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PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE T. K. GHOSH’S ACADEMY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T. C. PALIT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/04/1974

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1495            1974 SCR  (3) 872  1974 SCC  (2) 354

ACT: Constitution    of    India,    1950--Art.    133(1)(a)    & (b)--Distinction between clause (a) and (b).

HEADNOTE: The plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for the ejectment  of the defendant appellant from the premises in dispute and for recovery  of certain amount on account of arrears  of  rent. The defendant-appellant on the other hand claimed that-under the  deed  of trust they were entitled to  occupy  the  said premises  without payment of rent.  The lower court  decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents.  On appeal the  High  Court  set aside the  decree  for  ejectment  and reduced  the  amount for recovery.  The High  Court  granted certificate  of  fitness under clauses (a) and (b)  of  Art. 133(1) of the Constitution. On appeal it was contended by the respondents that the  High Court  was wrong in granting the certificate of fitness  and that it should be cancelled. Dismissing  the application for cancellation of  certificate of fitness, HELD : The appeal is maintainable under Art. 133 (1) (b)  of the Constitution. To attract the application of Art. 133(1)(b) it is essential that  there  must  be  a  judgment  involving  directly   or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of  an amount  or value not less than rupees twenty thousand.   The variation  in  the language used in clauses (a) and  (b)  of Art.  133(1)  pointedly  highlights  the  conditions   which attract  the application of the two clauses.   Under  clause (a)  what is decisive is the amount or value of the  subject matter in the court of first instance and "still in dispute" in appeal to the Supreme Court : under clause (b) it is  the amount or value of the property respecting which a claim  or question  is involved in the judgment sought to be  appealed from.   The expression "property" is not defined but  having regard  to  the  use of the  expression  "amount"  it  would apparently include money.  But the property respecting which the claim or question arises must be property in addition to or  other than the subject matter of the dispute.  If  in  a proposed  appeal  there  is  no  claim  or  question  raised respecting  property other than the subject  matter,  clause

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(a) will apply : if there is involved in the appeal a  claim or  question respecting property of an amount or  value  not less than rupee twenty thousand in addition to or other than the  subject  matter of the dispute clause (b)  will  apply. [878 F-H] Chhitarmal v. M/s.  Shah Pannalal Chandulal, [1965] 2 S.C.R. 751, referred to. The  judgment of the High Court in the present case  plainly did  not affirm the decision of the trial court because  the High  Court  set  aside the decree for  ejectment  and  also reduced  the  amount for the recovery of  which  decree  for ejectment  and also reduced the amount for the  recovery  of which  decree  had  been awarded by the  trial  court.   The variation of the decree of the trial court was in favour  of the  defendants-appellants but that circumstance  would  not detract  from the fact that the judgment of the  High  Court was  not  one  of affirmance of the decision  of  the  trial court.  In determining the character of the appellate decree what has to be looked into is the appellate decree taken  in its entirety and compare it with the decision of the  trial- court as a whole and decide whether the appellate decree  is one of affirmance or not.  In this enquiry the nature of the variation  made  whether it is in favour  of  the  intending appellant or otherwise would not be relevant. [877 G-H] Tirumalachetti  Rajaram  v.  Tirumalachetti  Radhakrishnayya Chetty, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 452, followed. In the instant case the said premises were admittedly of the value  of  more  than rupees twenty  thousand.   The  school premises were plainly not the subject 873 matter  of the dispute because if that had been so the  case would  have  fallen under clause (a).  On the  contrary  the present  was a case relating to a claim respecting  property of the value of more than rupees twenty thousand.  The  case as such would fall within the ambit of clause (b). [879 C] Surapati  Roy  & Ors. v. Rant Narayan Mukherji  &  Ors.,  50 Indian Appeals 155, relied on. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Jagan Nath Pandurang & Anr. [1972]  3 S.C.R. 929 held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 570 of 1969. From the Judgment and decree dated the 29th September,  1967 of   the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 459 of 1961. D.   P. Uniyal and S. N. Singh, for the appellant. S.C.  Agarwala,  V. J. Francis and S. S.  Bhatnagar,  for respondent nos. 1 and 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA,  J.  A  decree for ejectment from  the  premises  in dispute  and for recovery of Rs. 7,163/12/3 was  awarded  by learned  Additional  Sub Judge Patna in favour  of  the  two plaintiff-respondents,  against the Board of Trustees T.  K. Ghosh’s Academy Patna and other defendants.  On appeal filed by some of the defendants the Patna High Court set aside the decree for ejectment.  The amount for the recovery of  which decree had been awarded by the trial court was also  reduced to  Rs.  3,725/2/-.  The present appeal has  been  filed  on certificate by the Managing Committee T. K. Ghosh’s  Academy and other defendants against the decision of the High Court. The two plaintiff-respondents are the sons of Shri Jadu Nath Palit  who founded in 1876 a school known as T.  K.  Ghosh’s Academy.   The school attracted some of. the  best  students

