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             REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1640 OF 2009

[Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8077 of 2008]

Mahesh Chand Sharma  ....Appellant   

Versus State of U.P. & Ors. ....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Deepak Verma, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal arises out of Judgment and order dated  9.5.2008 passed by learned Single Judge of High Court of  Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal  Misc. Application  No.26653 of 2007 wherein and whereby a petition filed by  respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4, viz., Panna Lal, Ram Babu and  Rajkumar respectively under Section 482 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure  (for  short,  'Cr.P.C.')   has  been  allowed and the Criminal case No.1245/IX of 2007 titled  State Vs. Panna Lal and Ors.  registered against them  under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian  Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') on the file of Additional

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Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Mathura and the order dated  24.9.2007 whereby and whereunder the Presiding Officer of  the Court took cognizance against the accused, respondent  nos.2 to 4 herein, have been quashed.  Appellant, feeling  aggrieved by the said order of quashment is before us  challenging the same on variety of grounds. 3. We have accordingly heard Mr. D.K. Goswami, learned  counsel for the appellant  and Mr. R. Dash, learned senior  counsel  for respondent No.1-State.  Despite service of  notices none appeared before us for the accused-respondent  Nos.2 to 4. 4.   Facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are mentioned  hereinbelow: 5.  The appellant filed a complaint purportedly under  Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. on 13.10.2004 before the  Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura.  The main allegation  in  the  said  complaint  is  that  he  had  purchased  land  admeasuring 0.38 decimal from Mahesh Chand, S/o Shri Jagan  Prasad  vide   registered  sale  deed  dated  6.10.1986.  Pursuant  to the execution of said sale deed in favour of  the  appellant-Mahesh  Chand  Sharma,  he  was  handed  over  possession of the same by the vendor and since then he  continues to be in possession thereof.

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6. On 23.9.1996 appellant, with an intention to protect  the property, started constructing boundary wall, which  was  objected  to  by  Panna  Lal,  Ram  Babu  and  Rajkumar,  respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein.  They contended that  the  land in question, alleged to have been purchased by the  appellant is recorded in their names and they were ready  to fight on this issue. 7. Thereafter,  appellant  Mahesh  Chand  Sharma  and  his  vendor Mahesh Chand  both went to Tehsildar's Court and  made  inquiries about  case no.293/14 A.T and came to know  that  the  said  accused  in  collusion  with  Area  Lekhpal,  Prahlad Singh  got their names mutated on the basis of  report dated 18.8.1992 said to have been prepared under  Section 22 of the Land Record Manual.   8. In  the  said  report,  Area  Lekhpal   reported  that  accused Panna Lal, Ram Babu and Rajkumar, sons of Parsadi  are the only  heirs of Jagan Prasad and Devi Prasad both  sons of Bidha Ram.  It was falsely stated that Jagan  Prasad  had no heir, while  the vendor of the appellant  Mahesh Chand is the only son of Late Jagan Prasad and is  still alive and he is also the legal heir  of his real  uncle Devi Prasad who had no issues.   9. It appears that the Area Lekhpal had given totally  untrue statement and  by showing an alive person Mahesh

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Chand S/o Jagan Prasad, appellant's vendor as dead had got  the  said  names  of  the  accused  mutated.   According  to  appellant,  they  had  thereby  committed  the  offences  punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B  of  the IPC.   10. On  the  strength  of  these  allegations,  an  order  under  Section  156(3),  Cr.P.C.  was  passed.  The  said  application/complaint  of  the  appellant  was  allowed  and  police registered the FIR and started investigation. 11. Even  though  learned  Single  Judge  has  given  the  details of the family tree of the respondents and Mahesh  Chand, vendor of the appellant but to decide the said  case,  it  is  not   necessary  to  dwell  on  it  further.  Suffice it to say that Mahesh Chand is the only surviving  lineage on his side of the family. Therefore, Mahesh Chand  being  the  only  person  alive,  inherited   the  entire  property of  Bidha Ram. Being the lawful owner of the  above mentioned property, he executed the sale deed on  6.10.1986 as mentioned hereinabove in favour of appellant. 12. As would be revealed from the facts of the case, it  was  Area  Lekhpal  who,  in  furtherance  of  his  evil  intentions, gave a false statement with an object to help  the accused asserting that the last descendant of Bidha  Ram,  i.e.,  Mahesh  Chand,  vendor  of  the  appellant  had

