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PETITIONER: MAHARASHTRA STATE BOARD OF SECONDARY ANDHIGHER SECONDARY EDU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.S. GANDHI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/03/1991

BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1991 SCALE  (1)187

ACT:      Maharashtra  Secondary and Higher Secondary Board  Act, 1965/Maharashtra  Secondary Board Regulation 1977:  Sections 4,  18  and 23/Regulations 9(2) (XVIII)  and  14--Marksheets found tampered with--Enquiry held--Tampering with  knowledge of  consent  of candidates  parents  or  guardians--Students alone  to take  part in the inquiry--Advocates,  parents  or guardians not allowed_validity of enquiry.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant-Board conducted secondary examinations in the  month  of March 1990. During recounting  of  the  marks obtained  by  the candidates it was  found  that  moderators mark-sheets relating to 283 examinees, which included the 53 respondents,  had  been tampered with.  The  declaration  of their  results  was withheld pending enquiry.  Several  writ petitions were filed against non-declaration of the  results and the High Court directed the appellant to the expeditious action to declare the results.      The  Board appointed seven enquiry officers to  conduct the enquiry. Show cause notices were issued to the  students informing  them of the nature of tampering, the subjects  in which  the  marks  were  found  tampered  with,  the   marks initially obtained and the marks increased due to tampering, and  also  indicated  the proposed  punishment,  if  in  the enquiry it would be found that marks were tampered with  the knowledge or connivance or at the instance of the candidates or  parents or guardians. They were also informed that  they would  be  at  liberty  to  inspect  the  documents  at  the Divisional  Board  at Bombay; they were entitled  to  adduce documentary  and  oral evidence at the hearing;  they  would also  be  permitted to cross-examine the  witnesses  of  the Board, if any; they would not be entitled to appear  through an advocate, and the parents or guardians would be permitted to accompany the students at the time of  enquiry, but  they would not be entitled to take part in the enquiry.      All  the candidates admitted that the  marks  initially awarded by                                                        773 the examiners had been tampered with in the moderators mark- sheets;  and due to tampering the marks were  increased  and the  increase was to their advantage. However,  they  denied that either they or their parents or guardians were privy to

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the tampering.      The  Enquiry Officers submitted their  reports  holding that  the  moderators mark-sheets had  been  fabricated  and submitted  the reports to the Board. The Standing  Committee constituted  in this regard considered the records  and  the reports   and  resolved  to  withhold,  as  a   measure   of punishment,   the  declaration  of  the  results  of   their examinations  and  to debar the students to  appear  in  the supplementary  examination. The notification to that  effect was  published on 31.8.1990 and the report submitted to  the High Court.      The High Court allowed the writ petitions. One  Hon’ble Judge held that the Standing Committee was devoid of  power, and because it did not obtain the approval of the Divisional Board,  the impugned notification was without  authority  of law.  On  merits, the learned Judge held that  the  Standing Committee  did not apply its mind in the proper  perspective to  the  material  facts, and therefore,  the  finding  that tampering    was    done   at   the    instance    of    the examinees/parents/guardians was perverse. The other  Hon’ble Judge  held that the examinees were not guilty of  the  mal- practices and their guilt had not been established.      Before  this Court, it was contended on behalf  of  the respondents that the Act empowered that Divisional Board  to deal with the use of unfair means at the final  examination, and  the  Standing  Committee  was  an  alien  body  to  the divisional  Board; the students were minors and neither  the parents nor anybody like an advocate was permitted to assist the  students; answers to the questionnaire  were  extracted from  the  students  to confess  their  guilt:  no  adequate opportunity  was given to the students at the  enquiry;  the evidence  without subjecting it to cross-examination was  of no  value; the Standing Committee did not apply its mind  to the facts, nor recorded reasons in support of its conclusion that  the  examinee/parents/guardians were  parties  to  the fabrication;  the Board should establish the  guilt  of  the examinees  beyond  all reasonable doubts;  the  standard  of proof  ought  to  be of a high degree akin  to  trial  in  a criminal  case;  the  test of benefit  to  an  examinee  was preposterous;  no evidence was placed on record, nor was  it proved and hence the findings of the Standing Committee were clearly  based on no evidence; the Enquiry Report  contained only  conclusions  bereft  of the  statement  of  facts  and reasons in support thereof; and the order ought to have been a  speaking order preceded by a fair enquiry and the  report must                                                        774 be based on cogent evidence.      On  behalf  of the Board, it was inter  alia  contended that   all  the  examinees  admitted  in  answers   to   the questionnaire  that tampering was done and it was  to  their advantage,  and that in view of the admission, the  need  to examine any person from the concerned section was obviated.      Allowing   the  appeals,  upholding  the   notification subject to modifications, this Court,      HELD: (1) there is no manner of doubt that unfair means were used at the final Secondary Examination by  fabricating the  Moderators’ mark-sheet of the examinees,  in  concerted manner, admittedly to benefit the students. [782C]      (2)  The  State Board is empowered  to  constitute  the Divisional  Boards  and the Standing Committees.  The  State Board  is  also  empowered to make  regulations  to  conduct examinations  and also to deal with the use of unfair  means at  the  final  examination  conducted  by  the  Board.  The Divisional Board is empowered to conduct within its area the

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final  examination  on  behalf  of  the  State  Board.   The Divisional Board is also empowered to deal with the cases of unfair  means  according to the procedure laid down  by  the State Board. [783F-G]      (3)  The Standing Committee is an executive arm of  the Divisional   Board   for  the  efficient   and   expeditious functioning  of  the  Board as  adumberated  under  the  Act itself.  It  is  not  a  foreign  body.  When  the  Standing Education  Committee takes the decision its decision  is  on behalf  of  the Divisional Board, and the  decision  of  the Divisional  Board in turn is on behalf of the  State  Board. [786E-F]      (4)  On a fair and harmonious reading of  the  relevant provisions  of  the Act and the  Maharashtra  Secondary  and Higher  Secondary  Education  Board,  Regulation,  1977  the Examination  Committee of the Divisional Board is  itself  a statutory body which acted on behalf of the Divisional Board and is not a delegate of the Divisional Board. [786H]      State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr., [1978] 2  S.C.C. 102; Kargram Panchayat Samiti & Anr. v.  State  of West Bengal & Ors., [1987] 3 S.C.C. 82; Baradakanta Misra v. High  Court of Orissa & Anr., [1976] Suppl. S.C.R.  561  and Tej Pal Singh (dead) through L.rs. v. State of U.P. &  Anr., [1986] 3 S.C.R. 429, referred to.                                                        775      (5)  The Standing Committee is an integral part of  the Divisional  Board and its acts are for and no behalf of  the Divisional  Board. Accordingly, the Board must be deemed  to have  passed the impugned notification as per the scheme  of the  provisions of the Act and the  Regulations.  Therefore, the finding of the learned Judge that the Standing Committee had  no  power to take the impugned  decision, etc.  without approval  of  the Divisional Board is  clearly  illegal  and cannot be sustained. [789B-C,F]      (6)  While exercising the powers under Article  226  or Article  136  of the Constitution, the High  Court  or  this Court,  is not sitting as a Court of Appeal on the  findings of  facts  recorded  by  the  Standing  Committee  (Domestic Enquiry Board) nor have power to evaluate the evidence as an appellate  Court and to come to its own conclusions. If  the conclusions reached by the Board can be fairly supported  by the  evidence on record then the High Court or  this   Court has  to  uphold the decision, though as appellate  Court  of facts, it may be inclined to take a different view. [789C]      (7)  Fabrication cannot be done except to  benefit  the examinees. The fabricator had done it for reward in  concert with  outside agencies. Therefore, the inference from  these facts   drawn   by   the   Standing   Committee   that   the examinees/parents/guardians  were responsible  to  fabricate the moderators’ mark-sheets is based on evidence. [790G]      (8)  It is not open to the High Court to  evaluate  the evidence  to come to its own conclusions. Thereby  the  High Court  has  committed  manifest  error  of  law   warranting interference by this Court. [791A]      (9)   The Writ Court would not interfere with an  order of  educational institution. Therefore, what the writ  Court needs  to  do  is  to  find  whether  fair  and   reasonable opportunity  has  been given to the students  in  the  given facts. [792F]      D.M.K.  Public  School v. Regional  Joint  Director  of Hyderabad,  A.I.R.  1986  A.P. 204;  G.B.S.  Omkar  v.  Shri Venkateswara University, A.I.R. 1981 A.P. 163.      (10)  Assistance of an Advocate to the delinquent at  a domestic enquiry is not a part of the principles of  natural justice.  It  depends on the nature of the inquiry  and  the

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peculiar circumstances and facts of a particular case.[792H]                                                        776      (11)   The  regulations  and  the  rules   of   enquiry specifically  excluded the assistance of an advocate at  the inquiry.  Therefore, the omission to provide the  assistance of  a  counsel  at  the inquiry  is  not  violative  of  the principles of natural justice. [793A]      (12) The procedure adopted at the inquiry was fair  and just and it was not vitiated by any procedural  irregularity nor was violative of the principles of natural justice.  The absence of opportunity to the parents or guardians, in  this background, did not vitiate the legality or validity of  the inquiry conducted or decision of the Committee. [793G-H]      (13)   Unless  the  rule  expressly  or  by   necessary implications, excluded recording of reasons, it is  implicit that  the  principles of natural justice or fair  play  does require recording of reasons as a part of fair procedure. In an  administrative decision, its order/decision  itself  may not  contain reasons. It may not be the requirement  of  the rules, but at the least, the record should disclose reasons. It  may  not  be like a judgement. But the  reasons  may  be precise. [794F]     Union  of  India  v. Mohan Lal Capoor &  Ors.  [1973]  2 S.C.C.  836;  Gurdial Singh Fiji v. State of Punjab  &  Ors. [1979  2  S.C.C. 368 and S.N. Mukherjee v. Union  of  India, J.T. 1990 (3) S.C. 630, referred to.      (14) The omnipresence and omniscience of the  principle of natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision  in  flagrant  infraction of  fair  play.  But  the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not  a rule  of thumb or a straight jacket formula as  an  abstract proposition  of  law. It depends on the facts of  the  case, nature  of the inquiry and the effect of the order  decision on  the  rights of the person and  attendant  circumstances. [795F]      (15) In the instant case, since the facts are admitted, the  need  to  their reiteration was obviated  and  so  only conclusions have been stated in the reports. The omission to record  reasons is neither illegal, nor is violative of  the principles of natural justice. [795H-796A]      Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 506; A.K. Roy etc. etc. v. Union of India &  Ors. [1982] 1 S.C.C. 271; Pett v. Grehound Racing Association Ltd., [1968] 2  ALL Eng.  Reports  545; Union of India v. H.C.  Goel,  [1964]  4 S.C.R. 718; M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen  & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.C. 617; Shanti Prasad  Jain  v. The  Director  of  Enforcement, [1963 3  S.C.R.  297;  Merla Ramanna v. Nallaparaju & Ors., [1955] 2 S.C.R. 941;                                                        777 Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India & Ors., [1986] 3 S.C.C. 229;  Government  Medical Store Depot, Karnal  v.  State  of Haryana  &  Anr., [1986] 3 S.C.R. 450; M/s.  Kesoram  Cotton Mills  Ltd. v. Gangadhar & Ors., [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809;  State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 370; Gujarat  Steel Tubesl Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha,, [1980]  2 S.C.R. 146; Union of India & Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, J.T. (1990) 4 S.C. 456; Vishwa Nath v. State of Jammu &  Kashmir, [1983] 1 S.C.C. 215; Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay  Municipal Corporation, etc., [1985] 3 S.C.C. 545, referred to.      (16)  Court  should  be  slow  to  interfere  with  the decisions  of domestic tribunals appointed by the  education bodies like universities. [799F]      (17) In dealing with the validity of the impugned order passed  by a University under Article 226 the High Court  is not sitting in an appeal over the decision on this question.

