15 September 2004
Supreme Court
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MALLESHI Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,PRAKASH PRABHAKAR NAOLEKAR
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001343-001343 / 2002
Diary number: 22499 / 2002


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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1343 of 2002

PETITIONER: Malleshi

RESPONDENT: State of Karnataka

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/2004

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & PRAKASH PRABHAKAR NAOLEKAR

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Appellant was convicted for offence punishable under Section 364  A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ’IPC’), and sentenced to  life imprisonment by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge,  Chitradurga (hereinafter referred to as the ’trial court’).  In appeal  Karnataka High Court by the impugned judgment confirmed the conviction  and sentence. It is to be noticed that four persons faced trial.   Appellant-accused for the sake of convenience is described as A-1 and  the co-accused as A2 to A4. They were acquitted by the trial court.

       Accusations which led to the trial of the accused persons are as  follows:

       Vijayabhasker, (PW 2) was a student of S.J.M. College, situated  on Holalkere Road in Chitradurga, he was studying I year B.Sc., and was  staying at Challakere in his Uncle’s house.  He used to come to  Chitradurga to attend the college daily by bus.  Jagadish (PW 3) was a  classmate of PW 2 and resident of Challakere, both of them usually come  together to Chitradurga from Challakere. On 25.11.1997 Vijayabhaskar,  (PW 2), Jagadish (PW 3) and their friend Raghavendra,(PW 4) finished  their practical classes and came out of the college at about 2-45 p.m.   At that time, a person called PW 2 by taking his name, he turned and  saw that person was wearing white shirt and pant. PW 2 went to him and  was told by that person that he knew his father Hanumantha Rao, as he  used to come to their village Chintarlapalli in Anantapur District, for  Tamarind business.  He enquired with PW 2 about the fees and other  expenses stating that he wanted to admit his son.  PW.2 told him that  about Rs.2,000/- will be the expenses in the  college. A Trax Jeep was  parked nearby. The said person took PW 2 towards the Trax jeep  informing him that his son is there.  PW 2 went there, he was asked to  sit in the jeep. Three other persons also came and sat in the jeep. The  person who took him to the jeep also sat by his side, there were two  drivers in the jeep, they closed the doors of the jeep and it was  driven towards Challakere on N.H. 4.  They treated PW 2 well till they  crossed Challakere gate. Thereafter he was threatened not to raise any  voice, otherwise he will be murdered. After they crossed Challakere,  they enquired from him about the phone number stating that they will  ask his father to pay Rs.4,00,000/- to them for his release.  PW 2 told  them that such huge amount cannot be arranged and hardly they may get  about Rs.50,000/- by raising loan from others.  They told him that  their Boss wanted at least Rs.2,00,000/-.  On the way, they allowed him  to meet the call of nature however some of them accompanied him.  He  was given water to drink.  They stopped the vehicle near a village and  the accused persons got down for buying cigarettes.  The drivers in the

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jeep asked him to run away, and accordingly PW.2 ran away, he came to  know that the place was Byrapur village.  He went and informed the  villagers and got them near the jeep, they surrounded the said jeep,  caught hold the accused persons, informed to the police, Molakalmurnu.   They were all taken to the police station along with the said jeep.  Later on PW 2 gave complaint as per Ex.P.2, which was registered.   Subsequently, the case was transferred to Chitradurga Rural Police and  then the charge sheet came to be filed.  According to prosecution  accused No. 1 Malleshi was the  person who was in white shirt and pant,  who abducted PW.2 from the college and accused No.2 to 4 were the other  three persons who were in the  jeep during the course of the  incident.         Trial court analysed the evidence of PW 2 who was the main  witness and whose abduction was alleged.  PWs. 3 and 4 were also stated  to have witnessed a part of the occurrence i.e. A 1 calling the victim  PW-2 and their going together towards the vehicle.  Though PW 4 resiles  from the statement made during investigation, his evidence corroborated  that of PWs. 2 and 3 to the extent that he had seen PW 2 going in the  company of somebody towards the trax jeep. PWs. 6 and 11 were the  drivers of the vehicle.  They resiled from their statements recorded  during investigation. Trial court took into account the evidence of PWs  2 and 3 and the fact that the vehicle and the accused persons were  confined by the villagers and they were arrested from the spot found  the accused /appellant guilty while acquitting A-2 to A-4 as the  evidence was not found sufficient to convict them.

       In appeal the High Court found that the analysis of factual  position as done by the trial court did not suffer from any infirmity.   It also analysed the evidence in detail and affirmed the view of the  trial court.  The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

       In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant  submitted that the evidence of PW 2, the alleged victim was not  sufficient to hold the appellant guilty.  PW 2 had no earlier  acquaintance with the accused \026 appellant. Since there was no test  identification parade, it was not proper on the part of the trial court  to hold the accused guilty.  The alleged demand of ransom has not been  established.  In any event, no demand has been conveyed to any person  for a ransom and therefore Section 364 A has no application.

