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PETITIONER: MAGANLAL CHHAGGANLAL (P) LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1974

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. RAY, A.N. (CJ) PALEKAR, D.G. KHANNA, HANS RAJ MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BHAGWATI, P.N. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2009            1975 SCR  (1)   1  1974 SCC  (2) 402  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC2044  (2)  RF         1975 SC 648  (2)  F          1975 SC1187  (21,22,23,24)  F          1976 SC 490  (158)  F          1977 SC2279  (31)  F          1977 SC2437  (6)  E&R        1979 SC 478  (71,136,137)  R          1979 SC1303  (8)  R          1979 SC1588  (12)  D          1980 SC 801  (6,7)  F          1980 SC1144  (3,4)  R          1980 SC1438  (13)  R          1981 SC 670  (8)  APL        1982 SC 780  (2)  RF         1982 SC 781  (5)  RF         1983 SC 658  (13)  R          1984 SC1828  (2)  F          1985 SC 930  (1)  RF         1988 SC1136  (10)  RF         1989 SC1933  (23)  R          1991 SC 855  (35)

ACT: Constitution  of  India,  1950, Art.  14--Provision  in  the Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  Act.  1888  and  the  Bombay Government  Premises  (Eviction)  Act, 1955,  for  a  speedy procedure  of eviction in addition to procedure in  a  civil suit--Special procedure, if discriminatory.

HEADNOTE: Chapter   VA   was  introduced  in  the   Bombay   Municipal Corporation  Act, 1888, by Maharashtra Act 14 of  1961.   It consists  of  ss. 105A to 105H.  Section  105A  (d)  defines unauthorised   occupation.    Under   9.   105B   (p)    the Commissioner, by notice served on the person in unauthorised occupation could order him to vacate within one mouth of the date  of  service  of  the notice. on  any  of  the  grounds

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mentioned  in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that  sub-section. Under   sub-s.  (2),  before  making  such  an  order,   the Commissioner a ball issue a notice to the persons  concerned specifying  the  grounds on which the order of  eviction  is proposed  to be made and to show cause against the  proposed order of eviction.  The person concerned can file a  written statement,  produce  documents  and is  entitled  to  appear before the Commissioner by a lawyer.  If, after hearing  the person concerned the Commissioner is satisfied that the case falls under clauses (a). (b) or (c) of sub-@. (1) he  issues a  notice  of  eviction, and, if the person  so  ordered  to vacate  fails  to comply with the order be, as well  as  any other person who obstructs eviction, can be evicted by force under sub-s. (3).  Under sub-s. (6) the Commissioner may. in certain  cases,  in lieu of evicting the person  cancel  the order  under  sub-s.  (1) and such person  may  continue  in occupation.  Under s. 105E the Commissioner, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act. has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the C.P.C. in respect  of. (i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining  him  on oath, (ii) requiring the   discovery  and production of documents. and (iii any other matter which may be  prescribed by regulations under s.105H.  Under  s.  105F every order of eviction is appealable to the Principal Judge of  the  City Civil Court of Bombay or such  other  judicial officer of not less than 10 years standing as the  Principal Judge may designate.  The appellate Judge is given power  to stay  the  enforcement  of  the  order  of  Commissioner  on conditions  and  is  required  to  dispose  of  the   appeal expeditiously.   Section 105G provides that, subject to  the result of the appeal, every order of the Commissioner or  of the appellate Judge is final.  Under s. 105H regulations may be made. inter alia, in respect of holding of inquiries  and the procedure to be followed in appeals. The  Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act,  1955,  also lays  down  special procedure for eviction of  persons  from government premises which is more or less similar to Chapter V of the Municipal Act.  The power to order the eviction  is given  to  an  authority not lower in  rank  than  a  Deputy Collector  or  an Executive Engineer Section 8A of  the  Act provides  that  no civil court shalt  have  jurisdiction  to entertain  any suit or proceedings  in respect of  eviction. There  is  no such provision in the Municipal  Act  but  the proceedings   in  the instant cases arose before s.  8A  was introduced in the 1955-Act by Maharashtra Act of 1969. The  constitutional validity of Chapter VA of the  Municipal Act and the provisions of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act.  as it stood prior to its amendment by Maharashtra  Act of  1969, was challenged on the Sound that  they  contravene Art.  14  on  the basis of the decision  of  this  Court  in Northern India Caterers [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399, wherein it  was held,  by the majority of Judges that amongst  occupants  of public premises inter se there was discrimination in as much as  the special procedure in the Punjab Public Premises  and Land 2 (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, was more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil suit  and that it was left to the arbitrary and unfettered  discretion of  the Government to adopt such special  procedure  against some and not against the others. HELD  (By Full Court) : The impugned provisions of  the  two Acts are not violative of Art. 14. (Per  A.  N. Ray.  C.J., Palekar, Mathew  and  Alagiriswami, JJ.)

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(1)  It  could not be contended that the special  provisions of  law  applying to government and public  bodies  are  not based  upon  reasonable classification or that  they  offend Art. 14. [10 F-G] (2)  The  mere  availability  of  two  procedures  will  not vitiate one of them, namely, the special procedure. [23 B] Where  a  statute  providing  for  more  drastic   procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered  by the ordinary procedure as in  Anwarali  Sarkar’s Case  [1952] S.C.R. 284 and Surajmal Mohta’s case  [1965]  1 S.C.R. 448, without any guidelines as to the class of  cases in which either procedure to is be resorted to, the, statute will be hit by Art. 14.  But a provision for appeal may cure the  defect.  Also in such cases, if from the  preamble  and surrounding  circumstances as well as the provisions of  the statutes themselves, explained and amplified by  affidavits, necessary guidelines could be inferred as in the  Saurashtra Case  [1952]  S.C.R. 435 and Jyoti Pershads’ case  [1962]  2 S.C.R.  125,  the statute will not be hit  by  the  Article. Where the statute itself covers only a class of cases as  in Haldar’s case [1960] 2 S.C.R. 646 and Bajoria’s case  [1954] S.C.R.  30  the statute will not be bad.  The fact  that  in such cases executive will choose which cases are to be tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity  of the statute. [22 G-23 B] (3)  In  the present cases, the statutes themselves, in  the two  classes  of cases, that is, premises belonging  to  the Corporation and the Government, clearly lay down the purpose behind  them  namely that they should be subject  to  speedy procedure  in  the matter of evicting  unauthorised  persons occupying  them.  The fact that the  legislature  considered that  the ordinary procedure is insufficient or  ineffective for  evicting  the  unauthorised occupants  and  provided  a special   speedy  procedure  therefore,  is  a   clear   and sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the duty  of evicting  such  occupants and the power to do  so  has  been conferred. [23 B-G] (4)  Further,  it would be extremely unreal to hold that  an administrative  officer  would, in  taking  proceedings  for eviction   of  unauthorised  occupants  of  government   and municipal  property, resort to the procedure  prescribed  in the  two Acts in some cases and to the ordinary civil  court in  others.   In considering whether the officers  would  be discriminating  between one set of persons and another,  one has to take into account normal human behaviour.  It is  not every  fancied possibility of discrimination but  real  risk that must be taken into account.  Discrimination is not writ large  on  the face of the statute; it may be  possible  but highly improbable, and, if there is discrimination in actual practice the power of this Court can be invoked. [Z3 D-G] (5)  Moreover, considering the object with which the special procedure  has been enacted the procedures laid down by  the two  Acts are not so harsh or unconscionable as  to  suggest that a discrimination would result if resort to them is  had in  some  cases and to the ordinary civil court  in  others. Even   though  the  officers  deciding  the   question   are administrative officers there is ample provision in the Acts for notice of the grounds of eviction and opportunity to the person  affected  to file a written  statement  and  produce documents.   He can also be represented by a lawyer and  the officer   himself  has  power  to  enforce   attendance   of witnesses,  to examine them on oath, and to order  discovery and  production of documents.  ’There is also provision  for appeal  to the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or  a District  Judge.   It  may be that a second  appeal  is  not

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available to the affected person as when procedure before an ordinary  civil court is followed, but the  aggrieved  party may  resort to the High Court under either Art. 226  or  227 and this is not less effective than a second appeal. [24  D- H] 3 Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja V. Bombay [1952] S.C.R. 710; Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Viswanatha Sastri [1955] 1 S.C.R.  787; Muthiah v. C.I.T. Madras [1955] 2 S.C.R.  1247; Thangal  Kunju  Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam  Potti  &  Anr. [1955]  2  S.C.R.  1196 and  Ramkrishna  Dalmia  v.  Justice Tendolkar [1959] S.C.R. 279. referred to. (6)  The  majority  of  the  Court  in  the  Northern  India Caterers’  case  in ignoring the obligatory  nature  of  the notice under s. 4 of the Punjab Act and discretionary  power under  s.  5  which was to be exercised  after  hearing  the patty,  were  in error in proceeding on the basis  of  s.  5 alone  and holding that it conferred arbitrary power on  the Collector  to resort to the power under the Act in the  case of some and to a suit in the case of others.  Under s. 4, if the Collector is of opinion that a person is in unauthorised occupation and has to be evicted he shall issue a notice  to him  to. show cause why an order of eviction should  not  be passed.   But  after considering the cause  shown,  evidence produced   and   after  giving  the  person   a   reasonable opportunity of being heard the Collector may order eviction. Therefore,  if  he is of opinion that it is a case  where  a suit  is  more appropriate he may not  order  eviction,  and then, it would be for the Government to institute the  suit. The Collector has no discretion either to file a suit or  to take  proceedings  under the Act.  Nor  can  the  Government order  the Collector to pass an order of eviction  in  every case  under  s.  5 as the power under that  section  is  the Collectors’ statutory power. [23 H-24 D] Northern India Caterers Ltd. v.. Punjab [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399, overruled. (Per  Khanna  J)  :(1) The simple fact that  there  are  two forums  with  different  procedures would  not  justify  the quashing  of the impugned provisions is being  violative  of Art. 14 especially when both procedures are fair and in con- sonance  with  the principles of natural justice.   What  is necessary  to attract the inhibition of the Article is  that there  must  be  substantial  and  qualitative   differences between  the  two  procedures  so that  one  is  really  and substantially  more drastic and prejudicial than the  other. A dogmatic and finical approach inapplying   the    Article should be avoided.[26 C-D] The impugned provisions provided for the giving of notice to the party affected; he has to be informed of the grounds  on which  the order    for eviction is proposed to be made;  he has  to  be afforded an opportunity to  file      a  written statement  and produce documents; and he can be  represented by  lawyers.   The  provision-,  of  the  C.P.C.   regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and  examining them  on  oath  as  also those  relating  to  discovery  and production of documents which are made applicable, provide a valuable  safeguard.   The aggrieved party has  a  right  of appeal and the appeal lies not to an administrative  officer but to a judicial officer of the status of a Principal Judge of  the  City  Civil  Court or a  District  Judge.   If  the appellate officer concerned acts beyond his jurisdiction his order would be liable to be assailed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.  Therefore, the procedure envisaged  in the  impugned  provisions is not so onerous and  drastic  as would justify an inference of discrimination. [25 H-26 C]

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(2)  It would thus appear that some of the infirmities  from which the Punjab Act, which was struck down in the  Northern India Caterer’s Case 11967] 3 S.C.R. 399, suffered, are  not present  in  the impugned enactments.  Hence  there  are  no sufficient grounds for overruling the view expressed by  the majority in the Northern India Caterers Case. [25 D, 29E-F] This Court may, no doubt, in appropriate cases overrule  the view  previously  taken by it but that should  only  be  for compelling  reasons.   Necessity may sometimes  be  felt  of ridding stare decision of its petrifying rigidity.  Some new aspects  may  come to light and it may become  essential  to cover  fresh  grounds  to  meet the  new  situations  or  to overcome  difficulties which did not manifest themselves  or were  not  taken  into account when  the  earlier  view  was propounded.   Law. if it has to satisfy human needs  and  to meet  the problems of life, must adapt it.;elf to cove  with new  situations.   It has to be recognised that there  is  a continuous  process of growth of law and one can  retard  it only at the risk of alienating law from life itself.   There should  not  be  much hesitation  to  abandon  an  untenable position  when the rule to be discarded was, in its  origin, the product 4 of  institutions  or  conditions which  have  gained  a  new significance or development with the progress of years.   It sometimes  happen  that  the rule of law which  grew  up  in remote  generations  may, in the fulness of  experience,  be found  to serve another generation badly.  The Court  cannot allow  itself to be tied down and become captive of  a  view which,  in the light of the subsequent experience, has  been found  to be patently erroneous, manifestly unreasonable  or to  cause hardship or to result in plain iniquity or  public inconvenience. [27 B-G]  In  Bengal  Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar,  [1955]  2 S.C.R.  603  although  this  Court  affirmed  its  power  to overrule and depart from the view expressed in its  previous judgments,  it also stressed the importance of  not  lightly dissenting  from previous pronouncements of this  Court.   A view  which  has  been accepted for a long  period  of  time should not be disturbed unless the court can say  positively that  it  was  wrong,  or  unreasonable,  or  that  it   was productive  of public hardship or inconvenience.  It has  to be borne in mind that certainty and continuity are essential ingredients  of rule of law, and certainty in law  would  be considerably  eroded  and suffer a serious set back  if  the highest  court  of  the  land  readily  overrules  the  view expressed  by it in earlier cases even though that view  has held  the field for a number of years.  In many cases  which come up before this Court two views are possible and  simply because  the Court considers that the view not taken by  the Court in an earlier case was a better view would not justify the  overruling of the view taken in the earlier case.   The law  laid down by this Court is binding upon all  courts  in the  country under Art. 141 and numerous cases all over  the country  are  decided in accordance with the view  taken  by this  Court.   Many people arrange their affairs  and  large number of transactions also take place on the, faith of  the correctness  of  the  view taken by this  Court.   It  would create uncertainty, instability and confusion if such a view is held to be not the correct law. [26 F-27 B; 28 E-G, 27 E- F] The  Court has thus to keep the balance between the need  of certainty and continuity and the desirability of growth  and development  of law.  On the one band the need is to  ensure that  the judicial inventiveness shall not be desiccated  or

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stunted  and  on  the  other it is  essential  to  curb  the temptation   to  lay  down  new  and  novel  principles   in substitution of well-established principles in the  ordinary run  of  cases  and  the  readiness  to  canonize  the   new principles  too  quickly before their saintliness  has  been affirmed by the passage of time. [27 F-H] It  may  be that the view expressed by the minority  in  the Northern  India Caterers case appears to be  preferable  but that by itself would not show that a decision arrived at  by the  majority  was plainly erroneous requiring to  be  over- ruled.   It also cannot be said that the decision had  given rise to public inconvenience and hardship.  The legislature, in view of the majority decision in the case made  necessary amendments  in  many  of the enactments so  as  to  bar  the jurisdiction  of  the civil court in matters dealt  with  by those  enactments,  and  no  constitutional  amendment   was required to set right the difficulty experienced as a result of the majority decision. [29 F-H] (Per Bhagwati and krishna Iyer, JJ) . (1) It is not uncommon to   find   legislation  according  special   treatment   to Government or other public bodies, and such legislation  has been  upheld by this Court in numerous decided  cases.   But from  that  it does not follow that every  law  which  gives differential treatment to government or other public  bodies is  necessarily  immune  from challenge  on  the  ground  of discrimination.   To  get out of the reach of  the  equality clause   in  Art.  14  it  must  appear  that  not  only   a classification  has been made but also that it is one  based on  some  real  distinction bearing a  just  and  reasonable relation to the object of the legislation and is not a  mere arbitrary selection. [34 C-D, G-H, 3 5 A-B] In  the present case, the speedy machinery for  eviction  of unauthorised  occupants of public premises is  justified  in that  it  is  in  the interest of  public  that  speedy  and expeditious  recovery  of such  premises  from  unauthorised occupiers is made possible through the instrumentality of  a speedier procedure instead of the elaborate procedure by way of  civil suit involving both expense and delay.   There  is thus a valid basis of differentiation and the constitutional validity  of  the impugned provisions in  the  two  statutes cannot, in the circumstances, be assailed on the ground that they   make  unjust  discrimination  between  occupiers   of government  or  municipal premises and  occupiers  of  other premises. [35 G36 C] 5 (2)  Unlike the decision in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer (63 Law.   Ed.  1058; 250 U.S. 400) which was concerned  with  a party  having  several rights to relief arising out  of  the same  act, the present case is concerned with the  existence of  several  remedies in enforcement of a  single  right  to relief.   The only right which is sought to be  enforced  by the  Municipal  Corporation and the Government  is  a  right based  on title given by the general law of the land and  it is  for the enforcement of this right that  two  alternative procedures are available to the Municipal Corporation or the Government.   Therefore, it could not be urged by  the  res- pondents,  on  the  basis  of  the  Hammer  case,  that  the constitutional guarantee under Art. 14 is not violated where the law gives a free choice of remedies to a person entitled to relief even if one remedy is more drastic and prejudicial than  the other.  If for determination and enforcement of  a liability two alternative procedures are available, one more drastic and prejudicial than the other and no guiding policy or principle is laid down by the legislature as to when  one or  the other procedure shall be followed, so  that,  either

