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PETITIONER: MAHANT DHARAM DAS ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/01/1974

BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN RAY, A.N. (CJ) KHANNA, HANS RAJ GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1069            1975 SCR  (3) 160  1975 SCC  (1) 343  CITATOR INFO :  C          1984 SC 858  (24)  R          1984 SC1059  (19)

ACT: Sikh Gurudwaras Act (Punjab Act 8 of 1925) as amended by Act 1 of 1959, ss. 3, 7 and 8-If violative of Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 26 of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: The Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925, enacted for providing  control and management of Sikh Gurudwaras, was extended to the  area known  as  PEPSU,  by  Punjab Act 1  of  1959  with  certain modifications.   The  scheme of the Act is  that  places  of worship  about  which  there was no  doubt  were  placed  in Schedule  1.  Part  III  of the  Act,  which  describes  and regulates the manner of management could be made  applicable by  speedy  assertion  of the claim made on  behalf  of  the shrines to properties, under ss. 3 to 6. Section 3(4)  makes the declaration in the notification under s. 3(2) that it is a   Sikh  Gurudwara  conclusive  and  incapable   of   being challenged.   Whether any place not included in  Schedule  I should or should not be placed under the provisions of  Part III could be determined in the manner provided for in ss.  7 to  11. An application for such a purpose may be made by  50 or  more Sikh worshippers under s. 7. The  State  Government shall  publish  the  petition and  the  list  of  properties claimed  by the Gurudwara by notification under s. 7(3)  and s.  7(5) makes the publication of a notification  conclusive proof  that the provisions of sub-ss. (1) to (4)  have  been complied with.  Section 7(4) provides for individual  notice of  the  Gurudwara’s  claim to a right,  title  or  interest included  in the list, to the person in possession  of  such right etc. The  Mahant  of  a Shrine included as a  Sikh  Gurudwara  in Schedule  1,  the Mahant of a Shrine declared to be  a  Sikh Gurudwara on an application under s. 7(1) and the Mahant  of a  Shrine regarding which an application under s.  7(1)  was pending, challenged the Constitutional validity of ss.  2(4) defining  a  hereditary  office holder, 3,  7  and  8  which provides  for  the  procedure  for  a  declaration  that   a

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Gurudwara  asserted  to be a Sikh Gurudwara is  not  a  Sikh Gurudwara,  on the ground of violation of Arts. 14,  19  (1) (f) and 26.  Rejecting all the contentions. HELD  (Per  A. N. Ray, C.J., P. Jaganmohan Reddy and  P.  K. Goswami,  JJ) : 1 (a) As regards the Gurudwara  included  in Schedule I of the Act it was declared to be a Sikh Gurudwara long prior to the coming into force of the Constitution  and was  managed by the Interim Gurudwara Board  constituted  by the  Firman of the Maharaja which was the law of  the  PEPSU and has the force of law even after coming into force of the Constitution  by virtue of Art. 372 and continues to be  law till  it  was repealed and substituted by a law  made  by  a competent legislature.  The Mahant, therefore. had no manner of right during the entire period from 1946, when the Firman was issued till long after the amending Act, nor did he even assert  his  right  thereto since  then  until  the  present proceedings.   He  cannot,  therefore,  be  allowed  now  to challenge the factum that the Gurudwara is a Sikh Gurudwara. [174G-175B] (b)The  respondent specifically raised the contention  and asserted  in  the pleadings that the Gurudwara  was  a  Sikh Gurudwara and that its possession and management had  vested in the Interim Gurudwara Board in PEPSU. [175E; 176A-B] (c)The  entry relating to the last Jamabandi for the  year 1954-55  does  not  show  that the  Gurudwara  was  a  Udasi Gurudwara.  it shows that the Mahant was working  under  the management of the Interim Gurudwara Board.  Many of the Sikh Gurudwaras were managed by Udasis and under the firmans, the interim  Gurudwara  Board, which was in  management  of  the Gurudwara,  could  get the affairs of the  Gurudwara  looked after by others under their supervision. [175F-H] (d)Therefore,  the  question whether the Gurudwara  was  a Sikh Gurudwara or was a Udasis Gurudwara had been determined as early as 1946 by the firman 161 of the Maharaja.  The, fact that the appellant alleged  that he  was in possession of the Gurudwara was of little  moment because  if  the law vested the management  in  the  Interim Gurudwara Board the possession of the appellant would either be  permissible or hostile.  In either case, the  status  of the Gurudwara as a Sikh Gurudwara had been determined before the Constitution and since it was a pre-constitutional  law, which  declared it so, the appellant cannot challenge it  on the ground of violation of his fundamental rights.  Even  if the  appellant  continued  to be in possession  he  has  not acquired  a  right of management when once  that  right  was ’vested  in another body.  The Firman of an erstwhile  ruler of  a  princely State was law and continued to be  law  till repealed or substituted by a law of a competent legislature. [176G-177B] Ameerunnissa  Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum  and  Others (1953) S.C.R. 404 and State of Rajasthan and Others v.  Shri Sajjanlal  Panjawar  and others [1974] 1 S.C.R. at  p.  511, followed. (e)The firman vested the management and possession of  the Gurudwara  in a body created by it, with a Constitution  and membership,   quorum  etc.   Such  an  order  could  be   an administrative-order  only if the Gurudwaras in  respect  of which  the management was vested were already vested in  the State.   Therefore the contention of the appellant that  the firman was only an administrative order not having the force of  law  would be fatal to the case of the  appellant.   The very fact that pending a comprehensive law the Maharaja  was issuing a firman itself shows that it is a law. [177B-D] (f)The  Maharaja envisaged a comprehensive law to  replace

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his  firmans but by that time the State was merged  and  the law  embodied in the firmans which was continued to  be  the law after the merger was replaced by the Amending Act  which provided   for  the  Interim.   Gurudwara  Board  being   in possession and management during the transition period.  The Fundamental  rights  conferred by the Constitution  are  not retrospective  in  operation.  Therefore, it  could  not  be contended  by the appellant that the pre-constitutional  law took  away  rights only for an interim period and  that  the rights existed after the interim period and were subject  to the Constitution. [177E-H] Sri  Jagadguru  Karl  Basava  Rajendrawami  of  Gavimutt  v. Commissioner  of  Hindu  Religious  Charitable   Endowments, Hyderabad [1964] 8 S.C.R. 252 and Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India A.I.R, 1955 S.C. 624, referred to. (2)The  whole object of the Act was to reduce the  chances of protracted litigation in a matter involving the religious sentiments of a large section of a sensitive people proud of their  heritage.   The  provision of  law  which  shuts  out further  inquiry  and  makes a notification  in  respect  of Certain  preliminary steps conclusive, does not involve  the exercise of any judicial function. [178F-H] (3)Sections  3(4) and 7(5) are statutory provisions.   The prescription of rules of evidence by a legislature which  is competent   to  provide  for  irrebuttable  and   conclusive presumptions not only as mere rules of evidence but even  as a  substantive  pieces  of  law  so  long  as  the  relevant provisions are within its legislative competence and are not otherwise unconstitutional, is valid. [179D-E] Municipal  Board,  Hapur v. Raghuvandra  Kripal  and  others A.I.R. 1966 S.C 693 followed. Izhar  Ahmad  Khan and others v. Union of India  and  others [1962] Supp.  S.C.R. 234, referred to. (4)Section  3(2)  provides that on the receipt of  a  list "duty forwarded under the provisions of sub-s.(1)" the State Government  is  expected  to publish  a  notification.   The publication of such a notification is made conclusive  proof of  certain  facts by s. 3(4).  The use  of  the  expression "duly forwarded" shows that the State Government is expected to  satisfy itself before the issue of a notification  under s. 3(2), that the application was a proper application under if  sub-s. (1) and has been duly forwarded,  which  implies, that  the requirements of s. 3(1) have been fulfilled.   The High  Court  was,  therefore,  right  in  holding  that  the provisions  of  s. 3(4) and s. 7(5) do not suffer  from  any constitutional or other legal impediment. [179F-180] 12-L379Sup.CI/75 162 (5)The  notice to be served under s. 7(4) even  though  it was  served subsequent to the notification under s. 7(5)  is determined  by  the  rule of  conclusive  proof.   Once  the provision  of conclusive presumption under s. 7 (5) is  held to  be. valid and constitutional that question could not  be allowed  to be agitated on rebutted as that  would  militate against the conclusive nature of the statutory  presumption, Non  having  regard  to the object of  the  Act,  can  that, provision  be: considered to. be unreasonable as  these  are only,  preliminary  steps necessary for holding  an  inquiry which  inquiry forms an essential part to the  determination of  the  his.   To take advantage of  preliminary  steps  to protract litigation is itself unreasonable.  The presumption that  the  authorities enjoined by the Act to  take  certain steps will do so is an irrebuttable presumption and if  that does  not affect substantial justice being done between  the parties  to  the lis, no question of  unreasonableness  will

