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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  867 of 2003

PETITIONER: Mahadeo Bajirao Patil                                                 

RESPONDENT: State of Maharashtra and others                                     

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2005

BENCH: B.P. SINGH & S.B. SINHA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

B.P. SINGH, J.

       This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment  and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated  October 30, 2001 in First Appeal No. 981 of 1996.  By the  aforesaid judgment the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by  the State of Maharashtra/respondent No.1 herein and held that the  application filed by respondent No.1 under Section 18 of the Land  Acquisition Act for making a reference was barred by limitation.   The sole question which, therefore, arises for consideration in the  instant appeal is whether the said application filed by the appellant  herein under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was barred by  time.

       The facts of the case in so far as they are relevant for the  disposal of this appeal are as follows:-                  One Kulkarni held a lease executed on December 3, 1979  for a period of 20 years in respect of an area of 142 Hectares 78  Ares from the State of Maharashtra for mining Silica sand.  The  aforesaid lessee applied to the State of Maharashtra on May 3,  1991 for transfer of the mining lease in favour of the appellant  herein.  In the mean time, on October 8, 1991 a proposal was  submitted to the Collector of Sindhudurg by Respondent No.136,  namely, M/s. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. for acquisition of  land for the purpose of the said Corporation situated in village  Achirne. Pursuant thereto land measuring 13 Hectare 9 Ares were  notified for acquisition by Notification issued under Section 4 of  the Land Acquisition Act on February 13, 1992.  Subsequent  thereto the Government by its Order dated February 20, 1992  allowed the application for transfer of mining lease in favour of the  appellant herein.  This included the lands notified for acquisition of  village Achirne.  The agreement was thereafter executed by and  between the aforesaid Kulkarni and the appellant on May 15, 1992  and the lease-hold rights were transferred in favour of the  appellant.

       On July 25, 1992 a declaration under Section 6 of the Act  was issued in respect of the lands earlier notified on February 13,  1992.

       Sometime in May 1994, the appellant filed a writ petition  before the High Court of Bombay being Writ Petition No. 1238 of  1994 for quashing the acquisition proceeding as also the inquiry  conducted under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act.  It was also prayed

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that respondent No.136 M/s. Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. be  restrained from taking any further action in the matter.  This writ  petition was disposed of by order of June 7, 1994 which directed  the State of Maharashtra to comply with the requirements of  Section 17(3)(a) of the Act within eight weeks and declare the  award within eight weeks thereafter.  The award ultimately came  to be declared on August 29, 1994 which awarded compensation  only to the land owners/ respondents 2 to 135 and not to the  appellant who was a mere lessee and found not entitled to grant of  compensation.  It is also not disputed that on September 18, 1994 a  telegram was sent to the appellant herein by the Special Land  Acquisition Officer informing him of the declaration of the award  which translated into English reads as follows:- "This Office No. LQN/Konkan Railway  Project/Sank-3-Achirne 463/91 dated 31-8-94 be  perused Mouje Achirne Taluka Vaibhavwadi  Award No.463/91 has been declared on 29-8-94".

"As per the discussion in this Award first  demand is rejected".             

       On receiving the telegram on September 20, 1994 the  appellant immediately applied to the Collector for providing him a  copy of the award filed in his office.  Thereafter, on December 9,  1994, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.447 of 1995 before the  Bombay High Court.  In the Writ Petition, he admitted the fact that  although an award had been declared by the Special Land  Acquisition Officer it had not been officially served upon him.   The appellant annexed to this writ petition as Ex. B an ordinary  copy of the award and challenged the validity of the award in as  much as the appellant had not been awarded any compensation.   This writ petition was disposed of by the High Court by its  judgment and order of January 30, 1995 directing the appellant to  seek remedy under Section 18 of the Act with liberty to make an  appropriate application for condonation of delay. On February 20,  1995 an application under Section 18 of the Act was filed.  The  Joint Civil Judge who heard the aforesaid Land Reference No.69  of 1995 allowed the reference application and awarded  compensation of Rs.4 crores to the appellant with interest @ 10%  per annum from November 1, 1996 onwards.  We may only notice  that in the aforesaid writ petition the land owners/ respondents 2 to  135 were added as party respondents while respondent No.136  intervened in the writ petition making a grievance that in the land  reference case no order should have been passed in the absence of  respondent 136 i.e. M/s Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. since  the acquisition was made at the instance of the aforesaid  Corporation.

