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PETITIONER: MAHENDRA SINGH DHANTWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HINDUSTAN MOTORS LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1976

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2062            1976 SCR  635  1976 SCC  (4) 606  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC 505  (23)  RF         1984 SC1673  (1)

ACT:      Industrial Disputes  Act. 1947-Ss.  33(2)(b)  and  33A- Scope of.      Misconduct not  mentioned in  standing  Orders-Standing Orders, if exhaustive of all kinds of misconduct.      Constitution of  India, Art.  226-Scope of jurisdiction in industrial disputes.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent  terminated the  appellant’s services on the ground  of habitual  absence which is a misconduct under the company’s  standing orders. Although there was a dispute pending before  the Tribunal, the respondent did not make an application under s. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for its  approval. On  an application by the appellant under s. 33A of the Act, the Tribunal ordered his reinstatement. A few months  after the appellant rejoined duty the respondent terminated  his   services  purporting   to  act  under  the agreement of  service  with  him.  On  a  complaint  by  the appellant  under   s.  33A,   the   Tribunal   ordered   his reinstatement. A  single Judge  of the  High Court dismissed the  writ  petition  of  the  respondent  holding  that  the discharge was  nothing  but  dismissal  for  misconduct.  On appeal, the  Division Bench  held that  since  the  employer invoked the  terms of  the agreement,  it was  not a case of discharge for  misconduct and  as such  the Tribunal  had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under s. 33A.      Allowing the appeal. ^      HELD: The  Tribunal has  not committed any error of law or of  jurisdiction in entertaining the application under s. 33A and  the Single  Judge was right in not interfering with the award  under Article  226 of  the Constitution  and  the Division Bench was wrong in doing so. [641H; 641E]      (a)  The   Tribunal  has  found  as  a  fact  that  the termination was on account of misconduct of the employee. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that there was any manifest error of  law committed  by the  Tribunal in  reaching  that

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conclusion only  because the  misconduct, as  found, was not within the four corners of the various misconducts mentioned in the standing orders. [641H]      (b) Standing  orders only  describe  certain  cases  of misconduct and  they cannot be exhaustive of all the species of misconduct.  Even though  a given  conduct may  not  come within the  specific terms  of misconduct  described in  the standing orders, it may still be a misconduct in the special facts of a case, which it may not be possible to condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action. [641F]      (c) Termination  simpliciter under  the  conditions  of service or under the standing orders is outside the scope of s. 33  of the  Act. This does not mean that the employer has the last  word  about  the  termination  of  service  of  an employee. It  is also  not a correct proposition of law that in case  of a  complaint under s. 33A, the Tribunal would be debarred   from    going   into    the   question    whether notwithstanding the  form of  the order. in substance, it is an action  of dismissal  for misconduct  and not termination simpliciter. [642-A-B]      Management of Murgan Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Another [1965] 2 SCR 148, held inapplicable.      Air India  Corporation, Bombay v. V. A. Rebellow & Anr. [1972] 3 S.C.R. 606, referred to. 636      Shyamala Studios  v. Kannu  Devar  (S.S.)  and  Others, [1966] 2  LLJ 428  and Sri  Rama Machinery  Corporation  (P) Limited, Madras  v. Murthi  (N.R.) and  Others, [1966] 2 LLJ 899, partly approved.      (d) Section  33(2)(b)  makes  it  obligatory  upon  the employer to  make an  application to  the Tribunal under the proviso when  he discharges  or dismisses  the  workman  for misconduct. From  the provisions  of s.  33, it  is manifest that punitive action of the employer in whatever form it may be passed,  is permissible  against an  ordinary workman  as distinguished from  a  protected  workman  even  during  the pendency of  proceedings before  the Tribunal  provided that the employer  pays one month’s wages and also applies to the concerned Tribunal  for approval  of his  action. Since  the action is  punitive,  namely,  dismissal  or  discharge  for misconduct, the  Tribunal  has  to  oversee  the  action  to