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arise. [180B-E] (6)On the death of a Guru before he nominates his Chela or where a Guru marries and is disqualified and another  person is  appointed as a Mahant, it may be that such a person  may not  have the right to challenge the notification  under  s. 7(3) because he is not a holder of a hereditary office.  But if  a  hereditary office holder cannot be found  then  s.  8 provides  for a challenge to the notification under s.  7(3) by  any  20 or more worshippers of the  Gurudwara.   If  the Bhekh  of a Sampradaya is entitled to nominate  a  successor and a Mahant has been so nominated it could be resumed  that the  Bhekh will have more than twenty worshippers  and  they could  challenge the notification even if the  Mahant  could not. [180E-181B] (7)Besides,  whether such a person is a hereditary  office holder  is  a matter for the Tribunal  to  determine  having regard to well established rules of evidence by which courts determine  such matters.  The assumption that such a  Mahant may  not be considered to be a hereditary office  holder  is purely  hypothetical.  It is for the tribunal to  apply  the law for determining as to whether the person who challenges, the notification is a hereditary office holder and has locus start to do so. [181B-C] (8)The  period  of 90 days prescribed under s.  8  is  not unreasonable.  A period of limitation is by its very  nature to  some extent arbitrary but it could not be urged that  90 days  is not sufficient time for 20 or more  worshippers  to get  together  to  challenge:  the  notification  which   is designed  to  declare  the gurudwara  in  which  they  were; worshipping to be a Sikh Gurudwara. [181D-F] Per Khanna.  J. (1)In  the notice issued under s. 3(3) the appellant  (the Mahant of Gurudwara included in Schedule I) was mentioned to be  in  possession of the property in dispute..  Before  the Tribunal  when the appellant wanted to agitate the  question that the property in dispute was a Udasi institution and not a Sikh Gurudwara he was not, permitted to do so.  Therefore, the  appellant has locus standi to file the petition  before High Court under Art. 226. [185B-D] (2)But, the respondent has conceded that it is permissible to the appellant to makea claim that the property mentioned in the notification relating to the list ofproperties under  s.  3(2) including the property described to  be  the Gurudwara  itself,  in  respect of the  item  in  the  first Schedule,  belongs  to a Udasi Institution.   If  the  above stand taken on behalf of the respondent were to be  accepted the basis of the grievance of the appellant that there is  a denial of opportunity to him to establish his claim that the institution  is a Udasi institution disappears, and s.  3(4) would not be violative of the appellant’s right under  Arts. 19(1)(f) and 26. [182G-183B] (3)There  is a presumption of the constitutional  validity of  a statutory provision.  If a provision like s. 3 (4)  of the  Act of a local enactment has been on the  statute  book for  about half a century and a particular construction  has been  placed  upon it by the High Court of the  State  which sustains its Constitutional validity this Court should  lean in  favour of the view as would sustain the validity of  the provision  and not disturb the construction which  has  been accepted  for  such a lengthy time.  None  of  the  impugned provisions  has  been shown to  violate  the  constitutional rights of the appellants. [184E-F; 185F] 16 3 Raj,  Narain  Pandey  & Ors. v. Sani Prasad  Tewari  &  Ors. A.I.R.1973 S.C. 291.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE,’ JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.354, 1222 and 1251/69. From the judgment and order dated the 18th March/25th   July 1968 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Nos.514 of 1966, 1935 of 1962 and 2310 of 1965 respectively. C. K. Daphtary (In C.A. No. 354/69) Y.M.J. Tarkunde,  (In C. A.  No. 1251/69), M. B. Bal, R. D. Mahant, N. S.  Das,  Behl and   P. A.  Palli, for the appellants (In C.As. Nos. 354  & 1251/69).  Naunit Lal, Harbhajan  Singh Kathuria  and  Lalit Kohli, for the appellant (In C.A. No. 1222/69). D.   V. Patel (In C.A. No. 1251/69) Charan Singh and Harbans Singh,for respondent No. 3 (In all the appeals). V.   S. Desai, K. K. Chawla, (In C.A. No. 353/69) and O.  P. Sharma, for respondents Nos. 1-2 (In C. As. 354 and  1222/69 and respondents Nos. 1 & 4 (In C.As No. 1251/69). The  Judgment  of  the Court  was  delivered  by  Jaganmohan Reddy, J. Khanna, J. gave a separate Opinion. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Civil Appeals Nos. 354 and 1251 of 1969 are by certificate against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition  Nos. 514  of  1966  and 1935 of 1962  respectively  in  which  by majority the provisions of s. 3 read with Sch. 1 and ss.  5, 7  and  8  of  the Sikh  Gurdwaras  Act,  1925,  which  were challenged, were held to be valid.  Following the Full Bench Judgment in the above two Civil Writ Petitions.  Civil  Writ Petition No. 2310 of 1965 was also disposed of by a Division Bench  of  that High Court.  Against  that  Judgment  Civil, Appeal No. 1222 of 1969-is by certificate. In  all  these appeals the places of worship  to  which  the impugned provisions have been made applicable were  situated in  the  erstwhile  Patiala and East  Punjab  States  Union. After  the  States Reorganisation Act, 1956  when  the  said territories  were  merged;  the  Sikh  Gurdwaras  Act,  1925 (hereinafter  called ’the Act’) was made applicable  to  the places of worship situated in the areas to which the Act was made applicable by Punjab Act 1 of 1959 (hereinafter  called ’the Amending Act’) The  appellant Lachman Das in Civil Appeal No. 1251 of  1969 ,alleges  that he is an Udasi Faquir belonging to the  Udasi Sect  founded  by, Sri Chand, that he was  the,  Mahant  of, Gurdwara  Sahib  Pinjore  for  several  years  and  in  that capacity was in possession and control of all the properties belonging  to, it; that the Mahantship of an Udasi  Gurdwara devolves from Guru to Chella which is opposed to the  belief of  the Sikhs who believe only in ten Gurus and  none  else; and  that  though the Gurdwara is an Udasi Gurdwara  it  has been 164 included  in  Sch.  1 of the Act the effect of  which,  read with sub-ss. (2) & (4) of s. 3, makes the declaration in the notification  that  it is a ’Sikh  Gurdwara  conclusive  and incapable of being challenged. The appellant Dharam Das in Civil Appeal No. 354 of 1969  is an  Udasi  Sadh  and Mahant of Dera  Udasi  Sadhan.   It  is alleged  that  the  followers  of  this  Sampradaya  form  a distinct  religious denomination, as such  the  notification dated  February 17, 1961 including it in Sch.  1 of the  Act is  objectionable.  It-is further stated that not  even  the notice  under s. 7(4) of the Act was given to the  appellant and  he was not allowed to contest that the applicants  Were neither Sikhs nor worshippers of the institution in dispute,

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nor  are  the fifty or more persons required for  making  an application  under  s.  7(1) of the Act  and  who  made  the application  residents of the relevant Police  Station,  nor could  the allegations that the signatures were obtained  by fraud  of that the application was not in time  be  enquired into.  The notification was further challenge on the grounds that  there  was no authority which is required  to  satisfy itself  that the applicants were alive or dead nor does  the Act  give a  right to the  Mahant,  the  person  seriously affected, to challenge the locus standi of the applicants. The first appellant in C.A. 1222 of 1969 claims that he  was appointed  by  the  village Panchayat as  the  Mahant  after removing  Gurcharan Singh who succeeded after the  death  of the  last Mahant Hari Singh who was the Guru,  because  Hari Singh  had contracted a marriage.  He alleged that the  Dera in dispute known as Gurdwara Punjab Sahib was established by one   Mahant  Kesara  Singh.   The  Dera  has   considerable properties moveable and immoveable which are managed by  the village  Panchayat which also appoints Mahant  from  amongst the Chelas of the previous Mahants.  The succession, accord- ing to these averments, devolves from Guru to Chela, but  if a Mahant after he succeeds contracts a marriage he is liable to  be  removed  by the village  Panchayat  and  another  is appointed by them who will not be a hereditary Mahant within the meaning of the Act.  According to the appellant on April 11,  1961  about  52 persons  of  Tehsil  Barnala,  District Sangrur  gave an application under sub. s (1) of s. 7 of the Act  to  get the Dera in question declared a  Sikh  Gurdwara which  application  was  still pending on the  date  of  the filing  of the Writ petition on August 21, 1965  before  the Singh Gurdwara Tribunal. In  Civil Appeal No. 1251 of 1969 the High Court  held  that the  appellant  Lachman  Das claimed to be  a  Mahant  of  a different  Gurdwara than the one included in Sch.  1 of  the Act.   At P. 327 of the printed paper book this is what  is stated :-               "The petitioner has not claimed himself to  be               the  owner  of  the  institution  defined  and               described  in  item  No.  249  of  the   first               Schedule, and has, therefore, no locus  standi               to claim that the said institution should have               been included in Schedule II.  The institution               in which he claims to have interest  "Gurdwara               Sahib Pinjore" has not been listed in               165               Schedule I. item No. 249 in the first Schedule               relates   to  an  institution   of   "Padshahi               Pahaili",  and the petitioner admits  that  he               has   nothing  to  do  with  institutions   of               Padshahi  Pahaili.   There is,  therefore,  no               force  in  any of the  arguments  advanced  on               behalf  of  the petitioner in this  case,  and               Civil Writ 1935 of 1962 also therefore, merits               dismissal." It  is  submitted before us that this finding  of  the  High Court was based on a misapprehension that the appellant  had claimed  to  be a Mahant of a different Gurdwara  than  that included  in  Sch.  1 of that Act.  Apart from this,  it  is contended that sub-s. (4) of s. 3 of the Act clearly offends the guarantee of Art. 26 of the Constitution inasmuch as  it provides that a Gurdwara by virtue of its inclusion in  Sch. 1  of the Act shall be treated as a Sikh Gurdwara and  shall be managed by Sikh representatives, that the provision  also violates   the   guarantee  under  Art.  19(1)(f)   of   the Constitution  as it affects the rights of the appellant  not

