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PETITIONER: MANAGER GOVT. BRANCH  PRESS  &. ANR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D. B. BELLIAWPA

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/11/1978

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH TULZAPURKAR, V.D. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1979 AIR  429            1979 SCR  (2) 458  1979 SCC  (1) 477  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC  42  (13)  RF         1980 SC2084  (5)  RF         1981 SC 965  (4)  R          1983 SC 494  (19)  F          1986 SC 101  (223)  RF         1986 SC1626  (33)  D          1992 SC2093  (17)

ACT:      Constitution  of   India,  Articles   14   and   16(1), protection of,  when  available  to  temporary  employees-S. 16(1)  "appointment",   Scope,   Incumbent   on   dismissing authority to  disclose reason  for termination  of services, when specific charge of hostile discrimination.

HEADNOTE:      The  services   of  Belliappa,  a  temporary  Class  IV employee, were  terminated  without  assigning  any  reason, albeit in  accordance with  the conditions  of his  service, while three  other employees,  similarly situated, junior to Balliappa in  the same  temporary cadre,  were retained. The order terminating his services, was preceded by a show-cause notice of  proposed disciplinary  action  against  him,  but otherwise, there was nothing to show that the service record of Belliappa  was, in any way, inferior to his three juniors who have  been retained in service. Furthermore, neither the dismissal  order   nor  the  appellant’s  counter  affidavit assigned any  reason for  the termination  and the appellant had throughout  maintained that  there was  no nexus between the show-cause  notice and  the impugned  action.  The  High Court allowed a writ petition of Belliappa, holding that the order terminating his services, contravened the guarantee of equal treatment embodied in Article 16 of the Constitution.      It  was   contended  that  Belliappa  was  a  temporary employee, and  his services  could be terminated at any time without notice,  and that  Articles 14  and  16  are  J  not attracted when  the services  of a  temporary  employee  are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  The protection  of Articles 14 and 16(1) will

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be available  even to  a temporary  Government servant if he has been  arbitrarily discriminated  against and singled out for harsh  treatment in  preference to his juniors similarly circumstanced. The competent authority may have a discretion under the  conditions of  service governing the employee, to terminate his  services without  notice, but such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with reason and fair play, and not capriciously. Arbitrary invocation or enforcement of a service  condition terminating  the service of a temporary employee, may  itself constitute  denial of equal protection and offend  the Equality  clause in  Articles  14  and  16(l ).[464B-E]      Doddaiah v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 Mysore 223; Union of India  v. Prem  Parkash Midha,  [1965] 69  SLR 655  (SC); State of  U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, [1977] 1 SCR 462; and Madan Singh  Puran Singh,  v. Union  of India  1972  SLR  67 (Delhi): referred to.      2. The expression "appointment" used in Art. 16(1) will include termination   of  or removal from service, also. The expression "matters relating to employment", is not confined to initial  matters prior  to the  act  of  employment,  but comprehends all matters in relation to employment both prior and subsequent to 459 the employment  which are  incidental to  the employment and form part  of the A terms and conditions of such employment, such  as,   provisions  as  to  salary,  increments,  leave, gratuity, pension, age of superannuation, promotion and even termination of employment. [464E-G]      General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586; applied.      The Union  of India  v. Pandurang  Kashinath More,  AIR 1962 SC 630; differentiated      3. Where  there  is  a  specific  charge  of  arbitrary discrimination or some hostile or improper motive is imputed to the authority terminating the service, it is incumbent on the authority  to dispel  that charge  by disclosing  to the Court, the  reason or  motive which  impelled it to take the impugned action.  Excepting perhaps,  in cases  analogous to those covered  by Art.  311(2) proviso  (c),  the  authority cannot withhold  such information  from  the  court  on  the excuse, that the impugned order is purely administrative and not  judicial,   having  been  passed  in  exercise  of  its administrative discretion  under  the  rules  governing  the conditions of the service. [467A-B]      Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India, [1964] 5 SCR  190; Green v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1971] 1 All. E.R. 114; and Khudi Ram v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR 832 at 845, supported.      4. The archaic common law concept that employment was a matter between  the master and servant only, in its original absolute form,  is not  applicable to , Government servants. Even with  regard to  private employment,  much  of  it  has passed into the fossils of time. [467F-G]      ’Democracy, Equality  and Freedom’  (page 326) by K. K. Mathew, J.; referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal No.290 of 1969.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated tile  20th June  1968 of the Mysore High Court in W.P. No. 573 of 1 967.