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procedure  may be indiscriminately adopted  against  persons similarly  situated, the law providing for the more  drastic and  prejudicial procedure would be violative of  the  equal protection clause. [40 A-C, E] Arizona  Copper Co, v. Hammeer, 63 Law.  Ed. 1058; 250  U.S. 400, explained. State  of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, [1952] S.C.R. 284,  Shri Meenakshil  Mills Ltd., Madurai v. A. V. Visvanatha  Sastri, [1955]  1 S.C.R. 787, Suraj Mull Mohta v. A. V.  Vishvanatha Sastri, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of  Saurashtra,  [1952] S.C.R. 435, Kedar  Nath  Bajoria  v. State of West Bengal, [1954] S.C.R. 30, and M. Cr.   Muthiah JUDGMENT: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247, referred to. (3)  The  initiation  of the special procedure  provided  in Chapter  VA  at  the Municipal Act  is  with  the  Municipal Commissioner  as  he  is to issue a  notice  under  s.  105- B(3)but, so far as the ordinary procedure of a civil suit is concerned, it can only be filed by the Municipal Corporation with  the previous approval of the Standing  Committee.   It could  not  however  be contended, on this  basis  that  the choice between the two alternative procedures is not  vested in  the  same  authority  and that  therefore  there  is  no violation of Art. 14. [45 E-G] it  is not necessary in order to incur the  condemnation  of the  equality clause that the initiation of both  procedures should  be left to the arbitrary discretion of one  and  the same  authority.   What the equality clause  strikes  at  is discrimination   howsoever  it  results.   To   the   person subjected  to the more drastic and onerous procedure  it  is immaterial  whether such procedure is put into operation  by one  or  the other agency of the government  or  the  public authority.   It would be nothing short of  hypertechnicality to  say  that  action against him is not  initiated  by  the Municipal    Commissioner    or    the    Collector.     The constitutionality  of a statutory provision cannot  turn  on mere  difference of the hands that harm, though both  belong to the Government or the Corporation for otherwise, it would be  easy to circumvent the guarantee of equality and to  rob it  of  its  substance  by a  subtle  and  well  manipulated statutory   provision   vesting  the   more.   drastic   and prejudicial procedure in a different organ of the government or  public  authority than the one in whose hands  lies  the power to initiate the ordinary procedure.  One must look  at the substance and not the form. [46 A-H] (4)  Moreover,  it  is  not correct to say that  it  is  the Municipal  Commissioner who initiates the special  procedure set out in Chapter VA of the Municipal Act.  When he  issues notice under s. 105B (2) against an occupant he really  acts on   behalf  of  and  for  the  benefit  of  the   Municipal Corporation, whose right he seeks to enforce.  Similarly the Dy.   Collector or Executive Engineer acts on behalf of  the Government Therefore, it is really the Municipal Corporation and  the  Government that avail themselves  of  the  special procedure. [47 B-D] (5)  It  could  not  also be  contended  on  behalf  IS  the respondents  that  even where two procedures  are  available against  a  person,  one  substantially  more  drastic   and prejudicial than the other and there is no guiding principle or policy laid down by the legislature as to when one or the other shall be adopted. there would still be no violation of the  equality  clause if both procedures are fair.   Such  a contention may be relevant where the question is as  regards a reasonableness of the restriction under Art. 19, But  when the question is under Art. 14, mere fairness of the  special

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procedure which is impugned as discriminatory is 6 not enough to take it out of its inhibition.  What has to be considered  is  Whether there is equality  before  law;  and therefore  the  question whether the two procedures  are  so disparate  substantially  and qualitatively as  to  lead  to unequal treatment, has to be asked and answered. [47 E-48 C] (6)  The  challenge against the constitutional  validity  of Chapter  V-A of tile Municipal Act and  Government  Premises Eviction Act must, however, be rejected. [53 G-H] No  classification  can be logically  complete  or  precise. Life  is  not  capable of  being  divided  into  water-tight divisions and categories.  The legislature can therefore  do not  more  than  define broad categories  and  indicate  the policy  and purpose underlying the legislation and leave  it to  a stated authority to make selective application of  the law  in  accordance  with such policy  and  purpose.  it  is inevitable that when a special procedure is being prescribed for  a  defined  class  of  persons  such  as  occupiers  of municipal  or  government  premises,  discretion-of   course guided  and controlled by the underlying policy and  purpose of   the  legislature-must  necessarily  be  left   in   the administrative authority to select occupiers of municipal or government  premises to be brought within the  operation  of the special procedure.  That would not be obnoxious to  Art. 14  because,  in  such a case, the discretion  to  make  the selection  would be a guided and controlled  discretion  and not  an  absolute and unfettered one.  In  such  cases,  the power given to the executive body would import a duty on  it to classify the subject-matter of legislation in  accordance with the objective indicated in the statute.  The discretion has  to  be  exercised  in conformity  with  the  policy  to effectuate  which  the  direction  is given  and  it  is  in relation  to  that  objective  that  the  propriety  of  the classification  would have to be tested. it  is,  therefore, not  correct  to  say  that  merely  because  the  Municipal Corporation  or Government is not compellable to  adopt  the special procedure set out in the impugned provisions against all  occupiers of municipal or government premises,  but  is vested  with  the  discretion in the  matter,  the  impugned provisions  offend against Art. 14.  It would indeed  to  be odd  and certainly harsh and oppressive to the occupiers  of municipal   or   government  premises   if   the   Municipal Corporation or Municipal Commissioner or Government were  to be  compelled to adopt the special procedure in  all  cases. The  nature  of  the dispute, the complexity  of  the  issue arising  for consideration and the legal competence  of  the adjudicating authority to decide such questions will have to be   weighed  alongside  with  the  need  for   speedy   and expeditious recovery of municipal or government premises for public uses which is the basic policy and purpose underlying the legislation, and, the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Commissioner   or  Government  would  have  to   decide   in accordance  with  the  guidance  furnished  by  these   con- siderations, whether, in a given case, the special procedure should  be  adopted  or the occupier  of  the  municipal  or government  premises should be proceeded against  under  the ordinary  procedure.  There is thus clear guidance  provided by  the legislature as to when the special procedure  should be  adopted  and when the case should be, left to  be  dealt with   under  the  ordinary  procedure  and   the   impugned provisions  do not suffer from the vice  of  discrimination. [49 C50 F] Kathti  Raning  Rawat  v. The State  of  Saurashtra,  [1952] S.C.R.  435,  Ketlar Nath Bajoria v. State of  West  Bengal,

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[1954]  S.C.R.  30,  and A. Thangal Kunjit  Musaliar  v.  M. Venkitachalam Potti, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196, referred to. Northern  India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab,  [1967]  3 S.C.R. 399, overruled. (7)  It must also be constantly borne in mind, for otherwise it is likely to distort  the proper perspective of Art.  14, that  mere  minor differences between the    two  procedures would not be enough to invoke the inhibition of the equality clause.   What the equality clause is intended to strike  at are   real  and  substantial  disparities,  substantive   or processor,  and  arbitrary  or  capricious  actions  of  the executive,  and,  it  would be contrary to  the  object  and intendment   of  the  equality  clause  to  exalt   delicate distinctions,  shades  of harshness and  theoretical  possi- bilities  of,  prejudice  into  legislative  inequality   or executive discrimination. (54 B-D] There  is  no  formula  by which it can  be  said  that  one procedure is substantially more drastic and onerous than the other.  It does not follow that 7 merely  because one procedure provides the forum of a  civil court   while   the   other  provides  the   forum   of   an administrative tribunal that the latter is necessarily  more drastic and onerous than the former.  It is well known  that a  regular  suit in the civil court has a  long  drawn  out, expensive  and  escalating  litigative  system  which  often spells  ruin  to  the ordinary  man,  and  consequently,  by contrast, a prompt and inexpensive instrument, though manned by  administrative personnel untrained in the  sophisticated court   methodology  and  unaided  by  long  and   intricate arguments  of  counsel  engaged on  onerous  terms,  may  be preferred  by  many in this country.  The procedure  of  the civil  court  also  suffers from  many  technicalities.   It functions on the basis of adversary system of administration of  justice  which  may bring  about  inequality  where  the opposing  adversaries are not evenly balanced.  It is  quite possible  that in certain types of cases people may  receive better justice where judicial formalism is kept out and  the procedure  is  made  informal.  The  many-tiered  system  of appeals  built into the judicial pyramid often results in  a pyrrhic  victory  and leads to disenchantment with  the  end product  of delayed justice.  Therefore, whenever a  special machinery is devised by the legislature entrusting the power of determination of disputes to another authority set up  by the legislature in substitution of courts of law one  should not  react  adversely against the establishment of  such  an authority  merely because of a certain predilection for  the prevailing system of administration of justice by courts  of law. [54-155 G] In  the  present  case,  it is  apparent  that  the  special procedure set out in Chapter V-A of the Municipal Act is not substantially more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of civil suit.  The initial authority to determine the  liability  to  eviction  is  no  doubt  the   Municipal Commissioner  who  is  the Chief Executive  Officer  of  the Municipal  Corporation and who may not be possessed  of  any legal training but s. 68 of the Municipal Act provides  that this  function  may be discharged by any  Municipal  Officer whom  the Municipal Commissioner may generally or  specially empower  and  the  Municipal Commissioner  can  authorise  a Deputy   Municipal  Commissioner  attached  to   the   legal department  of the Municipal Corporation to  discharge  this function.   The  determination of liability to  eviction  is therefore  really,  in practice, made by an  officer  having proper and adequate legal training. Then again, the occupant

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against  whom the special procedure is set in  motion  would have  a  right  to file his written  statement  and  produce documents  and  he  would also be entitled  to  examine  and cross-examine-  witnesses.  The officer holding the  inquiry is given  the power to summon and enforce the attendance  of witnesses, examinethem      on  oath and also require  the discovery and production of documents.The  occupant     is entitled to appear at the inquiry by an Advocate.  Thus,  in effect    and substance the same procedure which is followed in a civil court ismade available in the proceeding  before the  officer holding the inquiry.  There is also a right  of appeal against the decision of such officer to a senior  and highly  experienced  judicial  officer and  not  to  a  mere executive authority, namely, the Principal Judge of the City Civil  Court or any other judicial officer of not less  than 10  years standing.  It is also open to the aggrieved  party to bring up the matter before the High Court for examination under  Art. 226 and 2227 even though a revision  application against  the  appellate  order is  not  provided  for.   The ultimate decision is, thus, by a judicial officer trained in the  art and skill of law and not by an  executive  officer. Therefore, in the context of need for speedy and expeditious recovery  of public premises for utilisation  for  important public uses, where dilatoriness of the procedure may  defeat the  very object of recovery, the special procedure set  out in the two Acts cannot be regarded    as   really    and substantially more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure  of  a  civil court. The two  procedures  are  not substantially and qualitatively disparate as to attract  the vice of discrimination.[55 C-56]

& CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 680of 1968. From the judgment and order dated the 21/23rd day of August, 1967  of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Petition  No.  478of 1966. Civil Appeals Nos. 2076-2080 of 1969 & 2093-2103 of 1969. 8 From the judgment and order dated the 14/17th March, 1969 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 676, 837,  838,  840 and 841 of 1967 and 827 to 836  and  839  of 1969. Civil Appeal No. 2527 of 1969. From the judgment and order dated the 21st/24th August, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No.  1 1 16 of 1966. Civil Appeal No. 249 of 1970. From  the judgment and order dated the 25th August, 1967  of the  Bombay High Court in Special Civil Appeal No.  1138  of 1966. Writ Petitions Nos. 333-348 of 1970. Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. A.   K.  Sen,  S.  C.  Mazumdar and  S.  K.  Basu,  for  the appellant (in C.A. 680/68). G.   L.  Sanghi, A. D. Merchant and B. R. Agarwala, for  the appellant (in C.As. 2076-2080/69 and 2093-2103/69). S.   J.  Sorabjee and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant  (in C.A. 2527/69). S.   J. Sorabjee, A. D. Merchant and B. R. Agarwala, for the petitioner (in W.P. 333-348/70). B.   R.  Agarwala,  K. L. Hathi and P. C.  Kapoor,  for  the appellant (in C.A. 249/70). R.   J.  Joshi, M. N. Kothari, K. S. Kadam, P. C.  Bhartari,

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J.  B.   Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder  Narain,  for respondents Nos. 1 & 2 (in C.A. 680/68). M.   C.  Bhandare,  K.  S.  Kadam, P.  C.  Bhartari,  J.  B. Dadachanji, O.   C.  Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondents Nos.  2 and 3 (in C.A. Nos. 2527/69). M.   C.  Setalvad,  Y.  S.  Chitale,  K.  S.  Kadam,  P.  C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain for  respondent Nos.  1 and 2 (in CA No. 249/70). M.   C.  Bhandare and M. N. Sliroff, for respondent  Nos.  7 (in C.A. 2527/69) and for respondent no. 3 (in C.A. 249/70). V.   S.  Desai  and M. N. Shroff, for respondent No.  3  (in C.A. 680/ 68 and respondent no 2 in (in C.As.  2076-2080/68, 2093-2103) and for respondent nos. 2 & 3 (in all the W.Ps.). The Judgment of A. N. Ray, C.J., D. G. Palekar, K. K. Mathew and  A. Alagiriswami, JJ., was delivered by A.  Alagiriswami J.,  H.  R.  Khanna,  J. gave a  separate  opinion.   P.  N. Bhagwati,  J.  also  gave a separate opinion  on  behalf  of himself and V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-These appeals and writ petitions relate  to the legality of certain proceedings taken under Chapter  V-A of  the  Bombay  Municipal Corporation Act  and  the  Bombay Government  Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955.  Chapter V-A  was introduced in the Bombay Municipal Act, 1888 by  Maharashtra Act  14  of 1961.  That chapter contains sections  105A  and 105B.   According  to the provisions of those  sections  the Commissioner in relation to premises belonging to or vesting in, or taken on lease by the corporation and the General 9 Manager  (also  defined as the Commissioner) of  the  Bombay Electric  Supply  and Transport Undertaking in  relation  to premises  of  the  corporation  which vest  in  it  for  the purposes of that undertaking were granted certain powers  of eviction  in  respect  of  unauthorised  occupation  of  any corporation premises.  Unauthorised occupation is defined as occupation  by  any person of corporation  premises  without authority  for such occupation and includes the  continuance in  occupation  by  any person of  the  premises  after  the authority under which he was allowed    to    occupy     the premises  has  expired, or has been duly  determined.  Under section  105B  the  Commissioner, by notice  served  on  the person  in unauthorised occupation, could ask him to  vacate if he had not paid for a period of more than two months  the rent  or  taxes  lawfully due from him in  respect  of  such premises; or sub-let, contrary to the terms  or   conditions of  his occupation, the whole or any part of such  premises; or  committed, or is committing, such acts of waste  as  are likely   to  diminish  materially  the  value,   or   impair substantially the utility, of the  premises,  or   otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms,  express      or implied,  under  which  he  is  authorised  to  occupy  such premises; or it any person is in unauthorised occupation  of any corporation premises; or any corporation premises in the occupation of any person are required by the corporation  in the  public  interest.  Before  making  such  an  order  the Commissioner  should issue a notice calling upon the  person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction  should not be  made  and  specify the grounds on  which  the  order  of eviction  is proposed to be made. The person  concerned  can file  a  written  statement and  produce  documents  and  is entitled  to  appear before the  Commissioner  by  advocate, attorney  or  pleader. Persons failing to  comply  with  the order of eviction as well as any other person who  obstructs eviction  can be evicted by force. Under section 105C  there

