http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5273 of 2005

PETITIONER: Mandir Shree Sitaramji alias Shree Sitaram Bhandar       

RESPONDENT: Land Acquisition Collector & Ors.  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/08/2005

BENCH: S. N. Variava & Tarun Chatterjee

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.2356 of 2004]

S. N. VARIAVA, J.

       Leave granted.           Heard parties.         This Appeal has been filed against the Judgment dated 21/22  August, 2003 passed by the High Court of Delhi.         Briefly stated the facts as follows: On 13th November, 1959 a Notification under Section 4 of the Land  Acquisition Act was issued for acquisition of app. 35,000 acres of land.   The said acquisition was for "planned development of Delhi".  Amongst  the lands, sought to be acquired, were Appellants’ land of app. 68  acres.  Clause 2(d) of the said Notification exempted lands of  "Religious Institutions".         This acquisition was challenged by a number of parties including  the Appellants.  The Writ Petition filed by the Appellants was allowed  by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court on the ground that the  Appellants were not heard in respect of their objections filed under  Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.  A Division Bench of the Delhi  High Court allowed the Appeal and dismissed the Writ Petition.  The  Appeal filed by the Appellants in this Court was allowed by the  Judgment reported in Shri Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of  Delhi & Ors. (1975) 1 SCR 597.  This Court held that there had been  no enquiry as to whether or not the Appellants’ land belonged to a  religious institution.  Therefore, this Court quashed the Section 6  Notification and remitted the matter back to the Land Acquisition  Collector to enquire into the objection of the Appellants.         It appears that the Government then decided not to pursue the  earlier Section 4 Notification in respect of the Appellants’ land.   Another Notification dated 13th March, 1975 under Section 4 of the  Land Acquisition Act, proposing to acquire app. 300 bighas for  "planned development of Delhi" was issued.  The Appellants again  challenged the proposed acquisition by filing a Writ Petition.  The Writ  Petition was dismissed by the impugned order.         On behalf of the Respondents, it has been submitted that the  Appellants are not entitled to maintain this Appeal as they have  already sold off the land to a third party.  It is submitted that the  Appellants no longer have any right, title or interest in the said land.   This has been denied by the Appellants who claim that they have only  entered into a development agreement.  In our view, it is not  necessary for us to go into this controversy.  It is preferable to decide  the challenge to the acquisition proceedings on their own merits.  We  have, therefore, left this question open and heard the parties on the  challenge to the acquisition.         On behalf of the Appellants, it was submitted that the acquisition  is not for "planned development of Delhi".  It was submitted that on  9th May, 1972 an Agreement has been entered into between the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

President of India on one hand and the Ministry of Commerce and  Industry Cooperative Housing Building Societies on the other.  It is  submitted that the Agreement is to allot to this Cooperative Society  app. 217 bighas and 8 biswas of land.  It is submitted that this is the  land of the Appellants.  It is submitted that in pursuance of this  Agreement a sum of Rs. 26,37,245 has been received from the  society.  It is submitted that the acquisition is actually for the society  yet it purports to show as if it is for "Planned development of Delhi".   It is submitted that as the acquisition is for a cooperative society, the  provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and particularly  Sections 39, 40 and 41 should have been complied with.  It is  submitted that those provisions have not been complied with and  therefore the acquisition is bad and should be set aside.         On the other, on behalf of the Respondents it is submitted that  the acquisition was effectively of 35000 acres of land in pursuance of  Notification under Section 4 issued in 1959.  It was submitted that  because of the orders of this Court, the Appellants’ land got excluded  from the earlier Notification.  It was submitted that land all around  Appellants’ land was acquired in pursuance of the earlier Notification.   It was submitted that in order to avoid any further complication and  delay the second Notification under Section 4 was issued on 13th  March, 1975.  It was submitted that the acquisition of Appellants’ land  was for purposes of "planned development of Delhi" and not for any  Co-operative Society.  It is submitted that acquisition for "planned  development of Delhi" has been upheld by a Constitution Bench of this  Court in the case of Aflatoon vs Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4  SCC 285].  It is pointed out that the Constitution Bench has in this  Judgment upheld acquisition inter alia on the ground that when there  is acquisition of such a large area of land, it is not possible to specify  in detail what the exact purpose of acquisition is.  It was pointed out  that an argument identical to the one now made has been negatived in  that Judgment.  Reliance was placed on para 24 of the Judgment  which reads as under: "24. It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the  acquisition was really for the co-operative  housing societies which are companies within  the definition of the word ’company’ in Section  3(e) of the Act, and, therefore, the provisions  of Part VII of the Act should have been  complied with.  Both the learned Single Judge  and the Division Bench of the High Court were  of the view that the acquisition was not for  company.  We see no reason to differ from  their view.  The mere fact that after the  acquisition the Government proposed to hand  over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the  property acquired for development to the co- operative housing societies would not make  the acquisition one for ’company’.  Nor are we  satisfied that there is any merit in the  contention that compensation to be paid for  the acquisition came from the consideration  paid by the co-operative societies.  In the light  of the averments in the counter affidavit filed  in the writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold  that it was co-operatives which provided the  fund for the acquisition.  Merely because the  Government allotted a part of the property to  co-operative societies for development, it  would not follow that the acquisition was for  co-operative societies and, therefore, Part VII  of the Act was attracted."