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    M. Veerappa and J. R. Das for the Appellant.      R. B.  Datar, P. R. Ramasesh and Lalit Bhargava for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G      SARKARIA, J.-The  respondent, Belliappa,  was appointed temporary Junior Compositor in the Grade of RS. 65-1-72-2-90 in the  Government Branch  Press, Mercara. The post was non- gazetted Class IV as defined in Clause (IV) of Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 5  of the Mysore Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal)  Rules, H 1957. The employment was temporary and was to continue until further orders. 460      The Branch  Manager, Mercara,  Respondent  1  (herein), served a  notice on  the respondent  on December  29,  1966, stating that the respondent had taken outside the Press some copies of  the ballot  papers  relating  to  the  Director’s election of  Coorg Cardamom  Cooperative Societies, Mercara. The respondent  was required  to show cause before 2.00 P.M. Of December 30, 1966, why disciplinary 8 action be not taken against him  as per  Rules. It  was further  stated  in  the notice that failure to comply with the notice will result in the respondent’s  suspension and further disciplinary action against him.      Thereafter on  January 3,  1967, an order was served on the  respondent,   terminating  his   service.  This   order (hereinafter called the impugned order) runs as under:           "Office of  the Manager,  Government Branch Press,      Mercara.                          Memoranda           As per instructions contained in Head Office Order      No. 570/66-67,  dated 3-1-1967,  Sri D.  B.  Belliappa,      Junior Compositor  of this  Office is  hereby  informed      that  your   appointment  is   purely   temporary   and      terminable at  any time without any previous notice and      without  reasons   being  assigned  therefore  are  not      required.  Therefore   your     services   are   hereby      terminated with immediate effect.                                                     Sd/- xxx                           Government Branch Press, Mercara."      On   January    7,   1967,    Belliappa   submitted   a representation, dated January 6, 1967, to the Branch Manager against termination  of his  service, but  without  success, attributing motives  to his immediate superior officer, that his relations  with the  Respondent were not cordial for the preceding three  months. He  also prayed  for permission  to continue to work and requested for disbursement of his pay.      On  February  4,  1967,  Belliappa  instituted  a  writ petition in  the High Court of Mysore with a prayer to quash the order  terminating his  service. He further prayed for a direction that  the Manager  of  the  Press  (appellant)  be directed to  appoint him a regular candidate  to the post of the Junior  Compositor in  accordance with the provisions of the  Mysore  State  Civil  Services  (Recruitment  of  Local Candidates to  Class III)  Rules, 1966,  with  consequential benefits. 461      The Manager  filed a counter-affidavit stating that the respondent’s appointment  was purely  temporary governed  by the conditions  in the  contract of  his  service,  and  was liable to be terminated without notice at any time; that the 1966 Rules  relied upon  by the  writ  petitioner  were  not applicable to him because he was a Class IV Employee.      Subsequently,  Belliappa   filed  a  further  affidavit urging additional  grounds for  impugning the  order of  his discharge. The  High Court,  by its  Order dated January 30,