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only  to  claim the properties of the Gurdwara as  a  Mahant thereof  but. also to the office of the Mahant of  the  said Gurdwara, and that the declaration in the notification under sub-s.  (4) of s. 3 of the Act which operated as  conclusive proof  that  the  Gurdwara  was  a  Sikh  Gurdwara,  was  an unreasonable  restriction  on  the  appellant’s  fundamental rights both under Art. 26 and Art. 19(1) (f). it was further contended that the provisions in the earlier part of s. 3(4) providing  that the declaration mentioned therein  shall  be conclusive proof that the provision of sub-ss. (1), (2)  and (3)  of s. 3 have been duly complied with are (i)  arbitrary and hence violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and  (ii) operate  as an unreasonable restriction on  the  appellant’s Fundamental rights under Arts. 26 and 19(1)(f). In  Civil Appeal No. 354 of 1969 apart from the  contentions raised  in  Lachman Dass’s case the  appellant  Dharam  Dass urged  certain  additional  grounds  for  invalidating   the provisions  of  the Act.  It is submitted that the  rule  of succession  followed for the past more than 200  years  from Guru  to  Chela is inconsistent with the, Gurdwara  being  a Sikh  Gurdwara,  but notwithstanding. this it  has  been  so declared  by a notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 7  on  an application  made  under  sub-s.  (1) of s.  7  of  the  Act claiming  it to be a Sikh Gurdwara.  The Privy  Council  had pointed  out  the essential differences between  Udasis  and Sikhs  in  Hem  Singh & Ors v. Basant Das  &  Anr.(1)  which criteria  had  not been kept in view  before  including  the appellant’s  Math  in  Sch.  1 of the  Act.   The  appellant having come to know of this notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 7 filed a petition under s. 8 of the Act as a  hereditary office holder claiming that the Gurdwara or Dera in question is not a Sikh Gurdwara and its properties do not belong to a Sikh Gurdwara before the Tribunal constituted under the  Act to  which the dispute was referred. The appellant filed  an application   before  the  Tribunal  on  January   6,   1966 requesting it to examine’ and determine the locus standi  of the  persons who made the petition under s. 7(1) of the  Act on  the  basis of which the notification was issued  by  the Government.    The   Tribunal,   however,   dismissed    the application on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to go (1)  L.R. 63 I.A. 180. 166 into the question by reason of the provisions of sub-s.  (4) of  s.  7  of  the Act.  Inasmuch as  the  appellant  is  in possession  of  the  Dera in question and is  sought  to  be dispossessed  and  deprived of his Mahantship he  has  every right  to challenge the notification but the  provisions  of sub-s. (5) of s. 7 of the Act prohibit him from  challenging the  validity  of  the petition on the basis  of  which  the notification under subs. (3) of s. 7 of the Act was founded. As  sub-s.  (5)  of  s.  7  makes  the  publication  of  the notification conclusive proof that the provisions of sub-ss. (1), (2), (3) and (4) have been duly complied with, although matters  in sub-s. (4) may be subsequent to the  publication it  violates Art. 14 as it is arbitrary._ It  also  violates Arts.   1  9  (1)  (1)(f)  and  26  because  it  places   an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the  appellant’s fundamental  rights as an Udasi Mahant.  The claim  made  by the appellant under s. 8 of the Act that he is a  hereditary office  holder within the meaning of sub-s. (4) of s.  2  of the  Act  has been challenged by  Sikh  Gurdwara  Prabandhak Committee.  The appellant apprehends that the Tribunal  will raise  this as a preliminary issue and possibly deprive  the appellant  an opportunity to establish that the Gurdwara  is not a Sikh Gurdwara.  The appellant also apprehends that  he

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may not be accepted as a hereditary Mahant because according to  the submissions made on his behalf the definition  under sub-s. (4) of s. 2 rules. out any Mahant who may be accepted or  recognised as a Mahant of the institution by  the  Udasi Bekh.  It may sometimes happen that there may be a break  in the  chain of succession from Guru to Chela such as where  a Guru dies before nominating his successor or there may be  a dispute between two Chelas as to who has been nominated.  In such  cases  it  is  the  Bekh  or  the  congregation  which determines  the  matter and selects a  particular  Chela  as Mahant.   A  single  break in the chain,  according  to  the learned  Advocate  for the appellant, deprives a  Mahant  of being  a hereditary office holder who may be prevented  from maintaining  a petition under s. 8 of the Act on the  ground that  it does not strictly comply with the definition  of  a Mahant.   It  is  also submitted that the  definition  of  a Mahant in Sub-s. (4) of S. 2 is unfair and violative of Art. 14  of the Constitution as it makes in  distinction  between Mahant  as  described in the definition  and  other  Mahants without any nexus with the object of the Act.  Further S. 8. read with s. 18 is violative of the appellant’s  fundamental rights  because  any  claim to a  property  which  has  been notified  as a Sikh Gurdwara is defeated by  the  conclusive presumption  under  S. 18 arising from any  of  the  grounds mentioned in that section. In  Civil  Appeal No. 1222 of  1969  additional  contentions urged  were that a notice under s. 7 (4) of the Act  was  in fact  issued  to  a dead person, namely,  Hari  Singh,  The, contention  of  the-  appellant that the notice  to  a  dead person is void and is not a notice under law was rejected by the High Court on the ground that since there was no  change in the annual revenue record and the name of the dead person was entered there in the column of ownership the notice  was valid which finding is challenged as being erroneous in law. The contention that no notification was ever published along with  the list at the Headquarters of the District  and  of’ the Tehsil under s. 7(3) of the Act was also rejected on the ground that under sub-s. (5) of                             167 5.7  of the Act, some of the provisions of the said  section have  been complied with are made conclusive and  cannot  be challenged.    As  an  example,  it  is  stated   that   the application  presented  by fifty or  more  persons  contains thumb  marks of persons who are not in existence  and  whose identity cannot be ascertained but notwithstanding this  the appellants  are  estopped  under sub-s, (5)  of  s.  7  from proving that the application is actually signed by less than 50 persons.  On this ground also the validity of sub-s.  (5) of s. 7 is assailed.  It is, therefore, submitted that sub- s.  (5)  of  s.  7 is ultra  vires  the  provisions  of  the Constitution.   It is also submitted that appeals  in  which the  Punjab  and Haryana High Court had held that  a  notice under subs. (4) of s. 7 of the Act sent to a dead person  or notice sent after tile publication of the notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 7 is bad in law, are pending in this Court. It has been further contended that there is no  intelligible differentia between a hereditary office holder as defined in s. 2(iv) and (v) of the Act and a de-facto holder of  office as  there  is no nexus between the two.  Section 8  is  also assailed  as contravening Art. 14 because the  Act  provides for two different procedures for the same purpose under s. 8 and  s. 38 of the Act.  The procedure under s. 8 is  onerous and  confers rights on a hereditary office holder.  It  does not  confer  any such right on other  office  holders.   The section  also prescribes a period of limitation of  90  days

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and  sets  out numerous defenses open to a  ’petitioner  who wants to make an application.  As against this the procedure prescribed in s. 38 affords to any person who claims to have an  interest in the Dera the right to appear and defend  the suit  and  establish  that the institution  is  not  a  Sikh Gurdwara.  The two different procedures for the same purpose and  object are discriminatory under Art. 14.  In  any  case these  are  unreasonable restrictions on the right  of  the appellants and violate Art. 19(1)(f). On  behalf  of  the respondents it  is  submitted  that  the appellants   have  not  established  or  even  prima   facie satisfied  the Court that the institutions were  established by  the  Udasis.   No documents were ,produced  not  even  a rejoinder  of the denial of the respondents  giving  details about  the  truth of the allegations was filed, nor  oven  a single  affidavit of a worshipper has been filed.  The  mere allegation that Udasi Faquirs have been in charge from  Guru to  Chela  and  that  the  appellants  are  Mahants  is  not sufficient  to  establish a right which  ’is  essential  for presenting  an  application  under  Art.  226  of  the  Con- stitution.   Several cases of this Court have been  referred to in support of this proposition. Even  assuming without conceding that the institutions  were Udasi  institutions, it is submitted that that right  having been  lost even prior to the constitution by virtue  of  the Firmans of the Maharaja of Patiala no relief can be  claimed nor  the  provisions of the Act can be challenged  as  being unconstitutional.   Several  other arguments  were  advanced which will be dealt with hereafter. The main question in these appeals is whether the appellants have the right to challenge the provisions of the Act by and under  which  a Gurdwara or an institution  is  declared  or assumed to be a Sikh Gurdwara.  The full Bench of the Punjab &   Harayana  High  Court  in  its  detailed  judgment   has considered several aspects in the light of 168 the  contentions advanced before it which  contentions  have been  repeated  before us.  Before we examine  the  impugned provisions, it is necessary to state that in order to remedy a  situation arising out of certain historical landmarks  of Sikh  struggle to retain their shrines which had  come  into the  possession of persons subscribing to  non-Sikh  faiths. the Act was passed.  The Sikhs believe in the ten Gurus--the last  of whom was Guru Gobind Singh.  They  further  believe that  there  is no other Guru after Guru  Gobind  Singh  who enjoined  on  his follower,,; that after  him  they,.-should consider  Guru  Granth  Sahib  as the  Guru.   They  do  not subscribe  to idol worship and polytheism, nor do they  have any  Samadhi  in their shrines.  The teaching of  Sikhs  was against  asceticism.   They believe in  Guru  Granth  Sahib, which  is  a  Rosary of  sacred  poems,  exhortations,  etc. During the time of the Sikh Gurus, the Gurdwaras were  under their direct supervision and control or under their  Masends or missionary agents.  After the death of Guru Gobind  Singh the  Panth is recognised as the corporate representative  or the  Guru on earth and thereafter they were managed  by  the Panth  through their Granthis. and other sewadars  who  were under   direct   supervision   of  the   local   Sangat   or congregation.   During  Mahant  raja  Ranjit  Singh’s   time Sikhism  became the religion of the State and large  estates and  Jagirs  were granted to the Gurdwaras  apart  from  the Jagirs  which  had  been earlier granted  during  the  Mugal period The position of the Gurdwaras changed during  British regime.   The  Mahants  who  were  in  charge  of  the  Sikh Gurdwaras could either be a Sikh Mahant or Udasi Mahant.  It