guarantee that  no unfair  labour practice  or victimisation has been  practised. If  the procedure  of fair  hearing has been observed,  the Tribunal  has to  find in an application under s.  33 that  a  prima  facie  case  is  made  out  for dismissal. If,  on the other hand, there is violation of the principles of  natural justice  in the enquiry, the Tribunal can go  into the  whole question  relating to the misconduct and  come   to  its  own  conclusion  whether  the  same  is established. [641E; 640H]      (e) In  the  instant  case  even  though  the  employer invoked the  agreement for  terminating the  service of  the employee it  was open  to the Tribunal to pierce the veil of the order  and have  a closes  look at  the circumstance and come to  a decision  whether the order was passed on account of certain misconduct. This is a finding of fact which could not be  interfered with  under Art.  226 of the Constitution unless the conclusion is perverse. [643F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2574 of 1972.      Appeal from  the Judgment and Order dated the 2nd June,

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1965 of  the Calcutta  High Court  in Appeal  from  Original Order No. 287 of 1964.      Naunit Lal and (Miss) Lalita Kohli for the Appellant.      B. Sen,  M.  Mookherjee,  Sardar  Bahadur  Saharya  and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Respondent No. 1.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      GOSWAMI, J.  This is  an appeal  at the instance of the workman on  certificate of  the Calcutta High Court from the decision  of   the  Division  Bench  reversing  the  earlier judgment and  order  of  the  learned  single  Judge  in  an application under  article 226  of the Constitution directed against the  award of  the First  Industrial Tribunal,  West Bengal, made  under section  33A of  the Industrial Disputes Act.      The appellant  (hereinafter  to  be  described  as  the workman)  was   employed  by   M/s  Hindustan   Motors  Ltd. (hereinafter to be described as the company) since August 3, 1949. On  August  3,  1956,  the  workman  entered  into  an agreement of  service with  the company  wherein  the  first clause reads as follows:-           "The Employer agrees to and does hereby engage the      services of  the employee  for  a  period  of  5  years      beginning  with   1-6-56  and   thereafter  until  this      agreement shall  be determined  by either  party hereto      giving to the other 3 months’ notice in writing of such      intended termination. 637           Provided  that   in  case   Employer   finds   the      employee’s work  satisfactory, Employer  shall have the      option to  extend the  period of  service by  a further      term of 3 years".      The workman  went on two months’ leave to Banaras for a change some  time in  1960. He  requested for  extension  of leave for  one month on medical grounds. He actually sent an application  on   August  8,  1960,  along  with  a  medical certificate praying  for extension of his leave. The company asked the  workman to  get himself examined by the company’s medical officer  within ten  days. As  the workman was lying ill at  Banaras, he  could not comply with the directions of the company.  On September 5, 1960, he sent another telegram followed  by   a  formal  application  enclosing  a  medical certificate for  extension of  his leave.  On September  15, 1960, the  company sent  a letter  to  him  terminating  his services on  the ground  of  habitual  absence  which  is  a misconduct under the company’s standing orders.      At the time of this termination there was an industrial dispute pending  between the  company and its workmen. Since the company  did not  ask for approval of its order from the Industrial Tribunal  the workman  made a  complaint  to  the Tribunal under  section 33A  of the  Industrial Disputes Act (briefly the  Act). The  company contested  the application. The Tribunal  made its award on September 27, 1962, ordering reinstatement of  the workman with 50% of his back wages for the period  of his  forced unemployment as compensation. The Tribunal directed  that the  award should be given effect to not later  than one  month of  the publication  of the award which was on October 26, 1962.      After a  little over  two months  of the publication of the award,  to be  precise, on February 4, 1963, the company intimated to  the workman to rejoin his service. The workman reported for  duty the following day on February 5, 1963. On February 16,  1963, the  company invoked  clause (1)  of the agreement which  we have  set out earlier and terminated the services of  the workman  by paying  three months’ salary in lieu of notice.

