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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  7902 of 2004

PETITIONER: Manager (Now Regional Director) R.B.I.

RESPONDENT: Gopinath Sharma & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/07/2006

BENCH: Dr. AR. Lakshmanan & Lokeshwar Singh Panta

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.

The appellant, The Manager (Now Regional Director),  Reserve Bank of India, Mall Road, Kanpur, aggrieved against  the final judgment and order dated 4.9.2003 of the High  Court of Judicature at Allahabd in Civil Misc. Writ Petition  No. 35290 of 1996, has filed this appeal.  The High Court  allowed the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein  and set aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour  Court and ordered reinstatement on similar post with back  wages.   BACKGROUND FACTS:                 Respondent No.1 was advised that he has been wait  listed for daily wage casual employment in the Bank at  Lucknow office of the Bank.  Respondent No.1 applied for  consideration of his day-to-day appointment which request  was acceded to.  In June, 1975, respondent No.1 acquired  qualification of High School but did not inform the Bank  about the same.  Therefore, his name was included in the  fresh list from 1.7.1975 to 30.6.1976 and was allowed to  work during the aforesaid period.  The name of respondent  No.1 was not included in the fresh list from 1.7.1976 to  30.7.1977.  He made representation for inclusion of his  name in the fresh list from 1976-1977.  However, his  representation was turned down by the Bank.  Respondent  No.1 again started making representations for taking him  back on the basis of the judgment of this Court in H.D.  Singh vs. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1986 SC 132 =  1985(4) SCC 201 and thereafter raised an industrial dispute  before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Kanpur.   The Central Government referred the matter for adjudication  to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur as under:- "Whether the action of management of RBI,  Kanpur in striking off the name of Gopi Nath  Sharma from the list of approved peon-cum-Farash  is justified?  If not, to what relief the concerned  workman is entitled?"

On 30.7.1996, an award was passed by the Tribunal  rejecting the claim of respondent No.1 on the ground of delay  and laches and also on merits holding that since as per  evidence adduced before Tribunal, he did not complete the  service of 240 days in the Bank, he is not entitled to the  benefit of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (hereinafter referred to as "the I.D. Act") or the benefit of the  judgment of this Court in H.D. Singh vs. Reserve Bank of

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India(supra). Aggrieved by the rejection, respondent No.1 filed  C.M.W.P.No. 35290 of 1996 before the High Court on  4.11.1996.  On 4.9.2003, the High Court delivered the  judgment allowing the writ petition ordering reinstatement of  respondent No.1 with back wages @ 10% from 1976 to 1989  and @ 50% from 1989 till 4.9.2003 (the date of judgment).  Aggrieved by the above judgment, the appellant filed the  present appeal. QUESTIONS OF LAW The questions of law that arise for consideration before  us are as under: 1.      As to whether the High Court in a petition  under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India,  assailing the correctness of the judgment of  the Labour Tribunal on a dispute arising  under the Industrial Disputes Act, was  justified in examining the policy of the R.B.I.  on a touchstone of Art. 14 of the  Constitution of India? 2.      Whether the High Court, in proceedings  under Art. 226, can interfere with the  findings of the Central Government  Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court on  factual issues in the absence of a challenge  on the ground of perversity and can award  relief on a ground not raised before  Tribunal? 3.             Whether a person can be ordered  reinstatement even when he was engaged on  day-to-day basis and it is not established  that he was working on regular post and  without establishing any right to hold any  post particularly when respondent No.1 had  worked only for 58 days?

We heard Mr. Mahendra Anand, learned senior  counsel, assisted by Mr. H.S. Parihar, learned counsel,  appearing for the appellant and Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned  counsel appearing for respondent No.1. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant  drew our attention to the award passed by the Tribunal.  The  Tribunal held that the reference was highly belated as the  name of the concerned workman was expunged in 1976  itself.    The Tribunal also relied on the judgment in the case  of Balwant Singh vs. Labour Court, Bhatinda 1996  Labour Industrial Cases 45 wherein five years’ old reference  was held to be belated by the Court and in the absence of  sufficient explanation, relief of reinstatement was denied.   Relying upon this authority, the Tribunal held that the  concerned workman would not be entitled for any relief.  On  merits, the Tribunal observed as under: "On merits too, the case of the concerned  workman is not proved.  The concerned workman  has filed his affidavit.  He was cross examined,  whereas the management has given the evidence of  Kanhaiya Lal Prasad MW.1 who had stated that the  concerned workman had not completed 240 days  in any calendar year.  He has not been cross- examined.  Thus, this evidence is unchallenged.   Consequently, relying upon his evidence, it is held  that the concerned workman has not completed  240 days in a calendar year.  Hence Section 25 F is  not attracted."

