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PETITIONER: MAN SINGH AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1985

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. TULZAPURKAR, V.D. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR 1737            1985 SCR  Supl. (2) 662  1985 SCC  (4) 146        1985 SCALE  (2)367  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC 648  (4,8)

ACT:      Constitution of India 1950, Articles 14, 19(1)(g) & 21.      Punjab Cycle  Rickshaws (Regulation  of  licence)  Act, 1976 Sections 3 & 5.      Cycle Rickshaw  - Licence  - Grant  of -  Vehicle to be plied by owner himself - Whether - Valid - Constitutional.      Statutory Interpretation.      Validity of  statute - Determination of - Duty of court Consider the  degree of  encroachment of  citizen’s right  - Reasonableness   can    be   determined    on    surrounding circumstances and contemporaneous legislation.

HEADNOTE:      The  Petitioners   in  the   Writ  Petition  ply  cycle rickshaws which  they hire  for the  day from  the owners of those vehicles.  They carry on that activity for about eight months in  the year  and then  return to the region to which they belong.  Por the  hire of  cycle rickshaws they pay the owners a  certain sum  for the  day retaining the balance of the day’s  income to  themselves. They are not in a position to purchase  any  cycle  rickshaws.  Unless  they  hire  the vehicles they  cannot carry  on that  activity. Oppressed by poverty this  arrangement of  cycle rickshaw  hire has  been resorted to  with the  owners who  through such exploitation obtain an  unduly handsome  return on  the paltry investment made in the purchase of the cycle rickshaws.      The  Punjab  Legislature,  enacted  the  Punjab’  Cycle Rickshaws(Regulation of  Licence) Act, 1976 and 8. 3 thereof provided that  no owner of a cycle rickshaw shall be granted any licence in respect of his cycle rickshaw nor his licence shall be  renewed  by  any  municipal  authority  after  the commencement of  the Act, unless the cycle-rickshaw is to be plied by such owner himself. Sec. 5 663 of the Act provided for penal punishment of any person found to A  be in possession of a cycle-rickshaw without a licence conforming to the provisions of the Act.      The  constitutional   validity  of   the  Punjab  Cycle Rickshaw (Regulation  of Licence)  Act, 1976  was challenged

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and this  Court In  M/S Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union v. State of Punjab, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 366, framed the following scheme:      (a)  Every   rickshaw  puller   in  Amritsar  or  other municipality who  had been  a licence within one year of the coming into  force of  the Act shall be entitled to apply to the  Municipal  Commissioner  for  a  certificate  or  other document to  the effect  that he  had  been  a  licence  for rickshaw pulling.      (b) The  Municipal Commissioner will verify the records and will  grant the  necessary certificate or other document within one month from the date of the application.      (c)  On   receipt  of  the  Municipal  certificate  the rickshaw  puller   will  apply   to  the   Credit  Guarantee Corporation of  India  (Small  Loans)  under  the  Guarantee scheme of 1971 for advance of a loan upto Rs. 900.      (d) The  loan amount  shall be  repaid by  the rickshaw puller in  15 monthly  instalments.  If  there  are  delayed payments of  instalments of  loan, higher  rate of  interest will be recoverable.      (e) When  the rickshaw  pullers during the agricultural season go to work in their fields, they shall nominate other rickshaw pullers  without employment  to ply  the  rickshaws during that season. The Municipal Commissioner, if satisfied that the  nomination made is bona fide will issue licence to such pullers,  or nominees of the licensed rickshaw pullers, in the agricultural season.      The petitioners  in their Writ Petitions contended that the 1976  enactment resulted in making their conditions much worse, for  whereas formerly  they could  at least  ply  the cycle rickshaws  on hiring  them from  the owners for a sum, they were  unable to  do so  now, especially as they did not have the funds, nor possessed the arrangements for obtaining a loan  for the  purpose, and  as they  were  not  permanent residents of  Amritsar, no  one was prepared to stand sure q for the  amount they sought to borrow from the Banks. It was further contended that this scheme of this 664 Court in M/S Azad Rickshaw Puller’s Union v. State of Punjab had  not   been  implemented   by  the   Amritsar  Municipal Corporation and  consequently the  provisions of  the Punjab Act of  1976 had  continued to operate with unbated severity to their  detriment, and  that it be declared ultra vires as an unconstitutional violation of the fundamental right under sub.cl.(g) of  cl.(l) of  Article 19  of the Constitution to carry on  occupation or  business. As a  similar restriction is not  imposed on  taxi drivers,  cart load carriers, three wheeler auto  rickshaw drivers and other vehicles plying for public hire  the Punjab  Act violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by  Articles 14  and 16  of the Constitution, The scheme propounded  by  the  Court  has  failed  because  the Municipal Administration  did not  make any  real attempt to implement it.      The Writ  Petitions  were  contested  by  the  Amritsar municipal Corporation.  It was  contended that the cost of a cycle rickshaw being about Rs.1200 a person with substantial financial  resources   would  purchase  a  number  of  cycle rickshaws and hire them out to rickshaw pullers at Rs. 8 per day irrespective  of  the  income  earned  by  the  rickshaw puller, thus  earning over  150 per  cent interest  over his investment. To  protect poor and needy rickshaw pullers from such exploitation, the Legislature enacted the Punjab Act of 1976 to  enable rickshaw  pullers to  escape the clutches of middlemen. Between the enforcement of the Punjab Act and the formulation of  the scheme  in Azad  Rickshaw Puller’s Union the Corporation  renewed more than nine thousand licences in

