  process clause  in  the  5th and 14th  Amendments  of  the  American Constitution makes significant difference to the approach of American   Judges  to  the  definition  and  evaluation   of constitutional  guarantees.   The  content  which  has  been meaningfully  and imaginatively poured into "due process  of law"  may,  in  my view, constitute an  important  point  of distinction between the American Constitution and ours which studiously avoided the use of that expression.  In the  Cen- tennial  Volume.   "The  Fourteenth  Amendment"  edited   by Bernard  Schwartz, is contained in an article on  ’Landmarks of Legal Liberty’ by Justice William J. Brennan in which the learned Judge quoting from Yeat’s play has this to say :  In the service of the ageold dream for recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of man, the 14th Amendment though 100 years old, can never be old.               "Like the poor old women in Yeat’s play,               "Did  you  see  an old woman  going  down  the               path?"  asked Bridget.  "I did  not,"  replied               Patrick, who had come into the house after the               old  woman left it, "But I saw a young  girl               and she had the walk of a queen." Our  Constitution too strides in its majesty but, may it  be remembered,  without the due process clause, I prefer to  be content  with a decision directly in point, All  India  Bank Employees’  Association(4) In which this Court rejected  the contention  that the freedom to form associations or  unions contained  in article 19 (1 ) (c) carried with it the  right that  a  workers’ union could do all that was  necessary  to make  that right effective, in order to achieve the  purpose for  which  the  union was formed.   One  right  leading  to another  and  that another to still other, and  so  on,  was described in the abovementioned decision as productive of  a "grotesque result". I have nothing more to add to what Brother Bhagwati has said on  the other points in the case.  I share his opinion  that though  the right to go abroad is not included in the  right contained  in  article  19(1)(a), if  an  order  made  under

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section 10(3)(c) of the Act does in fact violate, the  right of free speech and expression, such an order could be struck down as unconstitutional.  It is well-settled that a statute may  pass  the test of constitutionality and  yet  an  order passed under it may be unconstitutional.  But of that I will say no more (1)  2 L. ed. 2d 1204. (2)  12 L. ed. 2d 992. (3)  14 L. ed. 2d 179. (4)  [1962] 3 SCR 269. 663 because  in  this branch, one says no more  than  the  facts warrant  and  decides  nothing  that does  not  call  for  a decision.  The fact that the petitioner was not heard before or  soon  after the impounding of her  passport  would  have introduced  a  serious infirmity in the order  but  for  the statement of the Attorney General that the.  Government was, willing  to  hear the petitioner and further  to  limit  the operation  of the order to a period of six months  from  the date  of the fresh decision, if the decision was adverse  to the petitioner.  The order, I agree, does not in fact offend against article 19 (1) (a) or 19 (1) (g). 1,  therefore,  agree  with the order  proposed  by  Brother Bhagwati. BHAGWATI,  J.-The Petitioner is the holder of  the  passport issued  to  her on 1st June, 1976 under  the  Passport  Act, 1967.   On 4th July, 1977 the Petitioner received  a  letter dated  2nd  July, 1977 from the Regional  Passport  Officer, Delhi  intimating  to her that it has been  decided  by  the Government  of India to impound her passport  under  section 10(3)(c) of the Act in public interest and requiring her  to surrender  the passport within seven days from the  date  of receipt of the letter.  The petitioner immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Passport Officer requesting him  to furnish  a copy of the statement of reasons for  making  the order as provided in section 10(5) to which a reply was sent by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs  on 6th  July, 1977 stating inter alia that the  Government  has decided  "in  the  interest of the general  public"  not  to furnish  her a copy of the statement of reasons, for  making of  the order.  The Petitioner thereupon filed  the  present petition  challenging  the  action  of  the  Government   in impounding  her passport and declining to give  reasons  for doing  so.  The action of the Government was impugned  inter alia on the ground that it was mala fide, but this challenge was not pressed before us at the time of the hearing of  the arguments  and hence it is not necessary to state any  facts hearing  on that question.  The principal challenge set  out in  the petition against the legality of the action  of  the Government was based mainly on the ground that section 10(3) (c),  in  so far as it empowers the Passport  Authority  to’ impound a passport "in the interests of the general  public" is violative of the equality clause contained in Art. 14  of the  Constitution, since the condition denoted by the  words "in  the  interests  of the  general  public"  limiting  the exercise  of the power is vague and undefined and the  power conferred  by  this provision is, therefore,  excessive  and suffers  from the vice of "over-breath." The, petition  also contained a challenge that an order under section 10(3)  (c) impounding  a  passport could not be made  by  the  Passport Authority without giving an opportunity to the holder of the passportto be heard in defence and since   in the  present case, the passport  was impounded    by   the    Government without affording an apportunity of  hearingto          the petitioner, the order    was  null  and  void,  and  in  the

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alternativeif  section  10(3) (c) were  read in  such  a manner as to exclude the  right of hearing, the  section would be infected with the vice ofarbitrariness   and    it would be void as  offending Article 14.  These were the only grounds  taken  in the Petition as originally filed  and  on 20th July, 1977 the petition was admitted and rule issued by this Court and an interim order was made directing 664 that  the  passport  of the petitioner  should  continue  to remain  deposited with the Registrar of this  Court  pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition. The  hearing of the petition was fixed on 30th August  1977, but  before  that, the petitioner filed an  application  for urging  additional  grounds  and by  this  application,  two further grounds were sought to be urged by her.  One  ground was that section 10(3)(c) is ultra vires Article 21 since it provides for impounding of passport without any procedure as required by that Article, or, in any event, even if it could be  said that there is some procedure prescribed  under  the passport Act, 1967, it is wholly arbitrary and  unreasonable and,  therefore, not in compliance with the  requirement  of that  article.   The  other ground urged on  behalf  of  the petitioner  was  that  section  10(3)(c)  is  violative   of Articles  19(1)(a)  and 19(1)(g) inasmuch as  it  authorises imposition   of  restrictions  on  freedom  of  Speech   and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1 ) (a) and freedom to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, or business  guaranteed under  Article  19(1)(g)  and   these restrictions  are  impermissible  under  Article  19(2)  and Article  19(6)  respectively.  The  application  for  urging these  two additional grounds was granted by this Court  and ultimately at the hearing of the petition these were the two principal  grounds  which  were pressed  on  behalf  of  the petitioner. Before we examine the rival arguments urged on behalf of the parties  in regard to the various questions arising in  this petition,  it  would be convenient to set out  the  relevant provisions of the Passport Act, 1967.  This Act was  enacted on 24th June, 1967 in view of the decision of this Court  in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant  Passport Officer.   Government  of  India, New Delhi  &  Ors.(1)  The position  which obtained prior to the coming into  force  of this  Act was that there was no law regulating the issue  of passports for leaving the shores of India and going  abroad. The issue of passports was entirely within the discretion of the   executive  and  this  discretion  was   unguided   and unchannelled.   This  Court, by a majority,  bela  that  the expression  "personal  liberty" in Article 21 takes  in  the right  of locomotion and travel abroad and under Article  21 no  person can be deprived of his right to go abroad  except according  to the procedure established by law and since  no law had been made by the State regulating or prohibiting the exercise  of  such  right, the refusal of  passport  was  in violation of Article 21 and moreover the discretion with the executive  in  the matter of issuing  or  refusing  passport being  unchannelled and arbitrary, it was plainly  violative of  Article 14 and hence the order refusing passport to  the petitioner  was  also  invalid  under  that  Article.   This decision  was  accepted  by  Parliament  and  the  infirmity pointed  out  by it was set right by the  enactment  of  the Passports  Act, 1967.  This Act, as its preamble shows,  was enacted  to  provide for the issue of passports  and  travel documents  to regulate the departure from India of  citizens of India and other persons and for incidental and  ancillary matters.   Section  3 provides that no person  shall  depart

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from or attempt to depart from India unless be holds in (1)  [1967] 3 SCR525. 665 this  behalf a valid passport or travel document.  What  are the  different  classes of passports  and  travel  documents which can be issued under the Act is laid down in section 4. Section  5,  sub-section  (1)  provides  for  making  of  an application  for issue of a passport or travel  document  or for  endorsement  on such passport or  travel  document  for visiting  foreign country or countries and  sub-section  (2) says  that  on  receipt of such  application,  the  passport authority,  after  making such inquiry, if any,  as  it  may consider  necessary,  shall, by order in writing,  issue  or refuse  to issue the passport or travel document or make  or refuse   to  make  on  the  passport  or   travel   document endorsement  in  respect  of. one or  more  of  the  foreign countries  specified  in the application.   Sub-section  (3) requires  the passport authority, where it refuses to  issue the  passport or travel document or to make any  endorsement on  the passport or travel document, to record in writing  a brief  statement  of  its reasons  for  making  such  order. Section  6, sub-section (1) lays down the grounds  on  which the  passport authority shall refuse to make an  endorsement for  visiting  any foreign country and provides that  on  no other  ground the endorsement shall be refused.   There  are foul  grounds set out in this sub-section and of  them,  the last is that, in the opinion of the Central Government,  the presence of the applicant in such foreign country is not  in the public interest.  Similarly sub-section (2) of section 6 specifies the grounds on which alone and on no other grounds the  passport  authority shall refuse to issue  passport  of travel document for visiting any foreign country and amongst various  grounds  set out there, the last is  that,  in  the opinion  of the Central Government the issue of passport  or travel  document to the applicant will not be in the  public interest.  Then we come to section 10 which is the  material section  which falls for consideration.  Sub-section (1)  of that  section  empowers the passport authority  to  vary  or cancel  the endorsement of a passport or travel document  or to  vary  or  cancel  the conditions  subject  to  which a passport or travel document has been issued, having  regard, inter alia, to the provisions of sub-section (1) of  section 6  or  any notification. under section 19,  Sub-section  (2) confers  powers on the passport authority to vary or  cancel the  conditions  of  the  passport  or  travel  document  on application of the holder of the passport or travel document and  with the previous approval of the  Central  Government. Sub-section  (3)  provides that the passport  authority  may impound  or  cause to be impounded or revoke a  passport  or travel  document  on the grounds set out in clauses  (a)  to (h),  The order impounding the passport in the present  case was  made by the Central Government under clause  (c)  which reads as follows:--               "(c)  if  the  passport  authority  deems   it               necessary  so  to do in the  interest  of  the               Sovereignty   and  Integrity  of  India,   the               security of India, friendly relations of India               with any foreign country, or in the  interests               of the general public;" The  particular ground relied upon for making the order  was that  set out in the last part of clause (c),  namely,  that the  Central  Government deems it necessary to  impound  the passport  "in  the interests of the  general  public."  Then follows sub-section (5) which requires the 666

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passport  authority  impounding or revoking  a  passport  or travel document or varying or canceling an endorsement  made upon  it  to  "record in writing a brief  statement  of  the reasons  for making such order and furnish to the holder  of the passport or travel document on demand a copy of the same unless,  in  any  case, the passport  authority  is  of  the opinion  that  it  will  not be  in  the  interests  of  the soveriegnty  and integrity of India, the security of  India, friendly  relations of India with my foreign country  or  in the interests of the general public to furnish such a copy." It  was in virtue of the provision contained in  the  latter part  of  this  sub-section  that  the  Central   Government declined  to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons  for impounding the passport of the petitioner on the ground that it was not in the interests of the general public to furnish such  copy  to  the petitioner.  It is indeed  a  matter  of regret that the Central Government should have taken up this attitude  in  reply to the request of the petitioner  to  be supplied  a  copy  of  the  statement  of  reasons,  because ultimately, when the petition came to be filed, the  Central Government  did  disclose the reasons in  the  affidavit  in reply  to  the petition which shows that it was  not  really contrary  to public interest and if we look at  the  reasons given  in the affidavit in reply, it will be clear  that  no reasonable  person could possibly have taken the  view  that the  interests of the general public would be prejudiced  by the disclosure of the reasons.  This is an instance  showing how power conferred on a statutory authority to act in  the, interests of the general public can sometimes be  improperly exercised.   If the petitioner had not filed  the  petition, she would perhaps never have been able to find out what were the reasons for which her passport was impounded and she was deprived of her right to go abroad.  The necessity of giving reasons has obviously been introduced in sub-section (5)  so that  it may act as a healthy check against abuse or  misuse of  power.  If the reasons given are not relevant and  there is no nexus between the reasons and the ground on which  the passport has been impounded, it would be open to the  holder of  the passport to challenge the order impounding it  in  a court of law and if the court is satisfied that the  reasons are extraneous or irrelvant, the court would strike down the order.   This liability to be exposed to  judicial  scrutiny would by itself act as a safeguard against improper or  mala fide exercise of power.  The court would, therefore, be very slow  to  accept, without close scrutiny, the claim  of  the passport authority that it would not be in the interests  of the  general public to disclose the reasons.   The  passport authority would have to satisfy the court by placing  proper material  that  the giving of reasons would be  clearly  and indubitably against the interests of the general public  and if the Court is not so satisfied, the Court may require  the passport  authority to disclose the reasons, subject to  any valid and lawful claim for privilege which may be set up  on behalf  of the Government.  Here in the present case, as  we have  already  pointed  out,  the  Central  Government   did initially  claim that it would be against the  interests  of the  general public to disclose the reasons  for  impounding the  passport, but when it, came to filing the affidavit  in reply,  the Central Government very properly abandoned  this unsustainable  claim and disclosed the reasons The  question whether  these reasons have any nexus with the interests  of the general public or they are extraneous and irrelevant  is a matter 667 which  we shall examine when we deal with the  arguments  of

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the parties, ,Meanwhile, proceeding further with the  resume of the relevant provisions, reference may be made to section 11 which provides for an appeal inter alia against the order impounding  or revoking a passport or travel document  under sub-section  (3) of section 10.  But there is a  proviso  to this  section  which says that if the  order  impounding  or revoking  a  passport or travel document is  passed  by  the Central  Government,  there  shall be no  right  to  appeal. These are the relevant provisions of the Act in the light of which  we  have to consider the  constitutionality  of  sub- section (3) (c) of section 10 and the validity of the  order impounding the passport of the petitioner. Meaning and content of personal liberty in article 21 The  first contention urged on behalf of the  petitioner  in support  of the petition was that the right to go abroad  is part  of  ’personal  liberty  within  the  meaning  of  that expression as used in Article 21 and no one can. be deprived of  this right except according to the procedure  prescribed by  law.  There is no procedure prescribed by  the  Passport Act, 1967 for impounding or revoking a passport and  thereby preventing the holder of the passport from going abroad  and in  any event, even if some procedure can be traced  in  the relevant  provisions of the Act, it  is  unreasonable  and arbitrary,  inasmuch  as it does not provide for  giving  an opportunity  to  the  holder of the  passport  to  be  heard against the making of the order and hence the action of  the central  Government  in  impounding  the  passport  of   the petitioner  is in violation of Article 21.  This  contention of  the  petitioner  raises  a  question  as  to  the   true interpretation of Article 21, what is the nature and  extent of  the  protection afforded by this article ? What  is  the meaning of ’personal liberty’ : does it include the right to go  abroad  so that this right cannot be abridged  or  taken away  except in accordance with the procedure prescribed  by law ? What is the inter-relation between Art. 14 and Article 21 ? Does Article 21 merely require that there Must be  some semblance  of  procedure, howsoever arbitrary  or  fanciful, prescribed  by  law before a person can be deprived  of  his personal liberty or that the procedure must satisfy  certain requisites in the sense that it must be fair and  reasonable ?  Article 21 occurs in Part III of the  Constitution  which confers  certain  fundamental  rights.   These   fundamental rights had their roots deep in the struggle for independence and,  as  pointed  out by Granville Austin  in  ’The  Indian Constitution-Cornerstone  of a Nation’, "they were  included in the Constitution in the hope and expectation that one day the  tree of true liberty would bloom in India".  They  were indelibly  written in the sub-conscious memory of  the  race which fought for well-nigh thirty years for securing freedom from  British rule and they found expression in the form  of fundamental rights when the Constitution was enacted.  These fundamental  rights represent the basic values cherished  by the  people of this country since the Vedic times  and  they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual  and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent.  They weave a "pattern of guarantees  on  the  basic-structure of  human  rights"  and impose negative obligations on the State not to encroach  on indi- 668 vidual  liberty in its various dimensions.  It  is  apparent from  the enunciation of these rights that the, respect  for the  individual  and his capacity  for  individual  volition which  finds  expression  there is  not  a  self  fulfilling prophecy.  Its purpose is to help the individual to find his

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own  liability, to give expression to his creativity and  to prevent governmental and other forces from ’alienating’  the individual  from  his creative impulses.  These  rights  are wide  ranging  and comprehensive and they fall  under  seven heads,  namely, right to equality, right to  freedom,  right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion, cultural and  educational  rights,  right to property  and  right  to constitutional remedies.  Articles 14 to 18 occur under  the heading  ’Right to, Equality’, and of them, by far the  most important is Article 14 which confers a fundamental right by injuncting  the  State not to "deny to any  person  equality before  the law or the equal protection of the  laws  within the  territory  of India".  Articles 19 to  22,  which  find place  under  the  heading "Right  to  freedom  provide  for different  aspects  of freedom.  Clause (1)  of  Article  19 enshrines  what  may  be described as  the  seven  lamps  of freedom.   It  provides  that all citizens  shall  have  the right-(a)  to  freedom  of speech  and  expression;  (b)  to assemble   peaceably   and  without  arms;   (c)   to   form associations  or unions; (d) to move freely  throughout  the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part  of the territory of India; (f) to acquire, hold and dispose  of property  and (g) to practise any profession or to carry  on any occupation, trade or business,.  But these freedoms  are not  and cannot be absolute, for absolute  and  unrestricted freedom of one may be destructive of the freedom of  another and  in a well-ordered, civilised society, freedom can  only be regulated freedom.  Therefore, clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19  permit  reasonable  restrictions to be  imposed  on  the exercise   of  the  fundamental  rights   guaranteed   under clause’(1)  of that article.  Article 20 need not detain  us as,  that  is  not material for  the  determination  of  the controversy  between  the parties.  Then  comes  Article  21 which provides :               "21.  No person shall be deprived of his  life               or   personal  liberty  except  according   to               procedure established by law." Article  22 confers protection against arrest and  detention in certain cases and provides inter alia safeguards in  case of  preventive detention.  The other fundamental rights  are not  relevant  to, the present discussion and we,  need  not refer to them. It  is obvious that Article 21, though couched  in  negative language, confers the fundamental right to life and personal liberty.   So  far  as  the right  to  personal  liberty  is concerned,  it is ensured by providing that no one shall  be deprived  of personal liberty except according to  procedure prescribed by law.  The first question that arises for  con- sideration  on the language of Article 21 is : what  is  the meaning and content of the words ’personal liberty’ as  used in  this  article  ? This question incidently  came  up  for discussion  in  some of the judgments in A.  K.  Gopalan  v. State  of Madras(1) and the observations made  by  Patanjali Sastri,  J.,  Mukherjee, J., and S. R. Das,  J.,  seemed  to place  a  narrow  interpretation  on  the  words   ’personal liberty’ so as to confine (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. 669 the  protection  of  Article 21 to  freedom  of  the  person against  unlawful  detention.   But there  was  no  definite pronouncement  made on this point since the question  before the  Court was not so much the interpretation of  the  words ’personal liberty’ as the inter-relation between Article  19 and  21.  It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. &  Ors.(1) that the question as to the, proper scope and meaning of the

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expression     personal  liberty’  came  up   pointedly   for consideration  for  the first time before this  Court.   The majority of the Judges took the view "that personal liberty’ is  used  in the article as a compendious  term  to  include within  itself all the varieties of rights which go to  make up  the  personal liberties’ of man other than  those  dealt with  in  the several clauses of Article  19(1).   In  other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular species  or attributes of that freedom, ’personal liberty’ in Article 21 takes  in and comprises the residue".  The Minority  judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority  and explained their position in the following words : "No  doubt the expression ’personal liberty’ is a comprehensive one and the  right  to  move  freely is  an  attribute  of  personal liberty.   It  is said that the freedom to  move  freely  is carved   out  of  personal  liberty  and,   therefore,   the expression  ’personal liberty’ in Article 21  excludes  that attribute.   In  our view, this is not a  correct  approach. Both  are  independent fundamental rights, though  there  is overlapping.   There is no question of one being carved  out of  another.   The fundamental right of  life  and  personal liberty  has many attributes and some of them are  found  in Article  19.  If a person’s fundamental right under  Article 21  is infringed, the State can rely upon a law  to  sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless  the said  law satisfies the test laid down in Article  19(2)  so far   as  the  attributes  covered  by  Article  19(1)   are concerned".   There  can  be no doubt that in  view  of  the decision of this Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of  India(2) the  minority  view  must be regarded  as  correct  and  the majority view must be held to have been overruled.  We shall have  occasion to analyse and discuss the decision in R.  C. Cooper’s case a little later when we deal with the arguments based  on infraction of Articles 19(1) (a) and 19  (1)  (g), but it is sufficient to state for the present that according to  this  decision, which was a decision given by  the  full Court, the fundamental rights conferred by Part III are  not distinct  and mutually exclusive rights.  Each  freedom  has different  dimensions  and  merely  because  the  limits  of interference with one freedom are satisfied, the .law is not freed  from the necessity to meet the challenge  of  another guaranteed freedom.  The decision in A. K. Gopalan’s (supra) case  gave  rise  to  the theory  that  the  freedoms  under Articles  19,  21,  22 and  31  are  exclusive-each  article enacting  a  code  relating to the  protection  of  distinct rights,  but this theory was over-turned in R.  C.  Cooper’s case (supra) where Shah, J., speaking on behalf of the majo- rity pointed out that "Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantees on the texture of basic human: rights. The  guarantees  delimit the protection of those  rights  in their  allotted  fields : they do not attempt  to  enunciate distinct  rights."  The conclusion was summarised  in  these terms : "In our judgment, the assumption in A. K. (1)  [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332. (2)  [1973] 3 S.C.R. 530. 670 Gopalan’s  case  that certain articles in  the  Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters cannot be accepted as correct".   It was hold in R. C. Cooper’s case and  that  is clear from the judgment of Shah, J., because Shah, J., in so many  terms  disapproved of the contrary  statement  of  law contained in the opinions of Kania, C. J., Patanjali Sastri, J., Mahajan, J., Mukherjee, J., and S. R. Das, J., in A.  K. Gopalan’s  case  that  even where a person  is  detained  in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, as mandated

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by  Article  21,  the protection conferred  by  the  various clauses  of Article 19(1) does not cease to be available  to him  and the law authorising such detention has  to  satisfy the test of the applicable freedom under Article 19,  clause (1).  This would clearly show that Articles 19(1) and 21 are not mutually exclusive, for, if they were, there would be no question  of  a law depriving a person of  personal  liberty within  the  meaning  of  Article  21  having  to  meet  the challenge  of  a  fundamental  right  under  Article  19(1). Indeed,  in that event, a law of preventive detention  which deprives  a  person of ’personal liberty’ in  the  narrowest sense,  namely,  freedom  from  detention  and  thus   falls indisputably  within Art. 21 would not require to be  tested on the touchstone of clause (d) of Article 19 (1) and yet it was held by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal& Ors. (1) that  such a  law would have to satisfy the requirement inter  alia  of Article  19  (1),  clause (d) and in Haradhan  Saha  v.  The State, of West Bengal & Ors., (2) which was a decision given by  a  Bench  of  five judges,  this  Court  considered  the challenge   of   clause  (d)  of  Article   19(1)   to   the constitutional  validity  of  the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security  Act, 1971 and held that that Act did  not  violate the  constitutional guarantee embodied in that article.   It is  indeed difficult to see on what principle we can  refuse to  give  its  plain natural meaning  to  the  expression  ’ personal  liberty’  as used in Article 21 and read it  in  a narrow   and  restricted  sense  so  as  to  exclude   those attributes of personal liberty which are specifically  dealt with  in Article 19.  We do not think that this would  be  a correct  way  of interpreting the provisions  of  the  Cons- titution conferring fundamental rights.  The attempt of  the court  should  be  to  expand the reach  and  ambit  of  the fundamental  rights rather than attenuate their meaning  and content  by  a process of judicial construction.   The  wave length  for  comprehending  the  scope  and  ambit  of   the fundamental  rights  has  been set by this Court  in  R.  C. Cooper’s case and our approach in the interpretation of  the fundamental  rights  must  now be in tune  with  this  wave, length.   We  may point out even at the cost  of  repetition that this Court has said in so; many terms in R. C. Cooper’s case  that each freedom has different dimensions  and  there may be overlapping between different fundamental rights  and therefore  it  is  not a’ valid argument  to  say  that  the expression  ’personal  liberty’  in Article 21  must  be  so interpreted as to avoid overlapping between that article and Article 19(1).  The expression ’personal liberty’ in Article 21  is  of the widest amplitude and it covers a  variety  of rights  which go to constitute the personal liberty  of  man and some of them have been raised to the status of  distinct fundamental  rights  and given additional  protection  under Article 19.  Now, it has been (1)  [1973] 1 SCR 856. (2)  [1975] 1 S.C.R. 778. 671 held  by this Court in Satwant Singh’s case  that  ’personal liberty’  within the meaning of Article 21  includes  within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no  person can be deprived of this right except according to  procedure prescribed by law.  Prior to the enactment of the  Passports Act, 1967, there was no law regulating the right of a person to  go abroad and that was the reason why the order  of  the Passport   Officer  refusing  to  issue  passport   to   the petitioner  in  Satwant  Singh’s case  was  struck  down  as invalid.   It  win  be seen at once  from  the  language  of

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Article 21 that the protection it secures is a limited  one. It  safeguards  the  right to go  abroad  against  executive interference  which  is not supported by law; and  law  here means ’en-. acted law’ or ’State Law’.  Vide A. K. Gopalan’s case.   Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to,  go abroad  unless there is a law made by the State  prescribing the  procedure for so depriving him and the  deprivation  is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure.  It was for this reason, in order to comply with the requirement  of Article 21, that Parliament enacted the Passports Act,  1967 for regulating the tight to go abroad.  It is clear from the provisions of the Passports, Act, 1967 that is lays down the circumstances  under  which  a passport  may  be  issued  or refused  or  cancelled or impounded and  also  prescribes  a procedure for doing so, but the question is whether that  is sufficient compliance with Article 21.  Is the  prescription of  some  sort  of procedure enough or  must  the  procedure comply   with  any  particular  requirements  ?   Obviously, procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable.  This indeed was conceded by the learned Attorney General who with his  usual candour frankly stated that it was  not  possible for  him to contend that any procedure howsoever  arbitrary, oppressive  or unjust may be prescribed by the  law.   There was some discussion in A. K. Gopalan’s case in regard to the nature  of  the procedure required to  be  prescribed  under Article  21 and at least three of the learned Judges out  of five  expressed  themselves strongly in favour of  the  view that  the  procedure cannot be any arbitrary,  fantastic  or oppressive procedure.  Fazal Ali, J., who was in a minority, went to the farthest limit in saying that the procedure must include the four essentials, set out in Prof.  Willi’s  book on  Constitutional  Law, namely, notice, opportunity  to  be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary course of  procedure. Patanjali  Sastri, J. did not go as far as that but  he  did say  that "certain basic principles emerged as the  constant factors  known to all those procedures and they  formed  the core of the procedure established by law." Mahajan, J., also observed that Article 21 requires that "there should be some form  of proceeding before a person can be condemned  either in respect of his life or his liberty" and "it negatives the idea  of  fantastic,  arbitrary  and  oppressive  forms   of proceedings".  But apart altogether from these  observations in  A. K. Gopalan’s case, which have great weight,  we  find that even on principle the concept of reasonableness must be projected  in  the procedure contemplated  by  Article  21,, having regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21. 672 The inter-relationship between articles 14, 19 and 21 We  may  at this stage consider the  inter-relation  between Article  21  on the one hand and Articles 14 and 19  on  the other.   We have already pointed out that the view taken  by the majority in A. K. Gopalan’s case war,. that so long as a law  of preventive detention satisfies the  requirements  of Article  22, it would be within the terms of Article 21  and it  would not be required to meet the challenge  of  Article 19.  This  view proceeded on the  assumption  that  "certain articles in the constitution exclusively deal with  specific matters"  and where the requirements of an  article  dealing with  the  particular matter in question are  satisfied  and there is no infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by  that  article, no recourse can be had to  a  fundamental right  conferred  by  another  article.   This  doctrine  of exclusivity was seriously questioned in R. C. Cooper’s  case and it was over-ruled by a majority of the Full Court,  only Ray,  J., as he then was, dissenting.  The  majority  judges

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held that though a law of preventive detention may pass  the test  of Article 22, it has yet to satisfy the  requirements of  other fundamental rights such as Article 19.  The  ratio of  the  majority  judgment  in  R.  C.  Cooper’s  case  was explained  in  clear and categorical terms  by  Shelat,  J., speaking on behalf of seven judges of this Court in  Shambhu Nath  Sarkar v. State of West Bengal(1).  The learned  Judge there said :               "In Gopalan’s case (supra) the majority  court               had held that Article 22 was a  self-contained               Code   and  therefore  a  law  of   preventive               detention did not have to satisfy the require-               ment  of Articles 19, 14 and 21.  The view  of               Fazal  Ali,  J., on the other hand,  was  that               preventive  detention was a direct  breach  of               the right under Article 19 (1) (d) and that  a               law providing for preventive detention. had to               be  subject  to  such judicial  review  as  is               obtained under clause (5) of that Article.  In               R.  C. Cooper v. Union of India,  (supra)  the               aforesaid   premise,   of  the   majority   in               Gopalan’s  case  (supra) was  disapproved  and               therefore  it  no  longer  holds  the   field.               Though  Cooper’s case (supra) dealt  with  the               inter-relationship  of Article 19 and  Article               31,  the  basic  approach  to  construing  the               fundamental rights guaranteed in the different               provisions of the Constitution adopted in this               case held the major premise of the majority in               Gopalan’s case (supra) to be incorrect." Subsequently,  in  Haradhan Saha v. State of West  Bengal  & Ors.(2)  also, a Bench of five Judges of this  Court,  after referring to the decisions in A. K. Gopalan’s case and R. C. Cooper’s  case,  agreed  that the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act, 1971, which is a law of preventive  detention, has  to  be  tested in regard  to  its  reasonableness  with reference to Article 19.  That decision accepted and applied the  ratio in R. C. Cooper’s case and Shambhu Nath  Sarkar’s case  and proceeded to consider the challenge of Article  19 to  the  constitutional  validity  of  the  Maintenance   of Internal  Security Act, 1971 and held that the Act  did  not violate  any of the constitutional guarantees  enshrined  in Art.  19.  The same view was affirmed once again by a  Bench of four (1)  [1973] S.C.R.856. (1)  [1975] S.C.R.778. 673 judges  of this Court in Khudiram Das v. The State  of  West Bengal   &  Ors.(1)  Interestingly,  even  prior  to   these decisions, as pointed out by Dr. Rajive Dhawan, in his  book : "The Supreme Court of India :" at page 235, reference  was made,  by this court in Mohd.  Sabir v. State of  Jammu  and Kashmir(2)  to article 191(2) to justify preventive;  deten- tion.   The  law, must, therefore, now be taken to  be  well settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of ’personal liberty’ and there is consequently  no infringement  of the fundamental right conferred by  Article 21,  such  law, in so far as it abridges or takes  away  any fundamental  right under Article 19 would have to  meet  the challenge  of that article.  This proposition can no  longer be  disputed  after the decisions in R.  C.  Cooper’s  case, Shambhu  Nath Sarkar’s case and Haradhan Saha’s case.   Now, if  a  law  depriving a person  of  ’personal  liberty’  and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the  meaning

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of  Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more  of  the fundamental  rights conferred under Article 19 which may  be applicable  in a given situation, ex hypothesi it must  also be  liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.   This was in fact not disputed by the learned Attorney General and indeed  he  could  not  do  so in  view  of  the  clear  and categorical  statement  made  by Mukharjea,  J.,  in  A.  K. Gopalan’s case that Article 21 "presupposes that the law  is a  valid  and  binding  law  under  the  provisions  of  the Constitution   having  regard  to  the  competence  of   the legislature  and  the  subject it relates to  and  does  not infringe   any   of  the  fundamental   rights   which   the Constitution  provides  for", including  Article  14.   This Court  also  applied  Article  14  in  two  of  its  earlier decisions,  namely,  The State of West Bengal v.  Anwar  Ali Sarkar(3)   and   Kathi  Raning  Rawat  v.  The   State   of Saurashtra(4)  where there was a special law  providing  for trial  of certain offences by a speedier process which  took away  some of the safeguards available to an  accused  under the ordinary procedure in the Criminal Procedure Code.   The special  law  in each of these two cases  undoubtedly  pres- cribed  a procedure for trial of the specified offences  and this  procedure could not be condemned as inherently  unfair or unjust and there was thus compliance with the requirement of Article 21, but even so, the validity of the special  law was  tested before the Supreme, Court on the  touchstone  of Article  14  and in one case, namely, Kathi  Raning  Rawat’s case,  the  validity was upheld and in  the  other,  namely, Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case, it was struck down.  It was held in both  these  cases  that the procedure  established  by  the special  law must not be violative of the  equality  clause. That procedure must answer the requirement of Article 14. The  nature and requirement of the procedure  under  article 21. Now,  the  question  immediately arises as to  what  is  the requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article  ? There  can  be no doubt that it is a founding faith  of  the Constitution.  It is indeed the pillar on which (1)  [1975] 2 S.C.R.832. (2)  A.I. R.1971S.C.1713. (3)  [1952] S.C.R. 284. (4)  [1952] S.C.R. 435. 674 rests  securely the foundation of our  democratic  republic. And,  therefore,  it  must not be  subjected  to  a  narrow, pedantic  or lexicographic approach._ No attempt  should  be made to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude.   Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot  be  imprisoned Within  traditional  and  doctrinaire limits.  We must reiterate here what was pointed out by  the majority  in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu &  Another (1)  namely,  that  "from  a  positivistic  point  of  view, equality  is antithetic to arbitrariness.  In fact  equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of  law  in  a republic, while the other, to  the  whim  and caprice of an absolute monarch.  Where an act is  arbitrary, it  is implicit in it that it is unequal both  according  to political  logic  and constitutional law  and  is  therefore violative  of  Article 14".  Article 14  strikes,  at  arbi- trariness in State action and ensures fairness and  equality of  treatment.   The  principle  of  reasonableness,   which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential  element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like  a

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brooding  omnipresence  and the  procedure  contemplated  by Article  21 must answer the best of reasonableness in  order to be in conformity with Article 14.  It must be "’right and just  and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful  or  oppressive; otherwise,  it  would  be  no  procedure  at  all  and   the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. How  far  natural  justice  is  air  essential  element   of procedure established by law. The  question  immediately  arises  :  does  the   procedure prescribed  by  the  Passports Act, 1967  for  impounding  a passport  meet the, test of this requirement ? Is it  ’right or  fair or just’ ? The argument of the petitioner was  that it is not, because it provides for impounding of a  passport without  affording reasonable opportunity to the  holder  of the  passport  to  be  heard in  defence.   To  impound  the passport  of  a person, said the petitioner,  is  a  serious matter,   since   it  prevents  him  from   exercising   his constitutional  right  to  go  abroad  and  such  a  drastic consequence cannot in fairness be visited without  observing the  principle of audi alteram partem.  Any procedure  which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go  abroad without  giving reasonable opportunity to show cause  cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the  present case clear infringement of the  requirement  of Article  21.   Now,  it is true that  there  is  no  express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi   alteram  partem  rule  should  be   followed   before impounding  a  passport, but that is not conclusive  of  the question.  If the statute makes itself clear on this  point, then no more question arises.  But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication  and apply  the  principle  stated by Byles,  J.,  in  Cooper  v. Wandsworth   Board   of  Works(2).   "A   long   course   of decision---,  beginning with Dr. Bentley’s case  and  ending with some very recent cases, establish that, although  there are  no  positive words in the statute  requiring  that  the party shall be heard, yet-the justice of the common law will supply the omission of (1)  [1974]2S.C.R.348. (2)  [1863]14C.B.N.S.180. 675 the  legislature".   The principle of audi  alteram  partem, which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard,  part of  the  rules of natural justice.  In fact, there  are  two main  principles in which the rules of natural  justice  are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem.   We are not concerned here with the  former,  since there  is no case of bias urged here.  The question is  only in  regard to the right of hearing which involves  the  audi alteram  partem rule.  Can it be imported in  the  procedure for impounding a passport ? We  may commence the discussion of this question with a  few general observations to emphasise the increasing  importance of  natural  justice  in the field  of  administrative  law. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended  to invest law with’ fairness and to secure justice and over the years  it has grown into a widely pervasive  rule  affecting large areas of administrative action.  Lord Morris of Borth- y-Gest  spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his  address before the Bentham Club :               "We can, I think, take pride in what has  been               done in recent periods and particularly in the               field of administrative law by invoking and by               applying  these  principles which  we  broadly               classify  under  the  designation  of  natural

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             justice.   Many testing problems as  to  their               application  yet remain to be solved.   But  I               affirm that the area of administrative               action is but one area in which the principles               are  to  be  deployed.  Nor  are  they  to  be               invoked  only  when  procedural  failures  are               shown.   Does  natural justice qualify  to  be               described  as  a  "majestic"  conception  ?  I               believe it does.  Is it just a rhetorical  but               vague  phrase  which  can  be  employed,  when               needed,  to  give  a gloss of  assurance  ?  I               believe that it is very much more.  If it  can               be summarised as being fair play in action-who               could wish that it would ever be out of action               ?  It denotes that the law is not only  to  be               guided  by  reason and by logic but  that  its               purpose %,,ill  not be fulfilled;  it  lacks               more exalted inspiration." (Current Legal Pro-               blems, 1973, Vol. 26, p. 16) And  then  again,  in his speech in the House  of  Lords  in Wiseman  v. Borneman(1), the learned Law Lord said in  words of inspired felicity:               "that the conception of natural justice should               at  all  stages  guide  those  who   discharge               judicial functions is not merely an acceptable               but is an essential part of the philosophy  of               the  law.   We  often speak of  the  rules  of               natural  justice.  But there is nothing  rigid               or   mechanical   about   them.    What   they               comprehend has been analysed and described  in               many authorities.  But any analysis must bring               into  relief  rather their  spirit  and  their               inspiration  than any precision of  definition               or  precision  as to application.  We  do  not               search  for prescriptions which will lay  down               exactly   what  must,  in  various   divergent               situations,  be  done.   The  principles   and               procedures are               (1)   [1971]A.C.297.               676               to   be  applied  which,  in  any   particular               situation  or set of circumstances, are  right               and  just and fair.  Natural justice,  it  has               been said, is only "fair play in action."  Nor               do  we  wait for directions  from  Parliament.               The common law has abundant riches : there  we               may  find what Byles, J., called "the  justice               of the common law".  Thus,  the  soul  of natural justice is  fair  play  in action’  and  that  is  why  it  has  received  the   widest recognition throughout the democratic world.  In the  United States,  the right to an administrative hearing is  regarded as  essential requirement of fundamental fairness.   And  in England  too  it has been held that ’fair  play  in  action’ demands  that  before any prejudicial or adverse  action  is taken  against a person, he must be given an opportunity  to be  heard.   The rule was stated by Lord  Henning,  M.R.  in these  terms  in  Schmidt v. Secretary  of  State  for  Home Affairs(1)  :-where a public officer has power to deprive  a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is  that it has not to be done without his being  given  an opportunity of being heard and of making representations  on his  own  behalf".   The same rule also  prevails  in  other Commonwealth  countries  like  Canada,  Australia  and   New Zealand.   It has even gained access to the United  Nations.

