http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: MALOJIRAO NARASINGHRAO SHITOLE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/03/1969

BENCH: MITTER, G.K. BENCH: MITTER, G.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  953            1969 SCR  (3) 901  1969 SCC  (2) 723

ACT: Madhya  Bharat  Abolition of Jagirs Act 28 of 1951,  s.  29- Appeal to Board of Revenue-No provision in Act for exclusion of  time for obtaining copies or to condone delay  S. 30  of Act  makining Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy  Act  Samwat 2007  applicable to proceedings under Act-Effect of  ss.  34 and  s. 149(2) of Ryotwari Act--Construction of  s.  149(2)- Applicability of s. 12 of Indian Limitation Act 1908.

HEADNOTE: Section  29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act  28 of  1951  provided for appeals against orders of  the  Jagir Commissioner to the Board of Revenue.  The appeal was to  be filed within 90 days of the communication of the decision to the  party concerned.  The Act did not in terms contain  any provision for exclusion of time taken in obtaining copies or for  condonation  of delay in filing  the  appeal.   However under s. 30 of the Act the procedure under the Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samwat 2007 was made applicable  to the  proceedings.   Section  34 of  the  said  Ryotwari  Act provided  for  extension and computation of  the  period  of limitation and s. 149(2) theredf was in the following  terms :  "Excpt  where it is otherwise provided"  in  the  general principles of law of Limitation for the time being in  force in the United State regarding extension of the principles of limitation shall apply to claims made under this Act  before a Revenue officer". The  appellant  was a Sardar and Jagirdar in  the  erstwhile Gwalior  State.   His  Jagir was resumed  by  the  State  on December 4, 1952 under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act   1951.   He  received  a  memorandum  from  the   Jagir Commissioner on February 23, 1958 regarding the compensation payable to him under s. 13 of the Act.  On February 24, 1958 he  applied  to  the Jagir Commissioner for a  copy  of  the judgment as the memorandum supplied to him did not show  how the  compensation had been determined.  The application  was returned  to  the  appellant  on  March  11,  1958  with  an endorsement  that the copy could be had on payment of  fees. The very next day the appellant complied with the demand and a  copy  of a judgment was given to him on March  18,  1958.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

Tne  appellant preferred his appeal to the Board of  Revenue on  June 2, 1958 but the Board dismissed it as  time  barred under  s.29 of the Act.  The High Court upheld the order  of the Board. In appeal to this Court, HELD:The  High  Court was not right  in  upholding  the order  of the Board of Revenue which ignored the  provisions of  ss. 34 and 149(2) of the Ryotwari Act and  the  relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. [907 B-C] (i)Under  s. 34 of the Ryotwari Act the Board  must  guide itself by the provisions of the Limitation Act in force  for extension, and computation of the period of limitation.   It would  appear that s. 149(2) was aimed at giving  a  similar guide  line  to  the  Revenue Officer.   To  give  the  said interpretation  to  s.  149(2)  it  is  necessary  to   read "extension  of  the  principles  of  limitation"   occurring therein  as  "extension  of the period  of  limitation"  for otherwise the section would be devoid of any meaning. 902 The  word ’principles’ therein was inserted due to inept  or careless  drafting and what was meant was ’period’  and  not ’principles’.   However, even if the statute is read  as  it stands  the principle of the Limitation Act is not  only  to dismiss  a suit, appeal or application if filed beyond  time but  also  to extend the time for filing an  appeal  if  the delay  is explained.  That principle was clearly capable  of extension in the present case. [905 D; 906 E] (ii)The   general  principles  of  limitation   are   those contained  in the Limitation Act of 1908 which was in  force at  the  date when the present appeal was filed  before  the Board  of  Revenue.   Sections  3, 4, 5  and  29(2)  of  the Limitation Act 1908 show that unless excluded by the  Jagirs Act  or Ryotwari Act, s. 12 of the Limitation Act  would  be applicable  to  appeals filed before the  Board  of  Revenue under any of those Acts. [905 E; 906 C] (iii)In view of the applicability of ss. 34 and  149(2) of the Ryotwari Act to the case, the time spent in obtaining a  copy  of  the judgment forming the basis  or  giving  the reasons  of  the  decision  should  have  been  excluded  in computing  the period of 90 days under s. 29 of  the  Jagirs Act.  The appellant was not guilty of any laches.  If  there was  any  delay in filing the appeal the  Board  of  Revenue ’should have considered whether in the circumstances of  the case the same should have been condoned.  The Board did  not act judicially in throwing out the appeal. [906 F-907 B] Brijrajsingh  v.  The Board of Revenue  and  Another,  Misc. Civil  Case No. 22 of 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High  Court decided on 18-3-63, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 302 of 1966. referred to.      Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment  and  order dated  November 13, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court, Gwalior Bench in Misc.  Civil Petition 64 of 1961.- B.Sen,  P. W. Sahasrabudhe, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and  S.  V. Tambwekar, for the appellant. I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from an  order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Art. 227 of the  Con- stitution  refusing to quash an order made by the  Board  of Revenue  of  the  State  throwing  out  the  appeal  of  the appellant on the ground that it was barred by time.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