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favour of individual rickshaw pullers who were owners of the rickshaws plied  by them.  No limit  on the  number of cycle rickshaws to  be plied  had been  imposed by  the  Municipal Corporation.      On the  question: (l) Whether the Punjab Act of 1976 is an instance  of incomplete  legislation and cannot serve the purpose for  which  it  Was  intended  and  because  of  the prohibitions  and   restraints  incorporated   in   it,   it constitutes an  unreasonable restriction  on the fundamental rights guaranteed  under sub-cl.(g)  of cl.(l) of Art. 19 of the constitution and also violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (2) Whether the scheme framed by this Court in Azad  Rickshaw   Puller’s  Union   is  incapable  of  proper implementation, and therefore of no legal effect.      Dismissing the Writ Petitions, ^      HELD: 1.  (a) The Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act  1976 cannot  be regarded  as  an  unreasonable restriction on  the fundamental  rights of  the  petitioners under Art.  21 read with sub-cl.(g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution. [680 A] 665      (b) The  Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act A  of 1976 regulates the issue of licenses in respect of cycle rickshaws plying in any Municipal area in the State of Punjab. It  essentially provides  that no  owner of  a cycle rickshaw will  be granted  a license in respect of his cycle rickshaw unless  the vehicle  is plied by the owner himself. The intention  of the  statute is  to ensure  the plying  of cycle rickshaws  by rickshaw  pullers who  are owners of the vehicle thus eliminating the middleman who owns the vehicle. [675 E]      (c) The  true test of the validity of a statute must be the  effect   and  consequence   of  its  operation  on  the fundamental right  of the citizen. The object underlying the legislation  embodies  the  intent  of  the  legislature  in enacting it,  but in  construing its validity in the context of a  citizen’s fundamental  right the  question before  the Court always  must be  whether its impact on the fundamental right can  be regarded  as a  reasonable restriction  on the exercise  of   the  right.   The  focal  point  during  such examination is  the fundamental  right, and  the duty of the Court must  be to  consider the  quality and  degree of  the encroachment made  by the  operation of  the statute  on the citizen’s exercise of that right. [676 D-E]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, R.C. Cooper  v. Union of India, [1970] 3 S.C.R.53C, referred to.      In the instant case, 8. 3 of the Punjab Act of 1976 has the effect  of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply the  rickshaw as  owner of the vehicle and thereby to be the full  owner of  the income earned by him. No longer will he be  obliged to  pare with  an appreciable portion of that income in favour of another who owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is  a beneficial  legislation bringing  directly home to the rickshaw  puller the entire fruit of his daily toil. The enactment is  intended as  a social  welfare measure against the exploitation  of the  poor and  unemployed by  rapacious cycle rickshaw  owners  who  by  reason  of  their  superior financial resources  fatten their  wealth from  the  sweated toil of  rickshaw pullers.  The  legislation  constitutes  a reasonable restriction  on the right of such rickshaw owners to carry  on the  business  of  hiring  out  cycle  rickshaw inasmuch as  the  exercise  of  the  right  ld  excluded  by legislation designed  for the economic and social welfare of

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rickshaw pullers, who constitute a significant sector of the people, a sector 80 pressed by poverty and straitened by the economic misery of their situation that the 666 guarantee of  their full  day’s wages  to them  seems  amply justified. [676 F-677 B]      2.(a) The  scheme framed by this Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union  is a  good scheme, capable of implementation, and productive  of the  objective for which it was designed. If it has not been successfully implemented so far, it is in the main  largely on  account of  circumstances which  could have been  avoided. Inherently  there is  no feature  in the scheme which  operates against  its  effectiveness.  If  the scheme has not succeeded as was intended by the Court, it is largely because  appropriate action  was not  taken  by  the parties concerned to implement it. [680 D]      (b) It  is permissible to judge the reasonableness of a law on the basis of the surrounding circumstances as well as of contemporaneous  legislation enacted  as part of a single scheme. [678 D]      The Lord  Krishna Sugar  Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Anr. [1960] 1 S.C.R. 39, referred to.      (c) The  Punjab Act  confers on the State Government by 8. 7, power to frame appropriate rules in support of and for the furtherance  of the  object of  the Act. In the event of the scheme  being altered  or modified  by its  authors to a degree incompatible  with the  true operation and success of the Punjab Act, the situation can always be met by the State Government framing  suitable rules under 8 7 of the Act. The State Government is not only empowered to do so; it is under an obligation  to frame  rules appropriate to the successful implementation of the legislative goal. [679 F]      (d) The  Municipal  Corporation  should  determine  the maximum number  of licenses  which  should  be  granted  for plying cycle  rickshaws  within  its  jurisdictions  limits, keeping in  mind the  needs of  the travelling public on the one hand  and the  danger of uneconomic plying on the other. Every rickshaw  puller proposing  to take  advantage of  the scheme should  apply to  the Municipal  Commissioner  for  a certificate, the  period within  which such applications may be filed  being certified  by the Municipal Corporation from time to  time. All  the applications will be consider ed, in the serial  order in  which they are received, for the grant of certificate on the basis of which the rickshaw puller may take further  steps envisaged in the scheme for the grant of financial 667 assistance enabling  him to  purchase a  cycle rickshaw  for plying A  by him.  The issue  of the  certificate  shall  be subject to the following conditions: [680 H-681 B]      1. Each  certificate shall be granted in respect of one cycle rickshaw only. [681 C]      2. The  number of  certificates issued shall / t exceed the maximum,  if any,  fixed by the Municipal Corporation as the total  strength of  the cycle  rickshaws allowed  to ply within its jurisdictional limits. [681 D]      3. No  person shall  be  granted  more  than  one  such certificate. [681 E]      4. Preference  shall be given in the matter of granting certificates to those rickshaw pullers who had plied a cycle rickshaw for one year before the Punjab Act came into force. [681 E] D

