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PETITIONER: MAJOR GOPAL SINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/03/1961

BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SUBBARAO, K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1320            1962 SCR  (1) 328  CITATOR INFO :  R          1962 SC 994  (4)

ACT: Evacuee Property--Quasi-permanent allotment-Cancellation of- Custodian General,powers of-Enactment vesting evacuee Pro- perty  in Central Government-If Custodian General still  has power to cancel allotment-Administration of Evacuee Property Act,  1950  (31  of 1950), SS.  10,  27  -Displaced  Persons (Compensation  and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44  of  1954), SS. 12, 19.

HEADNOTE: The appellants who are displaced persons from West Pakistan, were  granted  quasi-permanent allotment of  some  lands  in village Raikot in 1949.  On October 31, 1952, the  Assistant Custodian cancelled the allotment of 14 allottees in village Karodian, and also cancelled the allotment of the Appellants in  Raikot but allotted lands to them in  village  Karodian, and  allotted the lands of Raikot to other persons.  The  14 allottees  of  village Karodian as well  as  the  appellants applied  for review of the orders of cancellation  of  their allotment.    The  application  of  the  14  allottees   was dismissed.   They  preferred  a revision  to  the  Custodian General who cancelled the appellant’s allotment (1)  (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 926. 329 in  Karodian and restored the allotment of the 14  allottees on  December  17, 1954 Thereupon,, on January 6,  1955,  the appellants moved the Custodian General for calling up  their review application and for revising the order of October 31, 1952,  cancelling their allotment-in Raikot.  The  Custodian General  refused to revise the order on the ground that  his power to revise had been taken away by the Displaced Persons (Compensation   and   Rehabilitation)   Act,,   1954.    The appellants  contended  that the, Custodian General  had  the power to revise the order. Held,  that  after the enactment of the,  Displaced  Persons (Compensation  and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, the  Custodian General ceased to have the power to cancel allotments.   By, the  issuing of a notification under, S. 12(1) of this  Act, the Fight, title or interest of the evacuee in the  property

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specified  in  the  notification was  extinguished  and  the property vested absolutely in the Central.  Government.  The right  of  the  Custodian  manage  the  property  under  the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, came to an end and  the management vested in a new set of  officers.   Even though  no-  managing officer was appointed  or  a  managing corporation,  constituted  under the new Act to  manage  the property   no   one--else  could’exercise   the   power   of cancellation of allotment. Bal  Mukund v. The State of Punjab, I.L.R. 1957  Punj.  712, approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 101 of 1959. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November  8, 1957, of the Deputy Custodian General,  Evacuee Property, Now Delhi Revision Petition No. 17-R/55 of 1955. Achhru Ram and K. L. Mehta for the appellants. B.K., Khanna and, T. M. Sen, for the respondent No. 1. N.S.  Bindra and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for  the  respondents Nos. 2-4. 1961.  March 15.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR   J.-The appellants who are admittedly   displaced persons  from  West Pakistan were granted  quasi-  permanent allotment  of  24  standard acres and 15 3/4  units  in  the village  of  Raikot  in Ludhiana District  in  1949.   Their father Sardar Nand Singh who was 42 330 found  entitled to quasi-permanent allotment of 40  standard acres  and  5  1/4 units of land  was  given  quasipermanent allotment  in  another  village named Humbran  in  the  same district.   The  two villages are, however, 25 miles  or  so distant  from  each other.  Nand Singh, therefore,  made  an application for consolidation of his lands with those of the appellants  in the village Raikot.  During the  pendency  of this   application  he  died  and  after  his  death,   the, application   was   continued  by  the   appellants.    This application was rejected by the Assistant Custodian on  July 23,  1951  on the ground that no land was available  in  the village  Raikot.   A  revision  petition  preferred  by  the appellants against the order of the Assistant Custodian  was dismissed  by the Additional Custodian on August  20,  1952. On  October  7,  1952 the appellants  preferred  a  revision application before the Custodian General. During   the  pendency  of  the  revision  application   the Additional  Custodian for the State of Punjab cancelled  the allotment  of  fourteen  quasi-permanent  allottees  of  the village  Karodian  in the same district on the  ground  that these persons were entitled to allotment of suburban land  a had been wrongly fitted in the village Karodian.  Acting suo motu  the Additional Custodian made an order on October  31, 1952  cancelling  the  order of allotment  of  land  in  the village Raikot made in favour of the appellants in the  year 1949  and  instead  allotted to them  land  in  Karodian  in substitution  of  :,the  lands at Raikot and  of  the  lands allotted to their father.  The land allotted was out of  the land released upon the cancellation of allotment of lands in favour  of the aforementioned 14 allottees.  These  fourteen allottees  preferred an application for review of the  order cancelling   their  allotment  on  the  ground   that   this cancellation  was a result of misapprehension of the  actual facts  and  that  they were not  entitled  to  allotment  of