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Vide  American Journal of International Law, Vol.  67,  page 479.    Magarry,  J.,  describes  natural  justice   "as   a distillate  of  due  process  of  law".  Vide  Fontaine   v. Chesterton(2).   It  is the quintessence of the  process  of justice inspired and guided by fair play in action’.  If  we look  at the speeches of the various law Lords in  Wiseman’s case,  it  will  be seen that each one  of  them  asked  the question  "whether  in the particular circumstances  of  the case,  the Tribunal acted unfairly so that it could be  said that  their  procedure  did  not  match  with  what  justice demanded",  ,or, was the procedure adopted by  the  Tribunal ’in  all  the circumstances unfair’?  The  test  adopted  by every law Lord was whether the procedure followed was  "fair in all the circumstances" and ’fair play in action’ required that an opportunity should be given to the tax payer "to see and  reply  to the counter-statement of  the  Commissioners" before reaching the conclusion that "there is a prima  facie case against him." The inquiry must, therefore, always be  : does  fairness  in action demand that an opportunity  to  be heard should be given to the person affected ? Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural  justice,  there  can be no  distinction  between  a quasi-judicial  function and an administrative function  for this  purpose.   The aim of both administrative  inquiry  as well  as  quasi-judicial  inquiry is to  arrive  at  a  just decision  and if a rule of natural justice Is calculated  to secure  justice,  or  to  put  it  negatively,  to   prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be   applicable  to  quasi-judicial  inquiry  and   not   to administrative  inquiry.  It must logically apply  to  both. On  what principle can distinction be made between  one  and the  other ?  Can it be said that the requirement  of  ’fair play in action’ is any the (1)  [1969] 2 Chancery Division 149. (2)  (1968) 112 Solicitor General 690. 677 less in an administrative inquiry than in a  quasi--judicial one?   Sometimes  an unjust decision  in  an  administrative inquiry  may  have  far more  serious  consequences  than  a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry and hence the rules  of natural  justice  must apply equally  in  an  administrative inquiry   which  entails-civil  consequences.   There   was, however,  a time in the early stages of the  development  of the doctrine of natural justice when the view prevailed that the  rules  of natural justice have application  only  to  a quasi-judicial   proceeding   as   distinguished   from   an administrative proceeding and the distinguishing feature  of a quasi-judicial proceeding is that the authority  concerned is required by the, law under which it is functioning to act judicially.  This requirement of a duty to act judicially in order to invest the function with a quasi,judicial character was spelt out from the following observation of Atkin,  L.J. in  Rex v. Electricity Commissioners(1), "wherever any  body of  persons  having legal authority to  determine  questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject  to the controlling jurisdiction of the  King  Bench Division.  . . .". Lord Hewart, C.J., in Rex V.  Legislative Committee   of  the  Church  Assembly,  (  2  )  read   this observation  to mean that the duty to act judicially  should be  an additional requirement existing independently of  the "authority  to determine questions affecting the  rights  of subjects"-something super added to it.  This gloss placed by Lord  Hewart,  C.J.,  on the dictum  of  Lord  Atkin,  L.J., bedevilled  the law for a considerable time  and  stultified

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the  growth of the doctrine of natural justice.   The  Court was constrained in every case that came before it, to make a search for the duty to act judicially sometimes from tenuous material  and sometimes in the services of the  statute  and this  led to oversubtlety and over-refinement  resulting  in confusion and uncertainty in the law.  But this was  plainly contrary to the earlier authorities and in the  epoch-making decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin(3), which marks  a turning point in the history of the development  of the  doctrine of natural justice, Lord Reid pointed out  how the   gloss   of  Lord  Hewart,  C.J.,  was   based   on   a misunderstanding of the; observations of Atkin, L.J., and it went counter to the law laid down in the earlier  decisions, of  the Court.  Lord Reid observed : "If Lord  Hewart  meant that it is never enough that a body has a duty to  determine what  the rights of an individual should be, but that  there must always be something more to impose on it a duty to  act judicially, then that appears to me impossible to  reconcile with  the earlier authorities".  The learned law  Lord  held that  the  duty to act judicially may arise  from  the  very nature of the function intended to be performed’ and it need not be shown to be superadded.  This decision, broadened the area  of application of the rules of natural justice and  to borrow  the words of Prof.  Clar in his article on  ’Natural Justice, Substance and Shadow’ in Public Law Journal,  1975, restored   light  to  an  area  "benighted  by  the   narrow conceptualism of the previous decade".  This development  in the  law had its parallel in India in the Associated  Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma & Anr(4) where (1)  [1924] 1 K.B.171. (2)  [1928] 1 K.B.411. (3)  [1964] A. C. 40. (4)  [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366. 5-119 SCT/78 678 this Court approvingly referred to the decision in Ridge  v. Baldwin  (supra)  and,  later  in State  of  Orissa  v.  Dr. Binapani(1) observed that : "If there is power to decide and determine  to  the  prejudice  of  a  person,  duty  to  act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power".  This Court  also, pointed out in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union  of India & Ors. (2) another historic decision in this branch of the law, that in recent years the concept of  quasi-judicial power  has  been undergoing radical change  and  said:  "The dividing  line between an administrative power and a  quasi- judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually  oblite- rated, for determining whether a power is an administrative, power  or  a  quasi-judicial power one has to  look  to  the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it  is conferred, the framework of the law  conferring  that power,  the consequences ensuing from the exercise  of  that power  and the manner in which that power is expected to  be exercised".  The net effect of these and other decisions was that the duty to act judicially need not be super-added, but it may be spelt out from the nature of the power  conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights  of the  person  effected and where it is found  to  exist,  the rules of, natural justice would be attracted. This  was  the advance made by the law as a  result  of  the decision  in  Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) in  England  and  the decision  in Associated Cement Companies’s case (supra)  and other  cases following upon it, in India.  But that was  not to be the end of the development of the law on this subject. The    proliferation   of   administrative   law    provoked considerable fresh thinking on the subject and soon it  came

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to be recognised that ’fair play in action’ required that in administrative  proceeding  also, the  doctrine  of  natural justice  must  be held to be applicable.   We  have  already discussed this aspect of the question on principal and shown why no distinction can be made between an administrative and a   quasi-judicial   proceeding   for   the;   purpose    of applicability  of  the doctrine of  natural  justice.   This position  was  judicially recognised and  accepted  and  the dichotomy   between   administrative   and    quasi-judicial proceedings  vis-a-vis  doctrine  of  natural  justice   was finally  discarded  as unsound by the decisions in In  re  : H.K. (All Infant) (3) and Schmidt v. Secretary of State  for Home  Affairs  (supra) in England and, so far  as  India  is concerned, by the memorable decision rendered by this  Court in A.K. Kraipak’s case (supra).            Lord Parker, C.J. pointed  out in the course of his judgment in In Re  :  H.K. (An  Infant) (supra) :               "But  at the same time,, I myself  think  that               even  if  an Immigration officer is not  in  a               judicial or          quasi-judicial  capacity,               he  must  at any rate give  the  immigrant  an               opportunity  of satisfying him of the  matters               in  the sub-section, and for that purpose  let               the   immigrant   know  what   his   immediate               impression  is  so  that  the  immigrant   can               disabuse him.  That               (1)   [1967] 2 S C.R. 625.               (2)   [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457.               (3)   [1967] 2 Q. B. 617.                679               is  not, as I see it, a question of acting  or               being required to act judicially, but of being               required  to act fairly.  Good  administration               and an honest or bonafide decision must, as it               seems    to   me,.   required    not    merely               impartiality,  nor merely bringing one’s  mind               to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and               to  the limited extent that the  circumstances               of  any particular case allow, and within  the               legislative   framework   under   which    the               administrator is working, only to that limited               extent  do  the  so-called  rules  of  natural               justice apply, which in a case such as this is               merely  a  duty to act fairly.   I  appreciate               that in saying that it may be said that one is               going further than is permitted on the decided               cases  because  heretofore  at  any  rate  the               decisions of the courts do seem to have  drawn               a  strict line in these matters  according  to               whether  there  is or’ is not a  duty  to  act               judicially or quasi-judicially." This Court, speaking through Hegde, J., in ,I.  K. Kraipak’s case  quoted  with  approval  the  above  passage  from  the judgment of Lord Parker, C.J., and proceeded to add :               "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to               secure  justice  or to put  it  negatively  to               prevent  miscarriage of justice.  These  rules               can  operate only in areas not covered by  any               law validly made.  In other words they do  not               supplant  the law of the land  but  supplement               it-Till  very recently it was the  opinion  of               the courts that unless the authority concerned               was  required  by  the  law  under  which   it               functioned to act judicially there was no room               for  the, application of the rules of  natural

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             justice.   The validity of that limitation  is               now  questioned.  If the purpose of the  rules               of  natural justice is to prevent  miscarriage               of  justice One fails to see why  those  rules               should be made inapplicable, to administrative               enquiries.  Often times it is not easy to draw               the   line  that   demarcates   administrative               enquiries   from   quasi-judicial   enquiries.               Enquiries which were considered administrative               at  one  time  are  now  being  considered  as               quasi-.judicial  in character.  Arriving at  a               just  decision  is  the  aim  of  both  quasi-               judicial  enquiries as well as  administrative               enquiries.    An   unjust   decision   in   an               administrative  enquiry  may  have  more   far               reaching  effect than a decision in  a  quasi-               judicial  enquiry.  As observed by this  Court               in  Suresh Koshy George v. The University  of               Kerala  and Ors. (1969)1 S.C.R. 317 the  rules               of  natural  justice are not  embodied  rules.               What particular rule of natural justice should               apply  to a given case must depend to a  great               extent on the facts and circumstances of  that               case the framework of the law under which  the               enquiry  is held and the constitution  of  the               Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that               purpose.  Whenever a complaint is made  before               a  court  that  some  principles  of   natural               justice had been contravened the court has  to               decide whether the observance of that rule was               necessary for a just decision on the facts  of               the case."                680               This view was reiterated and re-affirmed in  a               subsequent  decision of this Court  in  D.F.O.               South  Khari v. Ram Sanehi Singh(1).  The  law               must,  therefore,  now  be taken  to  be  well               settled   that  even  in   an   administrative               proceeding, which involves civil consequences,               the  doctrine of natural justice must be  held               to be applicable.               Now, here, the power conferred on the Passport               Authority  is  to impound a passport  and  the               consequence of impounding a passport would  be               to  impair  the constitutional  right  of  the               holder of the passport to go abroad during the               time   that   the   passport   is   impounded.               Moreover,  a passport can be impounded by  the               Passport  Authority only on certain  specified               grounds set out in sub-section (3) of  section               10  and the Passport Authority would  have  to               apply its mind to the facts and  circumstances               of a given case and decide whether any of  the               specified  grounds exists which would  justify               impounding  of  the  passport.   The  Passport               Authority is also required by sub-section  (5)               of  section  10 to record in writing  a  brief               statement  of the reasons for making an  order               impounding  a  passport and, save  in  certain               exceptional situations, the Passport Authority               is obliged to furnish a copy of the  statement               of  reasons  to the bolder  of  the  passport.               Where  the  Passport Authority which  has  im-               pounded  a passport is other than the  Central               Government,  a  right of  appeal  against  the

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order impounding the passport is given by section 11, and in the  appeal,  the  validity  of the  reasons  given  by  the Passport  Authority  for  impounding  the  passport  can  be canvassed before the Appellate Authority.  It is clear on  a consideration of these circumstances that the test laid down in the decisions of this Court for distinguishing between  a quasi-judicial   power  and  an  administrative   power   is satisfied and the power conferred on the Passport  Authority to impound a passport is quasi-judicial power.  The rules of natural  justice would, in the circumstances, be  applicable in  the exercise of the power of impounding a passport  even on  the  orthodox  view  which prevailed  prior to  A.  K. Kraipak’s case.  The same result must follow in view of  the decision  in  A.  K. Kraipak’s case, even if  the  power  to impound  a  passport  were  regarded  as  administrative  in character,   because  it  seriously  interferes   with   the constitutional  right  of the holder of the passport  to  go abroad and entails adverse civil consequences.               Now,  as already pointed out, the doctrine  of               natural  justice consists principally  of  two               rules,  namely, nemo debt esse  judex  propria               cause  :  no one shall be a judge in  his  own               cause,  and audi alteram partem : no  decision               shall   be  given  against  a  party   without               affording  him a reasonable hearing.   We  are               concerned here with the second rule and  hence               we   shall   confine  ourselves  only   to   a               discussion of that rule.  The learned Attorney               General,  appearing on behalf of the Union  of               India,  fairly conceded that the audi  alteram               partem rule is a highly effective tool devised               by the courts to enable a statutory  authority               to  arrive  at  a  just  decision  and  it  is               calculated to act as a healthy check on  abuse               or misuse of power and hence its reach  should               not be narrowed and its applicability  circum-               scribed.    He  rightly  did  not  plead   for               reconsideration of the historic advances  made               in  the  law as a result of the  decisions  of               this Court and did               (1)   [1973] 3S.C.C.864.               681               not suggest that the Court should re-trace its               steps.   That  would indeed have been  a  most               startling argument coming from the  Government               of  India and for the Court to accede to  such               an  argument would have been so act  of  utter               retrogression.    But  fortunately   no   such               argument was advanced by the learned  Attorney               General.   What  he urged was a  very  limited               contention,  namely that having regard to  the               nature   of   the  action  involved   in   the               impounding  of  a passport, the  audi  alteram               partem  rule  must be held  to,  be  excluded,               because if notice were to be given to the hol-               der of the passport and reasonable opportunity               afforded to him to show cause why his passport               should not be impounded, he might immediately,               on the strength of the passport, make good his               exit  from  the  country  and  the  object  of               impounding  the passport would be  frustrated.               The  argument  was that if  the  audi  alteram               partem rule were applied, its effect would  be               to  stultify  the  power  of  impounding   the               passport and it would defeat and paralyse  the

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             administration  of the law and hence the  audi               alteram  partem  rule cannot  in  fairness  be               applied while exercising the power to  impound               a  passport.  This, argument was sought to  be               supported by reference to the statement of the               law  in  A.S.  de Smith,  Judicial  Review  of               Administrative  Action,  2nd  ed.,  where  the               learned  author  says  at page  174  that  "in               administrative,  law  a prima facie  right  to               prior  notice and opportunity to be heard  may               be held to be excluded by implication-where an               obligation  to give notice and opportunity  to               be  heard would obstruct the taking of  prompt               action,  especially action of a preventive  or               remedial nature".  Now, it is true that  since               the  right to prior notice and opportunity  of               hearing  arises only by implication  from  the               duty  to  act fairly, or to use the  words  of Lord  Morris of Borth-y-Gest, from ’fair play in action,  it may  equally be excluded where, having regard to the  nature of  the action to be taken, its object and purpose  and  the scheme  of  the relevant statutory  provision,  fairness  in action does not demand its implication and even warrants its exclusion.  There are certain well recognised exceptions  to the  audi  alteram  partem  rule  established  by   judicial decisions  and  they  are summarised by  S.A.  de  Smith  in Judicial  Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., at  page 168  to  179.   If  we analyse  these  exceptions  a  little closely,  _it will be apparent that they do not in  any  way militate  against the principle which requires fair play  in administrative  action.   The word ’exception’ is  really  a misnomer  because  in  these exclusionary  cases   the  audi alteram  partem rule is held inapplicable not by way  of  an exception  to  "fair play in action",  but  because  nothing unfair  can be inferred by not affording an  opportunity  to present  or  meet a case.  The audi alteram partem  rule  is intended  to  inject justice into the law and it  cannot  be applied  to defeat the ends of justice, or to make  the  law ’lifeless,  absurd, stultifying, self-defeating  or  plainly contrary  to the common sense of the situation’.  Since  the life of the law is not logic but experience and every  legal proposition must, in the ultimate analysis, be tested on the touchstone  of  pragmatic realism, the audi  alteram  partem rule  would,  by  the experiential  test,  be  excluded,  if importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the  administrative process or the need for  promptitude  or the  urgency of the situation so demands.  But at  the  same time  it  must be remembered that this is a  rule  of  vital importance  in the field of administrative law and  it  must not  be  jettisoned save in very  exceptional  circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands.               682               It is a wholesome rule designed to- secure the               rule  of law and the court should not  be  too               ready  to eschew it in its application  to  a               given case.  True rue it is that in  questions               of  this kind a fanatical or  doctrinaire  ap-               proach  should be avoided, but that  does  not               mean  that  merely  because  the   traditional               methodology  of a formalised hearing may  have               the effect of stultifying the exercise of  the               statutory  power,  the  audi  alteram   partem               should  be  wholly excluded.  The  court  must               make  every  effort to salvage  this  cardinal               rule  to the maximum extent permissible  in  a

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             given  case.   It must not be  forgotten  that               "natural justice is pragmatically flexible and               is   amenable   to   capsulation   under   the               compulsive  pressure of  circumstances".   The               audi  alteram  partem rule is not  cast  in  a               rigid  mould and judicial decisions  establish               that it may suffer situational  modifications.               The core of it must, however, remain,  namely,               that   the   per%on  affected  must   have   a               reasonable opportunity of being heard and  the               hearing  must be a genuine hearing and not  an empty public relations exercise.  That is why Tucker,  L.J., emphasised  in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk(1)  that  "whatever standard  of  natural justice is adopted, one  essential  is that  the person concerned should have a  reasonable  oppor- tunity  of  presenting his case".  What opportunity  may  be regarded  as  reasonable  would necessarily  depend  on  the practical  necessities  of  the  situation.   It  may  be  a sophisticated  fullfledged  hearing or it may be  a  hearing which is very brief and minimal : it may be a hearing  prior to the decision or it may even be a post-decisional remedial hearing.   The  audi  alteram partem  rule  is  sufficiently flexible to permit modifications and variations to suit  the exigencies of myriad kinds of situations which max,  arise. This  circumstantial flexibility of the audi alteram  partem rule  was  empbasised by Lord Reid in  Wiseman  v.  Sorneman (supra)  when  he said that he would be "sorry to  see  this fundamental  general principle degenerate into a  series  of hard and fast rules" and Lord Hailsham, L.C., also  observed in  Pearl-Berg  V. Party(2) that the courts "have  taken  in increasingly  sophisticated  view  of what  is  required  in individual  cases".   It would not, therefore, be  right  to conclude  that  the  audi alteram partem  rule  is  excluded merely  because  the power to impound a  passport  might  be frustrated, if prior notice and hearing were to be given  to the  person  concerned before impounding his  passport.  the Passport  Authority  may  proceed to  impound  the  passport without giving any prior opportunity to the person concerned to  be  heard,  but  as soon as  the  order  impounding  the passport  is made, and opportunity of hearing,  remedial  in aim, should be given to him so that he may present his  case and controvert that of the Passport Authority and point  out why  his  passport  should not be impounded  and  the  order impounding  it recalled.  This should not only  be  possible but   also  quite  appropriate,  because  the  reasons   for impounding  the passport are required to be supplied by  the Passport  Authority  after the making of the order  and  the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to make a representation setting forth his case and plead for  setting aside   the   action  impounding  his  passport.    A   fair opportunity  of being heard following immediately  upon  the order  impounding the passport would satisfy the mandate  of natural  justice  and a provision requiring giving  of  such opportunity  to the person concerned can and should be  read by               (1)   [1949] 1 All Eng.  Reports 109.               (2)   [1971] 1 Weekly Law Reports,728. 683               implication  in the Passports Act,  1967.   If               such a provision were held to be  incorporated               in  the  Passports,  Act,  1967  by  necessary               implication,  as  we  hold  it  must  be,  the               procedure prescribed by the Act for impounding               a  passport would be fight, fair and just  and               it   would  not  suffer  from  the   vice   of

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             arbitrariness  or unreasonableness.  We  must,               therefore,    hold    that    the    procedure               ’established’  by the Passports Act, 1967  for               impounding  a passport is in  conformity  with               the  requirement  of Article 21 and  does  not               fall foul of that article.               But  the  question  then  immediately   arises               whether  the Central Government  has  complied               with this procedure in impounding the passport               of  the  Petitioner.  Now, it is  obvious  and               indeed this could not be controverted that the               Central  Government not only did not  give  an               opporgive  an  opportunity of hearing  to  the               petitioner after making the impugned order im-               pounding  her  passport but even  declined  to               furnish  to  the petitioner  the  reasons  for               impounding  her passport despite request  made               by her.  We have already pointed out that  the               Central  Government was wholly unjustified  in               withholding  the  reasons for  impounding  the               passport from the petitioner and this was  not               only in breach of the statutory provision, but               it  also amounted to denial of opportunity  of               hearing   to   the  petitioner.    The   order               impounding the passport of the petitioner was,               therefore, clearly in violation of the rule of               natural  justice  embodied in the  maxim  audi               alteram  partem and it was not  in  conformity               with the procedure prescribed by the Passports               Act,  1967.  Realising that this was  a  fatal               defect  which would void the order  impounding               the passport, the learned Attomey-General made               a  statement  on behalf of the  Government  of               India to the following effect :               "1. The Government is agreeable to considering               any  representation  that may be made  by  the               petitioner in respect of the impounding of her               passport and giving her an opportunity in  the               matter.  The opportunity will be, given within               two    weeks   of   the   receipt    of    the               representation.   It is clarified that in  the               present  case the grounds for  impounding  the               passport are those mentioned in the  affidavit               in reply dated 18th August, 1977 of Shri Ghosh               except those mentioned in para 2 (xi).               2.The  representation  of  the  petitioner               will be dealt with expeditiously in accordance               with law. This  statement removes the voice from the order  impounding the passport and it can no longer be assailed on the  ground that it does not comply with the audi alteram partem rule or is.  not  in  accord with the procedure  prescribed  by  the Passports Act, 1967. Is Section 10(3) (c) violative of Article 14 ? That takes us to the next question whether section 10(3) (c) is  violative  of any of the fundamental  rights  guaranteed under  Part III of the Constitution.  Only two  articles  of the  Constitution are relied upon for this purpose and  they are  Articles  14  and 19 (1) (a) and (g).   We  will  first dispose of the challenge based on Article 14 as it lies in a very  narrow  compass.   The argument tinder  this  head  of challenge, was that 684 section  10(3) (c) confers unguided and unfettered power  on the Passport Authority to impound a passport and hence it is

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violative  of the equality clause contained in  Article  14. It  was conceded that under section 10 (3) (c) the power  to impound a passport can be exercised only upon one or more of the,  stated grounds, but the complaint was that the  ground of  "interests  of the general public". was  too  vague  and indefinite  to  afford  any real guidance  to  the  Passport Authority  and the Passport Authority could, without in  any way violating the terms of the section, impound the passport of one and not of another, at its discretion.  Moreover,  it was  said that when the order impounding a passport is  made by  the Central Government, there is no appeal  or  revision provided  by  the Statute and the decision  of  the  Central Government  that  it  is in public  interest  to  impound  a passport is final and conclusive.  The discretion vested  in the  Passport  Authority, and particularly  in  the  Central Government, is thus unfettered and unrestricted and this  is plainly  in violation of Article 14.  Now, the law  is  well settled that when a statute vests unguided and  unrestricted power  in  an  authority to affect the rights  of  a  person without  laying  down any policy or principle  which  is  to guide  the authority in exercise of this power, it would  be affected by the vice of discrimination since it would  leave it open to the Authority to discriminate between persons and things similarly situated.  But here it is difficult to  say that  the discretion conferred on the Passport Authority  is arbitrary or unfettered.  There are four grounds set out  in section 10(3) (c) which would justify the making of an order impounding a passport.  We are concerned only with the  last ground denoted by the words "in the interests of the general public",  for that is the ground which is attacked as  vague and indefinite.  We fail to see how this ground can, by  any stretch of argument, be characterised as vague or undefined. The  words "in the interests of the general public"  have  a clearly well defined meaning and the courts have often  been called upon to decide whether a particular action is "in the interests of the general public" or in "public interest" and no difficulty has been experienced by the Courts in carrying out  this  exercise.   These  words  are  in  fact  borrowed ipsissima verba from Article 19(5) and we think it would  be nothing short of heresy to accuse the constitution makers of vague  and  loose  thinking.  The  legislature  performed  a scissor  and paste operation in lifting these words  out  of Article 19(5) and introducing them in section 10(3) (c)  and if  these  words  are not vague and  indefinite  in  Article 19(5),  it is difficult to see bow they can be condemned  to be  such  when  they occur in section 10(3)  (c).   How  can section  10(3)  (c)  be said  to  incur  any  constitutional infirmity  on account of these words when they are no  wider than  the  constitutional  provision in  Article  19(5)  and adhere  loyally  to  the  verbal  formula  adopted  In   the Constitution  ? We are clearly of the view  that  sufficient guidelines  are provided by the, words "in the interests  of the general public" and the power conferred on the  Passport Authority  to  impound  a  passport cannot  be  said  to  be unguided  or  unfettered.  Moreover, it must  be  remembered that the exercise of this power is not made dependent on the subjective opinion of the Passport Authority as regards  the necessity  of  exercising it on one or more of  the  grounds stated  in  the  section,  but  the  Passport  Authority  is required to record in writing a brief statement of reasons for impounding the passport and, save in cer- 685 tain  exceptional  circumstances, to supply a copy  of  such statement  to  the  person  affected,  so  that  the  person concerned  can  challenge  the  decision  of  the   Passport

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Authority in appeal and the appellate authority can  examine whether  the  reasons given by the  Passport  Authority  are correct,  and if so, whether they justify the making of  the order  impounding  the passport.  It is true that  when  the order   impounding  a  passport  is  made  by  the   Central Government,  there is no appeal against it, but it  must  be remembered that in such a case the power is exercised by the Central Government itself and it can safely be assumed  that the  Central  Government  will  exercise  the  power  in   a reasonable and responsible manner.  When power is vested  in a high authority like the Central Government, abuse of power cannot  be lightly assumed.  And in any event, if  there  is abuse  of  power, the arms of the court are long  enough  to reach it and to strike it down.  The power conferred on  the Passport Authority to impound a passport under section 10(3) (c) cannot, therefore, be regarded as discriminatory and  it does not fall foul of Article 14. But every exercise of such power  has to be tested in order to determine whether it  is arbitrary or within the guidelines provided in Section 10(3) (c). Conflicting  approaches for locating the  fundamental  right violated Direct and Inevitable effect test. We  think it would be proper at this stage to  consider  the approach  to  be  adopted  by the  Court  in  adjudging  the constitutionality   of  a  statute  on  the  touchstone   of fundamental  rights.   What is the test or yardstick  to  be applied  for  determining  whether  a  statute  infringes  a particular  fundamental  right ? The law on this  point  has undergone  radical change since the days of A. K.  Gopalan’s case.  That was the earliest’ decision of this Court on  the subject, following almost immediately upon the  commencement of   the  Constitution.   The  argument  which   arose   for consideration in this case was that the preventive detention order  results in the detention of the applicant in  a  cell and  hence it contravenes the fundamental rights  guaranteed under  clauses  (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g)  of  Article 19(1).   This  argument was negatived by Kania, C.  J.,  who pointed  out that : "The true approach is only  to  consider the  directness of the legislation and not what will be  the result of the detention, otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenu’s life-Any other construction put on the article-will be  unreasonable".   These  observations  were  quoted  with approval  by Patanjali Sastri, J; speaking on behalf of  the majority in Ram Singh and Ors. v. State of Delhi(1).  There, the detention of the petitioner was ordered with a view,  to preventing him from making. any speeches prejudicial to  the maintenance  of public order and the argument was  that  the order of detention was invalid as it infringed the right  of free  speech and expression guaranteed under  Article  19(1) (a).  The Court took the view that the direct object of  the order  was preventive detention and not-the infringement  of the  right  of freedom of speech and expression,  which  was merely  consequential upon the detention of the  detenu  and upheld  the  validity of the order.  The decision in  A.  K. Gopalan’s  case, followed by Ram Singh’s case, gave rise  to the  theory  that  the  object  and  form  of  State  action determine the extent of protection which may be claimed (1)  [1951]S.C.R.451. 686 by  an individual and the validity of such action has to  be judged by considering whether it is "directly in respect  of the  subject  covered  by  any  particular  article  of  the Constitution or touches the said article only  incidentially or indirectly".  The test to be applied for determining  the constitutional  validity of State action with  reference  to

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fundamental rights is : what is the object of the  authority in  taking  the action : what is the subject-matter  of  the action and to which fundamental right does it relate ?  This theory  that  "the extent of protection  of  important  gua- rantees,  such  as  the  liberty  of  person  and  right  to property,  depend  upon  the form and object  of  the  State action   and  not  upon  its  direct  operation   upon   the individual’s freedom" held away for a considerable time  and was  applied in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State  of Maharashtra  & Anr.(1) to sustain an order made by the  High Court  in a suit for defamation prohibiting the  publication of  the evidence of a witness.  This Court, after  referring to  the observation of Kania, C.J., in A. K. Gopalan’s  case and noting that they were approved by the Fill Court in  Ram Singh’s  case, pointed out that the object of  the  impugned order  was  to give protection to the witness  in  order  to obtain  true evidence in the case with a view to do  justice between  the  parties  and it incidentally  it  operated  to prevent the petitioner from reporting the proceedings of the court  in  the  press, it could not be  said  to  contravene Article 19(1) (a). But it is interesting to note that despite the  observations of Kania, C.J., in A. K. Gopalan’s case and the approval  of these  observations  in  Ram Singh’s case,  there  were  two decisions  given  by this Court prior  to  Mirajkar’s  case, which, seemed to deviate and strike, a different note.   The first  was  the decision in Express News Papers (P)  Ltd.  & Anr.  V. The Union of India & Ors.(2) where N. H.  Bhagwati, J.,  speaking  on  behalf  of the  Court,  referred  to  the observations of Kania, C.J., in A. K. Gopalan’s case and the decision in Rain Singh’s case, but ultimately formulated the test of direct and inevitable effect for the purpose of  ad- judging  whether a statute offends a particular  fundamental right.   The  learned  Judge  pointed  out  that  all   the consequences  suggested  on behalf of  the  petitioner’s  as flowing  out  of  the  Working  Journalists  (Conditions  of Service) and Miscellaneous Act, 1955, namely, "the  tendency to  curtail  circulation  and thereby narrow  the  scope  of dissemination  of information, fetters on  the  petitioners’ freedom  to  choose  the  means  of  exercising  the  right, likelihood of the independence of the press being undermined by having to seek government aid, the imposition of  penalty on  the  petitioners’ right to choose  the  instruments  for exercising   the   freedom  or  compelling  them   to   seek alternative  media  etc.", would be remote and  depend  upon various  factors  which  may  or may  not  come  into  play. "Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences  of the measures enacted in the impugned Act", said the  learned Judge,  "it  would  not  be  possible  to  strike  down  the legislation as having that effect and operation.  A possible eventuality  of  this  type would  not  necessarily  he  the consequence  which  could  be in the  contemplation  of  the Legislature  while enacting a measure of this type  for  the benefit of the (1)  [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744. (2)  [1959] S.C.R. 12. 687 workmen  concerned." Then again, the learned Judge  observed the  intention or the proximate effect and operation of  the Act  was such as to bring it within the mischief of  Article 19(1)  (a), it would certainly be liable to be struck  down. The real difficulty, however, in the way of the  petitioners is that neither the intention nor the effect and  ,operation of the impugned Act is to take away or abridge the right  of freedom   of   speech   and  expression   enjoyed   by   the

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petitioners".   Here  we find the gern of  the  doctrine  of direct  and  inevitable effect, which  necessarily  must  be effect intended by the legislature, or in other words, ’what may  conveniently  and  appropriately be  described  as  the doctrine of    intended  and real effect.  So also in  Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v.     The  Union of  India(1)  while considering the constitutional validity  of  the   Newspaper (Price  and Page) Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper  (Price  and Page) Order, 1960, this Court applied the test of direct and immediate effect.  This Court, relying upon the decision  in Dwarkadas  Shrinivas v. The Sholapur & Weaving  Co.  Ltd.(2) pointed  out  that "it is the substance  and  the  practical result  of  the act of the State that should  be  considered rather  than its purely legal aspect" and "the  correct  ap- proach  in_such  cases should be to enquire as  to  what  in substance  is the loss or injury caused to the  citizen  and not  merely what manner and method has been adopted  by  the State  in  placing the restriction." Since "the  direct  and immediate  effect  of  the order" would  be  to  restrain  a newspaper  from publishing any number of pages for  carrying its  news and views, which it has a fundamental right  under Article 19 (1) (a) to do, unless it raises the selling price as  provided  in the Schedule to the Order, it was  held  by this Court that the order was violative of the right of  the newspapers guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a).  Here again, the emphasis  was  on the direct and inevitable effect  ,of  the impugned  action of the State rather than on its object  and form or subject-matter. However,  it was only R. C. Cooper’s case that the  doctrine that  the  ,object  and  form  of  the  State  action  alone determine the extent of protection that may be claimed by an individual  and that the effect of the State action  on  the fundamental  right  of  the individual  is  irrelevant,  was finally rejected.  It may be pointed out that this  doctrine is  in sub-stance and reality nothing else than the test  of pith  and  substance which is applied  for  determining  the constitutionality of legislation where there is conflict  of legislative  powers  conferred on Federal and  State  Legis- latures  with reference to legislative Lists.  The  question which  is  asked  in such cases is : what is  the  pith  and substance of the legislations; if it "is within the  express powers,  then  it  is not  invalidated  if  incidentally  it effects  matters  which are outside the  authorised  field". Here  also,  ,on  the  application  of  this  doctrine,  the question that is required to be considered is : what is  the pith and substance of the action of the State, ,or in  other words,  what is its true nature and character; if it  is  in respect of the subject covered by any particular fundamental right, its validity must be judged only by reference to that fundamental right and it is immaterial that it  incidentally affects another fundamental right. (1)  [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842. (2)  [1954] S.C.R.674. 688 Mathew, J., in his dissenting judgment in Bennett Coleman  & Co.  &  Ors.  v. Union of India  &  Ors.(1)  recognised  the likeness of this doctrine to the pith and substance test and pointed out that "the pith and substance test, although  not strictly  appropriate,  might  serve a  useful  purpose"  in determining whether the State action infringes a  particular fundamental right.  But in R. C. Cooper’s case, which was  a decision  given  by  the Full  Court  consisting  of  eleven judges,  this  doctrine  was thrown  overboard  and  it  was pointed out by Shah, J.,, speaking on half of the majority :               "-it is not the object of the authority making

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             the law impairing the right of a citizen,  nor               the   form  of  action  that  determines   the               protection  he can claim; it is the effect  of               the law and of the action upon the right which               attract the jurisdiction of the Court to grant               relief.   If  this be the true  view,  and  we               think  it  is, in determining  the  impact  of               State  action upon  constitutional  guarantees               which  are  fundamental, it follows  that  the               extent  of protection against impairment of  a               fundamental  right  is determined not  by  the               object  of the Legislature nor by the form  of               the action , but by its direct operation  upon               the individual’s rights.               " we are of the view that the theory that  the               object and form of the State action  determine               the  extent of protection which the  aggrieved               party  may  claim is not consistent  with  the               constitutional scheme-"               "In  our  judgment, the assumption  in  A.  K.               Gopalan’s  case; that certain articles in  the               Constitution  exclusively deal  with  specific               matters  and in determining whether  there  is               infringement  of the  individual’s  guaranteed               rights,  the object and the form of the  State               action alone need be considered, and effect of               the laws on fundamental rights of the  indivi-               duals  in  general will be ignored  cannot  be               accepted as correct." The decision in R. C. Cooper’s case thus overturned the view taken  in A. K. Gopalan’s case and, as pointed out  by  Ray, J., speaking on behalf of the majority in, Bennett Coleman’s case,it laid down two interrelated propositions, namely,               "First, it is not the object of the  authority               making  the  law impairing the  right  of  the               citizen nor the form of action that determines               the  invasion of the right.  Secondly,, it  is               the effect of the law and the action upon  the               right  which attracts the jurisdiction of  the               Court  to grant relief.  The direct  operation               of  the  Act upon the rights  forms  the  real               test." The decision in Bennett Coleman’s case, followed upon R.  C. Cooper’s  case  and  it is’  an  important  and  significant decision,  since it elaborated and applied the  thesis  laid down  in  R. C. Cooper’s case.  The State action  which  was impugned in Bennett Coleman’s case was newsprint (1)  [1973] 2S.C.R.757. 689 policy which inter alia imposed a maximum limit of ten pages for every newspaper but without permitting the newspaper  to increase the number of pages by reducing circulation to meet its  requirement  even within the admissible  quota.   These restrictions were, said to be violative of the right of free speech  and  expression guaranteed under Article  19(1)  (a) since their direct and inevitable consequence was to,  limit the number of pages which could be published by a  newspaper to ten.  The argument of the Government was that the, object of   the  newsprint  policy  was  rationing  and   equitable distribution   of  imported  newsprint  which   was   scarce commodity  and  not  abridgement of freedom  of  speech  and expression.   The  subject-matter of the import  policy  was "rationing of imported commodity and equitable  distribution of newsprint"  and the newsprint policy did not directly and immediately  deal with the right mentioned in Article  19(1)

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(a) and hence there was no violation of that Article.   This argument of the Government was negatived by the majority  in the following words :               "Mr.   Palkhivala said that the tests of  pith               and  substance  of the subject matter  and  of               direct   and  of  incidental  effect  of   the               legislation  are  relevant  to  questions   of               legislative competence but they are irrelevant               to the question of infringement of fundamental               rights.   In  our  view this is  a  sound  and               correct   approach   to   interpretation    of               legislative  measures  and  State  action   in               relation to fundamental rights.  The true test               is  whether the effect of the impugned  action               is to take away or abridge fundamental rights.               If it be assumed that the direct object of the               law or action has to be direct abridgement  of               the  right of free speech by the impugned  law               or   action  it  is  to  be  related  to   the               directness of effect and not to the directness               of the, subject matter of the impeached law or               action.   The action may have a direct  effect               on  a  fundamental right although  its  direct               subject  matter  may  be  different.   A   law               dealing directly with the Defence of India  or               defamation may yet have a direct effect on the               freedom  of speech.  Article 19(2)  could  not               have   such   law  if   the   restriction   is               unreasonable even if it is related to  matters               mentioned   therein.   Therefore,   the   word               "direct" would go to the quality or  character               of the effect and not to the subject  matter.               The  object of the law or executive action  is               irrelevant    when    it    establishes    the               petitioner’s  contention’  about   fundamental               right.  In the present case, the object of the               newspaper restrictions has nothing to do  with               the  availability  of  newsprint  or   foreign               exchange because these restrictions come  into               operation after the grant of quota.  Therefore                             the restrictions are to control the number  of               pages or circulation of dailies or newspapers.               These  restrictions  are clearly  outside  the               ambit  of Article 19(2) of  the  Constitution.               It,  therefore,  confirms that  the  right  of               freedom  of speech and expression is  abridged               by these restrictions". The majority took the view that it was not the object of the newsprint   policy   or  its  subject   matter   which   was determinative but its direct consequence or effect upon  the rights of the newspapers and since "the effect 690 and consequence of the impugned policy upon the  newspapers" was direct control and restriction of growth and circulation of  newspapers,  the newsprint policy infringed  freedom  of speech  and  expression and was hence violative  of  Article 19(1) (a).  The pith and substance theory was thus negatived in the clearest terms and the test applied was as to what is the  direct  and  inevitable consequence or  effect  of  the impugned  State  action  on the  fundamental  right  of  the petitioner.   It is possible that in a given case  the  pith and substance of the State action may deal with a particular fundamental  right but its direct and inevitable effect  may be on another fundamental right and in that case, the  State action  would  have  to meet the  challenge  of  the  latter