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and  Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. B. C. Roy, Mr. Hasan Imam  and Mr.  Sachidanand  Sinha  received their  education  in  this school.   The  school was run in premises  which  originally belonged  to one Mr. Boilard.  Shri Jadu Nath died  in  1901 leaving  behind  three  minor sons, two of’  whom  were  the plaintiff-respondents and the third was their brother Dr. K. L.  Palit.  After Jadu Nath’s death, the management  of  the school  was looked after by the sons of Shri T. K. Ghosh  in whose memory the school had been founded.  Shri T. K.  Ghosh was  them  brother-in-law  of Shri Jadu  Nath.   A  Managing Committee  was  formed by the sons of T. K.  Ghosh  for  the management  of the school in 1905 or 1906.   Nearabout  1914 the  management  of the school was taken over by  Shri  Jadu Nath’s  sons.   In 1918-19 them Managing  Committee  of  the school  was  reformed under the directions of the  Board  of Secondary  Education.   On  September 11,  1919  the  school building  was purchased by the three sons of Shri Jadu  Nath from  Mr. Boilarld as per sale deed Ex.C. On July  28,  1930 Dr.  K.  L Palit sold his share in the  school  building  in favour of his two brothers, viz-, the plaintiff-respondents, as per sale deed Ex.Cl. 874 On  August 13, 1950 the two  plaintiff-respondents  executed Deed  of Trust.  Ex.P appointing Rai Bahadur Nirmal  Chandra Ghosh, Retired District and Sessions Judge and six others as trustees  of the school.  The object and the subject  matter of the trust would be clear from the following :               "Whereas  the settlors are the proprietors  of               the  High English School named T.  K.  Ghosh’s               Academy,  new located in a building owned  and               possessed by the settlors situated in  Mahalla               Chowahatta thana Pirbahore district Patna.               And whereas the settlors being desirous of the               continuance of the school and the perpetuation               of  the memory of the person after whom it  is               named  and  the association of same  with  the               name  of the institution, of the retention  in               it of Bengali as a subject of instruction  and               also  as  a medium of instruction  as  far  as               possible   and   also  of   the   improvement,               extension   or  alteration  as   regards   the               standard  and subjects of instruction  in  the               institution as may be considered suitable  for               the  benefit  of  students,  have  decided  to               settle  in  trust for this  purpose  the  said               school  consisting  of  its  name  good   will               together  ’with its funds, furniture,  library               and    other   educational   appliances    and               equipments   as  a   functioning   institution               affiliated  to  the Patna  University  in  the               manner   and  on  the  condition   hereinafter               following.               Now this Deed witnesses as follows               1.In  pursuance of_the said desire of  the               settlors  the settlors do hereby transfer  and               assign unto the trustees the ,,aid High School               T.  K. Ghosh’s Academy with all that  property               consisting  of the funds,  furniture,  library               and  equipments described and detailed in  the               schedule hereto to hold the same upon trust to               fulfil  the object of the settlors and on  the               conditions and with and subject to the  powers               provisions and agreements herein contained."               Clauses  4,  6 9, 10, 11 and 15 of  the  trust               read as under

