Non- Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7993          OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 12402/2008)

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. ..Appellant

Versus

Avinash Dhaniramji Kamble       ..Respondent

WITH

Civil Appeal  Nos.  7994/2009 to 8018/2009

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 12534/08,19022/08, 17741/08,  17749/08, 17987/08, 17989/08, 17992/08, 18000/08, 18032/08,  18033/08, 18036/08, 18037/08, 18047/08, 18052/08, 18054/08,  18058/08, 18063/08, 18068/08, 18070/08, 18075/08, 18080/08,  18082/08, 18083/08, 18090/08 and  18092/08)

J U D G M E N T

R.M. LODHA, J.

Leave granted.

2. In this group of 26 appeals,  the common judgment  

dated March 3, 2008 passed by the Division Bench of the  High  

Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur is under challenge  at  

the instance  of the employer.

3. In light of the order  that we intend to pass, it is not  

necessary to set out  the facts in detail.  Suffice it to say that in  

the complaints by the present respondents seeking declaration of  

unfair labour practices on  the part of the employer  under Items  

5,  6,  9 and 10 of  Schedule IV of  Maharashtra  Recognition of  

Trade Unions and Prevention of  Unfair  Labour  Practices,  Act,  

1971  (for  short   MRTU & PULP Act”),   the  Industrial   Court,  

Maharashtra (Nagpur Bench) Nagpur, in its order dated March  

19, 2003 held  that  complaints  were not  maintainable under  

Item 6 of Schedule IV  to the MRTU & PULP Act.  The Industrial  

Court also held that the  complaints were liable to be rejected in  

so  far  as  it  related to  Items 5 & 10  of  Schedule IV  but  as  

regards the unfair labour practice  under Item No.9 of Schedule  

IV, although relief  was granted  by the Industrial Court to 149  

temporary workmen who had completed 240 days  of continuous  

service, no relief  was granted to  the  present respondents as  

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they  have  not   completed  240  days of  continuous service  as  

required under the Model Standing Orders.  The Industrial Court,  

in  its  order,   in  respect  of  the  present  respondents  held  as  

follows:  

“From  the  evidence  adduced   by  the  complainants  in  all  other complaints it appears that in all 58 complainants have  not  at  all  completed   240  days  working  during  the  entire  period they were in the employment of the respondent.  The  list  of  these  complainants  is  at  Ex.101.   Hence,  their  confirmation  in  service  as  per  clause  4-C  of  the  Model  Standing Orders does not arise.”

4.  Dealing with the  writ petitions challenging the order  

of the Industrial Court at the instance of the employees as well as  

employer, the single Judge in his judgment dated April  29, 2005,  

inter  alia,  did  notice that   there was dispute between parties  

about  putting  of  uninterrupted  service  of  240  days  by  the  

employees but while dealing with   this aspect of the controversy,  

he  held that  the period during which the  employer engaged  

other batch or other persons in place of the employees (like the  

present   respondents)   will  have  to  be  treated  as  period  of  

‘involuntary unemployment’. The single Judge held thus:

“………The  case  of   the  present  nature  where  employer  resorts to rotation and grants employment only in batches,  

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considering  the  scheme of  Model  Standing Orders,  it  is  apparent  that  the  period  during  which  employer  engaged  other   batch  or  other  person  in  place  of  employee  like  present complainants, will have to be  treated as period of  “involuntary  unemployment”.   It  is  not  the  case  where  no  work is  available for  an employee with  employer but  the  case  is  where  employer  gives  that  work  to  another  temporary employee”……….  

5. The  aforesaid  judgment   of  the  single  Judge  was  

assailed by the employer in a group of  Letters Patent Appeals.  

The  Division  Bench     heard  these  Letters  Patent  Appeals  

together  and disposed of  them by a common judgment  dated  

March 3, 2008.  The Division Bench, inter alia,  held as follows:

“……..Though  the workman had not been able to establish  that  the  employer  had  engaged  two  sets  of  temporaries  employed alternatively, they have demonstrated that though  the work was still available a temporary workman appointed  for a fixed  term was not re-employed or continued, but was  given a break.  Another temporary was appointed likewise  for a fixed period and then again  given a break. ………………………………………………………………………

………In any case, it would not be open to the employer  to  now contend that the  work was not available after having  entered into agreement with the employees’ representative  on  12.1.2008,  whereby  it  has  undertaken  to  grant  permanency to 105 workmen.” .

6. Pertinently,  the  present  respondents   in  the  

complaints  set up a specific case that they had   completed 240  

days uninterrupted service as required under the Model Standing  

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Orders. Having  pleaded that, they also pleaded  that they were  

employed for six months  in rotation with other temporaries and  

upon expiry  of each  terms of six months they were replaced by  

another set of temporaries and that this practice  was followed  

with a view to prevent them to complete 240 days uninterrupted  

service. That these employees  (present respondents) have not  

actually  completed  240 days of  uninterrupted  service is not in  

dispute.  As regards rotational employment to temporaries, the  

Division Bench   held  that the concerned  workmen  had  not  

been able to establish  that the  employer had engaged  two sets  

of  temporaries   employed  alternatively.   Despite  having  held  

that, the Division Bench  concluded   that although  work was  

available,  temporary workmen appointed for a fixed term were  

not re-employed or continued but  were given  break.  It is here  

that we find  that findings of the Division Bench  are inconsistent.  

The Industrial Court   recorded  a categorical  finding of fact in  

respect  of   the  present  respondents  that  they  had  never  

completed  240  days  of   continuous  service.   But   the  single  

Judge as well as the Division Bench, however, treated  the gaps  

between diverse  spells of employment   as part  of  continuous  

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service  on  the  ground  that  these  were  due  to  involuntary  

unemployment.  This approach  of the High Court suffers from  

legal flaw   for more than one reason.   For one, this was not  

even the  case set up  by the complainants in the complaints.  

Secondly,   and  more   importantly,  the  termination  and  fresh  

employment  in respect of  some temporaries  had been several  

times  and  none of  the  complainants  (present  respondents)  

challenged  their  termination  being   illegal  as  and  when  their  

services  were brought  to an end on expiry of the  period for  

which they were engaged under the contract of  service.

7. Although the judgment  of the Division Bench  runs  

into  more  than  50  foolscap  typed   pages  and  reflects   good  

amount  of  industry  put  therein  but   as noticed above  crucial  

aspects have been mixed  up  necessitating  reconsideration of  

letters patent appeals by the Division Bench of the High Court.  

In  view thereof,  we   deem it  unnecessary   to  deal  with   the  

diverse  contentions  raised  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  and  

counsel  for  the parties  and leave all  these contentions to  be  

raised before  the Division Bench.

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8. By  way  of  footnote,   we  may  observe  that  during  

course  of hearing, Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior   counsel  for  

the employer  made a  proposal for  amicable settlement  that  

benefit   of  permanency  to  the  present   respondents   as per  

agreement  dated January 12, 2008 could be given from 2005 or  

so  but   even  such   fair  and  reasonable   proposal   was  not  

acceptable   to  Mr.  S.D.  Thakur   learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents.  

9. In  what  we have  discussed   above,  the  impugned  

judgment  dated  March  3,  2008  is  set  aside.   Letters  Patent  

Appeals  are restored  to the file of  the High Court   for  fresh  

hearing  and disposal in accordance with law.  All contentions of  

the parties are  kept  open to be agitated  before the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court.   No  order  as  to  costs.   Pending  

applications, if any,  stand disposed of.

…………………………..J (Tarun Chatterjee)

…………………………..J (R.M. Lodha)

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…………………………..J (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)

New Delhi, December 3,  2009

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