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fundamental  right.  The pith and substance  doctrine  looks only  at the object and subject-matter of the State  action, but  in  testing  the  validity of  the  State  action  with reference  to  fundamental  rights,  what  the  Court   must consider  is  the direct and inevitable consequence  of  the State action.  Otherwise, the protection of the  fundamental rights would be subtly but surely eroded. It  may  be  recalled  that the test  formulated  in  R.  C. Cooper’s case merely refers to ’direct operation’ or ’direct consequence   and  effect’  of  the  State  action  on   the fundamental  right  of the petitioner and does not  use  the word  ’inevitable’ in this connection.  But there can be  no doubt,  on a reading of the relevant observations  of  Shah, J.,  that such was the test really intended to be laid  down by  the  Court  in that case.  If the test  were  merely  of direct  or indirect effect, it would be a openended  concept and  in  the  absence of operational  criteria  for  judging ’directness’,  it  would give the  Court  an  unquantifiable discretion  to decide whether in a given case a  consequence or  effect  is direct or not.   Some  other  concept-vehicle would  be  needed to quantify the extent  of  directness  or indirectness  in order to apply the test.  And that is  sup- plied by the criterion of ’inevitable’ consequence or effect adumbrated in the Express Newspaper’s case.  This  criterion helps  to  quantify the extent of  directness  necessary  to constitute infringement of a fundamental right is direct and inevitable, then a fortiori it must be presumed to have been intended  by the authority taking the action and hence  this doctrine of direct and inevitable effect has been  described by some jurists as the doctrine of intended and real effect. This  is the test which must be applied for the  purpose  of determining whether section 10(3) (c) or the impugned  order made under it is violative of Art. 19(1) (a) or (g). Is Section 10(3) (c) violative of Article 19 (1) (a) or  (g) ? We may now examine the challenge based on Article 19(1)  (a) in  the  light  of  this  background.   Article  19(1)   (a) enshrines one of the most cherished freedoms in a democracy, namely,  freedom of speech and expression.  The  petitioner, being a citizen, has undoubtedly this freedom guaranteed  to her,  but the question is whether section 10(3) (c)  or  the impugned  Order  unconstitutionally takes away  or  abridges this freedom.  Now, prima facie, the right, which is  sought to-be  restricted  by  section 10(3) (c)  and  the  impugned Order, is the right to go abroad and that is not named as  a fundamental  right or included in so many words  in  Article 19(1)  (a), but the argument of the petitioner was that  the right to go abroad is an integral part of the freedom of 691 speech  and expression and whenever State action, be it  law or executive fiat, restricts or interferes with the right to go abroad, it necessarily involves curtailment of freedom of speech  and expression, and is, therefore required  to  meet the  challenge  of Article 19 (1) (a).   This  argument  was sought  to be answered by the Union of India by  a  two-fold contention.   The first limb of the contention was that  the right to go abroad could not possibly be comprehended within freedom of speech and expression, because the right of  free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) was exercisable  only  within  the territory of  India  and  the guarantee  of  its  exercise did  not  extend  outside  the, country  and  hence State action restricting  or  preventing exercise  of the right to go abroad could not be said to  be violative of freedom of speech and expression and be  liable to be condemned as invalid on that account.  The second limb

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of  the contention went a little further and challenged  the very  premise  on which the argument of the  petitioner  was based and under this limb, the argument put forward was that the right to go abroad was not integrally connected with the freedom of speech and expression, nor did it partake of  the same  basic  nature  and  character and  hence  it  was  not included  in  the  tight  of  free  speech  and   expression guaranteed  under  Article  19(1)  (a’)  and  imposition  of restriction on it did not involve violation of that Article. These were broadly the rival contentions urged on behalf  of the parties and we shall now proceed to consider them. (A)  Is  Freedom  of speech and expression confined  to  the Territory of India ? The  first question that arises for consideration  on  these contentions  is  as to what is the scope and  ambit  of  the right of free speech and expression conferred under  Article 19(1)  (a).   Has it any geographical limitations ?  Is  its exercise  guaranteed only within the territory of  India  or does  it also extend outside ? The Union of India  contended that  it was a basic postulate of the Constitution that  the fundamental  rights  guaranteed by it  were  available  only within the territory of India, for it could never have  been the  intention of the constitution-makers to  confer  rights which  the  authority of the State could not  enforce.   The argument  was stressed in the form of an interrogation;  how could  the  fundamental rights be intended to  be  operative outside  the  territory  of India  when  their  exercise  in foreign territory could not be protected by the State ? Were the fundamental rights intended to be mere platitudes. in so far  as territory outside India is concerned ? What was  the object  of  conferring the guarantee of  fundamental  rights outside  the territory of India, if it could not be  carried out  by- the State ? This argument, plausible though it  may seem  at  first blush, is, on closer scrutiny,  unsound  and must be rejected.  When the constitution-makers enacted Part III  dealing with fundamental rights, they inscribed in  the Constitution  certain  basic rights which  inhere  in  every human  being  and  which are essential  for  unfoldment  and development of his full personality.  These rights represent the   basic   values  of  a  civilised   society   and   the constitution-makers  declared  that they shall  be  given  a place  of  pride  in the Constitution and  elevated  to  the status of fundamental rights. 692 The  long  years  of the freedom struggle  inspired  by  the dynamic  spiritualism  of  Mahatma Gandhi and  in  fact  the entire  cultural and spiritual history of India formed,  the background  against  which  these rights  were  enacted  and consequently, these rights were, conceived by the  constitu- tion-makers  not  in  a narrow limited sense  but  in  their widest  sweep, for the aim and objective was to build a  new social  order where man will not be a mere plaything in  the hands  of  the State or a few privileged persons  but  there will  be full scope and opportunity for him to  achieve  the maximum  development of his personality and the  dignity  of the  individual  will be fully assured.   The  constitution- makers  recognised the spiritual dimension of man  and  they were  conscious that he is an embodiment of  divinity,  what the  great Upnishadnic verse describes as "the  children  of immortality"  and  his  mission in life is  to  realise  the ultimate truth.  This obviously he cannot achieve unless  he has  certain  basic freedoms, such as  freedom  of  thought, freedom  of  conscience, freedom of speech  and  expression, personal  liberty  to move where he likes and so on  and  so forth.   It was this vast conception of man in  society  and

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universe that animated the formulation of fundamental rights and it is difficult to believe that when the  constitution- makers, declared these rights, they intended to confine them only  within  the  territory of India.   Take  for  example, freedom  of  speech  and expression.   Could  it  have  been intended  by the constitution-makers that a  citizen  should hive  this  freedom in India but not outside  ?  Freedom  of speech  and expression carries with it the right  to  gather information  as also, to speak and express oneself  at  home and  abroad and to, exchange thoughts and ideas with  others not  only in India but also outside.  On what  principle  of construction  and  for  what  reason  can  this  freedom  be confined  geographically  within the limits of India  ?  The constitution-makers  have not chosen to limit the extent  of this freedom by adding the words "in the territory of India" at  the  end of Article 19(1) (a).  They  have  deliberately refrained from using any words of limitation.  Then, are  we going  to supply these words and narrow down the  scope  and ambit  of a highly cherished fundamental right ? Let us  not forget  that  what we are expounding is a  constitution  and what  we  are  called  upon  to  interpret  is  a  provision conferring a, fundamental right.  Shall we expand its  reach and ambit or curtail it ? Shall we ignore the high and noble purpose of Part III conferring fundamental rights ? Would we not be stultifying the fundamental right of free speech  and expression  by  restricting it  by  territorial  limitation. Moreover, it may be noted that only a short while before the Constitution   was  brought  into  force  and   whilst   the constitutional  debate  was still going  on,  the  Universal Declaration  of  Human  Rights was adopted  by  the  General Assembly  of the United Nations on 10th December, 1948 and most  of  the fundamental rights which we find  included  in Part  III were recognised and adopted by the United  Nations as   the  inalienable  rights  of  man  in   the   Universal Declaration  of Human Rights.  Article 19 of  the  Universal Declaration declared that "every one, has a right to freedom of  opinion and expression, this right includes  freedom  to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive  and import   information  and  ideas  through  any   media   and regardless of frontiers". (emphasis supplied).  This was the glorious  declaration of the: fundamental freedom of  speech and  expression noble in conception and universal in  scope- which was 693 before them when the constitution-makers enacted Article  19 (1)  (a).   We  have, therefore, no doubt  that  freedom  of speech  and  expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)  (a)  is exercisable not only in India but outside. It  is  true that the right of free  speech  and  expression enshrined  in Article 19 (1) (a) can be enforced only if  it sought  to be violated by any action of the State and  since State  action cannot have any extra  territorial  operation, except   perhaps  incidentally  in  case  of   Parliamentary legislation,  it is only violation within the  territory  of India that can be complained of by an aggrieved person.  But that  does  not  mean  that the right  of  free  speech  and expression  is  exercisable only in India and  not  outside. State action taken within the territory of India can prevent or  restrict  exercise of freedom of speech  and  expression outside  India.  What Article 19(1) (a) does is  to  declare freedom of speech and expression as a fundamental right  and to protect it against State action.  The State cannot by any legislative or executive, action interfere with the exercise of this right, except in so far as permissible under Article 19(2).  The State action would necessarily be taken in India

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but  it  may impair or restrict the exercise of  this  right elsewhere.   Take for example a case where a  journalist  is prevented  by a law or an executive order from  sending  his despatch  abroad.   The law or the  ,executive  order  would operate  on  the,  journalist in India  but  what  it  would prevent him from doing is to exercise his freedom of  speech and  expression  abroad.   Today in the  modern  world  with vastly developed science and technology and highly  improved and  sophisticated means of communication, a person  may  be able to exercise freedom of speech and expression abroad  by doing something within the country and if this is  published or  restricted, his freedom of speech and  expression  would certainly  be  impaired  and Article 19  (1)  (a)  violated. Therefore, merely because State action is restricted to  the territory of India, it does not necessarily follow that  the right  of free speech and expression is also limited in  its operation  to  the territory of India and  does  not  extend outside. This  thesis  can also be substantiated by  looking  at  the question  from  a slightly different point of view.   It  is obvious  that  the  right  of  free  speech  and  expression guaranteed  under  Article  19(1) (a) can  be  subjected  to restriction permissible under Article 19(2).  Such  restric- tion,  imposed  by a statute or an order made under  it,  if within  the limits provided in Article 19(2), would  clearly bind the citizen not only when he is within the country  but also  when  he  travels outside.  Take for  example  a  case where,  either  under  the  Passports Act,  1967  ,or  as  a condition  in  the Passport issued under it,  an  arbitrary, unreasonable and wholly unjustifiable restriction is  placed upon  the citizen that he may go abroad, but he  should  not make any speech there.  This would plainly be a  restriction which  would  interfere  with  his  freedom  of  speech  and expression outside the country, for, if valid, it would bind him  wherever he may go.  He would be entitled to  say  that such a restriction imposed by State action is  impermissible under  Article  19(2)  and  is  accordingly  void  as  being violative of Article 19(1 )(a) 6-119 SCI/78 694 It  would  thus  seem  clear  that  freedom  of  speech  and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) is exercisable not only inside the country, but also outside. There is also another consideration which leads to the  same conclusion.   The right to go abroad is, as held in  Satwant Singh  Sawhney’s case, included in personal liberty’  within the  meaning of Article 21 and is thus a  fundamental  right protected by that Article.  When the State issues a passport and  grants  endorsement for one country,  but  refuses  for another, the person concerned can certainly go out of  India but he is prevented from going to the country for which  the endorsement  is refused and his right to go to that  country is  taken  away.   This cannot be done by  the  State  under Article 21 unless there is a law authorising the State to do so and the action is taken in accordance with the  procedure prescribed  by  such law.  The right to, go abroad,  and  in particular  to  a  specified country, is  clearly  right  to personal  liberty exercisable outs de India and yet  it  has been   held  in  Satwant  Singh  Sawhney’s  case  to  be   a fundamental  right  protected by Article  21.  This  clearly shows   that  there  is  no  underlying  principle  in   the Constitution  which limits the fundamental rights  in  their operation to the territory of India.  If a fundamental right under  Article 21 can be exercisable outside India, why  can freedom  of  speech and expression conferred  under  Article

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19(1) (a) be not so exercisable ? This  view which we are taking is completely in accord  with the thinking on the subject in the United States.  There the preponderance of opinion is that the, protection of the Bill of  Rights  is available to United States citizens  even  in foreign countries.  Vide Best v. United States(1).   There is  an interesting article on "The Constitutional  Right  to Travel" in 1956 Columbia Law Review where Leonard B.  Boudin writes :               "The  final objection to limitation  upon  the               right  to travel in that they  interfere  with               the,   individual’s  freedom  of   expression.               Travel itself is such a freedom in the view of               one scholarly jurist.  But we need not go that               far;  it is enoughthat the freedom  of  speech               includes the right of Americans to exercise it               anywhere  without  the interference  of  their               government.    There   are   no   geographical               limitations   to  the  Bill  of   Rights.    A               Government  that  sets  up  barriers  to   its               citizens’ freedom of expression in any country               in the world violates the Constitution as much               as  if  it  enjoined such  expression  in  the               United States." These  observations were quoted with approval by Hegde,  J., (as  he then was) speaking on behalf of a Division Bench  of the  Karnataka  High Court in Dr. S.  S.  Sadashiva  Rao  v. Union  of India(2) and the learned Judge there  pointed  out that  "these  observations  apply  in  equal  force  to  the conditions  prevailing  in  this country".  it  is  obvious, therefore,  that  there are no geographical  limitations  to freedom  of speech and expression guaranteed  Under  Article 19(1) (a) and this freedom is exercisable not only in  India but also outside and if State (1)  184 Federal Reporter (2d)131. (2)  1965 Mysore Law Journal, P.605. 695 action  sets  up  barriers  to  its  citizen’s  freedom   of expression  in  any country in the world, it  would  violate Article  19(1)  (a)  as  much  as  if  ,it  inhibited   such expression  within the country.  This conclusion would on  a parity  of  reasoning  apply  equally  in  relation  to  the fundamental right to practice any profession or to carry any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g). (B)  Is the right to go abroad covered by Article 19 (1) (a) or (g) ? That  takes  us  to the next question arising  out  of   the second  limb  of the contention of the Government.   Is  the right  to go abroad an essential part of freedom  of  speech and  expression so that whenever there is violation  of  the former,   there  is  impairment  of  the  latter   involving infraction  of  Article  19 (1) (a)?  The  argument  of  the petitioner  was that while it is true that the right  to  go abroad  is not expressly included as a fundamental right  in any  of  the  clauses of Article  19(1),  its  existence  is necessary in order to make the express freedoms mentioned in Article  19(1) meaningful and effective.  The right of  free speech  and expression can have meaningful content  and  its exercise can be effective only if the right to travel abroad is ensured and without it, freedom of speech and  expression would   be   limited  by  geographical   constraints.    The impounding  of  the  passport of a person  with  a  view  to preventing him from going abroad to communicate his ideas or share  his  thoughts  and views with others  or  to  express

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himself  through song or dance or other forms and  media  of expression is direct interference with freedom of speech and expression.   It  is clear, so ran the argument, that  in  a complex   and  developing  society,  where  fast  modes   of transport and communication have narrowed down distances and brought  people  living  in different  parts  of  the  world together, the right to associate with like minded persons in other  parts  of  the globe, for the  purpose  of  advancing social,   political   or  other  ideas   and   policies   is indispensable  and  that is part of freedom  of  speech  and expression  which cannot be effectively implemented  without the  right  to go abroad.  The right to go  abroad,  it  was said,  is  a peripheral right emanating from  the  right  to freedom of speech and expression and is, therefore,  covered by  Article 19(1) (a).  This argument of the petitioner  was sought to be supported by reference to some recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.  We shall examine these  decisions a little later, but let us  first  consider the question on principle. We  may  begin  the discussion of  this  question  by  first considering  the nature and significance of the right to  go abroad.   It  cannot  be disputed that there  must  exist  a basically free sphere for man, resulting from the nature and dignity  of  the human being as the bearer  of  the  highest spiritual and moral values.  This basic freedom of the human being  is  expressed at various levels and is  reflected  in various  basic rights.  Freedom to go abroad is one of  such rights,  for the nature of man is a free  agent  necessarily involves free movement on his part.  There, can be no  doubt that if the purpose and the sense of the State is to protect personality  and its development, as indeed it should be  of any  liberal democratic State, freedom to go abroad must  be given its due place amongst the basic rights.  This right is an important basic 696 human   right  for  it  nourishes  independent   and   self- determining  creative character of the individual, not  only by  extending his freedoms of action, but also by  extending the  scope  of his experience.  It is a  right  which  gives intellectual and creative workers in particular the opportu- nity  of extending their spiritual and intellectual  horizon through study at foreign universities, through contact  with foreign colleagues and through participation in  discussions and  conferences.  The right also extends to private life  : marriage, family and friendship are humanities which can  be rarely affected through refusal of freedom to go abroad  and clearly  show  that this freedom is a genuine  human  right. Moreover, this freedom would be highly valuable right  where man  finds himself obliged to flee (a) because he is  unable to  serve  his  God as he wished at the  previous  place  of residence,  (b) because his personal freedom  is  threatened for  reasons  which do not constitute a crime in  the  usual meaning  of  the word and many were such  cases  during  the emergency, or (c) because his life is threatened either  for religious or political reasons or through the threat to  the maintenance  of minimum standard of living  compatible  with human  dignity.  These, reasons suggest that freedom  to  go abroad  incorporates  the important function of  an  ultimum refunium  libertatis when other basic freedoms are  refused. To,  quote  the  words of Mr. Justice  Douglas  in  Kent  v. Dulles(1)  freedom  to go abroad has much social  value  and represents a basic human right of great significance.  It is in  fact  incorporated  as an  inalienable  human  right  in Article  13  of the Universal Declaration of  Human  Rights. But  it is not specifically named as a fundamental right  in

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Article 19(1).  Does it mean that on that account it  cannot be a fundamental right covered by Article 19(1) ? Now, it may be pointed out at the outset that it is not  our view  that  a right which is not specifically  mentioned  by name can never be a fundamental right within the meaning  of Article  19(1).  It is possible that a right does  not  find express  mention in any clause of Article 19(1) and  yet  it may  be  covered by some clause of that Article.   Take  for example, by way of illustration, freedom of press.  It is  a most  cherished and valued freedom in a democracy  :  indeed democracy cannot survive without a free press.  Democracy is based  essentially on free debate and open  discussion,  for that  is  the only corrective of Governmental  action  in  a democratic  set  up.  If democracy means government  of  the people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen  must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and  in order  to enable him to intelligently exercise his right  of making  a  choice, free and general  discussion  of  public matters  is absolutely essential.  Manifestly,  free  debate and open discussion, in the most comprehensive sense, is not possible  unless  there  is a free  and  independent  press. Indeed  the  true  measure of the health  and  vigour  of  a democracy  is always to be found in its press.  Look at  its newspapers-do they reflect diversity of opinions and  views, do they contain expression of dissent and criticism  against governmental  policies and actions, or do they  obsequiously sing  the praises of the government or lionize or deify  the ruler.   The newspapers are the index of the true  character of the Government-whether if is democratic or authoritarian. It was (1)  357 U.S. 11 6 : 2 L. ed. 2d 1204. 697 Mr.  Justice Potter Stewart who said : "Without an  informed and  free  press, there cannot be  an  enlightened  people". Thus freedom of the press constitutes one of the pillars  of democracy  and indeed lies at the foundation  of  democratic Organisation  and yet it is not enumerated in so many  terms as  a fundamental right in Article 19(1), though there is  a view  held by some constitutional jurists that this  freedom is too basic and fundamental not to receive express  mention in  Part III of the Constitution.  But it has been  held  by this  Court  in several decisions, of which we  may  mention only   three,  namely,  Express  Newspapers’   case,   Sakal Newspapers  case  and  Bennett Coleman  &  Co’s  case,  that freedom of the press is part of the right of free speech and expression  and  is  covered by Article 19  (1)  (a).   The, reason is that freedom of the press is nothing but an aspect of  freedom  of speech and expression.  It partakes  of  the same  basic nature and character and is indeed  an  integral part of free speech and expression and perhaps it would  not be incorrect to say that it is the same right applicable  in relation  to the press.  So also, freedom of circulation  is necessarily involved in freedom of speech and expression and is  part  of it and hence enjoys the protection  of  Article 19(1)  (a).  Vide  Ramesh Thappar  v.  State  of  Madras(1). Similarly,  the right to paint or sing or dance or to  write poetry  or literature is also covered by Article 19(1)  (a), because  the  common  basic  characteristic  in  all   these activities is freedom of speech and expression, or to put it differently,  each  of these activities is  an  exercise  of freedom  of  speech and expression.  It would thus  be  seen that  even if a right is not specifically named  in  Article 19(1),  it may still be a fundamental right covered by  some clause of that Article, if it is an integral part of a named fundamental  right or partakes of the same basic nature  and

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character as that fundamental right.  It is not enough  that a  right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from  a named  fwidamental right or that its existence is  necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective.  Every activity which  facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended  in  that  fundamental  right  nor  can  it  be regarded  as  such merely because it may  not  be  possible, otherwise  to effectively exercise, that fundamental  right. The contrary construction would lead to incongruous  results and  the  entire  scheme  of  Article  19(1)  which  confers different   rights  and  sanctions  different   restrictions according to different standards depending upon. the nature, of  the right will be upset.  What is necessary to  be  seen is, and that is the test which must be applied, whether  the right  claimed  by the petitioner is an integral part  of  a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and  character as the named fundamental right so  that  the exercise  of such right is in reality and substance  nothing but  an  instance of the exercise of the  named  fundamental right.  If this be the correct test, as we apprehend it  is. the  right  to,  go abroad cannot in  all  circumstances  be regarded  as included in freedom of speech  and  expression. Mr. Justice Douglas said in Kent v. Dulles that "freedom  of movement  across frontiers in either direction,  and  inside frontiers  as  well,  was a part of  our  heritage.   Travel abroad. like travel within the country, ay be necessary  for livelihood.   It  may  be  as close  to  the  heart  of  the individual as the choice of what he eats, (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 594. 698 or  wears,  or reads.  Freedom of movement is basic  in  our Scheme  of  values."  And what the learned  Judge,  said  in regard  to freedom of movement in his country holds good  in our country as well.  Freedom of movement has been a part of our ancient tradition which always upheld the dignity of man and  saw  in him the embodiment of the  Divine.   The  Vedic seers  knew no limitations either in the locomotion  of  the human body or in the flight of the soul to higher planes  of consciousness.  Even in the post-Upnishadic period, followed by the Buddhistic era and the early centuries after  Christ, the people of this country went to foreign lands in  pursuit of  trade and business or in search of knowledge or  with  a view  to shedding on others the light of knowledge  imparted to  them by their ancient sages and seers.   India  expanded outside  her  borders: her ships crossed the ocean  and  the fine  superfluity of her wealth brimmed over to the East  as well  as  to the West.  He cultural  messengers  and  envoys spread  her  arts  and  epics in South  East  Asia  and  her religious  conquered China and Japan and other  Far  Eastern countries  and  spread  westward as  far  as  Palestine  and Alexendria.   Even at the end of the last and the  beginning of  the present century, our people sailed across the seas to  settle  down  in  the  African  countries.   Freedom  of movement  at home and abroad is a part of our heritage  and, as  already  pointed  out, it is a  highly  cherished  right essential  to  the  growth  and  development  of  the  human personality  and its importance cannot be  over  emphasised. But it cannot be said to be part of the right of free speech and  expression.   It is not of the same  basic  nature  and character  as  freedom  of speech and  expression.   When  a person  goes abroad, he may do so for a variety  of  reasons and  it  may not necessarily and always be for  exercise  of freedom  of speech and expression.  Every travel  abroad  is not  an exercise of right of free speech and expression  and

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it  would  not be correct to say that whenever  there  is  a restriction  on  the right to go abroad,  ex  necessitae  it involves violation of freedom of speech and expression.   It is  no  doubt true that going abroad may be necessary  in  a given case for exercise of freedom of speech and expression, but  that does not make it an integral part of the right  of free  speech  and expression.  Every activity  that  may  be necessary  for exercise of freedom of speech and  expression or  that may facilitate such exercise or make it  meaningful and  effective  cannot  be  elevated  to  the  status  of  a fundamental  right  as if it were part  of  the  fundamental right of free speech and expression.  Otherwise, practically every  activity would become part of some fundamental  right or  the other and. the object of making certain rights  only as    fundamental   rights   with   different    permissible restrictions would be frustrated. The  petitioner,  however, placed very  strong  reliance  on certain  decisions of the United States Supreme Court.   The first  was  the  decision in Kent v.  Dulles  (supra).   The Supreme  Court  laid  down in this case that  the  right  to travel  is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and  held  that the denial of passport by the Secretary of State was invalid because the Congress had not, under the Passport Act,  1926, authorised the Secretary of State to refuse passport on  the ground  of association with the communist party and  refusal to  file an affidavit relating to that affiliation and  such legislation was necessary before the Secretary of 699 State could refuse passport on those grounds.  This decision was  not  concerned  with the validity  of  any  legislation regulating issue of passports nor did it recognise the right to  travel as founded on the first Amendment which  protects freedom  of speech, petition and assembly.  We fail  to  see how this decision can be of any, help to the petitioner. The  second decision on which reliance was placed on  behalf of  the  petitioner was Apthekar v. Secretary  of  State(1). The  question Which arose for determination in  this  case related to the constitutional validity ’of section 6 of  the Subversive  Activities  Control  Act,  1950.   This  section prohibited  the use of passports by communists  following  a final  registration  order  by  the  Subversive   Activities Control  Board under section 7 and following the mandate  of this  section,  the State Department  revoked  the  existing passports   of   the  appellants.   After   exhausting   all administrative remedies, the appellants sued for declarative and injunctive relief before the District Court which upheld the validity of the section.  On direct appeal, the  Supreme Court  reversed  the judgment by a majority of  six  against three,  and  held the section to be  invalid.   The  Supreme Court  noted  first that the right to travel  abroad  is  an important aspect of the citizens’ liberty guaranteed by  the Due  Process  Clause of the Fifth Amendment  and  section  6 substantially  restricts  that right and then  proceeded  to apply  the strict standard of judicial review which  it  had till  then  applied  only in cases  involving  the  socalled preferred  freedoms of the first Amendment, namely, that  "a governmental  purpose-may  not be achieved  by  means  which sweep  unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area  of protected freedoms".  The Supreme Court found on application of  this  test  that  the  section  was  "overly  broad  and unconstitutional   on  its  face"  since  it   omitted   any requirement that the individual should have knowledge of the organisational    purpose   to   establish    a    communist totaliatarian dictatorship and it made no attempt to  relate the restriction on travel to the individual’s purpose of the

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trip  or  to  the  scurity-sensitivity of  the  area  to  be visited.   This  decision  again has  no  relevance  to  the present  argument  except for one observation  made  by  the Court  that "freedom of travel is a  constitutional  liberty closely  related to rights of free speech and  association". But  this observation also cannot help because the right  to foreign travel was held to be a right arising not out of the first  Amendment  but  inferentially  out  of  the   liberty guaranteed  in the Fifth Amendment and this observation  was meant  only  to  support the "tension of  the  strict  First Amendment test to a case involving the right to go abroad. The  last  decision cited by the petitioner Was Zemel  .  v. Rusk 2) This case raised the question whether the  Secretary of  State was statutorily authorised to refuse  to  validate the  passports of United States citizens for travel to  Cuba and  if  so,  whether the exercise  of  such  authority  was constitutionally  permissible.  The Court, by a majority  of six  against three, held that the ban on travel to Cuba  was authorised  by the broad language of the Passport Act,  1926 and  that  such  a restriction  was  constitutional.   Chief Justice Warren speaking on behalf of (1)  378 U. S. 500 :12 L. ed. 2d 992. (2)  381 U. S. 1 : 14 L. ed. 2d 179. 700 the  majority observed that having regard to  administrative practice both before and after 1926, area restrictions  were statutorily  authorised and that necessitated  consideration of Zemel’s constitutional objections.  The majority took the view  that freedom of movement was a right protected by  the ’liberty’  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  that  the Secretary  of  State was justified in  attempting  to  avoid serious  international  incidents by restricting  travel  to Cuba  and  summarily rejected Zemel’s  contention  that  the passport  denial  infringed his First  Amendment  rights  by preventing  him  from gathering first band  knowledge  about Cuban  situation.  Kent v. Dulles and Aptheker v.  Secretary of State were distinguished on the, ground that "the refusal to,  validate appellant’s passport does not result from  any expression  or  association on his part : appellant  is  not being forced to choose between membership of an Organisation and  freedom  to travel".  Justices, Douglas,  Goldberg  and Black  dissented in separate opinions.  Since  reliance  was placed  only  on  the opinion of  Justice  Douglas,  we  may confine  our  attention to that  opinion.   Justice  Douglas followed  the  approach  employed in  Kent  v.  Dulles  and, refused to interpret the, Pass.port Act, 1926 as  permitting the  Secretary of State to restrict travel to  Cuba.   While doing so, the learned Judge stressed the relationship of the right to travel to First Amendment rights.  He pointed out : "The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them,  to  observe  social, physical,  political  and  other phenomena  abroad  as  well as at  home  gives  meaning  and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Without  these contacts First Amendment rights suffer",  and added  that freedom to travel abroad is a right  "peripheral to  the  enjoyment of the First Amendment  guarantees".   He concluded  by observing that "the right to travel is at  the periphery   of   the   First   Amendment"   and    therefore "restrictions  on  the  right to travel in  times  of  peace should be so particularised that a First Amendment right  is not  thereby  precluded".   Now,  obviously,  the   majority decision  is  of- no help to the petitioner.   The  majority rightly  pointed out that in Kent v. Dulles and Aptheker  v. Secretary  of  State  there  was  direct  interference  with freedom of association by refusal to validate the  passport,

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since  the appellant was required to give up  membership  of the  Organisation if he wanted validation of  the  passport. Such was not the case in zemel v. Rusk and that is why, said the  majority it was not a First Amendment right  which  was involved.   It  appeared  clearly to be  the  view  of  the, majority  that if the denial of passport directly affects  a First  Amendment  right  such as freedom  of  expression  or association  as in Kent v. Dulles and Aptheker v.  Secretary of  State,  it  would  be  constitutionally  invalid.    The majority  did  not accept the contention that the  right  to travel  for  gathering  information is  in  itself  a  First Amendment  right.  Justice Douglas also did not  regard  the right  to travel abroad as a First Amendment right but  held that  it is peripheral to the enjoyment of  First  Amendment guarantees  because  it gives meaning and substance  to  the First  Amendment rights and without it, these  rights  would suffer.   That  is  why he observed  towards  the  end  that restrictions   on   the  right  to  travel  should   be   so particularised that a First Amendment right is not precluded or in other words there is no direct infringement of a First Amendment  right.   If there is, the restrictions  would  be constitutionally  invalid, but not otherwise.  It  is  clear that Justice Douglas never 701 meant to lay down that a right which is at the periphery  of the  First  right under the First  Amendment.   The  learned Judge, did not hold the right to travel abroad to be a First Amendment  right.   Both according to the majority  as  also Justice Douglas, the question to be asked in each case is  : is  the  restriction  on the right to travel  such  that  it directly interferes with a First Amendment right.  And  that is  the  same  test  which  is  applied  by  this  Court  in determining infringement of a fundamental right. We cannot, therefore, accept the theory that a peripheral or concomitant right which facilitates the exercise of a  named fundamental right or gives it meaning and substance or makes its  exercise  effective,  is  itself  a  guaranteed   right included  within the named fundamental right.  This much  is clear  as  a matter of plain construction,  but  apart  from that, there is a decision of this Court which clearly and in so  many  terms  supports  this  conclusion.   That  is  the decision  in  All  India  Bank  Employees’  Association   v. National Industrial Tribunal(1).  The legislation which  was challenged  in  that  case was section 34A  of  the  Banking Companies  Act and it was assailed as violative  of  Article 19(1)(c).   The effect of section 34A was that  no  tribunal could  compel the production and inspection of any books  of account  or other documents or require a bank to furnish  or disclose any statement or information if the Banking Company claimed such document or statement or information to be of a confidential nature relating to secret reserves or to provi- sion  for bad and doubtful debts.  If a dispute was  pending and  a  question  was raised whether  any  amount  from  the reserves or other provisions should be taken into account by a  tribunal,  the  tribunal could refer the  matter  to  the Reserve,  Bank of India whose certificate as to  the  amount which  could  be  taken into account,  was  made  final  and conclusive.   Now, it was conceded that section 34A did  not prevent  the  workmen  from  forming  unions  or  place  any impediments in their doing so, but it was contended that the right to form association protected under Article 19 (1) (c) carried  with  it  a guarantee that  the  association  shall effectively  achieve  the purpose for which  it  was  formed without  interference by law except on grounds  relevant  to the  preservation  of public order or morality  set  out  in

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Article  19(4).  In other words, the argument was  that  the freedom to form unions carried with it the concomitant right that  such  unions should be able to fulfil the  object  for which  they. were formed.  This argument was negatived by  a unanimous  Bench of this Court.  The Court said that  unions were  not restricted to workmen, that employers’ unions  may be  formed in order to earn profit and that a guarantee  for the  effective functioning of the unions would lead  to  the conclusion  that restrictions on their right to earn  profit could  be  put  only in the interests  of  public  order  or morality.   Such a construction would run basically  counter to the scheme of Article 19 and to the provisions of Article 19(1) (c) and (6).  The restrictions which could be  imposed on  the  right  to  form  an  association  were  limited  to restrictions  in the interest of public order and  morality. The  restrictions  which could be imposed on  the  right  to carry  on  any trade, business, profession or  calling  were reasonable res- (1)  [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269. 702 trictions  in the public interest and if the  guarantee  for the  effective functioning of an association was a  part  of the  right,  then restrictions could not be imposed  in  the public  interest on the business of an association.   Again, an association of workmen may claim the right of  collective bargaining and the right to strike, yet the right to  strike could not by implication be treated as part of the right  to form  association, for, if it were so treated, it would  not be possible to put restrictions on that right in the  public interest  as is done by the Industrial Disputes  Act,  which restrictions  would be permissible under Article 19(6),  but not  under Article 19(4).  The Court, therefore,  held  that the  right to form unions guaranteed by Article 19  (1)  (c) does  not carry with it a concomitant right that the  unions so  formed should be able to achieve the purpose  for  which they  are brought into existence, so that  any  interference with  such  achievement  by law  would  be  unconstitutional unless the same could be justified under Article 19(4). The  right  to go abroad cannot, therefore, be  regarded  as included  in  freedom of speech  and  expression  guaranteed under  Article  19(1)(a)  on the  theory  of  peripheral  or concomitant right.  This theory has been firmly rejected  in the  All  India  Bank Employees Association’s  case  and  we cannot  countenance any attempt to revive it, as that  would completely  upset the scheme of Article 19(1) and  to  quote the words of Rajagopala Ayyanger, J., speaking on behalf  of the Court in All India Bank Employees Association’s case "by a series of ever expending concentric. circles in the  shape of rights concomitant to concomitant rights and so on,  lead to  an  almost grostesque result".  So also,  for  the  same reasons, the right to go abroad cannot be treated as part of the,  right  to  carry on  trade,  business,  profession  or calling guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g).  The right to go abroad is clearly not a guaranteed right under any clause of Article  19(1  )  and section  10(3)  (c)  which  authorises imposition  of  restrictions on the right to  go  abroad  by impounding  of  passport  cannot  be  held  to  be  void  as offending  Article  19(1)  (a) or (g),  as  its  direct  and inevitable  impact is on the right. to go abroad and not  on the  right  of free speech and expression or the.  right  to carry on trade, business profession or calling. Constitutional  requirement of an order under Section  10(3) (c). But  that does not mean that an order made under section  10 (3)  (c)  may not violate Article 19(1) (a) or  (g).   While

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discussing the constitutional validity of the impugned order impounding  the  passport of the petitioner, we  shall  have occasion to point out that even where a statutory  provision empowering  an authority to take action is  constitutionally valid, action taken under it may offend a fundamental  right and in that event, though the statutory provision is  valid, the  action  may be void.  Therefore,  even  though  section 10(3) (c) is valid, the question would always remain whether an  order  made  under  it  is  invalid  as  contravening  a fundamental right.  The direct and inevitable. effect of  an order  impounding  a passport may, in a given  case,  be  to abridge or take away freedom of speech and expression or the right  to carry on a profession and where such is the  case, the order would be invalid, unless saved by Article 19(2) or Article 19(6).  Take for 703 example,   a  pilot  with  international   flying   licence. International  flying is his profession and if his  passport is impounded, it would directly interfere with his right  to carry  on  his  profession  and  unless  the  order  can  be justified  on  the ground of public interest  under  Article 19(6)  it  would be void as offending Article  19  (1)  (g). Another  example may be taken of an evangelist who has  made it  a mission of his life to preach his faith to people  all over the world and for that purpose, set up institutions  in different  countries.   If an order is made  impounding  his passport, it would directly affect his freedom of speech and expression   and the challenge to the validity of the  order under, Article 19 (1) (a) would be unanswerable unless it is saved  by article 19(2).  We have taken these  two  examples only  by way of illustration.  There may be many such  cases where  the  restriction imposed is apparently  only  on  the right to go abroad but the direct and inevitable consequence is to interfere with the freedom of speech and expression or the right to carry on a profession.  A musician may want  to go  abroad to sing, a dancer to dance, a visiting  professor to  teach  and a scholar to participate in a  conference  or seminar.   If  in  such a case his  passport  is  denied  or impounded,  it would directly interfere with his freedom  of speech and expression.  If a correspondent of a newspaper is given a foreign assignment and he is refused passport or his passport is impounded, it would be direct interference  with his  freedom  to carry on his profession.  Examples  can  be multiplied,  but the point of the matter is that though  the right to go abroad is not a fundamental right, the denial of the right to go abroad may, in truth and in effect, restrict freedom  of speech and expression or freedom to carry  on  a profession so as to contravene Article 19 (1) (a) or 19  (1) (g).   In  such a case, refusal or  impounding  of  passport would be invalid unless it is justified under Article  19(2) or Article 19(6), as the case may be.  Now, passport can  be impounded  under section 10(3)(c) if the Passport  Authority deems  it  necessary  so  to do  in  the  interests  of  the sovereignty  and integrity of India, the security of  India, friendly  relations of India with any foreign country or  in the  interests  of  the general  public.   The  first  three categories are the same as those in Article 19 (2) and  each of  them, though separately mentioned, is a  species  within the  broad genus of "interests of the general public".   The expression  "interests  of the, general public"  is  a  wide expression which covers within its broad sweep all kinds  of interests  of the general public including interests of  the sovereignty  and integrity of India, security of  India  and friendly relations of India with foreign States.  Therefore, when  an order is made under section 10(3) (c), which is  in

