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PETITIONER: MAHANT SANKARSHAN RAMANUJA  DAS GOSWAMI ETC., ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/08/1961

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. KAPUR, J.L. SUBBARAO, K. SHAH, J.C. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1967 AIR   59            1962 SCR  (3) 250

ACT: Estates   Abolition--Amending  Act  enjarging   meaning   of estate--Constitutionality        of--Minor         Inams--If estates--Orissa  Estates Abolition Act, 1961, (Orissa  1  of 1951),  as amended by Orissa Estates  Abolition  (Amendment) Act,  1954,  Orissa XVII of 1954) s.  2(g)--Constitution  of India Art. 31-A.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants were holders of pre-settlement minor  inams. The  grants were not of whole villages but of certain  lands and they comprised both the melwaram and kudiwaram rights in the lands.  The definition of ’estate’ in the Orissa Estates Abolition  Act, 1951, did not include a minor inam.  But  by the  Orissa  Estates Abolition (Amendment)  Act,  1954,  the definition was enlarged to cover minor inams also.  Both the Acts  had received the assent of the President.   The  appe- llants contended (i) that the Amendment Act of 1954 was  not a  law  for  the compulsory acquisition of  property  for  a public  purpose  and  was  not saved by Art.  31  A  of  the Constitution and (ii) that the minor inams were outside  the scope of the Abolition Act and could not be resumed. Held,  that  the  Amendment Act of 1954 was  valid  and  was within  the  Protection of Art. 31A.  In assenting  to  this Act, the President assented to new categories of  properties being  brought within the operation of the abolition Act  of 1951,  and  he,  in  fact,  assented  to  the  law  for  the compulsory  acquisition  for  public purpose  of  these  new categories of property.  Though the minor inams were not  of whole  villages  and  included both the  warams,  they  were nevertheless inams" and the Constitution defined an "estate" as  including  "any"  inam  and fell  within  the  scope  of Abolition Act of 1951 as amended in 1954. The  ejusdem generis rule cannot be applied to Inam  in  the definition of "estate" in Art. 31A(2)(a) because  particular categories like "jagir, in-am or muafi", are included in the definition  expressly  even  though the rule  may  apply  to "other similar grants" which expression may take its  colour from  the  categories named.  The ejusdem  generis  rule  is

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applicable  where a wide or general term has to be cut  down with  reference to the genus of the particular  terms  which precede the general words, 251

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: civil Appeals Nos. 474 to 501, 503 to 505, 508 to 512, 514 and 515 of 1959. Appeals  from  the judgment and orders dated  November,  28, 1956,  in  O. J. C. No. 213 of 1955 and  dated  December  4, 1956, of the Orissa High Court in O. J. C. Nos. 214 to  216, 218, 236 to 241, 244 to 248, 251, 261 to 264, 268, 269, 271, 279 to 282, 304 to 306, 318, 323, 324, 353, 357, 363 and 372 of 1955. A.   V.  Viswanatha  Sastri  and M. S. K.  Sastri,  for  the appellants  (in  C. As.  Nos. 474-487, 489-501  503-505  and 508-510 of 1959). M.   S.  K.  Sastri,  for  the appellant  (  In  C.  A.  No. 488/1959). G.   C.  Mathur, for the appellants (In C. As.   Nos.  ,111, 512, 514 and 515 of 1959.) C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India B.   R.      L. Iyengar and P.M. Sen, for the respondents. 1961.   August 22.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by HIDAYATULLAH,  J.-These are 38 appeals against the  judgment and  orders of the High Court of Orissa dated  November  28, 1956,   by  which  42  petitions  under  Art.  226  of   the Constitution filed by the present appellants and some others were  dismissed.  The High Court certified the cases as  fit for   appeal  to  this  Court  under  Art.  132(1)  of   the Constitution. The appellants are holders of pre-settlement minor inams  in the  State of Orissa.  Their grants art, different  both  in regard  to  the  time  when they were  made  and  the  lands involved  in  them.   They  were  made  for  performance  of services of deities and were classed as Devadayam grants  in the revenue papers.  The grants in all these cases were  not of  whole  villages  but of certain lands  and  hence  their classification  as minor inams, and they comprised both  the melwaram and kudiwaram rights 252 in  the lands.  It is not necessary to refer to these  cases separately, since a single argument was addressed before  us involving    the    consideration    whether    Notification No.4971-XV--9154-E.A.  dated  July 15, 1955, issued  by  the Orissa  State Government, and the Orissa  Estates  Abolition Act,  1951 (Act 1 of 1952) as amended by the  Orissa  Estate Abolition  (Amendment)  Act, 1954 (Act XXVII of  1954)  were respectively  beyond  the competence of the  State  and  the Orissa State Legislature. By the original Act, all estates of the intermediaries  were abolished,   and  on  a  notification  by  the   Government, such,estates  vested in Government.  By the  amending,  Act, the definition of’ "estate" was widened to cover even such;, minor inams, and then the impugned notification was  issued. The appellant contend that the original Act and the amending Act were, jointly or severally beyond the competence ,of the State Legislature and that the notification above  mentioned was void without any effect. The  Bill  resulting in the original Act was  introduced  on January 17, 1950, and the Act was passed by the  Legislative Assembly  September  28,  1951  It  was  reserved  for   the