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Its  jurisdiction is limited and though it is true  that  if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence the High Court may be justified to quash the order but the conclusion that  the  impugned order is not supported by  any  evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether the probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. The enquiry held by domestic  tribunals in such cases must no doubt be fair and the students must be given adequate opportunity to defend themselves and  holding such  enquiries,  the  tribunal must  follow  the  rules  of natural justice. [799F-G]      Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. v. Sagleshar  Persad  &  Ors., [1967] 3 S.C.R.  767  and  Bihar School  Examination  Board v. Subhas Chandra  Sinha  &  Ors. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 963. referred to.      (18) The examination committee has jurisdiction to take decision  in the matter of use of unfair means not  only  on direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial evidence. There is no scope for importing the principles  of criminal  trial  while considering the  probative  value  of probabilities  and circumstantial evidence. The  Examination committed  is not bound by technical rules of  evidence  and procedure as are applicable to Courts. [801E-F]      Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal & Ors., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 623;  Ghazanfer Rashid v. Board H.S. & I. Edn. U.P.,  A.I.R. 1970  Allahabad 209; Miller v. Minister of Pensions,  [1947] All. E.L.R. 372; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chet Ram &  Ors., [1989] 2 S.C.C. 425, referred to.                                                        778      (19) There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation  of the degree of probability and the quantum  of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on  the robust common sense and, ultimately, on the  trained institutions of the Judge. [802D]      (20) Strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of  proof  envisaged therein do not  apply  to  departmental proceedings  of  domestic  tribunals.  It  is  open  to  the authorities   to  receive  and  place  on  record  all   the necessary,  relevant, cogent and acceptable material   facts though  not proved strictly in conformity with the  Evidence Act, the material must be germane and relevant to the  facts in  issue. In grave cases like forgery,  fraud,  conspiracy, misappropriation,  etc.  seldom  direct  evidence  would  be available.  Only the circumstantial evidence  would  furnish the  proof.  Inference from the evidence  and  circumstances must   be  carefully  distinguished  from   conjectures   or speculation. [805D-E]      State  of  U.P.  v.  Krishna Gopal &  Anr.,,  [1988]  4 S.C.C. 302; Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,  [1952] S.C.R. 1091; Reg. v. Hodge, [1838] 2 Law 227; Bank of  India v.  J.A.H. Chinoy, A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 90; Khwaja v.  Secretary of  State, [1983] 1 All E.L.R. 765 (H.L.);  Sodhi  Transport Co.  &  Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc., [1986]  1  S.C.R. 939;  Bhandari v. Advocates Committee, [1956]  A.E.L.R.  742 (P.C.); Glynn v. Keale University & Anr. [1971] 2 A.E.R.  89 (Ch.D.);  In  Re: An Advocate, A.I.R. 1989  S.C.  245;  Shri Krishan  v. The Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra,  A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 376 and Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr.  Mahesh Madhav  Gosavi  & Ors. & Vice Versa, [1987]  1  S.C.R.  458, referred to.      (21)  The  standard of proof is not  beyond  reasonable doubt  "but" the preponderance of probabilities  tending  to draw  and  inference that the fact must  be  more  probably. Standard  of  proof  cannot  be put  in  a  straight  jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree  of

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proof.  The  probative value could be gauged  on  facts  and circumstances in a given case. The Standard of proof is  the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries. [805H-806B]      (22)  The conclusion reached by the Education  Standing Committee  that the fabrication was done at the instance  of either the examinees or their parents or guardians is  amply borne  out from the record. The High Court over-stepped  its supervisory  jurisdiction  and trenched into  the  arena  of appreciation of evidence to arrive its own conclusion on the specious  plea  of  satisfying ’conscience  of  the  Court’. [806G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 491-544  of 1991.      From  the Judgement and Order dated 12.12.1990  of  the Bombay High Court in W.P. Nos. 2646, 2659, 2651, 2649, 2657, 2664, 2648, 2647, 2666, 2658, 2662, 2663, 2667, 2665,  2691, 2693, 2694, 4091, 4098, 4155, 2743, 2789, 2791, 2790,  2740, 4290, 2824, 2858, 2848, 3052, 2863, 2848, 2844, 2843,  2832, 2852, 4846, 4844, 3312, 5101, 5102, 3313, 3207, 3064,  3005, 3335, 3188, 5123, 3514 and 4844 of 1990.      T.R.  Andhyarujana,  S.N. Wakharia, P.H.  Parekh,  D.Y. Chandrachud and Ms. Shalini Soni for the Appellant.      P. Chidambaram, Arun Jaitley, I.R. Joshi, M.N.  Shroof, Ms.  Indu Malhotra, Ms. Alka Mukhija, Harish N.  Salve,  Ms. Shireen  Jain, J.P. Cama, Mukul Mudgal, Mrs.  Urmila  Sirur, Dileep  Pillai, P. Kesava Pillai, Kailash Vasdev  and  Vimal Dave for the Respondents.      The Judgement of the Court was delivered by      K.  RAMASWAMY, J. We have heard the learned counsel  on either  side  and grant special leave to appeal in  all  the cases.      The quest for just result to save the precious academic years  to  the  students  while  maintaining  the  unsullied examination process is the core problem which the facts have presented for solution.      The  appeals  arise  from the  common  judgement  of  a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 2646 of 1990 and batch. The appellant for short ’the  Board’ conducted secondary examinations in the month of March 1990, whereat   the  marks  awarded,  after  the  formalities   of valuation  by  the examiners of the  answer-sheets  in  each subject;  the  random counter check by  the  moderators  and further  recounting  at the Board,  Moderators’  mark-sheets sent to Pune for feeding the computer to declare the results were found tampered with the appellant. Thereon, admittedly, it  was found that moderators’ mark-sheets relating  to  283 examinees which include 53 respondents in these appeals were tampered,  in many a case in more than 2 to 8 subjects,  and in few cases in one subject. As a result, 214 examinees have improved  their  ranking,  which  would  be  in  some  cases exceptionally good. The declaration of their results were                                                        780 withheld  pending further enquiry and the rest  declared  on June 30, 1990. Several writ petitions were filed in the High Court  against non-declaration of the results and  the  High Court  directed  to take expeditious action to  declare  the results  of the examination within the specified  time.  The Board  appointed  seven  enquiry  officers  to  conduct  the enquiry.  Show cause notices were issued to the students  on July 30, 1990 informing them of the nature of tampering, the subjects  in which the marks were found tampered  with,  the

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marks  initially  obtained and the marks  increased  due  to tampering, and also indicated the proposed punishment, if in the enquiry it would be found that marks were tampered  with the  knowledge  or  connivance or at  the  instance  of  the candidates or parents or guardians. They were also  informed that  they would be at liberty to inspect the  documents  at the Divisional Board at Bombay. They were entitled to adduce documentary and oral evidence at the hearing. They will also be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses of the Board, if any.  They  would  not  be entitled  to  appear  through  an Advocate, but the parents or guardians would be permitted to accompany the students at the time of enquiry, but they  are not  entitled  to take part in the enquiry.  The  candidates submitted  their  explanations  denying  the  tampering  and appeared before the Enquiry Officers on August 8, 9, 10, 20, 21 and 22, 1990. At the enquiry, each student inspected  the record.  A questionnaire was given to be filled in  writing. Every candidate was shown his answer book, marks awarded  in the   subject/subjects  and  the  tampered  marks   in   the moderators’  mark sheets. All the candidates  admitted  that the  marks initially awarded by the examiner  were  tampered in the moderators mark-sheets;  due to tampering the  marks  were increased and the increase was to their advantage.  However, they  denied that either they or their parents or  guardians were privy to the tampering. The Enquiry Officers  submitted their  reports holding that the moderators mark-sheets  have been fabricated and submitted the reports to the Board.  The Standing Committee constituted in this regard considered the records  and the reports on August 29, 1990, discussed  pros and cons and expressed certain doubts about the  possibility of the candidates/parents/guardians committing  fabrication. They  sought for and obtained legal opinion in that  regard. On  August 30, 1990 the standing committe  resolved to  with hold,  as  a measure of punishment, the declaration  of  the results of their examinations and to debar the 283  students to  appear  in the supplementary examination to be  held  in October,   1990  and  March,  1991.  The  notification   was published on August 31, 1990 and submitted the report to the High Court. There-after the High Court considered the  cases on  merits.  The learned Judges by separate  but  concurrent judgements allowed the writ petitions.                                                        781      Sugla,  J.  held  that the Standing  Committee  of  the Divisional Board under the Maharashtra Secondary and  Higher Secondary  Education Board Act of 1965 for short  ’the  Act’ was  devoid of power. It did not obtain the approval of  the Divisional  Board, and therefore, the impugned  notification was  without  authority of law. On merits also it  was  held that  the Standing Committee did not apply its mind  in  the proper  perspective  to the material facts.  Therefore,  the finding  that  tampering  was done at the  instance  of  the examinees/parents/guardians   is  perverse.   Bharucha,   J. without  going  into the jurisdictional  issue  agreed  with Sugla,   J.   and  held  that  the  preponderance   of   the probabilities would show that the examinees were not  guilty of the malpractices. The guilt has not been established. The examinees might well be innocent. Accordingly, the  impugned notification  dated August 31, 1990 was  quashed.  Mandatory injunction was issued to Board to declare the results of 253 examinees  within two weeks from the date of  the  judgement and marks were directed to be communicated to the  examinees within a period of two weeks thereafter.      The  admitted  facts are that the  mark-sheets  of  the examiners  were  not tampered. Only  the  moderators’  mark- sheets were tampered. As per the procedure, after the  marks