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conformity with the terms of that provision, it would be  in the interests of the general public and even if it restricts freedom  to carry on a profession, it would be protected  by Article 19(6).  But if an order made under section 10(3) (c) restricts freedom of speech and expression, it would not  be enough  that  it  is made in the interests  of  the  general public.   It must fall within the terms of Article 19(2)  in order to earn the protection of that Article.  If it is made in the interests of the, sovereignty and integrity of  India or,  in  the interests of the security of India  or  in  the interests of friendly relations of.  India with any  foreign country, it would satisfy the requirement of Article  19(2). But  if it is made for any other interests of  the,  general public  save  the  interests of "public  order,  decency  or morality", 704 it  would not enjoy the protection of Article 19(2).   There can be no doubt that the interests of public order,  decency or  morality are "interests of the general public" and  they would  be covered by section 10(3) (c), but  the  expression "interests  of  the general public" is, as  already  pointed out,  a much wider expression and, therefore, in order  that an order made under section 10(3) (c) restricting freedom of speech  and expression, may not fall foul of  Article  19(1) (a),  it is necessary that in relation to such  order,,  the expression  "interests  of the general  public"  in  section 10(3) (c) must be read down so as to be limited to interests of  public  order, decency or morality.  If  an  order  made under  section  10(3) (c) restricts freedom  of  speech  and expression,  it  must be made not in the  interests  of  the general  public  in a wider sense, but in the  interests  of public  order,  decency or morality, apart  from  the  other three  categories, namely, interests of the sovereignty  and integrity  of  India,  the security of  India  and  friendly relations  of India with any foreign country.  If the  order cannot be shown to have been made in the interests of public order,  decency  or morality, it would not  only  contravene Article 19 (1) (a), but would also be outside the  authority conferred by section 10(3) (c). Constitutional validity of the impugned Order: We  may  now  consider, in the  light  of  this  discussion, whether  the impugned Order made by the  Central  Government impounding  the  passport of the  petitioner  under  section 10(3)   (c)  suffers  from  any  constitutional   or   legal infirmity.  The first ground of attack against the  validity of the impugned Order was that it was made in  contravention of  the rule of natural justice embodied in the  maxim  audi alteram  partem and was, therefore, null and void.  We  have already   examined   this  ground   while   discussing   the constitutional validity of section 10(3) (c) with  reference to  Article  21.  and shown how the statement  made  by  the learned  Attorney  General on behalf of  the  Government  of India  has  cured  the impugned Order of the  vice  of  non- compliance  with  the audi alteram partem rule.  It  is  not necessary to say anything more about it.  Another ground  of challenge  urged on behalf of the, petitioner was  that  the impugned  Order  has the effect of placing  an  unreasonable restriction  on  the  right of free  speech  and  expression guaranteed  to  the petitioner under Article 19 (1)  (a)  as also on the right to carry on the profession of a journalist conferred  under Article; 19(1) (g), in as much as if  seeks to  impound  the  passport of  the  petitioner  idefinitely, without  any  limit of time, on the mere likelihood  of  her being required in connection with the Commission of  Inquiry headed  by Mr. Justice J. C. Shah.  It was not competent  to

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the Central Government, it was argued, to express an opinion as  to  whether the petitioner is likely to be  required  in connection  with  the proceeding before  the  Commission  of Inquiry.  That would be a matter within the judgment of  the Commission  of  Inquiry  and it would be  entirely  for  the Commission of Inquiry to decide whether or, not her presence is  necessary  in the proceeding before  it.   The  impugned Order impounding the passport of the petitioner on the basis of  a  mere  opinion  by the  central  Government  that  the petitioner  is likely to be required in connection with  the proceeding  before  the Commission of Inquiry  was,  in  the circumstances,  clearly unreasonable and hence violative  of Article                   705 19(1) (a) and (g).  This ground of challenge was  vehemently pressed  on  behalf of the petitioner  and  supplemented  on behalf of Adil Sahariar who intervened at the hearing of the writ petition, but we do not think there is any substance in it.  It is true, and we must straiglitaway concede it,  that merely because a statutory provision empowering an authority take  action in specified circumstances is  constitutionally valid as not being in conflict with any fundamental  rights, it  does not give a carte blanche to the authority  to  make any  order it likes so long as it is within  the  parameters laid  down  by the statutory provision.   Every  order  made under  a  statutory provision must not only  be  within  the authority  conferred  by the statutory provision,  but  must also  stand  the  test of  fundamental  rights.   Parliament cannot be presumed to  have intended to confer power on  an authority to act in contravention of fundamental rights.  It is  a  basic  constitutional  assumption  underlying   every statutory  grant  of power that the authority on  which  the power  is conferred should act constitutionally and  not  in violation of any fundamental rights.  This would seem to  be elementary  and no authority is necessary in support of  it, but  if any were needed, it may be found in the decision  of this Court in Narendra Kumar & Ors. v. The Union of India  & Ors.(1).  The question which arose in that case was  whether clauses (3) and (4) of the Non-ferrous Metal Control  Order, 1958 made under section 3 of the Essential Commodities  Act, 1955  were  constitutionally valid.  The argument  urged  on behalf  of  the petitioners was that these  clauses  imposed unreasonable   restrictions   of  the   fundamental   rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1) (f) and (g) and in answer to this argument, apart from merits, a contention of a prelimi- nary  nature was advanced on behalf of the  Government  that "as the petitioners have not challenged the validity of  the Essential Commodities Act and have admitted the power of the Central  Government  to  make an order in  exercise  of  the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act, it is not open  to the Court to consider whether the law made by the Government in  making the non-ferrous metal control order-violates  any of  the fundamental rights under the Constitution".  It  was urged  that  so  long as the Order does not  go  beyond  the provisions  in section 3 of the Act, it "must be held to  be good  and the consideration of any question of  infringement of  fundamental  rights  under the  Constitution  is  wholly beside  the point".  This argument was characterised by  Das Gupta,   J.,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Court  as   "an extravagant  argument"  and  it  was  said  that  "such   an extravagant  argument has merely to be mentioned to  deserve rejection".   The  learned  Judge  proceeded  to  state  the reasons for rejecting this argument in the following words :               "If there was any reason to think that section               3 of the Act confers on the Central Government

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             power to do anything which is in conflict with               the  constitution-anything which violates  any               of  the  fundamental rights conferred  by  the               Constitution,   that  fact  alone   would   be               sufficient and unassailable ground for holding               that  the section itself is void  being  ultra               vires  the  Constitution.  When,  as  in  this               case, no challenge is made that section .3  of               the Act is ultra vires the Constitu-               (1)   [1960] 2 S.C.R. 375.                706               tion, it is on the assumption that the  powers               granted   thereby   do   not   violate,    the               Constitution  and do not empower  the  Central               Government   to   do   anything   which    the               Constitution prohibits.  It is fair and proper               to  presume  that  in passing  ’this  Act  the               Parliament  could not possibly  have  intended               the  words  used by it, viz.,  "may  by  order               provide  for  regulating  or  prohibiting  the               production,  supply and distribution  thereof,               and trade and commerce in", to include a power               to  make such provisions even though they  may               be in contravention of the Constitution.   The               fact  that the Words "in accordance  with  the               provisions    of   the   articles    of    the               Constitution"  are not used in the section  is               of no consequence.  Such words have to be read               by  necessary implication in  every  provision               and  every law made by the Parliament  on  any               day  after the Constitution came  into  force.               It  is  clear therefore that  when  section  3               confers  power  to provide for  regulation  or               prohibition  of  the  production,  supply  and               distribution  of  any essential  commodity  it               gives  such  power to make any  regulation  or               prohibition  in so far as such regulation  and               prohibition  do  not violate  any  fundamental               rights granted by the Constitution of India." It would thus be clear that though the impugned Order may be within the terms of section 10(3) (c), it must  nevertheless not  contravene  any fundamental rights and if it  does,  it would be void.  Now, even if an order impounding a  passport is  made  in  the  interests of  public  order,  decency  or morality,  the  restriction imposed by it may  be  so  wide, excessive or disproportionate to the mischief or evil sought to be averted that it may be considered unreasonable and  in that  event, if the direct and inevitable  consequence,,  of the  Order is to abridge or take away freedom of speech  and expression,  it would be violative of Article 19(1) (a)  and would  not be protected by Article 19(2) and the same  would be the position where the, order is in the interests of the’ general  public but it impinges directly and  inevitably  on the freedom to carry on a profession in which case it  would contravene  Article  19 (1) (g) without being saved  by  the provision enacted in Article 19(6). But  we do not think that the impugned Order in the  present case violates either Article 19(1) (a) or Article 19(1) (g). What  the impugned Order does is to impound the passport  of the petitioner and thereby prevent her from going abroad and at  the  date  when the impugned order  was  made  there  is nothing  to  show that the petitioner was  intending  to  go abroad for the purpose of exercising her freedom of  speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession as  a journalist.   The direct and inevitable consequence  of  the

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impugned order was to impede the exercise of her right to go abroad  and not to interfere with her freedom of speech  and expression or her right to carry on her profession.  But we, must  hasten to point out that if at any time in the  future the  petitioner  wants  to  go abroad  for  the  purpose  of exercising  her  freedom  of speech and  expression  or  for carrying  on her profession as a journalist and she  applies to  the  Central  Government to release  the  passport,  the question  would  definitely  arise whether  the  refusal  to release or in other words, continuance of the impounding of 707 the passport is in the interests of public order, decency or morality  in  the first case, and in the  interests  of  the general  public  in  the second, and  the  restriction  thus imposed  is reasonable so, as to come within the  protection of  Article 19(2) or Article 19(6).  That is,  however,  not the question before us at present. We  may  observe that if the impugned Order  impounding  the passport  of the petitioner were violative, of her right  to freedom  of speech and expression or her right to  carry  on her  profession  as a journalist, it would not be  saved  by Article  19(2) or Article 19(6), because the  impounding  of the passport for an indefinite length of time would  clearly constitute an unreasonable restriction.  The Union contended that  though the period for which the impugned Order was  to operate  was  not specified in so many terms, it  was  clear that it was intended to be co-terminous with the duration of the  Commission of Inquiry, since the reason for  impounding was  that  the presence of the petitioner was likely  to  be required in connection with the proceedings before the  Com- mission of Inquiry and the term of the Commission of Inquiry being limited upto 31st December, 1977, the impoundig of the passport  could not continue beyond that date and  hence  it would not be said that the impugned Order was to operate for an  indefinite  period of time.  Now, it is  true  that  the passport of the petitioner was impounded on the ground  that her  presence was likely to be required in  connection  with the  proceeding  before the Commission of  Inquiry  and  the initial  time limit fixed for the Commission of  Inquiry  to submit  its  report was 31st December, 1977,  but  the  time limit  could  always be extended by the Government  and  the experience of several Commissions of Inquiry set up in  this country  over the last twenty-five years shows  that  hardly any  Commission  of Inquiry has been able  to  complete  its report within the originally appointed time.  Whatever might have  been the expectation in regard to the duration of  the Commission  of  Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice Shall  at  the time when the impugned Order was made, it is now clear  that it  has not been possible for it to complete its labours  by 31st  December,  1977 which was the  time  limit  originally fixed and in fact its term has been extended upto 31st  May, 1978.   The  period  for which  the  passport  is  impounded cannot,  in  the circumstances, be said to be  definite  and certain  and it may extend to an indefinite point  of  time. This would clearly make the impugned order unreasonable  and the  learned  Attorney General appearing on  behalf  of  the Central Government, therefore, made a statement that in case the  decision to impound the passport of the  petitioner  is confirmed  by  the  Central  Government  after  hearing  the petitioner, "the duration of the impounding will not  exceed a  period of six months from the date of the  decision  that may  be taken on the petitioner’s representation".  It  must be said in fairness to the Central Government that this  was a  very reasonable stand to adopt, because in  a  democratic society  governed by the rule of law, it is expected of  the

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Government  that it should act not only  constitutional  and legally but also fairly and justly towards the citizen.   We hope and trust that in future also whenever the passport  of any  person  is  impounded  under  section  10(3)  (c),  the impounding would be for a specified period of time which  is not  unreasonably long, even though no contravention of  any fundamental right may be involved. 708 The  last  argument  that  the  impugned  Order  could  not, consistently  with Article 19(1) (a) and (g), be based on  a mere opinion of the Central Government that the presence  of the  petitioner is likely to be required in connection  with the  proceeding  bEfore the Commission of  lnquiry  is  also without  force.   It is true that ultimately it is  for  the Commission of Inquiry to decide whether the presence of  the petitioner  is  required in order to assist it in  its  fact finding  mission,  but  the  Central  Government  which  has constituted  the  Commission of Inquiry and  laid  down  its terms  of  reference would certainly be able,  to  say  with reasonable anticipation whether she is likely to be required by  the  Commission of Inquiry.  Whether  she,  is  actually required  would be for the Commission of Inquiry to  decide, but  whether she is likely to be required can  certainly  be judged  by  the  Central  Government.   When  the,   Central Government appoints a Commission of Inquiry, it does not act in a vacuum.  It is bound to have some material before it on the  basis of which it comes of a decision that there  is  a definite  matter  of  public importance which  needs  to  be inquired into and appoints a Commission of Inquiry for  that purpose.   The Central Government would, therefore, be in  a position  to  say  whether the petitioner is  likely  to  be ,required  in  connection  with the  proceeding  before  the Commission of Inquiry.  It is possible that ultimately  when the  Commission of Inquiry proceeds further with the  probe, it  may  find that the presence of the  ,petitioner  is  not required,  but before that it would only be in the stage  of likelihood and that can legitimately be left to the judgment of  the  central Government.  The validity of  the  impugned Order  cannot, ,therefor.-, be assailed on this ground,  had the challenge based on Article 19 (1) (a) and (g) must fail. Whether the impugned Order is inter vires sec. 10(3) (c) ? The last question which remains to be considered is  whether the  impugned  Order is within the  authority  conferred  by section  10(3) (c).  The impugned Order is plainly,  on  the face  of it, purported to be made in public interest,  i.e., in  the interests of the general public, and therefore,  its validity must be judged on that footing.  Now it is  obvious that on a plain natural construction of section 10(3)(c), it is left to the Passport Authority to determine whether it is necessary  to  impound a passport in the  interests  of  the general public.  But an order made by the Passport Authority impounding  a passport is subject to judicial review on  the ground that the order is mala fide, or that the reasons  for making the order are extraneous or they have no relevance to the interests of the general public or they cannot  possibly support  the  making of the order in the  interests  of  the general public.  It was not disputed on behalf of the Union, and  indeed  it  could not be in view of  section  10,  sub- section  (5)  that, save in certain  exceptional  cases,  of which this was admittedly not one, the Passport Authority is bound  to  give  reasons for making an  order  impounding  a passport  and  though  in  the  present  case,  the  Central Government initially declined to give reasons claiming  that it was not in the interests of the general public to do  so, it realised the utter untenability of this position when  it

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came  to  file  the affidavit in  reply  and  disclosed  the reasons  which were recorded at the time when  the  impugned order  ’Was passed.  These reasons were that,  according  to the Central Government, the petitioner was involved 709 in  matters coming within the purview of the Commissions  of Inquiry  constituted by the Government of India  to  inquire into excesses committed during the emergency and in  respect of matters concerning Maruti and its associate companies and the  Central Government was of the view that the  petitioner should  be available in India to give evidence before  these Commissions of Inquiry and she should have an opportunity to present  her  views before them and according to,  a  report received  by the Central Government on that day,  there  was likelihood  of  her  leaving India.  The  argument  of  the, petitioner was that these reasons did not justify the making of  the,  impugned  Order in the interests  of  the  general public, since these reasons had no reasonable nexus with the interests  of the general public within the meaning of  that expression  as  used in section 10(3) (c).   The  petitioner contended  that  the expression "interests  of  the  general public" must be construed in the context of the  perspective of the statute and since the power to issue a passport is  a power  related  to foreign affairs, the  "interests  of  the general  public," must be understood as referable only to  a matter  having some nexus with foreign affairs and it  would not  be  given  a wider meaning.  So  read,  the  expression "interests  of  the  general  public"  could  not  cover   a situation  where the presence of a person required  to  give evidence  before a Commission of Inquiry.  This argument  is plainly  erroneous  as it seeks to cut down  the  width  and amplitude  of  the  expression " interests  of  the  general public",  an  expression which has a well  recognised  legal connotation  and  which is to be found in Article  19(5)  as well  as article 19(6).  It is true, as pointed out by  this Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal &  Anr.(1), that  "there is always a perspective within which a  statute is  intended to operate", but that does not justify  reading of  a statutory provision in a manner not warranted  by  its language  or  narrowing  down  its  scope  and  meaning   by introducing  a limitation which has no basis either  in  the language  or  in  the context of  the  statutory  provision. Moreover,  it  is evident from clauses (d), (e) and  (h)  of section  10(3)  that  there are.  several  grounds  in  this section  which do not relate to foreign affairs.  Hence we do not think the petitioner is justified in seeking to limit the expression "interests of the general public" to  matters relating to foreign affairs.  The petitioner then contended that the requirement that she should   be  available  for  giving  evidence   before   the Commissions  of  Inquiry did not warrant the making  of  the impugned  Order  "in the interests of the  general  public". Section 10(3),according to the petitioner, contained clauses (e)  and (h) dealing specifically with cases where a  person is  required in connection with a legal proceeding  and  the enactment of these two specific provisions clearly indicated the  legislative  intent that the general power  in  section 10(3) (c) under the ground "interests of the general public" was  not meant to be exercised for impounding a passport  in cases where a person is required in connection with a  legal proceeding.   The  Central Government  was,  therefore,  not entitled to resort to this general power under section 10(3) (c)  for  the  purpose of impounding  the  passport  of  the petitioner on the ground that she was (1)  1969] 3 S.C.R. 108 at 128.

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7-119 SCI /78 710 required to give evidence before the Commissions of Inquiry. The, power to impound the passport of the petitioner in such a case was either to be found in section 10(3) (h) or it did not  exist at all.  This argument is also unsustainable  and must  be rejected.  It seeks to rely on the maxim  expressio unius  exclusio  ulterius  and proceeds on  the  basis  that clauses (e) and (h) of section 10(3) are exhaustive of cases where a person is required in connection with a  proceeding, whether  before a court or a Commission of Inquiry,  and  no resort  can be had to the general power under section  10(3) (c) in cases where a person is required in connection with a proceeding  before a Commission of Inquiry.  But it must  be noted  that  this is not a case where  the  maxim  expressio unius exclusio ulterius has any application at all.  Section 10(3)  (e) deals with a case where proceedings  are  pending before a criminal court while section 10(3) (b) contemplates a situation where a warrant or summons for the appearance or a  warrant for the arrest, of the holder of a  passport  has been issued by a court or an order prohibiting the departure from  India of the holder of the passport has been  made  by any such court.  Neither of these two provisions deals  with a case where a proceeding is pending before a Commission  of Inquiry  and the Commission has not yet issued a summons  or warrant  for the attendance of the holder of  the  passport. We may assume for the purpose of argument that a Commission- of  Inquiry  is a ’court’ for the purpose of  section  10(3) (h),  but even so, a case of this kind would not be  covered by section 10(3) (h) and section 10(3) (e) would in any case not have application.  Such a case would clearly fall within the general power under section 10(3) (c) if it can be shown that  the  requirement  of the holder  of  the  passport  in connection  with  the proceeding before  the  Commission  of Inquiry  is in the interests of the general public.  It  is, of  course, open to the Central Government to apply  to  the Commission  of Inquiry for issuing a summons or warrant,  as the  case  may be, for the attendance of the holder  of  the passport  before the Commission and if a summons or  warrant is so issued, it is possible that the Central Government may be entitled to impound the passport under section 10(3) (h). But  that does not mean that before the stage of  issuing  a summons or warrant has arrived, the Central Government  can- not impound the passport of a person, if otherwise it can be shown  to be in the, interests of the general public  to  do so.   Section 10(3) (e) and (h) deal only with two  specific kinds  of  situations,  but  there may  be  a  myriad  other situations, not possible to anticipate or categorise,  where public  interests  may require that the passport  should  be impounded  and such situation would be taken care  of  under the  general provision enacted in section 10(3) (c).  It  is true that this is a rather drastic power to interfere with a basic human right, but it must be remembered that this power has been conferred by the legislature in public interest and we  have  no doubt that it will be sparingly used  and  that too,  with  great  care and circumspection  and  as  far  as possible,  the  passport of a person will not  be  impounded merely  on  the ground of his being required  in  connection with a proceeding, unless the case is brought within section 10(3)  (e) or section 10(3) (b).  We may echo the  sentiment in Lord Denning’s closing remarks in Ghani v. Jones(1) (1)  [1970] Q.B.693. 711 ’where  the  learned  Master of the Rolls said  :  "A  man’s liberty  of  movement is regarded so highly by  the  law  of

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England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the severest grounds".  This liberty is prized equally  high in  our country and we are sure that a Government  committed to basic human values will respect it. We  must  also  deal  with  one  other  contention  of   the petitioner,  though  we must confess that it  was  a  little difficult for us to appreciate it. The petitioner urged that in  order  that a passport may be impounded  under   section 10(3) (c), public interest must actually exist ill  presenti and  mere likelihood of public interest arising  in  future, would  be no ground for impoundig a passport.  We  entirely agree  with  the  petitioner  that  an  order  impounding  a passport can be made by the Passport Authority only if it is actually in the interests of the general public to do so and it  is not enough that the interests of the  general  public may  be likely to be served in future by the making  of  the order.   But here in the present case, it was not merely  on the future likelihood of the interests of the general public advanced  that  the impugned order was made by  the  Central Government.   The  impugned Order was made because,  in  the opinion  of  the  Central Government, the  presence  of  the petitioner was necessary for giving evidence before the Com- missions of Inquiry and according to the report received  by the  Central Government, she was likely to leave  India  and that might frustrate or impede to some extent the  inquiries which were being conducted by the Commissions of Inquiry. Then  it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that  the Minister  for External Affairs, who made the impugned  Order on behalf of the Central Government, did not apply his  mind and  hence the impugned Order was bad.  We find no basis  or justification  for this contention.  It has been  stated  in the  affidavit  in  reply that  the  Minister  for  External Affairs  applied his mind to the relevant material and  also to   the   confidential  information   received   from   the intelligence  sources  that  there  was  likelihood  of  the petitioner attempting to leave the country and then only  he made  the  impugned Order.  In fact, the  Ministry  of  Home Affairs had forwarded to the Ministry of External Affairs as far back as 9th May, 1977 a list of persons whose  presence, in  view of their involvement or connection or  position  or past  antecedents, was likely to be required  in  connection with  inquiries  to  be carried out by  the  Commissions  of Inquiry and the name of the petitioner was included in  this list.  The Home Ministry had also intimated to the  Ministry of External Affairs that since the inquiries were being held by   the   Commissions  of  Inquiry  in   public   interest, consideration  of public interest would justify recourse  to section  10(3)  (c)  for impounding  the  passports  of  the persons  mentioned in this list.  This note of the  Ministry of Home Affairs was considered by the Minister for  External Affairs  and despite the suggestion made in this  note,  the passports of only eleven persons, out of those mentioned  in the  list,  were ordered to be impounded and no  action  was taken  in regard to the passport of the petitioner.   It  is only  on  1st  July, 1977 when  the  Minister  for  External Affairs   received   confidential   information   that   the petitioner was likely to attempt to leave the country  that, after applying his mind to the relevant material and  taking into account confidential information, 712 he made the impugned Order.  It, is, therefore, not possible to say that the Minister for External Affairs did not  apply his mind and mechanically made the impugned Order. The  petitioner lastly contended that it was not correct  to say that the petitioner was likely to be required for giving

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evidence before the Commissions of Inquiry.  The petitioner, it  was said, had nothing to do with any emergency  excesses nor  was  she  connected in any manner with  Maruti  or  its associate  concerns, and, therefore, she could not  possibly have any evidence to give before the Commissions of Inquiry. But this is not a matter which the court can be called  upon to  investigate.  It is not for the court to decide  whether the presence of the petitioner is likely to be required  for giving  evidence  before  he  Commissions  of  Inquiry.  The Government, which has instituted the Commissions of Inquiry, would  be best in a position to know, having regard  to  the material  before it, whether the presence of the  petitioner is  likely to be required.  It may be that her presence  may ultimately not be required at all, but at the present stage, the  question is only whether her presence is likely  to  be required and So Far that is concerned, we do not think  that the  view  taken  by the Government can be  regarded  as  so unreasonable  or  perverse  that we would  strike  down  the impugned  Order  based upon it as an arbitrary  exercise  of power. We  do not, therefore, see any reason to interfere with  the impugned Order made by the Central Government.  We, however, wish  to utter a word of caution to the  Passport  Authority while  exercising  the power of refusing  or  impounding  or cancelling a passport.  The Passport Authority would do well to  remember  that it is a basic human right  recognised  in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with which the Passport Authority, is interfering when it refuses or ‘impounds or cancels a passport.  It is a highly valuable right which is a part of personal liberty, an aspect of  the spiritual  dimension  of man, and it should not  be  lightly interfered  with.  Cases are not unknown where  people  have not  been  allowed to go abroad because of the  views  held, opinions   expressed  or  political  beliefs   or   economic ideologies entertained by them.  It is hoped that such cases will not recur under a Government constitutionally committed to uphold freedom and liberty but it is well to remember, at all  times, that eternal vigilance is the price of  liberty, for  history  shows that it is always subtle  and  insidious encroachments   made  ostensibly  for  a  good  cause   that imperceptibly but surety corrode the foundations of liberty. In  view  of  the statement made by  the  learned  Attorney- General  to  which reference has already been  made  in  the judgment we do not think it necessary to formally  interfere with  the impugned order.  We, accordingly, dispose  of  the Writ Petition without passing any formal order.  There  will be no order as to costs. KRISHNA  IYER, J.-My concurrence with the argumentation  and conclusion contained in the judgment of ’my learned  brother Bhagwati  J. is sufficient to regard this supplementary,  in one  sense,  a mere redundancy.  But in another  sense  not, where  the vires of a law, which arms the Central  Executive with wide powers of potentially imperilling some 713 of  the life-giving liberties of the people in  a  pluralist system like ours, is under challenge; and more so, when  the ground  is virgin, and the subject is of growing  importance to more numbers as Indians acquire habits of  trans-national travel and realise the fruits of foreign tours, reviving  in modem terms, what our forbears effectively did to put Bharat on  the cosmic cultural and commercial map.  India is  India because  Indians,  our ancients, had journeyed  through  the wide world for commerce, spiritual and material,  regardless of  physical  or mental frontiers.  And when  this  precious heritage  of free trade in ideas and goods, association  and

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expression,  migration and home-coming, now crystallised  in Fundamental  Human  Rights, is alleged to  be  hamstrung  by hubristic  authority,  my  sensitivity  lifts  the  veil  of silence.   Such is my justification. for  breaking  judicial lock-jaw  to  express sharply the juristic  perspective  and philosophy  behind  the practical necessities  and  possible dangers  that society and citizenry may face if the  clauses of our Constitution are not bestirred into court action when a  charge  of  unjustified  handcuffs  on  free  speech  and unreasonable  fetters on right of exit is made  through  the executive  power  of Passport impoundment.  Even so,  in  my separate opinion, I propose only to paint the back drop with a  broad brush, project the high points with bold lines  and touch  up the portrait drawn so well by brother Bhagwati  J, if   I  may  colourfully,  yet  respectfully,  endorse   his judgment. Remember,   even  democracies  have  experienced   executive lawlessness  and  eclipse  of liberty on the  one  hind  and ’subversive’ use of freedoms by tycoons and saboteurs on the other,  and  then  the  summons to  judges  comes  from  the Constitution,   over-riding  the  necessary   deference   to government  and  seeing in perspective,  and  overseeing  in effective  operation  the enjoyment of the  ’great  rights’. This Court lays down the law not pro tempore but lastingly. Before us is a legislation regulating travel abroad.  Is  it void  in  part or over-wide in terms  ?  ’Lawful  illegality becomes  the rule, if ’lawless legislation be  not  removed. In  our  jural  order  if  a  statute  is  void,  must   the Constitution  and its sentinels sit by silently,  or  should the  lines  of  legality be declared with  clarity  so  that adherence to valid norms becomes easy and precise ?. We  are  directly concerned, as fully brought  out  in  Shri Justice    Bhagwati’s   judgment,   with   the    indefinite immobilisation of the petitioner’s passport, the reason  for the  action being strangely veiled from the victim  and  the right  to voice an answer being suspiciously  withheld  from her,   the  surprising  secrecy  being   labelled,   ’public interest’.   Paper curtains wear ill ’on  good  governments. And, cutely to side one’s grounds under colour of  ’statute, is  too sphinx-like an art for an open society  and  popular regime.   As we saw the reasons which the  learned  Attorney General  so unhesitatingly disclosed, the question arises  : ’wherefore are these things hid?’.  The catch-all expression ’public interest’ is ’sometimes the easy temptation to cover up  from the public which they have a right to  know,  which appeals in the short run but avenges in the long run   Since the  only  passport  to this Court’s  jurisdiction  in  this branch  of  passport law is the breach of a  basic  freedom, what is the nexus between a passport and a Part Ill right  ? What are 714 the  ambience and amplitude, the desired effect  and  direct object  of them key provisions of the Passports Act, 1967  ? Do  they  crib or cut down unconstitutionally,  any  of  the guarantees  under  Arts. 21, 19 and 14 ?   Is  the  impugned section  10, especially S. 10 (3) (c), capable  of  circums- cription  to make it accord with the Constitution ?  Is  any part ultra vires, and why ? Finally, granting the Act to  be good,  is  the  impounding order bad ?  Such,  in  the  Writ Petition,  is  the  range  of issues  regaled  at  the  bar, profound, far-reaching, animated by comparative  scholarship and  fertilised by decisional erudition.  The frontiers  and funeral of freedom, the necessities and stresses of national integrity,  security and sovereignty, the interests  of  the general  public,  public  order  and  the  like  figure   on

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occasions as forensic issues.  And, in such situations,  the contentious  quiet of the court is the storm-centre  of  the nation.  Verily, while hard cases tend to make bad law,  bad cases tend to blur great law and courts must beware. The  centre  of  the stage in a legal  debate  on  life  and liberty  must  ordinarily  be occupied by  Art.  21  of  our Paramount Parchment which, with emphatic brevity and  accent on legality, states the mandate thus:               "21.    Protection   of  life   and   personal               liberty.-               No  person  shall be deprived of his  life  or               personal liberty except according to procedure               established by law." Micro-phrases  used in National Chatters spread into  macro- meanings  with  the  lambent light of basic  law.   For  our purposes,  the  key  concepts  are  ’personal  liberty’  and ’procedure   established   by  law’.   Let  us   grasp   the permissible  restraints  on  personal liberty,  one  of  the facets  of which is the right of exit beyond one’s  country. The  sublime sweep of the subject of personal  liberty  must come  within  our  ken  if  we are  to  do  justice  to  the constitutional  limitations which may, legitimately, be  im- posed on its exercise.  Speaking briefly, the architects  of our Founding Document, (and their fore-runners) many of whom were  front-line fighters for national freedom,  were  lofty humanists who were profoundly spiritual and deeply  secular, enriched  by  vintage values and  revolutionary  urges  and, above all, experientially conscious of the deadening  impact of  the  colonial  screening of  Indians  going  abroad  and historically ’sensitive to the struggle for liberation being waged from foreign lands.  And their testament is our asset. What is the history, enlivened by philosophy, of the law  of travel ?  The roots of our past reach down to travels  laden with our culture and commerce and its spread-out beyond  the oceans  and the mountains, so much so our  history  unravels exchange  between India and the wider world.   This  legacy, epitomised  as  ’the  glory that was Ind’,  was  partly  the product of travels into India and out of India.  It was  the two-way  traffic  of  which there  is  testimony  inside  in Nalanda,  and outside, even in Ulan Bator.   Our  literature and  arts bear immortal testimony to our thirst  for  travel and even our law, over two thousand years ago, had canalised travels  abroad.  For instance, in the days of Kautilya  (BC 321-296)  there was a Superintendent of Passports ’to  issue passes  at the rate of a masha a pass’.  Further details  on passport law are found in Katutilya’s Arthasastra. 715 Indeed,  viewing the subject from the angle of  geo-cultural end  legal  anthropology  and current  history,  freedom  of movement and its off-shoot-the institution of  passport-have been there through the Hellenic, Roman, Israelite,  Chinies, Persian and other civilisations.  Socrates, in his  dialogue with  Crito,  spoke of personal liberty.   He  regarded  the right  of  everyone to save his country as an  attribute  of personal liberty.  He made the laws speak thus               "We  further proclaim to any Athenian  by  the               liberty  which we allow him, that if  he  does               not like us when he has become of age and  has               seen  the ways of the city, and made  our  ac-               quaintance, he may go where he please and take               his  goods  with him.  None of our  laws  will               forbid him, or interfere with him.  Anyone who               does  not like us and the city, and who  wants               to  emigrate to a colony or to any other  city               may   go   where  he  likes,   retaining   his

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             property."               (Plato, Dialogues) The  Magna  Carta, way back in 1215 A.D. on  the  greens  of Runnymede,  affirmed the freedom to move beyond the  borders of  the  kingdom  and, by the time of  Blackstone,  ’by  the common  law, every man may go out of the realm for  whatever cause  he  pleaseth, without obtaining  the  king’s  leave’. Lord  Diplock  in D.P.P. v. Shagwan(1)  stated  that  ’Prior to....  1962........... a British subject had the  right  at common  law  to  enter the United  Kingdom  without  let  or hindrance  when and where he pleased and to remain there  as long   as  he  liked’  (International  &   Comparative   Law Quarterly, Vol. 23, July 1974, p. 646).  As late as Ghani v. Jones(2)  Lord  Denning  asserted  :  ’A  man’s  liberty  of movement is regarded so highly by the Law of England that it is  not  to be hindered or prevented except on  the  ’surest grounds’ (I & C. L. Qrly, ibid. p. 646).  In ’Freedom  under the  Law"  Lord  Denning has  observed  under  the  sub-bead ’Personal Freedom’ :               "Let  me first define my terms.   By  personal               freedom  I  mean  the freedom  of  every  law-               abiding citizen to think what he will, to  say               what  he will, and to go where he will on  his               lawful occasions without let or hindrance from               any  other  persons.  Despite all  the  great.               changes  that  have come about  in  the  other               freedoms,  this  freedom has  in  our  country               remained intact." In  ’Freedom, The Individual and the Law, Prof.  Street  has expressed  a like view.  Prof.  H.W.R. Wade and Prof.   Hood Philips  echo  this liberal view. (See Int. &  _Comp.   L.O. ibid 646).  And Justice Douglas, in the last decade, refined and  re-stated,  in classic diction, the  basics  of  travel jurisprudence in Apthekar(3).               "The  freedom of movement is the very  essence               of  our free society, setting us apart.   Like               the  right  of  assembly  and  the  right   of               association,   it  often  makes   all   rights               meaningful               (1)   [1972]A.C.60.               (2)   [1970] 1 Q. B. 693 709.               (3) 378 U. S. 500.                716               -knowing,   studying,   arguing,    exploring,               conversing, observing and even thinking.  Once               the  right to travel is curtailed,  all  other               rights  suffer,  just as when curfew  or  home               detention is placed on a person.               America  is  of  course  sovereign,  but   her               sovereignty  is woven in an international  web               that  makes her one of the family of  nations.               The  ties with all the continents  are  close-               commercially  as  well  as  culturally.    Our               concerns  are  planetary beyond  sunrises  and               sunsets.   Citizenship implicates us in  those               problems  and  paraplexities, as  well  as  in               domestic  ones.  We cannot exercise and  enjoy               citizenship  in World perspective without  the               right to travel abroad." And,  in  India, Satwant(1) set the same high  tone  through Shri  Justice  Subba Rao although A. K. Gopalan(2  )  and  a stream of judicial thought since then, had felt impelled  to underscore  personal  liberty as embracing right  to  travel abroad.   Tambe CJ in A. G. Kazi(3) speaking for a  Division Bench,  made a comprehensive survey of the law and  vivified

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the concept thus:               "In  our  opinion, the language  used  in  the               Article  (Art.  21) also  indicates  that  the               expression ’Personal liberty’ is not  confined               only  to freedom from physical restraint,  ie.                             but  includes a full range of conduct which  a n               individual  is free to pursue within law,  for               instance,  eat  and drink what he  likes,  mix               with people whom he likes, read what he likes,               sleep  when  and as long as he  likes,  travel               wherever  he  likes,  go  wherever  he  likes,               follow  profession,  vocation or  business  he               likes,  of  course, in the manner and  to  the               extent permitted by law."                                             (P. 240) The  legal vicissitudes of the passport story in the  United States  bear out the fluctuating fortunes of fine men  being denied  this  great right to go  abroad-Linus  Pauling,  the Nobel  Prize-winner,  Charles  Chaplin,  the  screen   super genius,  Paul Robesen, the world singer, Arthur Miller,  the great  author  and  even Williams  L.  Clark,  former  Chief Justice  of  the United States Courts in  occupied  Germany, among other greats.  Judge Clark commented on this  passport affair and the ambassador’s role :               "It is preposterous to say that Dr. Conant can               exercise  some sort of censorship  on  persons               whom he wishes or does not wish to come to the               country  to which he is accredited.  This  has               never  been  held  to be the  function  of  an               Ambassador."               (P. 275, 20 Clav.  St. L.R. 2 May 1971) Men  suspected  of  communist leanings had  poor  chance  of passport  at  one  time; and politicians in  power  in  that country have gone to the extreme extent of stigmatising  one of the greatest Chief Justices of their (1)  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525. (2)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. (3)  A.I.R. 1967 Bom. 235. 717 country  as  near  communist.   Earl  Warren.  has,  in  his autobiography, recorded                "Senator  Joseph  McCarthy once said  on  the               floor of the Senate, ’I will not say that Earl               Warren  is a Communist, but I will ’say he  is               the  best  friend of Communism in  the  United               States." There has been built up lovely American legal literature  on passport  history to which I will later refer.  British  Raj has frowned on foreign travels by Indian patriotic  suspects and instances from the British Indian Chapter may abound. Likewise, the Establishment, in many countries has used  the passport and visa system as potent paper curtain to  inhibit illustrious   writers,   outstanding   statesmen,   humanist churchmen and renowned scientists, if they are  dissenters’, from  leaving  their national  frontiers.   Absent  forensic sentinels, it is not unusual for people to be suppressed  by power in the name of the people.  The politics of  passports has  often  tried  to bend  the  jurisprudence  of  personal locomotion to serve its interests.  The twilight of  liberty must affect the thought ways of judges. Things  have  changed, global awareness, in grey  hues,  has dawned.   The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights   and bilateral understandings have made headway to widen  freedom of  travel  abroad  as integral to  liberty  of  the  person

