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PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT  OF  BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK  MILLS  CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE WORKMEN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/1967

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. HIDAYATULLAH, M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1968 AIR  585            1968 SCR  (1) 581  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1969 SC 513  (9,26)  RF         1972 SC 343  (10)  F          1973 SC2272  (8,11,12,14)  RF         1973 SC2650  (11)  R          1976 SC  82  (7)  RF         1977 SC1666  (14)  RF         1977 SC2246  (15)

ACT: Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947 (14 of 1947),  ss.  10  and 19(6)-Jurisdiction  of Tribunal to consider matters  covered by an earlier award which has not been terminated by  notice under  S.  19(6)-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to  adjudicate  on matters provided for Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946).

HEADNOTE: The  Standing Orders of the appellant’s establishment,  duly certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing  Orders) Act,  1946, dealt, inter alia, with provisions  relating  to leave to be granted to the workmen.  In I.C. 11 of 1955  the Industrial Tribunal by its award modified the said  standing orders and made provisions for certain kinds of leave.   The award  came  into operation on November 18,  1956  under  s. 19(3)  read with s. 17A(7) of the Industrial  Disputes  Act. On further disputes arising the parties entered on September 19, 1958 into a settlement under s. 12(3) of the  Industrial Disputes  Act  whereby  in return for the  revision  of  the scales of pay, the workmen agreed that for a period of three years commencing from January 1, 1958, they would not  raise any  dispute  on  certain  matters  including  leave.   This settlement  was  terminated by the workmen by  notice  dated August  14, 1961 under s. 19(2) of the  Industrial  Disputes Act.   In  1963 the State Government again referred  to  the Industrial  Tribunal  an  industrial  dispute  between   the appellant  and the workmen.  This dispute was registered  as I.D.  No.  8 of 1963 and the questions referred  related  to privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave.  The appellant urged before the Tribunal that it was not competent to  hear the  reference because (i) the earlier award in I.C.  11  of 1955 which dealt with matters relating to leave had not been

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terminated  by  a notice under s. 19(6)  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act; (ii) the Standing Orders in question could  be modified  only by the procedure under the  Standing  Orders, Act  and not under the Industrial Disputes Act  because  the former  Act  was self-sufficient in regard  to  the  matters covered  by  it.   The  Tribunal and  the  High  Court  both rejected  the appellant’s objections, whereupon, by  special leave,  appeal  was filed in this Court.  On behalf  of  the workmen  it  was stated that notice of  termination  of  the earlier award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial disputes  Act had been given by them in a letter dated June 26, 1961. HELD:(i)  When  there is a subsisting award binding  on  the parties  the  Tribunal has no jurisdiction to  consider  the same  points in a fresh reference.  In the present case  the earlier award had not been terminated -and the reference was therefore incompetent. [588D] The letter of June 26, 1961 could not be treated as a notice under s.19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act terminating the earlier  award in I.C. 11 of 1955 because it did not  convey any  such  intention.   Moreover it was  written  while  the settlement  of September 19, 1958 by which the  workmen  had bound  themselves not to raise any dispute  regarding  leave facilities  for  three  years was still in  force,  for  the notice of. termination of the settlement under s. 19(2)  was given  by  the workmen only on August 14, 1961.   Until  the said  settlement was terminated the union of workmen had  no right to make demands about leave facilities as it purported to do on June 26, 1961. [587G--588C] 582 The  Workmen of Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. The  Western India Match Co. Ltd., [1963] 2 S.C.R. 27, referred to. (ii)  The Standing Orders Act which has for its object,  the defining  with  sufficient  precision.  the  conditions   of employment, under the industrial establishments and to  make the said conditions known to the workmen, has provided  more or  less a speedy remedy to the workmen, for the purpose  of having a standing order modified or for having any  question relating to the application, or interpretation of a standing order. referred to a labour court.  But there is no  warrant for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a selfcontained  statute with regard to the matters  mentioned therein,  the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal  under the  Act.  to  adjudicate upon the matters  covered  by  the standing  orders, has been in any manner abridged  or  taken away, It will always be open in a proper case, for the union or  workmen  to  raise  an  ’industrial  dispute’  as   that expression is defined in s. 2(k) of the Industrial  Disputes Act,  and  if such a dispute is referred by  the  Government concerned for adjudication the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court  as  the  case  may  be  will  have  jurisdiction   to adjudicate upon the same. [595B-D] Guest,  Keen,  Williams., Private Ltd. v.  P.  J.  Sterling, [1960]  1 S.C.R. 348, The Baualkot Cement Co. Ltd. v. R.  K. Pathan,  [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697 and Salem Electricity  v. Employees. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 498, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 501 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October  23, 1964 of the Mysore High Court in Writ  Petition No. 1985 of 1963. H.  R.  Gokhale,  A.  N. Sinha and  D.  N.  Gupta,  for  the appellants