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may  here be stated that the Udasis were not  Sikhs.   While the  teachings  of Sikhs were against  asceticism  and  were opposed  to Hindu rites, the Udasis though "using  the  Same sacred  writings as the Sikhs, kept up much more of the  old Hindu  practices  followed  asceticism, were  given  to  the veneration of Samadhis or Tombs and continue the Hindu rites concerning  birth, marriage and Shradh." (See Hem  Singh  v. Basant Das(1) Though there was no reconciliation between the Sikhs and Udasis, it did not matter if the Mahant of a  Sikh Gurdwara  was not a Sikh Mahant because the Panth or  Sangat exercised  control over the Gurdwaras.  After the  death  of Maharaja Ranjit Singh when the power of the Sikhs had  waned and  they  were  disorganised  and  dejected,  the  non-Sikh Mahants  asserted their control and denied to the  Panth  or the Sangat rights over those Gurdwaras.  After the Sikhs had recovered,  from their frustration caused by the, defeat  of the  Sikh Rajas they began to assert their rights by  filing suits and embarking on litigation for the recovery of their holy shrines. The  Shriomani  Gurdwara  Parbandhak   Committee-hereinafter referred  to  as the S.G.P.C.-had come into  existence  some time  in  January 1921 and was later  registered  under  the Societies Registration Act in the same year.  After  several attempts  were  made  to arrive at a  settlement  and  after trying many drafts/bills the Government of the time  brought forward  a measure which provided a Central Body called  the Board of Control, for the management and control of all  the historical  Gurdwaras.   By  then  the  S.G.P.C.  had  taken control  of many of the Gurdwaras from the Mahants who  were either religious minded (1)  63 I.A. 180, 201.                             169 or  realising  that their personal interests  lay  in  their seeking  the  protection  of the  S.G.P.C.  which  had  been especially   formed   for  the  purpose  of   managing   and maintaining  the  Gurdwaras  on lines  consistent  with  the teachings  of the Gurus and the wishes of the community  had voluntarily  placed the Gurdwaras under the control  of  the S.G.P.C. In order to provide for the control and  management of these Gurdwaras and those Gurdwaras which were claimed by the  Sikhs  to  be the Sikh Gurdwaras, a  Bill  which  later became  the Act was presented in 1925, the aims and  objects of which were, inter-alia, stated as follows               "1.  The  present Sikh Gurdwaras  and  Shrines               Bill is an effort to provide a legal procedure                             by  which-such  Gurdwaras and shrines  as  are,               owing  to  their  origin  and  habitual   use,               regarded  by  Sikhs as essentially  places  of               Sikh  worship, may be brought effectively  and               permanently  under  Sikh  control and  their               administration  reformed  so  as  to  make  it               consistent  with the religious views  of  that               community.   The  Sikh Gurdwaras  and  Shrines               Act,  1922,  which is to be  replaced  by  the               present   Bill,   failed   to   satisfy    the               aspirations of the Sikhs for various  reasons.               One,  for  instance,  was  that  it  did   not               establish  permanent committees of  management               for  Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines.  Nor  did  it               provide   for  the  speedy   confirmation   by               Judicial    sanction   of   changes    already               introduced  by  the  reforming  party  in  the               management of places of worship over which  it               had obtained effective control.

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             2.The  present Bill provides a  scheme  of               purely  Sikh management, secured by  statutory               and legal sanction for places of worship which               are decided either by the Legislature or by an               independent  Tribunal set up for the  purpose,               or  by  an  ordinary Court of law,  to  be  in               reality places of Sikh worship which should be               managed by Sikhs." The scheme of the Act was that there were certain places  of worship  about which no substantial doubt existed and  those places  were  forthwith placed in Sch.  1, Part  111,  which describes  and regulates the manner of management  could  be made applicable by the speedy assertion of the claim made on behalf  of the shrines to the property alleged to belong  to it,  which  assertion  was to be by petition  to  the  Local Government : (vide ss. 3 to 5).  Secondly whether any  place not  included in Sch.  1 should or should not be placed  for management  under  the  provisions  of  Part  III  could  be determined  in the manner provided for in ss. 7 to  11.   In respect of these Gurdwaras under sub-s. (1) of s. 7 fifty or more  Sikh  worshippers of a gurdwara each of whom  is  more than twenty-one years of age and was on the commencement  of the Act or, in the case of the extended territories from the commencement  of the Amending Act, a resident in the  police station area in which the Gurdwara is situated, may  forward to  the State Government, through the appropriate  Secretary to  Government so as to reach the Secretary within one  year from the commencement of the Act or within 180 days from the commencement  of  the  Amending Act,  praying  to  have  the Gurdwara declared to be a Sikh 170 Gurdwara.   Under  s. 8 twenty or more  worshippers  of  the gurdwara, each of whom is more than twenty-one years of  age and  was on the commencement of the Act or, in the  case  of the  extended  territories,  on  the  commencement  of   the Amending  Act,  as the case may be, a resident of  a  police station  area in which the gurdwara is situated may  forward to the State Government, so as to reach the Secretary within ninety  days  from  the  date  of  the  publication  of  the notification,   a  petition  signed  and  verified  by   the petitioner,  or  petitioners, as the case may  be,  claiming that  the gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara, and may  in  such petition  make a further claim that the  hereditary  office- holder  or  any  person who would  have  succeeded  to  such officeholder  under  the  system  of  management  prevailing before the first day of January, 1920 or, in the case of the extended territories, before the 1st day of November,  1956, as the case may be, may be restored to office on the grounds that  such  gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara  and  that  such office-holder ceased to be an office-holder after that  day. Section  9  deals with the effect of omission to  present  a petition under s. 8. It provides that the publication of.  a notification  under  the provisions of sub-s. (1)  of  s.  9 shall  be  conclusive  proof that the  gurdwara  is  a  Sikh Gurdwara  and the provisions of Part III shall apply to  the gurdwara  with effect from the date’ of the  publication  of the  notification.  Section 10 provides for the filing of  a petition claiming a right, title or interest in any property included in the list  published under sub-s. (3) of S. 7. If no claim has been made in respect of any of. the  properties within   the  specified  period  the  State  Government   is empowered  to  publish  a  notification  which  was  to   be conclusive proof of the fact that no such claim was made  in respect  of  any right, title or interest specified  in  the notification.   Section  11 provides for compensation  to  a

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hereditary office-holder of gurdwara notified under s. 7  or his presumptive, successor.  Chapter III of Part I  provides for the constitution and procedure of tribunal for  purposes of  the Act vide ss. 12 to 37.  Part 11 s. 38  is  concerned with  the  application  of the provisions  of  Part  III  to gurdwaras  found to be Sikh Gurdwaras by courts  other  than the  Tribunal constituted under the Act.  Part ’III  Chapter V,  as  already  stated,  deals with  the  control  of  Sikh Gurdwaras. The  Act,  as we have stated earlier, was  extended  to  the erstwhile  areas  of Patiala and East Punjab  States  Union- known as PEPSU by the Amending Act, consequently some of the provisions have been amended to provide for that  situation. For instance in sub-s. (1) of s. 3 the list to be  forwarded to the State Government through the appropriate Secretary to Government  had  to  be ’forwarded within  one  hundred  and eighty days of the commencement of the Amending Act.  In  so far as Sch.  1 Gurdwaras are concerned it is incumbent  upon any Sikh or any holder of a Gurdwara on the date of the com- mencement  of the Act or on the date of the Amending Act  to forward to the State Government a list of all rights, titles and  interests  in immovable properties situated  in  Punjab inclusive  of the gurdwara and in all  monetary,  endowments yielding income or profit received in Punjab which be claims to  belong,  within his knowledge, to the  Gurdwara  and  to furnish several details specified therein.  On receipt 171 of  this  list  the State Government  under  sub-s.  (2)  is enjoined  to  publish,  as soon as may  be,  a  notification declaring  that the gurdwara to which it relates is  a  Sikh Gurdwara  and,  after the expiry of the period  provided  in sub-s.  (1) for forwarding lists shall, as soon as  may  be, publish  by  notification a consolidated list in  which  all rights, titles, and interests in any such properties as  are described in sub-s. (1) which have been included in any list duly forwarded, shall be included, and shall also cause  for consolidated list to be published, in such manner as may  be prescribed,  at the headquarters of the district and of  the tehsil where the gurdwara is situated.  The State Government has  to send by registered post notice of the claim  to  any right,  title or interest included in the consolidated  list to each of the persons, named therein as being in possession of such right, title or interest either on his own behalf or on  behalf of an insane person or minor or on behalf of  the gurdwara,  provided that no such notice need be sent if  the person named as being in possession is the person who  for-- warded  the list in which the right, title or  interest  was claimed.    Subsection  (4)  makes  the  publication  of   a declaration and of a consolidated list under the  provisions of  sub-s. (2) conclusive proof that the provisions of  sub- ss.  (1), (2) and (3) with respect to such publication  have been  duly  complied with and that the gurdwara  is  a  Sikh Gurdwara, and the Provisions of Part III shall apply to such gurdwara with effect from the date of the publication of the notification declaring it to be a Sikh Gurdwara.  Section  4 provides  that if in, respect of any gurdwara  specified  in Sch.  1 no list has been forwarded’ under the provisions  of sub-s.  (1) of s. 3, the State Government shall,  after  the expiry  of ninety days from the commencement of the Act,  or in the case of the extended territories, after the expiry of one  hundred and eighty days from the commencement  of  the Amending  Act, as the case may be, declare  by  notification that  such  gurdwara shall be deemed to  )be  excluded  from specification  in Sch. 1. Section 5 deals with  a  situation where a list has been published.  A petition in respect’ of