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             "(4) The trustees will be entitled to nominate               2  (two)  members out of  themselves,  to  the               managing  committee of the school in  addition               to  the  Headmaster who will ex-officio  be  a               member.               (6)At  least  one male descendant  of  Babu               Jadu Nath Palit deceased shall, if  available,               be always a member of the body of trustees.               (9)The  trustees shall find other  premises               for  the location of the school and shift  the               school there within 5 (five) years of the date               of the deed and vacate the present premises to               the settlors.               (10)The  trustees  shall forthwith  start  a               building fund for the school.               875               (11)The  settlors will receive a house  rent               of Rs. 250/per month for the said period of  5               (five) years for the premises now occupied  by               the  school  as owners of  the  premises.  the               settlors  have  agreed that any  surplus  left               over  therefrom,  after  deducting-the  amount               spent on necessary repairs of the house and on               taxes,  ground rent and other  necessary  out-               goings in respect of the premises for the said               period  of  5  (five) years  will  go  as  the               contribution  of the settlors to the  building               fund as   provided in the preceding paragraph,               and the trustees will  be entitled to  receive               directly  from  the school such  surplus   and               deposit it in the said building fund.               (15) All matters and questions relating to the               proprietary rights in the school (exclusive of               the land and buildings where in the school, is               at  present located, which does not from  part               of the trust property) and its properties will               be disposed of by the trustees." It may be stated that the school building initially stood on holding No. 20. In 1951 the building was extended to holding No.  22 also. The upper portion of the building  on  holding No. 22 is used for the headmaster’s residence and the  lower portion for running the classes. According to the plaintiff- respondents, it was agreed that they would be paid a rent of Rs.  37/8/-  for the building on holding No. 22.  The  total rent thus came to Rs. 287/8/- i.e. Rs. 250 for the  building on holding No. 20 and Rs. 3718/- for the building on holding No. 22. It is further the case of the plaintiffs that in  or about  June  1956  it was settled by the  trustees  and  the Managing Committee of the school with  the  consent of  the plaintiffs  that  out of the monthly rent of Rs.  287/8/-  a cash  amount  of  Rs. 190/- would be paid  directly  to  the plaintiffs  and the balance,of Rs. 97/8/- could be  paid  by the  Managing  Committee of the school to the  trustees  for payment  of latrine and water taxes of the municipality  and for  meeting  costs of periodical repairs. As  the  premises were  not vacated within five years of the execution of  the Deed  of  Trust,  the  plaintiff-respondents  after  serving notice  of  demand filed the present suit on July  28,  1959 against  the  Board of Trustees r. K.  Ghosh’s  Academy  and other  defendants.  One  of  the  reliefs  claimed  was  for ejectment  of the defendants from the premises  in  dispute. The other relief claimed was for recovery of Rs.  7,163/12/3 on  account of arrears of rent from August, 1956 till  July, 1959  and  other items, the details of which were  given  in Schedule I to the plaint.

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The suit was contested by defendants No. 2, 3, 7 and 12 in-their capacity as members of the Managing Committee.  The other  defendants, including the trustees, did  not  contest the suit. According to the contesting defendants, there  was no   relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant   between   the plaintiffs  and  T.  K. Ghosh’s  Academy  and  its  Managing Committee. It was also stated that there was no contract  to pay the rent of Rs. 287/8/- per month. The Deed of Trust was stated  by  the  contesting  defendants  to  be  fraudulent, illusory  and  void  document.  According  further  to   the contesting defendants, the school was founded by the  father of  plaintiffs  for the uplift of education and  for  public good  with  no motive to derive any  personal  benefit.  The building was 876 also  stated to have been dedicated by the founder  for  the use of the public. The trial court, as mentioned earlier, decreed the suit.  It was  held  that the Deed of Trust was a  genuine  and  valid document  and  was binding on the school  and  its  Managing Committee.  As regards the existence of the relationship  of landlord and tenant, the trial court held that the  contract of  tenancy  was  evidenced by the Deed  of  Trust  and  was binding upon the parties. In  appeal before the High Court contention was advanced  on behalf  of the contesting defendants that there had  been  a dedication of the school building in favour of the school by the father of the plaintiff-respondents who had founded  the school.   Argument  was further advanced that there  was  no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties  and the  Deed  of,  Trust was not binding  upon  the  contesting defendants.   Contention was also raised that the  suit  for ejectment  was not maintainable unless the tenancy had  been determined  by the giving of a notice under section  106  of the  Transfer of Property Act.  The High Court rejected  the contention  that  there had been dedication  of  the  school building.  Likewise, the contention that there did not arise the relationship of landlord and tenant between the  parties was  rejected.   The  High Court set aside  the  decree  for ejectment because it was of the view that such decree  could be awarded only after determination of the tenancy by giving a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property  Act. The  High Court further reduced the amount for the  recovery of which the decree had been awarded, because it was of  the view  that  certain deductions were permissible out  of  the amounts claimed by the plaintiffs.  In the result the amount for  which  decree  had  been awarded  was  reduced  to  Rs. 3,725/2/-. At  the hearing of the appeal Mr. Agarwal on behalf  of  the plaintiff-respondents has contended that the High Court  was in error in granting a certificate of fitness for appeal  to this  Court  in  favour  of  the  defendant-appellants.   An application has also been filed on behalf of the  plaintiff- respondents for canceling the certificate of fitness granted by  the High Court.  This application has been  resisted  by the appellants. We  may state at the outset that the High Court granted  the certificate of fitness under clauses (a) and (b) of  article 133(1)  of  the Constitution.  Mr. Uniyal on behalf  of  the appellants has frankly stated that the certificate could  be granted only under clause (b) and not under clause (a).   We agree  with  Mr.  Uniyal in this respect,  and  are  of  the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for canceling the certificate of fitness. The  plaintiff-respondents, as would appear from the  resume

