IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1569 OF 2001

Mandal Revenue Officer … Appellant

Versus

Goundla Venkaiah and another … Respondents

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. This appeal is directed against order dated 20.6.2000 passed by  

the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whereby it allowed  

the writ petition filed by the respondents, quashed the orders passed  

by the Special Tribunal and the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh  

Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the  

‘Land Grabbing Act’) and declared that the respondents have acquired  

title over the schedule property by adverse possession.

2. Gonda  Mallaiah  (predecessor  of  the  respondents)  illegally  

occupied 5 acres land comprised in Survey No.42, Khanament village,  

Rangareddy District, which is classified in the revenue records as  

Kharizkhata-Sarkari.  In 1965 and 1986, notices were issued to Gonda  

Mallaiah under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act,

1905 but no order appears to have been passed for his eviction. In  

1990,  Mandal  Revenue  Officer,  Serlingampally,  Rangareddy  District  

(appellant herein) filed an application before the Special Tribunal  

constituted under the Land Grabbing Act for recovery of the possession  

of 5 acres land by alleging that the same was illegally occupied by  

Gonda Mallaiah.  During the pendency of the application, Gonda Mallaiah  

died and the respondents herein were brought on record as his legal  

representatives.  In their reply, the respondents denied the allegation  

that their father had illegally occupied the land and pleaded that they  

have  acquired  title  by  adverse  possession  because  they  are  in  

possession of the land and cultivating the same for last more than 50  

years without any interference or obstruction.  The respondents further  

pleaded that being landless poor they are entitled to assignment of  

land as per the Board’s Standing Orders, but instead of acting on their  

representations,  the  appellant  initiated  proceedings  under  the  Land  

Grabbing Act by wrongly treating them as land grabbers.   

3. By an order dated 27.5.1997, the Special Tribunal allowed the  

application of the appellant and declared that the schedule land is  

Government  land  which  had  been  grabbed  by  Gonda  Mallaiah  and  his  

successors and directed them to hand over possession thereof to the  

Government within 2 months.  The appeal preferred by the respondents  

was dismissed by the Special Court by detailed order dated 18.8.1998.

4. The respondents challenged the orders of the Special Tribunal  

and the Special Court in Writ Petition No.30262 of 1998.  The Division  

Bench of the High Court did not disturb concurrent finding recorded by

the Special Tribunal and the Special Court that the schedule land is  

Government land but set aside the orders passed by them on the premise  

that the respondents have acquired title by adverse possession and as  

such they cannot be evicted by being treated as land grabbers.

5. Shri R. Sundervardhan, learned senior counsel for the appellant  

submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the  

laboured attempt made by the High Court to justify its interference  

with the concurrent finding recorded by the Tribunal and the Special  

Court on the issue of illegal possession of the respondents and their  

predecessor is wholly unwarranted and uncalled for.  Learned senior  

counsel pointed out that after making in-depth analysis of the evidence  

produced by the parties, the Special Tribunal and the Special Court  

categorically held that the land comprised in Survey No.42 of village  

Khanament, Rangareddy District is Government land and Gonda Mallaiah  

had illegally occupied a portion thereof and argued that the High Court  

committed a serious jurisdictional error by interfering with the said  

finding merely because on  re-appreciation of the factual matrix of the  

case and evidence produced by the parties, a different conclusion could  

be reached.  Learned counsel criticised the High Court’s analysis of  

the documents produced by the parties including notice dated 22.6.1985  

issued to one R. Mallaiah under Section 7 of the Encroachment Act and  

the reply filed by him by pointing out that the observation made by the  

Special Court that the documents were suspicious in nature did not call  

for interference by the High Court.  Learned counsel also assailed the  

finding of the High Court that the respondents have acquired title by  

adverse possession and argued that in the absence of any evidence to

show  that  possession  of  Gonda  Mallaiah  and  the  respondents  was  

continuous and openly hostile to the Government, they cannot be said to  

have perfected their title over the schedule land.

6. Shri  M.N.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondents repeatedly urged that this Court should not pronounce upon  

the    legality  and  correctness  of  the  impugned  order  because  the  

application  made  by  the  respondents  for  assignment  of  land  and/or  

regularization of their possession in accordance with policy framed by  

the Government is pending and is likely to be decided shortly.  He then  

argued that the finding recorded by the High Court in favour of the  

respondents on the issue of their having acquired title by adverse  

possession is unassailable because the evidence produced by the parties  

is sufficient to establish that Gonda Mallaiah and the respondents were  

in uninterrupted possession of the schedule land for more than 50 years  

and  the  proceedings  initiated  against  Gonda  Mallaiah  under  the  

Encroachment Act were dropped after due consideration of the reply  

filed  by  him.   Shri  Rao  submitted  that  failure  of  the  concerned  

authorities of the Government to challenge the occupation of land by  

Gonda Mallaiah and the respondents for more than 50 years is conclusive  

of the fact that their possession was open and hostile and the High  

Court did not commit any error by declaring that the respondents have  

acquired title over the schedule land by adverse possession.

7. We  have  thoughtfully  considered  the  entire  matter. The  

phenomenon  of  encroachment,  unauthorized  occupation  and  grabbing  of  

public lands is as old as human civilization.  From time to time,

legislations have been enacted to curb this menace of encroachment.  

One  such  legislation  i.e.  Madras  Land  Encroachment  Act,  1905  was  

enacted by the legislature of the erstwhile State of Madras.  After  

formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, necessary changes were made  

in the nomenclature of the Act and it is now known as the Andhra  

Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the  

Encroachment Act’).  Section 2(1) of the Encroachment Act declares that  

all public roads, streets, lanes and paths, the bridges, ditches, dikes  

and fences, on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours  

and creeks below high water mark, and of rivers, streams, nalas, lakes  

and  tanks  and  all  canals  and  water-courses,  and  all  standing  and  

flowing water, and all lands except those enumerated in Clauses (a) to  

(e) shall be the property of the Government.  Section 2(2) further  

declares  that  all  public  roads  and  streets  vested  in  any  local  

authority shall be deemed to be the property of Government for the  

purpose  of  the  Act.   Section  5  defines  liability  of  person  

unauthorizedly  occupying  land  and  Section  6  prescribes  summary  

procedure  for  eviction  of  person  unauthorizedly  occupying  land  for  

which he is liable to pay assessment in terms of Section 3.  Section 7  

incorporates the rule of  audi alteram partem and makes it obligatory  

for the competent authority to issue notice and give opportunity of  

hearing to the alleged unauthorized occupant of land being the property  

of Government.  Section 7-A, which was added with effect from 13.5.1980  

provides for eviction of encroachment made by group of persons.