       The State of Maharashtra challenged the judgment and order  of the Joint Civil Judge in First Appeal No.981 of 1996 before the  Bombay High Court.  It was contended, inter alia, that the  application for reference made under Section 18 was barred by  limitation and there was no power in the Court or the Land  Acquisition Officer to condone the delay in filing an application  under Section 18 of the Act.  The High Court by its impugned  judgment and order has upheld the contention of the State of  Maharashtra.   

       From the facts noticed above it cannot be disputed that an  award had been declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer  on August 29, 1994.  Intimation about the declaration of the award  was sent to the appellant by telegram dated September 18, 1994  which was admittedly received by the appellant on September 20,  1994.  In the writ petition filed on December 9, 1994 the appellant

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admitted knowledge of the fact that an award has been declared but  asserted that a copy of the award had not been officially served  upon the appellant.  However, an ordinary copy of the award was  annexed to the writ petition as Ext-B.  The application under  Section 18 of the Act was made by the appellant on February 20,  1995.  Section 18 of the Act reads as follows :-

"18.Reference to Court \026 (1) Any person interested  who has not accepted the award may, by written  application to the Collector, require that the matter  be referred by the Collector for the determination  of the Court, whether his objection be to the  measurement of the land, the amount of the  compensation, the persons to whom it is payable,  or the apportionment of the compensation among  the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds  on which objection to the award is taken :

Provided that every such application shall be  made \026

(a) if the person making it was present or  represented before the Collector at the time  when he made his award, within six weeks  from the date of the Collector’s award.

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the  receipt of the notice from the Collector  under section 12, sub-section (2); or within  six months from the date of the Collector’s  award, whichever period shall first expire".

       A mere perusal of section 18 discloses that there are three  situations for which period of limitation has been provided for  making an application for reference.  Firstly, if the person making  the application was present or represented before the Collector at  the time when he made his award, the application must be filed  within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award.  

In the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellant was  not present when the award was made and, therefore, Section  18(2)(a) is not applicable to the facts of this case.

       Second and third situations are envisaged by Section 18 (2)  (b).  The second situation envisaged is where a notice is received  by the applicant under Section 12 sub-section (2) of the Act. In  such a case, the period of limitation prescribed is six weeks from  the date of the receipt of the notice or within six months from the  date of the Collector’s award whichever period shall first expire.   In the instant case, the High Court has held the application to be  barred by limitation,  firstly, on the ground that the telegram sent to  the appellant on September 18, 1994 amounted to a notice under  sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act, and secondly, on the  ground that in any event as on December 9, 1994 the applicant had  not only knowledge of the fact that an award had been declared but  had also a copy of the award which he annexed with writ petition  as Ext.B. If the date of knowledge is taken to be December 8,  1994, even then the application under Section 18 was barred by  limitation.  The correctness of these findings has been assailed  before us.

       It is by now well settled that notice under Section 12(2) of

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the Act is a clear intimation of making of the award requiring the  owner or person interested to receive the compensation awarded  under Section 11 of the Act.  It is not necessary that the notice  should contain all the details of the award including the  consideration by the Land Acquisition Collector and its manner of  determination of the compensation.  No particular form is  prescribed by the Act or the Rules.

       In State of Punjab and another  vs.  Satinder Bir Singh :  (1995) 3 SCC 330 this Court held :-

"The question then is whether the notice under  Section 12(2) is a valid notice.  From a conjoint  reading of Sections 11 and 12, it is clear that notice  is only an intimation of making of the award  requiring the owner or person interested to receive  compensation awarded under Section 11. On  receipt of the notice, if the person interested  receives compensation without protest, obviously  no reference need be made.  The determination of  compensation becomes final and binds the parties.   When he receives the compensation under protest  as contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, the  need to make the application for reference under  Section 18(1) would arise.  At that juncture it will  be open to the person interested either to make an  inspection of the award which was conclusive  between him and the Collector by operation of  sub-section (1) of Section 12, or seek a certified  copy of the award from the Collector and the  contents.  Thereon he could make necessary  objection for the determination inter alia, of  compensation for the land.  It is not necessary that  the notice should contain all the details of the  award including his consideration and its manner  of determination of the compensation as opined by  the learned Judge of the High Court.  It is not  incumbent that the person interested should  immediately make the reference application on his  receiving compensation under Section 31.  In other  words receipt of the amount and making the  reference application are not simultaneous.  The  statutory operation of limitation mentioned by  Section 18(2) does not depend on the ministerial  act of communication of notice in any particular  form when the Act or Rules has not prescribed any  form.  The limitation begins to operate from the  moment the notice under Section 12(2) is received  or as envisaged by Section 18(2)".