 In response learned counsel for the State of Karnataka  supported the judgments of the trial court and the High Court and  submitted that the evidence has been analysed carefully by both the  trial court and the High Court and no infirmity has surfaced. It was  further submitted that keeping in view the clear language of Section  364 A it is evident that the accused has been rightly convicted under  Section 364 A of the IPC.

       Section 364 A deals with ’Kidnapping for ransom etc.’ This  Section reads as follows:

"Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a  person in detention after such kidnapping or  abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to  such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a  reasonable apprehension that such person may be put  to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such  person in order to compel the Government or  

(any foreign State or international inter-governmental  organization or any other person) to do or abstain  from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be  punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and  shall also be liable to fine."

       

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       The Section refers to both "Kidnapping" and "Abduction".  Section  359 defines Kidnapping.  As per the said provision there are two types  of kidnapping i.e. (1) kidnapping from India; and (2) kidnapping from  lawful guardianship.

       Abduction is defined in Section 362. The provision envisages two  types of abduction i.e. (1) by force or by compulsion; and/or (2)  inducement by deceitful means. The object of such compulsion or  inducement must be the going of the victim from any place. The case at  hand falls in the second category.

       To "Induce" means "to lead into".  Deceit according to its plain  dictionary meaning signifies anything intended to mislead another.  It  is a matter of intention and even if promise held out by the accused  was fulfilled by him, the question is: whether he was acting in a  bonafide manner?   

The offence of abduction is a continuing offence.  This Section  was amended in 1992 by Act XLII of 1993 with effect from 22.5.1993 and  it was subsequently amended in 1995 by Act XXIV of 1995 with effect  from 26.5.1995.  The Section provides punishment for kidnapping,  abduction or detaining for ransom.

       To attract the provisions of Section 364 A what is required to be  proved is (1) that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; and  (2) kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; and  (3) that the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom. Strong reliance  was placed on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Netra Pal v. The  State (NCT of Delhi) (2001 Crl. L.J. 1669) to contend that since the  ransom demand was not conveyed to the father of PW 2, the intention to  demand was not fulfilled.

       To pay a ransom as per Black’s Law Dictionary means "to pay price  or demand for ransom".  The word "demand" means "to claim as one’s  due;" "to require"; "to ask relief"; "to summon"; "to call in Court";  "An imperative request preferred by one person to another requiring the  latter to do or yield something or to abstain from some act;" An asking  with authority, claiming."  The definition as pointed out above would  show that the demand has to be communicated.  It is an imperative  request or a claim made.           Netra Pal’s case (supra) was one where a child was kidnapped.  The court found as a fact that since the victim was a child, demand for  ransom could not have been made to him and only the demand to pay the  ransom could have been made to his guardians.  In that factual  background it was held that the offence was not under Section 364 A but  was under Section 362 of the IPC.  Accordingly conviction of the  accused was altered to offences relatable to Sections 363 and 365 of  the IPC.

       In the instant case as the factual position found by the trial  court and the High Court goes to show, the object of abduction was for  ransom.  This was clearly conveyed to the victim PW-2.  He was even  conveyed the amount to be paid.  It cannot be laid down as a strait- jacket formula that the demand for payments has to be made to a person  who ultimately pays.  By way of illustration it can be said that  a  rich business man is abducted.  He is told that for his release his  family members have to pay a certain amount of money; but money  actually belongs to the person abducted.  The payment for release is  made by the persons to whom the demand is made. The demand originally  is made to the person abducted or kidnapped. After making the demand to  the kidnapped or abducted person merely because the demand could not be  conveyed to some other person, as the accused is arrested in the  meantime, does not take away the offence out of the purview of Section  364 A.  It has to be seen in such a case as to what was the object

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of kidnapping or abduction.  The essence of abduction as noted above is  causing to stay in isolation and demand for ransom.  The demand in the  present case has already been made by conveying it to the victim.  In  Netra Pal’s case (supra) the High Court noted that there was no demand  to pay. The factual position in that case as noted above is that the  victim was a child to whom no demand could have been made.  In that  background the High Court took the view that Section 364 A has no  application as no demand has been communicated.  The position factually  is different here. Ultimately the question to be decided is "what was  the intention? Was it demand of ransom"? There can be no definite  manner in which demand is to be made. Who pays the ransom is not the  determinative fact, as discussed supra.

       Above being the position, there is no infirmity in the judgment  of the courts below to warrant any interference.

Appeal is dismissed.