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JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  :  Writ  Petition  (Civil)  Nos. 57286308 of 1982.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      V.M. Tarkunde and S.M. Ashri for the Petitioners.      Naunit Lal and S.K. Bagga for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      PATHAK, J.  The petitioners in these writ petitions ply cycle rickshaws in Amritsar which they hire for the day from the owners of those vehicles. Most of the petitioners belong to  other  districts  of  Punjab  and  also  come  from  the neighbouring States  of Jammu  and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar  Pradesh. They  carry on  that activity  for about eight months  in the  year and then return to the regions to which they  belong. They  observe this  practice year  after year. For  the hire of cycle rickshaws they pay the owners a certain sum  for the day, retaining the balance of the day’s income to  themselves. It is alleged by the petitioners that they are  not in  a position to purchase any cycle rickshaws and that  unless they hire the vehicles they cannot carry on that activity.      Over the years there has been considerable agitation in the State  of Punjab  against the  practice of the owners of cycle 668 rickshaws hiring people of the poorest stratum in society to ply the  cycle rickshaws for public passenger traffic and to charge them  for each  day’s use of the vehicles. It is said that oppressed  by their  poverty the  petitioners and those similarly placed  are obliged to enter into this arrangement with cycle  rickshaw owners,  who through  such exploitation are able quite often to obtain, an unduly handsome return on the paltry  investment made  in the  purchase of  the  cycle rickshaws.  The   agitation  led  the  State  Government  to consider  measures   for  enabling   the  pullers  of  cycle rickshaws to  extricate themselves  from such  exploitation, and it was thought desirable that the cycle rickshaw pullers should own  their own  vehicles, and  the  State  Government should arrange  interest free  loans for them to enable them to purchase  cycle rickshaws.  With this object in mind, the Punjab  Legislature   enacted  the  Punjab  Cycle  Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act. 1976.      S. 3 provided:           Licence for  cycle-rickshaws.- (1) Notwithstanding           anything contained  to the  contrary in the Punjab           Municipal Act,  1911, or any rule or order or bye-           law made  thereunder or any other law for the time           being in force, no owner of a cycle-rickshaw shall           be granted  any licence  in respect  of his cycle-           rickshaw nor  his licence  shall be renewed by any           municipal authority after the commencement of this           Act unless  the cycle-rickshaw  is to  be plied by           such owner himself.’ And s. 5 declared:-           "Penalties.- (1) Any person who is found to be, in           possession of  a cycle-rickshaw  without a licence           conforming to  the provisions of this Act or plies           or causes  it to  be plied  by a  person without a           valid driver’s  licence issued  under any  law for           the time  being in  force or plies or causes to be           plied a  cycle-rickshaw not  meant to be plied for           hire without  painting the  body thereof in yellow           shall be  punishable with  imprisonment which  may           extend to three months.      The  petitioners  considered  that  the  enactment  had

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resulted in  making their  conditions much worse for whereas formerly they  could at  least ply  the  cycle-rickshaws  or hiring them from the 669 owners for  a sum,  they were unable to do so now, specially as  they   did  not   have  the  funds,  nor  possessed  the arrangements for  obtaining a  loan for  the purpose. It was pointed out  that as  the  petitioners  were  not  permanent residents of  Amritsar, no  one was prepared to stand surety for the  amount which  they sought to borrow form the Banks, that inasmuch  as the  Banks at  Amritsar had been unable to recover about  eighty per  cent of the amount loaned by them they had  decided to  deny this  facility to  cycle-rickshaw pullers, and that, therefore, they were not in a position to purchase cycle-rickshaw.  In the  circumstances, a number of cycle rickshaw  pullers filed Civil Writ Petition No. 563 of 1979 Nanak  Chand &  Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. and Writ Petition No. 839 of 1979 Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd.) Ch. Town Hall, Amritsar & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors. [1981] 1 SCR 366.      Meanwhile,  and   to  the   same  end,   the  Municipal Corporation of Delhi had amended the Cycle-rickshaw Bye-laws of 1960. After amendment, bye-law 3 read as follows:-           "3 (1)  No person  shall keep  or ply  for hire  a           cycle rickshaw  in Delhi  unless he himself is the           owner thereof  and holds a licence granted in that           behalf by  the Commissioner  on payment of the fee           that may,  from time  to time, be fixed under sub-           section (2) of section 430 provided that no person           shall be granted more than one such licence-           (2) No  person shall  drive a  cycle rickshaw  for           hire unless  he holds a driving licence granted in           that behalf  by the Commissioner on payment of the           fee that  may, from  time to  time be  fixed under           sub-section (2) of Section 430. The bye-laws  framed by the Delhi Municipal Corporation were challenged by  cycle rickshaw  pullers in  Writ Petition No. 841 of  1980 Nanhu  & Ors.  v. Delhi  Administration &  Ors. [1981] 1 SCR 373.      The two  Writ Petitions  Nos. 563 and 839 of 1979 filed by the  cycle rickshaw  pullers of Amritsar were disposed of by this  Court on August 5, 1980 by a judgement in which the Court  decided  not  to  enter  into  the  question  of  the constitutional validity  of  the  Punjab  Act  but,  on  the contrary, to  frame a  scheme in  furtherance of the Act and for the purpose of giving effect to it. Likewise 670 on the  same day  this Court disposed of Writ Petitions Nos. 841 of 1980 and 728 of 1980 pertaining to the cycle rickshaw pullers of  Delhi, and  the judgment  proceeded on  the same lines as in Amritsar Writ Petitions.      The scheme  propounded by  the Court  in Azad  Rickshaw puller Union  (supra) was  intended to  be  a  self-working, specific  scheme   which  makes  the  statutory  ban  not  a negative, self-defeating  interdict, but a positive economic manumission ,  and to  apply to  the entire State of Punjab. Its principle features may be set forth here.      1.   Every rickshaw  puller who  had been a licensee in the Amritsar  or other  municipality within  one year of the coming into  force of  the  Punjab  Act  of  1976  would  be entitled to  apply to  the Municipal Commissioner within one month from  the date  of the judgment (August 5, 1980) for a certificate testifying that he had held a  licence for rickshaw pulling within that period. The Municipal Commissioner  would, after  verification from  the