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is  power to recover rent or damages as arrears of  property taxes. A person ordered to vacate on the grounds of being in arrears  of  rent or acting in contravention  of  the  terms under which he is authorised to occupy the premises could be allowed  to continue if he satisfies the  Commissioner.  The Commissioner  has, for the purpose of holding  any  inquiry, the  same  powers as are vested in a civil court  under  the Code  cf Civil Procedure, when trying a suit, in respect  of (a)  summoning and enforcing the presence of any person  and examining  him  on  oath,(b)  requiring  the  discovery  and production of documents, and (c) any other matter which  may be prescribed by regulations. An appeal from every order  of the  Commissioner  lies to the principal Judge of  the  City Civil Court or such other judicial officer as the  principal Judge  may  designate. The appeal is to be  disposed  of  as expeditiously  as  possible. Subject to the results  of  the appeal  every  order of the Commissioner  or  the  appellate officer is final. The power to make regulations includes the power to make regulations in respect of holding of inquiries and the procedure to be followed in such appeals. The provisions of the Bombay Government Premises  (Eviction) Act  are  more or less similar except that  they  relate  to Government premises and the power to order eviction is given to the competent authority not lower in rank than that of  a Deputy  Collector or an Executive Engineer appointed by  the State Government.  The only other matter 10 in  respect of which the provisions of this Act differ  from the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, just now  referred  to, is that section 8A of this  Act  provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any  person from any Government premises on any of the grounds specified in  section 4 or the recovery of the arrears of rent or  the damages  payable  for use or occupation  of  such  premises. This amendment was made as a consequence of the decision  of this Court in Northern India Caterers v. Punjab (1967 3  SCR 399).  But the matters arising under this Act and now before this  Court  were  in respect of  proceedings  taken  before section  8A was introduced in the Act by Maharashtra Act  12 of  1969 and this section has, therefore, no  relevance  for the purposes of these cases. It  was not and could not be argued that the Acts in so  far as  they  provided for special procedures  applying  to  the State  and  2the Municipal Corporation  were  invalid.   The decisions  in Baburao Shantaram More v. The  Bombay  Housing Board  (1954  SCR 572) upholding the exemption  of  premises belonging  to the Government or a local authority  from  the provisions  of  the Bombay Rents, Hotel  and  Lodging  House Rates Control Act, 1947; The Collector of Malabar v.  Erimal Ebrahim  Hajee  (1957 SCR 970) upholding the  provision  for special modes of recovery for income-tax; Asgarali  Nazarali Singaporawalla  v.  The  State  of  Bombay  (1957  SCR  678) upholding  the validity of Criminal Law Amendment Act,  1952 providing for the trial of all offences punishable under ss. 161, 165 or 165-A of the Indian Penal Code, or sub-s. (2) of s.  5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947  exclusively by  Special  Judges; Shri Munna Lal & Anr. v.  Collector  of Jhalawar & Ors. (1961 2 SCR 962) upholding the provision  of the   Rajasthan  Public  Demands  Recovery  Act,  1952   for recovering  moneys  due to a State Bank;  Nav  Rattanmal  v. State  of  Rajasthan (1962 2 SCR 324)  upholding  a  special period  of  limitation for the Government; Lachhman  Das  on behalf of Firm Tilak Ram Bux v. State of Punjab (1963 2  SCR 353) upholding the provisions of an Act setting up  separate

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authorities for determination of disputes and prescribing  a special procedure to be followed by them for the recovery of the dues of a State Bank; and Builders Corp. v. Union  (1965 2  SCR  289)  upholding the Doctrine of  priority  of  Crown Debts, are all instances where special provisions applicable to  the State were upheld.  It cannot now be contended  that special  provision of law applying to Government and  public bodies  is not based upon reasonable classification or  that it offends Art. 14. The submission was a much more limited one and that is  that as there are two procedures available to the Corporation and the  State  Government,  one  by way of  a  suit  under  the ordinary  law  and the other under either of the  two  Acts, which  is harsher and more onerous than the procedure  under the  ordinary  law, the latter is hit by Article 14  of  the Constitution  in the absence of any guidelines as  to  which procedure  may  be adopted.  For this  reliance  was  wholly placed on the decision in the Northern India Caterers’ case. In  that  case the question arose under  the  Punjab  Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act of  1959. The  majority consisting of Subba Rao, C.J. and  Shelat  and Vaidialingam, ]J. accepted that there is an intelligible 11 differentia  between the two classes of  occupiers,  namely, occupiers  of public property and premises and occupiers  of private  property and that it is in the interest  of  public that  speedy  recovery  of  rents  and  speedy  eviction  of unauthorised   occupiers  is  made  possible   through   the instrument mentality of a speedier procedure.  However, they referred  to  the decisions of this Court in State  of  West Bengal v..Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952 SCR 284), Suraj Mall  Mohta v. A. V. Visanatha Sastri (1965 1 SCR 448), Shree  Meenakshi Mills  Ltd.  Madural v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (1955 1  SCR 787) and Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P. (1963  Supp. 2  SCR  760  :  AIR 1963 SC 1417)  and  concluded  that  the principle  which  emerged  from  these  decisions  was  that discrimination  would  result  if there  are  two  available procedures,  one  more drastic or prejudicial to  the  party concerned  than  the  other  which can  be  applied  at  the arbitrary will of the authority.  They thought that as s.  5 conferred an additional remedy over and above the remedy  by way  of  suit leaving it to the unguided discretion  of  the Collector  to  resort  to one or the other  by  picking  and choosing  some  only  of  those  in  occupation  of   public properties  and  premises for the application  of  the  more drastic  procedure under s. 5 that section laid itself  open to  the charge of discrimination and as being  violative  of Art.  14,  and  in that view held that  section  void.   The minority  consisting of Hidayatullah and Bachawat, JJ.  held that  the impugned Act made no unjust  discrimination  among the  occupants  of government properties inter se,  that  it promoted  public  welfare and was a  beneficial  measure  of legislation,  that it was not unfair or oppressive and  that the unauthorised occupant was not denied equal    projection of  the  laws merely because the Government had  the  option proceeding against him either by way of a suit or under  the Act  they further held that "an authorised occupant  has  no constitutional  right to dictate that the Government  should have  no choice of proceedings, and that the argument  based upon  the option of the Government to file a suit is  unreal because  in  practice  the  Government  is  not  likely   to institute a suit in a case when it can seek relief under the Act". The  decision  in Northern India Caterers’ case led  to  the Public  Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupation)  Act,

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1958   being  replaced  by  Public  Premises  (Eviction   of Unauthorised   Occupants)   Act,  1971   which   was   given retrospective  operation from the date of the 1958  Act  and barred the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit  or proceeding   in  respect  of  eviction  of  any  person   in unauthorised occupation of public premises.  It also led  to the  amendment of one of the Acts now  under  consideration, the  Bombay Government Premises (Eviction)  Act  introducing therein  section 8A, already referred to, barring resort  to the  Civil Court.  In Hari Singh v. Military Estate  Officer (1973  1  SCR. 515) this Court referred to the  decision  in Northern India Caterers’ case and upheld the validity of the 1971 Act on the ground that there was only one procedure for ejectment  of persons in unauthorised occupation  of  public premises  under the 1971 Act and that there was no  vice  of discrimination under it. The  argument based on the availability of  two  procedures, one more onerous and harsher than the other and,  therefore, discriminatory has led some High Courts to resort to various reasoning In order to get 12 round  the  effect  of the decision in  the  Northern  India Caterers’  case.   This has happened in the case  of  Madras High  Court in Abdul Rashid ’V.  Asst.  Engineer  (Highways) (AIR  1970  Mad. 387), the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in  M. Begum  v. State (AIR 1971 of 382) and Meharunnissa Begum  v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1970-1 Andh.  LT 88) and the  Patna High  Court  in Bhartiya Hotel v. Union of India  (AIR  1968 Pat.  476).  The decision of the Patna High Court is one  of the cases which was considered along with Hari Singh’s case. It  is rather interesting that this attack based on Art.  14 of  the Constitution should have led to the apparently  more onerous and harsher procedure becoming the rule, the  resort to the ordinary Civil Court being taken away altogether.  It is difficult to imagine who benefits by resort to the  ordi- nary  Civil Courts being barred.  One finds it difficult  to reconcile oneself to the position that the mere  possibility of resort to the Civil Court should make invalid a procedure which would otherwise be valid.  It can very well be  argued that  as  long  as a procedure does not  by  itself  violate either  Art.  19  or Art. 14 and  is  thus  constitutionally valid,  the fact that procedure is more onerous and  harsher than the procedure in the ordinary civil courts, should  not make  that  procedure  void  merely  because  the  authority competent to take action can resort to that procedure in the case of some and ordinary civil court procedure in the  case of  others.  That a constitutionally valid provision of  law should be held to be void because there is a possibility  of its  being resorted to in the case of some and the  ordinary civil  court procedure in the case of others  somehow  makes one  feel  uneasy  and that ha-, been  responsible  for  the attempts  to get round the reasoning which is the  basis  in the decision in Northern India Caterers’ case. Let  us  now, therefore, see whether the decisions  of  this Court  necessarily  lead to the conclusion  reached  by  the majority  in Northern India Caterers’ case.  In doing so  we shall  take the various decisions of this ,,Court  in  their chronological  order.   The  first of  these  is  Anwar  Ali Sarkar’s  case (supra).  In that case under S. 5(1)  of  the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, which read as follows               "5(1).    A  Special  Court  shall  try   such               offences  or classes of offences or  cases  or               classes of cases, as the State Government  may               by  general  or  special  order  in   writing,               direct."

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a  number  of  persons  were tried  by  the  Special  Courts constituted  under s. 3 of that Act.  The Act  was  entitled "An  Act  to  provide  for the  speedier  trial  of  certain offences" and the preamble declared that "it is expedient to provide  for  the speedier trial of certain  offences."  The majority  came  to  the conclusion that  the  necessity  for speedier  trial  of offences did not  provide  a  reasonable basis  of classification and the procedure laid down by  the Act  for trial by Special Courts varied  substantially  from that  laid down for the trial of offences generally  by  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and as  it  left  it  to  the uncontrolled  discretion of the State Government  to  direct any case which it liked to be tried by the Special Court, it was  void.   Das J. (as he then was), who  agreed  with  the majority’s    conclusion,   however,   referred    to    the circumstances  which  may legitimately call for  a  speedier trial  and swift retribution by way of ,punishment to  check the commission of such offences, in these words 13               "On the other hand, it is easy to visualise  a               situation when certain offences, e.g. theft in               a  dwelling house, by reason of the  frequency               of  their  perpetration  or  other   attending               circumstances,  may  legitimately call  for  a               speedier trial and swift retribution by way of               punishment  to  check the commission  of  such               offences.   Are we not familiar with  gruesome               crimes  of  murder,.  arson,  loot  and   rape               committed  on  a large scale  during  communal               riots  in particular localities and  are  they               not  really different from a case of  a  stray               murder,   arson,  loot  or  rape  in   another               district  which  may not be  affected  by  any               communal  upheaval ? Do not the  existence  of               the communal riots and the concomitant  crimes               committed on a large scale call for prompt and               speedier trial in the very interest and safety               of  the community ? May not political  murders               or crimes against the State or a class of  the               community,    e.g.,   women,    assume    such               proportions   as   would  be   sufficient   to               constitute  them  into  a  special  class   of               offences requiring special treatment ? Do  not               these  special  circumstances add  a  peculiar               quality  to  these  offences  or  classes   of               offences or classes of cases which distinguish                             them from stray cases of similar crime s and  is               it  not reasonable and even necessary  to  arm               the  State with power to classify them into  a               separate group and deal with them promptly ? I               have no doubt in my mind that the  surrounding               circumstances and the special features I  have               mentioned above will furnish a very cogent and               reasonable basis of classification, for it  is               obvious that they do clearly distinguish these               offences from similar or even same species  of               offences  committed elsewhere and under  ordi-               nary  circumstances.  This  differentia  quite               clearly  has  a  reasonable  relation  to  the               object  sought  to  be achieved  by  the  Act,               namely,   the   speedier  trial   of   certain               offences.   Such a classification will not  be               repugnant  to the equal protection  clause  of               our   Constitution  for  there  will   be   no

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             discrimination,  for  whoever may  commit  the               specified offence in the specified area in the               specified circumstances will be treated  alike               and  sent up before a Special Court for  trial               under  the  special procedure.   Persons  thus               sent  up for trial by a Special  Court  cannot               point  their fingers to the other persons  who               may  be charged before an ordinary Court  with               similar or even same species of offences in  a               different place and in different circumstances               and  complain of unequal treatment, for  those               other persons are of a different category  and               are not their equals."               He, therefore, held that               "Section 5 (1). in so far as it empowers  that               State  Government  to  direct  ’offences’   or               ’classes of offences’ or ’classes of cases  to               be tried by a Special Court, also by necessary               implication and intendment, empowers the State               Government  to  classify  the  ’offences’   or               ’classes  of offences’ or ’classes of  cases’,               that is to say, to make a proper classifi-               14               cation  in the sense I have explained.  In  my               judgment,  this part of the section,  properly               construed  and understood, does not confer  an               uncontrolled and unguided power on. the  state               Government.   On the contrary, this  power  is               controlled  by  the  necessity  for  making  a               proper  classification which is guided by  the               preamble in the sense that the  classification               must have a rational relation to the object of               the  Act as recited in the preamble.   It  is,               therefore, not an arbitrary power." It is interesting to compare this decision with the decision of  this Court in the next case, Kathi Raning Rawat  v.  The State  of Saurashtra (1952 SCR 435) which was heard in  part alongwith it (Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case) but was adjourned  to enable the respondent state to tile an affidavit  explaining the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  enactment  of   the Saurashtra  State Public Safety Measures  (Third  Amendment) Ordinance,  1949.   It  was heard by the  same  Bench  which decided  Anwar  Ali  Sarkar’s  case.   Section  11  of   the Ordinance there under consideration was exactly in the  same terms as s. 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Court Act.   The only  difference  between the two was  that  the  Saurashtra Ordinance was purported to have been passed to provide  "for public safety, maintenance of public order and  preservation of  peace  and  tranquility  in  the  State  of  Saurashtra. However,  an  affidavit  was filed on behalf  of  the  state giving facts and figures relating to an increasing number of incidents  of  looting, robbery, dacoity,  nose-cutting  and murder by marauding gangs of dacoits in certain areas of the state and these details were held to support the claim  that the security of the state and public peace were  jeopardised and that it became impossible to deal with the offences that were  committed  in  different  places  expeditiously.   The affidavit  also  stated  that the  areas  specified  in  the notification  were the main zones of the activities  of  the dacoits.  The impugned Ordinance having thus been passed  to combat  the  increasing tempo of certain types  of  regional crime, the two-fold classification on the lines of type  and territory  adopted  in  the  impugned  Ordinance  was   held reasonable  and  valid  and  the  degree  of  disparity   of treatment  involved  as  in no way in  excess  of  what  the

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situation  demanded.   It was held that  "the  reference  to public safety, maintenance of public order and  preservation of  peace and tranquillity in the preamble shows a  definite objective  and  furnishes a tangible and rational  basis  of Classification  to the State Government for the  purpose  of applying  the provisions of the Ordinance and  for  choosing only  such  offences  or  cases  as  affect  public  safety, maintenance  of public order and preservation of  peace  and tranquillity."  It  would  be noticed thus  that  Anwar  Ali Sarkar’s  case  was concerned with a  piece  of  legislation which  covered the whole field of criminal law  without  any basis  for  classification except speedier trial  which  was held  not to be a good ground for classification,  while  in Kathi  Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra the  preamble as  well as the notification issued under the Act  specified certain  types of offences in certain areas alone, as  being those  which were to be tried by the Special Judge and  were held to validate an exactly similar provision. 15 In  Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja & Anr. v. The State of  Bombay (1952  SCR  710)  section 12 of  the  Bombay  Public  Safety Measures  Act, 1947 empowered Government to refer cases  for trial by a Special Judge and was, therefore, held void as it did  not  purport to proceed on  any  classification.   This would  belong  to the same category as  Anwar  Ali  Sarkar’s case.  The next case in chronological order is of Suraj Mall Mohta  & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & Anr. (1955  1  SCR 448).   In that case section 5(4) of the Taxation-on  Income investigation  Commission)  Act, 1947 was held  as  "dealing with the same class of persons who fall within the ambit  of section  34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, and as both  these sections   dealt   with   an  persons   who   have   similar characteristics   and   similar   properties,   the   common characteristics  being  that they are persons who  have  not truly  disclosed  their income, and have evaded  payment  of taxation  on  income, and the procedure  prescribed  by  the Taxation   on  Income  (Investigation  Commission)  Act   is substantially  prejudicial and more drastic to the  assesses than  the  procedure under the Indian  Income-tax  Act,  and therefore,  s. 5(4) being a piece of  discriminatory  legis- lation  offends against the provisions of article 14 of  the Constitution and is thus void." It would be noticed that  as in  Anwar A1i Sarkar’s case in this case also  the  ordinary law  under the Indian Income-tax Act and  the  extraordinary procedure  under  the  Taxation  of  Income   (Investigation Commission)  Act covered the same class of people and  there is  no indication as to why certain cases should be sent  to the  Commission  and  certain cases be dealt  with  by,  the regular  Income-tax  authorities.   But  here  again  it  is interesting to note the observation               but  the overall picture is that though  under               the Indian Income-tax Act the same officer who               first arrives at a tentative conclusion  hears               and decides the case, his decision is not  fin               is   subject  to  appeal,  while   under   the               provisions of sub-section (4) of section 5  of               the  decision  of the  Commission  tentatively               arrived  at  in the absence  of  the  assessee               becomes final when taken in his presence,  and               that makes all the difference between the  two               procedures.  If  there  was  a  provision  for               reviewing the conclusions of the Investigation               Commission  when acting both as  investigators               and  judges,  there might not have  been  such               substantial   discrimination   in   the    two