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consideration  of  the  president, Who gave  his  assent  on January   23,  1952.  In; the Act, before its  amendment  in 1954, "estate" was defined as follows                "2(g)  ’Estate’  means  any and  held  by  an               intermediary and included under; one entry  in               any of the general registers of revenue-paying               lands  and  revenue-free  lands  prepared  and               maintained under the law for the time being in               force  by  the  collector of  district  ,  and               includes revenue free-lands not entered in any               register  and all classes of tenures or  under               tenures  or  an  inam estate  or  part  of  an               estate"                   By   the   amending  act  of   1954   this               definition  was substituted by another  which,               read:                                    253               "2(g) ’Estate’ includes apart of an estate and               means  any  land  held  by  or  vested  in  an               intermediary  and included under one entry  in               any  revenue  roll  or  any  of  the   general               registers of revenue-paying lands and  revenue               free lands, prepared and maintained under  the               law relating to land revenue for the time  be-               ing in force or under any rule, order,  custom               or usage having the force of law, and includes               revenue-free lands not entered in any register               or revenue-roll and all classes of tenures  or               under tenures and any jagir, inam, or muafi or               other similar grant."               In  the original Act as well as in the Act  as               amended,  there  was a  general  provision  in               s.2(q) which may be read here :                "(q)  All words and expressions used in  this               Act  but not defined in it, shall  have,  with               reference to any part of the State of  Orissa,               the  same  meaning as defined in  the  tenancy               laws and rules for the time being in force and               in  the absence of written laws and rules,  as               recognised  in the custom for the  time  being               obtaining  in  that  part  of  the  State   of               Orissa."               In the original Act, a provision was  inserted               by  s.3 of the amending Act to  the  following               effect               "3.  For the purpose of removal of all  doubts               it  is  declared  that- such  lands  and  such               rights  in relation thereto and  such  persons               who  hold such lands and such rights  as  were               heretofore  covered by the definitions of  the               words  ’estate’  and  ’Intermediary’   in  the               Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, shall  not               cease  "to be so covered merely on the  ground               that  by virtue of the provisions of this  Act               the  said  definitions have been  amended  and               widened in scope." The  meaning of the last provision is clear.  It takes  away nothing from the ambit of the old definition, 254 but  only  adds  thereto, as indeed the  new  definition  of "estate"  introduced  by  the amending Act  shows  only  too plainly in its terms. To  complete the survey of the provisions which we way  have to  refer  to  in  this judgment,  we  first  set  down  the definition  of "estate" as given in the Madras Estates  Land