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1968, allowed  the respondent  to take  up these  additional grounds, to  the effect  that three  other persons,  namely, S/Shri B.  S. Vittala,  N. B. Achiah and Patric D’ Souza who are appointed  as temporary Junior Compositors subsequent to the  a  respondent’s  appointment,  had  been  retained  and continued in  service, while  a discriminatory treatment was meted out  to the  respondent, without  any reason.  It  was urged that  in these  circumstances, the  termination of the respondent’s  service,   while  continuing   three   others, similarly situated,  was violative  of  Article  16  of  the Constitution. At the stage of arguments, the respondent gave up his claim for regularisation of service.      The High  Court by  its  order  dated  June  20,  1968, allowed the  writ petition,  holding that the impugned order contravened the  guarantee of  equal treatment  embodied  in Article 16.  the High  Court did  not give  reasons in  this order, but  stated therein  that the  reasons given  in  the decision of  that Court  in Writ  Petition No.  153 of 1965, were applicable. In the result, the impugned order, by which the respondent’s services were terminated, was set aside and it was declared that he will be entitled to all the benefits flowing from  the court’s order, including reinstatement and the like.      Hence. this appeal by special leave.      Mr.  Veerappa,   learned  counsel  for  the  appellant, contends that  the respondent, Belliappa, was appointed in a temporary capacity  and his  service could  be terminated at any time  without notice. The proposition propounded is that Articles 14  and 16  are not  attracted in  a case where the services  of   a  temporary   employee  are   terminated  in accordance with  the  conditions  of  his  service.  In  the alternative, it  is submitted  that the  principle of ’first come and  last go’  may apply  only when  there is a general retrenchment and  not where there is some special reason for terminating the  services of  one employee  while continuing his juniors  in the temporary service. It is maintained that the show-cause  notice which was served on the respondent on December 29,  1966, furnishes  the motive  or the  cause for terminating the 462 respondent’s  services,   while  retaining  his  juniors  in service. Mr.  Veerappa contends  that in  spite of  the fact that the  position taken  by the  appellants in the impugned order was  that the  service of  the  respondent  was  being terminated without  assigning any  reason in accordance with the conditions  of his service, it could be spelled out from the show-cause notice that the real cause of terminating the respondent’s service  was his  unsuitability for  the job or unsatisfactory conduct.      A number  of decisions  have been  cited: The  Union of India v.  Pandurang Kashinath  More(1), Champaklal Chimanlal Shah  v.  the  Union  of  India(2),  Doddaiah  v.  State  of Mysore(3) Union  of India v. Prem Parkash Midha(4); State of U.P. v.  Ram Chandra  Trivedi(5); Madan Singh Puran Singh v. The Union of India.(6).      As against  this, it  is submitted  on  behalf  of  the respondent that  in his further affidavit, dated January 25, 1968, the  respondent had  taken  up  the  plea  of  hostile discrimination, with  particularity, stating  that while his three named  juniors who  were  in  all  respects  similarly situated, were  continued in  service;  the  respondent  was arbitrarily  singled   cut  for   discriminatory  treatment, although the  respondent’s record of service was good and at no time  he gave  room for  any complaint  from his official superiors. It  is  stressed  that  these  averments  in  the

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additional affidavit of the respondent were not rebutted or  countered  by the  opposite side  on affidavit, nor was any material produced  on record  to show  that  there  was  any special reason for terminating the respondent’s service, and continuing the  service of  his juniors.  It is  urged  that since the  consistent stand  taken by  the appellant  in the impugned order,  in their  counter-affidavit and at the time of arguments  in the  High Court was that the service of the respondent  has  been  terminated  without  any  reason,  in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service? the appellants should  not be  allowed to  commit a volt face in this special appeal and take up a different ground which was never set up or pleaded.      Before dealing  with the  contentions canvassed on both sides, it  will be  useful to notice the relevant undisputed facts for the discussion emerging from the pleadings and the material on record.      (1) A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 630.      (2) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 190.      (3) A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 223.      (4) [1965] 69 S.L.R. 655 (S.C.)      (5) [1977] I S.C.R. 462.      (6) 1972 S.L.R. 67 (Delhi). 463      The service  of the  respondent,  Belliappa,  has  been terminated     without  assigning   any  reason   albeit  in accordance with  the conditions  of his service, while three employees, similarly  situated, junior  to Belliappa  in the same temporary cadre have been retained.      A charge  of hostile  discrimination has  been levelled with sufficient particularity against the appellant. Hostile animus was also attributed by Belliappa in his writ petition to his  superior officers.  In the additional grounds of his further affidavit, Belliappa averred that his service record was good.  This  fact  has  not  been  controverted  by  the appellant by filing any counter-affidavit. However, there is material on  the record  to show that the impugned order was preceded by  a show-cause  notice of  proposed  disciplinary action against  Belliappa.  It could, therefore, be presumed that but  for this  show-cause notice, the service record of Belliappa was  good. At  any rate,  there is  nothing on the record to  show that  the service record of Belliappa was, m any way,  inferior  to  his  three  juniors  who  have  been retained in  service. The  impugned order  itself says  that Belliappa’s services  are being terminated without assigning any reason, and the same has been reiterated in the counter- affidavit, dated  September 22, 1967, filed on behalf of the present appellant in the High Court.      In order  to satisfy  our conscience and appreciate the arguments  of   Mr.  Veerappa   that  the  services  of  the respondent  have   been  terminated   on   the   ground   of unsuitability, we  requested him  to cause the production of the Head  Office Order  No. 570/66-67 dated January 3, 1967, which has been referred to in the impugned order. We granted Mr.  Veerappa   sufficient  time  for  this  purpose.  On  a subsequent date,  he informed us that this Head Office order also does  not contain  any reason  for the impugned action. Indeed, the  contents of  this Head  Office order  have been substantially reiterated in the impugned order, according to which, the  service of  Belliappa was  terminated Of course, there is  always some  reason or  cause for  terminating the services of  a temporary  employee. It  is not  necessary to state that  reason in  the order of termination communicated to the  employee concerned.  But where  there is  a specific charge of arbitrary discrimination or some hostile motive is