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already died.  On the strength of this statement having  been made by Area Lekhpal, the names of the respondent  Nos.2 to 4 were mutated in their favour by the Court of  Tehsildar on 9.10.1992. 13. Accused Respondent Nos.2 to 4 asserted that disputed  property was mutated in their names on the basis of an  unregistered  Will  dated  14.07.1974  said  to  have  been  executed by late Jagan Prasad, father of Mahesh Chand,  ignoring  his  only  son,  which  is  highly  ridiculous  and  certainly  an afterthought. 14. The  appellant,  on  coming  to  know  that  names  of  accused have been mutated on the property of which he is  the  lawful  owner,  having  purchased  the  same  from  its  previous owner, Mahesh Chand, S/o Jagan Prasad, thereby  moved an application before SDM, Mathura, to set aside the  mutation  order  dated  9.10.1992,  which  application  ultimately came to be allowed. 15. Feeling aggrieved by the said order passed in favour  of  the  appellant,  accused-respondents  filed  an  appeal  before the Commissioner of  Agra Division, but it met the  fate of dismissal.  The matter thus came to an end as far  as mutation proceedings were concerned.   16. Looking to the adamant and offensive attitude of the  accused,  the   appellant  was  constrained  to  move  a

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complaint  under  Section  156(3)  of  the  CrPC  before  the  learned Magistrate, Mathura who directed to investigate  the  matter  and  register  a  case  against  the  accused- respondents.  An FIR was registered as Crime No.51/2004.  After investigation,  the investigating officer submitted  the final report on 15.12.2004.  The appellant, feeling  aggrieved  by the said final report of the police, filed a  Protest  Petition  in  the  Court  of  A.C.J.M.,  Mathura  on  19.3.2005,  who treated it to be a complaint and fixed the  case for recording of the statement of the appellant. 17. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by ACJM,  Mathura, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No.335/2005  before  Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura, which came to  be admitted for hearing on 15.6.2005.  During the pendency  of this Revision, the appellant's protest petition dated  19.3.2005  was  dismissed  in  default  by  the  learned  Magistrate. On coming to know about the dismissal of the  said protest petition, appellant filed another Criminal  Revision  No.  526/2005  before  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge, Mathura. 18. The  Additional   Sessions  Judge  allowed  both  the  Revisions vide its judgment dated 31.10.2005 and set aside  the  orders  of  the  learned  Magistrate  dated  7.6.2005  treating the protest petition to be a complaint as also

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the order of dismissal of the said petition. 19. Pursuant  to  the  directions  of  the  learned  Addl.  Sessions Judge, Mathura, the  Magistrate  once again heard  the  appellant  and    pursuant  thereto,  directions  were  issued to the police to further investigate the matter  rejecting the final report of the police dated 15.12.2004.  Thereafter,  police  completed  the  investigation   and  Investigating  Officer  submitted   the  charge  sheet  on  18.9.2007  in  the  Court  of  Magistrate,  Mathura  for  commission of alleged offences under Sections  420, 467,  468, 471 and 120B of  the IPC.  20. On the strength of the charge sheet, Criminal Case  No.1245/IX  of  2007   as  mentioned  hereinabove   was  registered against the respondents, which took cognizance  against    respondent  Nos.2  to  4  vide  order  dated  24.9.2007.  21. The   accused  moved  the  High  Court  by  filing  a  petition  under  Section  482,  Cr.P.C.  as  mentioned  hereinabove with a prayer for quashing the charge sheet  and taking cognizance thereof.  The said petition having  been allowed, Mahesh Chand Sharma S/o Ganga Charan Sharma  is before us in this appeal. 22. We have critically gone through the impugned order  passed by  learned Single Judge and find that there has

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been total non-application of law with regard to provision  contained in Section 195 of Cr.P.C.  The  relevant portion  of  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  is  reproduced hereinbelow :

“Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid  Section that the complainant could move an  application in this regard before the Court  of  Tehsildar  and  that  Court  after  making  necessary  enquiry  could  pass  an  order  for  lodging  a  complaint  against  the  accused  persons and that complaint could be sent to  the Court of Magistrate having jurisdiction  to try the offence.  The  above procedure,  which was the right and correct procedure in  present  case,  was  not   followed  but  an  application  under  Section  156  (3)  Cr.P.C.  was  moved  for  police  investigation,  which  was  barred  in  view  of  the  provisions  of  Section 195 Cr.P.C.

Thus, the  entire proceedings taken on  the  basis  of  the  orders  passed  on  the  application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and  on the charge sheet submitted in compliance  of  the  orders  on  that  application  are  without  jurisdiction,  and  the  learned  Magistrate erred in law by taking cognizance  on that charge sheet.  Hence, the present  application  under  section  482  Cr.P.C.  deserves to be allowed and the proceedings  of the case deserves to be quashed in view  of the bar of  Section 195 Cr. P.C.  The  complainant  opposite  party  No.2  shall,  however,  be  at  liberty  to  move  an  application  against  the  accused  applicants  under  Section  340  Cr.P.C.  before  the  concerned  Court  in  accordance  with  the  provisions of law.