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of  facts given above, had prayed for a decree of  ejectment from  the  premises  in  dispute and  for  recovery  of  Rs. 7,163/76,/-.   The  jurisdictional  value of  the  suit  was mentioned to be Rs. 10,613/76/- consisting of the amount  of Rs. 7,163/76 and Rs. 3450 representing 12 months rent at the rate  of  Rs. 287/50.  The present case did not  fall  under clause (a)     of  article  133(1) because it could  not  be said that the amount or  877 value of the subject-matter of the dispute was not less than twenty  thousand rupees.  Question then arises  whether  the defendant-appellants  were  entitled  to  certificate  under clause  (b)  of  article  133(1).   Article  133(1)  at  the relevant time read as under :               "133  (1) An appeal shall lie to  the  Supreme               Court from any judgment, decree or final order               in  a civil proceeding of a High Court in  the               territory   of   India  if  the   High   Court               certifies-               (a)   that the amount or value of the subject-               matter  of the dispute in the court  of  first               instance  and still in dispute on  appeal  was               and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or               such  other  sum as may be specified  in  that               behalf by Parliament by law; or               (b)   that  judgment,  decree or  final  order               involves directly or indirectly some claim  or               question  respecting  property  of  the   like               amount or value; or               (c)   that the case is a fit one for appeal to               the Supreme Court;               and, where the judgment, decree or final order               appealed  from  affirms the  decision  of  the               court immediately below in ,my case other than               a  case referred to in sub-clause (c)  if  the               High  Court further certifies that the  appeal               involves some substantial question of law." It may be stated that there has been a subsequent  amendment of article 133(1) by the Constitution (Thirtieth  Amendment) Act,  1973.  We are, however, in the present case  concerned with the article as it stood before the amendment.   Perusal of  clause (b) of article 133(1) shows that an appeal  shall lie  to this Court from any judgment, decree or final  order in  a  civil proceeding of a High Court if  the  High  Court certifies that the judgment, decree or final order  involves directly  or  indirectly some claim or  question  respecting property  of  the  value of not less  than  twenty  thousand rupees.   It is further necessary that where  the  judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision  of the  court immediately below, the High Court should  certify that  the appeal involves some substantial question of  law. The  judgment of the High Court in the present case  plainly did  not affirm the decision of the trial court because  the High  Court  set  aside the decree for  ejectment  and  also reduced the amount for the recovery of which decree had been awarded  by the trial court.  It is no doubt true  that  the variation of the decree of the trial court was in favour  of the  defendant-appellants  but that circumstance  would  not detract  from the fact that the judgment of the  High  Court was  not  one  of affirmance of the decision  of  the  trial court.  As observed by the Constitution Bench of this  Court in  the  case of Tirumalachetti  Rajaram  v.  Tirumalachetti Radhakrishnayya  Chetty(1), in determining the character  of the  appellate  decree;  we have to look  at  the  appellate decree  taken  in  its  entirety and  compare  it  with  the