8. In some of the proceedings initiated under the Encroachment Act  

in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the occupants of the land questioned

the  Government’s  title  over  it  by  contending  that  they  came  into  

possession on the basis of validly executed lease, licence or sale  

transaction.   The  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  ruled  that  bona  fide  

dispute relating to title of land raised by the occupant cannot be  

decided in summary proceedings and such dispute can be adjudicated only  

by a regular civil court.  In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala  

Krishna Rao (1982) 2 SCC 134, this Court approved the view of the High  

Court and held that the Government cannot take unilateral decision that  

the property belongs to it and then take recourse to summary remedy  

under Section 6 of the Encroachment Act for eviction of the occupant.   

9. In view of the afore-mentioned development and keeping in mind  

the fact that there has been large scale grabbing of land belonging to  

Government,  local  authorities,  religious/charitable  institutions  

including a Wakf and even private lands, the State Legislature enacted  

the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter  

referred to as ‘the Land Grabbing Act’) to prohibit every activity of  

land  grabbing  in  the  State  and  to  provide  for  matters  connected  

therewith.  The new legislation deals with all types of land grabbing,  

public as well as private and provides for a comprehensive mechanism,  

which  is  substantially  different  than  the  one  provided  in  the  

Encroachment Act, for eviction of land grabber and adjudication of  

related disputes without requiring the parties to seek remedy before  

the regular court.  The necessity of bringing the new legislation is  

clearly reflected in the statement of objects and reasons incorporated  

in the bill, which led to enactment of the Land Grabbing Act.  The same  

read as under:-

“An Act to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the  State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected  therewith.

Whereas there are organized attempts on the part of certain  lawless  persons  operating  individually  and  in  groups,  to  grab,  either  by  force  or  by  deceit  or  otherwise,  lands  (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a  religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a  wakf, or any other private persons) who are known as “land  grabbers”.

And whereas such land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative  housing  societies  or  setting  up  fictitious  claims  and  indulging  in  large  scale  and  unprecedented  and  fraudulent  sales  and  lands  belonging  to  the  Government,  a  local  authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment  including a wakf, or private persons, through unscrupulous  real  estate  dealers  or  otherwise  in  favour  of  certain  sections of the people resulting in large accumulation of  unaccounted wealth and quick money to land grabbers;

And whereas, having regard to the resources and influence of  the persons by whom, the large scale on which and the manner  in which, the unlawful activity of land grabbing was, has  been or is being organized and carried on in violation by law  by them, as land grabbers in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and  particularly in its urban areas, it is necessary to arrest  and curb immediately such unlawful activity of land grabbing;

And  whereas,  public  order  is  adversely  affected  by  such  unlawful activity of land grabbers.”

10. Although,  the  Land  Grabbing  Act  envisaged  constitution  of  

Special Courts, absence of a specific provision making the Code of  

Civil  Procedure  and  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  applicable  to  the  

proceedings before such court enabled the land grabbers to approach the  

ordinary courts and get the orders of injunction which resulted in  

frustrating the proceedings initiated under the Land Grabbing Act for  

their eviction.  Therefore, the Governor of the State promulgated the  

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986.  

The need for amendment is discernible from the statement of objects and  

reasons, which are reproduced below:-

“Law's delays is an undeniable fact. Matters pending in Civil  and Criminal Courts take frustratingly long periods to reach  finality.  Matters  pending  in  Civil  Courts  are  delayed  notoriously  for  long  periods,  even  criminal  cases  taking  long periods for disposal. The  observations of Hon'ble Sri  Y.V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of lndia, in  In Re. The Special Courts Bill, 1978 highlight the  reality.  In urban areas due to pressure on land, prices have been  constantly  soaring  high,  and  taking  advantage  of  this  phenomenon, unscrupulous and resourceful persons backed  by  wealth  and  following  occupied  without  any  semblance  of  right,  vast  extents  of  land  belonging  to  the  Government,  Local  authorities,  Wakfs,  and  Charitable  and  Religious  Endowments and evacuees and private persons. In several cases  such illegal occupations  were noticed in respect of lands,  belonging to private individuals who are not in a position to  effectively defend their possession. In many cases this is  being  done  by  organised  groups  loosely  called  "Mafia",  a  distinct class of economic offenders, operating in the cities  of Andhra Pradesh. Unless all such cases of land grabbing are  immediately  detected  and  dealt  sternly  and  swiftly  by  specially devised adjudicating forums the evil cannot subside  and social injustice will continue to be perpetrated with  impunity. If civil and criminal  actions are dealt by two  separate forums, the desired objective cannot be achieved due  to  procedural delays. In every case of land grabbing the  person responsible is liable in tort and also for criminal  action. To remedy this menace it is felt that a Special  Court should  be constituted with jurisdiction to determine  both civil and criminal liabilities and also award sentences  of imprisonment and fine in order to advance the cause of  justice  in  the  same  proceeding  without  being  driven  to  duplication,  of  litigation  of  course  taking  care  of  procedural fairness and natural justice.  The Special Court  which consists of a serving or retired Judge of a High Court  serving or retired  District Judges and serving or retired  Civil Servants not below the rank of District Collector will  entertain only such cases in which the magnitude of the evil  needs  immediate  eradication.   Such  court  will  avoid  duplication  and  further  the  cause  of  justice,  since  under  existing  law,  evidence  given  in  a  Civil  Court  cannot  automatically be relied upon in a Criminal proceeding.

A High powered body like the Special Court, by the very  nature of its composition will be the best safeguard to guard  against  possible  miscarriage  of  justice  due  to  non- application of the existing procedural law for determination  of both civil and criminal  liability. The Special Court, in  exercise of its judicial discretion, will decide what type of  cases  of  alleged  land  grabbing  it  should  entertain,  the  guidelines being the extent or the  value or the location or  other  like  circumstances  of  the  land  alleged  to  have  been  grabbed.  In respect of matters in which the Special Court is

not inclined to proceed with, the District  Judge exercising  jurisdiction  over  the  area  will  constitute  the  Special  Tribunal.  The  Special  Tribunal  shall  have  to  follow  the  procedural law strictly and its jurisdiction is limited only  to adjudicating civil liability.

With a view to achieving the aforesaid objective, it has  been  decided  to  amend  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  (Prohibition) Act, 1982 by undertaking suitable legislation.”

11. The  1986  Ordinance  was  replaced  by  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  

Grabbing (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 1987.

12. We may now notice the relevant provisions of the Land Grabbing  

Act as amended in 1987.  The same are as under:-

“2. Definitions:-

(d) “Land grabber" means a person or a group of persons  who  commits  land  grabbing  and  includes  any  person  who  gives  financial  aid  to  any  person  for  taking  illegal  possession  of  lands  or  for  construction  of  unauthorised  structures  thereon,  or  who  collects  or  attempts  to  collect  from  any  occupiers  of  such  lands  rent,  compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation,  or  who  abets  the  doing  of  any  of  the  above  mentioned  acts, and also includes the successors-in-interest.