The  application  under  section  482  Cr.P.C.   is,  therefore,  allowed  and  the  charge  sheet  submitted  in  Criminal  Case  No.1245/IX of 2007 State Vs. Panna Lal and

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others and the order of the Magistrate dated  24.9.2007 taking cognizance thereon are set  aside.   However,  it  will  be  open  to  the  complainant opposite party No. 2 to move an  application before the concerned court for  taking action against the accused persons in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  section  340 Cr.P.C.”

23. To appreciate the facts and apply the  law correctly, it is necessary to go through  the  relevant   provisions  and  thus  we  reproduce Section 195(1)(b)(ii):

“195.   Prosecution  for  contempt  of  lawful  authority  of  public  servants,  for  offences  against  public  justice  and  for  offences  relating  to  documents  given  in  evidence -  (1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a) ... ... ...       (b) (i) ... ... ... (ii)  of  any  offence  described  in  Section  463, or  punishable  under  Section  471,  section  475  or  section  476,  of  the  said  Code, when such offence is alleged to have  been  committed  in  respect  of  a  document  produced  or  given  in  evidence  in  a  proceeding in any court, or (iii) ... ... ...” 24. While  dealing  with  the   provision  contained in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. this  Court in a celebrated judgment reported in  (1998) 2 SCC 493 titled Sachida Nand Singh &

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Anr.  v.  State of Bihar & Anr. has held as  under :-  

“6. A reading of the clause reveals two main  postulates  for  operation  of  the  bar  mentioned there.  First is, there must be  allegation  that  an  offence  (it  should  be  either an offence described in Section 463  or  any  other  offence  punishable  under  Sections 471, 475, 476 of the IPC) has been  committed.    Second  is  that  such  offence  should have been committed in respect of a  document produced or given in evidence in a  proceeding  in  any  court.   There  is  no  dispute before us that if forgery has been  committed  while  the  document  was  in  the  custody of a court, then prosecution can be  launched only with a complaint made by that  court.   There  is  also  no  dispute  that  if  forgery was committed with a document which  has not been produced in a  court then the  prosecution  would lie at the instance of  any person.  If so, will its production in a  court make all the difference? 7. Even if the clause is capable of two  interpretations  we are inclined to choose  the  narrower  interpretation  for  obvious  reasons.  Section  190  of  the  Code  empowers  “any magistrate of the first class” to take  cognizance of “any offence” upon receiving a  complaint, or police report or information  or  upon  his  own  knowledge.  Section  195  restricts  such  general  powers  of  the  magistrate,  and  the  general  right  of  a  person to move the court with a complaint is  to  that  extent  curtailed.   It  is  a  well- recognized  canon  of  interpretation  that  provision  curbing  the  general  jurisdiction  of  the  court  must  normally  receive  strict  interpretation  unless  the  statute  or  the  context  requires  otherwise  (Abdul  Waheed  Khan v. Bhawani AIR 1966 SC 1718: 1966 (3)  SCR 617)”

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25. Similar issue again came up for consideration before  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  yet  another  judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah  & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370 and held as under :

“7.  On  a  plain  reading  clause  (b)(ii)  of  sub-section (1) of Section 195 is capable of  two  interpretations.  One  possible  interpretations  is  that  when  an  offence  described in Section 463 or punishable under  Section 471,  Section 475 or Section 476 IPC  is alleged to have been committed in respect  of a document which is subsequently produced  or given in evidence in a proceeding in any  court,  a  complaint  by  the  court  would  be  necessary.   The  other  possible  interpretation is that  when a document has  been produced or  given in evidence in a  proceeding in any court and thereafter an  offence described as aforesaid is committed  in respect thereof, a complaint by the court  would be necessary.  On this interpretation  if the offence as described in the section  is committed prior to production or giving  in  evidence  of  the  document  in  court,  no  complaint by court would be necessary and a  private  complaint  would  be  maintainable.  The question which requires consideration is  which of the two interpretations should be  accepted having regard to the scheme of the  Act and object sought to be achieved. 8.Dr.  A.M.  Singhvi,  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants,  submitted  that  the  purpose  of  Section  195  is  to  bar  private  prosecution where the cause of justice is  sought  to  be  perverted  leaving  it  to  the  court  itself  to  uphold  its  dignity  and  prestige.   If  a  very  restricted  interpretation  is  given  to  Section  195  (1)(b)(ii)CrPC,  as  held  in  Sachida  Nand  Singh v. State of Bihar  (1998) 2 SCC  493 :