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decision of the trial court (1)  [1962] 2 SCR 452. 878 as a whole and decide whether the appellate decree is one of affirmance  or  not.   In this enquiry  the  nature  of  the variation  made  whether it is in favour  of  the  intending appellant or otherwise, would not be relevant. As  regards  the  applicability of  clause  (b)  of  article 133(1), we may observe  that  there is a  vital  distinction between clauses (a) and (b)   of  article  133(1)  and   the areas  covered  by the two clauses are  clearly  demarcated. Clause  (a) speaks of the subject-matter of the dispute  and what  is required by the clause to bring a case  within  its ambit  is that the amount or value of the subject-matter  of the  dispute  in the court of first instance  and  still  in dispute  was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees  or such  other  sum  as  may be specified  in  that  behalf  by Parliament  by law.  As against that, clause (b) of  Article 133(1) makes no mention of the subject-matter of the dispute and  it  is  immaterial for this clause as to  what  is  the amount  or value of the subject-matter in dispute.  What  is essential to invoke clause (b) is that the judgment,  decree or  final order should involve directly or  indirectly  some claim or question respecting property of the amount or value of not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may  be  specified  in that behalf  by  Parliament  by  law. Clause  (b) thus deals with a claim or  question  respecting property.   If  a judgment, decree or final  order  involves claim  or question respecting property and it is shown  that the  property  is of the amount or value of  not  less  than twenty  thousand rupees, the clause would be attracted.   It is  plain from the language of clause (b) that the  property respecting  which  claim  or question  is  involved  in  the judgment, decree or final order is not the subject matter of the dispute, for if that property were the subject matter of the  dispute  the case would fall not under clause  (b)  but under  clause  (a)  of  article  133(1).   It  may  also  be mentioned  that  the  requirement of  clause  (b)  would  be satisfied  if the judgment, decree or final order  involves, not  directly  but even indirectly, some claim  or  question respecting property of the amount or value of not less  than twenty thousand rupees. To  attract  the application of article 133 (1)  (b)  it  is essential  that  there must be-omitting  from  consideration other conditions not material a judgment involving  directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property  of an amount or value not less than Rs.20,000. The variation in the  language  used  in clauses (a) and  (b)of  article  133 pointedly  highlights  the  conditions  which  attract   the application  of the two clauses.  Under clause (a)  what  is decisive is the amount or value of the subject-matter in the court of first instance and "stilt in dispute" appeal to the Supreme  Court : under clause (b) it is the amount or  value of  the  property respecting which a claim  or  question  is involved  in  the judgment sought to be  appealed  from  The expression ’property" is not defined in the Code, but having regard  to  the  use of the  expression  "amount"  it  would apparently  include  money.  ’But  the  property  respecting which  the  claim  or question arises must  be  property  in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute. If in a proposed appeal there is no claim or question raised respecting  property other than the  subject-matter,  clause (a) will apply : if there is involved in the appeal a  claim or question respecting property of  879

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an  amount or value not less than Rs. 20,000 in addition  to or  other than the subject-matter of the dispute clause  (b) will   apply   (see   Chhitarmal  v.   M/s   Shah   Pannalal Chandulal(1). Keeping the above principles in view, we have no doubt  that the ,case of the appellant falls under clause (b) of article 133(1).   As  would appear from the resume  of  facts  given earlier, the case of the plaintiffs was that the  defendants were  liable  to  pay rent for being in  occupation  of  the school   premises.   As  against  that,  the  case  of   the defendant-appellants  was that they were entitled to  occupy the said premises for carrying on the school without payment of rent.  It is manifest that the judgment and decree of the High  Court as well as the trial court involved a  claim  or question respecting the school premises.  The said  premises are  admittedly  of  the value of more  than  rupees  twenty thousand.  The school premises were plainly not the subject- matter of the dispute because if that had been so, the  case would  have, fallen under clause (a).  On the contrary,  the present  was a case relating to a claim respecting  property of the value of more than rupees twenty thousand.  The  case as  such would fall within the admit of clause (b).  We  may in  this  context  refer  to  a  decision  of  the  Judicial Committee in the case of Surapati Roy & Ors. v. Ram  Narayan Mukherji  & Ors.(2). Question which arose in that  case  was regarding the validity of a certificate granted by the  High Court  under  section 110 of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure. Though  the  rent  claimed in the suits was  less  than  Rs. 10,000  the  High Court granted a  certificate  of  fitness. Objection was taken before the Judicial Committee  regarding the  validity  of the certificate, on the  ground  that  the subject-matter was of a value of less than, Rs. 10,000.  The objection  was  repelled by the Judicial  Committee  in  the following words : "The  subject  matter  in dispute  relates  to  a  recurring liability and is in respect of a property considerably above the appealable value.  The certificate in the  circumstances is quite in order." Reference  has been made by Mr. Agarwal to the  decision  of this Court in the case of Bombay Gay Co. Ltd. v. Jagan  Nath Pandurang  &  Anr.(3).  The respondent in  that  case  filed applications  under  the  Payment  of  Wages  Act   claiming overtime  wages  for the period 1957 to 1958 and  wages  for weekly  off days for the period 1962 to 1963, The  appellant filed appeal to this Court against the judgment of the  High Court  setting  aside the order of the  appellate  authority holding  the claim to be time-barred.  The appeal was  filed on  the basis of a certificate under article 133(1)(b).   It was held that the certificate issued by the High Court under article  133(1)(b)  was not proper.  Question was  posed  in that  case that the, certificate could be granted under  the above  clause  as there was a recurring liability  which  if calculated for subsequent years would come to Rs. 20,000  or more.  This Court was not impressed with the above argument. The said case (1)  [1965] 2 SCR 751. (2)  50 Indian Appeals 155. (3)  [1972] 3 SCR 929. 3-84SuPCI/75 880 cannot  be of much assistance to  the  plaintiff-respondents because  in  that  case  there  was  no  claim  or  question respecting  property of the value of more than  Rs.  20,000. In  he present case we have both the elements, namely, of  a recurring claim and of a claim in respect of property of the