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    This is  the second  round of  litigation with which we are concerned  in this  appeal. Since  an industrial dispute was pending  even on this date of termination of his service and the  company did  not apply to the Tribunal for approval of the  order, the workman made a complaint to the Tribunal, as on  the previous  occasion, under section 33A of the Act. The Tribunal accepted the complaint and held as follows:-           "In my  opinion, the  company has really dismissed      the petitioner  for a  piece of conduct which must have      appeared as misconduct in the eye of the company". The  Tribunal   observed  that   the  company  in  substance dismissed the  workman  for  misconduct  since  the  workman became "odious  to the  company" on  account of  his earlier success before the Tribunal in his application under section 33A  of  the  Act.  The  Tribunal,  therefore,  ordered  his reinstatement with  full back  wages for  the period  of his forced unemployment  as compensation.  This time the company did 638 not accept  the award  although on  the earlier occasion the company did  not choose  to litigate  and reinstated  him as ordered by the Tribunal.      The company moved the Calcutta High Court under article 226 of  the Constitution  to quash  the award.  The  learned single Judge  refused to  interfere with  the award  holding that  "the   reason  might  have  been  the  old  reason  of dismissal....". The learned Judge further observed that "the circumstances relied  on by  the  Tribunal  are  not  wholly irrelevant and the inference drawn by the Tribunal cannot be characterised as unreasonable".      The company  appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court and  the appeal  was accepted. The Division Bench held as follows:-           "It may  be that  having regard to the sequence of      events that  took place in this case the termination of      service of  the respondent  No. 1 by the letter of 16th      February 1963  may be regarded as a colourable exercise      of the  power under  the contract  of employment or may      even be  regarded as  one of  unfair labour practice or      mala fide,  but the  discharge cannot be said to be for      any misconduct.  There is  no evidence for discharge on      any specific  misconduct.  The  definite  case  of  the      respondent  No.1  has  been  that  it  was  by  way  of      retaliatory measure  that his services were terminated.      This may  be true  and may  show that the action on the      part of  the appellant company was mala fide. But until      it is  established that  there has been a contravention      of  section   33  of   the  Act   which  would   create      jurisdiction in the Industrial Tribunal to entertain an      application under  section  33A,  or  in  other  words,      unless it  is established  that there has been dischrge      for misconduct, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set      aside the  order of termination in an application under      section 33A".      On the  application  of  the  workman  the  High  Court granted a  certificate to him under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is how this matter has come before us for a decision.      We should  at the  outset observe  that this  is not an appeal against  the award  of the Industrial Tribunal but is only directed  against the  judgment of the High Court under article 226  of the  Constitution. In  an application  under article 226 of the Constitution the High Court was concerned only with  the question  of jurisdiction  of the Tribunal in entertaining the  application under  section 33A of the Act.

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The question  of jurisdiction again was intimately connected with the question whether the termination of service was for misconduct of the workmen. The learned single Judge accepted the finding  of the Tribunal when it held that the discharge was nothing but dismissal for misconduct and in that view of the matter  did not  find any  justification for interfering with the  award. According  to the learned Judge, therefore, no question of lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal arose to merit interference  with the  award under article 226 of the Constitution. 639      The Division  Bench, however, looked at the matter from a different  viewpoint. It  assumed that  the action  of the management was  even mala  fide and  so it could be wrongful and in  an appropriate reference under section 10 of the Act the workman  might be  able to  get proper  relief. The High Court, however, came to the conclusion that since clause (1) of the  agreement was  invoked by  the employer it was not a case of discharge for misconduct and that being the position the Tribunal  had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section  33A even  though the  action of  the  company might be as a result of unfair labour practice.      Mr. Naunit  Lal on  behalf of  the workman has assailed the conclusion  of the  Division Bench while Mr. Sen submits that the decision is legally unquestionable.      