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             procedures  as  would bring  the  case  within               article 14; but as pointed out above, there is               no  provision  of that kind  in  the  impugned               Act." It would, thus appear that if there had been a provision for appeal against the decision of the Investigation  Commission the reference to that Commission would have been held valid. We are referring particularly to this aspect because in both the  statutes now under consideration there is  a  provision for  appeal  to  the Civil Court which  is  safer  and  more liberal  than the provision of appeal under  the  Income-tax Act   to  the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner  and   the Appellate  Tribunal.  Mr. Sen appearing for the  appellants, however, tried to argue that the reference to the appeal  in this decision was 16 only  a  reference to the appeal against the orders  of  the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner. We  do  not see how that makes any difference.   As  already pointed  out,  the  fact  that  under  the  statutes   under consideration the appeal lies to the ordinary Civil Court is a  point in their favour.  The common feature  between  this case  and  Anwar  Ali  Sarkar’s case  is  that  the  special procedure  covers  the whole field covered by  the  ordinary procedure  and it was hold that there was no rational  basis of  classification  of  cases which could  be  sent  to  the Investigation Commission.  The decisions in Shree  Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Visvantha Sastri & Anr. (1955 1  SCR 767)  and  M.  Ct.  Muthiah & Ors. v.  The  Commissioner  of Income-Tax, Madras & Anr. (1955 2 SCR 1247) are on the  same lines as in Suraj Mall Mohta’s case and do not call for  any discussion. It  is  interesting  to pass on next  to  A.  Thangal  Kunju Musaliar v.M.  Venkitachalam Potti & Anr. (1955 2 SCR  1196) a case referred by  the  Government of the United  State  of Travancore  and  Cochin  under s.  5(1)  of  the  Travancore Taxation  on  Income (Investigation  Commission)  Act,  1124 modelled  on the Indian Taxation oil  income  (Investigation Commission)  Act, 1947, for investigation by the  Travancore Income-tax  Investigation Commission in 1949.  In  1950  the Indian  Act  was extended to Travancore and Cochin  and  the Travancore  Act was allowed to continue to be in force  with certain  modifications.   It was held that S.  5(1)  of  the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 read in Juxtaposition with s.  47 of  the Travancore Income-tax Act, 1121 (XXIII of 1121)  was not  discriminatory because s. 47(1) of the  Travancore  Act XXIII  of  1121  was directed  only  against  those  persons concerning   whom   definite  information  came   into   the possession  of the Income-tax Officer and in consequence  of which  the Income-tax Officer discovered that the income  of those persons had escaped or been under-assessed or assessed at  too  low  a rate or had been the  subject  of  excessive relief, and the, class of persons envisaged by S. 47(1)  was a definite class about which there was definite  information leading  to discovery within 8 years or 4 years as the  case may be of definite item or items of income which had escaped assessment.   On  the  other hand under S. 5  (  1)  of  the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 the class of persons sought to be reached comprised    only those persons about whom there was no  definite in formation and no discovery of  any  definite item  or  items of income which escaped taxation  but  about whom  the Government had only prima facie reason to  believe that they had evaded payment of tax to a substantial amount. Further, it was definitely limited to the evasion of payment of taxation on income made during the war period, whereas s.

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47(1)  of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was not  confined to escapement from assessment of income-tax made during  the war  period."  It  was, therefore, held that  there  was  no discrimination.  It would be noticed how thin is the line of distinction  between the two lines of  classification.   But that was held as justifying the different treatment  between the two classes of cases.  It is interesting to note that in Suraj  Mall  Mohta’s  case the provision of  s.5(1)  of  the Taxation on income (Investigation Commission) Act 17 (Act  XXX  of 1947) referring to the class  of  "substantial evaders of Income-tax" who required to be specially  treated under  the drastic procedure provided in that Act  was  held not to provide a valid classification.  But in this case the word  "substantial" was, by reference to  Stroud’s  Judicial Dictionary  and  the statement of law by Viscount  Simon  in Palsor  v. Grinling (1948 AC 291, 317) taken along  with  an affidavit filed in the case, held to mean "class of  persons who are intended to be subjected to this drastic procedure". It   was   also   held  that  "the   possibility   of   such discriminatory treatment of persons falling within the  same group  or category, however, cannot  necessarily  invalidate this  piece of legislation and that it was to  be  presumed, unless the contrary were shown, that the administration of a particular  law  would  be done ’not with an  evil  eye  and unequal  hand’ and the selection made by the  Government  of the cases of persons to be referred for investigation by the Commission would not be discriminatory." Reference was  made to the judgment of Mukherjea, J. in the Saurashtra  case  to the effect :               In   such  cases,  the  power  given  to   the               executive  body would import a duty on  it  to               classify the subject-matter of legislation  in               accordance with the objective indicated in the               statute.  The discretion that is conferred  on               official agencies in such circumstances is not               an unguided discretion, it has to be exercised               in  conformity with the policy  to  effectuate               which  the  direction is given and  it  is  in               relation to that objective that the  propriety               of the classification would have to be tested.               If   the  administrative  body   proceeds   to               classify  persons or things on a  basis  which               has  no rational relation to the objective  of               the  legislature, its action can certainly  be               annulled    offending   against   the    equal               protection clause.  On the other hand, if  the               statute  itself does not disclose  a  definite               policy  or objective and it confers  authority               on another to make selection at its  pleasure,               the statute would be held on the face of it to               be  discriminatory irrespective of the way  in               which it is applied." In Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal (1954  SCR 30) the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special  Courts) Act,  1949  was under consideration.  The Act  provided  for special  procedure  for  the  trial  of  certain   offences. It was entitled an Act to provide for the more speedy  trial and  more effective punishment of certain  offences.   These offences  were set out in the Schedule to the Act.  The  Act empowered  the Provincial Government to  constitute  Special Courts  of criminal jurisdiction for specified areas and  to appoint Special Judges to preside over such courts.  It  was observed that :               The  vice  of  discrimination,  it  is   said,

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             consists  in  the  unguided  and  unrestricted               power of singling out for different  treatment               one  among a class of persons ail of whom  are               similarly situated and circumstanced, be  that               class large or small.  The argument  overlooks               the distinction               --L131Supreme Court\75               18               between  those  cases  where  the  legislature               itself  makes  a  complete  classification  of               persons or things and applies to them the  law               which  it enacts, and others where the  legis-               lature merely lays down the law to be  applied               to  persons  or things answering  to  a  given               description   or  exhibiting  certain   common               characteristics,  but being unable to  make  a               precise and complete classification, leaves it               to  an  administrative  authority  to  make  a               selective application of the law to persons or               things within the defined group, while  laying               down  the standards or at least indicating  in               clear terms the underlying policy and purpose,               in  accordance  with, and in  fulfillment  of,               which the administrative authority is expected               to select the persons or things to be  brought               under  the operation of the law.   A  familiar               example  of  this type of legislation  is  the               Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which,  having               indicated  in  what classes of cases  and  fir               what  purposes  preventive  detention  can  be               ordered,  vests in the executive  authority  a               discretionary   power  to  select   particular               persons to be brought under the law.   Another               instance  in  point  is  furnished  by   those               provisions  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code               which   provide  immunity   from   prosecution               without   sanction  of  the   Government   for               offences  by  public servants in  relation  to               their  official  acts, the policy of  the  law               being  that  public officials  should  not  be               unduly harassed by private prosecution  unless               in  the opinion of the Government, there  were               reasonable grounds for prosecuting the  public               servant which accordingly should condition the               grant  of  sanction.  It  is  not,  therefore,               correct  to  say  that section 4  of  the  Act               offends against article 14 of the Constitution               merely   because   the   Government   is   not               compellable to allot all cases of offences set               out  in the schedule to Special Judges but  is               vested with a discretion in the matter." Later, reference was made to Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case and  it was pointed out that the observations made therein were  not applicable  to the statute under consideration in  Bajoria’s case  which  was  based on a classification  which,  in  the context  of  the  abnormal  post-war  economic  and   social conditions was readily intelligible and obviously calculated to subserve the legislative purpose.  Reference was also made  to  the statement by Mukherjea, J. in  the  Saurashtra case that               "... The object of passing this new  Ordinance               is identically the same for which the  earlier               Ordinance was passed, and the preamble to  the               latter,  taken  along  with  the   surrounding               circumstances,     discloses    a     definite

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             legislative policy which has been sought to be               effectuated   by  the   different   provisions               contained in the enactment.  If special courts               were  considered  necessary to  cope  with  an               abnormal situation, it cannot be said that the               vesting of Authority in the State Government to               select offences for trial by such courts is in               ,any way unreasonable." 19 We  may now refer to the decision in Kangsari Haldar &  Anr. v.  The  State of West Bengal (1960 2 SCR 646).   There  the appellants  were  prosecuted for having  committed  offences under s. 120B read with ss. 302 and 438 of the Indian  Penal Code  before the tribunal constituted under the West  Bengal Tribunals   of   Criminal   Jurisdiction   Act,   1952.    A notification issued under that Act declared certain areas to be   a  disturbed  area within a specified period,  and  the case against the    appellants  was  in  respect  of   their activities in that area and during that period.  It was held that  the  "classification  made  by  the  impugned  Act  is rational   and  the  differentia  by  which  offenders   are classified  has a rational relation with the object  of  the Act  to  provide  for  the  speedy  trial  of  the  offences specified  in the Schedule to the Act." It also  dealt  with certain other offences not specified in the Schedule to  the Act. In dealing with this case the Court observed :               "This question necessarily leads us to inquire               whether  the discriminatory provisions of  the               Act are based on any rational  classification,               and   whether  the  differentiation   of   the               offenders  brought within the mischief of  the               Act  has a rational nexus with the  policy  of               the  Act  and the object which it  intends  to               achieve.   The   preamble   shows   that   the               Legislature  was  dealing  with  the   problem               raised  by  disturbances which  had  thrown  a               challenge  to  the security of the  State  and               raised a grave issue about the maintenance  of               public   peace   and  tranquillity   and   the               safeguarding   of   industry   and   business.               It,therefore, decided to meet the situation by               providing  for speedy trial of  the  scheduled               offences.  Thus the object of the Act and  the               principles underlying it are not in doubt.  It               is  true  that speedy trial  of  all  criminal               offences  is desirable; but there would be  no               difficulty in appreciating the anxiety of  the               Legislature to provide for a special procedure               for  trying  the scheduled offences so  as  to               avoid all possible delay which may be involved               if  the  normal  procedure  of  the  Code  was               adopted.  If the disturbances facing the areas               in  the  State had to be  controlled  and  the               mischief  apprehended  had to be  checked  and               rooted out a very speedy trial of the offences               committed was obviously indicated.               The   classification  of  offenders  who   are               reached  by the Act is  obviously  reasonable.               The  offences specified in the four  items  in               the  schedule are clearly of such a  character               as  led  to the disturbance and  it  is  these                             offences  which  were intended to  be  speedily               punished in order to put an end to the  threat               to   the  security  of  the  State   and   the

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             maintenance of public peace and  tranquillity.               It  would  be  idle to  contend  that  if  the               offences of the type mentioned in the schedule               were  committed  and the  Legislature  thought               that  they  led to the  disruption  of  public               peace and tranquillity and caused jeopardy  to               the  security of the State they could  not  be               dealt  with as a class by  themselves.   Other               offences  committed by individuals  under  the               same  categories of offences specified by  the               Code  could  be rationally excluded  from  the               classification               20               adopted  by the Act because they did not  have               the  tendency to create the problem which  the               Act  intended  to meet.   We  are,  therefore,               satisfied that the classification made by  the               Act  is  rational and the  differentiation  on               which  the offenders included within  the  Act               are  treated as a class as distinguished  from               other  offenders  has  a  rational  nexus   or               relation  with the object of the Act  and  the               policy underlying it.  Therefore, it would  be               difficult  to accede to the argument that  the               Act violates Art. 14 of the Constitution." The  Court pointed out that the majority decision  in  Anwar All Sarkar’s case was based on two principal  considerations that,  having  regard  to the bald  statement  made  in  the preamble about the need of speedier trials, it was difficult to sustain the classification made by s. 5(1), and that  the discretion left to the executive was unfettered and for  its exercise  no  guidance  was given by the  statute.   It  was pointed  out that in the Saurashtra case the  majority  took the  view  that  the  preamble  to  the  Act  gave  a  clear indication  about  the  policy underlying the  Act  and  the object which it intended to achieve, that the classification on  which the impugned provisions were based was a  rational classification,  and  that  the  differentia  on  which  the classification was made had a rational nexus with the object and  policy  of the Act.  They then referred  to  Lachmandas Kewalram  Ahuja’s  case  and  pointed  out  that  it  merely followed  Anwar Ali Sarkars’ case.  Reference was then  made to  the decision in Kedar Nath Bajoria’s case and  to  Chief Justice  Patanjali Sastri’s statement that  "the  Saurashtra case  would  seem  to lay down the  principle  that  if  the impugned legislation indicates the policy which inspired  it and the object which it seeks to attain, the mere fact  that the legislation does not itself make a complete and  precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be applied, but leaves the selective application of the law  to be  made by the executive authority in accordance  with  the standard  indicated  or  the underlying  policy  and  object disclosed,  is not a sufficient ground for condemning it  as arbitrary and, therefore, obnoxious to Art. 14".  The result of the earlier decisions was summed up thus :               considering  the  validity  of  the   impugned               statute on the ground that it violates Art. 14               it  would first be necessary to ascertain  the               policy  underlying the statute and the  object               intended  to  be  achieved  by  it.   In  this               process  the  preamble,  to the  Act  and  its               material   provisions   can   and   must    be               considered.    Having  thus  ascertained   the               policy  and  the object of the Act  and  court               should  apply the dual test in  examining  its

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             validity : Is the classification rational  and               based on intelligible differentia; and has the               basis  of differentiation any  rational  nexus               with  its avowed policy and object?   If  both               these tests are satisfied the statute must  be               held  to  be  valid; and in such  a  case  the               consideration  as to whether the  same  result               could   not  have  been  better  achieved   by               adopting  a different classification would  be               foreign to the scope of the judicial  enquiry.               If  either of the two tests is  not  satisfied               the statute must be struck                21               down  as violative of Art. 14.  Applying  this               test   it  seems  to  us  that  the   impugned               provisions  contained  in  s.  2(b)  and   the               proviso   to  s.  4(1)  cannot  be   said   to               contravene  Art.  14.  As  we  have  indicated               earlier,   if  in  issuing  the   notification               authorised  by s. 2 (b) the  State  Government               acts  mala  fide or exercises its power  in  a               colourable way, that can always be effectively               challenged;  but,, in the absence of any  such               plea  and  without adequate material  in  that               behalf this aspect of the matter does not fall               to be considered in the present appeal. In Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi  (1962  2  SCR  125) section  19  of  the  Slum  Areas (Improvement  and Clearance) Act, 1956, which provided  that any decree obtained for the eviction of a tenant in  respect of  buildings  in areas declared "slum areas" could  not  be executed   without  the,  permission  of   ,the   "competent authority",  was held not obnoxious to the equal  protection of  law on the ground that there was enough guidance to  the competent  authority in the use of his discretion  under  s. 19(1)  of the Act.  It was urged before this Court  that  s. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act vested an unguided,  unfettered, and  uncontrolled power in an executive officer to  withhold permission  to  execute a decree which  the  petitioner  had obtained after satisfying the reasonable requirements of the law as enacted in the Rent Control Act and thus offends Art. 14.  In considering this argument the Court referred to  the summary  of  the  decisions of this Court  laying  down  the proper construction of Art. 14 rendered up to 1959, made  by Das, C.J., in Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar  (1959 SCR  279),  and made its own summary on  slightly  different lines.  of them 2 and 4 are important:               1...................               2.    The  enactment or the rule might not  in               terms  enact a discriminatory rule of law  but               might  enable  an  unequal  or  discriminatory               treatment to be accorded to persons or  things               similarly  situated.  This would  happen  when               the  legislature  vests  a  discretion  in  an               authority,   be  it  the  Government   or   an               administrative  official acting either  as  an               executive officer or even in a  quasi-judicial               capacity by. a legislation which does not  lay               down  any policy or disclose any  tangible  or               intelligible   purpose,  thus   clothing   the               authority  with unguided and  arbitrary  power               enabling it to discriminate.               In  such circumstances the very  provision  of               the law which enables or permits the authority               to  discriminate,  offends  the  guarantee  of