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B. R. L. Iyengar, Bisliamber Lal and H. K. Puri, for respon- dent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam,  J. This appeal, by the Management  concerned, by  special  leave is directed against the judgment  of  the Mysore  High Court, dated October 23, 1964, dismissing  Writ Petition No. 1985 of 1963, and declining to issue a writ  of prohibition,,   restraining  the,  second  respondent,   the Industrial  Tribunal, Bangalore-1  from proceeding  with the adjudication,  in  1. D. No. 8 of 1963.   The  short  facts, leading  up  to the State of Mysore, making  the  reference, which  is  the  subject  of  adjudication,  by  the   second respondent, in I.D. No. 8 of 1963, are as follows: The appellant is a textile mill, in Bangalore, manufacturing cotton, silk and cotswool piece-goods.  After the Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946 (Act  XX  of  1946) (hereinafter to be referred to, as the Standing Orders Act), came  into  force, the standing orders  of  the  appellant’s establishment  were  duly  drawn up, and  certified  by  the authorities.   Those  standing orders, among  other  things, related to the question of leave, to, be granted 583 to  the  workmen.  By its order, dated August 2,  1955,  the Government  of Mysore referred to the  Industrial  Tribunal, Bangalore,  for adjudication, an industrial dispute,  raised by certain categories of workmen, of the appellant  company. That  reference  was numbered as I.C. No. 11 of  1955.   The dispute that was referred, was               "Whether  the  Standing Orders  filed  by  the               Management and now certified by the certifying               authority be modified as a modification to the               existing  Standing  Orders as amended  by  the               employees  through  their association  in  the               light  of  the views and as indicated  in  the               Annexure to this notification". The  Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, made an award,  Exhibit M-6,  on September 25, 1956, whereby the  Tribunal  directed the  addition of certain clauses, in the Certified  Standing Orders  of the appellant company.  There is no  controversy, that  paragraphs  50  to  70,  of  Exhibit  M-6,  deal  with privilege leave, sick leave and casual leave, which could be availed  of, by the workmen.  Exhibit M-5 is a copy  of  the Certified Standing Orders of the Management company.   After the  amendments,  effected  to  those  Standing  Orders,  in pursuance of the award, Exhibit M-6, clauses 1, 2, 3 and  4, of  Order  9, of Exhibit M-5 deal with  festival  holidays,. leave   with   wages,  medical  leave  and   casual   leave, respectively.  The award, Exhibit M-6, after publication  in the State Gazette, on October 18, 1956, came into  operation on November 18, 1956, under the provisions of s. 19(3), read with  s. 17A(1), of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947  (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter referred to, as the Act). The first respondent began to make certain claims, for revi- sion  of  the  provisions,  regarding  leave,  and  as   the appellant  was  not willing to concede  those.  claims,  the first  respondent  appears  to  have  approached  the  State Government, to refer the dispute, regarding this matter,  to the Tribunal, for adjudication-, but, the State  Government, by its order, Exhibit M-2, dated October 10, 1962,  declined to  refer the matter for adjudication.  In the said  -order, the  Government is of the view that, as compared with  leave facilities,  provided for, in similar major  industries,  in Bangalore,   the  leave  facilities  then  granted  by   the Management  to the workmen of the appellant company,  cannot be  considered to be inadequate, and, therefore,  the  issue

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raised,  by  the  workmen, does  not  merit  reference,  for adjudication.   But,  nevertheless,  later  on,  the   State Government,  referred for adjudication, by its order,  dated March  20, 1963, the following matters, to the  second  res- pondent:               "Whether  the  workmen of  Bangalore  Woollen,               Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd., are entitled  to               the following leave benefits:               (a)   Privilege leave for one month in a  year               with pay. 584               (b)   Casual  leave of 12 days in a year  with               pay.               (c)   Sick  leave  of 30 days in a  year  with               full pay less E.S.I. benefits.               If not, to what reliefs they are entitled to" This reference, out of which the present proceedings  arise, was  registered as I.D. No. 8 of 1963.  From the  questions, referred  to above, it will be seen that the  dispute,  that was referred, for adjudication almost exclusively relates to the  question  of privilege leave, casual  leave,  and  sick leave,  which  are  already provided for.  in  the  Standing Orders, of the Management, Exhibit M-5. The  first respondent has placed its demands, in respect  of this  question,  before  the Industrial  Tribunal,  and  the Management  have also placed their points of view, on  these matters.   It is not necessary to refer to the  pleas  made, either by the appellant ,or the first respondent,  regarding the merits of the claim, which has not -been adjudicated, by the  Industrial  Tribunal.  But the  Management  raised  two preliminary   objections,  to  the  jurisdiction,   of   the Industrial  Tribunal, to entertain and adjudicate  upon  the questions,  referred  by the State  Government.   Those  two preliminary objections were to the effect:               (i) The award, Exhibit M-6, dealing with leave               and   other   facilities,  not   having   been               terminated  by the first respondent, by  issue               of a notice, as contemplated under s. 19(6) of               the  Act,  continues  to  be  in  force   and,               therefore,  the question of leave cannot  form               the subject matter of adjudication.               (ii) The question regarding leave  facilities,               having  been  provided for, in  the  Certified               Standing  Orders, framed by the company  under               the Standing Orders Act, any modifications  to               those provisions, as is now sought to be done,               can only be in the manner provided for, in the               Standing  Orders  Act,  and  cannot  form  the               subject  of  adjudication, by  the  Industrial               Tribunal, under the Act. The Workers’ Union met these-contentions by stating that the various  representations, made by it, to the Management.  as well  as the presentation of a Charter of Demands,  amounted to   notice   of  termination  of  the   Award   and   that, notwithstanding the Standing Orders Act, when an  industrial dispute was raised, regarding matters which might be covered by the Standing Orders of the Management, by the workmen and such  a dispute was referred,. for adjudication,  under  the Act,  by  the Government concerned, the  Tribunal  had  full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon that dispute. These  two questions have been answered, by  the  Industrial Tribunal, against the Management, by its order, dated August 26,  1963.  The High Court, in its order under  attack,  has also agreed 585