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records, grant  the certificate within one / nth of the date of application,  taking a  liberal attitude in the matter of issuing the certificate.      2.   On receipt  of the  certificate or  other document the rickshaw  puller could  apply to  the  Credit  Guarantee Corporation of  India  (Small  Loans)  under  the  Guarantee Scheme  of   1971,  requesting   the  Corporation  to  stand guarantee to  the Punjab  National Bank  or other.  mutually agreed upon  schedule bank for advance of a loan upto Rs.900 (or for  a larger  sum if  the price of a cycle rickshaw was more than Rs.900).      3.   The rickshaw  puller would  deposit a sum of Rs.50 with the  Bank as  a condition  of eligibility for obtaining the loan, and the balance of the loan would be guaranteed by the  aforesaid   Corporation.  Upon   fulfillment  of  those conditions, the  Bank would advance the sum required for the purchase of  a cycle  rickshaw to the manufacturer or vendor indicated by the rickshaw puller.      4.   Upon taking  delivery of  the cycle  rickshaw  and producing before  the Bank  the voucher  evidencing purchase and  delivery  along  with  the  rickshaw,  if  needed,  for physical  verification   within  one  week  of  taking  such delivery, and  thereafter whenever  directed,  the  rickshaw puller would execute the necessary documents required by the Bank in  order to  hypothecate the  vehicle in favour of the Bank. 671      5.   The rate  of  interest  payable  by  the  rickshaw puller to  A the Bank would be governed by the Scheme framed by the State Government for loans to rickshaw pullers.      6.   The loan would be repaid by the rickshaw puller in 15 monthly  instalments. If  payment of  the instalments  is delay-ed, higher  rates of  interest would be recoverable in accordance with  the  1971  scheme.  In  the  event  of  the instalment being  duly paid,  the Government would reimburse the rickshaw puller with the total amount of interest.      7.   Some further  facilities for  the rickshaw pullers would be  included within  the Scheme.  For example: (1) The Rickshaw Puller Union would be permitted by the Municipality to set  up and run a workshop for repair and allied work and a service  station for the cycle rickshaws. Sufficient place would be  allowed in suitable places for rickshaw stands and for the  safe  keeping  of  rickshaws  subject  to  moderate charges.  (2)  Where  during  the  agricultural  season  and rickshaw puller  nominated other  unemployed persons  to ply the rickshaws during that season the Municipal Commissioner, on satisfaction  that the  nomination was  made  bona  fide, would issue licences to the nominees for the duration of the agricultural season.      8.   If group  insurance of  the life  of the  rickshaw pullers and  of their  rickshaws was  feasible the Municipal Commissioner would  prepare  a  scheme  in  that  behalf  in consultation with the Rickshaw Puller Unions.      9.   Likewise, the  Municipal Commissioner  would  also draw up  a project whereby cycle rickshaws would be replaced by scooters  in  successive  phases  so  that  the  rickshaw pullers could ultimately become scooter drivers owning their own scooters.      The scheme  formulated by  the Court  in Nanhu  &  Ors. (supra) for  the Delhi  Cycle Rickshaw pullers contained the same  features.  The  Delhi  Administration  had  imposed  a ceiling on  the total  number of cycle rickshaws permissible on the  road within  its   territory, and the Court directed the  Delhi   Administration  to   consider  applications  by rickshaw pullers  for licenses  on their  merits,  including