The facts are as follows.  The appellant was a Sardar and a Jagirdar  in the former Gwalior State.  His Jagir  known  as Pohari  Jagir was resumed by the State on December  4,  1952 under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951. He  received  a memorandum from the  Jagir  Commissioner  on February 23. 1958 regarding the compensation payable to  him under  s. 13 of the Act in respect of the resumption of  his jagir.   On  February  24,  1958 he  applied  to  the  Jagir Commissioner, for a copy of the 90 3 judgment.   The  memorandum received by him gave  the  total amount  of compensation determined and the deductions to  be made  therefrom.  It did not contain the, data  forming  the basis of the calculations nor did it show how the  authority disposed  of the appellant’s claim to compensation and  made its own computation.  At the hearing, a copy of the judgment of  the Jagir Commissioner running into twenty  three  pages was  handed  up to us giving full details of the  claim  and showing  how the same were dealt with for fixing the  amount payable to the appellant. It appears that the application of the appellant for a  copy of  the judgment was returned to him on March 11, 1958  with an  endorsement  that the same could be had  on  payment  of fees.  On the very next day the appellant applied for a copy of the judgment after paying the fees mentioned and a  copy of  the  judgment was given to him on March 18,  1958.   The appellant  preferred his appeal to the Board of  Revenue  on June 2, 1958.  As already stated, the Board did not go  into the  merits of the case holding the appeal to be  barred  by time under the provisions of s. 29 of the Act. It  is  necessary  to note a few of the  provisions  of  the Madhya  Bharat  Abolition of Jagirs Act,  1951  (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’) to find out whether the appeal  to the Board of Revenue was out of time.  Under s. 3 of the Act the  Government had to appoint a date for the resumption  of all, jagir lands in the State, as soon as may be, after  the commencement of the Act.  The consequences of the resumption of  the  jagir land are given in s. 4. By the  operation  of that section the right, title and interest of every jagirdar and of every other person claiming through him in his  jagir lands including forests, trees etc. whether being worked  or mot,  were to stand resumed to the State free of all  encum- brances  and  certain  other consequences  were  to  follow. Section  5  of  the  Act however  enabled  the  Jagirdar  to continue   to  remain  in  possession  of  lands   personlly cultivated  by  him and of certain other items  of  property mentioned  in cl. (b) of the said section.  Under s.  8  the Government  was to be liable to pay to every jagirdar  whose jagir land was resumed under s. 3 such compensation as would be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Schedule 1. Under s. 12 every Jagirdar whose jagir land  had been  resumed under s. 3 was to file in the prescribed  form within  two months from the date of resumption, a  statement of  claim  for compensation before the  Jagir  Commissioner. Sub-s.  (2) of the section prescribed the particulars  which such  statement  of claim had to furnish. on  receipt  of  a statement  of  claim  under s. 12 or  if  no  statement  was received by him within the period fixed, it was the duty  of the  Jagir  Commissioner  to determine  (a)  the  amount  of compensation payable to the Jagirdar 904 under  s. 8, (b) the amount recoverable from him  under  cl. (e)  of sub-S. (1) ’of s. 4, (c) the amounts of  the  annual maintenance allowances payable to maintenance holders,  if any,  under  s. 9; (d) the amounts payable  annually  to-the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