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were  scrutinized  at the State Board and  found  the  marks tallied and to be correct, the moderators’ mark-sheets  were sent  to the computer at Pune, obviously in sealed  packets, for  feeding the results. After the date of  recounting  the marks in the office of the State Board at Bombay and  before the  d ate of taking them to feed the computer,  moderators’ mark-sheets, were tampered. The individual students were put on notice of the marks they originally obtained and the tampered marks  in  the subject/subjects concerned.  They  were  also given  the opportunity to lead evidence on their behalf  and if  the witnesses were examined on behalf of the Board  they would be permitted to cross-examine them. They inspected the records. The questionnaire given to all the examinees at the enquiry  were  before  us at the hearing  including  the  53 respondents   in   the   appeals.  We   have   persued   the questionnaire.  It  is clear from the answers given  to  the questionnaire that all the examinees admitted the marks they originally  got  and the tampered marks on  the  moderators’ mark-sheets.  They also admitted that the tampering  was  to their advantage. Everyone denied the complicity of either of the  candidates or the parents or the guardians. Thus it  is clear  that  at  the enquiry there is no  dispute  that  the moderators’   mark-sheets   were   tampered,   though    the candidates,  obviously  and quite expectedly,  denied  their complicity  in that regard. Due to tampering 214 would  have been passed and 69 accelerated their ranking and  percentage to seek admis-                                                        782 sion  into  prestigious institutions. The  racket  of  large scale  tampering  wading through  80,000  moderators’  mark- sheets  obviously was done by concerted action. It is  clear that  from large body of moderators’ mark-sheets, it is  not possible to pick the marks-sheets of the concerned  examinee alone  unless there is concerted and deliberate efforts,  in conspiracy with some members of the staff entrusted with the duties in this regard, for illegal gratification. It is also not  an innocent act of mere corrections as is sought to  be made  out by   Sri Chidambaram, the learned counsel for  the respondents.  We have no manner of doubt that  unfair  means were  used at the final Secondary Examination held in  March 1990,  by  fabricating the Moderators’  mark-sheets  of  283 examinees, in a concerned manner, admittedly, to benefit the students concerned.      The first question, therefore, is whether the  Standing Committee of the concerned Divisional Board has power  under the  Act and Regulations to enquire into the use  of  unfair means committed at the final examination conducted under the Act.  Section 4 of the Act declares that the State Board  of Secondary   and  Higher  Secondary  Education  is   a   body corporate.  Section 18 enumerates the powers and  duties  of the State Board. Clause (t) of Sec. 18 empowers the Board to make regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Clause (g) empowers the Board to give to   the   candidates  certificates  after   passing   final examination.  Clause (m) empowers to recommend measures  and to  prescribe  conditions of discipline.  Clause  (w)  gives residuary  power to do all such acts and things as  many  be necessary  to carry out the purposes of the Act. Section  19 gives  powers and entrust duties to the Divisional Board  of each  division.  Clause (f) postulates, "to conduct  in  the area of its jurisdiction the final examination on behalf  of the  State Board." Clause (1) provides, "to deal with  cases of use of unfair means according to the procedure laid  down by  the  State  Board." Section 23 provides  that  power  of appointments  of  the Committees by the  State  Board.  Sub-

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Section (2) thereof provides that:           "The State Board may appoint such other Committees           as   it   thinks  necessary  for   the   efficient           performance of its functions." Equally sub-section (3) of Sec. 23 empower thus:           "Each  Divisional Board shall  appoint  Committees           designated as follows:           (d) Examination Committee.                                                        783 Sub-Section (5) states thus:           "The constitution of every committee appointed  by           the State Board or a Divisional Board, the term of           office of its members and the duties and functions           to  be  discharged by it shall be such as  may  be           prescribed." Section 36 empowers the State Board to make regulations  for the  purpose of carrying into effect the provisions  of  the Act. Sub-section (2) thereof states that:           "In  particular  and  without  prejudice  to   the           generally of the foregoing power, such regulations           may  provide  for  all or  any  of  the  following           matters, namely:           (a)  the  constitution, powers and duties  of  the           Committees. appointed under section 23;           ........           (f)  the  arrangement  for the  conduct  of  final           examinations   by   the   Divisional   Board   and           publication of results;           ........           (n)  any  other matter which is to be  or  may  be           prescribed under this Act."  Sub-section (3) provides:           "No regulation made under this section shall  have           effect  until the same has been sanctioned by  the           State Government" Thus  it  is  clear that the State  Board  is  empowered  to constitute   the   Divisional  Boards   and   the   Standing Committees.  The  State  Board is  also  empowered  to  make regulations  to conduct examinations and also to  deal  with the  use of unfair means at the final examination  conducted by  the Board. The Divisional Board is empowered to  conduct within  its  area the final examinations on  behalf  of  the State Board. The Divisional Board is also empowered to  deal with  the cases of unfair means according to  the  procedure laid down by the State Board.      The  State Board made regulations named as  Maharashtra Secondary  and Higher Secondary Education Board  Regulations 1977  which came into force with effect from July 11,  1977. Regulation 9(2)  (xviii) read thus:                                                        784           "to  lay  down  the  procedure  and  specify   the           penalties to be followed by the Divisional Boards,           in  dealing with cases of use of unfair  means  by           persons  seeking admission to or appearing at  the           examinations conducted under the authority of  the           State Board." Under   Regulations  14  the  Standing  Committee   of   the Divisional Board was to be constituted under  sub-regulation (1) thereto. Sub-regulation (2) provides:           "Subject  to  the provisions of the  Act  and  the           Regulations, the Standing Committee shall have the           following duties and functions, namely--           .....           (x)  to deal with cases of use of unfair means  by           persons  seeking admission to or appearing at  the

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         final  examinations,  according to  the  procedure           laid down by the State Board."      By  a  resolution passed at the meeting  of  the  State Board  held  on October 26, 1985, Exhibit ’z’  provides  the procedure  for enquiry. Clause 3(f) defines ’misconduct’  as follows:           "Misconduct"  shall mean any illegal  or  wrongful           act  or  conduct  which is alleged  to  have  been           resorted to by any candidate and/or any member  of           staff,  at,  for  or  in  respect  of  the   final           examination   and,   without  prejudice   to   the           generality  of the foregoing,  shall  include.....           tampering  with the documents issued by the  Board           or  otherwise  howsoever  changing  a  candidate’s           results  in  any manner whatsoever  and  generally           acting in such a manner so as to affect or  impede           the  conduct  of the final examinations  and  fair           declaration of results thereof." Clause  (4) empowers to conduct an enquiry either  suo  moto or on a complaint about any misconduct and the procedure  in that regard so that the Chairman of the Divisional Board may entrust  the  enquiry  into the alleged  misconduct  to  any member  or  members of the Divisional Board other  than  the members  of the Standing Committee. Clause (5)  empowers  to entrust the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer shall give a notice in writing to the candidate ...... setting forth the  nature of  the  misconduct alleged against the candidate  and  call upon the candi-                                                        785 date  to  show cause within the time specified  therein.  It also  empowers  to  set out the punishment  proposed  to  be imposed on a candidate. Clause 5(b) gives an opportunity  to the candidates to inspect the relevant documents proposed to be relied upon at the enquiry. Clause 6 gives opportunity to the  delinquent  to submit an explanation;  to  produce  his witnesses as well as documentary evidence and to be heard in person,  if he/she so desires, but shall not be entitled  to be  represented  by an Advocate or any  other  persons.  The delinquent  shall  be  bound to  answer  truthfully  to  all questions relevant to the subject of enquiry that may be put to  him/her  by the Enquiry Officer . Clause  (10)  provides that  the concerned Enquiry Officer shall submit the  report in   writing  including  the  findings  and   the   proposed punishment. Clause 11 provides thus:           "The Standing Committee shall consider the  report           and  decide  the  case as it  may  deem  fit.  The           Standing Committee will take the decision in   the           same meeting." Clause (12) states thus: "The Standing Committee shall not be bound to give  detailed reasons in support of its order or decision but shall record its   reasons   if  it  disagrees  with  the   findings   of recommendations  of  the  inquiry  officer  and  under  such circumstances  the Standing Committee need not give  hearing to the delinquent concerned." Other clauses are not relevant for the purpose of this case. Hence omitted. The Board also in its meeting held on October 26,  1985  framed  rules in  Appendix  ’A’  providing  under different heads the nature of the offence and the quantum of punishment, the relevant item 16 reads thus:           "Tampering  with  the  Secondary/Higher  Secondary School Certificate and/or statement of marks or their copies and any other documents issued by the Board."           Cancellation of performance of the Examination and           debarring the candidate for five more examinations