The question  that arises  for  consideration  in  this appeal relates  to  the  applicability  of  the  proviso  to section 33(2)  (b) of  the Act  as amended  in 1956. Section 33(2)(b) at the material time reads as follows:-           "33(2):   During  the   pendency   of   any   such                     proceeding in  respect of  an industrial                     dispute, the employer may, in accordance                     with the standing orders applicable to a                     workman concerned in such dispute.                (b)  for any  misconduct not  connected  with                     the  dispute,   discharge   or   punish,                     whether by  dismissal or otherwise, that                     workman:           Provided that  no such workman shall be discharged      or dismissed,  unless he  has been  paid wages  for one      month and  an application has been made by the employer      to the authority before which the proceeding is pending      for approval of the action taken by the employer". We may  also read  section 33A  of the  Act as  that is  the section under which the complaint was originally made by the workman to the Industrial Tribunal.           33A: "Where an employer contravenes the provisions      of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before      a Labour  Court, Tribunal  or  National  Tribunal,  any      employee aggrieved  by such  contravention, may  make a      complaint in  writing, in the prescribed manner to such      Labour Court,  Tribunal or  National  Tribunal  and  on      receipt of  such complaint  that Labour Court, Tribunal      or  National   Tribunal  shall   adjudicate  upon   the      complaint as  if it  were  a  dispute  referred  to  or      pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of      this Act  and shall submit its award to the appropriate      Government and  the provisions  of this Act shall apply      accordingly". 640      It is  clear that the foundation of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to  entertain a  complaint under section 33A is the contravention of section 33 of the Act.      Section 33  may be contravened in a variety of ways. We are  concerned   in  this  appeal  only  with  one  type  of

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contravention, namely,  that the  employer did  not make any application to  the Tribunal  for approval  of the  order of termination of  service of  the workman. There is no dispute between the  parties  in  this  appeal  that  there  was  an industrial dispute  pending before the Tribunal in which the workman was  concerned and  that the  particular termination had nothing to do with that dispute. The only point on which the parties  differ is  as to  the nature  of the  order  of termination of  service. The  employer claims  it  to  be  a termination simpliciter  in exercise  of its  right under  a written contract  of service  entered between the parties in August 1956.  The workman  on the  other hand  contends that termination of his service was meted out as a punishment for avenging the defeat of the employer in an earlier litigation under section  33A at  the instance of the workmen. In other words  the   workman  contends   that  the   order  although purported, ex  facie, to be a termination under the terms of the agreement, is in truth and reality an order of dismissal for misconduct.      Originally when  the Act  was passed in 1947 (Act 14 of 1947) section  33 imposed  a ban  on  the  employer  against discharge, dismissal  or punishment  of a workman during the pendency  of  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal  and  other specified authorities  "except for  misconduct not connected with the  dispute." The section underwent a vital change for the  employer   when  the   Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal) Act  1950 (Act  48 of 1950) was passed and section 33  was   substituted  and   a  total  ban  imposed  against discharge, dismissal  or any  punishment of a workman during the pendency  of proceedings   before the Tribunal and other specified authorities.  The reservation  of the right to the employer to  take action  even in  case of misconduct, which was there  in the  original  Act,  was  withdrawn.  As  time passed, in  view  of  representations  from  employers,  the Parliament became alive to the question of discipline in the industry and  reintroduced in an altered form the said right of the  employer to  take  action  during  the  pendency  of proceedings before  the Tribunal when the Act was amended by the  Industrial   Disputes  (Amendment   and   Miscellaneous Provisions) Act  1956 (Act  36 of 1956). We have already set out the  material provision  of section 33(2) (b) at the out set which  has since  restored to  the employer the right to take punitive action under specified conditions.      To complete the picture we may note in passing that the section was  further  amended  by  the  Industrial  Disputes (Amendment) Act  (Act 36  of 1964) with effect from December 19, 1964,  whereby some  words were  inserted in sub-section (2) of  section 33  with which  we are not concerned in this appeal.      From the  provisions of  section 33 it is manifest that punitive action  by the  employer in whatever form it may be passed  is  permissible  against  an  ordinary  workman,  as distinguished from  a  protected  workman  even  during  the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal 641 provided that  the employer  pays one month’s wages and also applies to  the  concerned  Tribunal  for  approval  of  his action. Since  the action  is punitive, namely, dismissal or discharge for  misconduct, the  Tribunal has  to oversee the action to  guarantee  that  no  unfair  labour  practice  or victimisation has  been practised  thereby. If the procedure of fair  hearing has  been observed the Tribunal has to find in an  application under  section 33 that a prima facie case is made  out for  dismissal. If, on the other hand, there is violation of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  in  the