(e) "Land grabbing" means every activity of grabbing  of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local  authority,  a  religious  or  charitable  institution  or  endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person)  by  a  person  or  group  of  persons,  without  any  lawful  entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession  of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies  or  lease  and  licence  agreements  or  any  other  illegal  agreements  in  respect  of  such  lands,  or  to  construct  unauthorised  structures  thereon  for  sale  or  hire,  or  give  such  land  to  any  person  on  rental  or  lease  and  licence  basis  for  construction,   or  use  and  occupation,  of unauthorised structures; and the term  "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly.

3. Land grabbing to be unlawful:- Land grabbing in any form  is hereby declared unlawful; and any activity connected with

or  arising  out  of  land  grabbing  shall  be  an  offence  punishable under this Act.

4. Prohibition of land grabbing:- (1) No person shall commit  or cause to be committed land grabbing.

(2) Any person who, on or after the commencement of the  Act,  continues  to  be  in  occupation,  otherwise  than  as  a  lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government,  local  authority,  religious  or  charitable  institution  or  endowment including a wakf, or other private person, shall be  guilty of an offence under this Act.

(3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1)  or sub-section (2) shall, on conviction, be punished with  imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six  months but which may extend to five years, and with fine  which may extend to five thousand rupees.

7.  Constitution of Special courts:- (1) The Government may,  for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged  act of land grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the  ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land  grabbed, by notification, constitute a Special court.

7(5D)(i).   Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908,  the  Special  Court  may  follow  its  own  procedure which shall not be inconsistent with the principles  of natural justice and fair play and subject to the other  provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder while  deciding the Civil liability.

7-A.   Special  Tribunals  and  its  powers,  etc.:—  (1)  Every  Special Tribunal shall have power to try all cases not taken  cognizance of by the Special Court relating to any alleged  act of land grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and  title to, or  lawful possession of the land grabbed whether  before or after the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Land  Grabbing  (Prohibition)  (Amendment)  Act,  1987  and  brought  before it and pass such orders (including orders by way of  interim directions) as it deems fit:  

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, a Special  Tribunal shall,  in the trial of cases before it, follow  the procedure prescribed in  the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908).  

(3)  An  appeal  shall  lie,  from  any  judgment  or  order  not being interlocutory order of the Special Tribunal, to  the  Special  Court  on  any  question  of  law  or  of  fact.  Every  appeal  under  this  sub-section  shall  be  preferred  within a period of sixty days from the date of Judgment or

order of the Special Tribunal;

(4) Every finding of the Special Tribunal with regard  to any alleged  act of land grabbing shall be conclusive  proof of the fact of land grabbing, and of the persons who  committed such land grabbing  and  every  judgment  of  the  Special Tribunal with regard to the determination of the  title  and  ownership  to,  or  lawful  possession of,  any  land  grabbed  shall  be  binding  on  all  persons  having interest in such land:

8(2).   Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1990) the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act,  1972, (Act 9 of 1972) any case in respect of an alleged act  of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title  and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed  under this Act shall, subject to the provisions of this Act,  be triable in the Special Court and the decision of Special  Court shall be final.

8(6). Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any  alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the  fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such  land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with  regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or  lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on  all persons having interest in such land.

9.  Special Court to have the powers of the Civil Court and  the Court of Session:— Save as expressly provided in this Act,  the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Central  Act 5 of 1908) the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act  19  of  1972)  and  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  (Central  Act  2  of  1974)  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to the  proceedings before the Special Court and for the purposes of  the provisions of the said enactments, Special Court shall be  deemed to be a Civil Court, or as the case may be, a Court of  Session and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court and a  Court  of  Session  and  the  person  conducting  a  prosecution  before  the  Special  Court  shall  be  deemed  to  be  a  Public  Prosecutor.

10.  Burden of proof:-  Where in any proceedings under this  Act, a land is alleged to have been grabbed, and such land is  prima facie proved to be the land owned by the Government or  by a private person, the Special Court or as the case may be,  the Special Tribunal shall presume that the person who is  alleged to have grabbed the land is a land-grabber and the  burden of proving that the land has not been grabbed by him  shall be on such person.

15.  Act to override other laws:— The provisions of this Act  shall  have  effect  notwithstanding  anything  inconsistent  therewith contained in any other law for the time being in  force or custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a  court of any other tribunal or authority.”

13. The Land Grabbing Act was enacted in the backdrop of large scale  

encroachment  and  unauthorized  occupation  of  land  belonging  to  

Government,  local  authorities,  religious  or  charitable  institutions  

including Wakf as also the land belonging to private individuals and  

the fact that the remedy provided under the Encroachment Act was only  

in respect of Government land and was otherwise found to be wholly  

insufficient  to  meet  the  challenge  posed  by  the  menace  of  land  

grabbing.  

14. Since the basic objective of the Land Grabbing Act is to free the  

public as well as private land from the clutches of encroachers and  

unauthorized occupants, the provisions contained therein are required  

to be interpreted by applying the rule of purposive construction or  

mischief rule which was enunciated in Heydon’s case [(1584) 3 Co. Rep.  

7a] and which has been invoked by this Court for construing different  

legislations.  In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1955  

(2) SCR 603, S.R. Das, C.J.I. explained this rule in the following  

words:-

“It  is  a  sound  rule  of  construction  of  a  statute  firmly  established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s case  was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all  Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive  or  enlarging  of  the  common  law)  four  things  are  to  be  discerned and considered:

1st – What was the common law before the making of the Act,

2nd – What was the mischief and defect for which the common  law did not provide, 3rd –  What  remedy  the  Parliament  hath  resolved  and  appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and 4th – The true reason of the remedy;

and then the office of all the judges is always to make such  construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the  remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for  continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to  add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the  true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.”

