REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1526 OF 2009            (Arising out of SLP© No. 9782 of 2005)  

Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar                           …Appellant

Versus

       State of Maharashtra        …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal  has been filed  by the  appellant  to challenge  the

judgment and order dated 6th of December, 2004 passed by the

High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in

First Appeal No.875 of 2003 reversing the order dated 27th of

April,  1994  of  the  Reference  Court,  under  Section  18  of  the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’)

whereby  the  High  Court  had  reduced  the  quantum  of

compensation,  as  enhanced  by  the  Reference  Court  from

Rs.83,000/- to Rs.40,226/-.   

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3. The relevant  facts  as arising from the case  made  out  by the

parties, leading to filing of this appeal, and which will help us in

understanding the controversy involved, can be summarized as

follows.

The  property  in  acquisition  belonged  to  the  appellant,

bearing House No. 100/5 at village Deolali,  Tal.  & District

Osmanabad  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘acquired

property’). The same was sought to be acquired by the State

Respondent  for  the  Ruibhor  Medium  Project.  On  10th of

September, 1985, the State Respondent issued a notification

under section 4 of the Act regarding the need of the acquired

property  for  purposes  mentioned  in  the  notification.  This

notification was published on 16th of October, 1985. On 17th

of March, 1986, the State Respondent issued a notification

under section 6 of the Act regarding the need of the acquired

property for purposes mentioned therein. Thereafter, on 30th

of  March,  1988,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  passed  an

award of compensation under section 11 of the Act, granting

an amount of Rs.40,226/- as compensation to the appellant,

the said amount being inclusive of statutory benefits under

Section 23 of the Act.

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4. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded to him,

the appellant in 1991 filed a Reference case under section 18 of

the Act. On 27th of April, 1994, the learned Civil Judge, Senior

Division,  Osmanabad,  on  hearing  the  parties,  held  that  the

compensation  awarded  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  was

inappropriate  and,  therefore,  increased  the  same  to

Rs.83,000/-,  in  addition  to  Rs.5,000/-  towards  the  loss  and

damages  incurred  by  the  appellant.  He  also  awarded  other

statutory benefits under Section 23 of the Act. Being aggrieved

by this order of the Reference Court, the State Respondent filed

an appeal before the Aurangabad Bench of the High Court of

Bombay in December 1996. By the impugned Judgment dated

6th of December, 2004, the High Court had set aside the order of

the Reference Court and reduced the compensation in respect

of  the  acquired  property  from Rs.83,000/-  to Rs.40,226/-  as

granted by the Land Acquisition Officer.   

5. For the purposes of deciding this appeal, it is pertinent to note

the grounds on which the High Court had set aside the order of

the Reference Court, so that the same is kept in consideration

while  appreciating  the  contentions  of  both  the  parties  and

finally adjudicating on the issues involved.  

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6. The High Court was of the opinion that the evidence produced

by the appellants for proving their claim of inadequacy of the

compensation awarded  was insufficient.  The  High Court  also

held  that  the  witnesses  produced  for  examination  by  the

appellant  were  inconsistent  in  their  testimony,  especially

Dattatraya  Trimbakrao  Tirthkar,  father  of  the  appellant,  and

Ramchandra Shankarrao Baraskar,  an engineer  and also  the

valuer in respect of the market value of the acquired property.

As per the High Court, the father of the appellant was unable to

show how the acquired property  was mutated in the name of

the  appellant,  whether  by  partition  or  purchase  by  his

guardian.  Further,  the  valuer  was  unable  to  say  in  his

deposition the date of his visit to the acquired property for the

purpose of valuation. The evidence on record adduced by the

claimant  was  also  unsatisfactory,  as  he  could  not  prove  the

factum of having answered the notice under Section 9 of the Act

and his claim for Rs.7000/- for the vacant plot. Moreover, the

third  witness,  Tanaji  Madhukar  Kshirsagar,  who  claimed  to

have  purchased  property  in  the  vicinity  of  the  acquired

property, was unable to prove that the property purchased by

him  was  adjacent  to  the  acquired  property  and  that  the

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transaction of its purchase could be considered similar to the

acquisition of land of the appellant. Thus, the High Court was of

the  view  that  there  was  nothing  to  support  reliance  on  his

testimony.