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As stated above, the respondent herein invoked the  jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the  Constitution of India by filing a writ petition with a prayer to  quash the order dated 30.7.1996 passed by the Tribunal  and the verbal order dated  29.7.1976 passed by respondent  No.2 in the writ petition for deletion of the name of  the  petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) from the list of peon- cum-Farash of the Reserve Bank of India.  A further  direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the  Presiding Officer (respondent No.2 in the writ petition) to  include the name of respondent No.1 herein in the list of  peon-cum-Farash with retrospective effect from 29.7.1976  with all the consequential benefits was sought for.  The writ  petition was resisted by the Reserve Bank of India by filing a  detailed counter affidavit in the High Court. The High Court firstly took up the preliminary  objection for consideration which was to the effect that  reference was barred by time as it has been made after  about 13 years and that the respondent was wait listed for  the post of Peon-cum-Farash in 1973.  As far as the  question of validity of reference is concerned, the High  Court held that the Tribunal cannot go into the validity of  the reference and that the employer can challenge the  reference order on the ground of delay and since  the  reference order was not challenged by the Bank, the Labour  Court was obliged to decide the matter and that the Labour  Court was not authorized to go into the validity including  delay.  The High Court, as far as, the question of validity of  discontinuing the services of respondent No.1 due to over- qualification was concerned, it has held that over  qualification cannot be a disqualification for peon-cum- Farash where maximum qualification prescribed was 8th  pass.  The High Court further observed that such an  approach amounts to discouraging acquisition of education  on the one hand and that such an approach is clearly  arbitrary, discriminatory and not in national interest. As regards the statutory requirement of 240 days in a  calendar year, the High Court has observed that even if the  stand taken by the Bank that the respondent had not  completed 240 days in a calendar year is taken to be  correct, it will not make much difference and that by virtue  of the reference, the Labour Court was required to judge as  to whether the action of the Bank in striking off the name of  respondent No.1 from the list of approved employees was  justified or not. According to the High Court, acquiring higher  qualification is not misconduct and hence, dismissal of  workman on this ground is wrongful dismissal.  The High  Court further observed that some of the juniors of  respondent No.1 were retained on the ground that they had  not acquired higher qualification and that the Bank  specifically did not deny this fact and in such a situation if  the removal of respondent No.1 is taken to be retrenchment,  he would be entitled to relief under Section 25 G of the I.D.  Act.  It was, therefore, held that the employer-Bank  wrongfully terminated the services of respondent No.1 by  not including his name in the list prepared after June, 1976  and that the order of the Labour Court deciding the  reference against the respondent-workman is illegal and  liable to be set aside.  As far as, back wages is concerned,  the High Court held that the workman is entitled to get  nominal wages of 10% and thereafter 50% respectively. In the result, the High Court allowed the writ petition  filed by the respondent herein and set aside the order of the  Tribunal and the action of the management of the Bank in