15. The Land Grabbing Act is a self contained code.  It deals with  

various  facets  of  land  grabbing  and  provides  for  a  comprehensive  

machinery for determination of various issues relating to land grabbing  

including the claim of the alleged land grabber that he has a right to  

occupy the land or that he has acquired title by adverse possession.  A  

reading of the plain language of the definition of land grabber shows  

that it takes within its fold not only a person or a group of persons  

who actually commits the act of land grabbing but includes those who  

give financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands  

or for construction of unauthorized structures on such land or who  

collects or attempts to collect from the occupier of such lands rent,  

compensation  and  other  charges  by  criminal  intimidation.   The  

definition also includes the one who abets the doing of the actual land  

grabbing  or  financing  the  activity  of  land  grabbing,  etc.  as  also  

successor-in-interest of land grabber.  The definition of expression  

`land grabbing’ is very wide. It covers every activity of grabbing of  

any land belonging to Government, a local authority, a religious or  

charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf or even a private  

person, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to take illegal  

possession of such lands.  The creation of illegal tenancies, lease and

licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of or  

construction of unauthorized structures or sale or hire, etc. are also  

treated as acts of land grabbing.  Section 3 declares land grabbing in  

any form as unlawful and makes any activity connected with or arising  

out of land grabbing an offence punishable under the Act.  Section 4(1)  

lays down that no person shall commit or cause to be committed any  

land grabbing.  Section 4(2) lays down that any person who, on or  

after the commencement of the Act, continues to be in occupation,  

otherwise than as a lawful tenant,  of a grabbed land belonging to  

the  Government,  local  authority,  religious  or  charitable  

institution  or  endowment  including  a  wakf,  or  other  private  

person, shall be guilty of an offence under the Act.  By Section  

7(1), the State Government is empowered to constitute a Special Court  

for  expeditiously  holding  an  enquiry  into  any  alleged  act  of  land  

grabbing and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to,  

or lawful possession of the land grabbed.  Section 7-A(1) lays down  

that every Special Tribunal shall have power to try all cases of which  

cognizance has not been taken by the Special Court whether before or  

after  the  commencement  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  

(Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 1987.  Section 7-A(2) lays down that a  

Special Tribunal shall, save as otherwise provided in the Act, follow  

the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) in the  

trial of cases under the Act.  Section 7-A(3) provides for an appeal  

against any judgment or order except an interlocutory order, to the  

Special Court on any question of law or of fact.  By virtue of Section  

8(1), the Special Court is empowered to either suo moto, or on an  

application made by any person, officer or authority, take cognizance

of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing,  

or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of,  

the land grabbed whether before or after the commencement of the Act  

and pass appropriate orders including by way of interim directions.  

Section 8(2) contains a non obstante clause and gives finality to the  

decision of the Special Court and the provisions of the CPC and the  

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (CrPC)  shall,  insofar  as  they  are  not  

inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, apply to the proceedings  

before the Special Court.  By Section 9, the provisions of the CPC and  

Code of Criminal Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings  

of the Special Court except insofar as they are not inconsistent with  

the provisions of the Act.  This Section also declares that a Special  

Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court or, as the case may be, as  

the Court of Sessions and shall have the powers of a Civil Court and a  

Court of Sessions.  Section 10 contains special rule of burden of  

proof.    It  lays  down  that  where  there  is  an  allegation  of  land  

grabbing and the land which is subject matter of grabbing is prima  

facie proved to be owned by the Government or by a private person, the  

Special Court/Special Tribunal shall presume that the person who is  

alleged to have grabbed the land is a land grabber and it is for him to  

prove the contrary.   

16. As happens with several other statutes, the provisions of the  

Land  Grabbing  Act  have  also  become  subject  of  judicial  debate  and  

interpretation and in some judgments apparently conflicting views have  

been expressed necessitating consideration by a larger Bench.  The  

ambit  and  scope  of  the  definitions  of  ‘land  grabbers’  and  ‘land

grabbing’ was considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Konda  

Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. 2002 (3) SCC 258.  The facts of that  

case  were  that  on  the  strength  of  an  unregistered  agreement  for  

perpetual lease executed by one of the successors of the Inamadar Shri  

Mohd. Noorudin Asrari, the appellant claimed his title over the land  

comprising of various parts of Survey No.9 of village Khairathabad,  

Golconda Mandal, Hyderabad District.  Later, Shri Asrari is said to  

have executed a registered perpetual deed in favour of the appellant.  

Another person named Rasheed Shahpurji Chenoy also claimed the same  

piece of land.  He filed a suit in the Court of Additional Chief Judge,  

City Civil Court, Hyderabad.  The trial Court dismissed the suit by  

recording a finding that the suit land was a Government land and the  

plaintiff  did  not  have  any  title  over  it.   As  a  sequel  to  this,  

Tehsildar, Hyderabad initiated proceedings against the appellant and  

passed  an  order  on  28.5.1977  for  his  eviction.   The  appellant  

challenged that order by filing a writ petition in the High Court.  The  

learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition.  During the pendency of  

writ appeal preferred by the respondents, the Land Grabbing Act came  

into  force.   However,  this  was  not  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  

Division Bench, which opined that there was bona fide dispute of title,  

which must be adjudicated by the ordinary court of law.  Accordingly,  

the  writ  appeal  was  dismissed.   The  appellant  filed  another  writ  

petition against his threatened dispossession.  The same was disposed  

of by the learned Single Judge by taking note of the observations made  

by the Division Bench and the fact that the Government had already  

filed suit in the Court of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court,  

Hyderabad for declaration of title and recovery of possession.  Later

on, the suit was transferred to the Special Court, which ruled against  

the  appellant.   The  order  of  the  Special  Court  was  upheld  by  the  

Division Bench of the High Court.  Before this Court it was argued that  

the appellant could not be treated as a land grabber because he was in  

permissive possession and that he was having a bona fide claim to the  

property in dispute as held by the High Court in Writ Petition No.1414  

of 1977 and Writ Appeal No.61 of 1978.  The second contention urged on  

behalf of the appellant was that the Special Court had no jurisdiction  

to  try  the  case.   The  last  contention  was  that  the  appellant  had  

perfected his title to the land in dispute by adverse possession.  This  

Court analysed the definitions of ‘land grabber’ and ‘land grabbing’,  

referred to the dictionary meaning of the term ‘grab’ and observed:

“The various meanings noted above, disclose that the term  “grab” has a broad meaning — to take unauthorisedly, greedily  or unfairly — and a narrow meaning of snatching forcibly or  violently  or  by  unscrupulous  means.  Having  regard  to  the  object of the Act and the various provisions employing that  term we are of the view that the term “grab” is used in the  Act  in  both  its  narrow  as  well  as  broad  meanings.  Thus  understood, the ingredients of the expression “land grabbing”  would  comprise  (i)  the  factum  of  an  activity  of  taking  possession of any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously,  unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement, and (ii)  the mens rea/intention — “with the intention of/with a view  to” (a) illegally taking possession of such lands, or (b)  enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence  agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such  lands, or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon  for sale or hire, or (d) to give such lands to any person on  (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction,  or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures.