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(Fourth  Protocol).  And the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights has proclaimed in Art. 13 :               "(1)  Everyone  has the right  to  freedom  of               movement  and residence within the borders  of               each State.               (2)   Everyone  has  the right  to  leave  any               country,  including his own, and to return  to               his country." This  right  is yet inchoate and only lays the  base.   But, hopefully,  the loftiest towers rise from the  ground.   And despite  destructive  was  and  exploitative  trade,  racial hatreds  and  credal  quarrels,  colonial  subjections   and authoritarian  spells,  the world has  advanced  because  of gregarious  men  adventuring forth, taking with  them  their thoughts and feelings on a trans-national scale.  This human planet is our single home, though geographically variegated, culturally  diverse, politically pluralist, in  science  and technology  competitive and cooperative, in arts  and  life- styles  a  lovely  mosaic and, above all,  suffused  with  a cosmic  consciousness of unity and  inter-dependence.   This Grand  Canyon  has been the slow product  of  the  perennial process   of  cultural  interaction,   intellectual   cross- fertilization, ideological and religious confrontations  and meeting and mating of social systems; and the wellspring  is the wanderlust of man and his wondrous spirit moving towards a united human order founded on human rights.  Human advance has been promoted through periods of pre-history and history by the flow of fellowmen, and the world owes much to  exiles and   emigres   for   liberation,   revolution,   scientific exploration  and  excellence in arts.   Stop  this  creative mobility  by totalitarian decree and whole  communities  and cultures will stagnate and international awakening so  vital for the survival of homo sapiens wither away.  To argue  for arbitrary  inhibition  of  travel  rights  under   executive directive or legislative tag is to invite 718      and  accelerate future shock.  This broader setting  is necessary if we, are to view the larger import of the  right to  passport  in its fundamental bearings.  It  is  not  law alone  but life’s leaven.  It is not a casual  facility  but the core of liberty. Viewed  from  another  angle, travel abroad  is  a  cultural enrichment  which enables one’s understanding of  one’s  own country  in better light.  Thus it serves national  interest to  have its citizenry ’see other countries and judge  one’s country  on a comparative scale.  Rudyard.  Kipling,  though with an imperial ring, has aptly said               "Winds of the World, give answer               They are whimpering to and fro               And what should they know of England                     Who only England know ?"               (The English Flag) Why  is the right to travel all over the world and into  the beyond a human right and a constitutional freedom ? Were  it not so, the human heritage would have been more hapless, the human family more divided, the human order more unstable and the human future more murky. The Indian panorama from the migrant yore to tourist flow is an  expression  of  the will to  explore  the  Infinite,  to promote  understanding  of  the universe,  to  export  human expertise  and development of every resource.   Thus  humble pride  of patriotic heritage would have been pre-empted  had the  ancient  kings  and mediaval  rulers  banished  foreign travel  as our imperial masters nearly did.  And to look  at the  little  letters  of the text of Part III  de  hors  the

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Discovery of India and the Destiny of Bharat or the divinity of  the ’soul and the dignity of the person  highlighted  in the Preamble unduly obsessed with individual aberrations  of yesteryears or vague hunches leading to current fears, is  a parsimonious exercise in constitutional perception.      Thus, the inspirational background. cosmic  perspective and inherited ethos of the pragamtic visionaries and jurist- statesmen  who draw up the great Title Deed of our  Republic must  illumine  the sutras of Articles 21, 19 and  14.   The fascist  horror of World War II burnt into our  leaders  the urgency of inscribing indelibly into our Constitution  those values sans which the dignity of man suffers total  eclipse. The  Universa l Declaration of Human Rights, the  resurgence of  international fellowship, the vulnerability of  freedoms even  in  democracies  and  the  rapid  development  of   an integrated and intimately interacting ’one world’ poised for peaceful  and  progressive  intercourse  conditioned   their thought  processes.  The bitter feeling of the  British  Raj trampling  under  foot  swaraj the  birth-right  of  every Indian- affected their celebrations.  The hidden  divinity in   every  human  entity  creatively  impacted   upon   our founding fathers’ mentations.  The mystic chords of  ancient memory and the modern strands of the earth’s indivisibility, the pathology of provincialism, feudal backwardness, glaring inequality  Ind  bleeding  communalism,  the  promotion   of tourism, of giving and taking know- 719 how,  of studying abroad, and inviting scholars  from  afar- these  and  other realistic considerations  gave  tongue  to those  hallowed  human rights fortified by  the  impregnable provisions  of  Part 111.  Swami Vivekananda,  that  saintly revolutionary who spanned East and West, exhorted,  dwelling on the nation’s fall of the last century :               "My  idea as to the key-note of  our  national               downfall  is  that we do not  mix  with  other               nations-that  is the one and sole  cause.   We               never  had the opportunity to compare,  notes.               We were Kupa-Mandukas (frogs in a well)."               x           x            x            x               One of the great causes of India’s misery  and               downfall  has been that she narrowed  herself,               went  into her shell, as the oyster does,  and               refused  to give her jewels and her  treasures               to the other races of mankind, refused to give               the  life  giving truth to  thirsting  nations               outside the Aryan fold.  That has been the one               great  cause, that we did not go out, that  we               did not compare notes with other  nations-that               has been the one great cause of our  downfall,               and  every one of you knows that  that  little               stir, the little life you see in India, begins               from  the  day when Raja  Rammohan  Roy  broke               through  the  walls  of  this   exclusiveness.               Since that day, history in India has taken an-               other   turn  and  now  it  is  growing   with               accelerated  motion.   If we have  bad  little               rivulets in the past, deluges are coming,  and               none  can resist them.  Therefore, we must  go               out,  and  the secret of life is to  give  and               take.   Are we to take always, to sit  at  the               feet  of the Westerners to  learn  everything,               even  religion ? We can learn  mechanism  from               them.  We can learn many other things.  But we               have to teach them something.... Therefore  we               must  go  out, exchange our  spirituality  for

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             anything they have to give us; for the marvels               of  the region of spirit we will exchange  the               marvels  of  the region of matter  ....  There               cannot  be  friendship without  equality,  and               there  cannot  be equality when one  party  is               always  the teacher and the other  party  sits               always at his feet .... If you want to  become               equal with the Englishman or the American, you               will  have, to teach as well as to learn,  and               you have plenty yet to teach to the world  for               centuries to come." From the point of view of comparative law too, the  position is  well established.  For, one of the essential  attributes of   citizenship,  says  Prof.   Schwartz,  is  freedom   of movement.  The right of free movement is a vital element  of personal  liberty.  The right of free movement includes  the right to travel abroad.  So much is simple textbook teaching in  Indian,  as in Anglo-American law.   Passport  legality, affecting  as  it  does, freedoms  that  are  ’delicate  and vulnerable,  as well as supremely precious in our  society’, cannot  but  excite judicial vigilance  to  obviate  fragile dependency for exercise of fundamental rights upon executive clemency.   So important is this subject that the  watershed between  a police state and a government by the  people  may partly  turn on the prevailing passport policy.   Conscious, though I am, that such prolix 720 elaboration   of  environmental  aspects  is   otiose,   the Emergency  provsions  of our Constitution, the  extremes  of rigour the nation has experienced (or may) and the proneness of Power to stoop to conquer make necessitous the  hammering home  of  vital  values expressed  in  terse  constitutional vocabulary. Among the great guaranteed rights, life and liberty are  the first   among  equals,  carrying  a  universal   connotation cardinal   to  a  decent  human  order  and   protected   by constitutional   armour.   Truncate  liberty  in   Art.   21 traumatically and the several other freedoms fade out  auto- matically.   Justice  Douglas, that most  distinguished  and perhaps  most  travelled judge in the world, has  in  poetic prose and with imaginative realism projected the  functional essentiality  of the right to travel as part of liberty.   I may quote for emphasis, what is a woe bit repetitive               "The right to travel is a part of ’liberty’ of               which  the citizen cannot be deprived  without               due   process   of  law   under   the,   fifth               Amendment........  In  Anglo  Saxon  law  that               right  was emerging at least as early  as  the               Magna Carta........ Travel abroad, like travel               within  the  country, may be necessary  for  a               livelihood.   It may be as close to the  heart               of  the  individual as the choice of  what  he               eats  or wears or reads.  Freedom of  movement               is  basic in our scheme of values."  (Kent  v.               Dulles: 357 US 116-2 L. Ed. 2d. 1204 1958).               "Freedom  of  movement also has  large  social               values.    As   Chafoe  put  it   :   ’Foreign               correspondents  on lectures on public  affairs               need  first-hand information.  Scientists  and               scholars gain greatly from consultations  with               colleagues in other countries.  Students equip               themselves  for more fruitful careers  in  the               United   States  by  instruction  in   foreign               universities.  Then there are reasons chose to               the  core of personal life-marriage  reuniting

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             families,  spending  hours with  old  friends.               Finally   travel   abroad   enables   American               citizens   to  understand  that  people   like               themselves live in Europe and helps them to be               well-informed  on public issues.  An  American               who  has crossed the ocean is not  obliged  to               form  his  opinions about our  foreign  policy               merely  from what he is told by  officials  of               our  Government or by a few correspondents  of               American  newspapers.  Moreover, his views  on               domestic questions are enriched by seeing  how               foreigners   are  trying  to   solve   similar               problems.   In  many  different  ways   direct               contact  with other countries  contributes  to               sounder decisions at home....               Freedom  to  travel is, indeed,  an  important               aspect of the citizen’s liberty".                                    (Kent v. Dulles)               "Freedom  of movement at home and  abroad,  is               important for job and business  opportunities-               for cultural, political and social activities-               for  all the commingling which gregarious  man               enjoys.  Those with the right of free movement               use it at times for mischievous purposes.  But               that is true of many liberties we, enjoy.   We               nevertheless place our faith in them and                721               against  restraint, knowing that the  risk  of               abusing  liberty  so  as  to  give  right   to               punishable conduct is part of the price we pay               for this free society.               (Apthekar v. Secretary of State : 378 US  500-               12 L.Ed. 2d 992 (1964).               Judge Wyzanski has said               "This  travel does not differ from  any  other               exercise   of   the   manifold   freedoms   of               expression....... from the right to speak,  to               write,  to  use  the  mails,  to  public,   to               assemble, to petition."               (Wyzanski,   Freedom   to   Travel,   Atlantic               Montaly.  Oct. 1952, p. 66 at 68). The   American   Courts  have,  in  a  sense,   blazed   the constitutional trail on that facet of liberty which  relates to  untrammelled travel.  Kent, Apthekar and Zemel  are  the landmark  cases and American jurisprudence today holds as  a fundamental part of liberty (V Amendment) that a citizen has freedom  to  move  across  the  frontiers  without  passport restrictions subject, of course, to well-defined necessitous exceptions.  Basically, Blackstone is still current coin               "Personal  liberty  consists in the  power  of               locomotion,  of changing direction  or  moving               one’s  person  to  whatever  place  one’s  own               inclination may desire." To sum up, personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person.   Travel  makes  liberty  worthwhile.   Life  is   a terrestrial opportunity for unfolding personality, rising to higher  states,  moving to fresh woods and reaching  out  to reality  which makes our earthly journey a true  fulfilment- not  a tale told by an idiot full of ’sound and fury  signi- fying nothing, but a fine frenzy rolling between heaven  and earth.  The spirit of Man is at the root of Art. 21.  Absent liberty, other freedoms are frozen. While  the issue is legal and sounds in the  constitutional, its  appreciation  gains in human depth  given  a  planetary perspective  and  understanding of the  expanding  range  of

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travel  between  the  ’inner space’ of Man  and  the  ’outer space’ around Mother Earth. To conclude this Chapter of the discussion on the concept of personal  liberty, as a sweeping supplement to the  specific treatment by brother Bhagwati J., the Jurists’ Conference in Bangalore, concluded in 1969, made a sound statement of  the Indian  Law  subject, of course, to savings  and  exceptions carved out of the generality of that conclusion               "Freedom of movement of the individual  within               or in leaving his own country, in traveling to               other  countries  and  in  entering  his   own               country is a vital human liberty, whether such               movement  is  for the purpose  of  recreation,               education,  trade or employment, or to  escape               from an environment in               722               which  his other liberties are  suppressed  or               threatened.   Moreover, in an  inter-dependent               world  requiring  for  its  future  peace  and               progress    an   ever-growing    measure    of               international  understanding, it is  desirable               to  facilitate  individual  contacts   between               peoples   and  to  remove  all   unjustifiable               restraints on their movement which may  hamper               such contacts." So  much for personal liberty and its travel facet.  Now  to ’procedure  established by law’, the manacle clause in  Art. 21,  first  generally  and next, with  reference  to  A.  K. Gopalan  (supra)  and  after.   Again,  I  observe  relative brevity because I go the whole bog with brother Bhagwati, J. If  Article 21 includes the freedom of foreign  travel,  can its   exercise  be  fettered  or  forbidden   by   procedure established by law ? Yes, indeed.  So, what is ’procedure’ ? What  do  we  mean  by ’established’ ? And  What  is  law  ? Anything, formal, legislatively processed, albeit absurd  or arbitrary  ? Reverence for life and liberty must over  power this  reduction  an absurdem’ Legal interpretation,  in  the last  analysis, is value judgment.  The high seriousness  of the subject matter-life and liberty-desiderates the need for law,  not  fiat. law is law when it is  legitimated  by  the conscience and consent of the community generally.  Not  any capricious compthe but reasonable: mode ordinarily  regarded by  the  cream of society as dharma  or  law,  approximating broadly  to other standard measures regulating  criminal  or like, procedure in the country.  Often, it is a  legislative act, but it must be functional, not fatuous. This  line of logic alone will make the two clauses of  Art. 21  concordant, the procedural machinery not destroying  the substantive fundamentally.  The compulsion of constitutional humanism  and  the  assumption of full  faith  in  life  and liberty  cannot  be,  so  futile  or  fragmentary  that  any transient  legislative  majority  in  tantrums  against  any minority,  by  three  quick  readings of  a  bill  with  the requisite  quorum; can prescribe any  unreasonable  modality and thereby sterilise the grandiloquent mandate.  ’Procedure established  by  law’, with its  lethal  potentiality,  will reduce  life and liberty to a precarious plaything if we  do not  ex  necessitate  import into those  weighty  words  an, adjectival  rule of law, civilised in its soul, fair in  its heart and fixing those imperatives of procedural  protection absent  which the processual tail will wag  the  substantive head.   Can the sacred essence of the human right to  secure which  the  struggle  for  liberation,  with  ’do  or   die’ patriotism,  was  launched  be  sapped  by  formalistic  and pharisaic prescriptions, regardless of essential standards ?

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An   enacted  apperition  is  a   constitutional   illusion. Processual  justice is writ patently on Art. 21.  It is  too grave to be circumvented by a black letter ritual  processed through the legislature. So  I am convinced that to frustrate Art. 21 by relying  on any formal adjectival statute, however, filmsy or  fantastic its   provisions  be,  is  to  rob  what  the   constitution treasures.   Procedure  which deals with the  modalities  of regulating,  restricting  or even  rejecting  a  fundamental right falling within, Art. 21 has to be fair, riot  foolish, carefully 723 designed  to,  effectuate. not to subvert,  the  substantive right  itself.  Thus understood, ’procedure’ must  rule  out anything   arbitrary  freakish  or  bizarre.    A   valuable constitutional  right  can be canalised  only  by  civilised processes.  You cannot claim that it is a legal procedure if the passport is granted or refused by taking loss, ordeal of fire  or  by other strange or mystical methods.  Nor  is  it tenable  if life is taken by a crude or summary  process  of enquiry.  What is fundamental is life and liberty.  What  is procedural is the manner of its exercise,.  This quality  of fairness  in  the process is emphasised by the  strong  word ,established  which  means  ’settled  firmly  not   wantonly whimsically.  If it is rooted in the legal consciousness  of the  community  it becomes ’  established’  procedure.   And ’Law’  leaves  little doubt that it is normae,  regarded  as just since law is the means and justice is the end. Is there supportive judicial thought for this reasoning.  We go back to the vintage words of the learned Judges in A.  K. Gopalan  (supra)  and zigzag through R. C. Cooper to  S.  N. Sarkar and discern attestation of this conclusion.  And  the elaborate   constitutional  procedure  in  Art.  22   itself fortifies  the argument that ’life and liberty’ in  Art.  21 could   not   have  been  left   to   illusory   legislators happenstance.  Even as relevant reasonableness informs  art. 14 and 19, the component of fairness is implicit in Art. 21. A  close-up  of the Gopalan case (supra) is  necessitous  at this  stage to underscore the quality of procedure  relevant to personal liberty. Procedural  safeguards  are  the  indispensable  essence  of liberty.  In fact, the history of personal liberty is  large the history of procedural safeguards and right to a  hearing has  a human-right ring.  In India, because of  poverty  and illiteracy,  the  people are unable to  protect  and  defend their  rights;  observance  of  fundamental  rights  is  not regarded  as good politics and their transgression  as  had politics.   I  sometimes  pensively  reflect  that  people’s militant   awareness  of  rights  and  duties  is  a   surer constitutional  assurance of governmental respect  and  res- ponse than the sound and fury of the ’question hour’ and the slow   and   unsure  delivery  of  court   writ   ’Community Consciousness  and the Indian Constitution is a  fascinating subject of sociological relevance in many areas. To  sum  up, ’procedure’ in Art. 21 means fair,  not  formal procedure.  ’Law’ is reasonable law, not any enacted  piece. As   Art.  22  ,specifically  spells  out   the   procedural safeguards  for  preventive and punitive  detention,  a  law providing for such detentions should conform to Art. 22.  It has  been rightly pointed out that for other rights  forming part   of  personal  liberty,  the   procedural   safeguards enshrined  in  Art.  21 are available.   Otherwise,  as  the procedural safeguards contained in Art. 22 will be available only  in  cases of preventive and  punitive  detention,  the right to life, more fundamental than any other forming  part

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of personal liberty and paramount to the happiness,  dignity and  worth  of the individual, will not be entitled  to  any procedural  safeguard  save  such as  a  legislature’s  mood chooses.    In,   Kochunni(1)  the   Court,   doubting   the correctness of the Gopalan decision on this aspect, said : (1)  A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 1080,1093. 724 .lm15 "Had  the question been res integra, some of us  would  have been inclined to agree with the dissenting view expressed by Fazal Ali, J." Gopalan  does  contain some luscent  thought  on  ’Procedure established  by law’.  Patanjali Sastri, J. approximated  it to the prevalent norms of criminal procedure regarded for  a long time by Indo-Anglian criminal law as conscionable.  The learned Judge observed :               "On   the  other  hand,   the   interpretation               suggested by the Attorney General on behalf of               the  intervener  that  the  expression   means               nothing more than procedure prescribed by  any               law made by a competent legislature is  hardly               more acceptable.  ’Established’, according  to               him,  means prescribed, and if  Parliament  or               the  Legislature of a State enacted  a  proce-               dure,   however  novel  and  ineffective   for               affording   the   accused   person   a    fair               opportunity of defending himself, it would  be               sufficient for depriving a person of his  life               of personal liberty."               (pp. 201-203)               "The  main difficulty I feel in accepting  the               construction suggested by the Attorney General               is that it completely stultifies article 13(2)               and,   indeed,  the  very  conception   of   a               fundamental  right........ could it then  have               been  the  intention  of the  framers  of  the               Constitution    that   the   most    important               fundamental   rights  to  life  and   personal               liberty should be at the mercy of  legislative               majorities  as,  in  effect,  they  would   if               ’established’ were to mean merely prescribed ?               In other words, as an American Judge said in a               similar   context,  does  the   constitutional               prohibition  in  article 13(3) amount  to  ’no               more  than ’your shall not take away  life  or               personal freedom unless you choose to take  it               away,  which is more verbiage.........  It  is               said  that  article 21 affords  no  protection               against  competent legislative action  in  the               field  of substantive criminal law, for  there               is  no provision for judicial review,  on  the               ground of reasonableness or otherwise, of such               laws, as in the case of the rights  enumerated               in  article 19. Even assuming it to be so  the                             construction  of the learned  Attorney  Genera l               would  have  the effect  of  rendering  wholly               ineffective  and illusory even the  procedural               protection  which the article was  undoubtedly               designed to afford."                     (p. 202) (emphasis, added)               "After  giving the matter my most careful  and               anxious  consideration,  I have  come  to  the               conclusion  that there are only  two  possible               solutions of the problem.  In the first place,

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             a  satisfactory  via  media  between  the  two               extreme positions contended for on either side               may   be   found   by   stressing   the   word               ’established’  which  implies some  degree  of               firmness,  permanence and general  acceptance,               while  it  does  not  exclude  origination  by               statute.  ’Procedure esta-                725               blished by’ may well be taken to mean what the               Privy  Council referred to in King Emperor  v.               Bengori  Lal Sharma as ’the ordinary and  well               established  criminal procedure’, that  is  to               say, those settled usages and normal modes  of               proceeding   sanctioned   by   the    Criminal               Procedure  Code which is the general  law of               Criminal procedure in the country.               (p. 205) Fazal  Ali,  J.  frowned  on  emasculating  the   procedural substantiality of Art. 21 and read into it those  essentials of  natural justice which made processual law humane  :  The teamed Judge argued :               "It   seems  to  me  that  there  is   nothing               revolutionary  in the doctrine that the  words               ’Procedure  established by law’  must  include               the  four  principles  set  out  in  Professor               Willis’ book, which, as I have already stated,               are  different aspects of the  same  principle               and  which  have no vagueness  or  uncertainty               about them.  These principles, as the  learned               author points out and as the authorities show,               are  not absolutely rigid principles  but  are               adaptable  to the circumstances of  each  case               within  certain limits.  I have only  to  add,               that  it has not been  seriously  controverted               that  ’law’  means certain definite  rules  of               proceeding  and not something which is a  mere               pretence for procedure.               (emphasis, added) In short, fair adjectival law is the very life of the  life- liberty  fundamental  right  (Art.  21),  ’not   ’autocratic supremacy   of  the  legislature’.   Mahajan  J.  struck   a concordant note :               "Article   21  ’in  my  opinion,   lays   down               substantive law as giving protection to’  life               and  liberty in as much as it says  that  they               cannot  be  deprived except according  to  the               procedure established by law; in other  words,               it means that before a person can be  deprived               of   his  life  or  liberty  as  a   condition               precedent there should exist some  substantive               law conferring authority for doing so and  the               law  should  further  provide for  a  mode  of               procedure for such deprivation., This articles               gives  complete immunity against the  exercise               of  despotic  power  by  the  executive.    It               further  gives immunity against  invalid  laws               which  contravene the Constitution.  It  gives               also  further  guarantee  that  in  its   true               concept   there   should  be  some   form   of               proceeding  before a person can  be  condemned               either in respect of his life or his  liberty.               It negatives the idea of a fantastic arbitrary               and oppressive form of proceedings."                     (emphasis, added) In  sum,  Fazal Ali, J. struck the chord which  does  accord

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with a just processual system where liberty is likely to  be the victim.  May be, the learned Judge stretched it a little beyond   the  line  but  in  essence  his  norms  claim   my concurrence. 8-119 SCI/78 726 In John v. Rees(1) the true rule, as implicit in any law, is set down               "If  there is any doubt, the applicability  of               the  principles will be given the  benefit  of               doubt." And  Lord  Denning,  on the theme of  liberty,  observed  in Schmidt V. Secretary of State  (2)               "Where a public officer has power to deprive a               person  of  his liberty or his  property,  the               general principle is that it is not to be done               without hearing."  Human rights: It is a mark of interpretative respect for the higher  norms our  founding  fathers held dear in  affecting  the  dearest rights  of life and liberty so to read Art. 21 as to  result in  a  human order lined with human  justice.   And  running right  through Arts. 19 and 14 is present this principle  of reasonable   procedure  in  different  shades.   A   certain normative harmony among the, articles is thus attained,  and hold  Art.  21 bears in its bosom the construction  of  fair procedure  legislatively  sanctioned.  No  Passport  Officer shall  be  mini-Caesar nor Minister incarnate  Caesar  in  a system where the rule of law reigns supreme. My clear conclusion on Art. 21 is that liberty of locomotion into  alien  territory cannot be unjustly forbidden  by  the Establishment and passport legislation must take  processual provisions   which  accord  with  fair  norms,   free   from extraneous  pressure  and,  by  and  large,  complying  with natural justice.  Unilateral arbitrariness, police dossiers, faceless   affiants,  behind-the-back   materials,   oblique motives  and the inscrutable face of an official  sphinx  do not  fill  the ’fairness’ bill-subject, of course,  to  just exceptions  and critical contexts.  This minimum once  aban- doned,  the  Police State slowly builds up  which  saps  the finer  substance of our constitutional  jurisprudence.   Not party  but  principle and policy are the  key-stone  of  our Republic. Let. us not forget that Art. 21 clubs life with liberty  and when  we  interpret  the colour and  content  of  ’procedure established by law’ we must be alive to the deadly peril  of life  being  deprived without  minimal  processual  justice, legislative   callousness  despising  ’hearing’   and   fair opportunities  of defence.  And this realization once  sanc- tioned,  its exercise will swell till the basic  freedom  is flooded  out.   Hark  back  to  Art.  10  of  the  Universal Declaration  to realize that human rights have but a  verbal hollow  if the protective armour of audi alteram  partem  is deleted.  When such pleas are urged in the familiar name  of pragmatism public interest or national security, courts  are on  trial and must prove that civil liberties are  not  mere rhetorical  material  for lips service but  the,  obligatory essence of our bard-won (1) [1969]     2 all   E. R. 274. (2)  [1969] 2 Ch.  149. 727 freedom.   A Republic-if you Can Keep It-is the  caveat  for counsel  and court.  And Tom Paine, in his  Dissertation  on First Principles of Government, sounded the tossin:               "He  that would make, his own  liberty  secure

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             most guard even his enemy from oppression; for               if  he  violates this duty, he  establishes  a               precedent that will reach to himself." Phoney freedom is not worth the word and this ruling of ours is  not  confined to the petitioner but to the  hungry  job- seeker,  nun  and  nurse, mason and  carpenter,  welder  and fitter  and,  above  all, political  dissenter.   The.  last category,  detested as unreasonable, defies  the  Establish- ment’s  tendency  to enforce through conformity but  is  the resource of social change.  "The reasonable man", says G. B. Shaw; .lm15 " adapts himself to the word; the unreasonable one  persists in  trying  to adapt the world to himself.   Therefore,  all progress  depends on the unreasonable man." (George  Bernard Shaw in ’Maxims for Revolutionists’). ’Passport’ peevishness is a suppressive possibility, and  so the  words  of Justice Jackson (U.S. Supreme Court)  may  be apposite:               "Freedom  to differ is not limited  to  things               that do not matter much.  That would be a mere                             shadow  of freedom.  The test of its  substanc e               is the right to differ as to things that touch               the heart of the existing order."               (West  Yirginia  State Board of  Education  v.               Barnetto 319 US 624 (1943). Under our constitutional order, the price of daring  dissent shall not be passport forfeit. The  impugned legislation, ss. 5, 6 and 10 especially,  must be tested even under Art. 21 on canons of processual justice to  the  people  outlined  above.   Hearing  is  obligatory- meaningful  hearing,  flexible and realistic,  according  to circumstances,   but   hot  ritualistic  and   wooden.    In exceptional cases and emergency situations, interim measures may  be  taken,  to avoid the  mischief  of  the  passportee becoming  an escapee before the hearing begins.   ’Bolt  the stables after the horse has been stolen’ is not a command of ’natural justice.  But soon after the provisional seizure, a reasonable  hearing  must  follow,  to  minimise  procedural prejudice.   And when a prompt final order is  made  against the  applicant  or  passport  holder  the  reasons  must  be disclosed  to him almost invariably save in those  dangerous cases  where irreparable injury will ensue to the State.   A government which reveals in secrecy in the field of people’s liberty not only acts against democratic decency but  busies itself with its own burial.  That is the writing on the wall if  history were teacher, memory our mentor and  decline  of liberty  not  our unwitting endeavour.   Public  power  must rarely hide its heart in an open society and system. 728 I now skip Art.14 since I agree fully with all that  my learned brother Bhagwati J.has  said. That article has  a Pervasive processual  potency and versatilequality, egalitarian  in  its  soul and  allergic  to  discriminatory diktats.Equality  is the, antithesis of arbitrariness  and excathedra   ipse   dixit   is   the   ally   of   demagogic authoritarianism.    Only   knight-errants   of   ’executive excesses’-if  we may use a current cliche--can fall in  love with the Dame, of despotism, legislative or  administrative. If  this Court gives in here it gives up the ghost.  And  so it  that  I  insist  on  the  dynamics  of  limitations   on fundamental  freedoms as implying the rule of law;  Be  you, ever so high, the law is above you.’ A  minor pebble was thrown to produce a little  ripple.   It

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was feebly suggested that the right to travel abroad  cannot be  guaranteed  by  the  State  because  it  has  no  extra- territorial jurisdiction in foreign lands.  This is a  naive misconception  of  the  point  pressed  before  us.   Nobody contends  that India should interfere with  other  countries and their sovereignty to ensure free movement of Indians  in those  countries.  What is meant is that the  Government  of India  should not prevent by any sanctions it has  over  its citizens from moving within any other country if that  other country  has  no objection to their  travelling  within  its territory.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  one  can misunderstand  the obvious. A thorny problem debated  recurrently at the bar, turning on Art.  19, demands some juristic response although  avoidance of  overlap  per-  suades me to  drop  all  other  questions canvassed  before us. The Gopalan (supra) verdict, with  the cocooning  of  Art.  22  into a  self  contained  code,  has suffered supersession at the hands of R. C. Cooper(1)..   By way  of  aside,  the fluctuating   fortunes  of  fundamental rights, when   the  proletarist and the  proprietariat  have asserted  them  in  Court,  partially  provoke  sociological research  and hesitantly project the Cardozo thesis of  sub- conscious  forces  in judicial noesis  when  the  cycloramic review  starts  from  Gopalan, moves on to In  re  :  Kerala Education  Bill  and  then on to All  India  Bank  Employees Union,  next to Sakai Newspapers, crowning in Cooper(1)  and followed  by Bennet Coleman(2) and Sambu Nath Sarkar(3).  Be that  as it may, the law is now settled, as I apprehend  it, that  no  article  in Part III is an island but  part  of  a continent,  and the conspectus of the whole part  gives  the directions and correction needed for interpretation of these basic provisions. Man is not dissectible into separate limbs and,  likewise, cardinal rights in an organic  constitution, which  make man human have a synthesis. The  proposition  is indubitable,  that art. 21 does not, in a  given  situation, exclude Art. 19 if both rights are breached.      We may switch to Art. 19 very briefly and travel  along another, street for a while. Is freedom of extra-territorial travel  to assure which is the primary office of  an  Indian passport,  a facet of the freedom of speech and  expression, of profession or vocation under Article 19?      (1) [1973] 3 S.C.R. 530.      (2)  [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757.      (3)  [1973]1 S.C.R. 856.                  729 My total consensus with Shri Justice Bhagwati jettisons from this judgment the profusion of precedents and the mosaic  of many  points and confines me to some fundamentals  confusion on  which,  with  all the clarity on details,  may  mar  the conclusion.  It is a salutary thought that the summit  court should not interpret constitutional rights enshrined in Part III  to  choke its life-breath or chill its  elan  vital  by processes  of  legalism,  overruling  the  enduring   values burning in the bosoms of those who won our Independence  and drew  up our founding document.  We must also remember  that when  this  Court lays down the law, not ad  hoc  tunes  but essential  notes,  not temporary tumult  but  transcendental truth,  must guide the judicial process in translating  into authoritative notation the mood music of the Constitution. While  dealing  with  Art. 19 vis a vis  freedom  to  travel abroad,  we  have to remember one spinal  indicator.   True, high   constitutional  policy  has   harmonised   individual freedoms   with  holistic  community  good   by   inscribing exception’s  to Art. 19(1) in Art. 19(2) to (6).   Even  so, what is fundamental is the freedom, not the exception.  More

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importantly,  restraints are permissible only to the  extent they have nexus with the approved object.  For instance,  in a  wide  sense, ’the interests of the  general  public’  are served  by  a  family  planning  programme  but  it  may  be constitutional impertinence to insist that passports may  be refused  if  sterilisation certificates were  not  produced. Likewise,  it  is  in public interest to  widen  streets  in cities  but  monstrous  to impound a  passport  because  its holder  has  declined to demolish his house  which  projects into  the  street line.  Sure, the security of  State  is  a paramount  consideration  but  can  Govemment,  totalitarian fashion.  cquate Part,, country and refuse  travel  document because,  while  abroad, he may  criticise  the  conflicting politics of the Party-in-power or the planning economics  of the government of the day?  Is it conceivable that an Indian will  forfeit  his right to go abroad  because  his  flowing side-bums or sartorial vagaries offend a high-placed  autho- rity’s  sense of decency ? The point is that liberty can  be curtailed  only  if the grounds listed in  the  saving  sub- articles  are  directly,  specifically,  substantially   and imminently  attracted  so that the basic right  may  not  be stultified.   Restraints are necessary and validly  made  by statute,  but to paint with an over-broad brush a  power  to blanketban  travel  abroad  is to sweep  overly  and  invade illicitly.   ’The  law  of  fear’  cannot  reign  where  the proportionate  danger  is containable.  It  is  a  balancing process,  not over-weighted one way or the other.  Even  so, the perspective is firm and fair.  Courts must not interfere where the order is not perverse, unreasonable, mala fide  or supported  by  no material.  Under our system,  court  writs cannot  run government, for, then, judicial review may  tend to  be  a judicial coup.  But ’lawless’  law  and  executive excess  must be halted by judge-power best the  Constitution be  subverted  by  branches deriving  credentials  from  the Constitution.   An imperative guideline by which  the  Court will  test  the  soundness  of  legislative  and   executive constraint is, in the. language of V. C. Row(1) this (1)  [1952]S.C.R.597. 730 .lm15 "The reasonableness of a restriction depends upon the values of  life  in  a society, the circumstances  obtaining  at  a particular  point of time when the restriction  is  imposed, the  degree  and  the  urgency of  the  evil  sought  to  be controlled an similar others." What  characterises the existence and eclipse of  the  right of,  exit ?  Breathes there the man with soul so dead’  who, if  he  leaves, will not return to his  own  ’native  land’? Then,   why   restrict   ?  The   question,   presented   so simplistically,   may  still  have  overtones  of   security sensitivity  and sovereignty complexity and  other  internal and external factors, and that is why the case which we  are deciding  has  spread  the canvas wide.  I  must  express  a pensive  reflection, sparked off by submissions at the  bar, that,  regardless  of  the ’civil  liberty’  credentials  or otherwise  of  a particular government and mindless  of  the finer  phraseology  of a  restrictive  legislation,  eternal vigilance  by  the superior judiciary  and  the  enlightened activists  who  are the catalysts of the community,  is  the perpetual  price  of the preservation of  every  freedom  we cherish.   For,  if unchecked, ’the greater the  power,  the more dangerous the abuse.’ To deny freedom of travel or exit to one untenably is to deny it to any or many likewise,  and the  right to say ’Aye’ or ’nay’ to any potential  traveller should,  therefore, not rest with the minions or masters  of

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government  without  being gently and benignly  censored  by constitutionally sanctioned legislative norms if the reality of liberty is not be drowned in the hysteria of the hour  or the hubris of power.  It is never trite to repeat that where laws end, tyranny begins’, and law becomes. unlaw even if it is legitimated by three legislative readings and one assent, if  it  is  not in accord  with  constitutional  provisions, beyond  abridgement by the two branches of  government.   In the  context  of scray expressions like  ’security’  ’public order,  ’public interest’ and ’friendly foreign  relations’, we  must  warn  ourselves that not verbal  tables  but  real values  are the governing considerations in the  exploration and   adjudication  of  constitutional   prescriptions   and proscriptions.  Governments come and go, but the fundamental rights of the people cannot be subject to the wishful value- sets of political regimes of the passing day. The learned Attorney General argued that the right to travel abroad  was no part of Art. 19(1) (a), (b), (c), (f) or  (g) and so to taboo travel even unreasonably does not touch Art. 19.   As  a component thereof, as also by  way  of  separate submission,  it  was  urged that the direct  effect  of  the passport  law  (and refusal thereunder) was not  a  blow  on freedom  of  speech, of association or  of  profession  and, therefore, it could not be struck down even if it overflowed Art. 19(2), (4) and (6).  This presentation poses the issue, ’What  is the profile ’of our free system ?’ Is  freedom  of speech integrally interwoven with locomotion ? Is freedom of profession  done  to death if a  professional,  by  passport refusal without reference to Art. 19 (f ), is inhibited from taking  up a job offered abroad ? is freedom of  association such  a hot-house plant that membership of an  international professional  or  political Organisation can be cut  off  on executive-legislative  ipse dixit without obedience to  Art. 19(4) ? 731 This   renophatic  touch  has  not  been  attested  by   the Constitution and is not discernible in the psyche.  An anti- international  pathology  shall  not  afflict  our  National Charter.   A Human Tomorrow on Mother Earth is  our  cosmic constitutional perspective (See Art. 51 To. my mind, locomotion is, in some situation,  necessarily. involved in the exercise of the specified fundamental rights as an associated or integrated right.  Travel,  simiplicter, is peripheral to and not necessarily fundamental in Art. 19. Arguendo,  free speech is feasible without  movement  beyond the country, although soilequies and solo songs are not the vogue  in  this ancient land of silent saints  and  pyrating gurus, bhajans and festivals.  Again, travel may  ordinarily be ’action and only incidentally ’expression’, to borrow the Zemel diction. Movement within the territory of India is not tampered  with by  the  impugned order, but that is not all.  For,  if  our notions  are en current, it is common place that the  world- the family of nations--vibrates, and men-masses of  man-move and  ’jet’ abroad and abroad, even in Concorde, on  a  scale unknown  to history.  Even thoughts, ideologies  and  habits travel  beyond.  Tourists crowd out airline  services;  job- seekers  rush to passport offices; lecture  tours,  cultural exchanges, trans-national evangelical meets, scientific  and scholarly  studies and workshops and seminars escalate,  and international associations abound-all for the good of  world peace and human progress, save where are involved high risks to  sovereignty,  national security  and  other  substantial considerations  which Constitutions and Courts have  readily recognised.   Our free system is not so brittle or  timorous

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as to be scared into tabooing citizens trips abroad, except conducted tours or approved visits sanctioned by the Central Executive  and  indifferent  to Art. 19.   Again,  the  core question  arises, Is movement abroad so much a crucial  part of  free  speech, free practice of profession and  the  like that denial of the first is a violation of the rest? I  admit that merely because speaking mostly  involves  some movement,  therefore, ’free speech anywhere is dead if  free movement  everywhere  is  denied’,  does  not  follow.   The Constitutional lines must be so drawn that the constellation of  fundamental rights does not expose the  peace,  security and  tranquillity of the community to high risk.  We  cannot over-stretch   free  speech  to  make  it  an   inextricable component of travel. Thomas  Emerson  has summed the American Law which  rings  a bell even in the Indian system :               "The  values and functions of the  freedom  of               expression in a democratic polity are obvious.               Freedom  of  expression is  essentially  as  a               means of assuring individual  self-fulfilment.               The  proper end of man is the  realisation  of               his  character and potentialities as  a  human               being.   For  the achievement  of  this  self-               realisation the mind must be free." Again                732               "Freedom of expression is an essential process               for advancing knowledge and discovering truth.               So  also for participation in  decision-making               in   a   democratic  society.    Indeed   free               expression furthers stability in the community               by  reasoning  together  instead  of  battling               against each other.  Such being the value  and               function of free speech, what are the dynamics               of limitation which will fit these values and               functions  without retarding social  goals  or               injuring  social  interest  ? It  is  in  this               background that we have to view the problem of               passports and the law woven around it.   There               are  two ways of looking at the question  ....               as  a  facet of liberty and as an  ancient  of               expression."   Thomas  Emerson   comments   on               passports from these dual angles :               Travel abroad should probably be classified as               ’action’   rather   than   "expression".    In               commonsense  terms  travel  is  more  physical               movement  than communication of ideas.  It  is               true   that   travel  abroad   is   frequently               instrumental  to  expression, as  when  it  is               undertaken  by a reporter to gather  news’,  a               scholar  to  lecture,  a  student  to   obtain               information  or simply an ordinary citizen  in               order  to  expand  his  understanding  of  the               world.  Nevertheless, there are so many  other               aspects  to travel abroad on  functionally  it               requires  such different types  of  regulation               that,  at last as the general proposition,  it               would  have  to be  considered  "action".   As               action, it is a ’liberty’ protected by the due               process  clause  of the Fifth  and  Fourteenth               Amendments.   The  first  amendment  is  still               relevant   in  two  ways  :  (1)   There   are               sufficient  elements of expression in  travel,               abroad  so  that the umbrella effect  of  tile               first  Amendment  comes  into  play,   thereby               requiring the courts to apply due process  and