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imputed to  the authority  terminating the  service,  it  is incumbent on  the authority  making the  impugned  order  to explain the  same by  disclosing the reason for the impugned action. In  the instant  case, the  appellant intransigently withheld that information from the Court. There is no escape from the  conclusion that  Belliappa was  picked out for the impugned action,  whimsically, without  any  special  reason which could  put him  in a  class separate  from that of his three juniors who have been retained in service. 464      The ground is now clear for considering the contentions canvassed by the appellant.      Mr. Veerappa’s first contention is that Articles 14 and 16(1) of  the Constitution have no application, whatever, to the case of a temporary employee whose service is terminated in accordance  with the  terms and conditions of his service because the tenure or the duration of the employment of such an employee is extremely precarious being dependent upon the pleasure  and  discretion  of  the  employer-State.  In  our opinion, no  such generalisation can be made. The protection of Articles  14 and  16(1) will  be available even to such a temporary Government  servant if  he  has  been  arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for harsh treatment in preference to  his juniors  similarly circumstanced.  It  is true that the competent authority had a discretion under the conditions of  service governing  the employee  concerned to terminate the  latter’s employment without notice. But, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with reason and fair play  and not  capriciously. Bereft  of rationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into arbitrariness which is the very  anti-thesis of  the  rule  of  law  on  which  our democratic  polity   is  founded.  Arbitrary  invocation  or enforcement of  a service  condition terminating the service of a  temporary employee  may itself  constitute  denial  of equal protection  and offend  the Equality clause in Article 14  and   16(1).  Article   16(1)  guarantees  "equality  of opportunity  for   all  citizens   in  matters  relating  to employment or  appointment to  any office  under the State". Moreover, according  to the  principle underlying Section 16 of the  General Clauses  Act, the  expression  "appointment" used in Article 16(1) will include termination of or removal from service, also.      It is  now well  settled that  the expression  "matters relating to employment used in Article 16(1) is not confined to initial  matters prior  to the  act  of  employment.  but comprehends all  matters  in  relation  to  employment  both prior,  and   subsequent,  to   the  employment   which  are incidental to  the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of  such employment,  such as,  provisions as  to salary,  increments,   leave,  gratuity,   pension,  age  of superannuation,   promotion    and   even   termination   of employment. It is further well established that Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1) from part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and  supplement each  other. If  my authority  is needed for  the above  enunciation, reference may be made to the observations  made by Gajendragadkar J., as he then was, in General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari(1).      (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586. 465      In Union  of India  v.  P.  K.  More  (supra),  it  was contended befor  this Court  that Article  16 provides  that there shall be no inequality of treatment in the termination of the  service of  any employee  of  the  Government.  This interpretation of  the Article  was disputed by the Union of India, who  was the  appellant in  that case.  Although  the