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suburban  lands  at all.  The appellants also  preferred  an application for review of the order cancelling their  quasi- permanent allotment in the village Raikot. The Additional Custodian for the State of Punjab recommended to the Custodian General the restoration 331 of  the land to the 14 allottees which had been  taken  away from  them  by reason of cancellation of  the  allotment  in their  favour  by  the order dated October  31,  1952.   The Additional  Custodian admitted that these persons  were  not entitled to allotment of suburban land and that consequently their  allotment  had  been wrongly made  but  referred  the matter back to  the Additional Custodian for  decision.  The application made by the appellants was kept pending till the decision of the application of the 14 allottees of Karodian. The Additional Custodian, however, dismissed the application on  the ground that r. 14(6) of the Evacuee  Property  Rules which came into force on July 22, 1952, stood in the way  of cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant. On  December 17, 1954, the Deputy Custodian General,  before whom  these  allottees  had  preferred  an  application  for revision, revised the order of the Additional Custodian  and restored to the 14 allottees of Karodian the land which  had been originally allotted to them. and allotment of which had been  cancelled  earlier.   As a result of  this  order  the allotment of Karodian land made in favour of the  appellants automatically stood cancelled. On  January  6,  1955,  the  appellants  moved  the   Deputy Custodian  General for calling up their  review  application and for revising the order of October 31, 1952 passed by the Additional  Custodian  cancelling the  allotment  of  Raikot lands which had originally been made in their favour in  the year 1949. Consequent   upon  the  cancellation  of   the   appellants’ allotment   of  the  Raikot  land  they  were  allotted   to respondents 2 to 4. These persons were, therefore, impleaded as  parties to the proceedings before the  Deputy  Custodian General.   By  the order dated November 8, 1957  the  Deputy Custodian  General  dismissed the  appellants’  application. The appellants have, therefore, come up to this Court by way of appeal with special leave. The ground on which the appellants’ application was rejected by the Deputy Custodian General was that his jurisdiction to revise the order has been 332 taken away by virtue of the provisions of Displaced  Persons (Compensation  and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, (44  of  1954) and  the notification issued thereunder on March  24,  1955. In  taking this view he has relied upon the decision in  Bal Mukund  v. The State of Punjab (1).  In that case the  Court has  held that the powers of the Custodian General  to  deal with  matters  of  this kind have been  taken  away  by  the Displaced  Persons  (Compensation and  Rehabilitation)  Act, 1954,  and that these powers now vest in  another  authority and  that  there  is no provision for  continuing  the  pro- ceedings  which had been commenced under the  Administration of Evacuee Property Act., 1950, but had not been  concluded. Mr. Achhruram for the appellants challenged the  correctness of this decision. There  is  no specific provision in this Act to  the  effect that after its commencement the jurisdiction of the  various authorities   created  by  the  Administration  of   Evacuee Property   Act,  1950,  to  deal  with  the   allotment   or cancellation  of allotment of evacuee property shall  cease. What  is  urged  by Mr. Khanna on behalf  of  the  Custodian