Zamindars  of the Jagirdar, if any under s. 10 and  (e)  the amount payable to the cosharers of a Jagirdar, if any, under s. 11. The section casts a duty on the Jagir Commissioner to communicate  his decision to the Government,  the  Jagirdar, the  maintenance holders, the co-sharers and the  Zamindars, if  any,  as soon as may be practicable.  Under  s.  29  the Government  or any person aggrieved by the decision  of  the Jagir  Commissioner  under ss. 4, 10, 11, 13 or 14  had  the right to appeal to the Board of Revenue within 90 days  from the date of the communication of such decision to it or  him and the decision of the Board of Revenue was to be final. From the above provisions of the Act, it is amply clear that neither  the  Government  nor the Jagirdar  nor  any  person aggrieved by the decision of the Jagir Commissioner under s. 13 can file an appeal to the Board of Revenue to any purpose without  a  copy of the judgment showing  how  the  decision under s. 13 was arrived at. In this case, the memorandum  of compensation merely showed that a sum exceeding Rs. 17 lakhs had been determined as the amount payable to the  appellant. The memorandum did not show how the same was computed or how the clam for compensation preferred by the petitioner  under various heads was dealt with In order that an appeal may  be effective  the  appellant  must be  able  to  formulate  his grounds for challenging the judgment which has gone  against him. The  question therefore arises as to whether the time  taken in obtaining a copy of the judgment which forms the basis of the decision in determining the compensation can be excluded from the period of 90 days mentioned in s. 29 of the  Jagirs Abolition  Act.   There  is no provision in  the  Act  which expressly  empowers  the Board of Revenue  to  entertain  an appeal  filed beyond the period of 90 days from the date  of the communication of the decision under s. 13.  Under s.  30 of the Act               "The Jagir Commissioner, or any other  officer               conducting an enquiry under this Act, and  the               Board  of Revenue ’and the  Collector  hearing               appeals   from   the  orders  of   the   Jagir               Commissioner or the Tahsildar, as the case may               be, shall follow the procedure aapplicable  to               proceedings  under the Revenue  Administration               and  Ryotwari  Land Revenue and  Tenancy  Act,               Samvat  2007, so far as may be and shall  have               the  same powers, in relation  to  proceedings               before  them  as  a  revenue  officer  has  in               relation to original or appellate proceed-               90 5               ings,  as  the case may be,  under  the  Act."               (hereinafter referred to as the Ryotwari Act).               Section 34 of the Ryotwari Act provides               "Subject  to the provisions of the  Limitation               Act in force for the time being regarding  the               extension  and  computation of the  period  of               limitation :-               (1)no appeal to the Board shall be  brought               after the expiry of ninety days from the  date               of the decision or the order complained of;               (2).....................................               Section  149(2) of the Ryotwari  Act  provides               that               "Except   where  it  is  otherwise   specially               provided  the  general principles  of  law  of               Limitation for the time being in force in  the               United   State  regarding  extension  of   the               principles of limitation shall apply to claims