A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e) would suggest that  to bring a person within the meaning of the expression “land  grabber”  it  must  be  shown  that:  (i)(a)  he  has  taken  unauthorisedly,  unfairly,  greedily,  snatched  forcibly,  violently  or  unscrupulously  any  land  belonging  to  the  Government or a local authority, a religious or charitable  institution  or  endowment,  including  a  wakf,  or  any  other

private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c)  with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or  enter  or  create  illegal  tenancies  or  lease  and  licence  agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such  lands  or  to  construct  unauthorised  structures  thereon  for  sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or  lease  and  licence  basis  for  construction,  or  use  and  occupation of unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has given  financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of  lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon;  or (iii) he is collecting or attempting to collect from any  occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges  by criminal intimidation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing of  any  of  the  abovementioned  acts;  or  (v)  that  he  is  the  successor-in-interest of any such persons.”

The Court then considered the question whether a person prima  

facie claiming title over the land alleged to have been grabbed can  

also  be  treated  as  covered  by  the  expression  ‘land  grabber’  and  

answered the same in the following words:

“In  regard  to  the  ingredients  of  the  expression  “land  grabber”, it is necessary to point out that it is only when a  person  has  lawful  entitlement  to  the  land  alleged  to  be  grabbed that he cannot be brought within the mischief of the  said expression.  A mere prima facie bona fide claim to the  land alleged to be grabbed by such a person, cannot avert  being  roped  in  within  the  ambit  of  the  expression  “land  grabber”. What is germane is lawful entitlement to and not a  mere prima facie bona fide claim to the land alleged to be  grabbed. Therefore, the observation of the Division Bench of  the High Court in the said Writ Appeal No. 61 of 1978 that  the appellant can be taken to have prima facie bona fide  claim to the land in dispute which was relevant for the said  Land  Encroachment  Act,  cannot  be  called  in  aid  as  a  substitute for lawful entitlement to the land alleged to be  grabbed, which alone is relevant under the Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. In Gouni Satya Reddi v. Govt. of A.P. and others 2004 (7) SCC  

398,  another  two-Judge  Bench  appears  to  have  expressed  a  slightly  

different view.  The appellant in that case claimed to have purchased

the land in dispute by a registered sale deed executed on behalf of  

respondent No.3 by his General Power of Attorney holder, S. Prabhakar  

Rao.  Before starting construction, he obtained permission from the  

competent authority.  One Tirupathiah claiming to be General Power of  

Attorney holder of respondent No.3 objected to the construction by  

asserting  that  the  earlier  General  Power  of  Attorney  holder  of  

respondent No.3 had no right to transfer the property.  Thereupon, the  

appellant filed a suit for injunction.  An order of status quo was  

passed.   Tirupathiah  also  filed  a  suit.   The  trial  Court  finally  

decreed  the  suit  of  the  appellant  and  dismissed  the  one  filed  by  

Tirupathiah.  Thereafter, the appellant filed suit before the Special  

Court for restraining Tirupathiah from interfering with his possession.  

The Special Court did not believe the appellant’s case that he had  

purchased the property from S. Prabhakar Rao and dismissed the suit.  

While allowing the appeal preferred against the order of the Special  

Court, this Court referred to the definitions of land grabber and land  

grabbing and ruled that the appellant cannot be treated as land grabber  

because  he  was  not  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  was  entering  into  

possession illegally and without lawful entitlement.   

18. In Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Mandal Revenue Officer and others  

2007 (11) SCC 714, yet another Bench of two-Judges held that a mere  

allegation of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of  

the Special Court and that civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted in all  

matters which fall within the jurisdiction of Special Court.  The Bench  

referred  to  judgments  in  Konda  Lakshmana  Bapuji  v.  Govt.  of  A.P.

(supra),  Gouni Satya Reddi v. Govt. of A.P. and others (supra) and  

observed:

“Lawful entitlement on the part of a party to possess the  land being the determinative factor, it is axiomatic that so  long as the land grabber would not be able to show his legal  entitlement to hold the land, the jurisdiction of the Special  Court cannot be held to be ousted.

The Bench in  Konda Lakshmana Bapuji has applied both the  broader and narrow meanings of the said expression. It would  not, however, mean that all the tests laid down therein are  required to be satisfied in their letter and spirit. What is  necessary to be proved is the substance of the allegation.  The proof of intention on the part of a person being his  state of mind, the ingredients of the provisions must be  considered keeping in view the materials on records as also  circumstances attending thereto.  What would be germane for  lawful entitlement to remain in possession would be that if  the proceedee proves that he had bona fide claim over the  land, in which event, it would be for him to establish the  same.

In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji this Court has categorically held  that the requisite intention can be inferred by necessary  implication  from  the  averments  made  in  the  petition,  the  written statement and the depositions of witnesses, like any  other fact.  The question which must, therefore, have to be  posed and answered having regard to the claim of the land  grabber would be that, if on the face of his claim it would  appear  that  he  not  only  had  no  title,  but  claimed  his  possession only on the basis thereof, the same must be held  to be illegal. The question in regard to lawful entitlement  of  the  proceedee,  therefore,  for  invoking  the  charging  section plays an important and significant role.

We would like to add that the person’s purported belief that  he is legally entitled to hold the land and his possession is  not otherwise illegal must also be judged not only from the  point of time when he entered into the possession or when he  had acquired the purported title but also from the point of  view  as  to  whether  by  reason  of  determination  of  such  a  question by a competent court of law, he has been found to  have no title and consequently continuance of his possession  becomes illegal. If the proceedee against whom a proceeding  has been initiated under the provisions of the said Act is  entitled to raise the question of adverse possession, which  being based on knowledge of a lawful title and declaration of  the hostile title on the part of the person in possession,

there does not appear to be any reason as to why knowledge of  defect in his title and consequently his possession becoming  unlawful  to  his  own  knowledge  would  not  come  within  the  purview of the term “land grabbing” as contained in Section  2(e) of the Act. The provisions of the Act must be construed  so  as  to  enable  the  tribunal  to  give  effect  thereto.  It  cannot be construed in a pedantic manner which if taken to  its  logical  corollary  would  make  the  provisions  wholly  unworkable. Only because a person has entered into possession  of a land on the basis of a purported registered sale deed,  the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not be  sufficient to come to the conclusion that he had not entered  over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. From the above extracted observations made in Mahalaxmi Motors  

Ltd. v. Mandal Revenue Officer and others (supra), it is clear that the  

Bench unequivocally approved the ratio of  Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v.  

Govt. of A.P. (supra) and though not stated in so many words, it did  

not agree with the ratio of the judgment in Gouni Satya Reddi v. Govt.  

of A.P. and others (supra), which was decided without noticing the  

earlier judgment in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. (supra).

20. N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court 2006 (4) SCC 214 is also a  

judgment rendered by a two-Judge Bench on the scope of the Special  

Court’s jurisdiction to decide the question whether the alleged land  

grabber has acquired title by adverse possession.  Without noticing the  

earlier judgment of the coordinate Bench in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v.  