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             equal protection afforded by Art. 14.               3..................               4.    It  is not, however, essential  for  the               legislation  to  comply with the  rule  as  to               equal  protection,  that  the  rules  for  the               guidance of the designated authority, which is               to exercise the power or which is vested  with               the discretion, should be laid down in express               terms in the statutory provision itself.               22               (Then a reference was made to the statement of               law  in  Bajoria’s  cave,  which  is   already               extracted.)                Such  guidance may thus be obtained  from  or               afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light               of   the   surrounding   circumstances   which               necessitated  the legislation, taken  in  con-               junction  with well-known facts of  which  the               court  might take judicial notice or of  which               it  is appraised by evidence before it in  the               form of affidavits, Kathi Raning Rawat v.  The               State  of Saurashtra being an  instance  where               the guidance was gathered in the manner  above               indicated,  (b)  or even from the  policy  and               purpose of the enactment which may be gathered               from other operative provisions applicable  to               analogous   or   comparable   situations    or               generally   from  the  object  sought  to   be               achieved by the enactment."               The Court then went on to observe :               "In  the  circumstances  indicated  under  the               fourth  head,  just as in the third,  the  law               enacted would be valid being neither a case of               excessive delegation or abdication of legisla-               tive  authority  viewed from one  aspect,  nor                             open to objection on the ground of vio lation of               Art.   14   as   authorising   or   permitting               discriminatory treatment of persons  similarly               situated.  The particular executive or  quasi-               judicial  act  would,  however,  be  open   to               challenge as already stated on the ground  not               so  much that it is in violation of the  equal               protection of the laws guaranteed by Art.  14,               because ex concessis that was not permitted by               the  statute  but on the ground  of  the  same               being  ultra vires as not being sanctioned  or               authorized by the enactment itself." Though  the Court then went into the question whether  there was   any  guidance  found  or  principles  laid   for   the authorities’  guidance in the Act, and upheld its  validity, the  fourth proposition is very important.  In  the  present cases also affidavits have been filed by the officers  stat- ing  the purposes for which those provisions  were  enacted. The  very policy and the purpose of the  enactments  clearly make it apparent that the legislature intended to make  them applicable to a special class (1) the-property belonging  to the  Government,  and (2) property belonging to  the  Bombay Municipal  Corporation  and provide for a speedy  method  of recovering those properties. To summarise: Where  a  statute  providing for a  more  drastic  procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in Anwar Ali  Sarkar’s case  and Suraj Mall Mehta’s case without any guidelines  as

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to  the  class of cases in which either procedure is  to  be resorted  to,  the statute will be hit by Article  14.  Even there, as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mehta’s ease, a  provision for  appeal may cure the defect.  Further, in such cases  if from the preamble and surrounding circumstances, as well  as the provisions of 23 the   statute   themselves  explained   and   amplified   by affidavits,  necessary  guidelines could be inferred  as  in Saurashtra  case and Jyoti Pershad’s case the  statute  will not be hit by Art. 14.  Then again where tile statute itself covers  only  a  class  of cases as  in  Haldar’s  cave  and Bajoria’s  case the statute will not be bad.  The fact  that in  such cases the executive will choose which cases are  to be  tried  under the special procedure will not  affect  the validity of the statute.  Therefore, the contention that the mere  availability  of two procedures will  vitiate  one  of them,  that  is the special procedure, is not  supported  by reason or authority. The  statute  itself in the two classes of cases  before  us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is  premises belonging  to the Corporation and the Government  should  be subject  to  speedy  procedure in  the  matter  of  evicting unauthorized  persons occupying them.  This is a  sufficient guidance  for  the authorities on whom the  power  has  been conferred.   With  such an indication clearly given  in  the statutes  one  expects  the  officers  concerned  to   avail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and  not resort  to  the  dilatory procedure of  the  ordinary  Civil Court.   Even normally one cannot imagine an officer  having the  choice of two procedures, one which enables him to  get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter.  Administrative officers,  no  less than the courts, do not  function  in  a vacuum.   It  would  be extremely unreal  to  hold  that  an administrative  officer  would  in  taking  proceedings  for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts. in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other.   The provisions of these two Acts cannot  be  struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such  an  unrealistic fashion.  In considering  whether  the officers would be discriminating between one set of  persons and  another, one has got to take into account normal  human behaviour  and not behaviour which is abnormal.  It  is  not every  fancied  possibility of discrimination but  the  real risk of discrimination that we must take into account.  This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of the statute.  Discrimination may be  possible but  is very improbable.  And if there is discrimination  in actual  practice this Court is not powerless.   Furthermore, the  fact that the Legislature considered that the  ordinary procedure   is  insufficient  or  ineffective  in   evicting unauthorised   occupants  of  Government   and   Corporation property  and provided a special speedy procedure  therefore is  a  clear guidance for the authorities charged  with  the duty  of  evicting unauthorised occupants.   We,  therefore, find  ourselves  unable to agree with the  majority  in  the Northern India Caterers’ case’. We  should  add  that the basis of  that  decision  is  that section  5 of the Act enables the Collector to  discriminate against  some  by exercising his power under section  5  and take  proceedings  by  way  of  suit  against  others.    In proceeding  on  that  basis the majority  made   an  obvious mistake.  Under section 4 of the Act ’if the Collector is of

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24 OPinion  that any person is in unauthorised  occupation  of- any  public Premises and that he has to be evicted he  shall issue  a notice in writing calling upon such person to  show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed’.   Thus the  Collector has no option at all but to issue  a  notice. But after considering the cause and the evidence produced by such person and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being  heard. he may make an order of eviction.   Therefore, if  he  is of opinion that it is a case where, a suit  is  a more proper remedy because, of the circumstances of the case or  its complicated nature he may not order eviction.   Then it  would be for the Government to institute a suit.  It  is not  for the Collector to do so.  The Collector has no  dis- cretion  either to file a suit or to take proceedings  under the Act.  Nor can the Government order the Collector to pass an  order of eviction in every case under section 5  as  the power under that section is the Collector’s statutory-power. Thus,  the  majority, in ignoring the obligatory  nature  of the,  notice  under section 4 and  the  discretionary  power under section 5 which has to be exercised after hearing  the party  was in error in proceeding on the basis of section  5 alone  and holding that it conferred arbitrary power on  the Collector  to resort to the power under the Act in the  case of some and a suit in the case of some others. It  is also necessary to point out that the procedures  laid down  by  the two Acts now under consideration  are  not  so harsh  or onerous as to suggest that a discrimination  would result if resort is made to the provisions of these two Acts in  some  cases  and to the ordinary Civil  Court  in  other cases.   Even though the officers deciding  these  questions would be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the: party affected, to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, for the party affected to file a written  statement and  Produce documents and be represented by  lawyers.   The provisions  of the Civil Procedure Code regarding  summoning and  enforcing attendance of persons and examining  them  on oath,  and requiring the discovery and production  of  docu- ments are a valuable safeguard-for the person affected.   So is  the provision for appeal to the Principal Judge  of  the City  Civil Court in the city of Bombay, or to’  a  District Judge  in the districts who has got to deal with the  matter as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safeguard as was recognised in Suraj Mall Mehta’s case.  The main  diffe- rence  between the procedure before an ordinary Civil  Court and  the executive authorities under these two Acts is  that in one case it will be decided by a judicial officer trained in  law and it might also be that more than one  appeal-  is available.   As  against  that  there  is  only  one  appeal available in the other but it is also open to the  aggrieved party  to resort to the High Court under the  provisions  of Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the Constitution.  This is no  less effective  than the provision for a second appeal.   On  the whole,  considering  the  object with  which  these  special procedures  were enacted by the legislature we would not  be prepared  to  hold  that  the  difference  between  the  two procedures  is so unconscionable as to attract the  vice  of discrimination.   After  all,  Art. 14  does  not  demand  a fanatical approach.  We, therefore, hold 25 that  neither  the provisions of Chapter V-A of  the  Bombay Municipal  Corporation Act nor the provisions of the  Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are hit by Art.  14 of the Constitution.

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In  the  result  all  the appeals  and  writ  petitions  art dismissed.  The Petitioners will pay one set of costs.   The Appeals will be posted for disposal before a division Bench. KHANNA, J. I agree that the writ petitions be dismissed, but I would base my conclusion on the ground that the  procedure prescribed  by  the impugned provisions is  not  onerous  or drastic  when  compared  with that contained  in  the  Civil Procedure  Code.   My learned brother  Alagiriswami  J.  has analysed  the  impugned provisions contained in  the  Bombay Municipal Corporation Act as well as. those contained in the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act.  It would  appear therefrom  that  some of infirmities from which  the  Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act of 1959  suffered are not present in the  impugned  enactments. The impugned provisions provide for the giving of notice  to the party affected.  Such a party has to be informed of  the grounds  on which the order for eviction is proposed  to  be made and has to be afforded an opportunity to file a written statement  and  produce documents.  The party  can  also  be represented by lawyers.  The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure  regarding summoning and enforcing  attendance  of persons and examining them on oath as also those relating to discovery  and  production of documents provide  a  valuable safeguard.   The aggrieved party has a right of appeal,  and the  appeal lies not to an administrative officer but  to  a judicial  officer of the status of a Principal Judge of  the City  Civil Court or a District Judge.  It is also  apparent that if the officer concerned acts beyond his  jurisdiction, his order would be liable to-assailed under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.  I would, therefore, hold that  the procedure  envisaged  in  the  impugned  provisions  is  not onerous  and  drastic  as  would  justify  an  inference  of discrimination.   The simple fact that there are two  forums with different procedures would not justify the quashing  of the  impugned provisions as being violative of  article  14, especially  when both procedures are fair and in  consonance with  the  principles of natural justice.  I agree  with  my learned  brother  Bhagwati  J. that  what  is  necessary  to attract  the inhibition of article 14 is that there must  be substantial  and  qualitative differences  between  the  two procedures  so  that one is really  and  substantially  more drastic  and prejudicial than the other and that  we  should avoid dogmatic and finical approach when dealing with life’s manifold realities. I must also utter a note of caution against the tendency  to lightly overrule the view expressed in previous decisions of the Court.  It may 26 be  that. there is a feeling entertained by certain  schools of  thought,  to  quote  the words  of  Cardozo,  that  "the precedents  have  turned  upon  us  and  are  engulfing  and annihilating us-engulfing and annihilating the very devotees that worshipped at their shrine.  So the air is full of  new cults that disavow the ancient faiths.  Some of them tell us that instead. of seeking certainty in the word, the  outward sign,  we  are  to seek for something  deeper,  a  certainty relative and temporary, a writing on the sands to be effaced by  the advancing tides.  Some of them even go so far as  to adjure us to give over the vain quest, to purge ourselves of those  yearnings  for  the unattainable  ideal,  and  to  be content  with an empiricism that is untroubled by  strivings for  the  absolute.".  (see  page  9  Selected  Writings  of Benjamin  Nathan Cardozo by Margaret E. Hall).  At the  same time,  it  has  to  be borne  in  mind  that  certainty  and continuity  are  essential  ingredients  of  rule  of   law.

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Certainty  in law would be considerably eroded and suffer  a serious  set back if the highest court of the  land  readily overrules  the view expressed by it in earlier  cases,  even though  that view has held the field for a number of  years. In quite a number of cases which come up before this  Court, two  views  are  possible,  and  simply  because  the  Court considers  that  the  view not taken by  the  Court  in  the earlier  case  was  a better view of the  matter  would  not justify  the overruling of the view.  The law laid  down  by this  Court is binding upon all courts in the country  under article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous cases all over the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this  Court.   Many people arrange their affairs  and  large number  of transactions also take place on the faith of  the correctness  of  the  view taken by this  Court.   It  would create  uncertainty,  instability and confusion if  the  law propounded  by  this Court on the basis  of  which  numerous cases  have  been decided and many transactions  have  taken place is held to be not the correct law.  This Court may, no doubt,  in  appropriate cases overrule the  view  previously taken by it but that should only be for compelling  reasons. Necessity may sometimes be felt of ridding stare decision of its  petrifying rigidity.  As observed by  Brandeis,  "stare decisis   is   always   a   desideratum,   even   in   these constitutional  cases.  But in them, it is never a  command" (see The Unpublished Opinions, page 152).  Some new  aspects may come to light and it may become essential to cover fresh grounds   to  meet  the  new  situations  or   to   overcome difficulties which did. not manifest themselves or were  not taken  into  account when the earlier view  was  propounded. Precedents  have a value and the ratio decidendi of  a  case can  no  doubt be of assistance in the  decision  of  future cases.  At the same time we have to, as observed by Cardozo, guard  against the notion that because a principle has  been formulated as the ratio decidendi of a given problem, it  is therefore to be applied 27 as a solvent of other problems, regardless of  consequences, regardless    of   deflecting   factors,   inflexibly    and automatically, in all its pristine generality (see  Selected Writings,  page  31).  As in life so in law things  are  not static.  Fresh vistas and horizons may reveal-themselves  as a  result  of the impact of new ideas  and  developments  in different fields. of life.  Law, if it has to satisfy  human needs  and to meet the problems, of life, must adapt  itself to  cope  with  new situations.  Nobody is  so  gifted  with foresight  that he can divine all possible human  events  in advance and prescribe proper rules for each of them.   There are,  however, certain verities which are of the essence  of the rule of law and no law can afford to do away with  them. At  the  same time it has to be recognized that there  is  a continuing  process of the growth of law and one can  retard it  only  at the risk of alienating law  from  life  itself. There should not be much hesitation to abandon an  untenable position when the rule to be discarded was in its origin the product  of institutions or conditions which have  gained  a new significance or development with the progress of  years. It  sometimes happens that the rule of law which grew up  in remote generations may in the fulness of experience be found to  serve another generation badly.  The Court cannot  allow itself to be tied down by and become captive of a view which in the light of the subsequent experience has been found  to be ,patently erroneous, manifestly unreasonable or to  cause hardship   or  to,  result  in  plain  iniquity  or   public inconvenience.   The Court has to keep, the balance  between

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the need of certainty and continuity and the desirability of growth  and development of law.  It can neither by  judicial pronouncements allow law to petrify into fossilised rigidity nor  can  it allow revolutionary iconoclasm  to  sweep  away established  principles.   On the one hand the  need  is  to ensure  that judicial inventiveness shall not be  desiccated or  stunted,  on  the  other it is  essential  to  curb  the temptation   to  lay  down  new  and  novel  principles   in substitution of well established principles in the  ordinary run  of  cases  and  the  readiness  to  canonise  the   new principles  too quickly before their saintliness  has  been. affirmed  by  the  passage of time.   The  votaries  of  the pragmatic idea that principles    and   rules   should    be accommodated to ends must also take     into   account   the truth that of the ends to be achieved defines and order  are themselves  amongst the greatest and the most  obvious.  The distinction between evolution of law which is permissible by process   of judicial pronouncements and radical changes  in law  which  can  only  be  brought  about  as  a  result  of legislation  cannot  also be lost sight of. As  observed  by Cardozo J. :               "I think adherence to precedent should be  the               rule  and not the exception.  I  have  already               had  occasion  to  dwell  upon  some  of   the               considerations that sustain it.  To these               28               I  may add that the labour of judges would  be               increased  almost  to the  breaking  point  if               every past decision could be reopened in every               case,  and one could not lay one’s own  course               of  bricks  on the secure  foundation  of  the               courses  laid  down  by others  who  had  gone               before him...... The situation would, however,               be  intolerable if the weekly changes  in  the               composition  of the Court were accompanied  by               changes in its rulings.  In such circumstances               there is nothing to do except to stand by  the               errors  of  our brethren of the  week  before,               whether we relish them or not.  But I am ready               to  concede  that  the rule  of  adherence  to               precedent,   though   it  ought  not   to   be               abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed.               I  think that when a rule, after it  has  been               duly  tested by experience, has been found  to               be  inconsistent with the sense of justice  or               with the social welfare, there should be  less               hesitation   in   frank   avowal   and    full               abandonment.  We have had to do this sometimes               in the field of constitutional law." (see page               170  and  171 Selected  Writings  of  Benjamin               Nathan Cardozo by Margaret E. Hall). So  far as the question is concerned about the  reversal  of the  previous  view of this Court, such reversal  should  be resorted to only in specified contingencies.  It may perhaps be  laid down as a broad proposition that a view  which  has been  accepted  for  a long period of  time  should  not  be disturbed  unless the Court can say positively that  it  was wrong  or  unreasonable or that it is productive  of  public hardship or inconvenience.  Question about the overruling of its  previous decisions was considered by this Court in  the case  of  Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of  Bihar  & Ors.(1)   Das  Acting  CJ.  after  quoting  from   American, Australian and Privy Council decisions observed as under               "Reference is made to the doctrine of finality               of  judicial decisions and it is pressed  upon