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         and/or   to  lodge  complaint  by  the   concerned           institution/Authority to Police Department. Thus  a conspectus of these relevant provisions of the  Act, regulations                                                        786 and resolutions clearly cover the entire field of  operation regarding the use of unfair means at the final  examinations specified  the  competent authorities and the  procedure  to deal  with  the same. The Divisional Board  undoubtedly  has been empowered under Sec. 19 of the Act to deal with the use of  unfair means at the final examination. It may  be   made clear at this juncture that the Standing Committee  consists of  six  members of the Divisional Board and  none  of  them associated  with the enquiry. Enquiry Officers are also  the members of the Divisional Board. The regulations provide the procedure  in  this  regard.  It  is  undoubtedly  true   as contended  by  Shri Chidambaram, that the Act  empowers  the Divisional Board to deal with the use of unfair means at the final examination. But to give acceptance to the  contention that  the  Standing  Committee  is  an  alien  body  to  the Divisional Board is to do violence to the scheme of the  Act and Regulations. It is seen that under the scheme of the Act and  Regulations the State Board is empowered to  constitute the  Standing  Committee. Equally the  Divisional  Board  is empowered  to  constitute the committees which  include  the Examination Committee. The members thereof are only  members of  the Divisional Board. Equally the Inquiry  Officers  are also  the  members of the Divisional Board  other  than  the members  of the Education Standing Committee.  The  Standing Committee  is an executive arm of the Divisional  Board  for the  efficient and expeditious functioning of the  Board  as adumbrated  under the Act itself. It is not a foreign  body. Therefore, when the Divisional Board is acting in conducting the examinations and dealing with the use of unfair means at the  final Examination, it is acting on behalf of the  State Board  as its agent. When the enquiry was conducted by  some members  and the Standing Committee was taking the  decision thereon,  it  is acting on behalf of the  Divisional  Board. There  is  no dichotomy but distribution of  the  functions. Therefore,  when the Standing Education Committee takes  the decision  its decision is on behalf of the Divisional  Board to which they are members and the decision of the Divisional Board  to  which they are members and the  decision  of  the Divisional  Board in turn is on behalf of the  State  Board. This   is  the  integral  scheme  woven  by  the   Act   and Regulations.  Thus  under  the scheme of the  Act,  for  the efficient and expeditious function of the concerned  Boards; implementation of the provisions of the Act, and to  prevent use  of  unfair  means at the  final  examination  including tampering  the  result  of  the  examination,  the  Standing committee  is  clearly  within  its  power  to  take   final decision.  On a fair and harmonious reading of the  relevant provisions  and  given  their  due  scope  and   operational efficiency,   we  are  of  the  considered  view  that   the Examination  Standing  Committee  of  the  Divisional  Board itself  a statutory body acted on behalf of  the  Divisional Board and is not a delegate of the Divisional Board.                                                        787      In State of U.P.  v.  (Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr.,) [1978] 2 SCC 102 the respondent was appointed as a Munsif in the  State  Judicial Service and was later   promoted  as  a District  Judge.  The Administrative Committee of  the  High Court reviewed the service and the Committee recommended  to the  State Government and communicated to all the Judges  of the  recommendation  to compulsarily retire  the  respondent

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from  service. The Govt. accordingly retired the  respondent compulsarily which was challenged in a writ petition. A Full Bench  of  the Allahabad High Court held that  the  District Judge  cannot be retired from service on the opinion  formed by  the Administrative Committee and all the  Judges  should have  considered and made recommendation.  Accordingly,  the order  was set aside. On appeal, the Constitution  Bench  of this  Court held that Art. 235 of the Constitution  provides control  over the District Judges and the Court  subordinate thereto shall be vested in the High Court. It is open to the High  Court to make rules to exercise the power  of  control feasible,  convenient  and effective. Accordingly  the  High Court regulated the  manner of appointment of a Committee to screen the service record. Thus, the rules framed prescribed the  manner in which the power has to be exercised.  Truely, it is regulatory in character and the powers were  exercised by  the  Committee  and recommended to the  State  Govt.  to compulsarily retire the respondent and it amounts to  taking a  decision  on  behalf  of the  High  Court.  In  (Khargram Panchayat Samiti  v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,) [1987]  3 SCC 82 at p. 84 the facts were that the cattle fairs  run by the  two  rival  organisations would be  held  on  specified different  dates which were impugned in the jurisdiction  to pass such a resolution. The High Court held that the  Samiti was  vested  with power to grant licence to  hold  the  fair under  Sec. 117 of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973.  In  the absence  of any rules framed in that regard it had no  power to  specify dates on which such Hat or fair shall  be  held. While reversing the High Court’s judgement, this Court  held that the general administration of the local area vested  in the Samiti which had power to grant licences to held fair or hat  under Sec. 117 of the Act. Necessarily it carries  with it the power to supervise, control and manage such a hat  or fair within its territorial jurisdiction. The conferment  of the power to grant a licence for holding of a hat or a  fair includes the power to make incidental or consequential order for  specification   of a date on which such a Hat  or  fair shall be held. Accordingly, the resolution of the Samiti was upheld.  In (Baradakanta Misra,) v. (High Court of Orissa  & Anr.,) [1976]B Suppl. SCR 561 relied on by Sri  Chidambaram, the facts were that then appel                                                        788 lant  while  acting  as a District Judge,  an  enquiry  into certain  charges  was held against him, and was  reduced  to Addl. District Magistrate (Judicial). He refused to join the duty. Fresh proceedings were initiated against him and after enquiry  the High Court dismissed him on the ground that  he was  convicted on a charge of a criminal attempt. An  appeal was  filed  to  the Governor and a  Writ  petition  followed thereafter  filed  in the High Court were  dismissed,  while allowing  the appeal filed under Article 136. The  scope  of the  words  "control" and "deal" used in  Article  235  were interpreted at page 576 P&G and held that the word ’control’ includes   something   in  addition  to   the   disciplinary jurisdiction.  The  control is with regard  to  conduct  and discipline of the District Judges and Subordinate Courts and includes right to appeal against the order of the High Court in  accordance  with the condition or  service  includes  an order  passed  thereon. The word ’deal’  also  includes  the control  over  disciplinary  and  not  mere   administrative jurisdiction. The control which is vested in the High  Court is  complete  control  subject  only to  the  power  of  the Governor  in  the matter of  appointment  including  initial posting  and promotion of the District Judge and  dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of the District Judges  within

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the  exercise of the control vested in the High  Court.  The High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal subject, however, to the conditions  of service  to a right of appeal, if granted by the  conditions of  service, and to the giving of an opportunity of  showing cause  as required by Clause (2) of Art. 311 unless such  an opportunity  is dispensed with by the Governor acting  under the  provisos  (b) and (c) to that clause.  The  High  Court alone could make enquiries into disciplinary conduct. It was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss  the District Judge. Accordingly it was quashed.  That ratio  has no  application  to the facts in this case  since  the  Act, Regulations  and  the Resolutions empowered  the  Divisional Board and its Standing Committee to deal with use of  unfair means   at  final  examinations  including  fabrication   of documents  issued by the  Board as an integral part  of  the power of the Divisional Board. Similarly, the ratio in  (Taj Pal  Singh  (dead)  through Lrs) v. State of  U.P.  &  Anr., [1986]  3 SCR 429 also is inapplicable to the facts of  this case. In that case, the  facts were that while the appellant was  working as the District and Sessions Judge,  the  Stage Govt. moved the High Court to his premature retirement.  The Administrative  Judge agreed with Government’s  proposal  to retire the appellant after giving him three months’  notice, the Governor passed the impugned order compulsorily retiring the  appellant.  Three days  thereafter  the  Administrative Committee  had  approved the opinion of  the  Administrative Judge which was transmitted to the  Government.                                                        789 Assailing the action of the Government the writ petition was filed  which was dismissed by the High Court, but on  appeal this  Court  held  that the  Administrative  Judge  was  not competent  to  recommend  to the  Governor  or  compulsorily retire the District and Sessions Judge and the order of  the Government made pursuant thereto was declared illegal.  This Court  reiterated that the High Court has power  under  Art. 235  to make rules for its administrative  convenience,  but since the impugned action was not in pursuance of that rule, the  action was not upheld. That ratio also  renders  little assistance  to  the  respondents for the  reasons  that  the Standing Committee, as stated earlier is an integral part of while  exercising the powers, under Art. 226 or Art. 136  of the  Constitution, by the High Court or of this  Court,  are not  sitting  Committees (domestic enquiry body),  nor  have power to evaluate the evidence as an appellate Court and  to come  to its own conclusions. If the conclusions reached  by the Board can be fairly supported by the evidence on  record then  the  High  Court  or this  Court  has  to  uphold  the decision,  though  as  appellate  Court  of  facts,  may  be inclined to take different view.      The contention of M/s. Chidambaram, Jaitley, Salve  and Cama,  the  learned counsel for the students,  is  that  the students  were minors; neither the parents nor anybody  like an Advocate was permitted to assist the students. Answers to the  questionnaire  were  extracted  from  the  students  to confess  their guilt. No adequate opportunity was  given  to the  students at the enquiry. No-one on behalf of the  Board acquainted  with  the  Divisional  Board.   Accordingly  the Board   must   be  deemed  to  have  passed   the   impugned notification as per the scheme of the provisions of the  Act and  the Regulations. Therefore, the finding of the  learned Judge  Sugla, J. that the Standing Committee had no power to take  the  impugned decision, etc. without approval  of  the Divisional   Board  is  clearly  illegal   and   cannot   be sustained.

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    The  question then is whether the candidates  or  their parents   or   guardians  are  privy   to   the   fraudulent fabrication.  Since  we are informed that  investigation  in this  regard  by the Police is in progress,  we  refrain  to express  any final opinion in this regard. Suffice to  state that  the  records  clearly  establish  that  there  was   a fraudulent  fabrication of the moderators’  marks-sheets  of 283   candidates  including  the  respondents  herein.   The question, therefore, emerges whether the conclusion  reached by  the Standing Committee that the fabrication was done  at the  behest  of either the candidate or the parents  or  the guardians to                                                        790 their  advantage  is based on records. We  remind  ourselves that  the  facts  was  examined to explain  as  to  how  the moderators’ sheets were dealt with after the board  screened the  marks, but before taking to Pune to feed the  computer, nor  an  opportunity was given to cross examine   them.  The evidence without subjecting it to cross-examination is of no value. Enquiry report is not a report in the eye of law.  It does  not  contain  any  statement  of  facts,  nor  reasons recorded. It merely records conclusions. When seven  members were appointed  it is not expected that all  of  them  would submit   uniform  stereo  typed  reports  to  the   Standing Committee. The Standing Committee did not apply its mind  to the   facts,  nor  recorded  reasons  in  support   of   its conclusions   that  the   examinees/parents/guardians   were parties  to the fabrication and the fabrication was done  at their  behest.  Sri Chidambaram further contended  that  the Board should establish the guilt of the examinees beyond all reasonable  doubts.  Shri Jaitley, Sri Cama  and  Sri  Salve though did not support Sri Chidambaram that the standard  of proof must be beyond all reasonable doubt, they argued  that Standard  of proof must be a high degree akin to trial in  a criminal case. The Board did not discharge its duty, on  the other hand the Board had presumed that fabrication was  done for the benefit of the examinees. The test of benefit to  an examinee is preposterous. There is no presumption that   the fabrication   was   done  at  the  behest  of   either   the examinees/parents/guardians.  It must be established by  the Board  as of fact that the examinees/parents/guardians  were responsible  for  fabricating the  Moderators’  mark-sheets. Thus  no  evidence was placed on record,  nor  wait  proved; that, therefore, the findings of the Standing Committee  are clearly based on no evidence. The learned Judges of the High Court  were  justified in reaching the conclusion  that  the Board  had not established that the fabrication was done  at the  behest  of the  examinees/parents/guardians.  This  was resisted by Sri T.R. Andhyarujana, learned counsel appearing for the Board. It was his contention that all the  examinees admitted in answers to the questionnaire that tampering  was done  and  it  was  to  their  advantage.  In  view  of  the admission, the need to examine any person from the concerned section  was obviated. Fabrication cannot be done except  to benefit the examinees. The fabricator had done it for reward in  concert with outside agencies. Therefore, the  inference from  these facts drawn by the Standing Committee  that  the examinees/parents/guardians  were responsible  to  fabricate the  moderators’ marks-sheets is based on  evidence.  Proper enquiry  was conducted giving reasonable opportunity to  the candidates. Show cause notices set out the material facts on which  the  Board intends to place reliance.  The  examinees submitted   their   explanations  and  also   answered   the questionnaire. On consideration                                                        791