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striking out the name of respondent No.1 from the list of  approved peon-cum-Farash after June, 1976 and further  directed that the respondent must be reinstated and  appointed to the similar post. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant  submitted that the High Court’s judgment is perverse and  that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of the  Tribunal on factual issues in the absence of a challenge on  the ground of perversity and cannot award any relief on a  ground nor raised before the Tribunal. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the  respondent \026 a daily wage worker, was engaged on day to- day basis and that it was not established that he was  working on a regular basis and without establishing any  right to hold any post.  Learned senior counsel also  submitted that the High Court erred in examining the  legality of the policy and giving relief solely on the ground  that it found the policy and actions of the appellant contrary  to Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution.  In this context, it  was submitted that the High Court has taken into  consideration an entirely new aspect which was neither  pleaded by the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) in the  writ petition before the High Court nor was claimed in the  claim statement filed before the Tribunal,  without giving  any opportunity to the appellant to effectively reply to the  same i.e., the aspect of alleged arbitrariness and  discrimination in not considering the over qualified person  for further day to-day engagement.  He further submitted  that the High Court erred in not taking into account the  categoric finding that respondent No.1 had not completed  240 days of service in the Bank and holding that this will  not make much difference. Per contra, Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned counsel  appearing for respondent No.1, submitted that acquiring  higher qualification is not a misconduct and hence  dismissal of workman on this ground is wrongful dismissal   and that the High Court considered the contention of  respondent No.1 that some of his juniors were retained on  the ground that they had not acquired higher qualification,  and the Bank did not deny this fact and that the employer- Bank wrongfully terminated the services of respondent No.1  by not including his name in the list  prepared after June,  1976 and that the order of the Labour Court/Tribunal  deciding the reference against the workman is illegal and  liable to be set aside.  Learned counsel further submitted  that respondent No.1 worked for more than 240 days and  that the Management did not produce the attendance  Register for the period involved and only produced some of  the documents by which it could show that respondent No.1  had not worked for more than 240 days. Without the  attendance register and other material which was withheld  by the Bank, the respondent was handicapped in cross  examining the management witness.  He denied that the  respondent has worked only for 58 days.  In conclusion, he  submitted that this Court cannot interfere with the well  considered judgment of the High Court which has rightly set  aside the order of the Tribunal and ordered reinstatement  with back wages. We have carefully considered the rival submissions  made by learned counsel appearing for the respective  parties.  Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,  in support of his contention, cited many decisions.  We shall  advert to the decisions cited at a later stage.  We have also  carefully perused the relevant records and the orders  impugned in this appeal.  

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In our opinion, the High Court has committed a patent  error in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent  herein who is a daily wage worker when it was not  established that he was working on regular basis.  The High  Court, in our opinion, is not justified in directing that  respondent No.1 must be reinstated and appointed to  similar post.  The High Court has also clearly erred in  examining the legality of the policy and giving relief solely  on the ground that it found the policy and actions of the  appellant contrary to Arts. 14 & 16 of the constitution.  It is  pertinent to notice that the High court has taken into  consideration an entirely new aspect which was neither  pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition before the High  Court nor was claimed in the claim statement filed before  the Tribunal without giving an opportunity to the parties to  effectively reply to the same.  Likewise, the High Court also  failed to consider that the system of engagement of ’Ticca  Mazdoors’ has since been abolished in November, 1993,  while this fact was brought on record of High Court in the  counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank.   It is a matter of documentary proof that the  respondent has worked only for 58 days as could be seen  from the statement filed by the Bank.  This document was  annexed to the reply filed on behalf of the Bank before the  Tribunal.  In paragraph 9 of the reply, the Bank stated as  follows: "As regards para 9, Shri Vidya Dutta and  others mentioned herein were either non- matriculates or had completed 240 working days in  the preceding 12 calendar months at the relevant  time.  As such, Shri Sharma’s case is not  comparable to those cases and there is no  discrimination in not including his name in the  fresh waiting list."

The respondent has worked only for 58 days.  There is  no cross-examination on this aspect.  It is also not out of  place herein to mention that respondent No.1 was  discharged in July, 1976 and the Central Government  referred the matter for adjudication on 25.1.1989 nearly  after 13 years. Employers in relation to the Management of  Sudamdih Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs.  Their Workman represented by Rashtriya Colliery  Mazdoor Sangh, JT 2006 (1) SC 411 : This case, in turn, refers to the judgments in  Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors.,   JT 2000(1) SC 388 and S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. Vs. Telecom  District Manager, Karnataka, JT 2003(3) SC 436.  This  Court held that even though there is no limitation  prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial  tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes  should be referred to as soon as possible after they have  arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed  particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of  workmen.  This Court has held that a delay of four years in  raising the dispute after even re-employment of  most of the  old workmen was held to be fatal. In Nedungadi Bank  Ltd’s case (supra) this Court held a delay of seven years to  be fatal and disentitled the workmen to any relief.    In our opinion, a dispute which is stale could not be a  subject matter of reference.   In our view, respondent No.1 was not appointed to  any regular post but was only engaged on the basis of the  need of the work on day to-day basis and he has no right to