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the   consolidated  list  specified  in   the   notification published  under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 may be forwarded to  the State Government claiming a right, title or interest in  any property included in such consolidated list except a  right, title  or  interest  in  the  Gurdwara  itself  within   the specified period : (emphasis added).  Sub-section (3) of  s. 5 provides that the State Government shall also, as soon  as may  be, after the expiry of the period for making  a  claim under  the provisions of sub-s. (1) publish  a  notification specifying the rights, titles or interests in any properties in-respect  of  which no such claim has been made;  and  the publication of the notification shall be conclusive proof of the  fact  that  no such claim was made in  respect  of  any right,  title  or interest specified  in  the  notification. Section  6  provides  for  a claim  for  compensation  by  a hereditary  officeholder of a notified Sikh Gurdwara or  his presumptive successor, within the period prescribed  therein by   presenting   a  petition,  claiming   to   be   awarded compensation on the grounds that such office-holder has been unlawfully  removed from his office after the first  day  of January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended  territories, after  the 1st day of November, 1956, as the case  may,  and before the date of the publication of 172 the  notification,  and  that  such  office-bolder  or   his presumptive successor has suffered or will suffer  pecuniary loss in consequence of the gurdwara having been declared  to be a Sikh Gurdwara. A  canvass  of  the  provisions of  the  Act  presents  four situations(i)   where  the  Legislature  in   its   judgment considers a Gurdwara to ,be a Sikh Gurdwara and places it in Sch.   1  to  which  the  provisions  of  ss.  3  to  6  are applicable; (ii) in respect of the institutions contained in Sch. 11 no petition under S. 7 can be entertained unless the institution  is deemed to be excluded from specification  in Sch.  1 under the provisions of s. 4 by a notification  made after the expiry of ninety days from the commencement of the Act,  or, in the case of the ,,extended  territories,  after the  expiry  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  days  from   the commencement of the Amending Act; (iii) in respect of  other Gurdwaras  fifty  or  more Sikh worshippers  of  a  Gurdwara fulfilling  the requirements of sub-s. (1) of s. 7 can  pray to  have  the Gurdwara declared to be a  Sikh  Gurdwara  and thereafter  the  provisions  of Ss, 7  to  11  would  become relevant.   that  claim  can  be  forwarded  by  the   State Government to a Tribunal under s. 14 and enquired into by it under s. 16.  If the Tribunal finds that the Gurdwara is not a  Sikh Gurdwara subject to its finding being  confirmed  by the  High  Court  in appeal, it shall cease  to  have  any jurisdiction  over it thereafter, subject of course  to  any claim made in accordance with the provisions of s. 8 praying for  the  restoration of the hereditary office-holder  or  a person who would have succeeded to such office-holder  under the system of management prevailing before the first day  of January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended  territories, before  the 1st day ,of November, 1956, in respect of  which the  Tribunal shall continue to have jurisdiction.   On  the other  hand, if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that  it was  a Sikh Gurdwara with respect to which either there  was no appeal to the High Court or the High Court had  confirmed the  finding of ’the Tribunal, that fact would be  intimated to  the State Government and the State Government shall,  as soon  as  may  be, publish  a  notification  declaring  such gurdwara  to be a Sikh Gurdwara, and the provisions of  Part III  shall apply thereto with ,effect from the date  of  the

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publication  of such notifications (vide s. 17) ;  and  (iv) where after the expiry of one year from the commencement  of the Act or in the case of the extended territories from  the commencement  of the Amending Act as the case may be  or  of such  further period as the State Government may have  fixed under  the  provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 7  two  or  more persons having interest in any gurdwara in respect of  which no notification declaring the gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara has been published under the provisions of the Act may, with the  consent of the Deputy Commissioner of the  district  in ’which such Gurdwara is situated, institute a suit,  whether contentious  or  not,  in the principal  court  of  original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that  behalf by  the  State Government within the local limits  of  whose jurisdiction the gurdwara is situated praying for any of the reliefs  specified in s. 92 of the Code of Civil  Procedure, 1908  and may in such suit pray that the provisions of  Part III  be  applied  to  such gurdwara :  (see  s.  38).   Sub- ,,sections  (2) to (6) of s. 38 prescribe the procedure  for the inquiry. 173 In so far as Lachman Dass’s appeal is concerned the Gurdwara Panjaur  Padshahi Pehli was included as item 249 in Sch.   1 by s. 50 of the Punjab Act 1 of 1959.  It is contended  that the  appellant has been denied a right of hearing by  reason of  which  he has been precluded from challenging  that  the Gurdwara  is  not a Sikh Gurdwara but a Udasi  Gurdwara  and that  the provisions of the Act are arbitrary,  unreasonable and offends his fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f). During  the  course of the lengthy  arguments,  the  Learned Advocate  for  the  respondents on behalf of  the  State  of Punjab  put  forward  the  contention  that  a  Gurdwara  as mentioned  in first part of sub-s. (1) of s. 3  namely  that specified  in  Sch.   1 is a spiritual  notion  without  any physical  form  but  that word used in the  context  of  the latter  part  of that sub-section which  specifies  a  list, signed and verified by any Sikh or any present office-holder of a gurdwara specified in Sch.  1 of all rights, titles and interests   in  immovable  properties  situated  in   Punjab inclusive  of  the Gurdwara, would imply that the  place  of worship,  namely the Gurdwara itself, can be the subject  of an  inquiry  as to whether it belongs to the Sikhs  or  non- Sikhs.  Accordingly he made a statement conceding that it is punishable  to make a claim that the property  mentioned  in the  second notification under sub-s. (2) of s. 3  including the property described as Gurdwara itself in respect of item 249  in Sch.  1 is Udasi and consequently submits  that  the appellant has not been denied a right of hearing. It is true that a denial of a right to be heard as expressed in  the maxim audi alteram partem whether by legislative  or executive  action or in any other manner is abhorrent  to  a civilised  society;  it  is destructive  of  the  elementary principles  of justice according to which every citizen  has to be judged and is contrary to the cherished notions of the rule  of law which is the sheet-anchor and the umbilicus  of the   democratic  system  of  Government  embodied  in   our Constitution.  But is this principle applicable to the facts and  circumstances  of this case ? What are  the  facts  and circumstances   and  whether  having  regard  to  them   the appellant  has  a  right to challenge  before  us  that  the Gurdwara Panjaur Padshahi Pehli is not a Sikh Gurdwara.  The question would only arise if he has a locus standi to do so. But if he has not, the question whether under the provisions of the Act he could challenge the inclusion of the  Gurdwara as a Sikh Gurdwara in Sch.  1 or the declaration under  sub-

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s.  (2) of s. 3 that it is a Sikh Gurdwara need not be  gone into. This Gurdwara had been declared to be Sikh Gurdwara and  its management vested in the Interim Gurdwara Board  constituted for the management of Sikh Gurdwaras in the erstwhile  State of  Pepsu.  By a Firman-I-Shahi dated November 2, 1946,  the Maharaja of Patiala declared his intention to associate  the Sangat with the management of Gurdwaras and with that object be issued necessary instructions to prepare a  comprehensive legislation.   In the, meantime in order to avoid  delay  in giving  that  intention  a  practical  shape              he decided to appoint an Interim Committee which will undertake the  management of the Gurdwaras pending the passing of  the legis- 174 lation.   Six days thereafter i.e. on November 8,  1946  the Maharaja  issued  another  Firman  appointing   an   Interim Committee  for the management of the Sikh Gurdwaras  in  the State  and  nominated members thereof.  In that  Firman  he designated  the  Committee as an "Interim  Gurdwara  Board", which  was  directed  to  assume  the  functions  till  then performed  by  the  Deodhi Department and  to  exercise  the powers  vested  in the Sardar Sahib Deodhi Mualla.   It  was also provided that the Interim Gurdwara Board shall elect  a Vice-President  and  Secretary out of the  members  and  its decisions will be given effect to by majority of votes.  The President or Chairman will have a casting vote in case of a. tie.   Eight members were to form the quorum for a  meeting. On December 23, 1946, pursuant to the Firman dated  November 8,  1946  a  notification was  issued  by  Deodhi   Mualla Department, Patiala, for the information of the general pub- lic  that  the management of the  Sikh  Gurdwaras  specified therein had been handed over- to the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala.   In that list is mentioned at item 24 Gurdwara  at Pinjore  in  the  memory of  Padhshahi  Pehli.   This  Board continued to function even after the Amending Act came  into force.  Section 148-C of the Act provides thus :               "148-C.  Notwithstanding anything contained in               this   Act,  every  local  committee  in   the               extended   territories  functioning  for   the               management of one or more Gurdwaras under  the               control   of  the  Interim   Gurdwara   Board,               Patiala,  immediately before the  commencement               of   the   Amending  Act,  shall,   till   the               constitution  of the new Committee, be  deemed               to  be  a Committee for such  Gurdwaras  under               this Act." This  had  reference to s. 148-B which added  to  the  Board constituted under s. 43 additional members till  the  next election of the new board under s. 43-A.  Section 148-C made provisions  in respect of employees of the Interim  Gurdwara Board, Patiala and the local committee functioning under it. Section  148-E made special provisions regarding the  assets and  liabilities  of Interim Gurdwara  Board,  Patiala.   It provided  that  all lands and buildings (together  with  all interests of whatsoever nature or kind therein) belonging to the  Interim Gurdwara Board, all assets,  including  stores, articles,  and movable properties belonging to  the  Interim Gurdwara  Board  immediately before  such  commencement  and utilised  for  or in connection with  the  Interim  Gurdwara Board  shall  pass  to and vest in  the  Board.   ’Similarly clauses  (c), (d), and (e) made provision for  debts,  rents and s uits etc.  Section 148-F made provision for removal of difficulties.  In this way the Amending Act gave  continuity to  the vesting of the Gurdwara Pinjore Padbshahi  Pehli  in