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thereof  the Standing Committee had reached the  conclusions of  the  guilt of the examinees/parents/guardians.  This  is based  on record. It is not open to High Court  to  evaluate the  evidence  to come to its own conclusions.  Thereby  the High  Court has committed manifest error of  law  warranting interference by this Court.      Art. 51A of the Constitution enjoins every citizen,  as a fundamental duty, to promote harmony and spirit of  common brotherhood  among  the people, to  develop  the  scientific temper,  humanism and the spirit of inquiry and  reform;  to strive  towards excellence in all spheres of individual  and collective  activity so  that   the     nation    constantly rises  to higher levels of endeavour and  achievement.  Art. 29(2)  declares education as fundamental  right. The  native endowments  of men are by no means equal. Education means  a process which provides for intellectual, moral and  physical development  of  a  child  for  good  character   formation; mobility to social status; an opportunity to scale  equality and  a  powerful  instrument to bring  about  social  change including necessary awakening among the people. According to Bharat Ratna Dr. Ambedkar education is the means to  promote intellectual, moral and social democracy. In  D.M.K.  Public School  v. (Regional Joint Director of Hyderabad,) AIR  1936 (A.P.) 204 one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.) held that  education lays   foundation  of  good  citizenship  and  a   principal instrument to awaken the child to intellectual and  cultural pursuits  and  values  in preparing  the  child  for  latter professional  training  and  help  him  to  adjust  to   the environment.      In nation building activities, education is a  powerful level  to uplift the poor. Education should,  therefore,  be co-related to the social, political or economic needs of our developing  nation  fostering secular  values  breaking  the barriers  of casteism, linguism, religious  bigotry  and  it should  act  as an instrument of  social  change.  Education system  should be so devised as to meet these  realities  of life.   Education  nourishes  intellectual  advancement   to develop  dignity  of person without which there  is  neither intellectual excellence nor pursuit of happiness.  Education thus kindles  its flames for pursuit of excellence,  enables and  ennobles  the young mind to sharpen  his/her  intellect more  with reasoning than blind faith to reach  intellectual heights  and  inculcate in him or her to strive  for  social equality and dignity of person.      Teacher occupies pride of place next below the  parents as  he/she imparts education and disciple the  students.  On receiving  salary from public exchequer he/she  owes  social responsibility and accountability                                                        792 to  disciple  the students by total dedication  and  sincere teaching.  It would appear that their fallen  standards  and rectitude is also a contributory factor to the  indiscipline among  the students. The students, too, instead of  devoting his or her precious time to character building and to pursue courses  of study studiously and  diligently in the  pursuit of  knowledge and excellence, dissipate their precious  time and  many indulge in mass copying at the final  examinations or  use unfair means. Some even do not hesitate to  threaten the dutiful invigilators with dir consequences.      In  G.B.S. Omkar v. Shri Venkateswara  University,  AIR 1981 A.P. 163 P.A. Choudhary, J., in the context of  finding the   student   guilty  of  mal-practices  held,   that   "I regretfully note that standards of discipline and  education presently  detaining  in many Universities  in  our  country leave  a  good lot to be desired. They are low  and  falling

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lower  every  day. the fall-out of these  low  standards  of university education on liberal profession is proving to  be nearly  catastrophic ..... It is no wonder that some of  our Universities have ceased  to be centres of learning and have grown  into battle-fields for warring Caste groups." It  was held  that  what  the  Writ Court under  Art.  226  need  to consider  is  whether fair opportunity had been given  to  a petitioner and he had been treated squarely and whether  the student  had  a  fair deal with  the  University.  Once  the procedural formalities are complied with, in the absence  of any  allegation of mala fide, it must be presumed  that  the University had acted bona fide and honestly so long as there is the evidence justifying the inference arrived at  without there  being  a serious procedural  irregularity.  The  Writ Court  would  not  interfere with an  order  of  educational institution.  Therefore, what the writ court needs to do  is to  find  whether fair and reasonable opportunity  has  been given to the students in the given facts.      From  this background the question emerges whether  the impugned   notification   is  vitiated  by   any  procedural irregularity  under the provisions of the  Act,  regulations and  the Resolutions referred hereinbefore or  violative  of the principles of natural justice.      The  students involved at the examination of  secondary education  are by and large minors but that by itself  would not  be  a factor to hold that the  students  were  unfairly treated at an inquiry conducted during the domestic inquiry. Assistance  of an Advocate to the delinquent at  a  domestic enquiry is not a part of the principles of natural  justice. It  depends  on the nature of the inquiry and  the  peculiar circumstances   and   facts  of  a  particular   case.   The regulations and the rules of enquiry                                                        793 specifically  excluded the assistance of an Advocate at  the inquiry.  Therefore, the omission to provide the  assistance of  a  counsel  at  the inquiry  is  not  violative  of  the principles  of  natural  justice.  The  show  cause   notice furnished  wealth  of  material  particulars  on  which  the tampering   was  alleged  to  be  founded  and   given   the opportunity  to each student to submit the  explanation  and also to adduce evidence, oral or documentary at the inquiry. Each   student   submitted  the  explanation   denying   the allegation. At the inquiry the questionnaire in the proforma was  given  to  each  student.  It  is  undoubted  that  the allegation  of fabrication was stated to have been  done  at the  behest of either the student/parents or  guardians  and the  parents or guardians were not permitted to  participate in  the  inquiry. Inspection of documents was  given.  Their answer-sheets and marks secured were perused by the students and  were asked to testify whether the answer-books  belongs to  him  or  her and to identify the marks  awarded  by  the examiner to each answer to the question and the total  marks awarded.  It was also asked to verify and state whether  the moderator’s  mark-sheets  were  tampered  in  the  concerned subject  or subjects as the case may be. The  student  could easily  identify  and in fact identified his or  her  answer books   and   verified  the  marks  awarded   and   answered positively that the marks were fabricated in the moderators’ mark-sheets.  The questionnaire was also given  to  indicate their  educational background in the previous  school  years and also the marks they expected at the final  examinations. The need of the assistance of the parents/guardians was thus absolutely  nil.  Further question in the  proforma  was  to ascertain  from the students, due to tampering,  whether  or not  the  marks were increased to his or her  advantage.  It

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could  be answered by a mere look at the marks.  No  outside assistance  is needed. All the students have  admitted  that the  answer  books belong to them. They  also  admitted  the marks  initially  awarded  by  the  examiner  or  added   or subtracted,  if any, by the moderators. They  also  admitted that the fabrication in the moderators’ mark-sheets  in  the subject  or subjects and the marks were increased  to  their advantage. They also denied the complicity of him or her  or of  parents  or  guardians.  It  is  not  the  case  of  the respondents  that they were coerced to answer the  questions in  a particular manner. It is obvious from the record  that they had prior consultations with the counsel. Thus it could be  seen that the procedure adopted at the inquiry  is  fair and   just  and  it  is  not  vitiated  by  any   procedural irregularity  nor is violative of the principles of  natural justice.  The  absence  of opportunity  to  the  parents  or guardians, in this background does not vitiate the  legality or  validity  of the inquiry conducted or  decision  of  the Committee.                                                        794      It  is  true,  as  contended  by  Sri  Chidambaram  and reiterated  by other counsel, that the Inquiry  Report  does contain  only conclusions bereft of the statement  of  facts and  reasons in support thereof. As pointed out by Sri  Cama that  in  some of the reports, the body was written  in  the hand writing of one or other person and it was signed by the Inquiry  Officer concerned. But when an inquiry against  283 students was conducted, it is not expected that each Inquiry Officer alone should write the report under his/her hand. In the  circumstances  the Inquiry Officer  obviously  had  the assistance  of the staff in the office to write the body  or the  conclusions to his/her dictation and he/she signed  the report. The reports cannot be jettisoned on the ground  that the Inquiry Officer mechanically drew the conclusions in the reports  without  applying his/her mind to  the  facts.  The Enquiry Reports are not, therefore, bad in law.      In  (Union  of  India) v. (Mohan Lal  Capoor  &  Ors.,) [1973]  2 SCC 836 this court speaking through M.M. Beg,  J., for  a Bench of two Judges held in paragraph 28 at page  854 that  the  reasons are the links between  the  materials  on which   certain   conclusions  are  based  to   the   actual conclusions.  They  disclose  how mind  is  applied  to  the subject  matter  for  a  decision,  whether  it  is   purely administrative  or quasi-judicial. They would  reveal  nexus between  the facts considered and the conclusions  reached.. This view was reiterated in (Gurdial Singh Fijji) v.  (State of Punjab & Ors.,) [1979] 2 SCC 368. Those two cases  relied on  by  Sri  Chidambaram,  the  rules/regulations   required recording  of  reasons  in  support  of  the  conclusion  as mandatory.      Unless the rule expressly or by necessary implications, excludes  recording  of  reasons, it is  implicit  that  the principles  of  natural justice or fair  play  does  require recording  of  reasons as a part of fair  procedure.  In  an administrative  decision, its order/decision itself may  not contain reasons. It may not be the requirement of the rules, but at the least, the record should disclose reasons. It may not be like a judgement. But the reasons may be precise.  In S.N.  Mukherjee v. Union of India, J.T. 1990 (3) SC 630  the Constitution  Bench of this Court surveyed the  entire  case law in this regard, and we need not burden the Judgement  to reiterate them once over and at page 643 in paragraph 40  it held  that  except in cases where the requirement  has  been dispensed  with  expressly or by necessary  implication,  an administrative  authority  exercising  judicial  or   quasi-