Govt. of A.P. (supra), the two-Judge Bench held that the Special Court  

constituted under Section 7 of the Land Grabbing Act does not have the  

jurisdiction to decide questions relating to acquisition of title by  

adverse possession in a proceeding under the Act and the same would  

fall within the domain of the civil courts.  The Bench further held

that the learned Special Judge travelled beyond the jurisdiction vested  

on him under the 1982 Act in deciding that even if the provisions of  

Section  47  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  (Telangana  Area)  Tenancy  and  

Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 were a bar to the transfer of land without  

the sanction of Tehsildar, the occupants of land had perfected their  

title by way of adverse possession.

21. In view of the conflicting opinions expressed by the coordinate  

Benches,  the  matter  was  referred  to  a  larger  Bench.   In  V.  

Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (dead) and others 2009 (5) SCC 478, the  

three-Judge Bench approved the view expressed in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji  

v.  Govt.  of  A.P.  (supra)  that  the  Tribunal  and  Special  Court  

constituted under the Land Grabbing Act has the jurisdiction to go into  

the  question  of  acquisition  of  title  by  adverse  possession  and  

disapproved the subsequent judgment in  N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special  

Court  (supra).   While  doing  so,  the  three-Judge  Bench  also  

distinguished  an  earlier  judgment  rendered  in  Government  of  Andhra  

Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao (supra) wherein the provisions of the  

Encroachment Act were considered and observed:

“In  that  case,  the  principal  question,  which  arose  for  consideration, was as to whether the property in question  which was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a  long  time  and,  thus,  the  same  had  not  vested  in  the  Government  by  reason  of  a  land  acquisition  proceeding  initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University.  In that case, Osmania University filed a suit for possession  which  was  dismissed  on  the  premise  that  Habibuddin  had  perfected his title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania  University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take  steps for summary eviction of the persons who were not in  authorised  occupation  of  the  said  plots.  The  observations  made  therein  must  be  held  to  have  been  made  in  the  aforementioned factual matrix. It is one thing to say that a

summary  proceeding  cannot  be  resorted  to  when  a  noticee  resists a bona fide dispute involving complicated questions  of title and his right to remain in possession of the land  but it is another thing to say that although a Special Court  and/or a Tribunal which has all the powers of a civil court  would  not  be  entitled  to  enter  into  such  a  contention.  Krishna Rao, therefore, in our opinion has no application to  the facts of the present case.”

22. In the light of the above analysis of the relevant provisions  

of the Land Grabbing Act and law laid down by this Court, we shall now  

consider whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in  

interfering with the orders passed by the Special Tribunal and Special  

Court for eviction of the respondents.

23. While  deciding  the  application  filed  by  the  appellant,  the  

Special Tribunal referred to the oral as well as documentary evidence  

produced by the parties including khasara pahani (Ex.A-2) in which the  

schedule land is recorded in the name of the Government, sketch of the  

suit land (Ex.A-7) and held that the land belongs to the Government.  

The Special Tribunal further held that filing of application by Gonda  

Mallaiah for assignment of land by being treated as landless poor is  

also indicative of the fact that the land belongs to the Government.  

The plea of the respondents that they have perfected title by long  

possession was rejected by the Special Tribunal by making the following  

observations:

(i)  The  documents  produced  by  the  respondents  are  only  xerox  

copies of the notices issued to them from 1965 onwards and the  

same were not sufficient to establish their open and uninterrupted  

possession for 30 years, and  

(ii) The respondents’ claim that their possession was open and  

hostile to the Government is demolished by the fact that they

themselves applied to the Government for assignment of the land  

occupied by them.

24. The Tribunal further held that the factum of development of  

land for making it cultivable by Gonda Mallaiah does not entitle the  

respondents  to  claim  right  over  the  land  and  that  their  plea  for  

assignment  cannot  be  accepted  in  the  proceedings  under  the  Land  

Grabbing Act.  Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the respondents to  

hand over possession of the land to the Government.   

25. The  Special  Court  minutely  considered  the  entire  evidence  

produced  by  the  parties  and  held  that  the  land  in  question  is  

Government land and that Gonda Mallaiah and the respondents are land  

grabbers.  The Special Court referred to Khasra Pahanis for the period  

from 1959 to 1989 in which the land is recorded in the name of the  

Government and held that the respondents are not entitled to any right  

over  it  merely  because  they  have  been  cultivating  the  same.   The  

Special Court doubted the authenticity of the documents produced by the  

respondents  and  rejected  their  plea  of  having  perfected  title  by  

adverse possession by making the following observations:

“Even  otherwise  on  the  evidence  on  record  we  are  not  satisfied that the respondents establishment title by adverse  possession.  The documents filed in support of their plea of  adverse possession are xerox copies of the notices said to  have been issued under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment  Act. Ex.B.3 is one such notice dated 8.8.1962.  Ex.B.3 is a  Xerox  copy  of  the  notice.   Ex.B.3  does  not  inspire  any  confidence as a true one.  There is no signature above the  word ‘Tahasildar’.  The Sy. No. is stated to be 42 but is not  clear.  The extent is said to the Ac.1-07 gts.  Even we come  to Ex.B4 which is said to be a notice under Section 7 of the  Land Encroachment Act, we find Sy. No.64 and the extent is 20  guntas only.  This is also a Xerox copy.  When we come to the  next notice which is Ex.B-5 dated 21.2.1969 purported to have

been issued under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, we  find Sy. No.42, but the extent is mentioned as Ac.2.00.  We  do not find any details clearly in the notice.  The xerox  copies are not all legible. One important fact which has to  be looked into is that some signature and the date 21.2.1969  are  very  clear  when  the  other  recitals  are  not  at  all  legible.  The total extent of the Sy. No. is not mentioned in  the relevant column.  The person who signed the notice or  other details are sadly lacking.  The next notice is Ex.B-6  dated 22.6.1985.  This is also a xerox copy.  To whom the  notice is issued is not clearly legible.  But above the word  “R/o name of Mallaiah appears” but the surname is totally  different.   It  is  not  Gundla  Mallaih,  but  it  is  totally  different.  Here in this xerox copy the total extent of the  Sy. No. is shown as Ac 18-18 gts, but the figures are tampers  with and that is clear even to a naked eye.  The land in the  occupation of the person is mentioned in the relevant column  as Ac.7-12 gts.  Ex.B-7 is the reply to Ex.B-6 notice.  The  reply is submitted by Rakathapu Mallaiah, son of Venkaiah,  not  by  the  father  of  the  respondents  Goundla  Mallaiah.  Therefore, it is not clear whether the notice Ex.B-7 was  issued to the father of the respondents or not.  It is true  that the matter relates to the petition schedule property.  It  is  interesting  to  see  in  the  reply  Ex.B-7  that  the  respondents stated that they have perfected title by adverse  possession and that the provisions of Land Encroachment Act  are inapplicable.  The first respondent as R.W.1 stated in  his  evidence  that  his  father  submitted  all  the  original  records along with his explanation dated 4.4.1986, that is,  Ex.B-1, and therefore the originals are not forthcoming.  We  are not satisfied with the ipse-dixit of the witness.  The  xerox copies do not inspire any confidence in us as being  true copies of the originals.  It is true that when we come  to Ex.B-1 notice issued in the month of March, 1986 a reply  was given by the respondents’ father/G. Mallaiah.  We have  referred to the statement contained therein in the fore-going  paragraphs  wherein  he  requested  that  the  necessary  recommendations may be made to the competent officer to grant  patta to the petition schedule property.  Therefore, we are  not  included,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  that  the  earlier documents Exc. B-3 to 5 are genuine.  If we eschew  Exs.B-3 to B-5 there is absolutely no evidence to show that  Sri.  G.  Mallaiah,  the  father  of  the  respondents  and  the  respondents have been in possession of the petition schedule  property prior to 1970.  The documents filed in support of  their plea of adverse possession viz., Exs.B-8 to B-80 relate  to a period from 15.12.1977 to the date of the filing of the  petition or even thereafter.  The documents do not clearly  relate to the petition schedule property and they are all  xerox copies only.  Originals have not been produced before  the Court.  Even if there documents Exs. B-19 to 25 are taken  into consideration, they do not establish the possession of  the respondents or their predecessors in title prior to 1977.