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with the findings, recorded by the Tribunal.. In considering the  first objection, both the Tribunal and the  High  Court have  gone  into  the question as  to  whether  the  notice, contemplated  under  s.  19(6)  of the  Act,  should  be  in writing, or, whether it can be ,oral, and have expressed the concurrent  view that such notice can be oral also; but  the ultimate finding, recorded by the Tribunal, and accepted  by the  High  Court, is that the various  correspondence,  that passed  between the Management and the Union,  will  clearly show  that  the Union has terminated the  Award.   On  -.the second  objection the Tribunal, whose findings have,  again, ,been accepted by the High Court, has held that the scope of the -Standing Orders Act is very limited, and that there  is really no conflict, between the Act and the Standing  Orders Act.  It is the further view of the Tribunal that, in  spite of the provisions, contained in the Standing Orders,  framed by the company, under the provisions of the Standing  Orders Act,  it is nevertheless open to a Tribunal,  to  adjudicate upon those matters, when the question is referred to it,  as an industrial dispute, under the Act. In  this  appeal,  on behalf of the Management,  Mr.  H.  R. Gokhale,   learned   counsel,  has  raised  the   same   two contentions, relating to the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunal  to adjudicate upon the dispute, in  question.   In respect of the first objection, that the award, Exhibit M-6, has not been terminated by a written notice, under s.  19(6) of the Act, counsel urged that the views, expressed by  both the  Tribunal,  and the High Court, that there  could  be  a notice,  given  even orally terminating the  award,  is  not correct. No doubt. the findings, in this regard, that there can be an oral  notice,  given  under s. 19(6) of the  Act,  has  been sought  to be supported, by Mr. B. R. L..  Iyengar,  learned counsel, appearing for the Union.  In our opinion it was not really  necessary  either for the Tribunal or for  the  High Court,  to  embark  upon, and express  an  opinion,  on  the question,  as  to whether the notice of  termination  of  an award, under s. 19(6), of the Act, can be oral, because.  so far  as we can see, the Union has not raised any  plea  that the termination of the award, Exhibit M-6, in this case, has been  brought  about, by its giving an oral  notice  to  the Management.   On  the other hand, the specific plea  of  the Union, on this aspect, was that the various representations, made  by it, to the Management, as well as the  presentation of  the  Charter  of  Demands.  amounted  to  a  notice   of termination  of the award.  The various representations  and the  Charter of Demands, referred to, by the Union, are  the representations  and  charter  given  in  writing,  to   the Management,  on various matters.  Therefore, we  express  no opinion,  on this case, as to whether the termination of  an award,  can be brought about by an oral notice being  given, under s. 19(6), of the Act. We will then consider the _question, as to whether there has been a termination of the award, Exhibit M-6, in the  manner pleaded by the Union.  It cannot be over emphasized that an 586 intimation,  claimed  to  have  been  given,  regarding  the termination  of an award, must be fixed with reference to  a particular  date,  so as to enable a Court to  come  to  the conclusion  that  the  party, giving  that  intimation,  has expressed  its  intention to terminate the  award.   Such  a certainty regarding date, is absolutely essential,  because, the  period  of two months, after the expiry of  which,  the award will cease to be binding on the parties, will have  to be reckoned, from the date of such clear intimation.  It  is