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enquiry,  the  Tribunal  can  go  into  the  whole  question relating to  the misconduct  and come  to its own conclusion whether the same is established.      The submission  of  the  employer  is  that  since  the termination of the workman is in exercise of the right under the written  agreement it  was not  a case  of discharge  or dismissal  for  misconduct  and  there  was,  therefore,  no obligation on  the employer  to make  an  application  under section 33  of the  Act and  hence section  33 has  not been contravened and  the application  under section  33A is  not maintainable.      The question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether if  a particular  order of termination of service is not on  account of  misconduct and  is merely  a termination simpliciter the  employer  is  still  required  to  make  an application under section 33 of the Act.      We have  no doubt  in our  mind that  section  33(2)(b) makes it obligatory upon the employer to make an application to the Tribunal under the proviso only when he discharges or dismisses a workman for misconduct.      It is submitted by Mr. Sen that misconduct contemplated in section  33(2)(b) must  be a misconduct enumerated in the standing orders of the company. We are unable to accept this submission.      Standing orders  of a  company  only  describe  certain cases of misconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species  of misconduct  which a workman may commit. Even though a  given conduct  may not  come within  the  specific terms of misconduct described in the standing orders, it may still be a misconduct, in the special facts of a case, which it may not be possible to condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action. Ordinarily, the standing orders may limit the concept but not invariably so.      When, therefore, the Tribunal has found as a fact after taking note  of the  history and the entire circumstances of the case  that the  termination was on account of misconduct of the  employee it  is difficult  to hold that there is any manifest error  of law committed by the Tribunal in reaching that conclusion  only because  the misconduct,  as found, is not within  the four  corners  of  the  description  of  the various misconducts  mentioned  in  the  company’s  standing orders.  It  is  not  possible,  therefore,  to  accept  the submission that the Tribunal committed an error of law or of jurisdiction in  entertaining the  application under section 33A. 642      Termination simpliciter  or  automatic  termination  of service  under  the  conditions  of  service  or  under  the standing orders  is outside  the scope  of section 33 of the Act. This  does not mean that the employer has the last word about the  termination of service of an employee and can get away with  it by describing it to be a simple termination in his letter  of discharge  addressed to  the employee.  It is also not  a correct  proposition of  law that  in case  of a complaint under  section 33A  the Tribunal would be debarred from going  into the  question whether,  notwithstanding the form of  the  order  in  sub-stance,  it  is  an  action  of dismissal for misconduct and not termination simpliciter.      The possibility  that in an appeal against the award of the Tribunal  this Court  may have  taken a  different  view about the termination does not affect the present issue.      Mr. Naunit  Lal relies upon a decision of this Court in the Management  of Murugan Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Madras and  Another in  support of  his contention that even termination simpliciter  is within  the sweep of section 33.

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That was a case where the workman’s services were terminated "because he  deliberately adopted  go-slow and was negligent in the  discharge of  his duty".  The Supreme  Court in that case observed thus:           "His  services   were  therefore   terminated  for      dereliction of  duty and  go-slow  in  his  work.  This      clearly  amounted  to  punishment  for  misconduct  and      therefore to  pass an  order under  cl.  17(a)  of  the      Standing Orders  in such  circumstances was  clearly  a      colourable exercise  of  the  power  to  terminate  the      services of  a  workman  under  the  provision  of  the      Standing Orders". The Supreme Court further observed:           "In  these  circumstances  the  case  was  clearly      covered by  cl.(b) of  s.  33(3)  of  the  Act  as  the      services of  the respondent  were dispensed with during      the pendency of a dispute by meeting out the punishment      of discharge to him for misconduct". The decision is, therefore, not an authority for the extreme proposition advanced by Mr. Naunit Lal.      