The  said  period  will  not  satisfy  the  required  period  prescribed  for  acquiring  title  by  adverse  possession.  Therefore,  we  are  not  inclined  in  accordance  with  law  invoking the provisions of Act XII/1982, it cannot be said  that its action is either arbitrary or capricious.”

(underlining is ours)   

26. The Special Court then considered the respondents’ plea that  

dropping  of  proceedings  under  the  Encroachment  Act  amounts  to  

permitting them to continue possession and rejected the same by relying  

upon the judgment of this Court in  Government of Andhra Pradesh v.  

Thummala Krishna Rao (supra).  Likewise, the plea of the respondents  

that their possession was permissive and they cannot be treated as land  

grabbers because they are in occupation of the land for many decades  

and are paying the land assessment was rejected by the Special Court by  

relying upon order dated 15.12.1994 passed in LGC No.106/1989 in which  

it was held that in view of Rule 2 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana  

Area) Land Revenue Rules, any person desiring to take up un-occupied  

land is required to submit an application to the Tehsildar and he shall  

not enter upon the land without obtaining written permission from the  

Tehsildar and that any person entering into possession without such  

permission cannot claim to be Sivaijamaidar.  The Special Court opined  

that the possession of the respondents cannot be treated as permissive  

because notices Ex.B-2 and Ex.B-6 were issued to them before filing  

application under the Land Grabbing Act and in any case, their plea of  

permissive possession was destructive of their claim of having acquired  

title by adverse possession.   

27. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Division Bench of  

the  High  Court  appointed  two  sets  of  Advocate  Commissioners  to

ascertain the nature of the schedule land, considered their reports and  

concluded that land occupied by Gonda Mallaiah and his successors is an  

agricultural land.  The High Court observed that the respondents herein  

are in possession and enjoyment of the land for last many years and  

silence on the part of the concerned authorities right from 1959 up to  

the filing of petition before the Special Tribunal in 1990 clearly  

indicates that they were satisfied with the stand of the respondents  

and  their  predecessor  that  they  are  entitled  to  assignment  of  the  

schedule land by being treated as landless poor.  The High Court was of  

the view that if the authorities were serious to evict Gonda Mallaiah  

or the respondents then they would have taken appropriate steps and  

would not have allowed them to continue in possession for more than 50  

years and collected revenue from them.  The High Court then considered  

the respondents’ plea of having acquired title by adverse possession,  

referred to some judicial precedents on the subject and held:

“The  evidence  produced  by  the  State  itself  clearly  established that the petitioners have perfected their title  over the schedule I and by way of adverse possession applying  the  principle  of  ‘tacking’.   Thus  possession  of  the  petitioners  over  Ac.5.00  of  schedule  land  is  not  without  lawful entitlement.  The evidence available does not suggest  that they are land grabbers and the schedule land has been  grabbed by them.  On the other hand they entered the land as  landless  persons  and  they  requested  the  government  for  assignment by virtue of their long standing possession and  improvements  made  to  the  land  and  paying  tax  to  the  government.  They proved that they are lawfully entitled to  continue in possession and enjoyment of the land.”

28. The High Court then referred to the often quoted judgment of  

this Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC  

477 on the scope of the writ of certiorari and concluded:

“It has come in evidence that originally the State was the

owner of the schedule land.  But it allowed the petitioners  and their predecessors to enjoy the schedule land as their  own peacefully, continuously and to its knowledge for more  than the statutory period.  The petitioners clearly stated in  their counter filed before the Special Tribunal as to how and  when their adverse possession commenced and nature of their  possession of which the authorities are quite aware.  The  petitioners possession over the schedule land is hostile to  the State as they have established the ingredients, namely  the  nature  of  possession  as  adequate,  in  continuity,  publicity and extent.  The authorities did not object for  such  continuous  possession  and  enjoyment.   As  mentioned  earlier the principles of adverse possession by tacking will  apply to the case of the petitioners.  Thus, the petitioners  have  perfected  their  title  over  the  schedule  property  by  adverse possession.”

29. In our view, even though by making reference to the judgment of  

this Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others (supra), the  

High Court has given an impression that it was aware of the limitations  

of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of  

India, a critical analysis of the impugned order makes it clear that  

the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed serious error by  

interfering  with  the  well  articulated  and  well  reasoned  concurrent  

findings recorded by the Special Tribunal and the Special Court that  

Gonda Mallaiah had illegally occupied the Government land and after his  

death, the respondents continued with the illegal possession and as  

such they were liable to be treated as land grabbers within the meaning  

of Section 2(d) of the Land Grabbing Act and that they have failed to  

prove that their possession was open and hostile to the Government so  

as to entitle them to claim title over the schedule land by adverse  

possession.  The respondents did not produce any affirmative evidence  

before the Special Tribunal regarding the point of time when Gonda  

Mallaiah occupied the land and started cultivation.  Instead, they

relied upon the notices issued under Section 7 of the Encroachment Act  

and  pleaded  that  the  proceedings  initiated  under  that  Act  will  be  

deemed to have been dropped because no order was passed for eviction of  

their father by treating him an encroacher of the Government land.  The  

Special Court has considered this issue in detail and assigned cogent  

reasons for doubting the authenticity of the documents produced by the  

respondents  in  support  of  their  plea.   The  High  Court  completely  

overlooked the observations made by the Special Court on this issue and  

decided the case by presuming that the competent authority had taken a  

conscious decision to allow Gonda Mallaiah to continue his occupation  

of the Government land.  In our considered view, the approach adopted  

by the High Court was ex-facie erroneous because absence of final order  

in the proceedings initiated under the Encroachment Act cannot lead to  

an inference that the concerned authority had recognized the possession  

of Gonda Mallaiah over the schedule land.  That apart, even if this  

Court  was  to  presume  that  the  proceedings  initiated  against  Gonda  

Mallaiah  under  the  Encroachment  Act  had  been  dropped,  the  said  

presumption cannot be over stretched for entertaining the respondents’  