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judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.  In para 36 it was further held that recording  of reasons  excludes  changes  of arbitrariness  and  ensure  a degree  of fairness in the process of decision  making.  The said principle would apply                                                        795 equally  to  all decisions and its  applications  cannot  be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal,  revision or  judicial  review. "It is not required that  the  reasons should  be  as elaborate as in the decision of  a  Court  of law."  The extent and nature of the reasons would depend  on particular  facts  and circumstances. What is  necessary  is that  the reasons are clear and explicit so as  to  indicate that the authority has given the consideration to the points in  controversy. The need for  recording reasons is  greater in  a case where the order is passed at the original  stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order,  need not give separate reasons. If the appellate  or revisional   authority  disagrees,  the  reasons   must   be contained  in the order under challenge. Thus it is  settled law  that the reasons are harbinger between the mind of  the maker  of the order to the controversy in question  and  the decision  or  conclusion  arrived at. It  also  exclude  the chances  to  reach  arbitrary,  whimsical   or    capricious decision  or  conclusion.  The  reasons  assure  an  inbuilt support  to the conclusion/decision reached. The order  when it effects the right of a citizen or a person,  irrespective of the fact, whether it is quasi-judicial or  administrative fair play requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons. The recording of reasons is also an assurance  that the authority concerned consciously applied its mind to  the facts  on record. It also aids the appellate  or  revisional authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the High  Court under  Art. 226 or the Appellate jurisdiction of this  Court under Art. 136 to see whether the authority concerned  acted fairly  and  justly  to meet out justice  to  the  aggrieved person.      From this perspective, the question is whether omission to  record  reasons  vitiates the impugned order  or  is  in violation   of  the  principles  of  natural  justice.   The omnipresence  and  omniscience of the principle  of  natural justice  acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary  decision in  flagrant infraction of fair play. But the  applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of  thumb or  a straight jacket formula as an abstract proposition  of law.  It  depends  on the facts of the case  nature  of  the inquiry  and the effect of the order/decision on the  rights of  the person and attendant circumstances. It is seen  from the  record  and  is not disputed,  that  all  the  students admitted, the factum of fabrication and it was to his or her advantage and that the subject/subjects in which fabrication was  committed  belong  to  him or her.  In  view  of  these admissions  the Inquiry Officer, obviously did not  find  it expedient to reterate all the admissions made. If the  facts are  disputed,  necessarily  the authority  or  the  Inquiry Officer, on consideration of the material on record,  should record  reasons in support of the conclusion reached.  Since the facts are admitted, the need to their                                                        796 reiteration  was obviated and so only conclusions have  been stated in the reports. The omission to record reasons in the present  case  is neither illegal, nor is violative  of  the principles  of natural justice. Whether the conclusions  are proved  or  not  is  yet another  question  and  would  need detailed consideration.

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    In Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1964] 3 SCR  506 at  p. 514 the ratio  that the Enquiry Report  must  contain reasons in support of the findings drawn neatly and  briefly is of no assistance for the aforestated facts of this  case. The  ratio in      A.K. Roy, etc. etc. v. Union of  India  & Ors., [1982] 1 SCC 271 that the aid of friend could be taken to   assist  the  detenu  and in  Pett  v.  Grehound  Racing Association Ltd., [1968] 2 All Eng. Reports 545 the right to appoint an Agent to represent the case of the petitioner are also of no assistance since the rule expressly excluded such a representation. The ratio in Union of India v. H.C.  Goel, [1964]  4 SCR 718 also does not help the respondents for the reason  that  it  is  not a case  of  no  evidence  and  the conclusions were reached on the basis of the admission  made by the respondents. The ration in M/s. Bareilly  Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors., [1971] 2 SCC 617 also does  not  apply to the facts of this case for  the  reasons that  the  need to examine the witnesses on  behalf  of  the Board was obviated by the admissions made by the  examinees. The  ratio  in   Shanti  Prasad  Jain  v.  The  Director  of Enforcement, [1963] 3 SCR 297 is equally of no assistance to the respondents since the contention that the  circumstances under  which the fabrication of the moderators’  mark-sheets came to be made is not a relevant fact. Therefore, there  is no  need  to examine the concerned officials  in  the  State Board  to  explain as to how and who dealt with  the  papers from  the  time recounting was done in the office  till  the moderators’  mark-sheets  were  sent  to Pune  to  feed  the computer.  The ratio in Merla Ramanne v. Nallaparaju &  Ors, [1955] 2 SCR 941 and Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India  & Ors.,  [1986] 3 SCC 229 also do not assist  the  respondents for  the  reason  that the answer  books  of  the  concerned students, the marks awarded by the examiners or addition  or alteration,  if any, made by the moderators and  fabrication of  the  moderators’ mark-sheets were admittedly  given  for personal inspection to the concerned students and given them an  opportunity  to inspect the record and  thereafter  they made admission. The further contention of Sri Cama that  the Standing  Committee  did not deal individually  the  answers given  by  each student and the decision was  not  based  on evidence  is without force as the conclusions are  based  on the  admissions. Equally the need to consider each  case  on merits  is obviated by the admission made by every  student. The ratio in (Government medi                                                        797 cal  Store  Depot,  Karnal) v. (State of  Haryana  &  Anr.,) [1986]  3  SCR 450 at p. 454 that the charges are  vague  is also  of no assistance to the facts of this case. The  ratio in (M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd.,) v.  (Gangadhar & Ors.,) [1964]  2  SCR  809 at p. 825 that  the  documents  must  be supplied at least 48 hours in advance is also of no help  to the  respondents  in  view of the  admissions  made  by  the respondents. The ratio  in Tej pal Singh’s case (supra) that mere inspection of the documents will not cure the defect of procedure  or  violation  of principles of  natural  justice also  does not apply to the facts of his case. The ratio  in (State of Punjab) v. (Bhagat Ram) [1975] 2 SCR 370 that  the supply  of  synopsis  of  the  material  is  not  sufficient compliance with the principle of natural justice, also  does not  render any assistance to the respondents. The ratio  in (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd.,) v. (Gujarat steel Tubes  Mazdoor Sabha,)  [1980] 2 SCR 146 at p. 202 that the conclusion  and the  findings  are in different hand-writings,  which  would show  the  non-application of the mind to the facts  and  it violates  the  principle of natural justice  also  does  not

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apply  to  the facts of this case. The ratio  in  (Union  of India  &  Ors.) v. (Mohd. Ramzan Khan,) JT 1990 (4)  SC  456 also does not apply to the facts in this case as the  report is  solely based on the admission made by the examinees  and no  new  material  has  been  relied  upon  by  the  Enquiry Officers.  Undoubtedly, it is settled law that the right  to life  includes right to reputation and livelihood  and  that the   individual as an entity is entitled to the  protection of Art. 21, but in view of the facts of this case the  ratio in (Vishwa Nath) v. (State of Jammu & Kashmir,) [1983] 1 SCC 215  and  (Ogla tellis & Ors.,) etc.  v.  (Bombay  Municipal Corporation & Ors., etc.,) [1985] 3 SCC 545 also do not help the  respondents. The further contention of Sri  Salve  that the  order  must  be a speaking order  preceded  by  a  fair enquiry and the report must be based on cogent evidence, and in  this  case all the requirements are lacking is  also  an argument  of  despair.  Therefore,  for  the  reasons  given earlier, the argument stands rejected.      The  next contention that the notification is  vitiated for  the reasons that the Standing Committee itself did  not record  any  reason in support of its  conclusion  that  the examinees or the parents or the guardians are parties to the fabrication  cannot  be sustained for the  reason  that  the regulation itself postulates that if the Committee disagrees with  the  Inquiry  Officer then only it  is  obligatory  to record reasons. Since the Committee agreed with the  report, there  is no need, on their part, to record the reasons. The impugned   notification,  therefore,  is  not  vitiated   by violation of rules of natural justice.      The   crucial  question,  therefore,  is  whether   the conclusions                                                        798 reached by the authorities that the examinees, their parents or  guardians  were parties to the fabrication  and  whether their complicity was established from record and whether the evidence  was sufficient to support such conclusion  reached by the Standing Committee or the Enquiry Officer.      Counsel on either side generated considerable debate on "the  standard of proof" in a domestic enquiry. Mr.  Jaitely placed reliance on paragraph 18 of Vol. 17 of Halsbury’s Law of England, Fourth Edition, at page 16, which reads thus           "To  succeed  on any issue the party  bearing  the           legal burden of proof must (1) satisfy a judge  or           jury of the likelihood of the truth of his case by           adducing  a  greater weight of evidence  than  his           opponent,  and (2) adduce evidence  sufficient  to           satisfy them to the required standard or degree of           proof. The standard differs in criminal and  civil           cases.  In  civil cases the standard of  proof  is           satisfied on a balance of probabilities.  However,           even  within  this formula variations  in  subject           matter or in allegations will affect the  standard           required;  the  more serious the  allegation,  for           example  fraud, crime or professional  misconduct,           the  higher will be the required degree of  proof,           although it will not reach the criminal  standard.           In  criminal cases, the  standard required of  the           prosecution  is  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt.           This  standard  is  also  requisite  in  case   of           committal  for  contempt, and  in  pension  claims           cases.  In matrimonial cases it seems  that  proof           on balance of probabilities is sufficient. Once  a           matter  is established beyond reasonable doubt  it           must  be  taken for all purposes of law  to  be  a           fact,  as  there  is no  room  for  a  distinction