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consideration of  the period during which the applicants had carried on such activity. In 1982 the present writ petitions were filed by a number of rickshaw pullers of Amritsar, who complained that the scheme 672 propounded by  this Court  had not  been implemented  by the Amrtisar  Municipal   Corporation  and  in  the  result  the provisions of  the Punjab  Act  of  1976  had  continued  to operate with unabated severity to their detriment. They pray that  the   Punjab  Act   be  declared  ultra  vires  as  an unconstitutional violation  of their fundamental right under sub-cl. (g)  of cl. (1) of Article 19 of the constitution to carry on  their occupation  or business.  They also  contend that as  a  similar  restriction  is  not  imposed  on  taxi drivers, cart  load carriers,  three  wheeler  auto-rickshaw drivers and other vehicles plying for public hire the Punjab Act violates  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  petitioners guaranteed by  Articles 14  and 16  of the  constitution. In this connection  they  also  point  out  that  20,000  cycle rickshaws are  being allowed  to  ply  in  Ahmedabad,  Agra, Kanpur, Varanasi,  Patna, Calcutta and Nagpur, cities with a population not  less than  that  of  Amritsar,  by  rickshaw pullers who  do not  own the  vehicles plied  by  them.  The petitioners say  that the Scheme propounded by the court has failed because the Municipal Administration did not make any real attempt to implement it.      In opposing  the writ  petitions the Amritsar Municipal Corporation affirms that the cost of a cycle rickshaws being about Rs.1200  a person with substantial financial resources would purchase a number of cycle rickshaws and hire them out to rickshaw  pullers at  Rs.8 per  day irrespective  of  the income earned  by the rickshaw puller, thus earning over 150 per cent  interest over  his investment  after  taking  into account expenditure  incurred in  petty repairs.  To protect poor and  needy rickshaw  pullers from such exploitation the Punjab Legislature  ’had enacted the aforesaid Punjab Act of 1976 to  enable rickshaw pullers to escape from the clutches Of such middle-men. lt was asserted that with the Punjab Act coming into  force a  large number  of rickshaw  pullers had taken advantage  of the  Act and  purchased their  own cycle rickshaws under  the Punjab  Government Scheme  by  securing loans from  the Banks. It seems that between the enforcement of the  Punjab Act and the formulation of the scheme by this Court in  Azad Rickshaw  Pullers Union  (supra) the Amritsar Municipal Corporation  had already  renewed more  than  nine thousand licences  in favour of individual rickshaw pullers, who were  owners of the rickshaws plied by them. No limit on the number  of cycle  rickshaws to be plied had been imposed by the  Municipal Corporation.  According  to  the  Amritsar Municipal Corporation the individual rickshaw pullers failed to apply  to the  Municipal Corporation  for  the  requisite certificates enabling  them under  the Scheme  to apply to a schedule Banks for a loan. It 673 transpires, however,  that the  Azad Rickshaw  Pullers Union deposited  1170   applications,  purporting   to   be   from individual rickshaw  pullers, with  the  Amritsar  Municipal Corporation for certificates in accordance with the terms of the Scheme and this, it was said, was done between the first week of  August, 1980 and the first week of September, 1980. It is alleged by the petitioner that these applications have remained pending  with the  Municipal Corporation ever since and no  certificate has  yet been  issued pursuant to any of those applications.  The material  on the  record,  however, discloses  that   on  September   16,  1980   the  Municipal

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Corporation wrote  to the Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union asking it to  direct  the  individual  applicants  to  furnish  the license numbers  of the  previous rickshaw  driving licenses issued within  one year  of the  coming into  force  of  the Punjab  Act  of  1976  in  order  to  enable  the  Municipal Corporation to  verify from  its records that the respective applicants were  entitled to  the certificate. The Municipal Corporation has  stated on  affidavit  that  the  names  and addresses of  the  applicants  set  forth  in  many  of  the applications were  illegible, some  of them  were  not  even signed or bore the impression of the applicant’s thumb mark, that  some   of  the  applications  had  been  submitted  in duplicate or  triplicate in  order to  obtain more  than one certificate  for   the  same   applicant,   that   all   the applications were  made on  the printed  form  of  the  Azad Rickshaw Pullers  Union, and  in the circumstances it became necessary for the Municipal Corporation to ask that Union to direct the  applicants to  furnish the  license  numbers  of their rickshaw  driving licenses  80 that  the  certificates could be  issued without  delay. It  is pointed out that the said Union  wrote back on October 3, 1980 that as it had not been possible  for the  rickshaw pullers to preserve the old licenses they could only make a statement that they had been plying rickshaws  in the  past and the Municipal Corporation should verify from its records whether the applications were in order. It is stated that none of the applicants presented himself  nor   produced  any   licenses  or  License  number thereafter. The  Municipal Corporation  wrote on December l, 1980 again  to the  said Union  for the information required from the applicants 80 that further action could be taken in the matter.  It is  said that  the thing  was  done  by  the applicants or by the said Union and ultimately the Municipal Corporation, after  waiting for  a considerable  time for  a response from  the applicants,  decided to  attempt to trace out the  names of  the applicants  from its old records. The task, it appears, took a considerable time, and according to the Municipal  Corporation it  was hampered by the fact that the names  and addresses  of the applicants were not clearly legible on the 674 applications  and   in  some   cases  the   addresses   were incomplete.   The    Municipal   Corporation   affirm   that notwithstanding the  lack of cooperation from the applicants it was  able to  prepare as  many  as  785  certificates  by November 22,  1983 and a letter was written by the Municipal Corporation to  the said  Union  asking  the  applicants  to collect their  certificates. It  is alleged that none of the applicants turned up. According to the Municipal Corporation the applicants are merely pawns in the hands of the previous owners of  the cycle  rickshaws and are being manipulated by them.      It also appears that the Municipal Corporation received a letter  dated September  1, 1980  from the  Azad  Rickshaw Pullers Union  for permission  to  use  the  rickshaw  stand already situate  at the  General Bus  Stand, Amritsar  as  a rickshaw repairing  workshop. There  was  a  further  letter dated September 17, 1980 from the Azad Rickshaw Puller Union for allotment of land for rickshaw sheds and rickshaw stands to enable  the rickshaw  pullers to  keep their rickshaws in safe custody  during their  leisure  hours  and  during  the night. The allotment of land was requested in five different localities of  the city  80 that  a corresponding  number of sheds could be raised, the land required for each shed being 10,000 square  meters. On  October  4,  1980  the  Municipal Corporation replied  that there  was no  vacant land  at the