7. Given  these  findings,  the  High  Court  held  that  evidence

adduced  by  the  appellant  was  unsatisfactory,  on  which  the

Reference  Court  ought not to have placed reliance.  The High

Court has even held that the deposition of the father and the

expert seems to be concocted merely in order to garner support

for the claimant’s case. Upon the aforesaid findings arrived at

by the High Court, it has set aside the order of the Reference

Court and held that the order of the Land Acquisition Officer

valuing  the  acquired  property  at  Rs.40,226/-  was  just,

reasonable, proper and adequate.

8. Feeling aggrieved by this judgment and order of the High Court,

the appellant has filed the present special leave petition, which

was heard by us on grant of leave in the presence of the learned

counsel for the parties.  

9. The  first  question that  arose  for  our  consideration  in  this

appeal is whether the High Court was justified in reversing

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the finding of  fact  arrived at  by the Reference  Court  on

reappreciation  of  evidence  under  Article  136  of  the

Constitution of India.  

10. If  the  first  question  is  answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  next

issue is with respect to the  sufficiency and reliability of the

evidence adduced by the appellant to discharge his burden

of  proving  that  the  compensation  awarded  by  the  Land

Acquisition  Officer  was  inadequate,  thus  justifying

enhancement as ordered by the Reference Court.

11. The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  the

impugned judgment and order of the High Court was passed

not  after  considering  the  fact  that  the  appellant  had  proved

through examination of three witnesses and production of the

sale deed of a sale transaction in the vicinity that he was legally

entitled to an enhanced compensation, and that the order of the

Reference Court was fully justified.  Further, he contended that

the  High  Court  had  failed  to  consider  the  fact  that  the

Respondent was unable to produce for examination any witness

or any other evidence to rebut any of the submissions of the

appellant.  The  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant  was  also  that  the  High  Court  did  not  give  proper

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weightage to the fact that the acquired property was situated

near Osmanabad Latur Road and that the Aurangabad Solapur

Highway is just 3 k.m. from it, indicating that it was in an area

which was developed, lucrative from the point of view of further

development and hence capable of yielding a high price for the

owner on its sale.  The learned counsel for the appellant has

brought  to  our  notice  the  aforesaid  factual  situation  of  the

acquired property and then relying on the principles laid down

by this Court in Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust,

Bhopal  [AIR  1989  SC  1222], submitted  that  “in  order  to

ascertain the market value of the land taking into consideration

the  special  value  which  ought  to  be  attached  to  the  special

advantage  possessed  by  the  land;  namely,  its  proximity  to

develop urbanized area, the Court has to ascertain as best as

possible from the materials before it what a willing vendor might

reasonably  expect  to obtain from a willing purchaser,  for the

land  in  that  particular  position  and  with  that  particular

potentiality.  The value of the potentiality has to be determined

on such materials as are available and without indulgence in

fits of imagination.”  According to the learned counsel for the

appellant, the High Court also ignored the ratio in Bhag Singh

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&  Ors.  v.  Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  (AIR  1985  SC

1576) in giving importance to technicalities in a matter of land

acquisition by relying on minor inconsistencies in the testimony

of  the  witnesses.  It  was  also  the  contention  of  the  learned

counsel for the appellant that the claim of the State Respondent

regarding absence of permission from the gram panchayat for

construction  of  the  property  cannot  be  accepted.  This  was

because  the  claimant  had  specifically  deposed  that  such

permission was obtained.  Further,  this  was evident  from the

fact that the property was numbered as house no 100/5 by the

gram panchayat. There is nothing to suggest that no permission

has  been  obtained  and  the  respondent  has  not  examined

anybody from the gram panchayat to substantiate its assertion.