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the Interim Gurdwara ’Board and to manage it even after  the Amending,  Act, without creating any kind of hiatus  in  the control  and  management  of such  Gurdwaras.   The  Pinjore Gurdwara  was declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara long  prior  to the  Constitution  and was managed by the  Interim  Gurdwara Board  constituted  by the Firman which was the law  of  the Pepsu  State having the force of law even after the  Consti- tution by Virtue of Art. 372 and continued to be law till it was 175 repealed  and  substituted  by a law  made  by  a  competent Legislature.   The, appellant had no manner of right  during the entire period from 1946 till long after the Amending Act nor  did he even assert his right thereto since then until the  filing of the Writ Petition and cannot, be  allowed  to challenge  now  the  factum  that the  Gurdwara  is  a  Sikh Gurdwara. It is strenuously contended by the Learned Advocate for  the appellant  that the appellant cannot be non-suited as  there were  no  pleadings,  no allegation that  the  Gurdwara  was declared  a  Sikh  Gurdwara  or  that  its  management   and possession was vested in the Interim Gurdwara Board or  that the  appellant was dispossessed at any time; nor were  these allegations canvassed by the appellant in the Writ  petition during  its hearing before the High Court nor has  the  High Court  dealt,  with  this  aspect;  nor  were  any  accounts required to be produced nor was the Mahant ever appointed as a  servant of the Gurdwara.  He further contended  that  the Firman does not affect the status of the Gurdwara as it  was not  only of a temporary nature but it  specifically  stated that it will be in force till a new law was made. In  our  view these contentions have no force  and  must  be rejected.   The  allegation  of the appellant  in  his  Writ petition  paragraph-9(d) was that the State Government  when preparing the two schedules did not make any enquiry,  never served any notice on the appellant asking him to explain  as to  whether it was an Udasi institution or a Sikh  Gurdwara, and  arbitrarily included Gurdwara Panjaur sahib,  an  Udasi institution,  in Sch.  1 which is against the principles  of natural  justice.  In reply thereto in paragraph  9(d)  res- pondents  1 and 3 denied these allegations and averred  that the  Institution  was  a Sikh Gurdwara  and  was  under  the management  of the Interim Gurdwara Board in  the  erstwhile Pepsu territory.  Respondent 2 also while admitting that the appellant was in possession of the Gurdwara and the property attached therewith said that possession was on behalf of the said  Gurdwara.   Respondent 2 further,  while  emphatically denying that the Gurdwara was an Udasi institution, asserted that the institution was a Sikh Gurdwara.  Annexure A-I  was relied upon by the appellant to show, that nothing had, been stated therein that the Gurdwara was under the management of the  Interim  Gurdwara Board.  This annexure related  to  an entry  in  last  Jamabandi for the, year  1954-55  in  which Column  I showed the number of the Khata and in  the  second column  name of the owner was described as  "Gurdwara  Sahib Panjore  Malik Be ehatman, Mahant Lachhman Das Chela  Mahant Isher   Dass  caste  Udasi  resident  of  village   Panjore, Mohtmim." In the third column the name of the cultivator was given.  There is nothing in this entry which shows that  the Gurdwara was an Udasi Gurdwara or the Lachhman Dass was  not working under the management of the Interim Gurdwara  Board. The words ’Be ehetmam and Mohtmim’ clearly show that he  was only  managing  it.  This  is  not  inconsistent  with   the allegations that many of the Sikh Gurdwaras were managed  by Udasis  nor is it inconsistent with the fact that under  the

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Firmans  the Interim Gurdwara Board which was in  management of the Gurdwara could get the affairs of the Gurdwara 176 looked  after by others under their supervision.   For  this reason perhaps originally the vires of the provisions of the Act was not specifically agitated in the original  petition. It  was only subsequently that an attempt was made  to  have amended.   Be  that. as it may it cannot be  said  that  the question of the management of the impugned Gurdwaras was not raised.  In paragraph 2 of the affidavit of Kehar Singh Mann the deponent stated that the Sikh Gurdwaras in the State  of Pepsu  fell  into three categories-(1) Gurdwaras  owned  and managed by the Government; (2) Gurdwaras which were  managed by  the the Interim Gurdwara Board established by the  Ruler of the erstwhile, State of Patiala by order of the  Ijlas-i- khas December, 1946; and (3) Gurdwaras which were  privately managed   by  the  Local  Committees.   The  Government   by notification  No.  48  Gurdwaras  dated  February  1,  1957, constituted  a committee consisting of M.L.As and M.L.Cs  to submit its report for suitable amendments being made in  the Act  covering  the  Gurdwaras situated in  Pepsu  and  after obtaining  the  relevant data the  Committee  submitted  its report  on September 14, 1957 which is R-1 a copy  of  which was  attached to the affidavit of Kehar Singh  Mann.   These recommendations  of  the  Committee were  accepted  and  the Amending Act was introduced.  The full Bench in its judgment referred  to  the  basis on which  certain  historical  Sikh Gurdwaras  of erstwhile Pepsu area were included in Sch.   1 and  others  not  so included.  According  to  the  Advisory Committee’s report;               "All  the Gurdwaras managed by Government  and               the  Interim  Gurdwara  Board  should  not  be               included in Schedule 1. While recommending the               inclusion   of  Gurdwaras  mentioned  in   the               attached  lists, the Committee has  given  due               consideration to the religious and  historical               importance of the Gurdwaras and their economy.               It  was  felt that the inclusion  of  all  the               Gurdwaras  managed  by  the  Interim  Gurdwara               Board in Schedule I and section 85 of the Act,               would   be  conducive  to  inconvenience and               complications in the management of some of the               Gurdwaras.  The Committee has, therefore,  not               recommended  the  inclusion  of  some  of  the               Gurdwaras in Schedule I." The  full Bench also further stated that the  appellant  has not  claimed  himself  to be the owner  of  the  institution devined  and  described in item No. 249 of the Sch.   1  and therefore  has  no  locus  standi to  claim  that  the  said institution should have been included in that Schedule. It  is, therefore, clear that the question whether  Gurdwara Pinjore Padhshahi Pehli was a Sikh Gurdwara or was an  Udasi Gurdwara had been determined as early as 1946 by the  Firman of  the  Maharaja of Patiala.  The fact that  the  appellant alleges  that  he was in possession of the  Gurdwara  is  of little  moment because if the law vested the  management  in the  Interim Gurdwara Board the possession of the  appellant could either be permissible or hostile.  In either case  the status  of  the  Gurdwara  as  a  Sikh  Gurdwara  had   been determined  before the Constitution and since it was a  pre- Constitution  law  which declared so  the  appellant  cannot challenge it on the ground of viola- 177 tion  of  his  fundamental rights.  Even  if  the  appellant continued  to be in possession he has. not acquired a  right

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of  management when once that right was vested  in,  another body.  That Firman of an erstwhile Ruler of a Princely State was law and continued to be law till repealed or substituted by  a  competent  Legislature  has  been  concluded  by  the decisions of this Court in Ameerunnissa Begum and others  v. Mahaboob  Begum  and Others,(1) and State of  Rajasthan  and Others v. Shri Sajjanlal Panjawat and others.(2) In view  of the  legal  position  an attempt was made  to  describe  the Firman  of the Maharaja of Patiala referred to above  as  an administrative order not having the force of law.  With this submission  we  are unable to agree A glance at  the  Firman leaves no manner of doubt that it vested the management  and possession of the Gurdwaras in a body created by it, with  a Constitution  and Membership quorum etc.  It could  only  be administrative  if  the Gurdwaras in respect  of  which  the management  was vested were already vested in the State  but that will be fatal to the case of the appellants.  The  very fact  that  pending  a comprehensive law  the  Maharaja  was issuing  the  Firman  itself shows that it is  a  law.   The pleadings clearly raised the question of the locus standi of the  appellant  to assert that the Gurdwara was not  a  Sikh Gurdwara and it was clearly asserted that the possession  of the  appellant was on behalf of the said Gurdwara  which  is not  inconsistent  with  the fact that  the  possession  and management  of it was vested in the Interim Gurdwara  Board. It  was contended by the learned Advocate for the  appellant that  if the pre-Constitution law takes away rights  for  an interim  period  then the rights existed after  the  interim period and is subject to the Constitution.  But even if this proposition is admitted, and it is not necessary to  express our  view, the assumption on which it is based  is  invalid. No  doubt the Maharaja of Patiala envisaged a  comprehensive law  to  replace his Firmans but by that time the  State  of Patiala was merged and the law embodied by the Firmans which was continued to be the law after the merger was replaced by the  Amending  Act which provided for the  interim  Gurdwara Board   being  in  possession  and  management  during   the transition   period.    In   Sri   Jagadguru   Kari   Basava Rajendraswami of Gavimutt v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad(3)   scheme  had  been framed before the Constitution and s. 103(d)of  the  Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1951, properly  construed, gave an operative force to the  earlier schemes  framed  under the Madras Act 2 of  1973  as  though they’  were  framed under the Act 19 of 1951.   It  was  not intended by this section that those schemes must be examined and reframed in the light of the relevant provisions of  the Act.  In these circumstances it was held that, although  the scheme  in  question  had not  been  completely  implemented before  the Constitution, that was no ground  for  examining its  provision in the light of Art. 19 of the  Constitution. The fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution are not retrospective  in  operation and the observations  made.  by this  Court in Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of  India(4)  were not applicable to that case. (1)[1953]  S.C.R.  404. (2)[1974] 1 S.C.R. 500  at  p.  511. (3)[1964] 8 S.C.R. 252. (4) A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 624. 13-L379 Sup.  CI/75 178 The  complaint in the appeals relating to Sch.  1  Gurdwaras is  that  the  mere  publication  of  a  declaration  of   a consolidated  list under sub-s. (2) of S. 3 is by virtue  of sub-s.  (4)  of S. 3 conclusive proof of the fact  that  the application  made under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 was in fact  made by  a Sikh or any present office holder of the  Gurdwara  in

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question   specified  in  Sch.   1  of  the  Act  that   the notification and the consolidated list had been published in the  prescribed manner at the headquarters of  the  District etc.  and  the  fact  that  the  State  Government  sent  by registered  post a notice of the claim etc. to each  of  the persons named in the list as being in possession of any such right  etc. i.e. of the requisites of sub-sections (1),  (2) and (3) of s. 3. The appellant Dharam Das further  complains that  sub-s.  (5)  of s. 7 bars an  inquiry  into  the  fact whether  the persons who made the application  under  sub-s. (1) of s. 7 were in fact fifty or more or not, whether  such persons  were in fact Sikh worshippers of the  Gurdwaras  or not,  and whether each one of them was more than  twenty-one years  of age or not at the relevant time.  The  publication of  this  notification  is to be  conclusive  proof  of  the compliance with the requirements of sub-ss. (1) to (4) of S. 7.  These provisions have been challenged as offending  Art. 14  because  the impugned presumptions have  the  effect  of taking  away the rights which are available. to the  parties in  contesting their suits under S. 38 thus driving a  wedge of individual discrimination between cases tried under  Part I  of the Act on the one hand and those tried under Part  II of the Act (S. 38) on the other; that the said  presumptions are  pieces  of  substantive law and  not  merely  rules  of evidence;  and  that the presumptions in question  have  the effect  of taking away certain defenses which  are  normally open  to a litigant in an ordinary legal  proceedings,  i.e. the plea as to the locus standi of claimant either under sub section (1) of section 3 or under sub-section (1) of Section 7  by  pleading  and proving that  such  claimants  did  not possess the requisite qualifications entitling them to  make the  claim  in dispute.  These very contentions  were  urged before  the  High Court and negatived by it  on  a  detailed consideration by reference to the case law. It  must not be forgotten that the whole object of  the  Act was  to  reduce the chances of protracted  litigation  in  a matter involving the religious sentiments of a large section of  a  sensitive people proud of their heritage.   The  long history  of  the  struggle of the Sikhs to  get  back  their religious  shrines to which reference has been made  in  the Sikh historical books make it amply clear that the intensity of  the struggle, sacrifice and shedding of blood  had  made the  Government  of  the day realize that  a  speedy  remedy should be devised and accordingly the, procedures prescribed in  ss.  3  and  7 have been  innovated  by  the  Act.   The provision of law which shuts out further enquiry and makes a notification   in  respect  of  certain  preliminary   steps conclusive,  does not involve the exercise of  any  judicial function.  It has been so held in Municipal Board, Hapur  v. Raghuvendra Kripal and others(1).  Though this case and  the case  of Izhar Ahmad Khan and others v. Union of  India  and others (2 ) had been cited (1)  A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 693 (2) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 235. 179 before the High Court as supporting the contention that sub- s.  (4)  of  s. 3 and sub-s. (5) of s. 7 are  liable  to  be struck  down as they are equivalent to an ex-parte  judgment of  the  legislature  given against  the  petitions  on  the relevant  point,  the High Court on an examination  of  this case  held that the ratio supported a  contrary  conclusion. In  lzhar  Ahmed  Khan’s  case sub-s. (2) of  s.  9  of  the Citizenship, Act provided that if any question arises as  to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of   another  country,  it  shall  be  determined  by   such