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             us  that  we should not reverse  our  previous               decision except in cases where a material pro-               vision of law has been overlooked or where the               decision  has  proceeded  upon  the   mistaken               assumption of the continuance of a repealed or               expired statute and that we should not  differ               from  a  previous decision  merely  because  a               contrary view appears to us to be  preferable.               It  is needless for us to say that  we  should               not lightly dissent from a previous pronounce-               ment  of  this Court.  Our  power  of  review,               which  undoubtedly exists, must  be  exercised               with  due  care  and  caution  and  only   for               advancing  the public well being in the  light               of the surrounding circumstances of each  case               brought  to our notice but we do not  consider               it right to continue out power within               (1)   [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603.               29               rigidly  fixed limits as suggested before  us.               If on a reexamination of the question we  come               to the conclusion, as indeed we have, that the               previous   majority   decision   was   plainly               erroneous  then it will be our duty to say  so               and  not to perpetuate our mistake  even  when               one  learned  Judge  who  was  party  to   the               previous  decision considers it  incorrect  on               further  reflection.  We should do so all  the               more   readily  as  our  decision  is   on   a               constitutional  question  and  our   erroneous               decision has imposed illegal tax burden on the               consuming public and has otherwise given  rise               to  public inconvenience or hardship,. for  it               is by no means easy to amend the Constitution.               Sometimes frivolous attempts.  May be made  to               question  our  previous decisions but  if  the               reasons on which our decisions are founded are               sound  they will by themselves  be  sufficient               safeguard  against  such  frivolous  attempts.               Further,  the doctrine, of stare decision  has               hardly  any  application to  an  isolated  and               stray decision of the Court very recently made               and  not  followed by a  series  of  decisions               based thereon.  The problem before us does not               involve  overruling a series of decisions  but               only.involves  the question as to  whether  we               should   approve  or  disapprove   follow   or               overrule, a very recent previous decision as a                             precedent.  In any case, the doctrine of stare               decision is not an inflexible rule of law  and               cannot  be permitted to perpetuate our  errors               to the detriment to the general welfare of the               public or a considerable section thereof." It  would  follow from the above that  although  this  Court affirmed  its,  power to overrule and depart from  the  view expressed  in its previous judgments, it also  stressed  the importance   of  not  lightly  dissenting   from,   previous pronouncements of this Court. Applying  the principle enunciated above also, I am  of  the view that no sufficient ground has been shown for overruling the  view  expressed  by  the  majority  in  Northern  India Caterers case(1).  It may be that the view expressed by  the minority in that case appears to be preferable, but that  by itself  would not show that the decision arrived at  in  the

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Northern  India Caterers case was plainly erroneous  and  as such  requires  overruling.   It also cannot  be  said  that aforesaid  decision has given rise to  public  inconvenience and  hardship.  The legislature has in view of the  decision in Northern India Caterers case made necessary amendments in many of the enactments so as to bar the jurisdiction of  the civil courts in matters dealt with by those enactments.   No consti- (1)  (1967) 3 S.C.R. 399. 30 tutional amendment was required to set right the  difficulty experienced  ,as a result of the decision of this  Court  in Northern India Caterers case. I  am, therefore, of the view that it is not  necessary  for the purpose ,,of this case to overrule the majority decision in the case of Northern India Caterers. BHAGWATI, J., These appeals and writ petitions challenge the ,constitutional validity of Ch.  VA of the Bombay  Municipal Corporation  Act,  1888  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the Municipal Act) and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act,  1955  (hereinafter  .referred  to  as  the  Government Premises Eviction Act) as it stood prior to its amendment by Maharashtra  Act  12  of  1969,  on  the  ground  that  they contravene  Art. 14 of the Constitution.  The  challenge  is based mainly on the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab(1) where this Court held S. 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and  Rent Recovery)  Act,  1959 lo be void as being in  conflict  with Art.  14 of the Constitution.  The question is  whether  the ratio  of  this  decision is applicable  to  the  provisions contained in Ch.  VA of the Municipal Act and the Government Premises  Eviction Act, and if it is, whether this  decision requires to be reconsidered by us. The Municipal Act is an old statute enacted for the  purpose of  providing for the, municipal administration of the  city of  Bombay.  Ch.  VA was introduced in the Municipal Act  by Maharashtra Act 14 of 1961.  It consists of a fasciculus  of sections  commencing from s. 105A and ending with  S.  105H. Section   105A  is  the  definition  section   which   gives definitions  of  various terms used in Ch.  VA  and  one  of those terms is "unauthorised occupation" which is defined by cl.  (d)  to mean occupation by any  person  of  Corporation premises withcut authority for such occupation and  includes continuance  in  occupation by any person  of  the  premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been duly determined, Sub-s. (1) of S. 105B provides inter alia as follows : "105B. (1) Where the Commissioner is satisfied.- (a)  that  the person authorised to occupy  any  corporation premises has, whether before or after the corn- (1)) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399. 31               mencement of the Bombay Municipal  Corporation               (Amendment) Act, 1960.               (i)   not  paid for a period of more than  two               months,  the rent or taxes lawfully  due  from               him in respect of such premises; or               (ii)  sub-let,  contrary  terms the  terms  or               conditions of his occupation, the whole or any               part of such premises; or               (iii) committed,  or is committing, such  acts               of waste as are likely to diminish  materially               the   value,  or  impair   substantially   the               utility, of the premises; or               (iv)  otherwise acted in contravention of  any

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             of        the terms, express or implied, under               which   he  is  authorised  to   occupy   such               premises-               (b)   that  any  person  is  in   unauthorised               occupation of any corporation premises;               (c)   that  any  corporation premises  in  the               occupation  of any person are required by  the               corporation in the public interest.               the Commissioner may notwithstanding  anything               contained  in  any law for the time  being  in                             force, by notice-order that person, as  well  as               any  other person who may be in occupation  of               the  whole or any part of the premises,  shall               vacate  them within one month of the  date  of               the service of the notice." Before,  however,  an  order can be made  by  the  Municipal Commissioner against any person under subs. (1) of s.  105B, sub-s.   (2)  of  that  section  says  that  the   Municipal Commissioner  shall issue a notice in writing  calling  upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.  This notice is required to specify  the grounds  on  which the order of eviction is proposed  to  be made  and  it  is intended to give  an  opportunity  to  all persons who are or may be in occupation of or claim interest in  the  Corporation  premises to  show  cause  against  the proposed order of eviction.  Sub-s. (2) of s. 32 105B then proceeds to say that the person concerned may file a written statement and produce documents in support of  his case  and at the inquiry before the Municipal  Commissioner, he  is entitled to appear by advocate, attorney or  pleader. This procedure is intended to, give effect to the  principle of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteim  partem and it is as it should be, for the Municipal Commissioner is given  power to determine whether a person is liable  to  be evicted from any Corporation premises under cl. (a), or  cl. (b)  or cl. (c) of sub-s. (1), and before any  determination adverse to him is made affecting his right to hold the  said premises, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.  If after hearing the person concerned, the Municipal Commissioner  is  satisfied that the case falls  within  cl. (a),  cl.  (b) or cl. (c), and such person is liable  to  be evicted  under any of these three clauses, he may by  notice order such person to vacate the Corporation premises  within one month of the date of the service of the notice.  If  the person  ordered to vacate the Corporation premises does  not comply   with   the  order  of   eviction,   the   Municipal Commissioner  can  under sub-s. (3) of s.  105B  evict  that person  and  any  other person who obstructs  him  and  take possession of the Corporation premises, if necessary, by use of force.  Sub-s. (6) of s. 105B provides that if a  person, who  has  been ordered to vacate  any  Corporation  premises under  sub-cl.  (i) or sub-cl. (iv) of cl. (a)  sub-s.  (1), within  one month of the date of service of the  notice,  or such  longer time as the Municipal Commissioner  may  allow, pays  to  the municipal Commissioner the rent and  taxes  in arrears,  or  as the case may be, carries out  or  otherwise complies   with  the  terms  contravened  by  him   to   the satisfaction  of the Municipal Commissioner,  the  Municipal Commissioner  shall on such terms as he thinks fit, in  lieu of  evicting such person under sub-s. (2), cancel the  order made by him under sub-s. (1), and thereupon such person  may continue to hold the Corporation premises on the same  terms as  before.  Then follows s. 105C which inter  alia  confers

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power  on  the Municipal Commissioner to assess  damages  on account of use and occupation of the Corporation premises in cases  where  any  person is found  to  be  in  unauthorised occupation  of the same.  Sec. 105D is not material for  our purpose  and. we may omit it from consideration.  Sec.  105E is  the  next  section  and that  says  that  the  Municipal Commissioner  shall. for the purpose of holding any  inquiry under  the  Act, have the same powers as are vested  in  the civil Court.under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit,  in respect of (a) summoning and enforcing  attendance of  any person and examining him on oath, (b) requiring  the discovery  and  production of documents and  (c)  any  other matter which may be prescribed by Regulations made under 3 3 s.   105H.   This  section  clearly  contemplates  that  the Municipal Commissioner, while holding an inquiry, can  order discovery  and  production  of documents  and  also  examine witness on oath in the same manner as a civil court.   Every order of the Municipal Commissioner under s. 105B or s. 105C is made appealable under s. 105F and the appeal lies to  the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court of Bombay or such of their  judicial officer in Greater Bombay of not  less  than ten  years standing as the Principal Judge may designate  in that  behalf.  The appellate officer is given power to  stay the  enforcement of the order of the Municipal  Commissioner which is impugned in the appeal, for such period and on such conditions as he deems tit and the appeal is to be  disposed of  by  him as expeditiously as possible.  Sec.  105G  gives finality to the order made by the Municipal Commissioner  or the  appellate  officer and provides that it  shall  not  be called  in  question in any original suit,  application  or, execution  proceedings.   There  is  lastly  s.  105H  which confers  power  on  the  Municipal  Commissioner,  with  the approval of the Standing Committee, to make Regulations  for all  or any of the matters set out in that  section,  which. include inter alia the holding of enquiries, the  principles which may be taken into account in assessing damages’  under s.  105C  and  the  procedure  to  be  followed  in  appeals preferred  under  s.  105F.  It would thus be  seen  that  a special  procedure  is  enacted  under  these  sections  for eviction  of any person from Corporation premises on any  of the  grounds set out in cl. (a)., cl. (b) cl. (c) of  sub-s. (1) of s. 105B. The  Government  Premises  Eviction, Act also  lays  down  a special procedure for eviction of any person from government premises  which is more or less identical with that set  out in Ch.  VA of the Municipal Act.  The   only  difference  is that whereas under Ch.  VA of the Municipal Act   the  power to determine the liability and make an order of eviction  is given to the Municipal Commissioner, the Government Premises Eviction_Act  gives this power to the  Competent  Authority, who  would be’-an officer not lower in rank than that  of  a Deputy  Collector or an executive engineer appointed by  the State  Government.   There  is  also  one  other  difference between  the provisions of Ch.  VA of the Municipal Act  and the provisions of the Government Premises Eviction Act  and. that  arises because. section 8A has been introduced in  the Government  Premises  Eviction Act by an amendment  made  by Maharashtra  Act. 12 of 1969 whereas no such  amendment  has been made in Ch.  VA of the.  Municipal Act.  This amendment was  made  in  the  Government  Premises  Eviction  Act   in consequence of the decision of this Court in Northern  India Caterers  Ltd.  v.  State  of Punjab,(1)  but  that  is  not material because, so far as the present cases arising  under the  Government  Premises Eviction Act  are  concerned,  the

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proceedings  for  eviction  were  taken  and  the  order  of ’eviction  was made before section 8A was introduced in  the Government  Premises Eviction Act and the provisions of  the Government Premises Eviction Act with which we are concerned are, therefore, the provisions as they stood prior to  their amendment by the introduction, of section 8A. (1)  [1967] 3 S. C. R. 399. 4--L131 Sup. C.I./75 34 Having  set out the relevant provisions of the two  statutes impugned  in  these cases, we may now turn  to  examine  the grounds on which they are challenged.  But before we do  so, we  may  clear  the  ground  by  pointing  out-and  this  is important to remember in the context of an argument advanced on behalf of the respondents which we shall have occasion to examine  a  little  later-that  the  special  procedure  for determining the liability to eviction and securing  eviction of  persons found liable to be so evicted laid down  in  the two  statutes has not been assailed before us on the  ground that it is unreasonable and imposes unjustified  restriction on  the fundamental right to hold property guaranteed  under Art.  19(1) (f).  It was faintly argued before us  that  the impugned  provisions  of  these two  statutes  by  providing special procedure for eviction of occupants of Municipal  or Government premises have made unjust discrimination  between occupants  of other premises and are on that account  viola- tive  of  Art.  14.   But "there is  no  substance  in  this challenge.  It is not uncommon to find legislation according special  treatment to Government or other public bodies  and such  legislation has been upheld by this Court in  numerous decided  cases.  Bachawat, J., in his minority  judgment  in Northern  India  Caterers Ltd. v. State of  Punjab  (1)  has referred to several such decisions and there are many  more. We  may  mention  a few of them.  The  decision  in  Baburao Shantarm More v. The Bombay Housing Board and Anr.(2) upheld the  validity of the exemption of premises belonging to  the Government  or a local authority from the provisions of  the Bombay Rents Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act,  1947. The  decision  in  Shri  Munnalal &  Anr.  v.  Collector  of Jhalawar  & Ors.(3) held that the Rajasthan  Public  Demands Recovery  Act,  1952  was  not  unconstitutional  as  giving special facility to the Government as a banker for  recovery of its dues.  It was decided in Nav Rattanmal & OrS. v.  The State  of Rajasthan(4) that the legislature  may  reasonably provide  a  longer  period of limitation for  suits  by  the Government and in Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab & Ors. (5) it was held that the Patiala Recovery of States Dues Act, IV of   2002K,   in  setting  up   separate   authorities   for determination   of  disputes  and  prescribing   a   special procedure to be followed by them for recovery of dues of the Patiala   State   Bank   by   summary   process,   was   not discriminatory  and void.  Now, in all these  decisions  the law  providing for special treatment to Government or  other public  bodies was held not to be discriminatory,  but  from that  it  does  not  follow  that  every  law  which   gives differential treatment to Government or other public  bodies is  necessarily  immune  from challenge  on  the  ground  of discrimination.  There is no talisman or, charm protecting a law  from the vice of unconstitutional discrimination,  when the  discrimination is in favour of the Government or  other public  bodies.   The  law  is now  well  settled  that  the legislature  has  power  of  making  special  laws  to  atam particular  ends,  and  for that purpose it  may  select  or classify persons (1)  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399.

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(3)  [1961] 2 S.C.R. 962. (5)  [1963] S.C.R. 353. (2)  [1954] S.C.R. 572. (4)  [1962] 2. S.C.R. 324 35 and  things  upon which such laws are to operate.   But  the mere  fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve  a statute  from the reach of the equality clause contained  in Art.  14.  To get out of its reach it must appear  that  not only a classification has been made but also that it is  one based   on  some  real  distinction,  bearing  a  just   and reasonable relation to the object of the Legislation, and is not  a mere arbitrary selection.  The classification  to  be valid and permissible must satisfy a double test; it must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which  distinguishes those  who  are  grouped  together  from  others,  and  that differentia  must  have a rational relation ,to  the  object sought to be achieved by the statute.  It was on application of  this  double test that in the  above-mentioned  decision that  the  law making special provision  for  Government  or other  public bodies was held to be constitutionally  valid. The  application of the same double test, however,  resulted in  the  invalidation of the exemption of debts due  to  the Central Government or the Government of any State or a local authority  from  the operation of the  Rajasthan  Jagirdar’s Debt Reduction.Act which provided for scaling down of  debts of  Jagirdars  whose  Jagir lands had been  resumed  by  the Government.  Vide State of Rajasthan v. Mukanchand & Ors.(1) It will thus be seen that where a statute, according special treatment   to  Government  or  other  public   bodies,   is challenged on the ground of discrimination, the validity  of the  statute has to be judged by applying this double  test, and it is this double test which we must, therefore, proceed to  apply  in  determining  the  validity  of  the  impugned provision contained in the two statutes. So  far  as Ch.  VA of the Municipal Act  is  concerned,-and what  we say in regard to Ch.  VA of the Municipal Act  must also  apply equally in relation to the  Government  Premises Eviction   Act   with  the   words   "Government   Premises" substituted for the words "Municipal premises"-the statement of objects and reasons for the introduction of this Chapter, as  also  the provisions contained in it,  clearly  indicate that  this Chapter was enacted to provide to  the  Municipal Corporation  a speedier remedy for eviction of  unauthorised occupants  from Municipal premises, as against the  ordinary remedy of a civil suit involving expense and delay, so, that the  Municipal  Corporation  should be  able  to  carry  out effectively   ’its   policy  of   slum   clearance,   speedy development of the estates of the Corporation and  providing more  housing accommodation’.  Chapter VA of  the  Municipal Act,  no doubt, differentiates occupiers of  Municipal  pre- mises  from  occupiers  of other premises, but  there  is  a socially  valid  and  legally  intelligible  differentiation between  the two classes of occupiers.  So far as  Municipal premises  are  concerned,  the members  of  the  public  are vitally  interested in seeing that such premises  are  freed from  unauthorised occupation as speedily and  expeditiously as  possible in order that the Municipal Corporation  should be  able to implement its policy of slum  clearance,  speedy development  of  Municipal estates and  providing  for  more housing accommodation, (1) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 903. 3 6 which  are  projects  redounding to  public  benefit.   This element  of  public  interest  in  speedy  and   expeditious