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General is that this is the effect of the provisions of  ss. 12(2) and 19 of the Act. Section  12 of the 1954 Act empowers the Central  Government to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of  displaced persons by publishing in the official gazette a notification to  the effect that it has decided to acquire  such  evacuee property  in  pursuance  of this provision.   It  is  common ground  that  by notification S. R. 0. 697 dated  March  24, 1955  the Central Government decided to acquire all  evacuee property  allotted  to displaced persons  by  the  Custodian under the "Conditions" contained in the notification of  the Government  of Punjab in the Department  of  Rehabilitation, No. 4892-6 dated July 8, 1949, except certain categories  of property  specified in the schedule.  The Raikot lands  were allotted to the appellants under the aforesaid  notification of  the Government of Punjab.  It is not disputed  on  their behalf  that  they do not fall within any  of  the  excepted categories  of  property,  set out in  the  schedule.   Sub- section 2 of s. 12 of the Act (1)  I.L.R. 1957 Punj. 712. 333 provides  that on the publication of the notification  under sub-s. 1 the right, title or interest of any evacuee in  the property  specified  in the notification  shall  immediately stand  extinguished and that property shall vest  absolutely in  the Central Government free from all encumbrances.   The power  of the Custodian under the Administration of  Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to allot any property to a person or  to cancel an allotment existing in favour of a person rests  on the   fact  that  the  property  vests  in  him.   But   the consequence  of the publication of the notification  by  the Central  Government under s. 12(1) of the Displaced  Persons (Compensation  and Rehabilitation) Act with respect  to  any property  or  a  class of property would be  to  divest  the Custodian  completely of his right in the  property  flowing from  s.  8 of the Administration of Evacuee  Property  Act, 1950, and vest that property in the Central Government.   He would, therefore, not be competent to deal with the property in  any manner in the absence of any provision in either  of these two enactments permitting him to do so.  No  provision was,  however,  pointed out to us in either  of  these  Acts whereunder  despite  the  Vesting of  the  property  in  the Central Government the Custodian was empowered to deal  with it.   Sub-s.  4 of s. 12 of the 1954 Act provides  that  all evacuee property acquired under that section shall form part of  the compensation pool.  Under s. 16(1) of this  Act  the Central Government is empowered to take such measures as  it considers necessary or expedient for the custody, management and  disposal of the compensation pool.  Sub-s. 2 of  s.  16 empowers the Central Government to appoint such officers  as it deems fit or to constitute such authority or  corporation as it deems fit for the purpose of managing and disposing of the  properties  forming  part  of  the  compensation  pool. Section 19 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained  in  any contract or any other law  for  the  time being  in  force but subject to the rules that may  be  made under  the Act the managing officer or managing  corporation may  cancel  any  allotment etc., under  which  any  evacuee property acquired under the Act is held or 334 occupied  by  a person whether such allotment or  lease  was granted  before or after the commencement of the Act.   This provision  thus  confers  the power  to  deal  with  evacuee property  acquired under the Act only on a managing  officer appointed or managing corporation constituted under the  Act

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and  makes no mention whatsoever of the Custodian  appointed under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act.  No doubt, under  s. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee  Property  Act the Custodian is empowered to manage evacuee property and in exercise  of  his power he will be competent to  allot  such property  to any person or to cancel an allotment  or  lease made  in  favour  of a person.  Apart  from  the  fact  that subsequent  to the issue of the notification under s.  12(1) of  the Displaced Persons (Compensation and  Rehabilitation) Act,  the property would cease to be evacuee  property,  the aforesaid powers of the Custodian would be in conflict  with those  conferred  by  s. 19 of the 1954 Act  on  a  managing officer  or  a managing corporation constituted  under  that Act.  In other words, to that extent the provisions of s. 10 of  the  1950  Act and s. 19 of the 1954  Act  cannot  stand together.  As already stated the powers conferred by  sub-s. (1) of s. 19 of the 1954 Act are to prevail  notwithstanding anything  contained in any other law for the time  being  in force.  Therefore, they must prevail over the provisions  of B. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act.  It  is true  that  there,  is  nothing on record  to  show  that  a managing  officer was appointed with respect to  the  Raikot properties  acquired under the notification dated March  24, 1955.  But it is not necessary to ascertain that fact.   The point  is, who, after the coming into force of the 1954  Act could  cancel  an allotment.  Section 10 says  that  only  a managing officer or a managing corporation can do so.   This means that no one else can do so even though some other  law may have authorised another person or authority to cancel an allotment. Mr.  Achhruram,  however,  contended  that  the  appellants’ rights  were  protected by s. 10 of  the  Displaced  Persons (Compensation  and Rehabilitation) Act.  Section 10 runs  as follows: 335               "Special procedure for payment of compensation               in certain cases.-Where any immovable property               has  been  leased or allotted to  a  displaced               person  by the Custodian under the  conditions               published-               (a)by the notification of the Government of               Pun.  jab in the Department of  Rehabilitation               No. 4892-S or 4892-S dated the 8th July, 1949,               or               (b)by the notification of the Government of               Patiala  and East Punjab States Union  in  the               Department  of  Rehabilitation No. 8R  or  9R,               dated  the 23rd July, 1949, and  published  in               the  official Gazette of that State dated  the               7th   August,  1949,  and  such  property   is               acquired under the provisions of this Act  and               forms  part  of  the  compensation  pool,  the               displaced   person  shall,  so  long  as   the               property   remains  vested  in   the   Central               Government,  continue  in possession  of  such               property  on the same conditions on  which  he               held the property immediately before the  date               of the acquisition, and the Central Government               may,   for   the   purpose   of   payment   of               compensation   to   such   displaced   person,               transfer  to him such property on  such  terms               and conditions as may be prescribed." It  is followed by an explanation; but that explanation  has no bearing upon the point urged by Mr. Achhruram.  It is  no doubt  true  that  the Raikot lands  were  allotted  to  the