       It is not disputed that a telegram was sent to the appellant by  the Special Land Acquisition Officer informing the appellant that  the award had been declared on August 29, 1994 and further  stating that the first demand as discussed in the award was rejected.   The counsel for the appellant sought to contend before us that  though this telegram intimated the factum of declaration of the  award necessary particulars were not disclosed therein.  On the  other hand, counsel for respondent No.1 and 136 contended that  the telegram clearly mentions the fact that the demand of the  appellant had been rejected.  The appellant sought to contend that  the reference to "first demand" in the telegram is to the request of  the appellant made on September 15, 1993 to change the alignment  of the railway track so that the mining area of which the appellant  was the lessee, was not disturbed.  It was this demand that had

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been rejected.  Such a plea does not appear to have been raised  before the High Court. The appellant has not placed before us a  copy of the award declared by the Special Land Acquisition  Officer. The representation made by him on September 15, 1993 to  the Collector, Sindhudurg, of which copy had no doubt been  endorsed to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, did not relate to  any claim of compensation payable in respect of the lands to be  acquired.  It was only a representation confined to the request  made by the appellant to change the railway alignment so that the  mining area was not disturbed.  He submitted that the appellant  later claimed compensation amounting to Rs.29 crores by a  demand made on May 26, 1994.  We are not persuaded to accept  this contention.  The Special Land Acquisition Officer while  making an award was certainly not concerned with the alteration of  railway track alignment.  He was only concerned with the grant of  compensation in accordance with law relating to the lands forming  subject matter of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  The  submission urged on behalf of the appellant before the High Court  that since no amount had been awarded to the appellant, the award  declared on August 29, 1994 was not an award under Section 11 of  the Land Acquisition Act, must also be rejected.  It is not disputed  before us and also noticed by the High Court, that the Land  Acquisition Officer held that the appellant being a lessee was not  entitled to any compensation and compensation was payable only  to the land owners, namely, respondents 2 to 135.   

We are here not concerned with the correctness of the  decision, but the fact remains that having considered the claim of  the appellant for compensation, the Special Land Acquisition  Officer rejected the claim.  This does amount to the making of an  award, commonly described as "nil award". If the appellant was  aggrieved by such an award, it was open to him to seek reference  under Section 18 of the Act which the appellant actually did.  We,  therefore, cannot hold that no award as envisaged by Section 11 of  the Act was declared on August 29, 1994,     since the claim of the  appellant was considered and was totally rejected. There was,  therefore, no question of giving any calculation of the manner in  which the compensation was computed.  Since, the application  under Section 18 was not filed within six weeks of the receipt of  notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, the High Court did not  commit any error in holding that the application was barred by  limitation.  It was not disputed before us that the Land Acquisition  Officer making a reference, or the Court considering a reference  under Section 18 of the Act has no power of condonation of delay  in making an application under the aforesaid Section.

       The next ground on which the High Court held the  application to be barred by limitation is that in any event the  appellant had knowledge of the award being made on December 8,  1994, since he filed a copy of the award as annexure to the writ  petition filed on December 9, 1994 and, therefore, should have  filed the application under Section 18 of the Act within six weeks.   The submission urged on behalf of the appellant relying upon the  decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The  Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1500 that  in the instant case even if it is assumed that the appellant had  knowledge of the award at least on December 8, 1994,  he could  make an application within six months from the date of such  knowledge, would have deserved serious consideration, but for the  finding recorded by us earlier that the appellant had    notice under  Section 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, period of limitation for  filing the application under Section 18 was six weeks from the date  of receipt of the notice and not six months from the date of  knowledge of the award.

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       In the view that we have taken, we find no merit in this  appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.