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recovery of possession from unauthorised occupants is absent in  case  of  premises belonging to  private  parties.   The speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorised occupants from Municipal  premises is, therefore, justified, in that it  is in  the interest of the public that speedy  and  expeditious recovery  of Municipal premises from unauthorised  occupiers is made’ possible through the instrumentality of a  speedier procedure,  instead  of the elaborate procedure  by  way  of civil suit involving both expense and delay.  Speedy justice is  to-day, in view of the existing procedural skein  of  an ordinary suit, an almost impossible feat.  There is, thus, a valid   basis  of  differentiation  between   occupiers   of Municipal premises and those of other premises, and there is a  rational  relation  and nexus between the  basis  of  the classification  and  the  object of  the  legislation.   The constitutional  validity of the impugned provisions  in  the two  statutes cannot, in the circumstances, be  assailed  on the  ground  that they make  unjust  discrimination  between occupiers of Government or Municipal premises and  occupiers of other premises. The  main ground of attack against the constitutionality  of the impugned provisions, however, was that even if occupiers of  Government  or  Municipal  premises  form  a  class   by themselves as against occupiers of private, owned properties and such classification is justified on the ground that they require  differential  treatment  in  public  interest,  the impugned   provisions  discriminate  amongst  occupiers   of Government  or Municipal premises inter se and  are,  there- fore,  violative of the equality clause.   The  petitioners- appellants   contended  that  the  special   procedure   for determining  the  liability  to eviction laid  down  in  the impugned provisions is more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil suit and both these procedures operate in the same field without there being any guidelines provided  in the, impugned provisions as to when one or  the other  procedure shall be followed with the result that  the impugned provisions permit discrimination amongst  occupiers of  Government  or Municipal premises in that  some  may  be subjected  to  the  special procedure while  others  may  be subjected  to  the  ordinary procedure.   The  occupiers  of Government  or Municipal premises can be  proceeded  against under  the  impugned provisions as also under  the  ordinary procedure  of a civil suit, and there being no principle  or policy  to  guide  the  authority as  to  when  the  special procedure  should  be adopted, or the case should  be  dealt with  under the ordinary procedure, it would be open to  the authority to make a discriminatory choice amongst  occupiers of  Government or Municipal premises, and this absolute  and unguided  power of selection, though exercisable within  the class  of occupiers of Government or Municipal premises,  is discriminatory.  The vice of discrimination, it was  argued, consists in the unguided and unrestricted power of  singling out  for  being  subjected to  the  special  procedure  some amongst a class of persons, namely, occupiers of  Government or Municipal premises, all of whom are similarly situate and circumstanced, leaving others to be dealt with according  to the ordinary procedure.  This argument was 37 sought  to  be supported by the majority  decision  of  this Court   in  Northern  India  Caterers  Ltd.   V.  State   of Punjab.(1)  We  do not think this argument  is  sound.   The majority decision in Northern Indian Caterers Ltd. v.  State of Punjab(1) has no application in the present case, and  in any  event,  we  are  of the view  that  decision  does  not represent the correct law.

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The  statute  which came up for  consideration  before  this Court in Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of  Punjab(2) was  the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and  Rent Recovery) Act, 1959. This Act laid down a special  procedure for   eviction  of  un-authorised  occupants   from   public premises.  The constitutional validity of the  enactment  of this special procedure was challenged before this  Court  as being violative of Art. 14. There were two grounds on  which the challenge was based : one was that the Act discriminated unjustly  between occupants of public premises and those  of private  property  and  the  other  was  that  even  amongst occupants   of   public  premises  inter   se,   there   was discrimination, inasmuch as the special procedure set out in the  Act was more drastic and prejudicial than the  ordinary procedure  of a civil suit and it was left to the  arbitrary and  unfettered  discretion of the Government to  adopt  the special procedure against some and not against the rest.  So far as the first ground is concerned, it was clearly and  in so  many  terms repelled by Bachawat, J.,  in  the  minority judgment, and though the majority, speaking through  Shelat, J.,  did  not finally pronounce upon the  validity  of  this ground, they pointed out that there was great force in it as it   was  possible  to  say  that  there  was   intelligible differentia  between occupiers of public premises and  other occupiers  and the differentia had rational nexus  with  the object  of the legislation. It was the second  ground  which evoked difference of opinion amongst the learned Judges, the majority, speaking through Shelat, J., taking the view  that this  ground was well founded, while the minority,  speaking through  Bachawat,  J.,  holding that it  was  not.  Shelat, J.,  speaking  on behalf of the majority,  referred  to  the earlier  decisions of this Court in State of West Bengal  v. Anwar  Ali(2) Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v.  A.  V. Visvanatha  Sastri,(3) Suraj Mull Mohta v. A. V.  Visvanatha Sastri(4) and Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P.,(5) and pointed out that the "principle which   emerges  from  these decisions is that discrimination would result if  there  are two  available procedures, one more drastic and  prejudicial to  the  party  concerned than the other and  which  can  be applied at     the  arbitrary  will of the  authority".  The learned  Judge then proceeded to add : "if the ordinary  law of  the land and the special law provide two  different  and alternative procedures, one more prejudicial than the  other discrimination must result if it is left to the will of  the authority to exercise the more prejudicial against some  and not  against  the rest. A person who  is  proceeded  against under the more drastic procedure is bound to complain as  to why  the drastic procedure is exercised against him and  not against the others. even (1)  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (3)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 787. (4) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448. (5) [1963] Supp. 2 S. C. R.   760. 38 though  those  others  are  similarly  circumstanced.    The procedure   under  S.  5  is  obviously  more  drastic   and prejudicial  than  the one under the  Civil  Procedure  Code where  the  litigant can get the benefit of a  trial  by  an ordinary  court  dealing with the ordinary law of  the  land with  the  right of appeal, revision, etc., as  against  the person who is proceeded against under S. 5 of the Act as his case  would  be disposed of by an executive officer  of  the Government,  whose decision rests on his mere  satisfaction, subject no doubt to an appeal  but before another  executive officer, viz., the Commissioner.  There can be no doubt that s. 5 confers an additional remedy over and above the  remedy

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by  way of suit and that by providing two alternative  reme- dies  to  the Government and in leaving it to  the  unguided discretion  of the Collector to resort to one or  the  other and to pick and choose some of those in occupation of public properties  and  premises for the application  of  the  more drastic  procedure under s. 5, that section has lent  itself open to the charge of discrimination and as being  violative of  Article 14 and in that view, held s. 5 of the Act to  be void.   Bachawat,  J.,  delivering  judgment  on  behalf  of himself  and Hidayatullah, J., (as the then was)  held  that "without  violating Art. 14, the law may allow a litigant  a free  choice of remedies, proceedings and tribunals for  the redress of his grievances".  The learned Judge observed that "it is not pretended that the proceeding under the  impugned Act is unfair or oppressive.  The unauthorised occupant  has full  opportunity  of  being  heard  and  of  producing  his evidence.   He  is not denied the equal protection  of  the, laws  because  the government has the option  of  proceeding against him either by a suit or under the Act", and added  : "an  unauthorised  occupant has no constitutional  right  to dictate  that  the  government  should  have  no  choice  of proceedings.   The  argument based upon the  option  of  the government to file a suit is unreal, because in practice the government is not likely to institute a suit in a case where it  can  seek  relief under the  Act".   The  learned  Judge concluded  by  saying  that  "Art. 14  does  not  require  a fanatical  approach to the problem of equality  before  law" and upheld the validity of the Act.  We find it difficult to accept the reasoning of the majority as well as the minority decisions.   Neither  reasoning commends itself to  us.   We shall presently explain our standpoint in--relation to  this problem,  which  arises when there are two  procedures  laid down by the Legislature, one harsher than the other, and the question   is  whether  that  involves  violation   of   the constitutional  mandate  of equality before  law.   But  one point we wish to make, and we cannot over emphasise it, that Art. 14 enunciates a vital principle which lies at the  core of our republicanism and shines like a beacon light pointing towards  the  goal of  classless  egalitarian  socioeconomic order which we promised to build for ourselves when we  made a tryst with destiny on that fateful day when we adopted our Constitution.   If  we  have  to  choose  between  fanatical devotion  to  this  great principle of  equality  and  fable allegiance  to it, we would unhesitatingly prefer to err  on the side of the former as against the latter.  We should  be breaking our faith with the Constitution if we whittle  down in  any  measure  this high and  noble  principle  which  is pregnant with hope for the common man and which is at once a goal as well as a pursuit, for history shows 39 that  it is by insidious encroachments made in the  name  of pragmatism  and  expediency  that freedom  and  liberty  are gradually  but imperceptibly eroded and we should not  allow the same fate to overtake equality and egalitarianism in the name of expediency and practical convenience. The first and preliminary answer given by the respondents to the  challenge  levelled  on  behalf  of  the   petitioners- appellants  was  that  no violation  of  the  Constitutional guarantee  under Art. 14 is involved where the law  gives  a free choice of remedies to a person entitled to relief, even if  one  remedy  is more drastic and  prejudicial  than  the other.  The respondents relied on the decision of the United States  Supreme Court in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer(1)  in support  of this contention.  Now it may be noted  that  the minority  decision in Northern India Caterers Ltd. v.  State

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of  Punjab(2) also found support in the decision in  Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,(1) and on the basis of that  decision, held that the law does not violate Art. 14 because it  gives an   aggrieved  party  the  free  choice  of  remedies   and proceedings  for the redress of-his grievances.   We  cannot accept  this broad and unqualified statement of the  law  as correct and if we, scrutinize the decision in Arizona Copper Co.  v.  Hammer(2) closely, we would find that it  does  not support any such statement.  It is, no doubt, true that  Mr. Justice   Pitney  said  in  this  case  :..........  it   is thoroughly  settled  by our  previous  decisions  that...... election  of remedies is an option very frequently given  by the  law  to  a person entitled to  an  action,   an  option normally  exercised  to his own advantage, as  a  matter  of course".  But this observation must be read in the,  context of the question which arose for decision in that case and if it  is  so  read, it would be clear that  what  Mr.  Justice Pitney  had  in mind when he made this observation  was  the existence  of  several rights to relief arising out  of  the same  act  and  not the existence  of  several  remedies  in enforcement of a single right to relief.  Under the laws  of Arizona, an employee injured in the course of his employment had  open to him three avenues of redress, any one of  which he might pursue according to the facts of his case,  namely, (1) the common law liability relieved of the  fellow-servant defense,   and  in  which  the  defenses   of   contributory negligence  and assumption of risk are questions to be  left to the jury; (2) the Employers’ Liability Law, which applies to  hazardous occupations where the injury or death  is  not caused  by  his  own  negligence;  and  (3)  the  Compulsory Compensation   Law,  applicable  to   especially   dangerous occupations,  by which he may recover  compensation  without fault  upon  the part of the employer.  The  question  which arose for determination was whether this system denied equal protection  to  employers  because  it  conferred  upon  the employee  a  free  choice  amongst  several  remedies.   Mr. Justice  Pitney answered the question against the  employers by saying that it is well settled by previous decisions that the  law may give election of remedies to a person  entitled to an action.  The reference here obviously Was to  election between  different rights to relief given by different  laws for  the injury suffered in the course of  employment.   The employee  could claim damages under the common-law or  under the Employees’ Liability Law or (1) [1967] Law Ed.  1058 250 U,S.400. (2) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399. 40 under the Compulsory Compensation Law.  He could elect under what law he would claim damages,which right he would enforce depending on the facts of his case.  It is not as if he  had different procedures available to-him for enforcing a  right given to him by law.  Here in the present case, there are no different  rights conferred on the Municipal Corporation  or the   Government   by   different  laws   with   choice   to the.Municipal  Corporation  or the Government to  force  one right  or the other.  The only right which is sought  to  be enforced  by the Municipal Corporation or the Government  is the  right  based on title given by the general law  of  the land,  and it is for the enforcement of this right that  two alternative  procedures are, according to the,  petitioners- appellants  available  to the Municipal Corporation  or  the Government.  Thai is a totally different situation from  the one  in  Arizona  Copper  Co. v.  Hammer  (supra)  and  that decision has, therefore, no application in the present case. it is indeed too late and too much now to contend that  Art.

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14  does not forbid discrimination in matters of  procedure. A  rule  of procedure comes as much within  the  purview  of article 14 as any rule of substantive law, and to quote  the words of Mukherjea, J., in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (supra) "it is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of  the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with  like protection and without discrimination".  Vide also  Weaver’s Constitutional  Law,,  page 407.  If for  determination  and enforcement  of a liability, two alternative procedures  are available,  one more drastic and prejudicial than the  other and  no  guiding, policy or principle, is laid down  by  the legislature  as to when one or the other procedure shall  be followed  so that either procedure may  be  indiscriminately adopted   against  persons  similarly  situated,   the   law providing  for  the more drastic and  prejudicial  procedure would be violative of the equal protection clause.  That was laid  down  as far back as 1952 in the  celebrated  case  of State  of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) which  was decided  ,by a Bench.of seven judges.  Section 5(1) of  West Bengal  Act  10 of 1950 was impeached in that case  and  the majority  decision held that section to be  wholly  invalid. The preamble to the Act merely stated that it was  expedient to provide for speedy trial of certain offences and  section 5(1) empowered a special Court to try such offences or class of  offences  or  cases  or class  of  cases  as  the  State Government  may  by  general or  special  order  in  writing direct.   The majority cf the judges took the view that  the procedure  laid  down by the Act for trial  by  the  special court varied substantially from that laid down for the trial of offences generally by the Code of Criminal Procedure  and no  standard  was laid down and no principle or  policy  was disclosed in the Act to guide the exercise of the discretion by  the Government in selecting cases for reference  to  the special court for trial under the special procedure provided under  the Act.  All that was relied on as indicative  of  a guiding principle for selection was the object, as disclosed in  the preamble of the Act, of providing for the  "speedier trial  of certain offences", but the majority of the  judges brushed that aside as too indefinite and vague to constitute a  reasonable basis for classification.  "Speedier trial  of offences", observed Mahajan J., "may be the reason 41 and motive for the legislation but it does not amount either to  a  classification  of offences or of cases. .  .  In  my opinion it is no classification at all in the real sense  of the term as it is not based on any characteristics which are peculiar  to persons or to cases which are to be subject  to the  special procedure prescribed be the  Act".   Mukherjea, J., said, "I am definitely of opinion that the necessity  of a  speedier  trial  is too vague, uncertain  and  elusive  a criterion  to form a rational basis for  the  discrimination made.   The necessity for speedier trial may be  the  object which the legislature had in view or it may be the  occasion for  making the enactment.  In a sense quick disposal  is  a thing  which is desirable in all legal proceedings. This  is not  a  reasonable classification at all  but  an  arbitrary selection’’.   Similar observations were also made  by  Fazl Ali,  J., and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. The  majority  judges accordingly  held that section 5(1) vested an arbitrary  and uncontrolled  discretion in the State Government  to  direct any  cases which it Liked to be tried by the  special  court and it was therefore, violative of article 14. It  is interesting to compare the decision in State of  West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) with the decision of this

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Court  in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of  Saurashtra(1). Both these cases were taken up for hearing together, but the Saurashtra case was adjourned to enable the State Government to file an affidavit explaining the circumstances which  led to  the  enactment  of the Saurashtra  State  Public  Safety (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 which was impugned in that case.  The Saurashtra case was thereafter heard by the  same Bench  of  seven  Judges which decided  Anwar  Ali  Sarkar’s (supra) case.  Section II of the Saurashtra Ordinance was in the  same terms as section 5(1) of the West Bengal  Act  and the  constitutional objection against the validity  of  that section was also the same, namely, that it committed to  the absolute  and  unrestricted  discretion  of  the   executive Government  the  power  to refer cases to be  tried  by  the special procedure laid down in the Saurashtra Ordinance  and the  section was, therefore, discriminatory, and void.   But this time the conclusion reached by the majority judges  was different.  The decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case  (supra) was  distinguished by three of the learned judges  who  were parties  to the majority decision in that case.   Fazl  Ali, J.,  observed : "The main objection to the West  Bengal  Act was  that  it  permitted discrimination  without  reason  or without  any  rational  basis.  .  .  The  mere  mention  of ’speedier trial’ as the object of the Act did not ,cure  the defect’,  as the expression afforded no help in  determining what  cases required speedier trial. . . The  clear  recital (in  the  Saurashtra  Ordinance)  cf  a  definite  objective furnishes a tangible and rational basis of classification to the  State  Government  for  the  purpose  of  applying  the provisions  of  the  Ordinance and for  choosing  only  such offences  or cases as affect public safety,  maintenance  of public order and the preservation of peace and tranquillity. Thus under section 11, the State Government is expected only to  select  such offences or class of offences or  class  of cases for being tried in a Special Court in accordance  with the  special  procedure,  as are calculated  to  affect  the public safety, maintenance of public order etc."  Mukherjea. J.,  also,  after distinguishing the decision in  Anwar  Ali Sarkar’s case (supra) on similar (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 435. 42 grounds, said : "In my opinion, if the legislative policy is clear  and definite and, as an effective method of  carrying out that policy, a discretion is vested by the statute  upon a  body  of administrators or officers-  to  make  selective application  of  the  law to certain classes  or  groups  of persons,  the statute itself cannot be condemned as a  piece of discriminatory legislation. In such cases the power given to the executive body would import a duty on it to  classify the  subject-matter  of legislation in accordance  with  the objective indicated in the statute.  The discretion that  is conferred on official agencies in such circumstances is  not an unguided discretion; it has to be exercised in conformity with the policy to effectuate which the discretion is given, and  it is in relation to that objective that the  propriety of  the classification would have to be tested".   Das,  J., also  pointed  out that in the preamble  cf  the  Saurashtra Ordinance there was sufficient indication of policy to guide the  executive Government in selecting offences or class  of offences  or  class of cases for reference  to  the  special court  and section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance  did  not, therefore, confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on  the State  Government.   The majority  judges  accordingly  held section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance to be valid. Though the minority judges in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of