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appellants under the notification referred to in el. (a)  of this  section and, therefore, they would be entitled to  the benefits  conferred by this section provided they  satisfied all  the  other  requirements of this  section,  express  or implied.  It is implicit in this section that the  displaced person to whom land was allotted "held" the land and was  in possession of such property at the date of the notification. It  is not disputed that the appellants ceased to  hold  and had   lost  possession  of  the  Raikot  lands  before   the publication  of this notification.  Even assuming  that  the order  of  the Custodian cancelling the allotment  in  their favour  was  erroneous there will be no  difference  in  the result because what is essential is the facts of holding and possession of the land on the date of the notification. 336 Mr.  Achhruram  then referred to the "Conditions"  on  which allotments  of  land  may be  made  under  the  notification referred  to  in  sub-s. 10(a) and pointed  out  that  under condition  no. 6 the Custodian or  rehabilitation  authority would be competent to resume or cancel an allotment only  on one of the grounds set out in that condition.  He said  that the   cancellation  of  the  allotment  in  favour  of   the appellants  was impermissible inasmuch as it was  not  based upon any of the grounds set out in the 6th condition.   That may  or may not be so.  We would repeat that the  appellants had  lost  their possession before the  publication  of  the notification and are thus not entitled to the protection  of the  section.   Moreover, the Custodian, by  reason  of  the divesting  of  the  property, as from March  24,  1955,  had become  functus  officio with respect to it  and  could  not rectify  any error made by him in the past in the matter  of cancellation  of  allotment.   It  is  true  that  had   the appellants  been  in possession at the  critical  time  they would  have had the right to obtain a permanent transfer  in their  favour  of  the Raikot lands and by  virtue  of  what happened and without any fault on their part they have  been deprived  ’of  that right.  That is indeed  unfortunate  but none  of  the authorities created by the  Administration  of Evacuee  Property Act could rectify the wrong that has  been done  by  them to the appellant.  The  question  whether  it could be rectified by any of the authorities constituted  by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)  Act or not was not canvassed before us and, therefore, there  is no occasion for us to say anything about it. Mr. Achhruram contended that r. 74 of the Displaced  Persons (Compensation  and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 stood in  the way  of the Custodian allotting the Raikot property  to  the respondents  during the pendency of the  proceedings  before the Custodian General.  That rule reads as follows:               "Allotments  which are the subject  matter  of               dispute.-No  property  in  a  rural  area   in               respect  of  which any case is  pending  in  a               Civil  Court  or before  a  Deputy  Custodian,               Custodian  or  Custodian  General,  shall   be               transferred to the allottee". 337 The  aforesaid  rule  is in Chapter  X  headed  "Payment  of compensation  under section 10 of the Act" and deals with  a transfer  of  property  to  an  allottee  by  way  of  final settlement  of his claim to compensation and does  not  deal with  the question of allotment on a quasi-permanent  basis. Moreover,  this  rule  applies to  a  proceeding  before  an authority created by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)  Act and not to an authority created by  the Administration   of   Evacuee  Property  Act.    There   is,