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

             made under this Act before a Revenue Officer." It  is  clear from the language of s.34 that in  hearing  an appeal under the Ryotwari Act the Board must guide itself by the provisions of the Limitation Act in force for  extension and  computation  of  the period of  limitation.   It  would appear  that s. 149(2) was aimed at giving a  similar  guide line   to   the   Revenue  Officer.   To   give   the   said interpretation  to  s.  149(2) it is  necessary  to  read  " extension of the principles of limitation" occurring therein as "extension of the period of limitation" for otherwise the section  would  be  devoid  of  any  meaning.   The  general principles   of  limitation  are  those  contained  in   the Limitation Act of 1908 which were in force at the date  when the appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act, 1908 laid down that subject  to  the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 25 (inclusive), every  suit instituted,  appeal preferred, and application  made,  after the  period of limitation prescribed therefor by  the  First Schedule  was  to be dismissed although limitation  had  not been set up as a defence.  Under s. 5 of the Limitation  Act of  1908  an appeal could be admitted after  the  period  of limitation prescribed therefor when the appellant  satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring or making  the application within such period.  Under s.  29(2) of the Limitation Act               "Where any special or local law prescribes for               any  suit  appeal or application a  period  of               limitation    different   from   the    period               prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the               provisions  of  section 3 shall apply,  as  it               such  period were prescribed therefor in  that               Schedule  and for the purpose  of  determining               any period of limitation               906               prescribed for any suit, appeal or application               by the special or local law--               (a)the  provisions contained in section  4,               sections  9 to 18 and section 22  shall  apply               only in so far as, and to the extent to which,               they  are  not  expressly  excluded  by   such               special or local law; and               (b)the  remaining  provisions of  this  Act               shall not apply." These sections go to show that unless excluded by the Jagirs Act  or Ryotwari Act section 12 of the Limitation Act  would be  applicable to appeals filed before the Board of  Revenue under any of those Acts. It  has been held by a Division Bench of the Madhya  Pradesh High  Court  in  Brijrajsingh v. The Board  of  Revenue  and another(1) that the expression "principles of limitation" in s.  149(2) mentioned above should be construed as  extension of  the period of limitation.  For the reasons given  above, we  are in agreement with the said conclusion of  the  Madya Pradesh  High  Court.   In our view,  the  word  ’principle’ therein  was inserted due to inept or careless drafting  and what was meant was "period" and not principles’. Even if we were to read the Statute as it is, the  principle of  the  Limitation  Act  is to dismiss  a  suit  appeal  or application if filed beyond time but also to extend the time for  filing  an  appeal if the  delay  is  explained.   That principle  is  clearly capable of extension in  the  present case. If  sections 34 and 149(2) were applicable to the  facts  of the  case  before the Board of Revenue and we hold  to  that effect,  the time spent in obtaining a copy of the  judgment formi

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

ng  the  basis or giving the reasons of  the  decision should have been excluded in computing the period of 90 days under  s.  29  of the Jagirs Act.  The appellant  was  not guilty of any laches in his appeal to the Board of  Revenue. He  applied  for a copy of the judgment of  the  Jagir  Com- missioner on the day next after communication to him of  the order  of the Jagir Commissioner.  Even if  the  application was  unaccompanied by any fees prescribed for  the  purpose, the  Board  of  Revenue should have  taken  this  fact  into consideration  before holding the appellant’s appeal  to  be out  of  time.   If  the application for  the  copy  of  the judgment made on the 24th February was in order, the  appeal was  in time.  Even if the time taken in obtaining the  copy of  the  judgment be reckoned from the 12th  March  to  18th March,  1958,  the  appellant was out by two  days  only  in filing  the appeal to the Board of Revenue.  If the  1st  of June 1958 which (1)  Misc.  Civil Case No. 22/1962 decided on 18-3-63. 90 7 happened  to be a Sunday be left out of  consideration,  the appellant was out by one day only. As appears from the order dated September 28, 1961 the Board of Revenue refused to entertain the appeal on the ground  of limitation  without considering the question as  to  whether the appellant had made out a case for condonation of  delay, if  any.  In our view, the Board of Revenue had  not acted judicially  in throwing out the appeal.  The High Court  was therefore  not right in upholding the order of the Board  of Revenue  which ignored the provisions of ss. 34 and 149  (2) of  the  Ryotwari  Act and the relevant  provisions  of  the Limitation  Act.   A sounder view of the law  was  taken  by another   Division   Bench  of  the  same  High   Court   in Brijrajsingh’s case(1) noted above. For  the reasons given the appeal is allowed, the  order  of the Board of Revenue is quashed and the matter sent back  to the Board for disposal of the appeal according to law and in the  light  of the observations made by us.   The  appellant will have the costs of this appeal. G.C.                                   Appeal allowed. (1) Misc.  Civil case No. 22/1962 decided on 18-3-63. 908