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Court thought  it unnecessary  to pronounce  finally on this dispute for  the purpose  of that  case, yet it proceeded an the assumption  that Article  16 might  be  violated  by  an arbitrary and discriminatory termination of service. In that case, the  respondent, P. K. More, had been detained legally under a  statute. In  view of this fact, the Court held that ’the respondent  might  legitimately  have  been  put  in  a separate class  and treated  differently from  others not so detained."      In the  instant case, no special circumstance or reason has  been   disclosed  which  would  justify  discriminatory treatment to Belliappa as a class apart from his juniors who have  been  retained  in  service.  Mr.  Veerappa’s  frantic efforts  to   spell  out   justification  for   differential treatment to  the respondent  by reference to the show-cause notice that preceded the impugned action, is entirely futile when the  stand tenaciously  adhered to  throughout  by  his client is  that there  is no  nexus between  the  show-cause notice and  the impugned  action which was taken without any reason in  exercise of  the power  vested in  the  competent authority  under   the  conditions   of   the   respondent’s employment.      In view  of this,  we have  no alternative  but to hold that  the   termination  of  Belliappa’s  service  was  made arbitrarily and  not on the ground of unsuitability or other reason, which  would warrant discriminatory treatment to him as a class apart from others in the same Cadre.      In the  view we  take, we  are further  fortified by  a decision of  the Constitution  Bench in  Champak Lal’s  case (supra). That  was a case of a temporary Government servant. Rule S  governing a temporary Government servant, which came up for  consideration  in  that  case,  gave  power  to  the Government  to   terminate  the   service  of   a  temporary Government servant  by giving  him one  month’s notice or on payment of  one month’s pay in lieu of notice. This rule was attacked on the ground that it was hit by Article 16. In the alternative, it  was urged  that even if rule 5 is good, the order by which the appellant’s services were dispensed with, was bad because it was discriminatory. Reference was made to a number  of persons whose services were not dispensed with, even though  they were  junior to  the appellant and did not have as  good qualifications  as he  had. Wanchoo  J. (as he then was,  speaking for  the Court, repelled the alternative argument in these terms: 466           "We are  of opinion that there is no force in this      contention. This  is not  a case  where services  of  a      temporary employee  are being retrenched because of the      abolition of  a post.  In such  a case,  a question may      arise as  to who  should be  retrenched when one out of      several  temporary  post  is  being  retrenched  in  an      office.  In  those  circumstances,  qualifications  and      length of  service of  those holding  similar temporary      posts  may  be  relevant  in  considering  whether  the      retrenchment of  a particular  employee was as a result      of discrimination.  The present however is a case where      the appellant’s  services were  terminated because  his      work was  found to  be unsatisfactory.. (In such a case      there can,  in our  opinion,  be  no  question  of  any      discrimination. It  would be  absurd to say that if the      service of  one temporary  servant is terminated on the      ground of  unsatisfactory conduct  the services  of all      similar employees  must also  be terminated  along with      him, irrespective  of what  their conduct is. Therefore      even though  some of  those mentioned  in the plaint by