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Act, 1908, which was applied to Orissa.  Section 3(2)(d)  of that Act defined "’estate" as:               "Any inam village, of which the grant has been               made,   confirmed   or   recognised   by   the               Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to               the  grant  the village has  been  partitioned               amongst  the  grantees or  the  successors  in               title of the grantee or grantees." The  argument  in this case is based upon  this  definition, because  in defining an estate’, whole villages  which  were inam  were contemplated and not minor inams of  lands  only. We shall refer to this later. The amending Act was also reserved for the consideration  of the  President  and  was  assented  to  by  him.   When  the Constitution  was  brought  into  force,  the  Bill  of  the Original  Act had already been introduced in  the  Assembly. On  June  18,  1951,  before  the  Act  was  passed  by  the Legislative  Assembly,  the Constitution  (First  Amendment) Act,  1951  bad  been enacted, and Art.  31A  inserted  with retrospective  operation in the Constitution.   Article  31A provided:               "31A.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in               article 13, no law providing for--               (a)   The  acquisition  by the  State  of  any               estate  or  of  any  rights  therein  or   the               extinguishment  or  modification of  any  such               rights...               shall be deemed to be void on the ground  that               it  is  inconsistent with, or  takes  away  or               sbridges any of the rights                                    255               conferred by article 14, article 19 or article               31 ;               Provided that where such law is a law made  by               the Legislature of a State, the provisions  of               this  article shall not apply  thereto  unless               such   law,  having  been  reserved  for   the               "consideration of the President, has  received               his assent.               (2)   In this article               (a)   the   expression  "estate’   shall,   in               relation  to  any local area., have  the  same               meaning  as  that  expression  or  its   local               equivalent has in the existing law relating to               land tenures in force in that area, and  shall               also  include  any jagir, inam,  or  muafi  or               other similar grant........               Article  31,  before it was  amended,  by  the               constitution  (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1955,               provided inter alia that no property shall  be               acquired  for a public purpose unless the  law               provided  for compensation, and  either  fixed               the  compensation or specified the  principles               on which the compensation was to be determined               and given. (Cl.2). By cl. (3), it was provided               that  no law such as was referred, to  in  cl.               (2) was to have effect unless such law  having               been  reserved  for the consideration  of  the               President had received his assent.  Clause (4)               then provided :               "(4)  If any Bill pending at the  commencement               of  this constitution in the Legislature of  a               State  has, after it has been passed  by  such               Legislature,    been    reserved    for    the               consideration   of  the  President   and   has

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             received  his  assent,  then,  notwithstanding               anything  in  this Constitution,  the  law  so               assented to shall not be called in question in               any  court on the ground that  it  contravenes               the provisions of clause (2)." The combined effect of these provisions of the  Constitution was  that  there  could  be  no  compulsory  acquisition  of property  for public purposes, unless the law  provided  for payment of compensation; 256 but  the law could not be called in question on this  ground if  it  had  been  reserved for  the  consideration  of  the President  and had been assented to by him.  The assent,  of the President was a condition precedent to the effectiveness of  the law.  By the amendment of the Constitution  and  the addition  of Art. 31A., no such law was to be deemed  to  be void  on  the ground that it was inconsistent with  or  took away  or  abridged any of the rights  conferred  by  Art.14, Art.19  or Art.31 , provided that it had been  reserved  for the  consideration  of the President and  had  received  his assent.   By  the  definition clause,  Art.  31A(2)(a),  the expression  "’estate"  was to have the same meaning  in  any local  area, which it or its equivalent had in the  existing law  relating to land tenures in force in that area but  was to include among others any.  "inam’. The  contention  of the appellants is really  twofold.   The first  argument is that the benefit of Art. 31A  might  have been available to the original Act,. as it was a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes  but? not to the amending Act, which was not such, a law but  only amended  a  previous  law by, enlarging  the  definition  of estate".  The second argument is that the word "estate"  as. defined  in  s.2(g) before its amendment did. not  apply  to pre-,settlement  minor inams of lands as it applied only  to an "inam estate", and an "inam estate" bad the meaning which the  definition of "estate" had in the, Madras Estates  Land Act., viz., only whole "inam villages".  This, it is  urged, follows  from  the  provisions  of  s.2(q)  of  the  Estates Abolition Act quoted earlier. The  first argument is clearly untenable.  It  assumes  that the benefit of Art.31A is only available to those laws which by themselves provide for compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes and not to laws amending such laws,  the assent  of the President notwithstanding.  This  means  that the whole of the law, original and amending, must be  passed again, and be reserved for the 257 consideration of the President, and must be freshly assented to by him.  This is against the legislative practice in this country.   It is to be presumed that the President gave  his assent  to  the amending Act in its relation to the  Act  it sought  to amend, and this is more so, when by the  amending law the provisions of the earlier law relating to compulsory acquisition  of property for public purposes were sought  to be  extended  to new kinds of properties.  In  assenting  to such  law,  the  President assented  to  new  categories  of properties  being  brought  within  the  operation  of   the existing  law, and he, in effect assented to a law  for  the compulsory  acquisition  for public purposes  of  these  new categories of property.  The assent of the President to  the amending Act thus brought in the protection of Art. 31A as a necessary consequence.  The amending Act must be  considered in relation to the old law which it sought to extend and the President asserted to such an extension or, in other  words, to  a  law for the compulsory acquisition  of  property  for