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also  necessary to state that, in this case, the High  Court and  the  Tribunal,  have proceeded on the  basis  that  the decision  of  this Court, in The Workmen  of  Western  India Match  Co.  Ltd.  v. The Western India  Match  Co.  Ltd.(1), supports  the proposition that an inference of an  intention to terminate an award or a settlement, can be gathered  from the   various  correspondence  that  passed,   between   the Management  and the Union.  That decision, in  our  opinion, does not lend any support to such a view.  From the facts of that  case, it is seen that there was a settlement,  between the  parties, on April 29, 1955, and there was a Charter  of Demand,  given  by  the workmen, on January  25,  1957.   On January 14, 1953, the Government of West Bengal referred, to the  Industrial  Tribunal concerned,  for  adjudication  the demands made by the workmen.  Earlier to that date, on March 29, 1957, the management had sent a reply to the Union  that the  Charter of Demands, of January 25, 1957, could  not  be considered,  inasmuch as the settlement of April  29,  1955, had  not been validly terminated, under the Act.  In  answer to  that communication, the Union wrote, on April  8,  1957, that  the  various  representations,  made  by  it,  to  the management and the representation of the charter of demands, amounted  to a notice of termination of the settlement.   In dealing  with  this point, it will be seen that  this  Court observes that no formal notice, as contemplated by s. 19(2), of  the Act, has been given by the Union.  But, this  Court, ultimately,  held  that  though no such  formal  notice  was given,  the letter of April 8, 1957, written by  the  Union, could  itself be construed as notice, within the meaning  of s.  19(2),  and therefore the Tribunal had  jurisdiction  to adjudicate upon the claim, as the reference was made, by the State Government, long after the expiry of two months,  from April  8, 1957.  It will therefore be seen, that this  Court treated the letter, of April 8, 1957, written by the  Union, as  amounting  to  a notice of intention  to  terminate  the settlement.   But.  in  the instant  case,  we  specifically desired  Mr. lyengar, counsel for the Union, to state  which was  the particular letter, or representation, made  by  the Union,  which could be considered to amount to a  notice  of termination  of the award.  Learned counsel stated  that  he relied upon the letter, dated June 26, 1961, written by  the Union, to the Management, as amounting to a notice, given by his client, intimating its intention to terminate the award, Exhibit M-6. In  view of this stand, taken by the counsel for the  Union, we are not     referring  to  the events  that  took  place, subsequent to this [1963] 2 S.C.R. 27. 587 date,  viz.,  June  26,  1961,  excepting  to  state   that, ultimately,  the  State  Government,  referred  the  present dispute,  for adjudication, to the Industrial Tribunal.   We have already stated that the award, in I.C. No. 11 of  1957, remained  in  operation, till November 18.  1957,  under  s. 19(3),  of  the Act, but notwithstanding the expiry  of  the period  of  operation, of the award, under sub-s.  (3),  the said  award  will  continue to be binding  on  the  parties, unless it is terminated, in accordance with s. 19(6), of the Act.   Even  during  the  period, when  this  award  was  in operation, i.e., within; November 18, 1957, the workers made certain demands, as mentioned in their letter, dated October 28,  1957.   The demands referred to, in  the  said  letter. related   to  various  claims.  made  by  the   Union.    In particular,  item  3,  of Annexure A, to  the  said  letter, related  to certain claims, made by the  several  employees, regarding  privilege leave and casual leave.   On  September

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19,  1958, there was a settlement, arrived at,  between  the parties,  under Exhibit M-3.  It is only necessary  to  note clause  5 of this agreement, whereby the  Staff  Association withdrew the demands, in respect of the various claims, made on October 28, 1957, including the claim made, for privilege leave  and casual leave.  The Staff Association also  agreed that,  for a period of three years, commencing from  January 1, 1958, they would not raise any dispute regarding- any  of the  subjects  covered  by  Annexure  A  to  their  original demands,  which included also the claim for privilege  leave and  casual  leave.   No  doubt  there  is  a   reservation, regarding  gratuity,. with which we are not  now  concerned. Therefore, it will be noted that though a claim was made, in respect  of leave, on October 28, 1957, the  Union  withdrew that  claim, under the agreement, M-3, and they also  agreed not  to  make  any  demands,  for  three  years.This  is   a settlement, arrived at. by the parties, and this  settlement will  be  binding  on  them. unless  it  is  terminated.  in accordance with s. 19(2) of the Act. On August 1.4, 1961, the Union issued a notice, Exhibit  W-3 to  the Management, under s. 19(2) of the Act, stating  that the   settlement,   of  September  19,  1958,   will   stand terminated, and cease to be binding, after the expiry of two months.  from  the date of receipt of that  letter,  by  the Management. it is in between September 19, 1958, the date of the  settlement  M-3 and August 14, 1961, the  date  of  the notice-W-3,  terminating  the settlement, that  the  letter, dated June 26, 1961, relied on by Mr. Iyengar, as  amounting to  a notice of termination of the award, %,as sent  by  the Union.  No doubt, in this letter, the Union has, among other matters, claimed leave facilities. as stated therein.   That claim  related  to privilege leave, casual  leave  and  sick leave.   Even  this letter does not, as such,  intimate  the Management, of the Union’s intention to terminate the award, Exhibit  M-6.  Mr. Iyengar. learned counsel, urged that  the very  fact that the Union has made claims, in  this  letter, regarding  leave facilities which are inconsistent with  the award , Exhibit M-6, will clearly show that the Union is not standing by the award.  From the facts. mentioned 588 above, it will be clearly seen that the parties have entered into  a settlement, on September 19, 1958, and one  part  of the  agreement  is that the Union is withdrawing  its  claim regarding leave facilities    and it has also agreed not  to raise any disputes, regarding that matter,  for a period  of three  years.   This  settlement  is  binding,on  both   the Management  and the Union, and will continue to be  binding, until  it is terminated, in accordance with S. 19(2),of  the Act.   Notice of intention to terminate the  settlement  was given  on August 14, 1961, and, under S. 19(2) of  the  Act, the settlement will cease to be binding, after the expiry of two months, i.e., on October 14, 1961.  This letter, written on  June 26, 1961, long before the issue of the  notice,  on August 14, 1961, terminating the settlement, under S. 19(2), is,  in our opinion, of no avail.  Unless the settlement  is terminated,  the  Union  had no right to  make  any  demands regarding  leave facilities*, as it has purported to do,  on June  26,  1961.   Therefore, in our  opinion,  this  letter cannot  be  considered to be a notice, given by  the  Union, expressing its intention to terminate the award.  Apart from the fact that :it does not convey any such intention, it  is also invalid, inasmuch as it has been given, even before the settlement was terminated.  From this, it -will follow  that when  there is a subsisting award, binding on  the  parties, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to consider -the same