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             other  constitutional doctrines  with  special               care; (2) conditions imposed on travel  abroad               based  on  conduct  classified  as  expression               impair  freedom of expression and hence  raise               direct first Amendment questions." Travel  is  more  than speech : it is  speech  bridged  with conduct, in the words of Justice Douglas:               "Restrictions on the right to travel in  times               of  peace should be so particularized that  at               First Amendment right is not precluded  unless               some  clear countervailing  national  interest               stands in the way. of its assertion." I  do not take this. as wholly valid in our Part III  scheme but refer to it as kindred reasoning. The  delicate,  yet  difficult,  phase  of  the  controversy arrives  where free speech and free practice  of  profession are   inextricably  interwoven  with  travel  abroad.    The Passport Act, in terms, does not inhibit expression and only regulates action-to borrow the phraseology of Chief  Justice Warren in Zemel.  But we have to view the proximate and real conservance of thwarting trans-national travel through the 733 power of the State exercised under s. 3 of the Passport  Act read, A with ss. 5, 6 and 10.  If a right is not in  express terms  fundamental within the meaning of Part III, does  it escape  Art. 13, read with the trammels of Art. 19, even  if the immediate impact, the substantial ,effect, the proximate import or the necessary result is prevention of free  speech or  practice  of one’s profession ? The answer is  that  as- sociated  rights,  totally integrated, must enjoy  the  same immunity.  Not  otherwise. Three  sets of cases may be thought of.  Firstly, where  the legislative  provision or executive order expressly  forbids exercise  in  foreign lands of the fundamental  right  while grunting passport.  Secondly, there may be cases where  even if  the  order  is- innocent on its  face,  the  refusal  of permission  to go to a foreign country may,  with  certainty and immediacy, spell denial of free speech and  professional practice  or business.  Thirdly, the fundamental  right  may itself   enwomb   locomotion  regard-.  less   of   national frontiers.  The second and third often are blurred in  their edges and may overlap. The  first  class  may  be  illustrated.   If  the  passport authority  specifically  conditions the  permission  with  a direction  not  to address meetings abroad or not  to  be  a journalist  or  professor in a foreign  country,  the  order violate Art. 19(1) (a) or (f) and stands voided unless  Art. 19  (2) and (6) are complied with.  The second category  may be exemplified and examined after the third which is of less frequent  occurrence.   If  ’a person  is  an  international pilot,  astronaut,  Judge.  of the  International  Court  of Justice, Secretary of the World Peace Council, President  of a  body of like nature, the particular profession  not  only calls  for its practice travelling outside Indian  territory but  its  core itself is international travel.  In  such  an area,  no  right  of  exit, no  practice  of  profession  or vocation.  Similarly, a cricketer or tennis player recruited on  a  world  tour.  Free speech may  similarly  be  bit  by restriction  on  a  campaigner for  liberation  of  colonial peoples  or against  genocide before  the  United  Nations Organisation.   Refusal in such cases is hit on the head  by negation  of a national passport and can be rescued only  by compliance  With  the relevant saving provisions ,  in  Art. 19(2), (4) or (6). So  far is plain sailing, as I see it.  But  the  navigation

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into the penumbral zone of the second category is not easy. I  Supposing  a  lawyer  or  doctor,  expert  or   exporter, missionary   or  guru,  has  to  visit  a  foreign   country profession-ally   or  on  a  speaking  assignment.   He   is effectively   disabled  from  discharging  his  pursuit   if passport is refused.  There the direct effect, the necessary consequence, the immediate impact of the embargo on grant of passport (or its subsequent impounding or revocation) is the infringement  of  the right to  expression  or  profession’. Such infraction is unconstitutional unless the relevant part of  Art.  19 (2) to (6) is complied With.  In  dealing  with fundamental  freedom  substantial justification  alone  will bring  the  law under the  exceptions.   National  security, sovereignty,  public  order and public interest must  be  of such  a  high  degree as to offer  a  great  threat.   These concepts should not be devalued to suit 734      the  hyper-sensitivity  of  the  executive  or  minimal threats  to the State.  Our, nation is not so  pusillanimous or precarious as to fall or founder. if some miscreants pelt stones  at its fair face from foreign countries.   The  dogs may  bark, but the caravan will pass.  And the danger  to  a party  in power is not the same as rocking the  security  or sovereignty of the, State.  Sometimes, a petulant government which  forces silence may act unconstitutionally  to  forbid criticism from far, even if necessary for    the good of the State.   The perspective of free criticism with  its  limits for  free people everywhere, all true patriots will  concur, is  eloquently  spelt out by Sir Winston  Churchill  on  the historic  censure  motion  in the  Commons  as  Britain  was reeling under defeat at the hands of Hitlerite hordes :               "This  long debate has now reached  its  final               stage.  What a remarkable example it, has been               of the unbridled freedom of our  Parliamentary               institutions  in time of war  Everything  that               could be thought of or raked up has been  used               to  weaken confidence in the  Government,  has               been   used  to  prove  that   Ministers   are               incompetent and to weaken their confidence  in               themselves,  to  make the  Army  distrust  the               backing it is getting from the civil power, to               make  workmen lose confidence in  the  weapons               they are striving so hard to, make, to present               the  Government as a set of non-entities  over               whom  the Prime Minister towers, and  then  to               undermine  him  in  his  own  heart,  and,  if               possible, before the eyes of the nation.   All               this  poured  out by cable and  radio  to  all               parts of the world, to the distress of all our               friends and to the delight of all our foes   I               am  in favour of this freedom, which no  other               country would use, or dare to use, in times of               mortal  peril such as those through  which  we               are passing." I wholly agree that spies, traitors, smugglers, saboteurs of the health, wealth and survival or sovereignty of the nation shall  not  be passported into hostile soil  to  work  their vicious  plan fruitfully.  But when applying  the  Passports Act,  over-breadth hyper-anxiety,  regimentation    complex, and political mistrust shall not sub-consciously exaggerate, into morbid or neurotic refusal or unlimited impounding  or- final  revocation  of  passport,  facts  which,  objectively assessed,  may  prove tremendous trifles.  That is  why  the provisions  have  to be read  down  into  constitutionality, tailored  to  fit the reasonableness test and  humanised  by

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natural  justice.  The Act will survive but the order  shall perish  for  reasons  so  fully  set  out  by  Shri  Justice Bhagwati.  And, on this construction, the conscience of  the Constitution  triumphs over vagarious  governmental  orders. And,   indeed,  the  learned  Attorney  General   (and   the Additional  Solicitor General who appeared with  him),  with characteristic  and  commendable grace  and  perceptive  and progressive  realism, agreed to the happy resolution of  the present  dispute  in  the  manner  set  out  in  my  learned brother’s judgment. A concluding caveat validating my detour.  Our country,  its hopes,  all its tears and all its fears, must  never  forget that  freedom is recreated year by year, that freedom is  as freedom does, that we have gained a republic ’if we can keep it’ and that the water- 735 shed  between a police state and a people’s raj  is  located partly  through its passport policy.  Today, a poor  man  in this poor country despaire of getting a passport because  of invariable   police   enquiry,   insistence   on    property requirement  and other avoidable procedural obstacles.   And if  a system of secret informers, police dossiers,  faceless whisperers  and political tale-bearers  conceptualised  ’and institutionalised ’in public interest,’ comes to stay, civil liberty  is  legisidally  constitutionalised--a  consumption constantly to be resisted.  The merits of a particular  case apart, the policing of a people’s right of exit or entry  is fraught  with  peril to liberty unless  policy  is  precise, operationally respectful of recognised values and harassment proof.   Bertrand Russel has called attention to a  syndrome the Administration will do well to note :               "We  are all of us a mixture, of good and  bad               impulses  that  prevail in an  excited  crowd.               There  is in most men an impulse to  persecute               whatever is felt to be ’different’.  There  is               also  a  haired of any claim  to  superiority,               which  makes  the stupid many hostile  to  the               intelligent  few.   A motive such as  fear  of               communism  affords what seems a  decent  moral               excuse for a combination of the heard  against               everything in any way exceptional.  This is  a               recurrent   phenomenon   in   human   history.               Wherever it occurs, its results are horrible."               (Foreword by Bertrand Russel to Freedom is  as               Freedom Does-Civil Liberties Today-by  Corliss               Lament.  New York, 1956) While interpreting and implementing the words of Art. 14, 19 and 21, we may keep J. B. Preistley’s caution :               "We do not imagine that we are the victims  of               plots, that bad men are doing all this.  It is               the machinery of power that is getting out  of               sane  control.  Lost in its elaboration,  even               some  men  of  goodwill begin  to  forget  the               essential  humanity this machinery  should  be               serving.   They  are  now  so  busy   testing,               analysing,  and reporting on bath  water  that               ’they  cannot remember having thrown the  baby               out of the window."               (Introduction  by  H.  H.  Wilson,   Associate               Professor  of  Political  Science,   Princeton               University  to Freedom is as Freedom  Does  by               Corriss Lament, ibid p. xxi.) I have divagated a great deal into travel  constitutionality in  the  setting. of the story of the  human  journey,  even though such a diffusion is partly beyond the strict needs of

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this case.  But judicial travelling, like other  travelling. is  almost  like ’talking with men of  other  centuries  and countries.’ I  agree  with Sri Justice  Bhagwati,  notwithstanding  this supplementary. KAILASAM,  J.-This petition is filed by Mrs.  Maneka  Gandhi under  Article 32 of the Constitution of India  against  the Union of India 736 and the Regional Pass port Officer for a writ of  certiorari for  calling  for  the  records of  the  case  including  in particular the order dated July 2, 1977 made by the Union of India  under section 10(3) (c) of the Passports Act, Act  15 of  1967, impounding the passport of the petitioner and  for quashing the said order. The petitioner received a letter dated July 2, 1977 on  July 4,  1977  informing  her that it had  been  decided  by  the Government  of  India to impound her passport.   The  letter read as follows               "You may recall that a passport no.   K-869668               was  issued to you by this office, on  1-6-76.               It has been decided by the Government of India               to  impound your above passport under  section               10(3) (c) of the Passport Act, 1967 in  public               interest.               You  are  hereby required  to  surrender  your               passport K-869668 to this office within  seven               days  from  the date of the  receipt  of  this               letter." On  July  5, 1977 the petitioner addressed a letter  to  the second  respondent, Regional Transport  Officer,  requesting him  to furnish her a copy of the statement of  the  reasons for  making  the  impugned  order.   On  July  7,  1977  the petitioner  received  the following communication  from  the Ministry of External Affairs:               "The  Government has decided to  impound  your               passport  in  the interest of  general  public               under  section 10(3)(c) of the  Passport  Act,               1967.   It  has further been  decided  by  the               Government  in the interest of general  public               not  to  furnish you a copy  of  statement  of               reasons for making such orders as provided for               under  section  10(5) of  the  Passports  Act,               1967." The   petitioner  submitted  that  the  order   is   without jurisdiction  and not ’in the interests of general  public.’ The validity of the order was challenged on various grounds. It was submitted that there was contravention of Art. 14  of the  Constitution, that principles of natural  justice  were violated;  that  no  opportunity of hearing  as  implied  in section 10(3) of the Act was given and that the with-holding of  the  reasons for the order under section  10(5)  is  not justified  in law On July 8, 1977 the petitioner prayed  for an  exparte  ad interim order staying the operation  of  the order  of the respondents dated July 2, 1977 and for  making the  order of stay absolute after hearing  the  respondents. On  behalf of the Union of India, Shri N. K. Ghose,  I.F.S., Director  (P.V.)  Ministry  of  External  Affairs,  filed  a counter  affidavit.  It was stated in the counter  affidavit that  on  May  11, 1977, the Minister  of  External  Affairs approved the impounding of the passport of 11 persons and on May 19, 1977 an order was passed by the Minister  impounding the passports of 8 persons out of 11 persons that on July 1, 1977 the authorities concerned informed the Ministry of- Ex- ternal  Affairs  that  the petitioner and  her  husband  had

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arrived at Bombay on the after-noon of July 1, 1977 and that information  bad been received that there was likelihood  of the   petitioner  leaving  the  country.   The   authorities contacted the Ministry of External Affairs 737 and  Minister  after  going  through  the  relevant   papers approved the impounding of the passport of the petitioner on the  evening  of July 1, 1977 in the  interests  of  general public  under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports  Act,  1967. On  July 2, 1977 Regional Transport Officer on  instructions from the Government of India informed the- petitioner  about the Central Government’s decision to impound her passport in public interest and requested her to surrender her passport. In  the  counter affidavit various allegations made  in  the petition  were denied and it was stated that the  order  was perfectly justified and that the petition is without  merits and should be dismissed.  The rejoinder affidavit was. filed by the petitioner on July 16, 1977. An  application Civil Misc.  Petition No. 6210 of  1977  was filed by the petitioner for leave to urge additional grounds in  support  of  the writ petition and  a  counter  to  this application was filed on behalf of the Ministry of  External Affairs on August 18, 1977. A petition by Adil Shahryar was filed seeking permission  to intervene  ill the writ petition and it was ordered by  this Court.  During the hearing of the writ petition,  Government produced the order disclosing the reasons for impounding the passport. The reasons given are that it was apprehended that the  petitioner was attempting or was likely to  attempt  to leave the country and thereby hamper the functioning of  the Commissions  of Inquiry.  According to the  Government,  the petitioner  being the wife of Shri Sanjay Gandhi, there  was likelihood of the petitioner being questioned regarding some aspects of the Commission.  In the counter affidavit it  was further--alleged that there was good deal of evidence abroad and it would be unrealistic to over-look the possibility  of tampering   with  it  or  making  it  unavailable   to   the Commission,  which can be done more easily  and  effectively when  an  interested  person is ’abroad.   So  far  as  this allegation was concerned as it was not taken into account in passing the order it was given up during the hearing of  the writ  petition.  The only ground on which  the  petitioner’s passport  was  impounding  was that she  was  likely  to  be examined  by the Commission of Inquiry and her presence  was necessary in India. Several questions of law were raised.  It was submitted that the  petitioner was a journalist by profession and that  she intended  to proceed to West Germany in connection with  her professional duties, as a journalist and that by denying her the passport not only was her right to travel abroad  denied but  her fundamental rights guaranteed under  Article  19(1) were  infringed.   The contention was that before  an  order passed under Article 21 of the Constitution could be  valid, it should not only satisfy the requirements of that article, namely  that the order should be according to the  procedure established by law, but also should not in any way  infringe on  her fundamental rights guaranteed under  Article  19(1). In  other  words,  the  submission was  that  the  right  to personal  liberty cannot be deprived without satisfying  the requirements  of not only Art. 21, but also Article 19.   In addition the provisions of Section 10(3)(c) were  challenged ’as  being ultra vires of the powers of the legislature  and that in any event 738 the  order vitiated by the petitioner not having been  given

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an opportunity of being heard before the impugned order  was passed.   It  was  contended  that  the  fundamental  rights guaranteed  under  Article 19(1) particularly the  right  of freedom  of speech and the right to practise profession  was available  to Indian citizens not only within the  territory of  India  but,  also beyond the  Indian  territory  and  by preventing  the petitioner from travelling abroad her  right to  freedom  of  speech and  right  to  practise  profession outside  the country were also infringed. The plea  is  that the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed under  article  19  are available not only within territory of India but outside the territory of India as well. The  question that arises for consideration is  whether  the Fundamental   Rights,   conferred   under   Part   III   and particularly  the  rights  conferred under  Article  19  are available   beyond  the  territory  of  India.  the   rights conferred  under Article 19 (1) (a), (b), (c), (f ) and  (g) are               (a)   to freedom of speech and expression;               (b)   to assemble peacebly and without arms;               (c)   to form associations or unions;               x                      x                     x               x               (f)   to   acquire,   hold  and   dispose   of               property; and                (g)  to practise any profession, or to  carry               on any occupation, trade or business; The  rights conferred under Article 19(1) (d) and (e)  being limited  in  its  operation to the territory  of  India  the question  of  their extraterritorial  application  does  not arise. In order to decide this question, I may consider the various provisions  of the Constitution, which throw some  light  on this point.  The preamble to the Constitution provides  that the  people, of India have solemnly resolved  to  constitute India   into  a  Sovereign  Socialist  Secular   Democrative Republic and to secure to all its ciitzens:               Justice, social,  economic and political;               Liberty  of thought, expression, belief  faith               and worship;               Equality of status and of opportunity; and  to               promote among them all,. Fraternity assuring the, dignity of the individual and  the, unity of the nation. By  the  article,  India  is  constituted  as  a  Democratic republic and its citizens secured certain rights.  While-  a reading of the article would indicate that the articles  are applicable  within  the  territory of  India,  the  question arises  whether  they are available beyond  the  territorial limits of India. Article  12  of  the Constitution  defines  "the  State"  as including  the  Government and Parliament of India  and  the Government  and the Legislature of each of the  States  and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government                  739 of   India.   Article  13  provides  that  laws   that   are inconsistent with or in derogation of Fundamental Rights are to that extent void.  Article 13(1) provides, that all  laws in  force in the territory of India immediately  before  the commencement  of  this Constitution, in so far as  they  are inconsistent  with the provisions of Part III shall, to  the extent of such inconsistency, be void.  What are the laws in force  in the territory of India  immediately  before  the commencement  ,of the Constitution that are referred  to  in

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the  Article  will  have to be  looked  into.   Before  that Article  13(2) may be noticed which provides that the  State shall  not  make ’any law which takes away or  abridges  the rights.  conferred  by Part III, and any law  made  in  con- travention  of  this  clause shall, to  the  extent  of  the contravention,  be void.  The word "law" in the  Article  is defined as:               (a)   "law"  includes  any  Ordinance,  order,               bye-law,   rule,   regulation,   notification,               custom  or  usage having in the  territory  of               India the force of law; and               (b)   "laws in force" includes laws passed  or               made  by  a  Legislature  or  other  competent               authority in the territory of India before the               commencement  of  this  Constitution  and  not               previously repealed, notwithstanding that  any               such  law or any part thereof may not be  then               in  operation either at all or  in  particular               areas.  While  the  applicability  of  the  custom  and  usage   is restricted  to  the  territory of India "law"  may  have  an extra-territorial application. In distributing the legislative powers between the Union and the  ’States Article 248 provides that Parliament  may  make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and the  Legislature of a ’State may make laws for the whole  or any part of the State.  Article 245(2) provides that no  law made  by  parliament shall be deemed to be  invalid  on  the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation.  This article  makes  it clear that a State law  cannot  have  any extra-territorial operation while that of the parliament can have.   The  Parliament  has undoubted power  to  enact  law having extra-territorial application.  In England section  3 of  the  Statute  of  Westminster,  1931  (22  Geo.   V.C.4) provides :               "It  is hereby declared and enacted  that  the               Parliament  of  a Dominion has full  power  to               make laws having extraterritorial operation." But in determining whether the provisions of a  Constitution or  a  ,statute have extra-territorial  application  certain principles are laid down.  Maxwell on The Interpretation  of Statutes Twelfth Edition, at p. 169, while dealing with  the territorial application of British legislation has stated :-               "It has been said by the Judicial Committee of               the  Privy  Council  that :  ’An  Act  of  the               Imperial Parliament today, unless it provides,               otherwise, applies to the whole of the United               Kingdom and to nothing outside the United               740               Kingdom not even to the Channel Islands or the               Isle  of Man, let alone to a  remote  overseas               colony of possession." Lord  Denning M. R. has said that the general rule is  "that an Act of Parliament only applies to transactions within the United  Kingdom and not to transactions outside." These  two extracts  are from two decisions (1) Att.  Gen. for  Alberta vs.  Huggard Assets, Ltd., (1953) A.C. 420 and C.E.B. Draper &  Son,  Ltd. vs.  Edward Turner & Son. Ltd. (1964)  3  All. E.R.  148 at p. 150 Maxwell comments on the  above  passages thus  "These statements, however, perhaps  oversimplify  the position."  The decisions cited will be referred to in  due course. Craies  on  Statute Law (Sixth Ed.) at p.  447  states  that an  Act  of the legislature will bind the subjects  of  this realm,  both within the kingdom and without, if such is  its

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intention.   But  whether any particular Act  of  parliament purports to bind British subjects abroad will always  depend upon the intention of the legislature which must be gathered from  the  language of the Act in question."  Dicey  in  his Introduction  to  the Study of the Law of  the  Constitution (1964   Ed.)  at  page  lin  states  the  position  thus   : "Parliament normally restricts the operation of  legislation to  its own territories, British ships wherever they may  be being included in the ambit of territory.-Parliament does on occasions,   however,  pass  legislation   controlling   the activities of its own citizen when they are abroad." Salmond in  his  book on Jurisprudence (Twelfth  Ed.)  distinguishes between   the  territorial  enforcement  of  law   and   the territoriality of law itself.  At p. 11 the author states : "Since  territoriality is not a logically necessary part  of the idea of law, a system of law is readily conceivable  the application  of  which  is limited  and  determined  not  by reference to territorial considerations, but by reference to the  personal  qualifications of the individuals  over  whom jurisdiction  is  exercised." According  to  the  text-books above  referred to, the position is that a law  is  normally applicable within the territory, but can be made  applicable to  its citizens wherever they may be.  Whether such  extra- territorial applicability is intended or not will have to be looked for in the legislation. I will now refer to the decisions of courts an this subject. In Niboyet v. Niboyet(1) the Court of Appeal stated: "It  is true that the words of the statute are general, but  general word,,, in a statute have never, so far as I am aware,  been interpreted so as to extend the action of the statute beyond the territorial authority of the Legislature.  All  criminal statutes are in their terms general; but they apply only  to offences  committed  within  the  territory  or  by  British subjects.  When the Legislature intends the statute to apply beyond the ordinary territorial authority of the country, it so  states  expressly  in the statute  as  in  the  Merchant Shippina  Acts, and in some of the Admiralty Acts."  In  the Queen  v.   Jameson and Others (2)  the Chief  Justice  Lord Russet (1)  48 L. J. P. I at p. 10. (2)  [1896] 2 Q. B. Division 425 at 430. 741 stated  the position thus : "It may be said  generally  that the  area  within. which a statute is to  operate,  and  the persons  against whom it is to operate, are to  be  gathered from the language and purview of the particular statute.  In Cooke  v.  The Charles A. Vogeler Company(1), the  House  of Lords  in  dealing  with the jurisdiction of  the  Court  of Bankruptcy  observed that "English legislation is  primarily territorial,  and it is no departure from that principle  to say  that  a foreigner coming to this  country  and  trading here,  and here committing an act of bankruptcy, is  subject to our laws and to, all the incidents which those laws enact in such a case; while he is here, while he is trading,  even if  not actually domiciled, he is liable to be made a  bank- rupt  like  a native citizen........ It is  limited  in  its terms  to  England; and I think it would  be  impossible  to suppose  that  if the Legislature had intended  so  broad  a jurisdiction  as is contended for here,, it would  not  have conferred it by express enactment." In Tomalin v. S. Pearson &  Son,  Limited(2)  the Court of appeal  dealing  with  the application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906,  quoted with  approval a passage from Maxwell on  Interpretation  of Statutes  at p. 213 where in it was stated: "In the  absence of an intention clearly expressed or to be inferred from its

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language, or from the object or subject-matter or history of the  enactment, the presumption is that Parliament does  not design its statutes to operate beyond the territorial limits of  the United Kingdom".  The law that is applicable in  the United  Kingdom  is fairly summed up in the  above  passage. The  presumption  is  that the statute is  not  intended  to operate  beyond  the territorial limits  unless  a  contrary intention  is  expressed  or  could  be  inferred  from  its language.   The decision of the Privy Council  in  Att.-Gen. for  Alberta v. Huggard Assets, Ltd. (8), has  already  been referred to as a quotation from Maxwell’s Interpretation  of Statutes.  The Privy Council in that case held that "An  Act of   the  Imperial  Parliament  today  unless  it   provides otherwise, applies to the whole of the United Kingdom and to nothing outside the ’United Kingdom: not even to the Channel Islands  or the Isle of Man, let alone to a remote  overseas colony  or  possession."  The Court of  Appeal  in  a  later decision  reported  in (1964) 3 All.  E.R.  p.  148  (C.E.B. Draper & Son, Ltd. vs.  Edward Turner & Son, Ltd.)  approved of  the proposition laid down in Att.  Gen. for Alberta  vs. Huggard  Assets, Ltd., observing "Prima facie an Act of  the United  Kingdom  Parliament, unless it  provides  otherwise, applies  to the whole of the United Kingdom and  to  nothing outside the United Kingdom". The cases decided by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of  India  may be taken note of.  Dealing  with  the  extra- territorial application of the provisions of the  Income-tax Act,  the Federal Court in Governor--General in  Council  v. Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. (4) after finding that there was no  territorial operation of the Act observed that if  there was  any  extra  territorial  operation  it  is  within  the legislative  powers given to tile Indian Legislature by  the Constitution  Act.   After discussing the case-law  ’on  the subject at p. 61 regarding the making of laws for the (1)  [1901] A. C. 102 at p. 107. (2)  [1909] 2 K. B. 61. (3)  [1953] A. C. 420. (4)  A. I. R. (31) 1944 Federal Court 51. 9-119 SCI/78 742 whole or any part of British India on topics in Lists I  and III  of  Sch. 7 and holding that the  Federal  Legislature’s powers  for extra-territorial legislation is not limited  to the cases specified in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (2) of  section  99  of  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935, concluded  by  stating that the extent, if  any,  of  extra- territorial  operation which is to be found in the  impugned provisions  is  within the legislative powers given  to  the Indian  Legislature  by  the  Constitution  Act.   Again  in Wallace  Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of  Income-tax, Bombay,  Sind  and Baluchistan(1),- the Federal  Court  held that  there  was no element of  extraterritoriality  in  the impugned  provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, and  even if  the provisions were in any measure  extraterritorial  in their  effect, that was not a ground for holding them to  be ultra vires the Indian Legislature.  In Mohammad Mohy-ud-din v.  The King Emperor(2), the Federal Court  was  considering the  validity of the Indian Army Act, 191 1. In this case  a person  who  was not a British subject but had  accepted,  a commission  in the Indian Army was arraigned before a  court martial  for  trial  for  offences  alleged  to  have   been committed  by him outside British India.  It was  held  that section  41  of  the  Indian  Army  Act,  191  1,  conferred jurisdiction on the courtmartial to try non-British subjects for  offences committed by them beyond British India.  On  a

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construction  of section 43 of the Act the Court  held  that the  court-martial has powers "over all the native  officers and  soldiers  in  the said  military  service  to  whatever Presidency   such  officers  and  soldiers  may  belong   or wheresoever  they may be serving." Repelling the  contention that there was a presumption against construing even general words  in  an Act of Parliament as intended to  have  extra- territorial   effect   or   authorising    extra-territorial legislation  the Court observed: "The passages relied on  in this connection from Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes do not go the length necessary for the appeIlant’s case.  It is true that every statute is to be interpreted, so far as  its language  admits, as not to be inconsistent with the  comity of  nations or with the established rules  of  International Law.   Whatever  may  be the rule of  International  Law  as regards  the ordinary citizen, we have not been referred  to any rule of International Law or principle of the comity  of nations  which is inconsistent with a State exercising  dis- ciplinary  control  over its own armed  forces,  when  those forces  are operating outside its territorial limits".   The law  as  laid  down by the Courts  may  now  be  summarised. Parliament   normally   restricts  the  operation   of   the legislation  to  its own territories.  Parliament  may  pass legislation  controlling  the  activities  of  the  citizens abroad.   An intention to have extra territorial  operation should be expressed or necessarily implied from the language of the Statute.  The Statute should be so interpreted as not to  be inconsistent with the comity of nations or  with  the established rules of international law. It is now necessary to examine the various articles of  Part III of the Constitution to find out whether any intention is expressed  to  make  any  of  the  rights  available  extra- territorially.   The application of Article 14 is  expressly limited to the territory of India as, it lays down that "The (1)  [1945] F.C.R. 65. (2)  [1946] F.C.R. 94. 743 State  shall not deny to any person equality before the  law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory  of India".  Article 15 relates to prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of  birth, and Art. 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public  employment.  By their very nature the  two  Articles are confined to the territory of India.  So also Articles 17 and  18  which deal with abolition  of  untouchability  and abolition of titles.  Before dealing with Articles 19 and 21 with  which we are now concerned the  other articles may  be referred  to  in brief.  Articles 20 and 22  can  have  only territorial application.  Articles 23 and 24 which relate to right  against  exploitation  and Articles 25  to  28  which relate  to  freedom  of  conscience  and  free   profession, practice  and propagation of religion etc. prima  focie  are applicable only to the territory of India At any rate  there is   no  intention  in  these  Articles  indicating   extra- territorial  application.  So also articles 29 and 30  which deal  with  cultural and educational rights  are  applicable only  within  the territory of India.  Article 31  does  not expressly  or  impliedly have any extra  territorial  appli- cation.   In  this background it will have  to  be  examined whether   any  express  or  implied  intention   of   extra- territorial applicability is discernible in Articles 19  and 21. Article  19(1) (a) declares the right to freedom  of  speech and  expression.  While it is possible that this  right  may have  extra-territorial application, it is not  likely  that

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the  framers  of  the Constitution  intended  the  right  to assemble peaceably and without arms or to form  associations or unions, or to acquire hold and dispose of property, or to practise  any  profession, or to carry  on  any  occupation, trade   or   business,  to  have   any   extra   territorial application,  for such rights could not be enforced  by  the State  outside the Indian territory.  The  rights  conferred under Art. 19 are Fundamental Rights and Articles 32 and 226 provide that these rights are guaranteed and can be enforced by the aggrieved person by approaching the Supreme Court  or the High Courts.  Admittedly, the rights enumerated in  Art. 19(1)  (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) cannot be enforced by  the State  and in the circumstances there is a presumption  that the Constitution-makers would have intended to guarantee any right  which the State cannot enforce and would have made  a provision  guaranteeing  the  rights and  securing  them  by recourse to the Supreme Court and the High Courts.  The restriction of the right to move freely throughout  the territory  of India and the right to reside and stay in  any part  of the territory of India is strongly relied  upon  as indicating  that  in the absence of  such  restrictions  the other  rights are not confined to the, territory  of  India. The provisions in Art. 19 (1) (d) and (e) i.e. the right  to move freely throughout the territory of India and to  reside and  settle  in  any part of the  territory  of  India  have historical significance.  In A. K. Gopalan vs.  The State of Madras,(1)  Kania  C.J.,  said that in the  right  "to  move freely  throughout the territory of India" the emphasis  was not  on  the free movement but on the right to  move  freely throughout  the  territory of India.  The intention  was  to avoid  any restriction being placed by the States  hampering free movement (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. 744 throughout the territory of India.  It is a historical  fact that there were rivalries between the various States and the imposition  of restraint on movement from State to State  by some States was not beyond possibility.  In the two  clauses 19 (1) (d) and (e) the right "to move freely throughout  the territory of India" and "to reside and settle in any part of the  territory  of  India"  the  "territory  of  India"   is mentioned  with  the purpose of preventing the  States  from imposing  any  restraint.   From the  fact  that  the  words "territory  of  India" are found in these  two  clauses  the contention  that the other freedoms are not limited  to  the territory  of India for their operation cannot be  accepted. In Virendra v. The  State  of Punjab and Another,(1)  S.  R. Das, C. J., who spoke on behalf  of the  Constitution  Bench stated : "The point to, be kept in view   is  that   several rights  of  freedom guaranteed to the  citizens  by  Article 19(1) are exercisable by them throughout and in all parts of the  territory  of India".  The view that the  rights  under Art. 19 (1) is exercisable in the territory of India has not been   discussed.   Far  from  Art.  19(1)  expressing   any intention  expressly  or  impliedly  of  extra   territorial operation the context would indicate that its application is intended to be only territorial.  The right under Art. 19(b) and  (c) to assemble peaceably and without arms and to  form associations or unions could not have been intended to  have any  extraterritorial  application  as it  will  not  be  in accordance  with  the accepted principles  of  international law.   As the rights under Articles 19(b) and (c) cannot  be enforced  outside  India the inference, is  that  no  extra- territorial application was intended.  So also regarding the rights  conferred  under  Articles 19(f)  and  (g)  i.e.  to

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acquire,  hold and dispose of property; and to practise  any profession,  or  to  carry  on  any  occupation,  trade   or business,  would  not have been intended  to  be  applicable outside India. It  was submitted that when the Constitution was framed  the founding  fathers  were influenced by  the  United  Nations’ Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights which  was  made  in December,  1948  and  they  thought  it  fit  to  make   the Fundamental   Rights  available  to  the   Indian   citizens throughout the world.  The history of the conception of  hu- man  rights  may be shortly traced.  The main  task  of  the Human  Rights’  Commission which was set up  by  the  United Nations  was to draw an International Bill of  Rights.   The Commission  split  this task into two documents  :  a  short declaration  of  principles  and  an  elaborate  treaty   or covenant  enforcing those principles so far as  practicable. The  Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not  intended to be binding as law but to present the main ideals of human rights  and freedoms in order to inspire everybody,  whether in  or  out of governments, to work  for  their  progressive realization.  The Commission finished the Declaration and it was  promulgated  by the UN Assembly on December  10,  1948. The  discussion  about the Draft  Indian  Constitution  took place  between February and October, 1948 and  the  Articles relating  to  the  Fundamental  Rights  were  discussed   in October,  1948,  i.e. before the  Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights was promulgated by the UN Assembly on  December 10,  1948.  It is most unlikely that before the  Declaration of Human Rights was promulgated ’ (1) [1958]S.C.R.308. 745 the  framers of the Indian Constitution decided  to  declare that the Fundamental Rights conferred on the citizens  would have   application  even  outside  India.    The   Universal Declaration  of Human Rights was not binding as law but  was only  a pious hope for achieving a common standard  for  all peoples  and  all nations.  Article 13  of  the  Declaration which is material for our discussion runs as follows : Paragraph  1. Everyone has the right to freedom of  movement and residence with in the borders of each state. Paragraph  2. Everyone has the right to leave  any  country, including his own, and to return to his country. Paragraph  1 restricts the right of movement  and  residence specifically within the borders of the country.  The second, paragraph  aims at securing the right to leave  any  country including  his  own  and  to return  to  his  country.   The Declaration  at  that  stage  did  not  have  any  idea   of conferring on the citizens of any country right of  movement beyond borders of the State or to freedom of speech or right to  assemble  outside the country of origin.   Even  in  the American  Constitution  there  is no  mention  of  right  to freedom  of speech or expression as being available  outside America.  Regarding the right of movement within the borders of  the  State it is not mentioned as one  of  the  freedoms guaranteed in the American Constitution but everyone in  the country  takes  it  for granted that one can  roam  at  will throughout the United States. The right of a citizen to leave any country and to return to his country is recognised in the United States.  While there is  no  restriction  on the citizen to  return  to  his  own country  the  Government  of the United  States  does  place certain  restrictions  for  leaving  the  country,  such  as obtaining  of the passports etc.  Even the right  to  travel outside  the United States is not unrestricted.  A  passport is a request by the Government which grants it to a  foreign

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Government  that the bearer of the passport may pass  safely and  freely.   The passport is considered as a  licence  for leaving a country and an exit permit rather than a letter of introduction.  Even in America the State Department when  it issues  a  passport specifies that they are  not  valid  for travel  to  countries  in-which the United  States  have  no diplomatic representation as the position of the  Government is  that it will not facilitate overseas travel where it  is unable  to  afford  any protection to  the  traveller.   The American public particularly the news reporters are claiming that they should be allowed to travel wherever they wish  if need be without their Government’s assurance to  protection. ’The  right  of  the American citizen to  travel  abroad  as narrated  above shows that even the right to travel  outside the country is not unfettered. In  vain one looks to the American law to find  whether  the citizens  are  granted any right of freedom  of  speech  and expression  beyond the territory of the United States.   The First  Amendment  provides for freedom of speech  and  press along  with  freedom  of religion.  Liberty  of  speech  and liberty  of  press are substantially  identical.   They  are freedom  to utter words orally and freedom to  write,  print and  circulate words.  But this freedom of expression  would be  meaningless  if people were not permitted to  gather  in groups to discuss mutual 746      problems and communicate their feelings and opinions to governmental   officers.   The  First  Amendment   therefore provides  that  the  people  have  the  right  to   assemble peaceably  and  petition  the  government  for  redress   of grievances.  The- petition for redress can only be  confined to  the  United States of America.  In a recent  address  on Human  Rights Warren Christopher, U.S. Deputy  Secretary  of State  reproduced in Shan, October 1977, stated  before  the American  Bar Association in Chicago that the  promotion  of human  rights has become a fundamental tenet of the  foreign policy  of  the Carter Administration.   In  explaining  the conception  of human rights and its practice in America  the Deputy Secretary stated that the efforts should be  directed to  the most fundamental and important human rights  all  of which  are  internationally  recognised  in  the   Universal Declaration  of  Human  Rights  which  the  United   Nations approved  in 1948.  While emphasing the three categories  of human rights (1) the right to be free from the  governmental violation of the integrity of the person; (2)- the right  to fulfilment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and  education,  and  (3)  the  right  to  enjoy  civil  and political liberties, he stated that the freedom of  thought, of  religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press,  freedom of movement within the outside one’s own country; freedom to take part in government, were liberties which     American enjoy  so fully, and too often take for granted,  are  under assault in many places.  It may be noted that while freedom of movement is referred to as both within and outside  one’s own  country  the other rights such as freedom  thought,  of religion, of assembly of speech, of press, are not stated to be  available  outside one’s own country.  It is  thus  seen that except the right to movement outside    one’s       own country  other rights are not available  extra-territorially even in America. The fundamental rights, under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution are  subject  to the restrictions that may be  placed  under Art.  19(2)  to (6) of the  Constitution.   The  Fundamental Rights  are  not  absolute but  are  subject  to  reasonable restrictions  Provided for in the Constitution itself.   The

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restrictions imposed are to be by operation of any  existing law  or  making  of  a  law  by  the  Legislature   imposing reasonable restrictions.  The scheme of the Article, thus it while  conferring Fundamental Rights on the citizens  is  to see  that such exercise does not affect the rights of  other persons  or  affect the society in general.   The  law  made under Art. 19(2) to (6), impose restrictions on the exercise of  right of freedom of speech and expression,  to  assemble peaceably without arms etc.  The restrictions thus  imposed, normally  would  apply only within the  territory  of  India unless   the   legislation  expressly   or   by necessary implication  provides for extra-territorial  operation.   In the  Penal  Code, under sections 3 and 4, the  Act  is  made specifically applicable to crimes that are committed outside India  by  citizen  of India.  Neither in  Art.  19  of  the Constitution  nor in any of the enactments  restricting  the rights under Art. 19(2) is there any provision expressly  or by  necessary  implication providing  for  extra-territorial application.   A  citizen  cannot  enforce  his  Fundamental Rights  outside the territory of India even if it  is  taken that such rights are available outside the country. 747 In  the  view  that  a  citizen  is  not  entitled  to   the Fundamental  Rights  guaranteed under Art.  19  outside  the territorial limits of India,- the contention of the  learned counsel for the petition that by denying him the passport to travel outside India, his Fundamental Rights like freedom of speech  and expression, to assemble peaceably,  to  practise profession or to carry on occupation, trade or business  are infringed,   cannot  be  accepted.   The  passport  of   the petitioner was impounded on the ground that her presence  in connection with the Inquiry Commission may be necessary  and in  the interest of public it was necessary to do  so.   The impugned  order  does  not place  any  restrictions  on  the petitioner while she is away from India.  Hence the question whether the State could impose such restraint does not arise in this case.  As the contention was that by impounding the, passport  the petitioner’s fundamental right of  freedom  of speech  etc.  outside the country was infringed,  it  became necessary  to  consider  whether the citizen  had  any  such right. It  was  strenuously  contended  that  the  Legislature   by involving   powers   under  Art.  21  cannot   deprive   the Fundamental  Rights  guaranteed under Art. 19  at  any  rate within  the  territory of India.  It win now  be  considered whether an Act passed under Art. 21 should also satisfy  the requirements of Art. 19. The  submission was that Art. 19 applies to laws made  under Articles  20,  21  and 22 and the  citizen  is  entitled  to challenge  the validity of an Act made under Art. 21 on  the ground  that it affects the rights secured to him under  cl. (1) of Art. 19.  Article 20(1) provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence,  nor  be subjected to a penalty greater  than  that which  might have been inflicted under the law in  force  at the time of the commission of the offence.  Article 22 deals with  protection  against arrest and  detention  in  certain cases, that is, in respect of preventive detention. It has been decided by this Court in Gopalan’s(1) case; that in  the  case of punitive detention for offences  under  the Penal  Code, it cannot be challenged on the ground  that  it infringes  the right specified under Art. 19(a) to  (e)  and (g) of the Constitution of India.  Kania C.J. held :               "If there is a legislation directly attempting