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the post and that his dis-engagement cannot be treated as  arbitrary.  The High Court, in our view, has totally  misdirected itself in holding that non-consideration of the  name of respondent No.1 on acquiring higher qualification  is not misconduct, hence, dismissal of the workman on this  ground is wrongful within the meaning of Item 3, Schedule  II to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 without giving any  reason as to how non-inclusion of name for day to-day  appointment amounts to wrongful dismissal.  The High  Court completely erred in relying on Section 25 G of the  I.D. Act while not holding that the workman has been  retrenched within the meaning of Section 25F and thus  misdirected itself about the applicability of provisions of  Section 25G of the I.D. Act even if it does not involve  retrenchment.  The High Court also failed to consider that  the inclusion of the name in the waiting list for  appointment as ’Ticca Mazdoor’ on day to-day basis does  not confer any right for regular appointment or to hold any  post.  As already noticed, no relief can now be given to  respondent No.1 especially when the system of keeping  waiting list for Ticca Mazdoor has been dispensed with  since 23.7.1993 and at present the Bank does not maintain  any list.  The High Court, therefore, wrongly proceeded on  the basis as if the daily wage appointment is for a regular  post on which a person can be reinstated.  The High Court  has also committed an error in giving the relief of  reinstatement with back wages without considering  whether the concerned workman was gainfully employed  from 1976 till date of judgment, there being no evidence on  record.  Likewise, the High Court ought to have seen that  respondent No.1 was not entitled to any back wages on the  basis of the well settled principle "No work \026 No Pay".  In  our opinion, the High Court has completely erred in  ordering an appointment to a similar post on which a  person just before the name of respondent No.1 is at  present working without considering the fact that such  person must be senior to the workman concerned and was  already promoted to the next cadre in Class III.   Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned counsel appearing for  the respondent argued that along with respondent No.1,  Vidya Dutta, Ram Roop Pasi, Lakhan Lal Srivastava, Aquil  Ahmad, Mazafar alam, Chandra Bhan and Mahesh Kumar  Shukla were also appointed by the Bank in Class IV Staff  and the former four persons are still working as Coin Note  Examiners drawing about Rs.2000/- per month and the  latter three persons have been absorbed as labour and  peon drawing about Rs.1700/- per month.  The respondent  has stated that besides financial loss, his promotions have  also been adversely affected by the discriminate and illegal  termination of his services/striking his name from the  approved list of peon-cum-Farash w.e.f. July, 1976. In  paragraph 9 of the reply, the Bank has denied the said  statement as could be seen from paragraph supra.  

This categorical denial has not been considered by  the High Court and the High Court does not even refer to  this aspect.  We have already noticed that the respondent  has worked only for 58 days and that the monthly chart  filed and annexed to the reply affidavit clearly shows that  the respondent has actually worked for 58 days only.   Regional Manager, S.B.I. vs. Rakesh Kumar  Tewari, JT 2006(1) SC 252 (Ruma Pal & Dr. AR.  Lakshmanan,JJ.) : In the above case, there was no pleading that there is

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violation of Section 25G of the I.D. Act.  Respondent No.1  raised no allegation of violation of Section 25G of the I.D.  Act in his statement of claim before the Tribunal.  This  judgment also refers to the judgment in Regional  Manager, State Bank of India vs. Raja Ram,  (2004) 8  SCC 164, where this Court held: ’before an action can be termed as an unfair  labour practice it would be necessary for the  Labour Court to come to a conclusion that the  badlis, casuals and temporary workmen had been  continued for years as badlis, casuals or temporary  workmen, with the object of depriving them of the  status and privileges of permanent workmen. To  this has been added the judicial gloss that artificial  breaks in the service of such workmen would not  allow the employer to avoid a charge of unfair  labour practice. However, it is the continuity of  service of workmen over a period of years which is  frowned upon. Besides, it needs to be emphasized  that for the practice to amount to unfair labour  practice it must be found that the workmen had  been retained on a casual or temporary basis with  the object of depriving the workman of the status  and privileges of a permanent workman. There is  no such finding in this case. Therefore, Item 10 in  List I of the Fifth Schedule to the Act cannot be  said to apply at all to the respondent’s case and the  Labour Court erred in coming to the conclusion  that the respondent was in the circumstances,  likely to acquire the status of a permanent  employee."

The Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board  vs. Subhash Chand & Anr., JT 2006(3) SC 393 : This case relates to the disengagement of casual  employees.  The question arose was as to whether the  provisions of Section 25G are to be complied with.  In this  case, the respondent was appointed on contractual basis  by the appellant during paddy seasons on consolidated  wages.  Upon termination of the services, the respondent  raised an industrial dispute.  The appellant took the stand  that the respondent was employed only for 208 days  during the previous year whereas the respondent  contended that he had worked for 356 days.  The Labour  Court held that the termination was violative of Section  25G of the I.D. Act and hence an unfair labour practice.   The appellant filed a writ petition against the decision of  the Labour Court which was dismissed by the High Court.  Setting aside the decision of the Labour Court, the High  Court held Fifth Schedule to the I.D. Act inapplicable and  hence dispensing with the engagement of the respondent  cannot be said to be unwarranted in law.   Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Umadevi  & Ors., JT 2006(4) SC 420 : In paragraphs 34 & 35 of the above judgment, this  Court held as under: " 34. While answering an objection to the locus  standi of the writ petitioners in challenging the  repeated issue of an ordinance by the Governor of  Bihar, the exalted position of rule of law in the  scheme of things was emphasized, Chief Justice  Bhagwati speaking on behalf of the Constitution  Bench in Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors. v. State of  Bihar & Ors. stated:

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"The rule of law constitutes the core of our  Constitution of India and it is  the essence of the  rule of law that the exercise of the power by the  State whether it be the Legislature or the Executive  or any other authority should be within the  constitutional limitations and if any practice is  adopted by the Executive which is in flagrant and  systemic violation of its constitutional limitations,  petitioner no. 1 as a member of the public would  have sufficient interest to challenge such practice  by filing a writ petition and it would be the  constitutional duty of this Court to entertain the  writ petition and adjudicate upon the validity of  such practice."

Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of  equality in public employment is a basic feature of  our Constitution and since the rule of law is the  core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be  disabled from passing an order upholding a  violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking  of the need to comply with the requirements of  Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution.  Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public  employment, this Court while laying down the law,  has necessarily to hold that unless the  appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and  after a proper competition among qualified persons,  the same would not confer any right on the  appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the  appointment comes to an end at the end of the  contract, if it were an engagement or appointment  on daily wages or casual basis, the same would  come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly a  temporary employee could not claim to be made  permanent on the expiry of his term of  appointment. It is also to be clarified that merely  because a temporary employee or a casual wage  worker is continued for a time beyond the term of  his appointment, he would not be entitled to be  absorbed in regular service or made permanent,  merely on the strength of such continuance, if the  original appointment was not made by following a  due process of selection as envisaged by the  relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent  regular recruitment at the instance of temporary  employees whose period of employment has come  to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very  nature of their appointment do not acquire any  right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the  Constitution of India should not ordinarily issue  directions for absorption, regularization or  permanent continuance unless the recruitment  itself was made regularly and in terms of the  constitutional scheme. Merely because an  employee had continued under cover of an order of  court, which we have described as ’litigious  employment’ in the earlier part of the judgment, he  would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or  made permanent in the service. In fact, in such  cases, the High Court may not be justified in  issuing interim directions, since, after all, if  ultimately the employee approaching it is found  entitled to relief it may be possible for it to mould  the relief in such a manner that ultimately no

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prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim  direction to continue his employment would hold  up the regular procedure for selection or impose on  the state the burden of paying an employee who is  really not required. The courts must be careful in  ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the  economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or  its instrumentalities or lend themselves the  instruments to facilitate the bypassing of  constitutional and statutory mandates.

35. The concept of ’equal pay for equal work’  is different from the concept of conferring  permanency on those who have been appointed on  ad hoc basis, temporary basis or based on no  process of selection as envisaged by the rules. This  court has in various decisions applied the principle  of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the  parameters for the application of that principle.  The decisions are rested on the concept of equality  enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the  Directive Principles in that behalf. But the  acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a  position where the court could direct that  appointments made without following the due  procedure established by law, be deemed  permanent or issue directions to treat them as  permanent. Doing so would be negation of the  principle of equality of opportunity. The power to  make an order as is necessary for doing complete  justice in any cause or matter pending before this  court, would not normally be used for giving the  go-by to the procedure established by law in the  matter of public employment. Take the situation  arising in the cases before us from the State of  Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision,  the Government had issued repeated directions  and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc  employment or engagement be given. Some of the  authorities and departments had ignored those  directions or defied those directions and had  continued to give employment specifically  interdicted by the orders issued by the Executive.  Some of the appointing officers have even been  punished for their defiance. It would not be just or  proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction  under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in  exercise of power under Article 142 of the  Constitution of India permitting those persons  engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent  based on their appointments or engagements.  Complete justice would be justice according to law  and though it would be open to this court to mould  the relief, this court would not grant a relief which  would amount to perpetuating an illegality."    

Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore vs. S.  Mani & Ors. , (2005) 5 SCC 100: In paragraphs 30 & 31 of the above judgment, this  Court held as under: "30. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T.Hadimani ((2002)

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3 SCC 25) it was stated:

"3\005.In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in  placing the onus on the management without first  determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the  respondent had worked for more than 240 days in  the year preceding his termination. It was the case  of the claimant that he had so worked but this  claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for  the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in  fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his  termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own  statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded  as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to  come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact,  worked for 240 days in a year.  No proof or receipt  of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of  appointment or engagement for this period was  produced by the workman. On this ground alone,  the award is liable to be set aside."

31.     In Siri Niwas, (2002) 8 SCC 400, this Court      held :

"13. The provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872  per se are not applicable in an industrial  adjudication. The general principles of it are,  however, applicable. It is also imperative for the  Industrial Tribunal to see that the principles of  natural justice are complied with. The burden of  proof was on the respondent workman herein to  show that he had worked for 240 days in the  preceding twelve months prior to his alleged  retrenchment. In terms of section 25-F of the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an order retrenching  a workman would not be effective unless the  conditions precedent therefore are satisfied.  Section 25-F postulates the following conditions to  be fulfilled by an employer for effecting a valid  retrenchment:

(i)     one month’s notice in writing indicating the  reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu  thereof;

(ii)    payment of compensation equivalent to 15  days average pay for every completed year of  continuous service or any part thereof in  excess of six months."

It was further observed:

"14. \005As noticed hereinbefore, the burden of  proof was on the workman. From the award it does  not appear that the workman adduced any evidence  whatsoever in support of his contention that he  complied with the requirements of section 25-B of  the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from examining  himself in support of his contention he did not  produce or call for any document from the office of  the appellant herein including the muster rolls. It is  improbable that a person working in a local  authority would not be in possession of any  documentary evidence to support his claim before

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the Tribunal. Apart from muster rolls he could have  shown the terms and conditions of his offer of  appointment and the remuneration received by him  for working during the aforementioned period. He  did not even examine any other witness in support  of his case."  

This judgment was approved in the case of Secretary,  State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Umadevi & Ors. (supra).   This judgment also refers to the H.D. Singh’s case (supra).   This Court held that H.D. Singh’s case was rendered on its  own facts.  In M.G. Datania vs. Reserve Bank of India, (2004) 10  SCC 451, while the L.P.A. was pending in the High Court, a  terms of settlement was arrived at on 23.7.1993 between the  Management of the Bank and the Reserve Bank Workers’  Federation.  The relevant portion is as under: "Terms of settlement (i)     The existing arrangement or practice of engaging  persons on daily wages purely on temporary and ad  hoc basis in Class IV in various cadres shall be  discontinued forthwith. (ii)    \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005. (iii)   \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005 (iv)    \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.."

This Court in a recent judgment in the case of  Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. & Ors. Vs.  Zakir Hussain,  (Ruma Pal & Dr. AR. Lakshmanan,JJ.),  (2005) 7 SCC 447, this Court held as under: "The respondent was a temporary employee of  the appellant Corporation on probation for a period  of two years.  His services were terminated by an  order of termination simpliciter.  The order was  innocuous and without any stigma or evil  consequences visiting him.  Therefore, there was no  requirement under the law to hold any enquiry  before terminating the services.  The courts below  have also erred in granting back wages along with  reinstatement.  Even otherwise, the respondent has  not led any evidence before the trial Court except  his own ipse dixit to show that his services were  terminated on the ground of any alleged  misconduct.  Therefore, it was not obligatory on the  part of the Corporation to hold an enquiry before  terminating the services."           For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that  respondent No.1 has worked for 58 days on casual basis,  therefore, he is not entitled for any relief in his belated claim.   The High Court, on erroneous view of the facts and  circumstances of the case, allowed the writ petition filed by  the respondent herein without taking into account the  categoric finding of fact that respondent No.1 had not  completed 240 days of service in the Bank and held that this  will not make much difference.  In our opinion, such a  casual approach is not warranted in the facts and  circumstances of the case.  We, therefore, have no hesitation  in setting aside the order dated 4.9.2003 passed by the High  Court in C.M.W.P. No. 35290 of 1996 and affirm the order  passed by the Tribunal.

In the result, the appeal succeeds.  However, there  shall be no order as to costs.