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points, in this reference. Normally, this conclusion, arrived at, by us, may be  enough to  dispose  of  this  appeal-,  but  the  second  question, relating  to the jurisdiction of the  Tribunal,  functioning under  the  Act,  to adjudicate upon a  dispute,  which  may result in the modification of the Standing Orders. framed by the management. under the Standing Orders Act, has also been adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, and the High Court and the correctness  of those findings, have been canvassed.  before us.   If,  later  on, there is a  proper  reference  to  the Tribunal,  the same questions may arise, for  consideration; and  therefore.  we shall proceed to express, our  views  on that aspect also. The  contention  of  Mr. Gokhale. learned  counsel  for  the appellant,  is  that the Management, after the  coming  into force of the Standing Orders Act, had framed standing orders which have been certified, by the Certifying Officer.  Those Standing  Orders, originally framed, made provision for  the grant of privilege leave, sick leave, casual leave and other allied  matters.   The Award, Exhibit M-6,  dealt  with  the claim  of  the  workmen, in this regard,  and  gave  certain directions.  Those directions have been incorporated, by the Management.  by  amending  the  Standing  :Orders  and   the provisions  regarding  leave. etc., are all to be  found  in those Standing Orders Exhibit M-5.  The Standing Orders Act, as  the  various provisions therein will show,  is  a  self- contained  statute, imposing obligations on  the  Management and  also conferring rights. on the parties  concerned.  for the  framing  of  and  ,,effecting  modifications,  in   the Standing Orders.  The manner in 589 which  the modification is to be sought, is also  indicated, in the Act. In  this  connection,  learned counsel referred  us  to  the interpretation,  placed upon item 5, in the Schedule to  the Standing  Orders Act, by this Court, in The Bagalkot  Cement Co.  Ltd.  v.  R.  K. Pathan(1), that it  is  open,  to  the authorities  functioning under the Standing Orders  Act,  to make  substantive provisions for the granting of  leave  and holidays,  along  with conditions in respect of  them.   Mr. Gokhale  pointed out that the Standing Orders Act placed  an obligation,  on the management, to have the Standing  Orders certified;  it imposes a duty on the Certifying Officer  and the   Appellate   Authority,   to   adjudicate   upon    the reasonableness and fairness of the Standing Orders-, a right has been given. both to the workmen, and the management,  to apply to the Certifying Officer to have the Standing  Orders modified;  there is provision for appeals; penal  provisions are  provided, for failure to submit draft standing  orders, or   for  modifying  standing  orders,  otherwise  than   in accordance  with s. 10; and, finally, jurisdiction is  given under  s. 13-A, to the Labour Court, constituted  under  the Standing  Orders Act, to entertain any dispute that  may  be referred  to it, by the employer or workman,  regarding  the application,  or interpretation of a standing order.   These provisions,  according to the learned counsel. clearly  show that  the Standing Orders Act is a self-sufficient  statute. by  if  any  provision made. in respect  of  leave.  in  any Standing Orders,. requires modification. the only  procedure to be adopted by the party concerned. is as indicated in the Standing Orders Act.  In respect of all matters which are to be  so dealt with. regarding industrial  establishments.  to which  the  Standing  Orders  Act  applied,  the  Industrial Tribunal,   constituted   under  the  Act,  will   have   no jurisdiction  to entertain -a claim or adjudicate  upon  the

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same.   When two statutes. as in this case. the Act and  the Standing  Orders  Act, more or less deal  with  some  common matters, the proper and reasonable view to hold will be that the  Act  can  be  invoked only  in  respect  of  industrial establishments which are not governed   by   the    Standing Orders Act.  Mr. Gokhale also pointed out that    under such circumstances, the remedy to be adopted is the one,    under the  Standing,  Orders Act; and this is also to  be  deduced from  the views, expressed by this Court. in  certain  deci- sions, to which he has drawn our attention. Mr.  lyengar,  learned counsel for the Union, on  the  other hand,  points out that the Act and the Standing Orders  Act. have  been enacted for different purposes; the scope  of  an adjudication, under the Standing Orders Act, counsel  points out,  is only regarding the fairness or  reasonableness,  of standing  orders.  The Standing Orders, certified under  the Standing  Orders  Act, are no doubt binding on  the  parties and,  in individual cases, it may be possible for a  workman to apply for a modification of a particular Stand- (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697. 590 ing,  Order or -raise a question, regarding the  application or  interpretation of a Standing Order, and refer it to  the Labour  Court.  But, counsel points out. that does not  mean that  there  cannot  be  a larger question,  by  way  of  an industrial dispute. raised by the Union, or the workmen,  as a  body, concerned, which will necessitate an  adjudication, by the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act. In  this connection, counsel drew our attention to the  fact that the Act and the Standing Orders Act, were amended by  a common  Act-the Industrial Disputes (Amendment  And  Miscel- laneous  Provisions)  Act, 1956 (Act KXXVI of  1956).   This Amending  Act  made  provision  for,  adjudication,  by  the certifying  authority and the appellate authority under  the standing  Orders Act, ,Upon the reasonableness and  fairness of standing orders.  It made :a provision, giving a right to a  workman also to apply to the Certifying Officer, to  have the  standing  orders  modified.   Section  13A,   regarding reference being made to the Labour Court, by a workman or an employer,  in respect of the application, or  interpretation of a standing order, was also incorporated, by the  Amending Act.   Side  by  side with these  amendments,  made  to  the Standing  Orders Act, various amendments were  effected,  in the Act also.  Provisions regarding the constitution of  the Labour  Court,  as  well as the  Industrial  Tribunals,  and matters over which they have jurisdiction, as enumerated  in the  particular Schedules to that Act, were also  made.   An adjudication,  made by the Labour Court, or  the  Industrial Tribunal,  is binding on the parties, referred to, in S.  18 of  the Act.  No doubt S. 13A, of the Standing  Orders  Act, enables  an  employer or a workman, to refer to  the  Labour Court,   any  question  relating  to  the  application,   or interpretation, of a standing order.  But the same  Amending Act  has  incorporated, in the Second Schedule to  the  Act, item  2, relating to ’the application and interpretation  of standing   orders’,   over  which  the  Labour   Court   has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon.  ’Similarly, counsel points out,  the Industrial Tribunal, constituted ,under  the  Act, has been given jurisdiction to deal with matters,  -referred to,  in the Second and Third Schedules to the  Act.   ’Leave -with  wages and holidays’ is item 4, of the Third  Schedule to  the Act, over which jurisdiction has been given only  to the Industrial Tribunal.  If the contention of the appellant is  accepted,  it will mean. that in respect  of  a  similar question,  covered  by  the  standing  orders  framed  by  a