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places mentioned  by the  said Union  and that  land at some other suitable  places may  be suggested.  By a letter dated December 1, 1980 the Municipal Corporation reminded the said Union  that   it  should   suggest  alternative  places  for providing sheds  for  the  rickshaws.  It  is  alleged  that thereafter there was no reply. There are other affidavits on the records,  some  of  them  having  been  filed  by  other rickshaw  puller  Unions  of  Amritsar  alleging  that  some rickshaw pullers  had already  availed of the benefit of the Scheme propounded by this Court and were plying rickshaws on loans taken  from the Banks. Then there are applications for intervention by  Rickshaw Pullers  Union belonging  to other Municipalities in  Punjab which  suggest that  the Municipal Committee concerned,  purporting to  act  under  the  Scheme propounded by  this Court,  have entered  upon a  course  of rampant corruption,  granting a  number of certificates to a single applicant  behind whom  stand the old rickshaw owners who are  thus perverting  the scheme  for their  own  greedy ends. In  other words,  the  original  rickshaw  owners  are attempting, through  false applications  made in the name of fictitious persons,  to secure certificates enabling them to put a  number of  vehicles on  the road.  Further affidavits have been  filed in  support of the writ petition testifying to  the   difficulty  in  obtaining  certificates  from  the Municipal Corporation and there 675 after loans  from the  Banks and  to  the  impossibility  of plying Rickshaws  without  proper  arrangements  for  safely parking them  for the  night. There  are allegations on both sides, the  petitioners being  accused of having been set up by the  original owners of the vehicles in order to have the Punjab Act of 1976 struck down by the Court and on the other side   the    Municipal   Corporation   being   accused   of unwillingness to work the Scheme propounded by the Court.      Two questions arise before us. The first is whether the Punjab Act  of 1976 is an instance of incomplete legislation and cannot  serve the  purpose for which it was intended and in  the  circumstances,  because  of  the  prohibitions  and restraints   incorporated   in   it,   it   constitutes   an unreasonable restriction  on the  fundamental rights  of the petitioners guaranteed  under sub-cl.(g) of cl.(l) of Art.19 of the  Constitution and also violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  The second question is whether the scheme framed by  this Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (supra) is incapable  of proper  implementation, and therefore of no legal effect.      The Punjab  Act of 1976 regulates the issue of licenses in respect  of cycle  rickshaws plying in any municipal area in the State of Punjab. It contains very few provisions, and essentially provides  that no owner of a cycle rickshaw will be granted a license in respect Of his cycle rickshaw unless the vehicle  is plied by the owner himself. She intention of the statute  is to  ensure the  plying of cycle rickshaws by rickshaw  pullers  who  are  owners  of  the  vehicle,  thus eliminating the middlemen who owns the vehicle.      The petitioners  contend that  8.3 o  the  Punjab  Act constitutes an unreasonable restriction on their fundamental right under  sub-cl.(g) of  clause (1)  of Article 19 of the Constitution to  carry on  their occupation  of plying cycle rickshaws because  the exercise  of that right has been mate dependent upon  their owning  the cycle  rickshaws piled  by them. It  is urged  that the  constitutional validity of the impugned legislation  cannot be sustained on the basis of an administrative scheme  which has  not been sanctioned by it, and there  is nothing in the Punjab Act itself which enables

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rickshaw pullers  to acquire  proprietary  rights  in  cycle rickshaws plied  by them.  It is urged that while the object of the  statute has been expressed in 8.3 of the Punjab Act, there is nothing in the Act which provides the machinery for achieving that  object. It is not sufficient, it is said, to provide that 676 the rickshaw  puller should  own the cycle rickshaw which he plies. The  statute should  have provided the mechanics of a system which  would have  enabled rickshaw pullers, in their abject poverty,  to become  the owners  of such vehicles. No such provision  having been  made  in  the  statute,  it  is submitted, the  Act represents  at  best  a  declaration  of policy and  nothing more.  Our attention has been invited to the observations  of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978]  2 S.C.R.  621, where  it has  been elaborately explained that  Article 21  must be  read with Article 19 in adjudging the  constitutional validity  of an  Act,  and  in doing so  the consequences  brought about  by  the  impugned legislation, and of the action under it, on the citizen must constitute the  test of  its validity rather than the object of the Legislature or the form of action. Reference was made in this  connection to  the law  laid down in B.C. Cooper v. Union of  India [1970]  3 S.C.R.  530, and  other cases.  It cannot be  disputed, it  seems to  us, that the true test of the validity of a statute must be the effect and consequence of its  operation on  the fundamental  right of the citizen. The object underlying the legislation embodies the intent of the Legislature  in  enacting  it,  but  in  construing  its validity in the context of a citizen’s fundamental right the question before  the Court always must be whether its impact on that  fundamental right  can be  regarded as a reasonable restriction on  the exercise  of the  right. The focal point during such  examination is  the fundamental  right, and the duty of the Court must be to consider the quality and degree of the  encroachment made by the operation of the statute on the citizen’s exercise of that right.      In the  instant case,  s.3 of  the Punjab  Act has  the effect of  making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply the rickshaw  as owner  of the vehicle and thereby to be the full owner of the income earned by him. No longer will he be obliged to  part with  an appreciable portion of that income in favour of another who owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is beneficial  legislation   bringing  directly   home  to  the rickshaw puller  the entire  fruit of  his daily  toil. m  e enactment is  intended as  a social  welfare measure against the exploitation  of the  poor and  unemployed by  rapacious cycle rickshaw  owners  who  by  reason  of  their  superior financial resources  fatten their  wealth from  the  sweated toil or  rickshaw pullers.  Even if  we look at the impugned legislation from  the point  of view  of its  impact of  the fundamental right  of rickshaw  owners who give them on hire to rickshaw  pullers  for  plying,  it  is  plain  that  the legislation constitutes  a  reasonable  restriction  on  the right of such rickshaw owners to carry on the 677 business of  hiring out  cycle  rickshaws  inasmuch  as  the exercise A  of the right is excluded by legislation designed for the economic ant social welfare of rickshaw pullers, who constitute a  significant sector  of the people, a sector 80 pressed by  poverty and straitened by the economic misery of their situation that the guarantee of their full day’s wages to them seems amply justified.      On the question whether the Punjab Act is incomplete in itself and,  88 it  stands,  has  the  effect  of  disabling