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         between  what  is  found  by  inference  from  the           evidence and what is found as a positive face." and  contended that the standard of proof of fabrication  of record  in a domestic inquiry does not differ from  criminal charge  and it must be of a higher degree. In the  Board  of High  School  and Intermediate Education U.P.  v.  Bagleshar Persad & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 767 relied on by Sri Andhyarjuna the  facts  were  that the  appellant  Board  accepting  the findings  of the committee that the respondents used  unfair means  in answering the subjects, cancelled the  declaration of  the  results  of  the  respondent  in  the  High  School Certificate Examination held in 1960. The charges were based on the facts that in the Hindi  paper the                                                        799 respondent  gave wrong answers to a particular  question  in the same way in which the answers have been given by another candidate who was having consecutive number. The High  Court held  that  the findings of the Committee were based  on  no evidence  and  quashed the cancellation of the  results.  On appeal,  this Court held that the respondent  admitted  that the mistakes in answers in the two papers were identical and he  pleaded  that he could not say anything as to  why  this happened.  The proof of charges was inferred that as  either the respondent copied from the answer book of the  candidate or that both of them had copied from any other source.It was accordingly  held  that is would amount to the  adoption  of unfair means. The High Court, therefore, committed error  in assuming  that there is no evidence in proof of it. At  page 774 this Court further held that in dealing with question as to  whether the Committee was justified in  arriving at  its conclusion against the respondent it would not be reasonable to  exclude from the consideration of the  circumstances  on which  the  whole enquiry came to  be held and  the  general background of the atmosphere in the examination hall. It was also further held at page 775 that educational  institutions like the universities set up enquiry committees to deal with the  problem  of adoption of unfair means by  candidate  and normally  it  is within the jurisdiction  of  such  domestic tribunals  to decide all relevant questions in the light  of the  evidence  adduced  before them. In the  matter  of  the adoption  of  unfair means direct evidence may  sometime  be available  but cases may arise where direct evidence is  not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of the probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This is the problem with the educational-institution. How to face it,  is a serious problem and unless there is  justification to  do  so,  court  should be slow  to  interfere  with  the decisions  of domestic tribunal appointed by  the  education body like universities. In dealing with the validity of  the impugned order passed by the universities under Art. 226 the High Court is not sitting in  an appeal over the decision on this question. Its jurisdiction is limited and though it  is true  that  if the impugned order is not  supported  by  any evidence,  the  High  Court may be justified  to  quash  the order.  But  the conclusion that the impugned order  is  not supported by any evidence must be reached after  considering the   question   as  to  whether   the   probabilities   and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said  conclusion. The  enquiry held by domestic tribunals in such cases  must, no  doubt  be fair and the students must be  given  adequate opportunity to defend themselves and holding such enquiries, the  tribunal  must  follow the rules  of  natural  justice. Accordingly, it was held that the appeal was allowed and the order of the High Court was set aside and                                                        800

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that of the domestic tribunal was confirmed.      In (Bihar School Examination Board) v. (Subhash Chandra Sinha  & Ors.,) [1970] 3 SCR 963 this Court emphasised  that the  essence of an  examination is that the worth  of  every person  is appraised without any assistance from an  outside source. The academic standards require that the  authority’s appreciation  of  the  problem must be  respected.  A  full- fledged  judicial  inquiry  was  not  required.  It  is  not necessary  to conduct an inquiry in each individual  case to satisfy  itself  who are the candidates  that  have  adopted unfair means when the examination as whole had to go. It was further held at p. 968 E to H that "while we do not wish  to whittle  down the requirement of natural justice  and  fair- play in case where such requirement may be said to arise, we do not want that this court should be  understood as  having stated  that an enquiry with a right to representation  must always  precede  in  every  case,  however,  different.  The universities are responsible for their standard and  conduct of  the  examination. The universities are  responsible  for their  standard and conduct of the examination. The  essence of  the  examination is that the worth of  every  person  is appraised without any assistance from an outside source.  It cannot  be held that a detailed quasi-judicial enquiry  with right  to  its alumini to plead and lead  evidence, etc.  is preceded  before the   result are withheld  or  examinations cancelled. If there is sufficient material on which it could be   demonstrated  that  the  Authority was  right  in   its conclusion  that the examination ought to be cancelled  then academic standards require that the Authority’s appreciation of  the problem must be respected. It would not be  for  the courts  to  say  that  we  should  have  examined  all   the candidates  or  even their representatives with  a  view  to ascertaining whether they had received assistance or not. To do this, would encourage indiscipline, if not also  prejury. It is true as stated by Sri Chidambaram that the above ratio was  laid in the context of the cancellation of  examination of  the  entire centre. But the general principles  must  be kept  in  view while dealing with the problem faced  by  the academic institutions.      In (Seth Gulabchand) v. (Seth Kudilal and Ors.,) [1966] 3  SCR  623  this Court held that  there  is  no  difference between cases in which charges of a fraudulent  or  criminal character  are made and cases in which such charges are  not made.  While striking the balance of probability, the  court would keep in mind the presumption of honesty and  innocence or  the  nature  of the crime or fraud  charged.  The  rules applicable  to  circumstantial evidence  in  criminal  cases would not apply to civil cases. The ordinary rules governing civil  cases  of balance of probabilities will  continue  to apply.                                                        801      In (Ghazanfar Rashid) v. (Board, H.S. & I. Edn. U.P.  & Ors.,) AIR 1970 Allahabad 209 a full Bench, speaking through ours learned brother K.N. Singh, J. (as he then was) dealing with  the standard or proof of the charge of use  of  unfair means  at the examination, it was held that it was the  duty of  the  Examination Committee, etc., to maintain purity  of examination  and  if examinee is found to have  used  unfair means at the examination, it is the duty of the  Examination Committee  to  take action against the erring  examinees  to maintain  the  educational  standard.  Direct  evidence   is available  in  some cases but in a large  number  of  cases, direct  evidence  is not available. In  that  situation  the Examination   Committee   as  of  necessity   to   rely   on circumstantial  evidence which may include the answer  given

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by  the  examinee, the report of the Superintendent  of  the centre,  the invigilator  and the report of the experts  and other attending circumstances. The Examination Committee, if relies upon such evidence to come to the conclusion that the examinee  has used unfair means in answering questions  then it  is  not open to the High Court to  interfere  with  that decision, merely because the High Court may take a different view  on re-assessment of those circumstances. While  it  is open  to the High Court to interfere with the order  of  the quasi-judicial  authority,  if it is not  supported  by  any evidence  or if the order as passed in contravention of  the statutory  provisions  of  the law or in  violation  of  the principles of natural justice, the court has no jurisdiction to  quash the order merely on the ground that different view could  possibly  be taken on the evidence available  on  the record.  The Examination Committee has jurisdiction to  take decision  in the matter of use of unfair means not  only  on direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial evidence. There is no scope for importing the principles  of criminal  trial  while considering the  probative  value  of probabilities  and circumstantial evidence. the  Examination Committee  is not bound by technical rules of  evidence  and procedure as are applicable to Courts. We respectfully agree with the ratio.      In Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] All Eng.  Law Reports 372 at p. 374 Denning J., as he then was, reiterated that the evidence against the petitioner must have the  same degree of cogency as is required to discharge a burden in  a civil   case.   It  must  carry  a  reasonable   degree   of probability,  but not so high as is required in  a  criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: "We think it more probable than not the burden is discharge but, if the probabilities are equal, it is not discharged."                                                        802      In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chet Ram & Ors., [1989]  2 SCC  45 relied on by Sri Chidambaram, this Court dealt  with the proof of guilt of the accused at a criminal trial.  This Court held that when two views are plausible, the view being taken  must  have  some content of plausibility  in  it  and without  the same, the other view cannot be  countenance  in law  as a plausible alternative. It must be remembered  that at  a  criminal trial the burden of proof is always  on  the prosecution.  It  must establish the guilt  of  the  accused beyond  all  reasonable doubts. If there exist  a  plausible alternative  view, its benefit must be extended only to  the accused  and  not to the prosecution. Therefore,  the  ratio therein is inapplicable to a proceeding either in the  civil case  or in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal. State  of U.P.  v.  Krishna Gopal & Anr., [1988] 4 SCC 302 at  p.  314 also relates to criminal trial. In paragraph 26 in assessing the  evidence  adduced by the prosecution, this  Court  laid that  the  concept of probability, and the  degrees  of  it, cannot  obviously  be  expressed in terms  of  units  to  be mathematically  enumerated  as  to how many  of  such  units constitute  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  There  is  an unmistakable  subjective  element in the evaluation  of  the degree  of  probability and the quantum of  proof.  Forensic probability  must, in the last analysis, rest on the  robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained institutions of the  Judge.  In evaluating the  circumstantial  evidence  in Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] SCR 1091  at p.  1097 the Court approved the statement of Baron  Alderman in Reg v. Hodge, [1988] 2 Law, 227 that:           "The  mind was apt to take a pleasure in  adapting           circumstances   to  one  another,  and   even   in

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         straining them a little, if need be, to force them           to  form  parts, of one connected whole;  and  the           more ingenious the mind of the individual the more           likely  was it, considering such matters, to  over           reach  and mislead itself, to supply  some  little           link  that  is wanting, to take for  granted  some           fact  consistent  with its previous  theories  and           necessary to render them complete."      It  was  held  that  in  evaluating  the  evidence   of circumstantial  nature  it is  the duty of  the  prosecution that  all  the  circumstances  must  be  fully   established circumstances should be consistent only with the  hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. This standards of proof also is not relevant not to be extended to consider the evidence  in an  inquiry by the domestic tribunal. The ratio in  (Bank of India  v. J.A.H. Chinoy,) AIR 1950 PC 90 that the  appellate court  would be reluctant to differ from conclusion  of  the trial Judge if his conclusion is based on                                                        803 the  impression made by a person in the witness box is  also not  germane  for  the purpose of this  case.  It  was  laid therein that inferences and assumptions founded on a variety of  facts and circumstances which, in themselves,  offer  no direct  or positive support for the conclusion reached,  the right  of  the appellate court to  review  this  inferential process cannot be denied. While dealing with proof of  fraud it  was held that speculation is not enough to bring home  a charge of fraudulent conspiracy.      In Khwaja v. Secretary of State, [1983] 1 All Eng.  Law Reports  785  (H.L.)  dealing  with  the  functions  of  the Immigration Authorities and of the Courts, Lord  Wilberforce at p. 7877, laid the law that the allegation that permission to  enter into  the country by an immigrant was obtained  by fraud  or deceit being of a serious character and  involving issues  of personal liberty requires a corresponding  degree of satisfactory evidence. If the Court is not satisfied with any  part  of  the evidence, it  may remit  the  matter  for reconsideration  or  itself  receive  further  evidence.  It should quash the detention order where the evidence was  not such  as  the authority should have relied on or  where  the evidence received does not justify the decision reached  or, of course, for any serious procedural irregularity. At p.784 Lord Scarman held that it is not necessary to import in  the civil  proceedings of judicial review the formula devised by Judges  for  the guidance of juries in criminal  cases.  The reviewing  court  will, therefore, require to  be  satisfied that the facts which are required for the  justification  of the  restraint put on liberty do exist. The  flexibility  of the  civil  standard of proof suffices to  ensure  that  the court  will require the high degree of probability which  is appropriate  to what is at stake. The nature and gravity  of an  issue  necessarily determines the  manner  of  attaining reasonable   satisfaction  of  the  truth  of   the   issue. Therefore,  the civil standard of flexibility be applied  to deal with immigration cases.      In Sodhi Transport Co.  & Anr., etc. v. State of U.P. & Anr.,  etc., [1986] 1 SCR 939 at p. 954 this  Court  dealing with rebutable presumption held that:           "A presumption is not in itself evidence  but only           makes  a  prima  facies case for  party  in  whose           favour   it  exists.  It  is  a  rule   concerning           evidence.  It  indicates the person  on  whom  the           burden   of  proof  lies.  When   presumption   is           conclusive,  it  obviates the  production  of  any           other  evidence to dislodge the conclusion  to  be

