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PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT OF THE HINDUSTHAN COMMERCIALBANK LTD., KANPUR,

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHAGWAN DASS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/11/1964

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1142            1965 SCR  (2) 265  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1966 SC1216  (5)  RF         1968 SC 384  (8)  RF         1968 SC 985  (5)  RF         1971 SC1283  (7)

ACT: Supreme  Court  Rules, Order 13 r. 2--petition  for  special leave   to  appeal--whether  can  be   entertained   without appellant first applying for certificate to High Court-- and without applying for exemption under Order 45 r.  1--whether Order 13 r. 2 mandatory.

HEADNOTE: In a petition under Article 227 filed by the respondent, the High  Court  quashed  an order of  the  Labour  Court.   The appellant  then  filed  before the  High  Court  a  petition praying for the issue of a certificate under Art. 132(1) and Art.  133  of the Constitution for leave to  appeal  to  the Supreme  Court.  The petition was returned to the  appellant with   the  intimation  that  it  should  be  presented   at Chandigarh  and not at Delhi.  The appellant thereafter  did not  proceed  with  that petition but applied  for  and  was granted ex-parte special leave to appeal under Article 136. It  was  contended  on behalf of  the  respondent  that  the special  leave  granted to the appellant was  liable  to  be revoked  and  it  was obtained without  complying  with  the provision  of  Order  13 r. 2 of the  Supreme  Court  Rules, whereby  when  an  appeal lies to the  Supreme  Court  on  a certificate  issued  by a High Court or other  tribunal,  no application  to the Supreme Court for special leave  ran  be entertained unless the High Court or the tribunal  concerned has  first  been  moved  and it has  refused  to  grant  the certificate; and furthermore special leave had been obtained without  applying for exemption from moving the  High  Court for a certificate. HELD : In view of the provisions of Order 13 r. 2 which is a mandatory  rule, no application for special leave to  appeal in this case could be entertained unless the High Court  had first  been  moved  and refused to  grant  the  certificate.

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Under  Order 45 r. 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, this  Court could,  for sufficient reasons shown, excuse  the  applicant from compliance with the requirements of Order 13 r. 2;  but no  such  application  for exemption  had  been  made.   The special  leave to appeal obtained in contravention of  Order 13  r. 2 was therefore liable to be revoked. [267 G, H;  268 Al Union  of India v. Kishore Lal Gupta [1960] 1,  S.C.R.  493, 500, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1964 and C.M.P. No. 2174 of 1964. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and order,  dated February  23,  1962,  of  the Punjab  High  Court  in  Civil Miscellaneous No. 1322 of 1961. T.   R. Bhasin, for the appellant. M.   K. Ramamurthi, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agar- wala, for the respondent. 266 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J.  The short point arising for our  decision  in this case is whether the special leave to appeal granted  to the  appellant  on  August 21, 1962  should  be  revoked  on account of non-compliance with the provisions of 0. 13, r. 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950. The  respondent was a cashier in the employ of the  Amritsar Branch  of the appellant Bank.  He was suspended on  May  5, 1952 and finally dismissed from the service of the appellant on January 24, 1959.  In the meantime, he was prosecuted for offences under ss. 408 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.  He was  acquitted by the Trial Magistrate oil March  21,  1955, and  a revision petition against the order of acquittal  was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge on June 23, 1955. On January 9, 1961, he filed a petition under s. 3 3 (C) (2) of  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before  the  Presiding officer  of  the  Central Government  Labour  Court,  Delhi, claiming  from the appellant payment of a sum of Rs.  16,000 in  terms  of  paragraph  521(2)  (c)  of  the  Bank  Award, including  full  salary  and  allowance  from  the  date  of suspension to the date of termination of his service.  By an order  dated  March 28, 1961, the Labour Court  allowed  the claim to the extent of Rs. 375 only, and dismissed the  rest of  the  claim.   On May 29, 1961, the  respondent  filed  a petition  in  the Punjab High Court under Art.  227  of  the Constitution  against the order of the Labour Court.  By  an order dated February 23, 1962 a learned single Judge of  the Punjab High Court quashed the order of the Labour Court, and directed  it to decide the matter afresh in accordance  with law.   The  High  Court held that  by  giving  an  erroneous decision  with regard to the effect and scope  of  paragraph 521  of  the  Bank  Award and  the  decision  of  the  Trial Magistrate  acquitting  the  respondent,  the  Labour  Court failed  to exercise jurisdiction and to give effect  to  the provisions  of  paragraph  521  of  the  Award  and  in  the circumstances,  on a true interpretation of Art. 227 of  the Constitution the High Court had power to quash the  impugned order.   On April 30, 1962, the appellant filed  before  the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi, a  petition praying  for issue of a certificate under Arts.  132(1)  and 133  of the Constitution certifying that the  case  involved substantial  questions of law a.,; to the interpretation  of Art. 227 of the Constitution and was otherwise a fit one for