claim that their possession was open and hostile qua the true owner  

i.e. the Government.  The payment of land revenue by Gonda Mallaiah  

and/or  the  respondents  and  making  of  applications  by  them  to  the  

Government for assignment of the schedule land or regularisation of  

their possession, completely demolish their case that their possession  

was  open  and  hostile  and  they  have  acquired  title  by  adverse  

possession.  In this context, it is necessary to remember that it is  

well neigh impossible for the State and its instrumentalities including  

the  local  authorities  to  keep  every  day  vigilance/watch  over  vast

tracts of open land owned by them or of which they are the public  

trustees.  No amount of vigil can stop encroachments and unauthorised  

occupation  of  public  land  by  unscrupulous  elements,  who  act  like  

vultures to grab such land, raise illegal constructions and, at times,  

succeeded  in  manipulating  the  State  apparatus  for  getting  their  

occupation/possession  and  construction  regularized.   It  is  our  

considered view that where an encroacher, illegal occupant or land  

grabber of public property raises a plea that he has perfected title by  

adverse  possession,  the  Court  is  duty  bound  to  act  with  greater  

seriousness, care and circumspection.  Any laxity in this regard may  

result in destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property  

and give upper hand to the encroachers, unauthorised occupants or land  

grabbers.

30. In State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (Dead) through Lrs.  

2000  (5)  SCC  652,  this  Court  considered  the  question  whether  the  

respondents had acquired title by adverse possession over the suit land  

situated at Nohar-Bhadra Road at Nohar within the State of Rajasthan.  

The suit filed by the respondent against his threatened dispossession  

was decreed by the trial Court with the finding that he had acquired  

title by adverse possession.  The first and second appeals preferred by  

the State Government were dismissed by the lower appellate Court and  

the High Court respectively.  This Court reversed the judgments and  

decrees of the courts below as also of the High Court and held that the  

plaintiff-respondent could not substantiate his claim of perfection of  

title by adverse possession.  Some of the observations made on the  

issue of acquisition of title by adverse possession which have bearing

on this case are extracted below:-

“So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse  possession and that too in respect of public property is  concerned,  the  question  requires  to  be  considered  more  seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately  involves destruction of right/title of the State to immovable  property and conferring upon a third-party encroacher title  where he had none. The decision in  P. Lakshmi Reddy v.  L.  Lakshmi Reddy adverted to the ordinary classical requirement  — that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario — that is  the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in  publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse  to the competitor. It was also observed therein that whatever  may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire  title by adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot  commence until he obtains actual possession with the required  animus.”  

31. A somewhat similar view was expressed in A.A. Gopalakrishnan v.  

Cochin Devaswom Board 2007 (7) SCC 482.  While adverting to the need  

for protecting the properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards,  

the Court observed as under:-

“The  properties  of  deities,  temples  and  Devaswom  Boards,  require  to  be  protected  and  safeguarded  by  their  trustees/archakas/shebaits/employees.  Instances  are  many  where  persons  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  managing  and  safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom  Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by  setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse  possession. This is possible only with the passive or active  collusion of the authorities concerned. Such acts of “fences  eating  the  crops”  should  be  dealt  with  sternly.  The  Government,  members  or  trustees  of  boards/trusts,  and  devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or  encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and  safeguard  the  properties  of  religious  and  charitable  institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.”

32. Before concluding, we may notice two recent judgments in which  

law on the question of acquisition of title by adverse possession has  

been considered and reiterated.  In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam 2007

(14) SCC 308, the Court observed as under:-

“Claim  by  adverse  possession  has  two  elements:  (1)  the  possession  of  the  defendant  should  become  adverse  to  the  plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in  possession  for  a  period  of  12  years  thereafter.  Animus  possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of  adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law  that  mere  possession  of  the  land  would  not  ripen  into  possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have  animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of  the  true  owner.  For  the  said  purpose,  not  only  animus  possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown  to  exist  at  the  commencement  of  the  possession.  He  must  continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under  the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a  period of more than 12 years without anything more does not  ripen into a title.”

33. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma 2007 (6) SCC 59, the  

Court considered various facets of the law of adverse possession and  

laid down various propositions including the following:

“Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or  presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the  adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the  hostile  acts  and  claims  of  the  person  in  possession.  It  follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession  lie in it being open, continuous and hostile.”

“To assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry  is required:

1.  Application  of  limitation  provision  thereby  jurisprudentially  “wilful  neglect”  element  on  part  of  the  owner  established.  Successful  application  in  this  regard  distances the title of the land from the paper-owner.

2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of  the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already  distanced  from  the  paper-owner,  to  the  adverse  possessor.  Right  thereby  accrues  in  favour  of  adverse  possessor  as  intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and  intention in the upkeep of the property.”

34. In  view  of  above  discussion,  we  hold  that  the  respondents  

miserably failed to establish that they had acquired title over the  

schedule land by adverse possession and the High Court was not at all  

justified in upsetting the orders passed by the Special Tribunal and  

Special Court.   

35. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set  

aside and the writ petition filed by the respondents before the High  

Court is dismissed.  As a corollary, the orders passed by the Special  

Tribunal  and  the  Special  Court  shall  stand  automatically  restored.  

Within two months from today, the respondents shall hand over vacant  

possession of the schedule land to an officer not below the rank of  

Additional Collector, who shall be nominated by District Collector,  

Rangareddy District.  Needless to say that if the respondents fail to  

hand  over  vacant  possession  of  the  schedule  land  to  the  officer  

nominated by the District Collector then he shall take possession of  

the land and, if necessary, use appropriate force for that purposes.

36. With a view to ensure that the respondents are not able to  

manipulate the State apparatus for continuing their illegal occupation  

of  schedule  land  in  question,  we  direct  the  Government  of  Andhra  

Pradesh and its functionaries not to regularise their possession.  The  

respondents shall also not be entitled to invoke jurisdiction of any  

court including the High Court for securing an order which may result  

in frustrating implementation of this Court’s order.

……………………………….…J. [G.S. Singhvi]

………………………………..J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi 06 January, 2010