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rickshaw pullers  from carrying  on he  occupation of plying cycle rickshaws because of the condition of ownership in the cycle rickshaws,  the Court  is  entitled  to  consider  the factual matrix  in which  the Punjab Act was enacted for the purpose of  determining its validity. The record of the case discloses that  for several  years a  powerful movement  has raged  aimed   at  freeing   the   rickshaw   pullers   from exploitation by  cycle rickshaw owners. The owner is usually a person  of sufficient  wealth enabling  him to  acquire  a number of  cycle rickshaws.  The  rickshaw  puller,  on  the contrary, is a needy person, beaten by poverty and compelled to ply  the rickshaw  on terms  dictated by  the owner,  who taking advantage  of the  desperate plight  of the  rickshaw puller is  in a position to demand a wholly disproportionate hire charge for the use of the vehicles The labour and toil, and the  sweat and  strain, involved  in pulling  the  cycle rickshaw works, in a few years, serious injury to the health and stamina  and life-span  of the  rickshaw puller. He must toil the  whole day  long in  order to  earn a small income, most of  which he  must hand over to the owner in payment of the hire  charge. In  the circ circumstances, the Government prepared a  scheme as  early as  1970 to enable the rickshaw puller to  extricate himself  from the  shackles of a system which, for several decades, had debased and condemned him to a lamentable  existence. The object was to assure him a life where the  entire fruit  of his  labour and  industry  would accrue to his own benefit. We have on the record before us a circular No.  RMJ/1734/73 dated August 6, 1973 issued by the Jullunder Circle  of the Punjab National Bank. Fr . the very beginning, the  scheme extended  a number  of concessions to rickshaw pullers,  and as  it stood  in 1973 it provided for loans by  the Banks  to rickshaw  pullers.  The  loans  were intended for  such individuals  who did  not already own any rickshaw and  who had  been issued  a certificate  to ply  a rickshaw by  the municipal  authority. The loan was intended for the purchase of a new cycle rickshaw ant extended to 90% of the total cost of rickshaw or Rs.700 whichever was lower. The rickshaw  purchased with the loan was to be hypothecated to the bank and 678 registered with  the municipal  authority in the name of the borrower as  owner and  the bank  as financier. The advances would be  covered by  a guarantee  extended under the Credit Guarantee  Corporation  of  India  (Small  Loans)  Guarantee Scheme, 1971.  The scheme contained further details relating to payment’  of interest,  the documentation  required,  the mode of disbursement, the terms of repayment of the loan and so on.  It was  in this factual context and in order to give statutory recognition  to the  object underlying  the scheme that the Punjab Act in 1976 was enacted.      But learned  counsel for  the petitioners contends that the validity of s.3 of the Punjab Act cannot be sustained on the basis  of a  scheme which  can be  varied it will by the authors of  the scheme  during the  operation of  the Punjab Act. The  scheme, it  is said,  may be  altered to  a degree where it  cease to  be identifiable  with the  object of the impugned legislation.  Reliance is placed by learned counsel on The  Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India &  Anr. [1960]  1 S.C.R.  39. In  that case, the Court laid  down   that  it   was   permissible   to   judge   the reasonableness of  a law  on the  basis of  the  surrounding circumstances as  well  as  of  contemporaneous  legislation enacted as  part of  a single  scheme. But it also laid down the limitations  circumscribing that principle. Subba Rao. J said:

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         "But I am clear in my mind that the validity of an           Act shall  not be  made to depend upon another Act           unconnected  with   the  impugned   Act  or  power           conferred thereunder,  which  might,  if  properly           exercised, off-set  the evil  tendency or the vice           of the  impugned Act. If the validity of an Act is           made to  depend upon  such a  foundation, a super-           structure will  have been built on shifting sands.           To  do   that  is  to  destroy  the  stability  of           legislation and  to introduce an uncertain element           therein. If  two or  more Acts  were parts  of the           same scheme  of plan,  to Implement  the  same  or           common objective,  or if  the impugned Act, though           it was  not originally  conceived at the time when           the earlier  Act was passed, was only as extension           or  a   further  step   by  the   legislature  for           implementing the  object of  the earlier Act or if           the legislature  by express reference incorporated           in the  Impugned Act the provisions of the earlier           Act, it would be permissible to rely upon the said           provisions of  the earlier  Act, not  because they           formed part of the prevailing 679           conditions but  because either  the  earlier  Act,           formed   part of  the impugned Act by reference or           both of  them formed  part of the same legislative           plan           .................... .........................           But to  go beyond this is to destroy the stability           of  legislation  and  to  introduce  an  uncertain           element. To  go  further  and  to  depend  upon  a           notification of  a transitory  nature issued under           an unconnected  Act is  to place  the statute in a           fluid state.  In such  a  situation  its  validity           would depend  upon a  statutory order of temporary           duration; it would change colour with the changing           attitudes of  an authority  empowered to issue the           order."      These  are   valuable   dicta,   valid   whenever   the constitutionality of  a statute  falls to be examined in the context of contemporaneous legislation. In the present case, however, the  Punjab Act was enacted with an eye to a scheme already existing  and in  operation. The scheme supplied the mechanics for  the operation of the Punjab Act. The two were not unconnected.  They were  closely connected  and, indeed, constituted an  integrated plan.  The apprehension  that the validity of  the Act is dependent on the continued operation of the  scheme which  was open to subsequent modification at the will  of its authors has no foundation. The consequences of such  modification can  be taken  care of. The Punjab Act confers on  the State  Government, by  R.7, power  to  frame appropriate rules  in support  of and-for the furtherance of the object  of the  Act. In  the event  of the  scheme being altered or  modified by its authors to a degree incompatible with the  true operation  and success of the Punjab Act, the situation can  always be met by the State Government framing suitable rules under 8.7 of the Act. The State Government is not only  empowered to  do so;  it is under an obligation to frame rules  appropriate to the successful implementation of the legislative  goal. It  seems to  us that  in a situation which calls  for adjustment  from time  to time  in view  of varying economic  and social factors, a sufficient degree of flexibility is  needed, and  consequently it was appropriate for the  Legislature to  leave the measure of control to the rule asking  power of the State Government. That in truth is