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         drawn  on proof of certain facts. But when  it  is           rebuttable it only points out the party on whom                                                        804           lies  the duty of going forward with  evidence  on           the  facts  presumed,  and  when  that  party  has           produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to           show  that the real fact is not as  presumed,  the           purpose of presumption is over. Then the  evidence           will  determine the true nature of the fact to  be           established, the rules of presumption are  reduced           from  enlightened human knowledge  and  experience           and  are drawn from the  connection, relation  and           coincidence of facts and circumstances."      Bhandari  v. Advocates Committee, [1956] All  Eng.  Law Reports 742  (PC) is also a case concerning the professional misconduct.  In proof of the charge it was held that  it  is the duty of the professional domestic tribunal investigating the allegation to apply a high standard of proof and not  to condemn  on a mere balance of probabilities.  In  Glynn)  v. (Keele University & Anr., [1971] 2 All Eng. Law Reports,  89 (Chancery  Division)  relied on by Sri Salve,  the  question arose whether failure to give an opportunity to the students before  the  suspension is violative of  the  principles  of natural  justice. It was held that the student did not  deny commission  of the offence, therefore, it was held that  the student suffered no injustice by reason of the breach of the rules.  Further while dealing with the scope of the  inquiry by  the domestic tribunal, it was held that the society   is charged  with  the supervision and upbringing of  the  pupil under  tution, be the society, a university or college or  a school.  Where  this relationship exists it is  quite  plain that  on the one hand in certain circumstances the  body  or individual acting on behalf of the society must be  regarded as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity-- expulsion from  the society   is the obvious example. On the other  hand,  there exists  a wide range of circumstances in which the  body  or individual  is  concerned to impose penalties by  a  way  of domestic  discipline.  In those circumstances  the  body  or individual is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at all but  in a ministerial capacity, i.e. in the  performance  of the  rights  and  duties vested in the  society  as  to  the upbringing and supervision of the members of the society. No doubt  there is a moral obligation to act fairly,  but  this moral  obligation  does not, lie within the purview  of  the court  in  its control over quasi-judicial acts.  The  ratio relied  on by Shri Salve, far from helping the  respondents, is consistent withour view. The ration in In Re: An Advocate AIR 1989 SC 245 also concerned with professional  misconduct of an Advocate and higher standard of proof of the charge of misconduct was insisted upon. Equally so in Shri Krishan  v. The  Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra., AIR 1976 SC  376. These decisions relied on by Sri Jaitley also do not  assist us.                                                        805 The   contention  of  Sri  Cama  placing  any  reliance   on Shivajirao  Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav  Gosavi  & Ors.  and  vice  versa,  [1967] 1 SCR  458  that  the  Vice- chancellor  would not have done what he did except with  the instructions of the Chief Minister who was to be  benefitted by  getting his daughter passed in M.D. was not accepted  by this  Court  and  that it was  further  contended  that  the benefit  test is preposterous one and the  preponderence  of probabilities  is not possible to be deduced from the  test, does not appear to be sound. This Court noted that the Chief Minister  was  not prepared, as suggested  by  the  Division

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Bench,  to face an inquiry and that, therefore,  substituted to  the findings of the Division Bench, in  the  penultimate paragraph of the judgment that the court would be  cognizant of  the steep decline of public standards, public moral  and public  morale  which  have been  contaminating  the  social environment  and emphasised that "where such  situation  cry out  the Court should not and cannot remain mute  and  dumb" and it is necessary to cleanse public life.      It  is thus well settled law that strict rules  of  the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply  to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable  material facts  though  not proved strictly in  conformity  with  the Evidence  Act. The material must be germane and relevant  to the  facts  in issue. In grave cases  like  forgery,  fraud, conspiracy,  misappropriation, etc. seldom  direct  evidence would  be available. Only the circumstantial evidence  would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence  and circumstances must be carefully  distinguished from  conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to  take pleasure  to adapt circumstances to one another and even  in straining  them a little to force them to form parts of  one connected   whole.   There  must  be  evidence   direct   or circumstances to deduce necessary inference in proof of  the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there  are objective  facts,  direct or circumstantial  from  which  to infer  the  other fact which it is sought to  establish.  In some  cases  the other  facts can be inferred with  as  much practical  as if they had been actually observed.  In  other cases   the   inferences  do  not   go   beyond   reasonable probability.  If  thee are no positive proved  facts,  oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences  can be  made the method of inference fails and what is  left  is mere speculation on conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of  proof that a fact in dispute has been  held  established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt                                                        806 "but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw  an inference  that the fact must be more probable. Standard  of proof  cannot  be  put  in a  straight  Jacket  formula.  No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof.   The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in  a given case. The standard of proof is the same both  in civil cases and domestic enquiries.      From this legal setting we have to consider whether the inference  deduced by the Education Standing Committee  that the  fabrication of moderators’ mark-sheets was done at  the behest  of either the examinee or the parent or guardian  is based  on the evidence on record. It is already  found  that the  examinees  admitted  the  forgery  of  their  concerned moderators’  mark-sheets resulting the increase of marks  to their  advantage. The fabrication of the  moderators  ’mark- sheets  was  done  after  the  scrutiny  by  the   concerned officials  in  the office of the State Board at  Bombay  and before the moderators’ mark-sheets were taken out to Pune to feed the computer. Why one is expected or interested to wade through  eighty thousand moderators’ marks-sheets to  locate only  the  283  examinees  mark-sheets   and  add  marks  by fabrication?  Unless  either  the  examinee  or  parent   or guardian  approached  the fabricator; given the  number  and instructed him/them to fabricate the marks, it would not  be possible  to  know  their number to fabricate.  The  act  of

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fabrication  is  an  offence. Merely it  was  done   in  one subject  or  more  than one  makes  little  difference.  Its gravity  is not mitigated if it is committed in one  subject alone.  This  is  not an innocent act or  a  casual  mistake during the course of performance of the official duty as  is sought  to  be  made  out.  It   was  obviously  done  as  a concerted   action. In view of the admitted facts and  above circumstances the necessary conclusion that could unerringly be drawn would be that either the examinee o r the parent or guardian  obviously was a privy to the fabrication and  that the  forgery  was  committed at his or her  or  parent’s  or guardian’s   behest.  It  is,  therefore  clear   that   the conclusion reached by the Education Standing Committee  that the  fabrication  was  done at the instance  of  either  the examinees  or their parents or guardians is amply borne  out from the record. The High Court in our view over-stepped  is supervisory  jurisdiction  and trenched into  the  arena  of appreciation      of      evidence    to  arrive   its   own conclusions  on the specious plea of satisfying  ’conscience of the court’.      The  question   then is whether the rules  relating  to mode  of  punishment  indicated inthe Appendix  ’A’  to  the resolution are invalid. We have given our anxious thought to the  contention  and to the view of the High Court.  In  our view the punishments indicated in                                                        807 the last column is only the maximum from which it cannot  be inferred  that  it left no discretion  to  the  disciplinary authority.  No  axiomatic  rule can be laid  that  the  rule making  authority intended that under no  circumtances,  the examination Committee could award lesser penalty. It depends on the nature and gravity of the misconduct to be dealt with by the disciplinary authority. In a given case, depending on the  nature and gravity of the misconduct lesser  punishment may be meted out. So by mere prescription of maximum penalty rules do not become invalid.      We  have  no  hesitation  to  conclude  that  when  the evidence  justified  the examination Standing  Committee  to record the finding that the examinees, parents or  guardians are  parties to the fabrication, it is not open to the  High Court   under Art. 225 to itself  evaluate the evidence  and to  interfere  with the finding and to  quash  the  impugned notification.  This Court under Art. 136 has to correct  the illegalities  committed by the High Court when  it  exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 226. In view of  the fair  attitude adopted by the counsel for the Board,  it  is not  necessary  to  go  into  the  question  of  quantum  of punishment.      In the light of the above finding, normally the appeals are  to be allowed, the judgement of the High Court  is  set aside  and the impugned notification dated August  31,  1990 upheld in toto. But we modify the High Court’s order as  per the  directions given in our order dated  January 30,  1991, wherein we accepted the signed statement by the counsel  for the Board without prejudice to their contention and directed the Board (a) to allow all the candidates referred to in the Notification  of  August 31, 1990 to appear  at  the  S.S.C. examination to be conducted in March, 1991 by the Board; and (b)  to  declare  the  untampered  results  of  nine   named candidates  therein.  The failed candidates covered  by  the notification and willing to appear in ensuing examination of March 1991, there applications will be accepted if the  same are submitted on or before 13th February, 1991 through Heads of their respective schools. So far as the other  candidates are concerned, their results shall not be declared, but they

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will  be permitted to appear in the ensuing  examination  of the  Board  to  be  held  in  March,  1991  in  case   their applications  are  received  before  13th  February,   1991, through  Heads of their respective schools. In  this  regard the  Board shall inform all the concerned schools  and  will also give due publicity in the two local newspapers within 3 days.  The Board was further directed to consider the  cases of  such candidates out of 283 who are similar to  the  nine named candidates other than respondent                                                        808 No.  17,  Deepa  V. Agarwal and in  their  cases  also   the untampered  result  shall   be declared  on  or  before  6th February,  1991 and we are informed that results of 18  more candidates were declared.      The  notification  dated  August  31,  1990  is  upheld subject to above modification and shall be operative between the  parties. Before parting with the case we  impress  upon the   appellant   to   have   indepth   investigation   made expeditiously,   if   need  be,  with  the   assistance   of C.B.C.I.D.,  of  the  racket of fabrication  and  bring  the culprit to justice.      The  appeals  are  allowed  accordingly,  but  in   the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs. R.S.S.                                      Appeals allowed.                                                        809