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value of more than Rs. 20,000.  We, therefore, hold that the appeal  is  maintainable  under  article  133(1)(b)  of  the Constitution.   The  application  for  cancellation  of  the certificate  of  fitness  granted  by  the  High  Court   is dismissed. Coming  to the merits of the appeal, we find that  till  the execution  of  the  Deed of Trust on August  13,  1950,  the school  in  question was treated as  a  proprietary  school. This  is clear from the inspection note dated  December  10, 1947  of  the  Inspector  of  Schools.   According  to   the inspection  note, this institution was a proprietary  school and  the proprietors made good any deficit that  accrued  in running  the  school efficiently.  In the  annual  statement dated January 8, 1950 relating to the school which had to be furnished  by  the  school  authorities  to  the  Board   of Secondary  Education, it was mentioned that the  proprietors of  the  school were the plaintiff-respondents.  It  was  by Deed  of  Trust dated August 13, 1950  that  the  plaintiff- respondents   transferred  and  assigned  to  the   trustees property  consisting  of the funds, furniture,  library  and equipment  described  and detailed in the  Schedule  to  the Trust Deed.  The Trust Deed, however, made it clear that the land  and  building wherein the school was located  did  not form part of the trust property.  As the school did not  own any  building of its own and was being run in  the  building belonging  to the plaintiff-respondents, it was resolved  by the trustees that efforts be made for acquiring land for the school building and for collecting and depositing funds  for the  construction of the building.  This is clear  from  the resolutions  passed in the meetings of the trustees held  on May 21, 1951 and April 20, 1952. It  has  been  argued on behalf of the  appellants  that  no liability  for  payment  of rent can be  fastened  upon  the defendants  and that the High Court was in error in  holding to the contrary.  There is, in our opinion, no force in this contention.  It has been proved upon the material on  record that  the  Managing  Committee has  been  receiving  deficit grants  from  the  Government on  the  basis  of  statements showing  house rent payable by it for school building to  be Rs. 250 plus Rs. 37.50 per month.  In view of the fact  that the  school  receives  grant  from  the  Government  on  the representation  that an amount of Rs. 287.50 has to be  paid on account of house rent, it hardly lies in the mouth of the appellants  to  assert that there is no  liability  for  the payment  of  rent for the school building.  In  addition  to that, we find that the Managing  881 Committee  in its resolution passed in the meeting  held  on December 23, 1954 admitted that an amount of Rs. 287.50  was to  be  paid  as  rent to the  proprietors  for  the  school premises  including  the portion in the  occupation  of  the headmaster.  The fact that rent of Rs. 287.50 was agreed  to be  paid for the school buildings was also mentioned in  the audit  report  relating to the school for the  period  April 1956 to October 1956. In  view of the above material, we find no cogent ground  to interfere  with the judgment of the High  Court  maintaining decree for recovery of money to the extent of Rs.  3,725/2/- in   favour  of  the  plaintiff-respondents.    The   appeal consequently   fails   and   is  dismissed,   but   in   the circumstances without costs. P.B.R                     Appeal dismissed. 882

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