Further, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that

the High Court was not justified in allowing the appeal in the

first instance merely on suggestions made by the respondents

in  cross-examinations,  when  they  had  failed  to  derive  any

admissions  on  the  basis  of  these  suggestions.  The  learned

counsel  for the appellant submitted that the High Court was

not justified in considering grounds that were not at all raised

by  the  State  Respondent  in  the  appeal  before  it.  Lastly  the

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learned counsel for the appellant argued that judgment of the

High  Court  was  not,  therefore,  at  all  a  proper  judgment  of

reversal.

12. On  the  other  hand,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  State

Respondent submitted that there was no documentary evidence

to prove that the appellant submitted a reply under section 9 of

the  Act.  Further,  he  contended  that  the  Reference  Court

enhanced the award of compensation without considering the

true nature of the evidence, which was rightly set aside by the

High Court after properly considering the evidence brought in

by  the  appellant  and  the  actual  distance  of  the  acquired

property from the developed organized area and the allegedly

similar sale. On the issue of sufficiency of the evidence adduced

by  the  appellant,  he  submitted  that  the  appellant  could  not

produce  any  material  evidence  in  support  of  his  claim  for

enhanced  compensation  and  the  Reference  Court  was  thus

wrong  in  placing  reliance  on  the  same.  More  specifically,

according to the learned counsel for the State Respondent the

testimony of the expert, the father of the appellant and Tanaji

(who  allegedly  purchased  proximate  property)  was  fabricated

and hence unreliable. He contended that there was no evidence

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to  prove  that  the  construction  on the  acquired  property  was

done with the permission of the gram panchayat, as required.

Learned counsel  further contended that since the High Court

had  reversed  the  finding  of  the  Reference  Court  after

considering the materials  on record,  it  was not open for this

Court to interfere with the findings of fact under Article 136 of

the Constitution of India.

13.We  have  heard  and  considered  all  these  contentions  of  the

learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials

on record including the Judgment of the Reference Court and

also the impugned Judgment.   

14.It is not in dispute that the High Court, in the exercise of its

first  appeal  jurisdiction,  was  entitled  to  come  to  a  different

findings of fact and after considering the evidence and materials

on record can come to a different  conclusion based on such

consideration. Accordingly, we are of the view that in the event

we hold that this Court would not be permitted to interfere with

the  findings  of  fact  arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  on

consideration of the materials on record, oral and documentary,

in that case, the question of going into the other aspects of the

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matter,  which  was  argued  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties, would not arise at all.  In this view of the matter, before

we proceed further, we may take note of the fact that whether

this court, in the exercise of its power under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India, would be entitled to examine the findings

of fact arrived at by the High Court while reversing the findings

of fact arrived at by the Reference Court and whether this Court

in the exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India is also entitled to set aside the findings of fact arrived at

by the High Court on the ground that the judgment of the High

Court was not a proper judgment of reversal. Accordingly, let us

first examine whether in the exercise of our power under Article

136 of the Constitution of India, we can upset the judgment of

reversal on facts and come to a finding that on the evidence

already on record, the order of the Reference Court was just,

proper  and adequate.  Therefore,  let  us examine whether  this

Court would be entitled to examine the findings of fact arrived

at by the High Court on consideration of evidence on record and

the  power  to set  aside  the  findings  of  the High Court  under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India in the matter of reversal

of findings of fact.

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15. It  is  not  in  dispute  that  power  under  Article  136  of  the

Constitution of India is exercisable not only against a judgment

of reversal on facts but also in cases of concurrent findings of

fact and such powers are wide enough. This view was expressed

by this Court way back in the year 1958 in the case of State of

Madras v. A.Vaidyanatha Iyer (AIR 1958 SC 61). In Para 13

at  page  64  of  the  aforesaid  decision,  this  Court  observed  as

follows  

“in  Article  136  the  use  of  the words  ‘Supreme Court may in its discretion grant special leave to appeal  from  any  judgment,  decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the  territory  of  India’  show  that  in  criminal matters no distinction can be made as a matter of construction between a judgment of conviction or acquittal.”  