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company,  the  Labour Court, which is  denied  jurisdiction, under  the  Act, will be competent to  adjudicate  upon  the same.   Therefore,  counsel points out,  that  the  matters, ,covered  by the standing orders, in respect of the  various items contained in the Schedule to the Standing Orders  Act, can  no  doubt,  be  dealt  with,  in  accordance  with  the provisions  contained  therein; but a general  or  a  larger controversy regarding those matters, can certainly form  the subject  of an ’industrial dispute’, as that  expression  is defined  in  the  Act, and, if that is  so,  the  Industrial Tribunal will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those matters, when a reference is made, by the State Government. 591 We are in agreement with the contentions of Mr. Iyengar,  on this point.  The scheme of the Standing Orders Act, has been dealt  with,  by  this  Court,  in  three  of  its  reported decisions:  Guest,  Keen, Williams, Private Ltd. v.  P.  .J. Sterling(1);   The  Bagalkot  Cement  Co.  Ltd.  v.  R.   K. Pathan(2);   and   Salem   Electricity   v.    Employees(’). Therefore, we do not think it necessary to cover the ,around over again.  Those decisions have also noted the  amendments effected  to  the Standing Orders Act, by the  Amending  Act XXXVI  of  1956.  Those are the decisions, which  have  been referred  to, by Mr. Gokhale, in support of  his  contention that  the observations made, therein, will show  that  after the  amendment  of  the Standing Orders  Act,  in  1956,  no industrial dispute can be raised, under the Act, in  respect of the matters covered, by the Standing Orders Act, and that the  remedy of the parties concerned, will only be, as  laid down,  therein.  On a perusal of those decisions, we do  not find  that any such proposition, has been laid therein.   On the  other hand, we will presently show, that in the  latest decision  of this Court, the question, as to  whether  there can  be  an industrial dispute, raised, which can  form  the subject  of  an  adjudication,  under  the  Act,  has   been specifically left open. In Guest, Keen, Williams, Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling(1), the  Management  had framed standing orders which  had  been certified,  under the Standing Orders Act.  On the basis  of those  standing  orders, certain  workmen  were  voluntarily retired, at the age of 55 years, and the dispute,  regarding this matter, was referred to the Industrial Tribunal,  under the  Act.   The order of the Management was set  aside,  and reinstatement  of  some  of the workers,  was  ordered.   An objection  was raised, on behalf of the  Management,  before this  Court, that the reference, by the Government,  itself, was bad, on the ground that s. 7 of the Standing Orders  Act makes the standing orders binding, between the employer  and his   employees,  and,  till  those  standing  orders,   are modified,  the parties, will be governed by  those  standing orders,  and  the  legality  of the  action,  taken  by  the Management, on the basis of the standing orders, cannot form the subject of a reference, under the Act.  But this  Court, after  referring to the scheme of the Standing  Orders  Act, observed that before the Standing Orders Act was amended, in 1956,   if   the   employees   wanted   to   challenge   the reasonableness,  or fairness of any of the standing  orders, the  only course was to raise an industrial dispute in  that matter,   but  that  this  position  was  altered,  by   the amendments made, to the Standing Orders Act, by which it bad been made obligatory, on the part of the Certifying Officer, and   the  Appellate  Authority,  to  adjudicate  upon   the reasonableness and fairness of a standing order, and a right had been given to the workman also. to apply (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348.