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authority,  in such manner, and having regard to such  rules of evidence as may be prescribed in that behalf.  Under  the above  provision  rule  3 of Sch.  III  of  the  Citizenship Rules,  1956  was  framed  and it was  this  rule  that  was challenged.   The  Court while up-holding  it  examined  the question  as  to when it could be said that  the  conclusive presumption prescribed by the statute fell within the  ambit of  the rules of evidence and when it could not be so  said. If rebuttable presumptions are within the domain of the  law of  evidence irrebuttable presumptions would also be  within the domain of that branch of the law.  Even though the  rule provided  for  a conclusive presumption, the  majority  held that it prescribed a rule of evidence.  That was a case of a rule made under a statutory provision but sub-s. (4) of s. 3 and  sub-s.  (5) of s. 7 of the Act are  rules  of  evidence prescribed by the Legislature which is competent to provide, for  irrebuttable  and conclusive presumptions not  only  as mere rules of evidence but even as substantive pieces of law so   long  as  the  relevant  provisions  are   within   the legislative  competence  of  the  Legislature  and  are  not otherwise unconstitutional. In Municipal Board, Hapur’s case also the majority  decision of  this  Court held that when a Legislature, says  that  an enquiry into the truth or otherwise of a fact shall stop  at a  given  stage and that fact is taken  to  be  conclusively proved, no question of discrimination would arise.  In  fact that case specifically held that the provisions of law which shuts  out  further  enquiry and  makes  a  notification  in respect  of certain preliminary steps conclusive,  does  not involve  the  exercise  of any judicial  function.   It  was pointed out that the Evidence Act is full of such  fictions. 1n  fact  under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act it is  on  the receipt  of a list "duly forwarded under the  provisions  of subsection  (1)"  that the State Government is  expected  to publish  a notification, the publication of which is made  a conclusive proof of certain facts by sub-s. (4) of s. 3.  As pointed  out  by the High Court the use  of  the  expression "duly forwarded" in relation to an application under  sub-s. (1)  of s. 3 shows that the State Government is expected  to satisfy itself before the issue of a notification under sub- s. (2) of s. 3, that the application in question is a proper application  under sub-s. (1), and has been duly  forwarded, which implies that the application. has been made by a  Sikh or  by the present office-holder of a Gurdwara specified  in Sch. 1, and that in effect it has fulfilled the requirements of  sub-s.  (1)  of s. 3. We are  in.  agreement  with  this conclusion  of  the High Court for the reasons given  by  it that the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 3 and sub-s. (5)  of s.   7 do not suffer from any constitutional or other legal impediment. 180 It  was,  however, pointed out by the High  Court  that  the above plea was not taken in any of the Writ petitions except that in the petition filed by Dharam Das. There  seems  to have been a divergence of  opinion  in  the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of personal notice to be  served under sub-s. (4) of S. 7 and even though  it  was served subsequent to the notification under sub-s. (5) of s. 7  it was nonetheless determined by the rule  of  conclusive proof.   But as the Full Bench of the High Court  explained, and  we concur with that explanation, once the provision  of conclusive presumption under sub-s. (5) of s. 7 was held  to be  valid  and  constitutional that question  could  not  be allowed  to be agitated or rebutted as that  would  militate against the conclusive nature of the statutory  presumption.

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Nor  having  regard  to  the object  of  the  Act  can  that provision be considered to be unreasonable as these are only preliminary  steps  necessary for holding an  enquiry  which enquiry forms an essential part to the determination of  the lis.   To  take advantage of preliminary steps  to  protract litigation is itself unreasonable.  The presumption that the authorities  enjoined by the Act to take certain steps  will do so has been an irrebuttable presumption and if that  does not  affect  substantial  justice  being  done  between  the parties  to  the lis, no question of  unreasonableness  will arise.   It  may also be pointed out that before us  it  was contended  that  no notice was served on  Bhag  Singh.   The Respondents’ Advocate, however, wanted to produce the notice on  which  Bhag  Singh had signed in  token  of  his  having received it, but that is a matter which we cannot  entertain in this appeal. It  is  also  argued in Dharam Das’s  case  that  the  right conferred by s. 8 of the Act on any hereditary office-holder confers  that  right only on a person who  could  trace  big office as a hereditary officeholder from an unbroken line of Gurus  to Chela and if there is any hiatus in that, such  as for  instance, the death of a Guru before he  nominates  his Chela  or  where  a Guru marries and  is  disqualified-  and another person is. appointed as a Mahant that person is  not given  the right to challenge the notification under  sub-s. (3)  of s. 7. This contention, in our view,  is  unjustified for  the  simple reason that "hereditary  office"  has  been defined in clause (iv) of sub-s. (4) of s. 2 as meaning  "an office  the  succession  to which before the  first  day  of January,   1920,  or,  in  ’  the  case  of   the   extended territories,  before the 1st day of November, 1956,  as  the case  may be, devolved, according to hereditary right or  by nomination  by  the office-holder for the time  being,"  and "hereditary office-holder" means the holder of a  hereditary office.  If a hereditary office-holder within the meaning of clause  (iv) of S. 2(4) cannot be found then S.  8  provides for a challenge to the notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 7 by  any twenty or more worshippers of the Gurdwara, each  of whom  is  more than twenty-one years of age and was  on  the commencement of the Act a resident of a police station  area in  which  the  gurdwara  is situated.   Surely,  if  as  is contended the Bhekh of a Sampradaya is entitled to  nominate a successor where a Mahant could not nominate his succes- 18 1 sor,  we presume that the Bhekh will have more  than  twenty worshippers who could challenge the notification.  We cannot assume that the Bhekh which nominated the Mahant would be of less  than twenty worshippers.  If it had lesser  number  of worshippers  than  20, it could hardly be  called  a  Bhekh. There   is,   in   our   view,   nothing   unreasonable   or discriminatory in this provision.  As to whether a person is a  hereditary office-holder at the time of the  presentation of the petition under sec. 8, will always be a case for  the Tribunal  to  determine having  regard  to  well-established rules  of evidence by which Courts determine these  matters. The assumption that if there is a break before 100 years  of a succession between a Guru and Chela, the present incumbent will  not  be considered as a  hereditary  office-holder  is purely  hypothetical  and  this Court will  not  venture  to express  its  view  on such an assumption.  It  is  for  the Tribunal to apply the law for determining as to whether  the person  who  challenges  the notification  is  a  hereditary office-holder and has locus standi to do so. In Civil- Appeal No. 1222 of 1969 the filing of the petition within  ninety days prescribed under s. 8 is  challenged  as

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unreasonable.   The  period  of limitation is  by  its  very nature to some extent arbitrary but it has never been  urged that  the  period  prescribed  in  the  Limitation  Act   is violative  of  Art. 14 of the Constitution, nor  if  such  a position is taken can it be sustained.  If is an  elementary principle of justice that a person having a right should not sleep over it and must come forward as quickly as  possible. The contingency that if a Mahant dies within a period of  90 days after the publication of the notification under  sub-s. (3) of s. 7 without nominating his successor there would be, no  time  for  the Bhekh to nominate the  successor  to  the office  or  for  the  Bhekh to call a  meeting  to  elect  a successor  of  properties  attached  to  the  Gurdwara   was forwarded, a declaration do not make the provision  invalid. Ninety   days  is  sufficient  time  for  twenty   or   more worshippers  to get together to challenge  the  notification which is designed to declare the gurdwara in which they  are worshipping  to be _a Sikh Gurdwara and which offends  their belief and worship. In  our  view there is no substance in any  of  the  appeals filed before us. We agree with the conclusion arrived at  by the  Full  Beach  of the Punjab &  Haryana  High  Court  and dismiss all these appeals, but in the circumstances, without costs. KHANNA,  J.-The short question which arises in civil  appeal No.  1251  of  1969 is whether section  3(4)  of  the  Silkh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)  is violative  of  the  appellant’s  fundamental  rights   under article 19(1)(f) and article 26 of the Constitution. Gurdwara  Sahib Panjore, Pahli Patshahi, situate in  Panjore is entered at item No. 249 in the first Schedule to the Act. After  a  list of properties attached to  the  Gurdwara  was forwarded,  a declaration was issued under section  3(2)  of the Act on May 24, 1960 that the 182 above mentioned Gurdwara was a Sikh Gurdwara.  By a separate A  notification  a consolidated list of  rights,  title  and interest  claimed  to  belong  to  the  Gurdwara  was   also published.   In  reply to a notice issued to  him,  Lachhman Dass  appellant  in  civil appeal No.  1251  of  1969  filed petition under section 5 of the Act claiming rights and  in- terest  in  the above mentioned property.   The  appellant’s petition  was forwarded to the Sikh Gurdwara  Tribunal.   In the  course  of  the proceedings  before  it,  the  Tribunal declined to frame an issue whether the Gurdwara in  question was a Sikh Gurdwara in view of section 3(4) of the Act.  The appellant  then  submitted an application for  amending  his petition so as to assert that the provisions of the Act were violative of his fundamental rights.  The application of the appellant was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it was  not  germane to the inquiry.  The  appellant  thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court under article 226 of the  Constitution  on the allegation that he  was  an  Udasi faqir  and that the shrine in question was an  Udasi  insti- tution and not a Sikh Gurdwara.  He prayed that a number  of provisions  of the Act might be declared to be violative  of the appellant’s rights under the Constitution.  The petition was  resisted  by  the State of  Punjab  and  the  Shiromani Gurudwara  Parbandhak  Committee (SGPC).  The  petition  was ultimately  decided by a Full Bench and the  contentions  of the petitioner were rejected by the majority. The  contention which has been advanced by Mr.  Tarkunde  on behalf of Lachhman Das appellant is that section 3(4) of the Act is violative of the appellant’s fundamental rights under article  19(1)(f)  and  article  26  of  the   Constitution.