       It is submitted that the Delhi Development Authority, for whom  the land has been acquired, cannot develop 35000 acres on its own.  It

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

was submitted that it, therefore, becomes necessary to give various  portions of land to various societies for the purposes of development.    It was submitted that merely because land is given to societies does  not mean that the acquisition is for the purposes of those societies.  It  was submitted that the Agreement dated 9th May, 1972 does not  specify that the land to be allotted to that society is the Appellants’  land.  It was submitted that the Agreement is merely to allot some  land out of the 35,000 acres being acquired.  It is submitted that the  Constitution Bench of this Court has approved such a course of action.           In support of this submission, it was also pointed out that the  planned development can only be in accordance with the Delhi  Development Act and that this permitted the authority to allot land to  various co-operative societies for the purposes of development.         We have considered the submissions of both the sides.  In our  view, there is no merit in the challenge to the proposed acquisition on  the ground that the acquisition was for the purposes of the society  covered by Agreement dated 9th May, 1972.  The subsequent  Notification is merely a follow up of the earlier Notification.  The entire  acquisition is for "planned development of Delhi".  To be remembered  that Appellants’ land is in the midst of the 35000 acres which have  been acquired pursuant to the Notification under Section 4 issued in  1959.  The Agreement dated 19th May, 1972 does not specify that it is  the Appellants’ land which is to be allotted to that Society.  The  Society is to be allotted some land and even if Appellants’ land is  allotted to this Society, after acquisition, it will not mean that the  acquisition was for this Society.  Therefore, the provisions of Part VII  of the Land Acquisition Act need not have been complied with.           It was next submitted, on behalf of the Appellants, that the  Government has formulated a scheme by which parties are permitted  to develop their own land.   It was submitted that the acquisition of  land of such parties was to be withdrawn as per the policy.   In this  behalf, reliance was placed upon a letter dated 3rd March, 1987 from  the office of the Prime Minister, wherein it is stated that the Appellants  may be permitted to develop the land in accordance with the norms  given by Delhi Development Authority.  Reliance was also placed upon  a letter dated 4th April, 1991 from the Director, Delhi Development  Authority, to one Shri Acharya Arun Dev (whom the Appellants claim  to be their power of attorney holder) wherein also the Appellants’  proposal to allot the land to them for development was stated to be  approved.  Reliance was also placed upon a letter dated 17th  September, 1991 from the Additional Secretary to the Minister of  Urban Development as well as minutes of a meeting held on 23rd  September, 1991 in the chambers of the Lt. Governor to consider the  Appellants proposal to develop the lands themselves.  Relying on these  documents, it was submitted that the Governments had decided to  withdraw from the acquisition.  It was submitted that the Government  should be held bound by its commitment to so withdraw.  It was  submitted that for this reason also the acquisition should be quashed.           As against this, on behalf of the Respondents, it is pointed out  that this very ground had been considered by the Delhi High Court on  an earlier occasion.  It was pointed out that after looking into the  relevant records the Delhi High Court had recorded in paras 18 and 19  of its Judgments as follows:

"18.   It also appears that there was a decision  relating to denotification of land in favour of  one Sita Ram Bhandar Trust.  File thereof had  been called for by the Prime Minister who  ordered that no land was to be denotified  without the previous approval of the  Cabinet/Prime minister.  When this file was  sent to the Ministry, based on the decision  contained in respect of Sita Ram Bahadur  Trust, following noting was recorded in respect  of the land in question on 17th June, 1999.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

"Notes from page 38/N onwards may kindly be  seen: The case of Denotification of village Kotla  Mahigiran, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi was  examined without calling a fresh report upto  date position of the case from DDA.  The then  Minister (UD) has ordered (P-41/N) for the  denotification of the land.

2. Subsequently, DDA has informed that out of  615 Bigha acquired by the Govt. physical  possession of land measuring 600 Bigha has  already been taken over by the DDA.

3. In the mean time the file relating to  denotification of land in favour of Sita Ram  Bhandar Trust has been called for by the Prime  Minister and the PM has ordered that no land is  to be denotified without the previous approval  of the Cabinet/PM.  In view of this no further  action is required in this case.  Submitted  please.

19.     This file was placed before the Minister.   It may be mentioned that in the meantime new  incumbent had taken charge.  This new  Minister took the following decision on the  basis of aforesaid noting dated 17th June,  1999.

"The file of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has since  been received back from the PMO and PM’s  instructions not to denotify the land have been  noted.

2. On the Trust’s file, I have recorded my  observations.  These observations apply in this  case as well.  There is no justification for  denotifying land, particularly when 600 bighas  have already been acquired and taken over."

       This could not be denied by the Appellants.  It is thus clear that  letters and minutes relied upon are mere recommendations.  No  decision to release from acquisition had been taken.  In any event the  Prime Minister had turned out this proposal.

       Even otherwise, we have seen the scheme sought to be relied  upon.  We find from the scheme that it only applies in respect of  persons/agencies who own and possess the land.  In this case  possession of the land had already been taken.  The scheme also  categorically states that the scheme would not take away the rights of  the Delhi Development Authority to acquire for development of Delhi.   Thus the scheme was not applicable to lands of the Appellants.  Even  under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act once possession is taken  the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition.   We thus see  no substance in this contention also.           In view of the above, we see no merit in this Appeal.  The Appeal  stands dismissed with no orders as to costs.