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(2)  [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697. (3)  [1966] 2 S.C.R. 498. 592 for  the  modification of any standing  order.   This  Court further observed, at p. 358:               "The  standing orders certified under the  Act               no   doubt  become  part  of  the   terms   of               employment  by  operation of s. 7; but  if  an               industrial  dispute arises in respect of  such               orders  and it is referred to the tribunal  by               the  appropriate government, the tribunal  has               jurisdiction to deal with it on the merits. According  to Mr. Gokhale, these observations  will  clearly indicate that the view of this Court is that prior to  1956, the  questions  regarding standing orders,  could  form  the subject of an industrial adjudication, under the Act, and he wants us to draw the inference that, after 1956, the view of this  Court  is,  that the jurisdiction  of  the  Industrial Tribunal, in such matters, has been taken away.  We are  not inclined  to accept this contention of the learned  counsel, for,  this Court, in the above decision, had no occasion  to consider  the  provisions  of the Standing  Orders  Act,  in relation to the Act.  In fact, there is no reference at  all to the amendments effected in 1956, to the Act. The  next decision is The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. v. R.  K. Pathan(1).   In that decision, this Court had  to  consider, again,  the effect of the Standing Orders Act, prior to  its amendment,  in 1956.  No doubt the amendments,  effected  in 1956,  are also adverted to when considering the  scheme  of the  Standing Orders Act.  In particular, the scope of  item 5, of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act, to the effect ’conditions of, procedure in applying for, and the authority which   may  grant.  leave  and  holidays’,  came   up   for consideration.  The contention, on behalf of the Management, appears  to have been that the jurisdiction. conferred on  a Certifying  Authority, under this clause, does  not  empower the said Authority to deal with the substantive question  of the  extent  and  quantum of leave  and  holidays.   It  was further  contended  that the said clause only  required  the Standing Orders to provide for conditions, subject to which, leave  and  holidays  could  be  granted,  as  well  as  the procedure,  in respect thereof.  In short, it was  contended that  the  quantum of leave and holidays, to be  granted  to workmen,  was  outside the purview of the  Schedule  to  the Standing Orders Act and, as such, they could not be included by  the Certifying Officer, or the Appellate  Authority,  in the Standing Orders.  This contention was rejected, by  this Court, and it was held that the substantive provisions,  for the granting of leave and holidays, along with conditions in that respect, could be provided for, in the Standing Orders, under  cl. 5, of the Schedule.  It will be noted  that  this decision was also concerned, solely with the question of the jurisdiction  of  the Certifying Officer and  the  Appellate Authority, under the Standing Orders Act, in relation to the standing  orders,  which came up for  consideration,  before them.   In  this  decision also this  Court  did  not  -have occasion to [1946] 2 S.C.R. 498. 593 consider whether those matters could form the subject of  an industrial adjudication, under the Act. Mr.  Gokhale,  no  doubt, relied upon  the  observation,  at p.710, to the following effect:               "It  is not disputed that the claim for  leave               and holidays can become the subject matter  of               an industrial dispute and if such a dispute is

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             referred  for  adjudication to  an  Industrial               Tribunal, the Tribunal can fix the quantum  of               holidays and leave.  What the Tribunal can  do               on  such  reference  is  now  intended  to  be               achieved by the Standing Orders themselves  in               respect of industrial establishments to  which               the  Act  applies.  We have noticed  that  the               Certifying  Officer as well as  the  appellate               authority   are,  in   substance,   industrial               authorities  and  if they are given  power  to               make provision for leave and holidays as  they               undoubtedly  are  given power to  provide  for               termination  of employment and  suspension  or               dismissal  for  misconduct, there  is  nothing               inconsistent  with the spirit of the  Schedule               or With the object of the Act." and attempted to persuade us to hold that in respect of  all the  matters,  covered  by the  standing  orders,  exclusive jurisdiction is vested only in the authorities,  constituted under  the  Standing Orders Act.  Though, prima  facie,  the above  observations may appear to give some support to  this contention   of   Mr.  Gokhale,  in   our   opinion,   those observations must be limited to the question that this Court was  considering,  in  that case,  which.  again.  was  with reference  to  the  powers of  the  authorities,  under  the Standing  Orders Act, as well as the rights of the  parties, with reference to those standing orders.  But, at any  rate, as  we  shall  presently show, in the  later  decision,  the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, in such matters, has been specifically left open. We  then  come  to  the decision of  this  Court,  in  Salem Electricity  v. Employees(1).  In that case,  the  appellant had  framed  standing orders and got them certified,  in  or about  1947.  under the Standing Orders Act.  In  1960,  the appellant   made  an  application,  before  the   Certifying Officer,  for  amendment  of certain  standing  orders.   By virtue  of the proposed amendment, the management wanted  to have  two  sets of standing orders. to govern  the  relevant terms and conditions of its employees.  Both the  Certifying Officer,  as  well as the Appellate Authority,  declined  to modify  the standing orders, as desired by  the  management. The question that arose for decision was it short one, as to whether the rejection of the application of the  management, was  justified  or not.  This Court, again,  considered  the scheme of the Standing Orders Act, both before and after its amendment in 1956, and held that in regard (1) [1946] 2 S.C.R. 498. L J(N)6SCI--12 594 to  the certification of the standing orders,  the  Standing Orders   Act  provided  for  a  self-contained  ’code,   and ultimately  held that the refusal of the Certifying  Officer and the Appellate Authority, to modify the standing  orders, was perfectly justified. Here,  again,  this Court had no occasion  to  consider  the position  of  standing  orders, framed  under  the  Standing Orders Act, in relation to an industrial dispute that may be raised,  and referred for adjudication, under the  Act.   In fact,  that  no decision was intended to be given,  on  that aspect, is made clear by the learned Chief Justice, when  he observes, at p. 506:               "It  may  be that even in  regard  to  matters               covered   by   certified   Standing    Orders,               industrial  disputes may arise,  between  the.               employer and his employees, and a question may