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Section 3(4) reads as under               " (4) The publication of a declaration and  of               a  consolidated list under the  provisions  of               sub-section (2) shall be conclusive proof that               the  provisions of sub-sections (1), (2)-  and               (3) with respect to such publication have been               duly complied with and that the Gurdwara is  a               Sikh Gurdwara, and the provisions of Part  III               shall apply to such Gurdwara with effect  from               the   date   of   the   publication   of   the               notification   declaring  it  to  be  a   Sikh               Gurdwara." It  is urged that the conclusive nature of  the  declaration under   the  above  provision  operates  as  a   denial   of opportunity  to the appellant to prove that the  institution in  question  is  an  Udasi  institution  and  not  a   Sikh institution,  and  as  such,  amounts  to  an   unreasonable restriction   on  the,  appellant’s  rights  under   article 19(1)(f) and article 26. At the hearing of the appeal, learned counsel for the  State of Punjab as well as for that of SGPC have stated that it is permissible  to make a claim that the property mentioned  in the  second notification under section 3(2),  including  the property described to be the Gurdwara itself, in respect  of item  No.  249  in the first Schedule belongs  to  an  Udasi institution. It  is plain that if the above stand taken on behalf of  the respondents were to be accepted, the basis of the  grievance of the appellant that there is denial of opportunity to  him to establish his claim that 183 the  institution in question is an Udasi  institution  would disappear.   It is also obvious that if  the  interpretation sought to be placed upon section 3 of the Act by the learned counsel  for  the respondents were  accepted,  section  3(4) would  not  be  violative of the  appellant’s  rights  under article 19(1)(f) and article 26. Mr.  V.  S. Desai on behalf of the State of Punjab  and  Mr. Patel   on  behalf  of  SGPC  point  out  that   the   above interpretation  of section 3 is in consonance with the  view taken  by Coldstream J., who was the President. of the  Sikh Gurdwara  Tribunal,  in  his order dated  January  29,  1929 relating to Gurdwara Rupar mentioned at sl.  No. 233 of  the first  Schedule  to  the Act as well  as  a  Division  Bench consisting of Broadway and Harrison JJ. of Lahore High Court in the case of (Mahant) Davinder Singh v. Shromani  Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee & Anr.(1) Coldstream J. observed in his order :               "The  sub-section  itself certainly  does  not               expressly  authorise the Local  Government  to               decide  what  building is referred to  in  the               Schedule  nor  take  away  from  the  Tribunal               jurisdiction  to  decide this  question.   The               ’Gurudwara  itself’  is  clearly  one  of  the               properties  to  be claimed on  behalf  of  the               Gurudwara   under  section  3(1).    Petitions               contesting  these  claims  are  sent  to   the               Tribunal  under section 14, and it is for  the               Tribunal to decide what part of the  property,               if  any, is the ’Gurdwara itself’ in which  no               right,  title  or interest can be  claimed  as               private property."               The  Division  Bench observed in the  case  of               (Mahant) Davinder Singh as under :               "The question, therefore, is narrowed down  to

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             this : can the correctness of the notification               under  section 5(3) be challenged; and if  so,               can any individual or religious body claim any               portion  of the area described as a  Gurudwara               by the SGPC, and if it can claim any  portion,               can it claim the whole ?               The  answer to the first portion is, I  think,               that so far as the notification under  section               5  ’deals  with  claims  to  Gurdwaras  it  is               meaningless  inasmuch as there can be no  such               claim.   The test is not whether a man  admits               that there is a Gurdwara or not but whether he               claims  the Gurdwara as such,  e.g.  supposing               there  be  a  dispute  between  two  sets   or               branches  of  Sikhs they cannot put  in  rival               claims  to  the Gurdwara as a  Sikh  Gurdwara.                             Any body may put in a claim provided h e  avoids               describing  it as a claim to a  Gurdwara.   He               may claim, in other words, that what the  SGPC               or  any other religious body declares to be  a               Sikh   Gurdwara  form  part  of  his   private               property  or  a part of the endowment  of  any               institution.   This is the view clearly  taken               by   the   officials   responsible   for   the               notification when they excluded ’H’ (a  corner               of  the property had been marked ’H’  in  the,               plan  annexed to the  Government  notification               under section 3(2) of the Act. (1)  A.I.R. 1929 Lahore 603. 184               Now,  if he can claim a portion is  there  any               reason  why  he cannot claim the  whole?   The               test suggested by Mr. Petman is impossible and               unworkable and, inasmuch as Government has not               seen  fit  to lay down that  the  Schedule  is               conclusive  proof that there is a Gurdwara  at               each of the places entered therein, or that  a               Gurdwara is a place notified as such, there is               no  reason, in my opinion, why any  individual               should  not come forward and. claim the  whole               area    described   and   defined    in    the               notification; provided always that he abstains               from  using the word ’Gurdwara’ as  describing               and forming the subject-matter of his claim." Narula J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority of  the Full  Bench  in the judgment under appeal  relied  upon  the above observations and added :               "The  judgment  of the Division Bench  of  the               Lahore  High Court clearly supports  the  view               that  though  section 5(1) bars any  claim  in               respect of the Gurdwara itself, every inch  of               the  land  and every part of the  building  of               what  may  be  described and  claimed  as  the               physical  Gurdwara. can be the  subject-matter               of a claim under section 5 (1 ) and of adjudi-               cation by the Tribunal.  This also shows  that               the  word ’Gurdwara’ as used in  section  5(1)               was understood by the Lahore High Court to  be               an  institution  as  distinguished  from   the               physical   building   popularly   called   the               Gurdwara." There  is a presumption of the constitutional validity of  a statutory provision. if a provision like section 3(4) of the Act  of a local enactment has been on the statute  book  for

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about half a century and a particular construction has  been placed upon it by the High Court of the State which sustains the constitutional validity of the provision, this Court, in my  opinion,  should  lean in favour of the  view  as  would sustain  the validity of the provision and not  disturb  the construction  which has been accepted for such a  length  of time. Reference  in  this context may be made to the case  of  Raj Narain Pandey & Ors. v. Sant Prasad Tewari & Ors.(1) wherein this Court observed :               "In  the  matter of the  interpretation  of  a               local  statute,  the view taken  by  the  High               Court  over a number of years should  normally               be adhered to and not disturbed.  A  different               view  would not only introduce an  element  of               uncertainty and confusion, it would also  have               the  effect of unsettling  transactions  which               might  have been entered into on the faith  of               those   decision$,  The  doctrine   of   stare               decision  can  be  aptly  invoked  in  such  a               situation.  As observed by Lord Evershed M. R.               in  the case of Brownsea Haven  Properties  v.               Poole  Corpn.  (1958) Ch 574,  there  is  well               established  authority  for the  view  that  a               decision  of  long standing on  the  basis  of               which (1)  A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 291. 185               many  persons will in the course of time  have               arranged  their affairs should not lightly  be               disturbed  by  a superior court  not  strictly               bound itself by the decision." I would, therefore, hold that section 3(4) is not  violative of the appellant’s rights under article 19(1)(f) and article 26. Question  has  been  raised about the locus  standi  of  the appellant  to  file  petition  under  article  226  of   the Constitution before the High Court.  In this respect I  find that in the notice issued under subsection (3) of section  3 of  the Act the appellant was mentioned to be in  possession of  the  property in dispute.  The appellant  made  a  claim about the property in dispute and the same is pending before the Tribunal.  During the pendency of the proceedings before the  Tribunal the appellant wanted to agitate  the  question that  the property in dispute was an Udasi  institution  and not  a  Sikh  Gurdwara.  The Tribunal declined  in  view  of section  3(4) of the, Act to frame an issue on the  question as to whether the Gurdwara in question was a Sikh  Gurdwara. According to the appellant the denial of opportunity to  him that  the property in dispute, was an Udasi institution  and not a Sikh Gurdwara was violative of his fundamental rights. These  facts, in my opinion, were sufficient to  clothe  the appellant  with a right to Me the petition before  the  High Court.   Whether the appellant would ultimately  succeed  in establishing his claim would be a matter for the Tribunal to adjudicate  upon.   The  question as to what  would  be  the effect  of  the  different  Firmans on  the  rights  of  the appellant  relates to the merits of his claim and  the  same can be gone into only in the proceedings before the Tribunal and  not  in writ proceedings before the High Court  nor  in appeal in this Court against the judgment of the High  Court dismissing the writ petition. So  far as the other two appeals are concerned, they  relate to properties about which notification has been issued under section  7 of the Act.  The properties covered by these  two

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appeals have not been included in the first Schedule, to the Act.   1 agree with my learned brother Jaganmohan  Reddy  J. that  none of the impugned provisions has been shown  to  be violative of the constitutional rights of the appellants  in these two appeals. I  further  agree  that  all the  three  appeals  should  be dismissed  and  that the parties be left to bear  their  own costs of the appeals. V.P.S.                            Appeals dismissed. 186