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1998 SCC (Cri.) 660 the protection afforded  by the provision will be virtually reduced  to a vanishing point, defeating the  very  object of the enactment.  The provision, it  is  urged,  does  not  completely  bar  the  prosecution of a person who has committed an  offence  of  the  type  described  thereunder,  but introduces a safeguard in the sense that  he  can  be  so  prosecuted  only  on  the  complaint of the court where the document  has been produced or given in evidence or of  some  other  court  to  which  that  court  is  subordinate.   Learned  counsel  has  also  submitted  that  being  a  penal  provision,  giving  a  restricted  meaning  as  held  in  Sachida Nand Singh  would not be proper as a  person  accused  of  having  committed  an  offence would be deprived of the protection  given to him by the legislature.  He has  also submitted that on the aforesaid  view  there  is  a  possibility  of  conflicting  findings  being  recorded  by  the  civil  or  revenue court where the document has been  produced  or  given  in  evidence  and  that  recorded by the criminal court on the basis  of private complaint and therefore an effort  should be made to interpret the section in  the manner which avoids such a possibility.”

Finally while interpreting the provision of Section 195 of  the Cr.P.C. the Bench held as under in para 10 of the said  Judgment.  

“10. The scheme of the statutory provision may  now be examined. Broadly, Section 195 Cr.P.C  deals  with  three  distinct  categories  of  offences which have been described in clauses  (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1)  contempt  of  lawful  authority  of  public  servants, (2) offences against public justice,  and (3) offences relating to documents given  in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences  punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which  occur in Chapter X IPC and the heading of the  Chapter  is  —  “Of  Contempts  of  the  Lawful

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Authority  of  Public  Servants”.  These  are  offences which directly affect the functioning  of or discharge of lawful duties of a public  servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in  Chapter XI IPC which is headed as — “Of False  Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice”.  The offences mentioned in this clause clearly  relate to giving or fabricating false evidence  or making a false declaration in any judicial  proceeding or before a court of justice or  before  a  public  servant  who  is  bound  or  authorised by law to receive such declaration,  and also to some other offences which have a  direct correlation with the proceedings in a  court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC).  This being the scheme of two provisions or  clauses of Section 195 viz. that the offence  should be such which has direct bearing or  affects the functioning or discharge of lawful  duties of a public servant or has a direct  correlation with the proceedings in a court of  justice, the expression “when such offence is  alleged to have been committed in respect of a  document produced or given in evidence in a  proceeding in any court” occurring in clause  (b)(ii)  should  normally  mean  commission  of  such  an  offence  after  the  document  has  actually been produced or given in evidence in  the court. The situation or contingency where  an offence as enumerated in this clause has  already been committed earlier and later on  the  document  is  produced  or  is  given  in  evidence in court, does not appear to be in  tune  with  clauses  (a)(i)  and  (b)(i)  and  consequently with the scheme of Section 195  Cr.P.C.  This  indicates  that  clause  (b)(ii)  contemplates  a  situation  where  the  offences  enumerated therein are committed with respect  to a document subsequent to its production or  giving  in  evidence  in  a  proceeding  in  any  court.”

26. The ratio decidendi of the aforesaid two cases lead  us to  a conclusion that the  order passed by the learned

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Single Judge cannot be sustained in law. 27. Learned Single Judge proceeded on absolutely wrong  facts and incorrect principles of law have been applied. 28. Learned Single Judge completely lost sight of the  fact that the offence committed by accused in collusion  with  Area  Lekhpal  was  not  in  relation  to  court  proceedings.  It was in any case behind the back of the  appellant and as soon as he came to know with regard to  the illegal designs of the accused he lodged a complaint  under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 29. The law on the point is too well settled in the light  of the above said two judgments of this Court that Section  195 (1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. contemplates a situation  where  offences  enumerated  therein  are  committed  with  respect  to  a  document  subsequent  to  its  production  or  giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. 30. The learned Single Judge further committed a gross  error  in  resorting  to  Section  340  of  the  Cr.P.C.  as  provisions of the said Section can be invoked only when it  is established that offence of  forgery had already been  committed.  In any case,  accused had miserably failed for  grant of any relief under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.  The  limit of exercising jurisdiction conferred on the Court  under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is well defined and  by no

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stretch of imagination, it could be said  that petition  filed  by  accused  under  Section  482  of  the  Cr.P.C  had  fulfilled the requirement as contemplated in this Section. 31. Looking to the facts from any angle, we are of the  considered   opinion  that  the  impugned  order  cannot  be  sustained.  The same is accordingly hereby set aside and  quashed.   32. As  a  necessary  consequence  thereof,  learned  Magistrate  is  directed  to  proceed  with  the  Criminal  Complaint filed by appellant herein against the accused- respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 in accordance  with law and on  merits at an early date and endeavour would be made by him  to dispose of the same within a period of six months from  the date of appearance of the parties. 33. The appeal stands allowed.

.......................J. [V.S. SIRPURKAR]

New Delhi. .......................J. August 28, 2009. [DEEPAK VERMA]