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             then  fall  to  be  considered  whether   such               disputes  can  be referred to  the  Industrial               Tribunal  for its adjudication  under  section               10(1)  of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act.   In               other  words,  where  an  industrial   dispute               arises  in  respect of such  matters,  it  may               become   necessary   to   consider    whether,               notwithstanding  the selfcontained  provisions               of the Act, it would not still be ,open to the               appropriate Government to refer such a dispute               for  adjudication.  We wish to make  it  clear               that our decision in the present appeal has no               relation  to  that question.  In  the  present               appeal,  the only point which we are  deciding               is whether under the scheme of the Act, it  is               permissible  to  the employer to  require  the               appropriate  authorities  Under  the  Act   to               certify two different sets of Standing  Orders               in regard to any of the matters covered by the               Schedule." None of the above decisions lend support to the  contentions :of  the learned counsel for the appellant that,  after  the amendment .effected in 1956, to the Standing Orders Act, the Industrial  Tribunal  will have no jurisdiction,  under  the Act, to adjudicate upon any disputes in relation to matters, covered  by the Standing Orders, framed under  the  Standing Orders Act. Further, accepting the contention of the learned counsel for -the  appellant,  will  be  to  practically  wipe  out   the existence  of the Act, so far as industrial  establishments, governed  by  the Standing Orders Act, are  concerned.   The Legislature,  in 1956, amended, .by the same Act  viz.,  Act XXXVI  of 1956, both the Act and the ’Standing  Orders  Act. Schedules  were  also  incorporated  in  the  Act,  and.  in particular,  the same item. which is referred to in s.  13A, of the Standing Orders Act, is again referred to, as item 2. of  the  Second Schedule to the Act, over which  the  Labour Court  has  jurisdiction.  Item 5, of the  Schedule  to  the Standing  Orders Act, as interpreted, by this  Court.  gives jurisdiction  to  the authorities under that Act,  to  frame standing order,;. with reference 595 not  only to the procedure for -rant of leave and  holidays, but  also  in respect of the quantum of  leave,  and  allied matters.   The Legislature, in item 4 of the Third  Schedule to  the Act, dealing with ’leave with wages  and  holidays’, has   conferred  jurisdiction,  In  that  regard,   on   the Industrial Tribunal.  The Standing Orders Act which, has for its  object,  the defining, with sufficient  precision,  the conditions  of employment, under the  industrial  establish- ments  and to make the said conditions known to the  workmen employed by them, has provided more or less a speedy  remedy to  the workman, for the purpose of having a standing  order modified,  or  for  having  any  question  relating  to  the application, or interpretation of a standing order, referred to a labour Court.  But there is no warrant, in our opinion, for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a self-contained   statute,  with  regarded  to  the   matters mentioned  therein,  the  jurisdiction  of  the   Industrial Tribunal,  under  the Act, to adjudicate upon  the  matters, covered   by   the  standing  orders,  has  been,   in   any manner,abridged     or taken away.  It will always be  open, in  a  proper  case,for the Union or  workmen  to  raise  an ’industrial  dispute’, as that expression is defined  in  s. 2(k)  of the Act, and, if such a dispute is referred by  the

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Government,  concerned,  for  adjudication,  the  Industrial Tribunal  or  Labour Court, as the case may  be.  will  have jurisdiction  to  adjudicate, upon the same.  But,  it  must also be borne in mind that an ’industrial dispute’ has to be raised  by the Union, before it can be referred and,  it  is not  unlikely that a Union must. be persuaded to  raise  the dispute, though the grievance of a particular workman, or  a member of the Union, be otherwise well-founded.  Even if the Union takes up the dispute, the State Government may, or may not, refer it to the Industrial Tribunal.  The discretion of the State Government, under s. 10 of the Act, is very  wide. It may be that the workmen. affected by the standing orders, may  not always, and in every case, Succeed in  obtaining  a reference  to the Industrial Tribunal, on a relevant  point. These  are some of the circumstances for giving a right  and remedy,  to  the  workman, under  the  Standing  Orders  Act itself,  but  there is no indication, in the scheme  of  the Standing,   Orders  Act,  that  the  jurisdiction   of   the Industrial  Tribunal, to entertain an ’Industrial  dispute’, bearing   upon   the  standing  orders  of   in   industrial establishment,  and  to adjudicate upon the  same,  has  any manner been abridged, or taken away, by the Standing  Orders Act.  Therefore, on this aspect, we are in agreement with he conclusions, arrived at, by the Industrial Tribunal, and the High Court. But,  in  view of our finding on the first point,  that  the award, Exhibit M-6 ’had not been terminated. it follows that the  reference.  made by the State Government,  dated  March 20,1963,  in  his case, is incompetent, and  the  Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same, in I.D.  No. 8 of 1963.  In the result, the order :of the  High Court is set aside, and a writ of 596 prohibition,   restraining  the  second   respondent,   from proceeding_  with the adjudication, in I.D. No. 8  of  1963, will issue, and the appeal allowed, to that extent.  Parties will bear their own costs, in this appeal. G.C.               Appeal allowed in part. 597