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therefore, no substance in this argument. Finally Mr. Achhruram referred to s. 17 of the 1954 Act  and to  r. 102 of the Rules framed thereunder and said that  the powers of the managing officers appointed under the Act  are confined only to properties which are entrusted to them  for management  and  not  with respect to  any  other  property. Section  17 deals with the function; and duties of  managing officers and managing corporation.  Sub-s. (1) provides that managing  officers  and managing corporations  will  perform such  functions  as may be assigned to them under  the  Act. Sub-s.  (2) provides that subject to the provisions  of  the Act  and the rules made thereunder, a managing officer or  a managing  corporation  may, among other  things,  take  such measures as he or it considers it necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing, administering, preserving, managing or  disposing  of  any property  in  the  compensation  pool entrusted to him or it... etc.  The argument is that  unless there is such "entrustment" the managing officer or managing corporation  has  no  function to perform  with  respect  to evacuee  property.  His contention appears to be that  there is  nothing to show that this property was "entrusted" to  a managing  officer.  In the first place the  section  confers the  particular  powers  On managing  officers  or  managing corporations  only and no one else.  Therefore, even  if  no managing officer or managing corporation was appointed  with respect  to  that property no one else  could  exercise  the power  of cancellation of allotment.  Further, there  is  no ground in the special leave petition or in the statement  of the 43 338 case  that there is no entrustment in fact of this  property or  this  class  of properties to  a  managing  officer   or managing corporation.  He cannot, therefore, be permitted to make out a new case at this stage of argument.  That  apart, this  argument  assumes  that  the  property,  despite   the publication  of the notification under s. 12(1) of  the  Act continues to be evacuee property.  Again, this provision  is a  general provision and the particular provision  regarding cancellation of allotment is s. 19(1) of the Act which  does not  refer  to entrustment at all and it is  this  provision which  must  prevail over the general  provision.   He  then contends  that the provisions of s. 19(1) of the  Act  being subject to rules made under the Act must be read along  with r.  102  which  deals with  cancellation  of  allotments  of leases.  That rule reads thus:               "Cancellation  of  allotments  and  leases---A               managing officer or a managing corporation may               sell  any  property in the  compensation  pool               entrusted to him or to it, cancel an allotment               or terminate a lease, or vary the terms of any               such  lease  or allotment if the  allottee  or               lessee, as the case may be-               (a)has sublet or parted with the possession               of  the  whole  or any part  of  the  property               allotted   or  leased  to  him   without   the               permission of a competent authority, or               (b)has used or is using such property for a               purpose  other  than  that for  which  it  was               allotted   or  leased  to  him   without   the               permission of a competent authority, or               (c)   has   committed   any   act   which   is               destructive of or    permanently injurious  to               the property, or               (d)   for  any other sufficient reason  to  be

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             recorded               in writing;               Provided  that no action shall be taken  under               this  rule unless the allottee or the  lessee,               as   the  case  may  be,  has  been  given   a               reasonable opportunity of being heard." He  points out that in the first place, the rule  speaks  of land ’entrusted’ to the manager and, therefore would operate only  if entrustment is established.  What we have  said  in regard to s. 17 would apply 339 here also.  He then says that this rule restricts the powers of  a  managing  officer or a managing  corporation  in  the matter  of  cancellation of allotment in the sense  that  it permits cancellation only on certain specified grounds  and, therefore,  it  cannot be said that s. 19(1) of the  Act  is completely  in conflict with s. 10 of the Administration  of Evacuee   Property  Act  in  so  far  as  the  question   of cancellation  of allotment is concerned.  We  cannot  accept the argument because, apart from the fact that the  acquired properties have ceased to be evacuee properties, el. (d)  of r. 102 permits the managing officer or managing  corporation to  cancel allotment "for any other sufficient reason to  be recorded  in  writing".   The only effect of r.  102  is  to permit  cancellation  ’of an allotment for  reasons  stated. That is all.  In our opinion, therefore, this rule does  not help the appellants. Mr.  Khanna had raised three other points but upon the  view which we have taken as to the effect of ss. 12 and 19 of the Act, it is not necessary to consider them. The  appeal is accordingly dismissed.  We, however, make  no order  as  to costs because had there been no delay  on  the part  of the Custodian General in dealing with the  revision application the present situation would not have arisen.                                Appeal dismissed.