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public purposes. The  argument  that this was not an acquisition of  an  inam estate  comprising  a. *hole village and  thus  outside  the Abolition  Act.  itself has no substance.  No  doubt,  these minor inams, were not of whole villages but of lands and the grant included both the warms and there were thus no  inter- mediaries.   But  they  were  inams  nevertheless,  and  the Constitution   defined and ‘estate’ an including any  inam’, and  the amending Act merely followed that definition.   The extended  definition  in  the  Constitution  and  a  similar extended  definition in the Act thus exclude resort to  ’the general  definition clause in s.2(q), of the  Abolition  let and  the definition of "estate" in the Madras, Estates  Land Act.   The definition of estate" introduced by the  amending Act  is sufficiently wide to cover such minor inams, and  s. 2(q)  only  applies,  if a word or expression  used  in  the Abolition Act is not defined therein. 258 If the minor inams are already within the definition of  the word  "estate", there is no need to go to s.2(q) or  to  any local law defining the word.  There can be no doubt that  if the  new definition of "estate" applies to minor inams  then they  are affected by the Abolition Act.  This, indeed,  was conceded. Learned  counsel  for  the appellants  also  urged,  through somewhat  faintly, that the ejusdem generis rule  should  be applied to the definition of ",estate" in Art. 31A(2)(a)  as also  to the corresponding new definition in  the  Abolition Act.   This argument proceeds upon an assumption  for  which there  is  no  foundation.   The  ejusdem  generis  rule  is applicable where as wide or general term has to be cut  down with  reference to the genus of the particular  terms  which precede  the  general  words.   This  rule  has  hardly  any application where certain specific categories are ’included’ in  the  definition.   The  ejusdem  generis  rule  may   be applicable  to  the general. words  "other  similar  grant", which   would   take  their  colour  from   the   particular categories, "jagir, inam, or muafi", which precede them, but the word "inam" is not subject to the same rule.  Once it is held  that inams of any kind were included, it makes  little difference  if  the  inams were of lands and  not  of  whole villages.   So also the fact that the holders of such  inams cannot   be  described  as  intermediaries,  or  that   they comprised both the melwaram and the kudiwaram rights.   Such a distinction would have significance, if the law  abolished only  intermediaries and not inams which it did.  Section  3 of the Abolition Act says               "3(1)  The State Government may, from time  to               time by notification, declare that the  estate               specified  in the notification has  passed  to               and  become vested in the State free from  all               encumbrances." If  the definition of the word "estate" was wide  enough  to include  a  minor inam and a notification  was  issued,  the consequences of s.3 of the Abolition 259 Act must follow.  Such a law is not capable of being  called in  question on the ground that it abridges any  fundamental right  conferred  by  Arts. 14, 19 and 31, if  it  has  been assented  to  by the President. the  notification  was  thus valid, if the law was valid. In  the  result, the appeals fail, and  are  dismissed  with costs, one set only. Appeals dismissed.

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