[Underlining is ours]

A reading of this observation of this Court, as quoted

herein above and considering the expressions used in Article

136  of  the  Constitution,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to

understand that this Court in its discretion may grant leave

to  appeal  from  any  judgment,  decree,  determination,

sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by

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any court or tribunal in the territory of India which would be

apparent also in cases of judgment of reversal and affirmance

in civil proceedings. It is true that the aforesaid observation

was made by this Court while dealing with a criminal case

but  the  scope  of  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India

cannot be different in civil or criminal proceedings. It is also

true that this Court while exercising its power under Article

136 of the Constitution of India will not readily interfere with

the  findings  of  fact  given  by  the  High  Court  but  it  can

interfere  with such  findings  of  fact  if  the  High  Court  acts

perversely or otherwise improperly.  

16. Again  in  Himachal  Pradesh  Administration  v.  Shri  Om

Prakash ((1972) 1 SCC 249), this Court while considering its

power  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India  on  the

question of interference with the findings of fact, observed as

follows:

“in appeals against acquittal by special leave under Article  136,  this  Court  has  undoubted  power  to interfere with the findings of the fact, no distinction being  made  between  judgments  of  acquittal  and conviction though in the case of acquittals it will not ordinarily interfere with the appreciation of evidence or on findings of  fact unless the High Court “acts perversely or otherwise improperly.”

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17. In  Arunachalam  v.  P.S.R.  Sadhanantham &  Anr.

((1979) 2 SCC 297), this Court while agreeing with the views

expressed  in  the  aforementioned  decisions  of  this  Court

stated thus:

“The power is plenary in the sense that there are no  words  in  Article  136  itself  qualifying  that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the  court  to  set  limits to  itself  within  which  to exercise such power. It is now the well-established practice of this Court to permit the invocation of the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances,  as  when  a  question  of  law  of general  public  importance  arises  or  a  decision shocks the conscience of the court. But within the restrictions imposed by itself,  this  Court has the undoubted power to interfere with the findings of fact, making no distinction between judgments of acquittal  and  conviction,  if  the  High  Court,  in arriving at those findings, has “acted perversely or otherwise improperly.”

18. Again in  State of U.P.  v.  Babul Nath ((1994) 6 SCC

29), this Court observed as follows:

“At the  very  outset  we  may mention  that in  an appeal  under Article 136 of  the Constitution  this Court does not normally reappraise  the evidence by itself  and go into the question of  credibility of the witnesses and the assessment of the evidence by  the  High  Court  is  accepted  by  the  Supreme

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Court as final unless, of course, the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.”  

19. In  Pattakkal  Kunhikoya  (Dead)  by  LRs.  v.

Thoopiyakkal Koya & Anr. ((2000) 2 SCC 185) it was

held that when an appeal arises under Article 136 of the

Constitution  of  India,  “it  is  not  the  practice  of  the

Supreme  Court  to  reappreciate  the  evidence  for  the

purpose of examining whether the findings of fact arrived

at by the High Court and the subordinate court is correct

or not. Exception can only be taken in the event of serious

miscarriage  of  justice  or  manifest  illegality  but  not

otherwise.”  

20. In  Mithilesh  Kumari  &  Anr.  v.  Prem Behari  Khare

((1989) 2 SCC 95) this court has held that where findings

of subordinate courts are shown to be “perverse or based

on no evidence or irrelevant evidence or there are material

irregularities affecting the said findings or where the court

feels that justice has failed and the findings are likely to

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result in unduly excessive hardship, the Supreme Court

could not decline to interfere merely on the ground that

findings in question are findings of fact.”

21. As  noted  herein  earlier,  this  Court  does  not  normally

reappreciate  evidence under Article 136, but  when the

High Court has redetermined a fact in issue in a civil

appeal,  and  erred  in  drawing  interferences  based  on

presumptions, the Supreme Court can reappreciate the

evidence to prevent further delay instead of remanding

the matter (See :   Dr.N.G. Dastane    v.   Mrs.S. Dastane  ,   

(1975) 2 SCC 326).

22.From a close examination of the principles laid down by

this Court in the aforesaid series of decisions as referred

to herein above on the question of exercising power to

interfere with findings of fact by this Court under Article

136  of  the  Constitution,  the  following  principles,

therefore, emerge:

• The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India are very wide.