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one of  the primary  reasons for  delegated legislation.  So long as  the rules  80 made  serve the object of the Act and fall within  the limitations implied thereby no fault can be found with them. 680      In our  judgment, the  impugned legislation  cannot  be regarded as  an unreasonable  restriction on the fundamental rights  of   the  petitioner  under  Article  21  read  with sub.cl.(g) of clause 1 of Article 19 of the Constitution.      An  attempt   was  made  by  learned  counsel  for  the petitioners to  show that  8.3 of  the Punjab Act created an invidious distinction between rickshaw pullers and those who carried on  the occupation  of plying other vehicle, such as taxi-cabs, on  hire.  We  see  /  comparison.  The  pathetic conditions in which rickshaw pullers pursue their burdensome vocation places  them in  a class apart from others in their right to  ameliorative and  protective  treatment  from  the State. This challenge must also fail.      Towards the  end, we  wish to express the view that the scheme framed  by this  Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (supra) is  a good  scheme, capable  of implementation,  and productive of  the object  for which  it was designed. If it has not  been successfully  implemented so far, it is in the main largely  on account  of circumstances  which could have been avoided.  Inherently, we  see no  feature in the scheme which operates  against its effectiveness. If the scheme has not succeeded  as was  intended By  the Court, it is largely because appropriate  action was  not taken  by  the  parties concerned to  implement it.  A large  number of applications were made  through the  Azad Rickshaw  Pullers Union  to the Municipal Corporation for the grant of certificates enabling the rickshaw  pullers to  obtain loans  from the  Banks. The Municipal Corporation  was anxious  to ensure that fraud was not practised on the scheme by existing- rickshaw owners who could be  tempted to  apply for  certificates in  fictitious names and secure benefits which should have been confined to rickshaw  pullers  as  owners  of  the  vehicles.  The  1170 applications made  through the  Azad Rickshaw  Pullers Union could not  be related  immediately to  bona fide  individual rickshaw pullers, and in the absence of the further material sought  by  the  Municipal  Corporation  from  the  rickshaw pullers it  would naturally  have taken considerable time to take action  on those  applications. It  seems to  US that a fresh opportunity  should be provided to rickshaw pullers to avail of  the scheme formulated by this Court. A fundamental condition for  benefiting from the scheme is that a rickshaw puller should  have been a licensee in the Amritsar or other municipality within one year of the coming into force of the Punjab Act.  We think that the range of eligibility should / t be confined by that limitation. We think it desirable that the  Municipal  Corporation  should  determine  the  maximum number of licenses which should be granted 681 for plying cycle rickshaws within its jurisdictional limits, keeping in  mind the  needs of  the travelling public on the one hand  and the  danger of uneconomic plying on the other. Every rickshaw  puller proposing  to take  advantage of  the scheme should  apply to  the Municipal  Commissioner  for  a certificate, the  period within  which such applications may be filed  being notified  by the  Municipal Corporation from time to time as the need arises. All the application will be considered, in  the serial order in which they are received, for the  grant of  a  certificate  on  the  basis  of  which rickshaw puller  may take  further steps  envisaged  in  the scheme for the grant of financial assistance enabling him to

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purchase 8  cycle rickshaw  for plying  by him. The ISSUE of such  certificate   shall  be   subject  to   the  following conditions:      1. Each  certificate shall be granted in respect of one cycle rickshaw only.      2. The  number of  certificates issued shall not exceed the maximum,  if any,  fixed by the Municipal Corporation as the total  strength of  the cycle  rickshaws allowed  to ply within its jurisdictional limits.      3. No  person shall  be granted  more   than  one  such certificate.      4. Preference  shall be given in the matter of granting certificates to  those rickshaw  pullers who  have  plied  a cycle rickshaw  for one year before the Punjab Act came into force.      On receipt  of the  certificates, the  rickshaw pullers may take further steps for the purpose of securing financial ASSISTANCE in accordance with the terms of the scheme.      We are  unable to  hold that  the Punjab Act of 1976 is ultra vires and that the scheme propounded by this ’Court in Azad  Rickshaw  Pullers  Union  (supra)  is  unworkable  and ineffective. We  believe that  given appropriate  compliance the scheme  will provide  adequate relief  to  the  rickshaw pullers  and  constitute  an  effective  supplementary  code fulfilling the object of the Punjab Act.      In the  CIRCUMSTANCES, we dismiss these writ petitions, but without any order as to costs. N.V.K.                                  Petitions dismissed. 682