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appeal  to  this  Court.   The  petition  was  returned  for correction  of defects, and was represented on May 5,  1962. On  June  1, 1962, the petition was again  returned  to  the appellant  with  an  intimation  that  the  same  should  be presented at Chandigarh.                             267 Thereafter, the appellant did not proceed with the petition, and  did  not  move  the  High Court  for  the  issue  of  a certificate  under Arts. 132(1) and 133.  On July  7,  1962, the appellant presented in this Court a petition for special leave  to  appeal.  In this petition, the  appellant  raised various questions of law as to the proper interpretation  of Art.  227  of the Constitution, and also set out  the  facts relating  to  the presentation of the petition  under  Arts. 132(1)  and  133.   On August 21, 1962,  the  appellant  was granted  ex parte special leave to appeal under Art. 136  of the Constitution.  In his statement of case, the  respondent contended,  inter, alia, that the special leave  granted  to the  appellant  was liable to be revoked,  inasmuch  as  the leave  was  obtained  without  filing  an  application   for exemption  from moving the High Court for a  certificate  of fitness under Art. 132 of the Constitution On July 18, 1964, the  respondent  also  filed  an  application  praying   for revocation  of  the special leave.  The  contention  of  the respondent  is  that the special leave  should  be  revoked. inasmuch as the same was obtained without complying with the provisions of 0. 13, r. 2 of the Supreme Court Rules,  which reads thus               "Where an appeal lies to the Supreme Court  on               a  certificate  issued by the  High  Court  or               other  tribunal no application to the  Supreme               Court  for special leave shall be  entertained               unless  the  High Court or the  tribunal  con-               cerned has first been moved and it has refused               to grant the certificate." Now, no appeal lay to this Court under Art. 133 of the  Con- stitution  from the judgment of the learned single Judge  of the  Punjab  High  Court.   But as  the  appeal  involves  a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Art. 227 of the Constitution. it would have lain on a certificate issued by the High Court under Art. 132 of the Constitution. The  appellant did not move the High Court for the issue  of the certificate, though it had earlier presented a  petition praying  for the grant of the certificate on  this  footing. In  view  of 0. 13, r. 2, no application to this  Court  for special  leave to appeal in this case could be  entertained, unless  the High Court had been first moved and had  refused to grant the certificate.  Under 0. 45, r. 1 of the  Supreme Court Rules. this Court could, for sufficient reasons shown, excuse  the appellant from compliance with the  requirements of  0. 13, r. 2. Up till now, the appellant has not  applied to  this Court for exemption from compliance with 0. 13,  r. 2.  In  the absence of any order of exemption, 0. 13,  r.  2 applies with full force, and peremptorily 268 enjoins that no application to this Court for special  leave to appeal shall be entertained.  The rule is mandatory.  The special  leave to appeal being obtained in contravention  of the rule is liable to be revoked. Relying on the case of Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta  & Bros  (1), Mr. Bhasin contends that the leave should not  be revoked at this late stage.  In that case, the special leave to  appeal  from a judgment of a single Judge  of  the  High Court  had  been  obtained without  first  appealing  to  an appellate  Bench of the High Court.  Though the leave  could

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have  been  revoked,  if the objection  were  taken  at  the earliest  opportunity, an application for revocation of  the leave  made  after  inordinate delay was  dismissed  on  the ground that the revocation at the late stage would prejudice the  appellant; for if the objection had been taken  at  the earliest  point  of time, the appellant would have  had  the opportunity  to  prefer  a Letters  Patent  Appeal  and  the appellant could not be made to suffer for the default of the respondents.   In that case, the special leave had not  been obtained in contravention of any mandatory rule.   Moreover, the delay in filing the application for revocation had  pre- judiced  the  appellant.  In the instant case,  the  special leave  to  appeal  was  obtained  in  contravention  of  the mandatory  provisions  of 0.13, r. 2. Moreover,  it  is  not shown  that  the appellant suffered any  prejudice  for  any default  of  the  respondent or any  delay  in  raising  the objection. We  direct that the special leave to appeal granted  to  the appellant be revoked.  The order of stay, if any, granted by this  Court stands vacated.  The parties will pay  and  bear their own costs -if the appeal. Special leave revoked. (1) [1960] I S.C.R. 493. 269