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• It  is  open  to  this  Court  to  interfere  with  the

findings  of  fact  given  by  the  High  Court  if  the

High  Court  has  acted  perversely  or  otherwise

improperly.

• When  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  parties  in

support  of  their  respective  cases  fell  short  of

reliability  and  acceptability and  as  such  it  is

highly unsafe and improper to act upon it.

• The  appreciation  of  evidence  and  finding  is

vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found

contrary  to  the  principles  of  natural  justice,

errors of record and misreading of the evidence,

or  where the conclusions of the High Court are

manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the

evidence on record.  

• The appreciation of evidence and finding results

in  serious  miscarriage  of  justice  or  manifest

illegality.

• Where findings of subordinate courts are shown

to  be  “perverse  or  based  on  no  evidence  or

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irrelevant  evidence  or  there  are  material

irregularities affecting the said findings or where

the  court  feels  that  justice  has  failed  and  the

findings are likely to result in unduly excessive

hardship.

• When the High Court has redetermined a fact in

issue  in  a  civil  appeal,  and  erred  in  drawing

interferences based on presumptions.

• The  judgment  was  not  a  proper  judgment  of

reversal.

(Underlining is ours)

23.Keeping the aforesaid position as enunciated and settled

by the aforesaid series of decisions of this Court on the

question of the power of this Court to interfere with the

findings of fact on reversal in the exercise of our power

under  Article  136 of  the Constitution of India,  we shall

now  proceed  to  examine  the  evidence  as  well  as

reasonings  given  by  the  Reference  Court  and  the  High

Court and the materials on record to find out whether the

findings  of  fact  arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  while

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reversing the findings of fact arrived at by the Reference

Court had satisfied the basic principles as noted herein

earlier.  

24. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the present

case  and evidence  and  materials  before  us,  which  was

duly considered by the Reference Court, the High Court

was  not  justified  in  interfering  with the  findings  of  the

Reference Court based on mere suggestions made by the

State Respondent and setting aside its order.  In our view,

the findings made by the High Court were arbitrary and

improper  inasmuch  as  the  High  Court  had  failed  to

consider the total lack of evidence adduced by the State

Respondent  and  disregarded  the  witnesses  produced

before it without sufficient justification for doubting their

credibility. Such  arbitrariness  in  findings  has  caused

serious miscarriage of justice as against the appellant by

denying  him  a  just  and  reasonable  compensation  for

property acquired from him by the State Respondent.  

25.The  High  Court  upheld  the  contentions  of  the  State

Respondent even though there was no evidence adduced

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by the State Respondent to support the same. Thus, its

findings are based on no evidence at all.

26.Keeping  this  in  mind,  we  are  inclined  to  reconsider

evidence on record in this appeal and assess the findings

of fact made by the courts below.

27.  We  now  turn  to  the  issue  of  sufficiency  of  evidence

adduced by the appellant to prove its claim of enhancement

of compensation. It  is a well-established proposition of law

that the burden of proving the true market value of acquired

property is on the State that has acquired it for a particular

purpose (See   Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue   

Officer    v.    V.  Narasaiah,   (2001)  3  SCC 530)  .  It  appears

from the record that the State had only produced a valuers’

report of a government engineer in order to substantiate its

claim of market value, whereas the claimant has produced a

valuation  report  and  sale  transaction  from  which  it  will

appear that the claimant has successfully proved the market

value  of  the  acquired  property  as  determined  by  the

Reference Court. Therefore, it can be legitimately concluded

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that the burden of proving inadequacy of the amount which

lay on the claimant was successfully discharged by him.