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    the appellant  were junior  to him  and did not have as      good qualifications  as he  had and  were  retained  in      service, it  does not  follow  that  the  action  taken      against the  appellant  terminating  his  services  was      discriminatory, for  that action was taken on the basis      of  his   unsatisfactory   conduct.   A   question   of      discrimination may  arise in  a case of retrenchment on      account of  abolition of one of several temporary posts      of the  same kind  in one office but can in our opinion      never arise in the case of dispensing with the services      of a  particular temporary  employee on  account of his      conduct being unsatisfactory."                          (Parenthesis and emphasis supplied) The principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if  the services  of a temporary Government servant are terminated in  accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the  job and/or  for his  work; being unsatisfactory, or for a  like reason which marks him off in a class apart from other temporary  servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16.      Conversely, if  the services  of a temporary Government servant are  terminated, arbitrarily,  and not on the ground of his  unsuitability, unsatisfactory  conduct or  the  like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service, a question of unfair discrimination may arise, notwithstanding the  fact that  in terminating  his service, the appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance 467 with the  terms of  the employment. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is  levelled with  specificity,  or  improper motives are  imputed to  the authority  making the  impugned order of  termination of  11 the  service, it is the duty of the authority  to dispell  that charge  by disclosing to the Court the  reason or  motive which  impelled it  to take the impugned action.  Excepting, perhaps,  in cases analogous to those covered  by Article 311(2), Proviso (c), the authority cannot withhold  such information from the Court on the lame excuse, that the impugned order is purely administrative and not  judicial,   having  been  passed  in  exercise  of  its administrative discretion  under  the  rules  governing  the conditions of  the service. "The giving of reasons", as Lord Denning put it in Green v. Amalgamated Engineering Union(1). "is one of the fundamentals of good administration", and, to recall the words of this Court in Khudi Ram v. State of West Bengal(2) in  a Government  of laws  "there is  nothing like unfettered discretion  immune from judicial review ability". The executive,  no less  than  the  judiciary,  is  under  a general duty  to act  fairly. Indeed,  fairness  founded  on reason  is  the  essence  of  the  guarantee  epitomised  in Articles 14 and 16(1).      Another facet  of Mr. Veerappa’s contention is that the respondent  had  voluntarily  entered  into  a  contract  of service on  the terms  of employment  offered to him. One of the terms  of that  contract, embodied in tile letter of his appointment is that his service was purely temporary and was liable to  termination at  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the appointing authority,  without reason  and  without  notice. Having willingly accepted the employment on terms offered to him, the  respondent cannot  complain against  the  impugned action taken in accordance with those mutually agreed terms.      The argument  is wholly  misconceived. It  is  borrowed from the  archaic common  law concept  that employment was a matter between  the master  and servant  only. In  the first place, this  rule in  its  original  absolute  form  is  not

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applicable to Government servant. Secondly, even with regard to private  employment, much  of  it  has  passed  into  the fossils of  time. "This rule held the field at the time when the master  and servant  were taken more literally than they are now  and when,  as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant,  like  the  rights  of  any  other  member  of  the household,  were  not  his  own,  but  those  of  his  pater familias".  The  overtones  of  this  ancient  doctrine  are discernible in  the Anglo-American jurisprudence of the 18th century and  the first  half  of  the  20th  century,  which rationalised the      (1) [1971] 1 All E.R. at p.114.      (2) [1975] (2) S.C.R. 832 at page 845. 468 employer’s absolute right to discharge the employee. "Such a philosophy", as  pointed out  by K.  K. Mathew  J. (vide his treatise: "Democracy,  Equality and Freedom", page 326), "of the employer’s  dominion over  his employee may have been in tune with  the rustic  simplicity of  bygone days.  But that philosophy  is   incompatible  with  these  days  of  large, impersonal, corporate  employers." To  bring it in tune with vastly changed  and changing  socio-economic conditions  and mores of  the day,  much of  this old  antiquated and unjust doctrine  has   been  eroded   by  judicial   decisions  and legislation, particularly  in its  application to persons in public employment,  to whom the Constitutional protection of Articles 14,  15, 16  and 311  is available. The argument is therefore overruled.      Coming back  to the point, we have a vague feeling that it was, perhaps, open to the appellant to say in view of the complaint alluded  to in  the snow-cause  notice against the integrity and  fidelity of  the respondent,  that the former had  lost  confidence  in  the  latter  and  considered  him unsuitable to  be continued  in the  post which  was one  of trust and  confidence. But  it will  be hazardous  for us to base  our   decision  on  any  such  speculation,  when  the appellant, himself,  instead of  taking any  such plea, has, with obdurate  persistency stuck  to the  position that  the respondent’s service has been terminated without any reason, which comes  perilously near  to admitting  that  the  power reserved  to  the  employer  under  the  conditions  of  the employment, has been exercised arbitrarily.      In the  absence of  any information  from the appellant indicating that  the respondent was marked off for discharge on  the  basis  of  an  intelligible  differentia  having  a reasonable  nexus   with  the   object  of  maintaining  the efficiency and  integrity of  the  public  service,  we  are constrained to  hold, in agreement with the High Court, that the  impugned   order  suffers   from  the  vice  of  unfair discrimination and  is violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. M.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 469