REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS.                     OF 2008 (CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NOS.8515-8516 OF 2008)

Mahila Vinod Kumar i …..

Petitioner

Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh …..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. Delay condoned.

3. Though, we are not inclined to entertain the special leave

petitions, but we find that there is a need for expressing views

on action to be taken for maliciously setting law into motion.   

4. The  petitioner  lodged  a  report  against  two  persons  at

Pichhore  Police  Station  to  the  effect  that  on  28.1.1993

between  6.00  to  7.00  a.m.  she  was  waylaid  by  them  who

dragged her and committed rape on her, one after another.

She claimed to have narrated the incident to her father and

uncle and, thereafter lodged the report at the police station.

On  the  basis  of  the  report,  matter  was  investigated.   The

accused persons were arrested.  Charge-sheet was filed.  The

accused persons faced trial for alleged commission of offence

punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (in short ‘the IPC’). The accused persons abjured their

guilt. During trial, the petitioner stated that she had actually

not  been  raped.   As  she  resiled  from the  statement  made

during investigation, she was permitted to be cross-examined

by the prosecution.  She even denied to have lodged the first

information report (Exh.P-1) and to have given any statement

to  the  police  (Exh.P-2).  In  view  of  the  statement  of  the

petitioner,  the  two  accused  persons  were  acquitted  by

judgment dated 28.11.2001.  The Trial Court found that the

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petitioner  had  tendered  false  evidence  and  had  fabricated

evidence against the accused persons with the intention that

such  evidence  shall  be  used  in  the  proceedings,  and,

therefore, directed cognizance in terms of Section 344 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) to  be

taken against the petitioner. A show-cause notice was issued

and the case was registered against the petitioner who filed

reply  to  the  effect  that  being  an  illiterate  lady,  she  had

committed the mistake and may be excused.  The Trial Court

found  that  the  petitioner  admitted  her  guilt  that  she  had

lodged  false  report  of  rape  against  the  accused.   She  was,

accordingly,  sentenced  to  undergo  three  months’  simple

imprisonment.  Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner filed an

appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, by the

impugned order, was dismissed.                     

5. Stand before the High Court was that being an illiterate

lady, she does not understand law and the particulars of the

offence were not explained to her and, therefore,  the appeal

should  be  allowed.  This  was  opposed  by  the  State  on  the

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ground that the petitioner had admitted her guilt before the

Trial Court and, therefore, the conviction is well founded.  The

High Court perused the records of the Trial Court and found

that in the show-cause reply she had admitted that she had

told  lies  all  through.  The  stand that  the  particulars  of  the

offence  were  not  explained  to her,  was found to be  equally

untenable, because in the show-cause notice issued, relevant

details  were  given.   In  the  first  information report,  and the

statement recorded by the police, she had clearly stated that

she  was  raped  by  the  accused  persons.  But  in  Court  she

denied to have stated so.  Learned counsel for the petitioner

submitted  that  the  Court  imposed  15  days’  simple

imprisonment which is harsh. But that is not the end of the

matter.  The  petitioner  filed  an  application  before  the  High

Court  stating that  a  wrong  statement  was made  before  the

High Court that she had already suffered custody for 15 days,

which weighed with the High Court to reduce the sentence.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that being a girl

of tender age, she was pressurized by her mother and uncle to

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give  a  false  report.   This  is  at  variance  with the statement

made  in  court  during  trial  to  the  effect  that  she  had  not

reported anything to the police. It is a settled position in law

that  so  far  as  sexual  offences  are  concerned,  sanctity  is

attached  to  the  statement  of  a  victim.  This  Court,  has,  in

several cases, held that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone

is sufficient for the purpose of conviction if it is found to be

reliable, cogent and credible.  In the present case, on the basis

of  the allegations made by the petitioner,  two persons were

arrested and had to face trial  and suffered the ignominy of

being involved in a serious offence like rape. Their acquittal,

may, to a certain extent, have washed away the stigma, but

that  is  not  enough.   The  purpose  of  enacting  Section  344,

Cr.P.C.  corresponding  to  Section  479-A  of  the  Code  of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Old

Code’) appears to be further arm the Court with a weapon to

deal  with  more  flagrant  cases  and  not  to  take  away  the

weapon already in its possession. The object of the legislature

underlying  enactment  of  the  provision  is  that  the  evil  of

perjury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and

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can be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to take

recourse  to Section 340(1)  (corresponding to Section 476 of

the Old Code) in cases in which they are failed to take action

under Section 344 Cr.P.C.

7. This  section  introduces  an  additional  alternative

procedure to punish perjury by the very Court before which it

is committed in place of old Section 479 A which did not have

the desired effect to eradicate the evils of perjury. The salient

features of this new provision are:

(1) Special  powers  have  been  conferred  on  two  specified

Courts, namely Court of Session and Magistrate of the

First Class, to take cognizance of an offence of perjury

committed by a witness in a proceeding before it instead

of  filing  a  complaint  before  a  Magistrate  and  try  and

punish  the  offender  by  following  the  procedure  of

summary trials. For summary trial, see Ch. 21.

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(2) This  power  is  to  be  exercised  after  having  the  matter

considered by the Court only at the time of delivery of the

judgment or final order.

(3) The offender shall be given a reasonable opportunity of

showing cause before he is punished.

(4) The  maximum  sentence  that  may  be  imposed  is  3

month’s imprisonment or a fine up to Rs.500 or both.

(5) The order of the Court is appealable (vide S. 351).

(6) The  procedure  in  this  section  is  an alternative  to  one

under Sections 340-343.  The Court has been given an

option  to  proceed  to  punish  summarily  under  this

section  or  to  resort  to  ordinary  procedure  by  way  of

complaint  under  Section  340  so  that,  as  for  instance,

where the Court is of opinion that perjury committed is

likely  to  raise  complicated  questions  or  deserves  more

severe  punishment  than  that  permitted  under  this

section or the case is otherwise of such a nature or for

some reasons considered to be such that the case should

be  disposed  of under  the  ordinary  procedure  which

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would be more appropriate, the Court may chose to do so

[vide sub-section (3)].

(7) Further  proceedings  of  any  trial  initiated  under  this

section shall be stayed and thus, any sentence imposed

shall also not be executed until the disposal of an appeal

or  revision  against  the  judgment  or  order  in the  main

proceedings in which the witness gave perjured evidence

or fabricated false evidence [vide sub-section (4)].  

8. For exercising the powers under the section the Court at

the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first

instance  express  an  opinion  to  the  effect  that  the  witness

before  it  has  either  intentionally  given  false  evidence  or

fabricated  such  evidence.  The  second  condition  is  that  the

Court  must  come to  the conclusion that in the interests  of

justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily

by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by

the  witness.  And  the  third  condition  is  that  before

commencing the  summary trial  for  punishment  the  witness

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must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why

he  should  not  be  so  punished.  All  these  conditions  arc

mandatory.  [See  Narayanswamy  v.  State  of  Muharashtra,

(1971) 2 SCC 182].  

9. The object of the provision is to deal with the evil perjury

in a summary way.

10. The evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions in

cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the

menace  effectively  it  is  desirable  for  the  courts  to  use  the

provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently

done.   

11. In the case at hand, the court has rightly taken action

and we find nothing infirm in the order of the Trial Court and

the  High  Court  to  warrant  interference.  The  special  leave

petitions are, accordingly dismissed.   

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…………………………..J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………..J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi: July 11, 2008  

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