28. In  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer v.  Sidappa

Omanna Tumari & Ors. (1995 Supp (2) SCC 168) it was

held that a report of an expert for establishing the market

value can be acted upon by the Court if “relevant factual

data or  material  which  constituted basis for  the report is

also produced and the same is proved to be genuine and

reliable and the method adopted by the expert is found to

be recognized and correct.” In this appeal, the report of the

engineer  engaged  by  the  appellant  to  prove  the  market

value of the acquired property, is based on his personal

visit to the site of the acquired property, the map drawn

by  him after  taking  the  measurements  of  the  acquired

property  and  the  valuation  report  made  by  him  after

deducting  the  cost  of  depreciation.  The  valuer  of  the

appellant has also submitted a map as well as the cost of

depreciation report and the valuation report. He has also

given details of the date of his visit to the said property in

1985.  Further,  it  is  not  disputed  that  he has used  the

PWD  practice  and  standard  engineering  norms  while

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deciding  the  value  of  the  acquired  property.  All  these

factors seem to make the valuation of the expert valuer

worthy of credence, as per the ratio of the above-stated

case.

29. Given that the appellant has been able to show, by the

testimony and valuation report of the expert valuer, that

the  award  of  compensation  passed  by  the  Land

Acquisition Officer was inadequate,  the onus now shifts

on  the  Respondent  to  adduce  sufficient  evidence  to

sustain  the  award,  as  was  held  clearly  in  the  case  of

Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Sidappa Omanna

Tumari (1995 Supp (2) SCC 168). We firmly feel that the

State Respondent has completely failed to discharge this

burden. The Respondent has been unable to produce any

evidence at all  to support its claim of sufficiency of the

award  and  the  High  Court  judgment,  leave  alone  the

question of having adduced sufficient evidence.  

30. It is clear that the High Court has completely overlooked

the lack of evidence in support of the contentions of the

Respondent  and  the  conclusion  of  the  High  Court  is

backed  only  by  assertions  rather  than  by  acceptable

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reasoning based on proper appreciation of evidence. This

being  the  case,  the  order  of  the  High  Court  cannot  be

sustained,  as  held  in  the  case  of  Othayath  Lekshmy

Amma &  Anr.  v.  Nellachinkuniyil  Govindan  Nair &

Ors. ((1990) 3 SCC 374). We are thus inclined to accept

the contention of the appellant that the High Court has

relied  merely  on  suggestions  made  by  the  State-

Respondent in cross-examinations, when they have failed

to  derive  any  admissions  on  the  basis  of  these

suggestions.

31. As  regards  the  evidence  of  Mr.  Tanaji,  who  claimed  to

have purchased property  in the  vicinity of  the acquired

property,  it  is  held that section 51A of  the Act  permits

acceptance of the certified copy of the sale transaction, as

produced  by  the  witness  in  this  case,  even  without

examination of the vendor or vendee. However, the use of

the term “may” in the said provision shows that there is

discretion with the court to the extent of reliance to be

placed on the same. This has been explicitly held in the

case of  Cement Corpn. Of India Ltd. V.  Purya & Ors.

((2004)  8  SCC  270).  This  Court  in  the  abovenamed

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decision also held that such a sale deed is to be believed

only if there is no contrary evidence to rebut its contents.

Given  that  the  State  Respondent  has  been  unable  to

adduce  any  evidence  to  rebut  this  sale  deed,  we  are

inclined  to  place  reliance  on  the  same  and  consider  it

genuine.

32. Coming to the findings of the High Court  regarding the

inconsistency  and  infirmity  in  the   testimony  of  the

witnesses produced by the appellant for examination, it is

emphasized that the burden of proof in civil cases is that

of  “balance  of  probability”  and  not  that  of  “beyond

reasonable  doubt”.  Thus  minor  inconsistencies  in

evidence are not relevant in civil cases in considering the

question of discharge of this burden. This principle has

been  reiterated  by this  Court  in  a  number  of  decisions

namely Sarjudas & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (AIR 2000

SC 403) and  State of Rajasthan  v.  Netrapal  & Ors.

((2007)  4  SCC  45).  Further,  all  inconsistencies  in

evidence  cannot  impeach  the  credit  of  the  witness  and

hence reliability of its testimony. It has been held by this

Court in Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya

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Pradesh  ((1999)  8  SCC  649) that  only  contradictory

statements would so affect the witnesses’ credit. We are of

the opinion that the inconsistencies  pointed out by the

High Court in the evidence adduced by the appellant are

only  minor  inconsistencies  and  do  not  warrant  non-

reliance on the same.