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             to  control a citizen’s freedom of  speech  or               expression, or his right to assemble peaceably               and  without arms etc.; the  question  whether               that,  legislation  is saved by  the  relevant               saving  clause  of Art. 19  will  arise.   If,               however,  the, legisation is not  directly  in               respect  of  any of these subjects, but  as  a               result of the operation of other  legislation,               for  instance,  for  punitive  or   preventive               detention,  his right under any of these  sub-               clauses  is  abridged  the  question  of   the               application of Article 19 does not arise." (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88. 748 Fazal  Ali  J., though he dissented from the  majority  view regarding   the  application  of  Article  19  to   punitive detention observed follows               "The  Indian  Penal Code  does  not  primarily               or .... necessarily impose restrictions on the               freedom  of movement and it is not correct  to               say that it is a law imposing restrictions  on               the right to move freely.  Its primary  object               is  to  punish  crime  and  not  to   restrict               movement......  But  if  it  (the  Punishment)               consists   in   imprisonment   there   is    a               restriction  on movement.  This  restraint  is               imposed not under a law imposing  restrictions               on movement but under a law defining crime and               making  it  punishable.   The  punishment   is               correlated directly With the violation of some               other person’s right and not with the right of               movement  possessed by the  offender  himself.               In  my  opinion, therefore, the  Indian  Penal               Code  does  not come within the ambit  of  the               words ’law’ imposing restrictions on the right               to move freely." The learned Judge, Justice Fazal Ali, took a different  view regarding preventive detention on the basis that it did  not admit  of  a trial but the order of detention rested  on  an apprehended  and  not  actual  danger.   Regarding  punitive detention, the decision of a Bench of five Judges in H. Saha v. State of West Bengal,(1) expressed the same view.   Chief Justice Ray observed :               "It is not possible to think that a person who               is  detained  will  yet be  free  to  move  or               assemble or form association or unions or have               the  right to reside in any part of  India  or               have  the  freedom of  speech  or  expression.               Suppose, a person is prosecuted of an  offence               of  cheating and convicted after trial, it  is               not  open to him to say that the  imprisonment               should be tested with reference to Art. 19 for               its  reasonableness.   A  law  which  attracts               Article  19,  therefore, must be  such  as  is               capable of being tested to be reasonable under               clauses (2) to (5) of Article 19." In  the case of punitive detention, it will be open  to  the accused  to raise all defences that are open to him in  law, such  as  that there have been no violation of  any  law  in force.  Regarding punitive detention this Court in Saha case has held that as the Constitution has conferred rights under Art. 19 and also adopted the preventive detention to prevent the greater evil by imperilling security, the safety of  the State  and the welfare of the nation, it is not possible  to think that a person who is detained will yet be free to move

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or assemble or form associations etc. Applying  the same reasoning, it is contended on  behalf  of the  state  that when a person is deprived of  his  life  or personal   liberty   in  accordance   with   the   procedure established  by law, he cannot invoke to his aid any of  the rights  guaranteed  under  Art. 19 of  the  Constitution  of India.  Whether this contention could be accepted (1) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 778. 749 or not will be examined with reference to the provisions  of the Constitution and the decisions rendered by this Court. Article 19 to 22 appear under the title "Right to  freedom". Article 19 confers freedoms on the citizens whereas Aft.  20 to 22 are not limited to citizens but apply to all  persons. Article  19  does not deal with the right to life  which  is dealt  with  under  Art. 21.  While  Art.  19  provides  for freedoms-which  a citizen is entitled to, Articles 20 to  22 restrain  the State from doing certain things.   Though  the right  to life and personal liberty is not dealt with  under Art. 19, as it is mentioned in Art. 21 though in a  negative form, the right to life and personal liberty is secured  and the  State  can deprive it only according to  the  procedure established by law.  While the rights guaranteed under  Art. 19(1)  are  subject to restrictions that may  be  placed  by Articles 19 (2) to (6), the right not to be deprived of life and  personal liberty is subject to its deprivation by  pro- cedure established by law.  The scope of the words "personal liberty"  was considered by Mukherjea, J. in Gopalan’s  case (supra.)  The learned Judge observed : "Article 19  gives  a list  of individual liberties and prescribes in the  various clauses the restrictions that may be placed upon them by law so  that  they may not conflict with the public  welfare  or general morality.  On the other hand, Articles 20, 21 and 22 are  primarily concerned with penal enactments or other  law under  which personal safety or liberty of persons would  be taken  away in the interest of society and the set down  the limits   within   which   the  State   control   should   be exercised......  the right to the safety of one’s  life  and limbs’ and to enjoyment of personal liberty, in the sense of freedom  from physical re-strain and coercion of  any  sort, are  the  inherent birth right-. of a man.  The  essence  of these rights consists in restraining others from interfering with  them  and hence they cannot be described in  terms  of "freedom"  to  do  particular  things.  .  .  ."  The  words "personal   liberty"  take  their  colour  from  the   words "deprivation  of  rifle’.  It means liberty of  the  person, that is freedom from personal restraint.  Article 21 is  one of  the  Articles along with Articles 20 and 22  which  deal with restraint on the person.  According to Dicey :               "The  right to personal liberty as  understood               in England means in substance a person’s right               not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest or               other  physical  coercion in any  manner  that               does not admit of legal justification."               (Dicey’s  Laws of Constitution 10th Edn.  page               207) In the debates relating to the drafting of the Constitution, in  Art.  15  the word that was  used  was  "liberty".   The framers of the Constitution thought that the word  "liberty" should be qualified by the insertion of the word  "personal" before it for otherwise it might be construed very widely so as  to  include even the freedoms already dealt  with  under Art.   19,  30  (which  corresponds  to  Art.  19   in   the Constitution).   The word "personal liberty" in  Article  21 is, therefore, confined to freedom from restraint of  person

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and is different from other rights enumerated in Article  19 of the Constitution. 750 It  is contended on behalf of the petitioner that after  the decision  of  the  Bank  Nationalisation  case  and   Bennet Colomon’s  case the view taken earlier by the Supreme  Court that  in  construing  whether the  deprivation  of  personal liberty is valid or not the enquiry should only be  confined to  the  validity of the procedure  prescribed  without  any reference  to  the rights conferred under Art. 19(1)  is  no longer good law.  The decisions bearing on this question may now be examined. In  Gopalan’s case it was held that Art. 19 dealt  with  the rights  of the citizens when he was free, and did not  apply to  a person who had ceased to be free and had  been  either under  punitive or preventive legislation.  It  was  further held that Art. 19 only applied where a legislation  directly hit  the rights enumerated in the Article and not where  the loss of rights mentioned in the Article was a result of  the operation of legislation relating to punitive or  preventive detention.   It was also stated by Justice Mukherjea that  a law depriving the personal liberty must be a valid law which the  legislature is competent to enact within the limits  of the powers assigned to it and which does not transgress  any of the Fundamental Rights the Constitution lays dawn.  The,, learned  Judge  explained that the reasonableness of  a  law coming under Art. 21 could not be questioned with  reference to anything in Art. 19 though a law made under Art. 21  must conform  to  the  requirements of Articles 14  and  20.   It cannot be said that it should conform to the requirements of Article  19.  The, view, thus expressed in  Gopalan’s  case, was  affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ram Singh v. State  of Delhi(1) where it was held :               "Although  personal  liberty  has  a   content               sufficiently  comprehensive  to  include   the               freedoms  enumerated  in Art. 19(1),  and  its               deprivation would result in the extinction  of               those  freedoms, the Constitution has  treated               these   civil  liberties  as   distinct   from               fundamental    rights   and   made    separate               provisions  in Art. 19 and Arts. 21 and 22  as               to  the limitations and conditions subject  to               which  alone  they  could  be  taken  away  or               abridged  ...  The  interpretation  of   these               Articles and their correlation was elaborately               dealt  with  by the full  court  in  Gopalan’s               case. Approving  the interpretation of the Articles  in  Gopalan’s case  it was held that law which authorises  deprivation  of personal liberty did not fall within the purview of Art.  19 and  its  validity  was not to be  judged  by  the  criteria indicated  in  that Article but depended on  its  compliance with the requirements of Arts. 21 to 22. This view was again affirmed in State of Bihar v.  Kameshwar Singh,(2)  where Das, J. in approving the law laid  down  in Gopalan’s case observed as follows               "As I explained in Gopalan’s case and again in               Chiranjit   LaPs   case  1950  SCR   869   our               Constitution  protects  the  freedom  of   the               citizen by article 19 (1) (a) to (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 451 (2)  [1952] S.C.R 889. 751               (e)   and  (g)  but empowers the  State,  even               while   those   freedoms   last,   to   impose

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             reasonable   restrictions  on  them   in   the               interest  of the State or of public  order  or               morality or of the general public as mentioned               in  clauses (2) to (6).  Further,  the  moment               even this regulated freedom of the  individual               becomes  incompatible with and  threatens  the               freedom  of the community the State  is  given               power by article 21, to deprive the individual               of his life and personal liberty in accordance               with procedure established by law, subject  of               course, to the provisions of Art. 22. In  Express  Newspapers (P) Ltd. & another v. The  Union  of India, & Others, (1) the test laid down was that there  must be  a  direct  or inevitable  consequence  of  the  measures enacted  in  the impugned Act, it would not be  possible  to strike  down  the  legislation as  having  that  effect  and operation.   A possible eventuality of this type  would  not necessary   be  the  consequence  which  could  be  in   the contemplation  of the legislature while enacting  a  measure of. this type for the benefit of the workmen concerned.  The test, thus applied, is whether the consequences were "direct and inevitable" ? In  Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of  India,(2) after citing with approval the case of Ram Singh and Express Newspapers case, it was observed :               "It is not the form or Incidental infringement               that  determine  the  constitutionality  of  a               statute   in   a  reference  to   the   rights               guaranteed  in Art. 19(1) but the reality  and               the  substance........ Viewed in this way,  it               does  not  select  any  of  the  elements   or               attributes of freedom of speech falling within               Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution." Reality and substance test was laid down in this case while, approving  of  the  earlier decisions  when  the  court  was considering  the question whether the ban  on  advertisement would affect the rights conferred under Art. 19(1) (a). The  correctness of the view as laid down in Gopalan’s  case and  affirmed in Ram Singh’s case was doubted by Subba  Rao, J. in Kochuni v. The State of Madras(3).  The learned  Judge after  referring to the dissenting view of Fazal Ali, J.  in Gopalan’s  case rejecting the plea that a law under Art.  21 shall not infringe Art. 19(1) observed : "The  question  being integrated with  the  dissenting  view expressed by Fazal Ali, J. we are bound by this judgment." Reliance   was  placed  by  the  learned  counsel  for   the petitioner on the decision by this Court in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. The Union of India. (4) The learned counsel referred to the passage at page 5 60A (1)   [1959] 1 S.C.R. 135. (2)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671 at page 691. (3)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. (4)  [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842. 752 Part where it was held that "the correct approach ; in  such cases  should be to enquire as to what in substance  is  the loss  or  injury  caused to a citizen and  not  merely  what manner and method has been adopted by ,,he State in  placing the  restriction  and, therefore, the right to  freedom,  of speech  cannot be taken away with the object of taking  away the business activities of the citizen.  Reference was  also made  to another passage at 867 where it ’was held that  the "legitimacy  of the result intended to be achieved does  not necessarily  imply  that  every  means  to  achieve  it   is permissible;   for  even  if  the  end  is   desirable   and

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permissible,  the  means employed must  not  transgress  the limits  laid  down  by the  constitution  if  they  directly impinge  on any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by  the Constitution.  It is no answer when the constitutionality of the  measure is challenged that apart from  the  fundamental right infringed the provision is otherwise legal. The above observations relied on by the learned counsel were made  in a petition where the validity of  Delhi  Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960 which fixed the maximum  number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to the price charged was questioned.  The order was  challenged as  contravening  Art. 19(1) (a) of the  Constitution.   The court  held that the order was void as it violated  Art.  19 (I) (a) of the Constitution and was not saved by Article  19 (2).   The court held that the right extended not merely  to the  method which is employed to circulate but also  to  the volume of circulation, and the impugned Act and order placed restraints  on  the latter aspect of the right as  the  very object of the Act was directly against circulation and thus, interfered  with the freedom of speech and  expression.   At page 866, the Court observed :               "The  impugned law far from being  one,  which               merely interferes with the right of freedom of               speech incidently, does so directly though  it               seeks  to  achieve the end  by  purporting  to               regulate    the   business   aspect    to    a               newspaper........   Such  a  course   is   not               permissible  and  the  courts  must  be   ever               vigilant in guarding perhaps the most precious               of   all   the  freedom  guaranteed   by   our               Constitution." This  decision  does not help us in resolving the  point  at issue  in  this case for the court was  concerned  with  the question whether the right of freedom of speech was directly affected  by the impugned order.  The impact of  legislation under Art. 21 on the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)  was not in issue in the case. The  two cases which were strongly relied on by the  learned counsel for the petitioner as having over-ruled the view  of Gopalan’s  case  as affirmed in Ram Singh’s  case  are  Bank Nationalisation Case(2) and Bennet Colomon’s case.(2) In  Kharak Singh’s(3) case the majority took the  view  that the  word  ’liberty’  in Art. 21 is qualified  by  the  word ’personal’  and  there  its  content  is  narrower  and  the qualifying adjective has been employed in order (1)  [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530. (2)  [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757. (3)  [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332. 753 to avoid overlapping between those elements or incidents  of liberty  like freedom of speech or freedom of movement  etc. already dealt with in Art. 19(1) and the liberty  guaranteed by Art. 21 and particularly in the context of the difference between  the  permissible restraints or  restrictions  which might  be imposed by sub clauses (2) to (6) of the,  Article of  the several species of liberty dealt with in  a  several clauses of Article 19(1).  The minority view as expressed by Subba Rao, J. is that if a person’s fundamental right  under Art.  21  is  infringed, the State can rely upon  a  law  to sustain  the  action; but that cannot be a  complete  answer unless the State laws satisfy the test laid down in  Article 19(2)  as  far the attributes covered by Article  19(1)  are concerned.   In  other words, the State  must  satisfy  that petitioners fundamental rights are not infringed by  showing that the law only imposes reasonable restrictions within the

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meaning  of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.  The  submission of  the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the  view as  ,expressed  by Subba Rao, J. has been  affirmed  by  the subsequent decisions in the Bank Nationalisation(1) case and Bennet Colomon(2) case. On  19th  July, 1969, the acting  President  promulgated  an ordinance  No.  8 of 1969 transferring to  and  vesting  the undertaking   of   14   names  commercial   banks   in   the corresponding  new bank under the ordinance.   Subsequently, the  Parliament, enacted Banking Companies  (Acquisition  of Transfer  of Undertaking) Act, 1969.  The object of the  Act was  to  provide  for the acquisition and  transfer  of  the undertakings of certain banking companies in conformity with the national policy and objectives and for matters corrected therewith  and incidental thereto.  The  petitioners  before the Supreme Court who held shares in some of the named banks or  had  accounts  current or fixed deposits  in  the  banks challenged the validity of the enactment.  In the  petitions under  Art.  32  of the Constitution  the  validity  of  the Ordinance and the Act was questioned on various grounds.   I am concerned with ground no. 3 which runs as follows : Article 19(1) (f) and Art. 31(2) are not mutually  exclusive and the law providing for acquisition of property for public purpose could be tested for its validity on the ground  that it  imposes limitation on the right to property  which  were not   reasonable;  so  tested  the  provision  of  the   Act transferring undertaking of the named banks and  prohibiting practically  from  carrying banking  business  violates  the guarantee  under  Art. 19(1) (f) and (g).  In  dealing  with this contention, the court held that Articles 19 (1) (f) and Article  31  (2)  are not  mutually  exclusive.   The  court observed  that the principle underlying the opinion  of  the majority in Gopalan’s case was extended to the protection of the freedom in respect of property and it was held that Art. 19(1)  (f)  and  31(2)  were  mutually  exclusive  in  their operation and that substantive provisions of law relating to acquisition of property were not liable to be challenged  on the ground that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on  the right  to hold pretty.  After mentioning the  two  divergent lines of authority, the court held that "the guarantee under Art. 31 (1) and (2) arises out of the limitations imposed on the authority of the State, (1)   [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530. (2)  [1973] 2S.C.R.757. 754 by  law, to take over the individual’s property.   The  true character  of  the limitation of the two provisions  is  not different.  Clause (1) of Article 19 and clause (1) and  (2) of  Art.  31  are  part of the  similar  article  19(1)  (f) enunicating  the object specified and Article 19(1)  and  31 deal with the limitation which may be placed by law  subject to  which  the rights may be exercised.   Formal  compliance with  the  conditions  of Art. 31(2) is  not  sufficient  to negative protection of guarantee to the rights to  property. The validity of law which authorises deprivation of property and  the law which authorises compulsory acquisition of  the property  for  a  public purpose must  be  adjudged  by  the application of the same test.  Acquisition must be under the authority of a law and the expression law means a law  which is  within  the competence of the legislature and  does  not impair the guarantee of the rights in Part 111. The  learned  counsel for the petitioner submitted  that  on similar  reasoning it is necessary that an  enactment  under Art. 21 must also satisfy the requirements of Article 19 and should  be  by a law which is within the competence  of  the

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legislature and does not impair the guarantee of the  rights in  part III including those conferred under Art. 19 of  the Constitution  of India.  The important question that  arises for  consideration  is  whether the  decision  in  the  Bank Nationalisation   case  has  over-ruled  the   decision   of Gopalan’s  case and is an authority for the proposition  and an  act of the legislature relating to deprivation  of  life and   personal  liberty  should  also  satisfy   the   other fundamental  rights  guaranteed  under  Art.  19(1)  of  the Constitution. In order to determine what exactly is the law that has  been laid  down in Bank Nationalisation Case, it is necessary  to closely examine the decision particularly from pages 570  to 578 of 1970(3) SCR.  After holding that :               "Impairment of the right of the individual and               not  the  object of the State  in  taking  the               impugned action, is the measure of protection.               To  concentrate merely on power of  the  State               and   the  object  of  the  State  action   in               exercising  that power Is therefore to  ignore               the true intent of the Constitution." the  Court proceeded to observe that "the conclusion in  our judgment is inevitable that the validity of the State action must  be adjudged in the light of its operation upon  rights of  individual  and  groups  of  individuals  in  all  their dimensions." Having thus held the Court proceeded to state :               "But  this Court has held in some cases to  be               presently  noticed  that Art. 19 (1)  (f)  and               Art. 31 (2) are mutually exclusive." It  is necessary at this stage to emphasize that  the  Court was  only considering the decisions that took the view  that Article  19  (1  ) (f) and 31(2)  were  mutually  exclusive. After referring to passages in A. K. Gopalan’s case at pages 571 to 573 noted at page 574 :               "The  view expressed in A. K.  Gopalan’s  case               was  reaffirmed  in Ram Singh  and  others  v.               State of Delhi(1)". (1) [1951] S.C.R. 451. 755 Having  thus  dealt  with the passages in  the  judgment  in Gopalan’s  case the Court proceeded to consider  its  effect and  observed that the principle underlying the judgment  of the  majority was extended to the protection of  freedom  in respect  of property and it was held that-Article 19(1)  (f) and.  Art. 31(2) were mutually exclusive in their operation. While observations in judgment of Gopalan’s case as  regards the  application  of Art. 19(1) (f) in relation to  Art.  21 were  not referred to, the Court proceeded to deal with  the correctness  of  the  principle  in  Gopalan’s  case   being extended  to  the protection of the freedom  in  respect  of property.   In A. K. Gopalan’s case (supra) Das, J.,  stated that  if the capacity to exercise the right to property  was lost,  because  of  lawful  compulsory  acquisition  of  the subject  of that right, the owner ceased to have that  right for  the  duration  of the  incapacity.   In  Chiranjit  Lal Chowduri’s case,(1) Das, J. observed at page 919 :               ".  .  . the right to property  guaranteed  by               Art. 19 (1) (f) would...... continue until the               owner  was  under  Art. 31  deprived  of  such               property by authority of law." Das, J. reiterated the same view in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, (2) where he observed :               "Art.  19(1)  (f) read with  Art.  19(5)  pre-               supposes   that   the  person  to   whom   the               fundamental  right is guaranteed  retains  his

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             property  over or with respect to which  alone                             that right may be exercised. Thus  the  observation  in  Gopalan’s  case  extending   the principle laid down in the majority judgment to. freedom  in respect  of property was reiterated by Das, J. in  Chiranjit Lal  Chowduri’s case (supra) and Subodh Gopal’s  case.   The principle  was given more concrete shape in State of  Bombay v. Bhanjit Munji(3) case wherein it was held that "if  there is  no property which can be acquired held or disposed  of,. no restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire,   hold  or  dispose  it  of,  and  as  clause   (5) contemplates  the placing of reasonable restrictions of  the exercise  of  those rights it must follow that  the  Article postulates  the existence of property over which the  rights are  to be exercised." This view was accepted in  the  later cases  Dabu  Barkya Thakur v. State of  Bombay(4)  and  Smt. Sitabati Debi and Anr. v. State of West Bengal.(5) The Court proceeded  further  after referring to some  cases  to  note that.   "With the decision in K. K. Kochuni’s case(6)  there arose  two  divergent lines of authority (1)  "authority  of law"  in  Art. 31 (1) is liable to be tested on  the  ground that  it  violates  other fundamental  rights  and  freedoms including  the  right to bold property  guaranteed  by  Art. 19(1)  (f) and (2) "authority of law" within the meaning  of Art. 31(2) is not liable to be tested on the ground that  it impairs  the  guarantee of Art. 19(1) (f) in so  far  as  it imposes substantive restrictions (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 869. (2)  [1954] S.C.R. 587. (3)  [1955] (1) S.C.R. 777. (4)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128. (5)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 940. (6)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. 756 though it may be tested on the ground of impairment of other guarantees."  Later  in  the decision  of  State  of  Madhya Pradesh. v. Ranoiro Shinde(1) the Supreme Court opined  that the  validity of law in cl. (2-) of Art. 31 may be  adjudged in the light of Art. 19 (1) (f).  But the Court in that case did  not consider the previous catena of  authorities  which related  to the inter--relation between Art. 31(2) and  Art. 19 (1) (f). In  considering the various decisions referred to  regarding the  interrelation  of Art. 31 (2) and Art. 19 (1)  (f)  the Court  proceeded to express its view that "the  theory  that the object and form of the State action determine the extent of  protection  which the aggrieved party may claim  is  not consistent with the constitutional scheme.  Each freedom has different dimensions." Having so stated the Court considered the  inter-relation of Art. 31 (2) and Art. 19 (1)  (f)  and held :               "The  true character of the limitations  under               the  two provisions is not different.   Clause                             (5)  of Art. 19 and cls. (1) & (2) of Art.  31               are parts of a single pattern; Art. 19(1)  (f)               enunciates the basic right to property of  the               citizens and Art. 19(5) and cls. (1) & (2)  of               Art.  31  deal with limitations which  may  be               placed by law, subject to which the rights may               be exercised." It must be noted that basis for the conclusion is that  Art. 19  and  cl. ( 1 and (2) of Art. 31 are parts  of  a  single pattern  and  while Art. 19(1) (f) enunciates the  right  to acquire,  hold and dispose of property; cl. (5) of  Art.  19 authorise imposition of restrictions upon the right.   There

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must be reasonable restriction and Art. 31 assures the right to  property and grants protection against the  exercise  of the  authority of the State and cl. (5) of Art. 19 and  cls. (1)  and  (2) of Art. 31 prescribe restrictions  upon  State action,  subject  to  which the right  to  property  may  be exercised.  The fact that right to property guaranteed under Art.  19(1) (f) is subject to restrictions under Art.  19(5) and  31 and thereby relate to the right to property  closely inter-related cannot be overlooked for that formed the basis for the conclusion.  After referring to the various Articles of the Constitution the Court observed :               "The  enunciation of rights either express  or               by   implication  does  not   follow   uniform               pattern.   But one thread runs  through  them;               they  seek  to  protect  the  rights  of   the               individual  or  group of  individuals  against               infringement  of those rights within  specific               limits.  Part III of the Constitution weaves a               pattern  of guarantees delimit the  protection               of those rights in their allot fields; they do               not attempt to enunciate distinct rights." It proceeded "We  are therefore unable to hold that the challenge to  the validity  of the provisions for acquisition is liable to  be tested only on the ground of non-compliance with Art. 31(2). Article 31(2) requires that property must be acquired for  a public purpose and that it must be acquired (1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 489. 757 under  a law with characterstics set out in  that  Articles. Formal  compliance  of the condition of Art.  31(2)  is  not sufficient  to negative the protection of the  guarantee  of the right to property." After  expressing  its conclusion, the  Court  proceeded  to state that it is found necessary to examine the rationale of the  two lines of authority and determine whether  there  is anything   in   the  Constitution  which  just   fies   this apparently-inconsistent  development  of  the  law.    While stating  that  in  its  judgment the  assumption  in  A.  K. Gopalanan’s case that certain articles exclusively deal with specific  matters  and  in  determining  whether  there   is infringement of the individual’s guaranteed rights, the  ob- ject and the form of State action alone need be  considered, and effect of laws on fundamental rights of the  individuals in  general will be ignored cannot be accepted  as  correct. To  this extent the Court specifically over ruled  the  view that  the object and form of the State action alone need  be considered.   It  proceeded "We hold the validity  "of  law" which authorities deprivation of property and "a low"  which authorises  compulsory  acquisition of property  for  public purpose  must  be adjudged by the application  of  the  same tests."  It will thus be seen that the entire discussion  by the Court in Bank Nationalisation case related to the inter- relation between Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(1) (f).  In  dealing with the question the Court has no doubt extracted  passages from  the judgments of learned Judges in Gopalan’s case  but proceeded  only to consider the extension of the,  principle underlying  the majority judgment to the protection  of  the freedom  in respect of property, particularly, the  judgment of  Justice Das.  After stating that two views  arose  after Kochuni’s   case   the  Court  concerned  itself   only   in determining  the  rationale of the two lines  of  authority. The view taken in Gopalan’s case that the objection and  the form of State action has to be considered was over ruled and it was laid down that it is the effect and action: upon  the

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right  of the person that attracts the jurisdiction  of  the Court  to  grant relief.  It is no doubt true  that  certain passing observations have been made regarding the liberty of persons, such as at page 576 :               "We  have  carefully  considered  the  weighty               pronouncements of the eminent judges who  gave               shape  to  the  concept  that  the  extent  of               protection of important guarantees such as the               liberty  of  person, and  right  to  property,               depends  upon  the form and  object  of  State               action and not upon its direct operation  upon               the individual’s freedom." Though the liberty of person is incidentally mentioned there is no further discussion on the subject.  While  undoubtedly Bank  Nationalisation case settles the law that  Art.  19(1) (f)  and Art. 31(2) are not mutually exclusive there  is  no justification  for holding that the case. is  authority  for the  proposition that the legislation under Art.  21  should also  satisfy  all the fundamental rights  guaranteed  under Art.. 19(1) of the Constitution.  As emphasised earlier Art. 19  (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) form a single pattern  and  deal with  right to property.  The fundamental right  under  Art. 19(1) (f) is restricted under Art. 19(5) or Art. 31 (2)  and as  the  article  refer to right to  property  they  are  so closely  interlinked,  and  cannot be held  to  be  mutually exclusive.   But Art. 21 is related to deprivation  of  life and personal liberty and it has been held 758 that  it is not one of the rights enumerated in  Art.  19(1) and  refers  only to personal rights as are not  covered  by Article 19. The  decision  in  Bank Nationalisation case so  far  as  it relates to Articles 19(1) and 21, is in the nature of obiter dicta.  Though it is a decision of a Court of 11 Judges  and is  entitled  to the highest regard, as the  Court  had  not applied its mind and decided the specific question and as is in  the nature of a general, casual observation-on  a  point not calling for decision and not obviously argued before it, the case cannot be taken as an authority on the  proposition in question.  The Court cannot be said to have declared  the law on the subject when no occasion arose for it to consider and decide the question. It  may  also  be noted that as the  Court  ruled  that  the impugned  Act  violated Art. 31 (2) by not laying  down  the necessary principles, the decision of the inter-relationship between Art. 19(1) (f) and 31(2) was not strictly  necessary for the purpose of giving relief to the petitioner.  We  are not  concerned  in this case as to whether the  decision  in Bank  Nationalisation case is in the nature of Obiter  dicta so   far  as  it  held  that  Arts.  19(1)  and  31(2)   are interrelated.   But  it  is  necessary  to  state  that  the decision  proceeded on some erroneous assumptions.  At  page 571  of flank Nationalisation case (supra) it  was  assumed. "The  Majority  of  the Court  (Kania,  C.J.  and  Patanjali Sastri,  Mahajan,  Mukherjea & Das JJ.) held  that  Art.  22 being  a complete code relating to preventive detention  the validity  of  an  order  of  detention  must  be  determined strictly  according to the terms and within the four  comers of that articles." This statement is not borne out from  the text  of  the  judgment$ in Gopalan’s case.  At  p.  115  of Gopalan’s case (supra) Kania C.J. has stated : "The  learned Attorney  General contended that the- subject of  preventive detention  does  not  fall under article 21  at  au  and  is covered wholly by article 22.  According to him, article  22 is a complete code.  I am unable to accept that contention."

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Patanjali Sastri J. at page 207 of the judgment said :  "The learned  Attorney General contended that article 22  clauses (4)  to  (7)  formed  a  complete  code  of   constitutional safeguards in respect of preventive detention, and, provided only these provisions are conformed to, the validity of  any law   relating   to  preventive  detention  could   not   be challenged.   I am unable to agree with this view".  Das  J. in referring to the Attorney General’s argument at page  324 stated : "that article 21 has nothing to do with  preventive detention  at  all and that preventive detention  is  wholly covered  by  article  22(4)  to  (7)  which  by   themselves constitute  a complete code.  I am unable to accede to  this extreme point of view also." Mukherjea J. at p. 229 of  that judgment observed : "1t is also unnecessary to enter into  a discussion  on the question raised by the learned  Attorney- General  as  to  whether article 22 by  itself  is  a  self- contained  Code,  with  regard  to  the  law  of  preventive detention  and whether or not the procedure it lays down  is exhaustive."  Justice  Mahajan at page 226 held that  "I  am satisfied  on  a  review of the whole  scheme  of  the  Con- stitution  that the intention was to make article  22  self- contained  in  respect  of  the  laws  on  the  subject   of preventive  detention." It is thus seen that the  assumption in  Bank  Nationalisation’s case that the  majority  of  the Court  held that article 22 is a complete code is  erroneous and the basis of the decision stands shaken.  If the  obiter dicta based 759 on  the  wrong  assumption is to be  taken  as  the  correct position in law, it would lead to strange results.  If arts. 19(1)  (a)  to  (e) and (g) are attracted  in  the  case  of deprivation  of personal liberty under art. 21,  a  punitive detention  for an offence committed under the  Indian  Penal Code such as theft, cheating or assault would be illegal  as pointed out in Gopalan’s case by Kania C.J. and Patan ’ jali Sastri J. for the reasonable restriction in the interest  of public  order would not cover the offences mentioned  above. As held in Gopalan"s case and in Saha’s case there can be no distinction between punitive detention under the Penal Code, and  preventive  detention.   As pointed  out  earlier  even though  Fazal Ali J. dissented in Gopalan’s case,  the  same view  was  expressed  by His Lordship  so  far  as  punitive detention  was concerned.  He said : "The Indian Penal  Code does not primarily or necessarily impose restrictions on the freedom of movement and it is not correct to say that it  is a  law imposing restrictions on the right to  move  freely." The  conclusion that art. 19 (1) and Art. 21  were  mutually exclusive was arrived at on an interpretation of language of art.  19 (1) (d) read with art. 19(5) and not on  the  basis that art. 19(1) and 21 are exclusive and Art. 21 a  complete code.   The  words  "Personal liberty" based  on  the  Draft Committee  report on Art. 15 (now Art. 21) was added to  the word   ’personal’  before  the  word  ’liberty’   with   the observation  that the word ’liberty’ should be qualified  by the  word  ’personal’  before it for  otherwise  it  may  be construed  very  wide  so as to include  even  the  freedoms already  dealt with in Art. 13 (now Art. 19).  In  Gopalan’s case  it was also pointed out by the Judges that art.  19(1) and  21 did not operate on the same field as Art. 19(1)  and 31(2)  of the Constitution are.  The right under Art. 21  is different  and does not include the rights that are  covered under  art.  19.  Art. 19(1) confers  substantive  right  as mentioned  in clauses. (a) to (g) on citizen alone and  does not  include the right of personal liberty covered  in  Art. 21.   For  the  reasons stated above obiter  dicta  in  Bank

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Nationalisation’s  case  that a legislation  under  art.  21 should also satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(1) cannot be taken  as  correct law.  The Court has  not  considered  the reasoning in Gopalan’s case and over-ruled it. Before  proceeding  to consider the test of  validity  of  a legislation as laid down in Bennet Colomon’s case  following the Bank Nationalisation ,case the decisions which  followed the  Bank  Nationalisation  case holding  on  the  erroneous premises  that  the  majority in Gopalan’s  case  held  that Article  22  was  a self-contained  Code.  may  be  shortly- referred to.  In S. N. Sarkar v. West Bengal(1), the Supreme Court  held that in Gopalan’s case the majority  Court  held that  Article 22 was a self-contained Code  and,  therefore, the law or preventive detention did not have to satisfy  the requirement  of  Articles  19,  14  and  20.   In  the  Bank Nationalisation  case the aforesaid premise in  Gopalan  was disapproved  and; therefore, it no longer holds  the  field. Though the Bank Nationalisation case dealt with in  relation to  Article  19 and 31, the basic approach  considering  the fundamental rights guaranteed in-the different provisions of the  Constitution adopted in this case held the  major  pre- mises  of  the majority in the Gopalan case  was  erroneous. The  view  taken  in this case also suffers  from  the  same infirmities referred to in (1)  [1973] 1 S.C.C. 856. 760 Bank Nationalisation case.  Later, in the case of  Khundiran v. West Bengal(1), a Bench of four Judges again  erroneously stated  that Gopalan’s case had taken the view that  Article 22   was   a  complete  Code.   After  referring   to   Bank Nationalisation  case and S. N. Sarkar’s and to the case  of H.  Saha v. State of West Bengal(2) the Court  regarded  the question  as  concluded  and  a  final  seal  put  on   this controversy and hold’that in view of the decision, it is not open  to any one now to contend that the law  of  preventive detention  which falls in Article 22 does not have  to  meet the requirement of Art. 14 or Art. 19." In  Additional District Magistrate v. S. S.  Shukla,(3)  the locus standi to move a habeas corpus petition under  Article 226  of  the Constitution of India  while  the  Presidential order  dated  27th  June,  1975 was  in  force  fell  to  be considered.  The Court while holding that the remedy by  way of  writ petition to challenge the legality of an  order  of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act  is not  open to a detenu during the emergency, had occasion  to consider  the  observations  made by the  majority  in  Bank Nationalisation case regarding the application of Art. 21 of the  Constitution of India.  Chief Justice Ray, at page  230 held :               "Article 21 is our rule of law regarding  life               and  liberty.  No, other rule of law can  have               separate  existence as a distinct right.   The               negative   language   of   fundamental   right               incorporated  in Part III imposes  limitations               on  the  power of the State and  declares  the               corresponding  guarantee of the individual  to               that  fundamental right.  The  limitation  and               guarantee  are complimentary.  The  limitation               of  State  action embodied  in  a  fundamental               right couched in negative form is the  measure               of the protection of the individual." After quoting with approval the view held in Kharak  Singh’s case  that  ,personal  liberty  in  Art.  21  includes   all varieties of rights which go to make personal liberty  other than  those in Art. 19(1), the learned Judge  observed  that

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the  Bank Nationalisation case merely brings in the  concept of  reasonable restriction in the law.  Justice Beg,  as  he then  was, considered this aspect a little more  elaborately at  page  322.   After  referring to  the  passage  in  Bank Nationalisation case the learned Judge observed :               "It seems to me that Gopalan’s case was merely               cited in Cooper’s case for illustrating a line               of reasoning which was held to be incorrect in               determining  the  validity of  ’law’  for  the               acquisition of property solely with  reference               to  the provisions of Art. 31.   The  question               under  consideration in that case was  whether               Articles  19 (1) (f) and 31 (2)  are  mutually               exclusive." The  learned Judge did not understand the Cooper’s  case  as holding that effect of deprivation of rights outside Art. 21 will also have to (1)  [1975] 2 S.C.C. 81. (2)  [1975] 1 S.C.R. 778. (3)  [1976] Supp.  S.C.R. 172. 761 be considered.  Justice Chandrachud understood the  decision in  Bank  Nationalisation case as holding that Art.  21  and Art.  19 cannot be treated as mutually  exclusive.   Justice Bhagwati  at page 433 of the reports took the view  that  in view  of  the decision of this Court in  Cooper’s  case  the minority view in Kharak Singh’s case that the law under Art. 21 must also satisfy the test laid down in Art. 19(1) so far the  attributes  covered  by Art. 19(1)  are  concerned  was approved.   It  is  seen that the view  taken  in  the  Bank Nationalisation  case that a law relating to deprivation  of life and personal liberty falling under Art. 21 has to  meet the requirements of Art. 19 is due to an error in proceeding on the basis that the majority Court in Gopalan’s case  held that  Article 22 was a self contained code.   The  decisions which  followed Bank Nationalisation case, namely, the  case of S. N. Sarkar v. West Bengal and Khundiram v. West Bengal, H.  Saha  v. West Bengal, suffer from  the  same  infirmity. With  respect  I  agree with the  view  expressed  by  Chief Justice  Ray  and Justice Beg, as be then was,  in  Shukla’s case. Next to Bank Nationalisation case strong reliance was placed on  Bennet  Colomon’s  case  by  the,  petitioner  for   the proposition that the direct effect of the legislation of the fundamental rights is the test. In  the  case  the petitioners impugned  the  new  newsprint policy  on  various  grounds.  The Court  held  that  though Article  19(1)(a) does not mention the freedom of press,  it is  settled  view of the Court that freedom  of  speech  and expression  includes  freedom  of  press  and   circulation. Holding  that  the  machinery of import  control  cannot  be utilised to control or curb circulation or growth of freedom of newspapers it was held that Newspapers Control Policy  is ultra-vires of the Import Control Act and the Import Control Order.  The Court after referring to the two tests laid down in Bank Nationalisation case observed : "Direct operation of the  Act upon the right forms the real test".  The  question that  was  raised  in  the case  was  whether  the  impugned newsprint policy is in substance a newspaper control.   The, Court held that the Newsprint Control Policy is found to  be Newspaper  Control Order in the, guise of framing an  import control  policy fog newsprint.  As the direct  operation  of the Act was to abridge the freedom of speech and expression, the Court held that the pith and substance doctrine does not arise in the present case.  On the facts of the case  there,