Mr. Naunit Lal also drew our attention to two decisions of the  Madras High Court in Shyamala Studios v. Kannu Devar (S.S.)  and   others  and  Sri  Rama  Machinery  Corporation (Private) Limited,  Madras v.  Murthi (N.R.)  and others  in support of  the above  submission. Although  the decision of the Supreme Court in Murugan Mills’ case (supra) was noticed by the  Madras  High  Court  it  does  not  appear  to  have correctly appreciated  the ratio  decidedi of that judgment. We are unable to hold that the Supreme Court in 643 Murugan Mills’ case (supra) went to the extent of re-writing section  33   by  completely  obliterating  the  concept  of misconduct of a workman for which alone in a limited way the right of  action for  the employer  is preserved  during the span of  pendency of  proceedings before the Tribunal in the interest of  discipline. To  the extent the Madras decisions state  that   termination  of   services  need  not  be  for misconduct of  the  workman  in  order  to  attract  section 33(2)(b), we cannot agree.      If the  Tribunal finds that a particular termination of service of  a workman is in truth and substance innocuous or in exercise of a bona fide right under the contract, section 33(2)(b) will  not be  applicable and necessarily there will be no contravention of section 33A of the Act.      In Air  India Corporation,  Bombay v.  V. A. Rebellow & Anr.(1) this Court had to deal with the validity of an award made under  section 33A  although the  Labour Court  in that case had  held that the workman was guilty of misconduct and that his  services were  terminated for  that  reason.  This Court did  not  agree  with  the  aforesaid  conclusion  and dismissed the  workman’s petition  under section  33A of the Act. In doing so this Court observed as follows:-           "It is  noteworthy that the ban is imposed only in      regard to action taken for misconduct whether connected      or unconnected  with  the  dispute.  The  employer  is,      therefore free to take action against his workmen if it      is not based on any misconduct on their part".      We are,  therefore, clearly  of opinion that the single Judge is  right in  not interfering  with  the  award  under article 226  of the  Constitution and  the Division Bench is wrong in doing so.      It is true that on the face of the order of termination the company  invoked clause (1) of the agreement and even so it was  open to the Tribunal to pierce the veil of the order and have a close look at all the circumstances and come to a

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decision whether  the order was passed on account of certain misconduct. This  is a  finding of  fact which  could not be interfered with under article 226 of the Constitution unless the conclusion  is perverse,  that is  to say,  based on  no evidence whatsoever.  We are,  however,  unable  to  say  so having regard  to the  facts and  circumstances described by the Tribunal in its order.      It is,  however, unexceptionable  that if  an  employer passes an order of termination of service in exercise of his right under  a contract  or in accordance with the provision of the standing orders and the Tribunal finds that the order is not  on  account  of  any  misconduct,  the  question  of violation of section 33 would not arise.      There remains,  however another  aspect  to  which  the Tribunal did  not properly address. The workman in this case had a  contract of  employment only for 8 years at the most. The reinstatement in his 644 case, therefore,  cannot extend  beyond a  period  of  eight years from June 1, 1956 and the contract of employment would have automatically  terminated on May 31, 1964. The Tribunal awarded reinstatement  on March  24,  1964,  when  even  the employer did not bring it to its notice that the contract of employment would terminate in May 1964.      Mr. Sen,  however, during  the course  of the argument" hinted at  another round  of litigation under section 33C of the Act to contest the claim to reinstatement ordered by the Tribunal.      We cannot be oblivious to the plight of this workman in his unequal  fight with  a big  company. He  was serving the company since  1949 for about eleven years when he was first dismissed in  1960. He has been involved in litigation since 1960 uptill  today except  for a lull for eleven days on his reinstatement after  the first award. Eleven years in actual service and sixteen years in litigation is a doleful tale by itself.      We, therefore, feel that, in the interest of industrial peace and  above all to draw a final curtain to this unhappy litigation,  we   would  be  justified  in  quantifying  the compensation payable to the workman in this case to a sum of Rs. 20,000/-  only in  lieu of  reinstatement with full back wages as  ordered by  the  Tribunal,  which  we  accordingly order. We  may also  observe that Mr. Sen, fairly enough had made it  clear before  us in the course of hearing that even if the  company succeeded in this Court it would be prepared to pay to the workman a sum of Rs. 10,000/- on compassionate grounds.      In the result the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The award of the Tribunal is varied as stated  above. The  appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.      CMC. No.  6664 of  1976 on  behalf of  the company  for urging additional grounds is dismissed as not pressed. P.B.R.                                       Appeal Allowed. 645