33.The  High Court  held  that  there  is  inconsistency  in  the

testimony of the father of the appellant and that of Mr.

Tanaji  in  so  far  as  the  distance  between  the  acquired

property  and  the  property  purchased  by  Mr.  Tanaji  in

Kajali is concerned because the former witness claims the

distance as 0.5 kms, while the latter has stated that it is

1.5  to  2  kms.   We  are  of  the  opinion  that  this

inconsistency is insignificant since both the statements go

on to prove that the two properties are close to each other

and are hardly contradictory.  

34.Further, the inconsistency pointed out in the testimony of

the  expert  valuer  is  that  he  stated  in  the  cross-

examination  that  it  is  necessary  for  valuation  of  the

acquired property to consider the type of material used in

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the construction of the same and the place from which the

materials were procured and in the examination-in-chief,

he agreed that he did  not see  any report  regarding the

same. These statements are, however, not contradictory.

While it might be necessary for the valuer to consider the

abovementioned factors in the process of his valuation, it

is not necessary for him to rely on the report of another

person with regard to the same. He, being an expert in his

field,  can  rely  on  his  own  knowledge,  experience  and

judgment to come to conclusions regarding these aspects

of the acquired property. Thus, the testimony of the expert

valuer is not rendered discredited on this ground.

35.The reasons given by the High Court for setting aside the

order of the Reference Court were limited to inconsistency

and  unreliability  of  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses

produced by the appellants and on the grounds that were

clearly argued by the State Respondent.   

36. It  appears  that  the  High  Court  found  doubts  in  the

evidence adduced by the appellants when none existed.

Thus, there is a patent error in rejecting the appellant’s

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evidence.  The  High  Court  sought  “consistence  in  the

evidence forsaking  the sense the evidence conveyed and

the  effect  it  produced.” Such  an  approach  renders  the

reasoning  of  the  High Court  unsustainable,  as  held  by

this Court in State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale

& Ors. (AIR 1993 SC 1126).

37. Finally,  it  is  pertinent  to  note  that  the  appellants  have

correctly brought out the opinion of this Court in the case

of  Suresh Kumar v.  Town Improvement Trust  (Supra) and

Bhag  Singh v.  Union  of  India (Supra).  The  former  case

clearly lays down that proximity to develop urbanized area

needs to be necessarily considered, while deciding on the

compensation to be paid for acquisition of land, on the

basis of evidence available. The High Court seems to have

ignored that based on the evidence put forth before it by

the  appellant,  the  acquired  property  is  situated  near

Osmanabad Latur Road and Aurangabd Solapur Highway,

and the Respondent has not given any evidence to rebut

this contention. Thus, the High Court has overlooked the

proximity  of  the acquired property  to a developed  area.

Further, while this Court clearly cautioned against taking

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up of “technical  pleas to defeat a just claim to enhanced

compensation”  under  the Act  in  Bhag  Singh v.  Union  of

India (supra),  the High Court set  aside the order of the

Reference  Court  merely  on  grounds  of  minor

inconsistencies  and  technicalities.  It  seemed  to  have

disregarded  the fact  that the compensation provision of

the Act is in the nature of a welfare stipulation and thus

the  State  government  must  be  just  and  fair  to  those

whose land it acquires.  It is not just and fair to deprive

the  owner  of  any property  without  payment  of  its  true

market value, especially when the law provides that the

same shall be paid.

38.Before parting with this judgment, we may also state here

that  the  entire  compensation  money  given  by  the

Reference Court has been allowed to be withdrawn and

therefore, this is one of the aspects that should have been

kept in mind.  

39.For the reasons above-stated, we set aside the impugned

judgment  of  the  High  Court,  thereby  restoring  the

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judgment  of  the  Reference  Court  awarding  enhanced

compensation to the appellant.

40.The appeal is accordingly allowed. There is no order as to

costs.

…………………..J.          [Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi               ……….…..… …..J.

March 04, 2009   [V. S. Sirpurkar]

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