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was no need to apply the doctrine of pith and substance It  may be noted that in Bennet Colomon’s case the  question whether Articles 21 and 19 are mutually exclusive or not did not arise for consideration and the case cannot be taken  as an  authority  for the question under consideration  in  the case.  Bennet Colomon’s case, Express Newspapers case, Sakal Newspapers case were all concerned with the right to freedom of the press which is held to form part of freedom of speech and expression. Whether  the  pith  and substance doctrine  is  relevant  in considering  the  question of  infringement  of  fundamental rights,  the  Court  observed  at  page  780  of  the   Bank Nationalisation case "Mr.  Palkhivala said that the tests of pith and substance of the subject matter and of direct 762 and of incidental effect of the legislation are relevant  to question  of legislative competence but they are  irrelevant to  the question of infringement of fundamental rights.   In our   view  this  is  a  sound  and  correct   approach   to interpretation  of legislative measures and State action  in relation to fundamental rights." It is thus clear, that  the test  of  pith and substance of the subject  matter  and  of direct  and incidental effect of legislation is relevant  in considering  the  question of  infringement  of  fundamental right. The  Court at page 781 said : "by direct operation is  meant the direct consequence or effect of the Act upon the  rights and  quoted  with approval the test laid down by  the  Privy Council  in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of  New  South Wales.(1) In  deciding whether the Act has got a direct  operation  of any  rights upon the fundamental rights, the two tests  are, therefore,  relevant and applicable.  These tests have  been applied  in  several  cases  before  the  decision  in  Bank Nationalisation  case.   A reference has been  made  to  the decision  of Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. and Anr.  V.  Union of India,(2) where the test laid down was that there must be a direct and inevitable consequence of the legislation.   In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of, India(3) this Court  followed the  test laid down in Express Newspapers case.   The  Court expressed  its  view that it is not the form  or  incidental infringement  that determine constitutionality of a  statute but reality and substance’ In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of  India(4) it was held that the "Correct approach in  such cases  should be to enquire as to what in substance  is  the loss  or  injury caused to the citizen and not  merely  what manner and method have been adopted by the State in  placing the   restriction.   The:  Supreme  Court  in   some   cases considered;  whether  the effect of the,  operation  of  the legislation  is  direct  and immediate or  not.   If  it  is remote,   incidental  or  indirect,  the  validity  of   the enactment  will not be effected.  The decision  in  Copper’s case has not rejected the above test.  The test laid down in cooper’s  case is the direct operation on the rights of  the person. The test was adopted and explained in Bennet Colomon’s  case as pointed above. The  view  that pith and substance rule is not  confined  in resolving conflicts between legislative powers is made clear in  the  decision  of  the  Federal  Court  in   Subramaniam Chettiar’s  case,(5) where Vardachariar, J. after  referring briefly  to the decision of Gallagher V. Lynn,(6) held  that "They  need not be limited to any special system of  federal constitution  is made clear by the fact hat in Gallagher  V. Lynn,  Lord  Atkin  applied pith  and  substance  rule  when

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dealing  with  a question arising under  the  Government  of Ireland Act which did not embody a federal system at all." (1) [1950] A. C. 235. (2) [1959] 1 S.C.R. 235. (3) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671. (4) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842. (5) [1940] Federal Court Reports 188. (6) [1937] A. C. 863. 763 The passport Act provides for issue of passports and  travel documents  for  regulating  the  departure  from  India   of citizens  of  India and other persons.   If  the  provisions comply  with  the requirements of Article 2 1, that  is,  if they  comply  with  the procedure  established  by  law  the validity  of the Act cannot be challenged.  If  incidentally the  Act  infringes on the rights of a  citizen  under  Art. 19(1)  the Act cannot be found to be invalid.  The pith  and substance rule will have to be applied and unless the rights are  directly affected, the challenge will fail.  If  it  is meant  as being applicable in every case however  remote  it may  be  where  the citizen’s rights under  Art.  19(1)  are affected, punitive detention will not be valid. The  result  of  the  discussion,  therefore,  is  that  the validity of the Passport Act will have to be examined on the basis  whether it directly and immediately infringes on  any of the fundamental right of the petitioner. If  a  passport is  refused according to procedure established by  law,  the plea that his other fundamental rights are denied cannot  be raised if they are not directly infringed. The  decisions  of the Supreme Court wherein  the  right  of person to travel abroad has been dealt with may be  noticed. In Satwant Singh v. Assistant Passport Officer, Delhi(1) the Court  held  that  though a passport was  not  required  for leaving,  for practical purposes no one can leave  or  enter into  India  without a passport.  Therefore, a  passport  is essential  for leaving and entering India.  The  Court  held the right to travel is part of personal liberty and a person could  not  be  deprived  of  it  except  according  to  the procedure laid down by law.  The view taken by the  majority was  that  the expression "personal liberty" in  Article  21 only  excludes the ingredients of liberty enshrined in  Art. 19 of the Constitution and the exression ’personal  liberty’ would  take  in the right to travel abroad.  This  right  to travel abroad is not absolute and is liable to be restricted according to the procedure established by law.  The decision has made it clear that "personal liberty" is ’not one of the rights secured under Article 19 and, therefore, liable to be restricted  by  the legislature according to  the  procedure established  by  law.  The right of an American  citizen  to travel  is  recognised.   In Kent v.  Dulles,(2)  the  Court observed that the right to travel is a part of the ’liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due  process of law under the Fifth Amendment.  "The freedom of  movement across  the  frontiers  in  either  direction,  and   inside frontiers as well, as a part of our heritage, Travel abroad, like travel within the country...... may be as close to  the heart  of the individual as the choice of what he  eats,  or wears, or reads.  Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of  values." In a subsequent decision--Zemel v. Rusk(3)  the Court sustained against due process attacks the Government’s refusal  to issue passports for travel to Ouba  because  the refusal  was  grounded  on  foreign  policy   considerations affecting  all citizens.  "The requirements of  due  process are  a function not only of the extent of  the  governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity

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for the restriction." (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 525. (2)  357 U. S. page 116, at page 127 (1958). (3)  381 U.S. (1) at page 14. 764               (The  Constitution  of the  United  States  of               America-Analysis  and  interpretation-at  page               1171) In Herbert Aptheker etc. v. Secretary of State,(1) the Court struck  down  a congressional prohibition  of  international travel  by members of the Communist Party.  In a  subsequent decision the Court upheld the Government’s refusal to  issue passports  for  travel to Cuba, because the refusal  was  on foreign  policy consideration affecting all citizens  [Zenel v,  Rusk  (supra)].  Thus an American’s citizen’s  right  to travel   abroad  may  also  be  restricted   under   certain conditions.   Our Constitution provides for  restriction  of the  rights by ’procedure established by law’.  It  will  be necessary to consider whether the impugned Act, Passport Act satisfies the requirements of procedure established by law. The  procedure established by law does not  mean  procedure, however,  fantastic  and oppressive or  arbitrary  which  in truth and reality is no procedure at all [(A.  K. Gopalan v. State  of  Madras) (1) observations of Mahajan,  J.].  There must  be some procedure and at least it must confirm to  the procedure  established by law must be taken to mean  as  the ordinary and well established criminal procedure, that is to say,  those settled usages and normal modes of  proceedings, sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code which is a general law  of  Criminal procedure in the Country.  But  as  it  is accepted that procedure established by law refers to statute law  and  as  the legislature is  competent  to  change  the procedure  the  procedure  as  envisaged  in  the   criminal procedure  cannot  be insisted upon as the  legislature  can modify  the  procedure.  The Supreme Court  held  in  Kartar Singh’s  case(3) that Regulation 236 clause (b) of the  U.P. Police  Regulation which authorises domiciliary visits  when ’there was no law on such a regulation, violated Article 21.  I  will not proceed to examine the provisions  of  Passport Act, Act 15 of 1967, to determine whether the Provisions  of the Act are in accordance with the procedure established  by law. The Preamble states that the Act is to provide for the issue of passports and travel documents to regulate the  departure from  India of citizens of India and other persons  and  for matters   incidental  or  ancillary  thereto.   It  may   be remembered that this Act was passed after the Supreme  Court had  held  in Satwant Singh V. Union of India’(1)  that  the right to tavel abroad is a part of person’s personal liberty of which he could not be deprived except in accordance  with the  procedure established by law in terms of Article 21  of the  Constitution.  The legislature came forward  with  this enactment  prescribing the procedure for issue of  passports for  regulating  the departure from India  of  citizens  and others. (1) 378 U.S. 500. (2) [1950] S.C.R. 88 at page 230. (3) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 332. (4) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525. 765 Section 5 of the Act provides for applying for passports  or travel  documents etc. and the procedure for passing  orders thereon.  On receipt of an application under sub-section (2) the  passport  authority may issue a passport  or  a  travel document   with  endorsement  in  respect  of  the   foreign

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countries  specified in the application or issue of a  pass- port or travel document with endorsement in respect of  some foreign  countries  and  refuse to make  an  endorsement  in respect of other countries or to refuse to issue a  passport or travel document and to refuse to make on the passport  or travel  document  any  endorsement.  In  the  event  of  the passport  authority  refusing  to  make  an  endorsement  as applied  for  or  refusal to issue a passport  or  a  travel document  or  refusal  of  endorsement,  the  authority   is required  to  record  in writing a brief  statement  of  its reasons  and  furnish  to that person,  on  demand,  a  copy thereof  unless the authority for reasons specified in  sub- section  (3) refuses to furnish a copy.  Section 6  provides that  the refusal to make an endorsement shall be on one  or other grounds mentioned in sub-sections (2) to (6).  Section 8  provides that every passport shall be renewable  for  the same  period  for which the passport was  originally  issued unless the passport authority for reasons to be recorded  in witing otherwise determines. Section  10  is  most important as  the  impounding  of  the passport ,of the petitioner was ordered under section  10(3) (c)  of  the  Act.   Section  10(1)  enables  the   passport authority to vary or cancel the endorsement on a passport or travel  document  or may with the previous approval  of  the Central Government, vary or cancel the conditions subject to which  a  passport or travel document has been  issued,  and require-  the holder of a passport or a travel  document  by notice  in  writing, to deliver up the  passport  or  travel document  to it within such time as may be specified in  the notice.  Sub-section (2) enables the bolder of a passport or a  travel document to vary or cancel the conditions  of  the passport.               Section 10(3) with which we are concerned runs               as follows               10(3).-The  passport authority may impound  or               cause to be impounded or revoke a passport  or               travel document,-               (a)  If  the passport authority  is  satisfied               that  the  holder of the  passport  or  travel               document is in wrongful possession of;               (b)  If  the passport or travel  document  was               obtained   by  the  suppression  of   material               information   or   on  the  basis   of   wrong               information  provided  by the  holder  of  the               passpot or travel document or any other person               on his behalf;               (c)   If  the  passport  authority  deems   it               necessary  so  to do in the interests  of  the               sovereignity  and  integrity  of  India,   the               security of India, friendly relations of India               with any foreign country, or in the  interests               of the general public; 766               (d)  If  the holder of the passpot  or  travel               document  has, at any time after the issue  of               the passort or travel document, been convicted               by a court in India for any offence  involving               moral  turpitude  and  sentenced  in   respect               thereof to imprisonment for not less than  two               years;               (c)  If proceedings in respect of  an  offence               alleged  to have been committed by the  holder               of the passport or travel document are pending               before a criminal court in India;               (f)  If any of the conditions of the  passport

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             or travel document has been contravened;               (g)  If the holder of the passport  or  travel               document  has failed to comply with  a  notice               under sub-section (1)requiring him to  deliver               up the same.               (b)  If  it is brought to the  notice  of  the               passport  authority that a warrant or  summons               for  the  appearance  or  a  warrant  for  the               arrest,  of  the  holder of  the  passport  or               travel  document  has been issued by  a  court               under  any law for the time being in force  or               if  an  order prohibiting the  departure  from               India  of the holder of the passport or  other               travel  document  has been made  by  any  such               court and the passport authority is  satisfied               that  a warrant or summons has been so  issued               or an order has been so made." Section 10(3) (c) enables the passport authority to  impound or  revoke  a passport if the passport  authority  deems  it ’necessary so to do in the interests of the sovereignty  and integrity   of  India,  the  security  of  India,   friendly relations  of  India  with any foreign country,  or  in  the interests of the general public. Section  10(5) requires the passport authority to record  in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making an order under sub-section (1) or(3) and to furnish the holder of the passport on demand a copy of the same unless in any case the passport authority is of the opinion that it will ’not be in the  interests  of the sovereignty and integrity  of  India, the, security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country or in the interests of the general public to furnish  such a copy.  Section 11 provides for an appeal  by the  aggrieved  person  against  any  order  passed  by  the passport  authority under several clauses mentioned in  sub- section  (1) of that section.  It is also provided  that  no appeal  shall  lie against any order passed by  the  Central Government.  Section 11(5) provided that in disposing of  an appeal, the appellate authority shall follow such  procedure as may be prescribed and that no appeal shall be disposed of unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of  representing  his case.  Rue 14 of the  Passport  Rules, 1967  prescribes that the appellate authority may  call  for the  records of the case from the authority who  passed  the order 767 appealed against and after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of representing his case pass final orders. To sum up under section 10(3) (c) if the passport  authority deems  it  necessary  so to do for  reasons  stated  in  the subsection,  he may impound a passport.  He is  required  to record  in  writing a brief statement of  ’the  reasons  for making  such  order and to furnish a copy of  the  order  on demand unless in any case he thinks for reasons mentioned in sub-section  (5)  that  a copy  should  not  be.  furnished. Except against an order passed by the Central Government the aggrieved  person  has  a right of  appeal.   The  appellate authority  is required to give a reasonable  opportunity  to the aggrieved person of representing his case. It  was  submitted  on behalf of the petitioner  that  on  a reading  of  section 10(3) observance of  rules  of  natural justice, namely the right to be heard, is implied and as the Government  had  failed  to  give  an  opportunity  to   the petitioner  to explain her case the order is  unsustainable. In  the alternative it was submitted that if  section  10(3) (c) is construed as denying the petitioner an opportunity of

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being  heard and by the provisions of section 11 a right  of appeal against an order passed by the Central Government  is denied  the provisions will not be procedure as  established by law under Article 21 and the relevant sections should  be held  ultra vires of the powers of the legislature.  It  was contended  that the power conferred on the authority to  im- pound a passport in the interests of general public is  very vague and in the absence of proper guidance an order by  the authority  impounding  the  passport "in  the  interests  of general  public" without any explanation is not valid.   The last  ground may easily be disposed of.  The words  ’in  the interests  of  general  public’  no  doubt  are  of  a  wide connotation but the authority in construing the facts of the case should determine whether in the interests of public the passport  will  have to be impounded.  Whether  the  reasons given have annexus to the interests of general public  would depend  upon the facts of each case.  The plea that  because of  the  vagueness of the words ’interests  of  the  general public’  in  the order, the order itself  is  unsustainable, cannot be accepted. The  submission  that  in the context the  rule  of  natural justice,  that  is,  the  right to be  beard  has  not  been expressly  or by necessary implication taken  away  deserves careful  consideration.   Under Section 10(3)  the  passport authority  is authorised to impound or revoke a passport  on any  of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (h) of  sub- section  (3).   Sub-section 3(a) enables  the  authority  to impound  a  passport  if the bolder of the  passport  is  in wrongful  possession  thereof.  Under sub-section  3(b)  the authority  can impound a passport if it was obtained by  the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information  provided by the holder of the passport.   Under clause  (d)  a passport can be impounded if the  holder  bad been convicted by a Court of India for any offence involving moral  turpitude and sentenced to imprisonment for not  less than  two  years.   Under clause (e)  the  passport  can  be impounded where 768 proceedings  in respect of an offence alleged to  have  been committed  by the holder of a passport is pending  before  a criminal  court in India.  Clause (f) enables the  authority to  impound  the passport if any of the  conditions  of  the passport  have  been  contravened.   Under  clause  (g)  the passport authority can act if the holder of the passport had failed  to  comply  with  a  notice  under  sub-section  (1) requiring him to deliver up the same.  Under sub-clause  (h) a  passport may be impounded if it is brought to the  notice of  the  passport authority that a warrant  or  summons  for appearance of the holder of the passport has been issued  by any court or if there is an order prohibiting departure from India  of  the  holder of the passport has been  made  by  a court.  It will be noticed that when action is  contemplated under any of the clauses (a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (h), it is  presumed  that the authority will give notice,  for  the passport authority cannot be satisfied under sub-clause  (a) that the holder is in         wrongful possession thereof or under   clause  (b)  that  he  obtained  the   passport   by suppression of material information.  Similarly under clause (d) whether a person has been convicted by a court in  India for  any offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced  to imprisonment  for  not  less than two  years,  can  only  be ascertained after hearing the holder of the passport.  Under clause  (e) the fact whether proceedings   in respect of  an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of  the passport  are  pending before a criminal court can  only  be

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determined after notice to him.  Equally whether a condition of  passport  has been contravened under sub-clause  (f)  or whether  he  has failed to comply with a notice  under  sub- section (1) can be ascertained only after hearing the holder of  the  passport.  Under clause (h) also a hearing  of  the holder  of the passport is presumed.  Reading clause (c)  in juxtaposition  with  other  ’Sub-clauses, it  will  have  to determined  whether it was the intention of the  legislature to deprive a right of hearing to the holder of the  passport before  it is impounded or revoked.  In this connection,  it cannot  be denied that the legislature by making an  express provision may deny a person the right to be heard.  Rules of natural  justice  cannot  be equated  with  the  Fundamental Rights.   As held by the Supreme Court in Union of India  v. J.  N.   Sinha,(1) that "Rules of natural  justice  are  not embodied  rules nor can they be elevated to the position  of Fundamental  Rights.  Their aim is to secure justice  or  to prevent miscarriage of justice.These rules can operate  only in  areas not covered by any law validly made.  They do  not supplant  the  law  but  supplement  it.   If  a   statutory provision  can be read consistently With the  principles  of natural  justice,  the  courts  should do  ’so.   But  if  a statutory  provision  either specifically  or  by  necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice  then  the court cannot ignore the  mandate  of  the legislature  or  the statutory authority and read  into  the concerned  provision the principles of natural justice."  So also  the right to be heard cannot be presumed when  in  the circumstances  of  the  case there  is  paramount  need  for secrecy  or  when  a  decision will  have  to  be  taken  in emergency  or when promptness of action is called for  where delay would defeat the very purpose or where it is expected (1) [1971] 1 S.C.R. 791. 769 that the person affected would take an obstructive attitude. To  a  limited extent it may be necessary te  rovoke  or  to impound   a  passport  without  notice  if  there  is   real apprehension  that the holder of the passport may leave  the country if he becomes aware of any intention on the part  of the  passport  authority  or the  Government  to  revoke  or impound the passport.  But that by itself would not  justify denial  of an opportunity to the holder of the  passport  to state his case before a final order is passed.  It cannot be disputed that the legislature has   not by express provision excluded the right to be heard.  When the passport authority takes action under section 10(5) he is required to record in writing  a brief statement of reasons and furnish a copy  to the  holder  of  the  passport  on  demand  unless  he   for sufficient  reasons considers it not desirable to furnish  a copy.  An order thus passed is subject to an appeal where an appellate  authority  is  required  to  give  a   reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to put forward his case.  When an appeal has to be disposed of after given  for a  specified period the revocation or impounding during  the without  hearing  the  aggrieved  person.   Further  when  a passport  is given for a specified period the revocation  or impounding during the period when the passport is valid  can only  be done for some valid reason.  There is a  difference between an authority revoking or modifying an order  already passed in favour of a person and initially refusing to grant a licence.  In Purtabpur Co. v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar,(1) the  Supreme  Court  held that "it would not  be  proper  to equate  an  order revoking or modifying a  licence  with,  a decision not to grant a licence." In Schmidt v. Secretary of State,  Home Affairs,(2) Lord Denning observed that "If  his

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permit  (alien) is revoked before the time limit expires  he ought,  I  think,  to  be given  an  opportunity  of  making representation;  for he would have a legitimate  expectation of  ’being  allowed to stay for the  permitted  time."  Lord Denning extended the application of the rule of audi alteram partem even in the case of a foreign alien who had no  right to  enter  the country.  When a permit was granted  and  was subsequently  sought  to  be revoked it has  to  be  treated differently  from that of refusing permission at  the  first instance.   As  in the present case the passport  which  has been   granted  is  sought  to  be  impounded   the   normal presumption  is  that the action will not be  taken  without giving a opportunity to the holder of the passport.  Section 10(3)  in  enumerating  the several  grounds  on  which  the passport authority may impound a passport has used the words like  ’if the authority is satisfied’, "the authority  deems it necessary to do so." The Privy Council in Durav- appah V. Fernando(3)  after  referring  to  an  earlier  decision  in Sugathadasa  v.  Jayasinghe(4) disagreed with  the  decision holding  "As  a general rule that words such  as  ’where  it appears  to . . . .’ or ’if it appears to  the  satisfaction of.....  or ’if the considers it expedient that. . .  .’  or ’if  the .... is satisfied that. . . standing by  themselves without  other  words  or  circumstances  of  qualification, exclude  a  duty to act judicially." The  Privy  Council  in disagreeing with this approach observed (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 807. (2) [1969] 2 Ch. 149. (3) [1967] 2 A. C. 337, (4)  [1958] 59 N.L.R. 457. 770 that  these various formulae are introductory of the  matter to  be  considered and are given little  guidance  upon  the question of audi alteram partem. The   statute  can   make itself clear on this point and if it does cadit quaestio. If it  does  not  then the principle laid  down  in  Cooper  v. Wardsworth Board of Works(1) where Byles, J. stated  "A long course  of decision, beginning with Dr. Bentley’s case,  and ending with some very recent cases, establish, that although there  are no positive words in the statute  requiring  that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common  law will  supply  the  omission  of  the  legislature."  In  the circumstances,  there  is  no material  for  coming  to  the conclusion  that the right to be heard has been  taken  away expressly or by necessary implication by the statute. I may at this stage refer to the stand taken by the  learned Attorney-General  on this question.  According to him "on  a true  construction,  the rule audi alteram  partenm  is  not excluded in ordinary cases and that the correct position  is laid  down  by the Bombay High Court in the  case  of  Minoo Maneckshaw  v.  Union  of  India.( 2 )  The  view  taken  by Tulzapurkar,  J. is that the rule of audi alteram partem  is not excluded in making an order under sec. 10(3) (c) of  the Act.   But  the Attorney General in  making  the  concession submitted  that  the  rule  will  not  apply  when   special circumstances  exist such as need for taking  prompt  action due  to the urgency of the situation or where the  grant  of opportunity  would  defeat  the very object  for  which  the action  of  impounding  is to be taken.   This  position  is supported by the decision of Privy Council in De Verteuil v. Knaggs,(3) wherein it was stated ’it must, however, be borne in mind that there may be special circumstances which  would satisfy  a Governor, acting in good faith,   to take  action even  if  be  did  not give an  opportunity  to  the  person affected  to make any relevant statement, or to  correct  or

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controvert  any  relevant statement brought forward  to  his prejudice."  This  extraordinary step can be  taken  by  the passport  authority  for impounding or revoking  a  passport when  he apprehends that the passport holder may  leave  the country  and  as  such prompt action  is  essential.   These observations  would  justify the authority  to  impound  the passport without notice but before any final order is passed the  rule of audi alteram partem would apply and the  holder of the passport will have to be beard.  I am satisfied  that the  petitioner’s  claim that she has a right  to  be  heard before  a final order under s. 10(3) (c) is passed  is  made out.  In this view the question as to whether sec. 10(3) (c) is ultra vires or not does not arise. it was submitted on behalf of the state that an order  under subclause 10(3) (c) is on the subjective satisfaction of the passport  authority  and  that as  the  decision  is  purely ’administrative  in character it cannot be questioned  in  a court  of  law except on very limited grounds.   Though  the courts  had  taken the view that the  principle  of  natural justice is inapplicable to administrative orders, there  ’is a change in the judicial opinion subsequently.  The frontier between judicial or (1)  1723 1 Str. 557 ; Mod.  Rep. 148. (2)  76 B.L.R.(1974) 788. (3)  [1918] A. C 557 771 quasi  judicial  determination  on  the  one  hand  and   an executive  or administrative determination on the other  has become  blurred.  The rigid view that principles of  natural justice applied only to judicial and quasi judicial acts and not  to administrative acts no longer holds the field.   The views  taken  by  the courts on this subject  are  not  con- sistent.    While  earlier  decisions  were  in  favour   of administrative convenience and efficiency at the expense  of natural  justice, the recent view is in favour of  extending the  application  of  natural justice and the  duty  to  act fairly  with  a caution that the principle  ’should  not  be extended  to  the  extreme so as  to  affect  adversely  the administrative efficiency.  In this connection it is  useful to  quote  the oft-repeated ,observations  of  Lord  Justice Tucker in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk(1) "The requirements of natural  justice  must depend on the  circumstances  of  the case,  the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which  the tribunal is acting , the subject matter that is being  dealt with,  and so forth .... but, whatever standard is  adopted, one  essential  is that the person concerned should  have  a reasonable  opportunity  of presenting his case." In  R.  v. Gaming  Board Ex. p. Benaim,(2) Lord Denning held  that  the view  that the principle of natural justice applied only  to judicial  proceedings and not to administrative  proceedings has  been  over-ruled in Ridge v. Baldwin.(3)  The  guidance that  was  given to the Gaming Board was  that  they  should follow  the principles laid down in the case  of  immigrants namely  that they have no tight to come in, but they have  a right  to be heard.  The Court held in construing the  words the Board "Shall have regard only" to the matter  specified, the  Board  has a duty to act fairly and it  must  give  the applicant  an opportunity of satisfying them of  the  matter specified in the section.  They must let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them.  The reference to  the  cases of immigrants is to the  decisions  of  Chief Justice  Parker  in Re H. K. (An infant)(1).   In  cases  of immigrants though they had no right to come into the country it  was  held  that they have a right to  be  heard.   These observations  apply to the present case and the plea of  the

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petitioner  that  the authority should act fairly  and  that they  must let her know what their impressions are so  that, if possible, she can disabuse them, is sound. In  American law also the decisions regarding the  scope  of judicial  review is not uniform.  So far  as  constitutional rights  are involved due process of law imports  a  judicial review   of  the  action  of  administrative  or   executive officers.   This  proposition is undisputed so  far  as  the questions  of law are concerned but the extent to which  the Court  should go and will go in reviewing determinations  of fact has been a highly controversial issue. (Constitution of the United States of America, P. 1152, 1973 Ed.) On  a consideration of various authorities it is clear  that where   the   decision  of  the  authority   entails   civil consequences and the petition is (1)   [1949] 1 All E.R.109,118. (2)  [1970] 2 Q.B. 417. (3)  [1964] A.C. 40 (4)  [1967] 2 Q.B.617, at 630. 772 prejudicially  affected he must be given an opportunity  to, be  heard  and  present  his case.   This  Court  in  Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board(1) and Rohtas Industries Ltd.  v. S. D. Agrawal,(2) has held that a limited  judicial scrutiny  of the impugned decision on the point of  rational and  reasonable nexus was open to a court of law.  An  order passed  by an authority based on subjective satisfaction  is liable  to  judicial scrutiny to a limited extent  has  been laid  down in U.P. Electric Co. v. State of U.P.(3)  wherein construing  the  provisions  of s.  3(2)(e)  of  the  Indian Electricity  Act 9 of 1910 as amended by the U.P. Act 30  of 1961, where the language used is similar to s. 10(3) (c)  of the  Passport Act, this Court held that when the  Government exercises its power on the ground that it "deems such supply necessary in public interest" if challenged, the  Government must  make out that exercise of the power was  necessary  in the  public interest.  The Court is not intended to  sit  in appeal over the satisfaction of the Government.  If there is prima  facie evidence on which a reasonable body of  persons may hold that it is in the public interest to supply  energy to consumers the, requirements of the statute are fulfilled. "In  our judgment, the satisfaction of the  Government  that the  supply  is  necessary  in the  public  interest  is  in appropriate  cases not excluded from judicial  review."  The decisions cited are clear authority for the proposition that the order passed under s. 10(3) (c) is subject to a  limited judicial scrutiny.  An order under s. 10(3) (c) though it is held to be an administrative order passed on the  subjective satisfaction   of  the  authority  cannot  escape   judicial scrutiny.   The  Attorney General fairly  conceded  that  an order under S. 10 (3) (c) is subject to a judicial  scrutiny and  that it can be looked into by the court to the  limited extent  of satisfying itself whether the order passed has  a rational  and  reasonable  nexus to  the  interests  of  the general public. It  was next contended on behalf of the petitioner that  the provisions  of  s.  10(5)  of the  Act  which  empowers  the Passport  authority or the Government to decline  furnishing the holder of the passport a brief statement of the  reasons for making an order if the authority is of the opinion  that it will not be in the interest of sovereignty and  integrity of  India,  security of India, friendly relations  of  India with any foreign country, or in the interests of the general public is unsustainable in law.  It was submitted that along

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with the right to refuse to furnish a copy of the order made by the Government, as a right of appeal is denied against an order  made  by the Central Govt. the provisions  should  be regarded  as. total denial or procedure and  arbitrary.   In view  of  the construction which is placed on S.  10(3)  (c) that  the  holder of the passport is entitled  to  be  heard before the passport authority deems it necessary to  impound a passport, it cannot be said that there is total denial  of procedure.  The authority under s. 10(5) is bound to  record in  writing a brief statement of the reasons for  making  an order  and furnish to the holder of the passport  or  travel docu- (1)  [1966] Sup. S.C.R. 31 1. (2)  [1969] 3 S.C.R. 108 (3)  [1969]  3 S.C.R. 865. 773 ment  on demand a copy of the same, unless in any case,  the passport authority is of the opinion that it will not be  in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security  of  India,  friendly relation of  India  with  any foreign  country  or in the interests of general  public  to furnish such a copy.  The grounds on which the authority may refuse to furnish the reasons are the same as provided in s. 10  (3)(c) for impounding a passport but the two powers  are exercisable  in  totally  different  contexts.   Under  sec. 10(3), the question that has to be considered is whether the passport has to be impounded in the interests of sovereignty and  integrity of India etc. or in the interests of  general public.   In passing an order under sec. 10(5) it has to  be considered  whether in the interests of the sovereignty  and integrity  of  India  etc. or in the  interests  of  general public,  furnishing of a copy of the reasons for the  order, should  be declined.  Though the same grounds are  mentioned for impounding a passport as well as for refusing to furnish the reasons for making an order, it would not mean that when an order under s. 10(3) (c) is passed it would automatically apply to s. 10(5) and for the same reason the authority  can decline to furnish the reasons for the order.  S. 10(5) says that  the  authority  shall furnish to  the  holder  of  the passport  on demand a copy unless in any case the  authority it  of  opinion  that it will not be  in  the  interests  of sovereignty  and  integrity of India  etc.   The  expression "unless in any case" would indicate that it is not in  every case  that the authority can decline to furnish reasons  for the order.  There may be some, cases, and I feel that it can be  only  in  very rare cases, that a  copy  containing  the reasons  for making such order can be refused.  Though  rare there may be some cases in which: it would be, expedient for the  authority to decline to furnish a copy of  the  reasons for making such order.  But that could only be an  exception is  indicated from the fact that the aggrieved person has  a right  of appeal under s. 1 1 which has to be decided  after giving a reasonable opportunity of representing his case.  A reasonable  opportunity cannot Ordinarily be  given  without disclosing  to  that person the reasons for the  order.   In those  rare  ,cases in which a copy for the reasons  of  the order  is  declined  by the passport authority  and  is  not furnished during the hearing of the appeal, it would furnish sufficient justification for the courts to have a close look into the reasons for the order and satisfy itself whether it has  been  properly made.  But I am unable to,  say  that  a provision which empowers the authority to decline to furnish reasons for making the order is not within the competence of the  legislature.  The learned counsel for  the  petitioner, with  some  justification, submitted that if no  reasons  we

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furnished by the Govt. and no appeal is provided against the order  of the Govt. it would virtually amount to  denial  of procedure  established by law as contemplated under Art.  21 of the ,Constitution of India.  Though there is considerable force  in this submission.  I am unable to accept this  plea for  two  reasons.  Firstly, the Govt. is bound to  give  an opportunity  to  the holder of the passport  before  finally revoking  or impounding it.  I expect the case in which  the authority  declines  to furnish reasons for making  such  an order  would be extremely rare.  In such cases it should  be born  in mind that when the Govt. itself passes an order  it should  be presumed that it would have made the order  after careful scrutiny.  If an order is passed 11-119 SCI/79 774 by  the passport authority, an appeal is provided.   If  the Govt. passes an order, though no appeal is provided for, but as the power is vested in the highest authority the  section is   not  unconstitutional--(Chinta  Lingam  and   Ors.   v. Government of India & ors.(1) for the order would be subject to  judicial  scrutiny  by the High Court  and  the  Supreme Court.   I  feel  that  in the  circumstances  there  is  no justification for holding that S. 10(5) of the Act is  ultra vires of the powers of the legislature.  We have taken  note of  the fact that in the present case there is no reason  in declining  to  furnish to the petitioner  the  statement  of reasons for impounding the passport but such a lapse by  the authority  would  not  make sec. 10(5) ultra  vires  of  the powers of the legislature. It was next contended that in the present case the  passport was  impounded under S. 10(3) (c) of the Act on  the  ground that  (a)  it is in the public interest  that  Smt.   Maneka Gandhi should be able to give evidence before the Commission of ’Inquiry and, (b) that Smt.  Maneka Gandhi should have an opportunity  to present her views before the  Commission  of Inquiry  and  according  to  a  report  received  there   is likelihood  of  Smt.  Maneka Gandhi leaving India.   It  was submitted  that  impounding of the passport  on  the  ground stated  above  is unjustified.  Referring to  S.  10(3)  (h) where  it is provided that when it is brought to the  notice of  the  passport authority that a warrant  or  summons  for appearance or a warrant for the arrest of the holder of  the passport  has been issued by a court under any law  for  the time being in force or if an order prohibiting the departure from  India  of the holder of the passport or  other  travel document  has been made by any such court and  the  passport authority is satisfied that a warrant or summons has been so issued  or an order has been so made, impound the  passport. For  application of this clause there must be a  warrant  or summons from the court or an order by the Court  prohibiting the  departure from India.  It was submitted that it is  not certain whether the Commission would require the presence of the  petitioner at all and if required. when  her.  presence will  be  necessary.   There  had been  no  summons  or  any requisition  from the Commission of Inquiry  requiring  ’the petitioner’s  presence  and  in such  circumstances  it  was submitted  that the order is without any  justification.   A notification  issued  by the Ministry  of  External  Affairs under  s. 22(a) of the Passports Act on 14-4-76 was  brought to  our  notice.   By that notification  the  Central  Govt. considered  that it is necessary in the public  interest  to exempt citizens of India against whom proceedings in respect of  an  offence alleged to have been committed by  them  are pending before a criminal court in India and if they produce orders  from the Court concerned permitting them  to  depart

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from  India from the operations of the provisions of  clause (f)  of  sub-section (2) of s. 6 of the Act subject  to  the condition  that the passport will be issued to such  citizen only for, a period specified in such order of the Court  and if no period is.specified the passport shall be issued for a period of six months and may be renewed for a further period of six months if the order of the (1) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 871 at p. 876. 775 court  is  not cancelled or modified.  The citizen  is  also required  to give an undertaking to the  passport  authority that  he shall, if required by the court  concerned,  appear before if at any time during the continuance in force of the passport  so  issued.   It  was  submitted  that  when  such facility is provided for a person who is being tried for  an offence  in  a  criminal court the same  facility  at  least should  be  given to a person who may be  required  to  give evidence before a Commission of Inquiry.  It is  unnecessary for  me  to  go  into the question  as  to  whether  in  the circumstances the impounding of the passport is justified or not for the’ learned Attorney General submitted that the im- pounding  was for the purpose of preventing  the  petitioner from  leaving  the country and that a final  decision-as  to whether the passport will have to be impounded and if so for what  period  will  be  decided later.   On  behalf  of  the Government a statement was filed which is as follows               "1. The Government is agreeable to considering               any  representation  that may be made  by  the               petitioner in respect of the impounding of her               passport and giving her an opportunity in  the               matter.  The opportunity will be given  within               two    weeks   of   the   receipt    of    the                             representation.   It is clarified that  in  th e               present case, the grounds for impounding  ’the               passport are those mentioned in the  affidavit               in reply dated 18th August, 1977 of Shri Ghosh               except those mentioned in para 2(xi).               2.  The representation of the petitioner  will               be dealt with expeditiously in accordance with               law.               3. In the event of the decision of  impounding               the passing having confirmed, it is  clarified               that  the duration of the impounding will  not               exceed a period of six months from the date of               the   decision  that  may  be  taken  on   the               petitioner’s representation.               4.   Pending   the   consideration   of    the               petitioner’s  represen- tation and  until  the               decision  of the Government of India  thereon,               the  petitioner’s  passport  shall  remain  in               custody of this Honourable Court.               5. This will be without prejudice to the power               of the Government of India to take such action               as  it may be advised in accordance  with  the               provisions  of the Passport Act in respect  of               the petitioner’s passport." In  view  of the statement that the petitioner  may  make  a representation in respect of impounding of passport and that the  representations  will be dealt with  expeditiously  and that even if the impounding of the passport is confirmed  it will not exceed a period of six months from the date, of the decision  that  may  be taken  on  the  petitioner’s  repre- sentation, it is not necessary for me to go into the  merits of  the case any further.  The Attorney General  assured  us

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that all the grounds 776 urged  before us by the petitioner and the grounds that  may be urged before the authority will be properly considered by the authority and appropriate orders passed. In the result, I hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any  of the fundamental rights enumerated-in Article  19  of the Constitution and that the Passport Act complies with the requirements  of  Art.  21 of the  Constitution  and  is  in accordance  with  the  procedure  established  by  law.    I construe section 10(3)(c) as providing a right to the holder of  the passport to be heard before the  passport  authority and that any order passed under section 10(3) is subject  to a  limited  judicial  scrutiny by the, High  Court  and  the Supreme Court. In  view  of  the statement made  by  the  learned  Attorney General  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made   in judgment, I do not think it necessary to formally  interfere with the impugned order.  I accordingly dispose of the  Writ Petition without passing any formal order.  There will be no order as to costs.                            ORDER Having  regard  to the majority view, and, in  view  of  the statement  made  by the learned  Attorney-General  to  which reference, has already been made in the judgments we do  not think  it necessary to formally interfere with the  impugned order.   We,  accordingly,  dispose  of  the  Writ  Petition without passing any formal order.  The passport will  remain in the custody of the Registrar of this Court until  further orders.  There will be no order as to costs. P.H.P. 777