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Saurashtra(1)  observed  that the decision of  the  majority judges in that case marked a retreat from the position taken up  by the majority in the earlier case of Anwar Ali  Sarkar (supra),   the   majority  judges  strongly   refuted   this proposition and pointed out that it was on an application of the  same  principle which resulted in the  invalidation  of section  5(1)  of the West Bengal Act that the  validity  of section  11  of the Saurashtra Ordinance  was  sustained  by them.   The  principle  which was applied  by  the  majority judges  in Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case and Kathi Raning  Rawat’s case(1)  was  the same and it was stated in these  terms  by Patanjali Sastri, C.J., delivering the majority judgment  of the Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria.v. State of West Bengal(2) : "if  the  impugned legislation indicates  the  policy  which inspired  it  and the object which it seeks to  attain,  the mere  fact  that  the legislation does  not  itself  make  a complete and precise classification of the persons or things to  which  it  is to be applied, but  leaves  the  selective application of the law to be made by the executive authority in accordance with the standard indicated or the  underlying policy  and object disclosed is not a sufficient ground  for condemning  it  as arbitrary, and  therefore,  obnoxious  to article 14.  In the case of such a statute it could make  no difference  in  principle whether the  discretion  which  is entrusted to the executive Government is to make a selection of  individual cases or of offences, classes of offences  or classes  of cases.  For, in either case, the  discretion  to make the selection is a guided and controlled discretion and not  an absolute or unfettered one and is equally liable  to be  abused, but as has been pointed out, if it be shown  any given  case  that  the  discretion  has  been  exercised  in disregard of the standard or contrary to the declared policy and object of the legislation, such exercise could be  chal- lenged  and annulled under article 14 which includes  within its  purview  both  executive  and  legislative  acts."  The statutory provision which (1) [1952] S.C.R. 435. (2) [1954] S.C.R. 30 43 was  challenged  in this case was section 4(1) of  the  West Bengal  Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts)  Act,  1949. This Act had been passed to provide for the more speedy  and more  effective punishment of certain offences  because  the Legislature thought that it was expedient to provide for the more  speedy trial and more effective punishment of  certain offences  which were set out in the Schedule annexed to  the Act.   Section 4(1) authorised the provincial Government  to allot cases for trial to a special judge by notification  as well as transfer cases from one special judge to another  or to  withdraw any case from the jurisdiction of  the  special judge  or  make such modifications in the description  of  a case  as  may be considered  necessary.   Patanjali  Sastri, C.J.,  applied the aforesaid principle extracted.  from  the decisions  in  Anwar  Ali Sarkar’s case  (supra)  and  Kathi Raning  Rawat’s case (supra) and held that section  4(1)  of the Act was valid and the special court had jurisdiction  to try  and  convict the appellants.  This  decision  might  at first blush appear to be unimportant as representing  merely one  more  case falling within one or the  other  ruling  in Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case or Kathi Raning Rawat’s case, but  a little  scrutiny  will reveal that it furnishes  a  complete answer to the argument of discrimination which found  favour with the majority judges in Northern India Caterers Ltd.  v. State of Punjab (supra).  We shall deal with that aspect  of the decision a little later.

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We  may  then refer to the decision of this Court  in  Suraj Mull  Mohta  v.  A.  V.  Visvanatha  Sastri  (supra).    The constitutional  validity of section 5(4) of the Taxation  on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 was assailed  in that  case on the ground that "evasion, whether  substantial or  unsubstantial, came within its ambit as well  as  within the  ambit of section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act",  and it  was,  therefore, violative of article  14.   This  Court compared  the  provisions of section 5(4) of  the  Act  with those of section 34(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act and came to  the  conclusion that section 5(4) dealt  with  the  same class  of persons who fell within section 34 of  the  Indian Income  Tax  Act and were dealt with in sub-section  (1)  of that section, and whose income could be caught by proceeding under  that section.  There was nothing  uncommon,  observed this  Court,  either  in properties  or  in  characteristics between persons who had been discovered as evaders of income tax during an investigation conducted under section 5 (1) of the Act and those who had been discovered by the Income  Tax Officer  to  have evaded income tax.  Both  these  kinds  of persons  had  common  properties  and  characteristics,  and therefore, required equal treatment but some of them  would, at  the  choice of the Co mission, be dealt with  under  the more  drastic and prejudicial procedure for assessment  laid down by the Act, while the others would be proceeded against under  the ordinary procedure set out in section 34  of  the Indian Income Tax Act.  This was clearly discriminatory  and section 5(4) was therefore held by this Court to be void and unenforceable as offending article 14. The  decision of this Court in Shree Meenakshi  Mills  Ltd., Madurai v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (supra) may also be noted in this connection.  In this case it was section 5(1) of the Taxation  on  Income (Investigation  Commission)  Act,  1947 which was challenged as consti- 44 tutionally  invalid  and the ground of  challenge  was  that after  the  coming  into  force of  the  Indian  Income  Tax (Amendment)  Act, 1954, which introduced section  34(1A)  in the   Indian   Income   Tax   Act,   section   5(1)   became discriminatory  and  void as the  newly  introduced  section 34(1A)  operated  in the same field as section  5(1).   This challenge was upheld in a unanimous judgment and the reasons which  weighed with this Court in taking that view may  best be  stated in the words of Mahajan, C.j., who delivered  the judgment of the Court               "Parliament has-by amending section 34 of  the               Indian Income-tax Act, now provided that cases               of  those  very persons  who  originally  fell               within the ambit of section 5(1) of Act XXX of               1947, and who it was alleged formed a distinct               class,  can  be dealt with under  the  amended               section 34 and under the procedure provided in               the   Income-tax  Act.   Both  categories   of                             persons,  namely,  those who  came  wi thin  the               scope  of section 5(1) as well those who  came               within  the ambit of section 34, now form  one               class.   In  other  words,  substantial   tax-               dodgers or war profiteers who were alleged  to               have formed a definite class according to  the               contention  of  the  learned  Attorney-General               under  section 5 (1), and whose  cases  needed               special   treatment  at  the  hands   of   the               Investigation  Commission  now  clearly   fall               within the ambit of amended section 34 of  the

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             Indian  Income-tax  Act.  That being  so,  the               only basis for giving them differential treat-               ment,  namely,  that they  formed  a  distinct               class    by   themselves,    has    completely               disappeared, with the result that  continuance               of  discriminatory  treatment  to  them  comes               within  the  mischief  of article  14  of  the               Constitution  and  has  thus  to  be  relieved               against.   All these persons can now well  ask               the question, why are we now being dealt  with               by the discriminatory and drastic procedure of               Act XXX of 1947 when those similarly  situated               as ourselves can be dealt with by the  Income-               tax  Officer under the amended  provisions  of               section 34 of the Act-in other words, there is               nothing  uncommon either in properties  or  in               characteristics  between us and those  evaders               of income-tax who are to be discovered by  the               Income-tax  Officer  under the  provisions  of               amended  section  34.   In  our  judgment   no               satisfactory  answer can be returned  to  this               query  because  the  field  on  which  amended               section 34 operates now includes the strip  of               territory  which, previously was  occupied  by               section   5(1)  of  Act   of  1947  and   two,               substantially different laws of procedure, one               being  more prejudicial to the  Assessee  than               the other, cannot be allowed to operate on the               same field in view of the guarantee of article               14 of the Constitution." The  same line of reasoning prevailed with this Court in  M. Ct. Muthiah & Ors. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras &  Anr.(1)  in  holding  that_though  section  5(1)  of  the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947  was valid when section (1)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247.                              45 34(1)  of the Indian Income-tax Act stood in  its  unamended form, it. became void and unenforceable on the amendment  of section  34(1) by the Indian Income-tax and Business  Profit Tax  (Amendment)  Act, 1948 because then section  34(1),  as amended,  operated  on the same field as  section  5(1)  and cases  which  were covered by section 5(1) could’  be  dealt with under the procedure laid-down in section 34(1). It  is,  therefore, clear from these  decisions  that  where there, are two procedures for determination and  enforcement of a liability, be it, civil or criminal or revenue, one  of which is substantially more drastic and prejudicial than the other,  and  they  operate in the same  field,  without  any guiding  policy or principle available from the  legislation as to when one or the other procedure shall be followed, the law providing for the more drastic and prejudicial procedure would be liable to be condemned as discriminatory and  void. This principle has held the field for, over twenty years and it is logically sound and unexceptionable.  The  respondents however,  tried to narrow its scope and ambit by  contending that  it  applies only where the choice of  two  alternative procedures  is  vested in the same,  authority  without  any policy  or  principle being provided by the  legislature  to guide and control the exercise of his discretion and it  has no validity where the initiation of one procedure is in  the hands  of one authority and, the initiation of the other  in the  hands  of another.  The respondents  pointed  out  that Chapter  VA of the Municipal Act does not leave it  to  the; discretion of the Municipal Commissioner to adopt at his own

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sweet will the special procedure provided in that Chapter or the  ordinary  procedure of a civil suit as he  thinks  fit. The initiation of, special procedure provided in Chapter  VA is,  no doubt, with the Municipal Commissioner as he  is  to issue  a  notice under section 105B(2), but so  far  as  the ordinary  procedure of a civil suit is concerned, it is  not in  the hands of the Municipal Commissioner to  initiate  it since  the  suit can be filed by the  Municipal  Corporation only  with the previous approval of the  Standing  Committee under  the provisions, of the Municipal Act.  The  arbitrary choice  of  two alternative procedures  is,  therefore,  not given  to  the same authority and there  is  accordingly  no violation   of   article  14.   This   contention   of   the respondents,  is,  in  our opinion, having,  regard  to  the substance of the guarantee of equality, untenable and cannot be  accepted.   It proceeds on a misconception of  the  true principle  on  which  this  Court,  has  struck  down   laws providing for special procedure which is substantially  more drastic   and  prejudicial  than  the  ordinary   procedure. principle  as well as precedent, clearly appreciated,  would remove  the mist of misunderstanding surrounding this  facet of constitutional quality.  The principle which emerges from the  decisions of this Court-and we have  already  discussed some  of  the  important  decisions-is  that  where  persons similarly  circumstanced are exposed to the  procedures  for determination  of  liability,  one being  more  drastic  and prejudicial  than. the other and no guidelines are  provided by  the  legislature  as  to when  one  procedure  shall  be followed  or the other. to that one person may be  subjected to  the  more drastic and prejudicial  procedure  while  the other  may be subjected to the more favourable one,  without there being any valid justification for distinguishing 46 between the two, the law providing for the more drastic  and prejudicial  procedure  is  liable  to  be  struck  down  as discriminatory.  It is not necessary, in order to incur  the condemnation of the equality clause, that the initiation  of both  procedures should be left to the arbitrary  discretion of  one and the same, authority.  What the  equality  clause striker,, at is discrimination, howsoever it results.  It is not  constricted  by  any  constitutional  dogma  or   rigid formula.   There  is an infinite variety of  ways  in  which discrimination  may  occur.   It  may  assume  multitudinous forms.  But wherever it is found and howsoever it arises, it is  within  the inhibition of the equality  clause.   Where, therefore, as between persons similarly situated, one may be Subjected to one procedure while another may be subjected to the  other,  without  there being  any  rational  basis  for distinction and one procedure is substantially more drastic, and prejudicial than the other, unjust discrimination  would result,  irrespective  of whether the  arbitrary  choice  of initiation  of  the  two procedures is vested  in  the  same authority  or  not.  Indeed to the person subjected  to  the more drastic and onerous procedure it is immaterial  whether such  procedure  is put into operation by one or  the  other organ  or agency of the Government or the public  authority. It  is  poor. comfort to him to be told that he  is  treated differently  from  others  like him,  but  the  differential treatment  emanates from one organ or agency of the  Govern- ment or the public authority as distinct from another.   His rejoinder would immediately be that it makes no  difference, because, whichever be they organ or agency of the Government or  the  public authority which initiates  the  differential treatment  against him, it is traceable to the broad  source of  State  power’  or power of  the  public  authority.  The

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unequal   treatment  by  reason  of  the  adoption  of   the substantially  more drastic and onerous procedure  would  be meted out to him by the Administration in its larger  sense- may  be  legally particularised in the  shape  of  different instrumentalities-and he would suffer all the, same.  We are hero  dealing  with  the  common  man  and  when  action  is initiated  against  him  for determining  his  liability  to eviction,  it  would be incomprehensible to him  to  make  a distinction  between  Municipal Commissioner  and  Municipal Corporation  or  Collector  and  Government.   It  would  be nothing  short  of  hypertechnicality  to  say  that  action against him is initiated not by the Municipal Corporation or the  Government  but by the Municipal  Commissioner  or  the Collector.   The constitutionality of a statutory  provision cannot  turn  on  mere difference of the  hands  that  harm, though  both  belong  to the  Government  or  the  Municipal Corporation,  for otherwise it would be easy  to  circumvent the guarantee of equality and to rob it of its substance  by a  subtle and well-manipulated statutory  provision  vesting the  more drastic and prejudicial procedure in  a  different organ of the Government or public authority than the one  in whose  hands  lies  the  power  to,  initiate  the  ordinary procedure.   That would be disastrous.  We must look at  the substance  and  not the mere form.  In fact  in  Suraj  Mull Mohta’s case (supra) and Shree Meenakshi Mills case  (supra) the  special  procedure under the Income  Tax  Investigation Commission Act could be initiated by the Central  Government while the ordinary                              47 procedure under the Income Tax Act could be initiated by  an altogether  different  authority,  namely,  the  income  Tax Officer, and yet it was held that section 5, sub-section (4) in one case and section 5, sub-.section (1)  in  the   other were  violative of article 14 since the two procedures,  one substantially  more  drastic and judicial  than  the  other. operated  in  the  same field without  any  guideline  being provided  by  the legislature as to when one  or  the  other shall be adopted.  Moresoever, it is not correct to say that it  is  the Municipal Commissioner who  would  initiate  the special  procedure  set out in Chapter  VA.   The  Municipal Commissioner  would  be moved by the Estate Officer  of  the Municipal Corporation to issue a notice under section  105B, sub-section  just  as a civil court would be  moved  by  the Municipal Corporation to issue process against the occupant. Alternatively, the matter can also be viewed from a slightly different standpoint.  When a Municipal Commissioner  issues notice  under section 105B, sub-section (2)  initiating  the special  procedure  against an occupant, he really  acts  on behalf  and for the benefit of the Municipal  Corporation-he seeks  to  enforce the right of the  Municipal  Corporation. Therefore,  it  is really the  Municipal  Corporation  which avails of the special procedure set out in Chapter VA.   The scope  and  content  of  the  aforementioned  rule   against discrimination in matters of procedure cannot, therefore, be narrowed  down  or  its applicability in  the  present  case obviated on the ground suggested by the respondents. It was then contended on behalf of the respondents that even where  two  procedures are available against a  person,  one substantially  more drastic and prejudicial than the  other, and there is no guiding principle or policy laid down by the legislature  as to when one or the other shall  be  adopted, there would be no violation of the equality clause, if  both procedures  are  fair.  The argument was  that  the  special procedure provided by the legislature would not fall foul of the equality clause even if it is substantially more drastic

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and  prejudicial  than  the ordinary  procedure,  if  it  is otherwise  fair and reasonable’ This argument was sought  to be  supported  by reference to certain observations  in  the minority  judgment in Northern India Caterers Ltd. v.  State of  Punjab.(1)  But we do not think- this is sound’  in  the context of the guarantee of equality although its  relevance to  reasonable  restrictions under article  19  is  obvious. When  we  are dealing with a question under article  14,  we have to enter the comparative arena for determining  whether there  is equal treatment of persons similarly  situated  so far  as  the  procedure for determination  of  liability  is concerned.  Mere fairness of the special procedure which  is impugned  as discriminatory is not enough to take it out  of the  inhibition of article 14.  The fairness of the  special procedure  would  undoubtedly  be relevant  if  the  special procedure is challenged as imposing unreasonable restriction under  article 19(1) (f). it would also be relevant  if  the special procedure were assailed as being in violation of the due process clause in a country like the United States.  But where  the  attack  is under article 14,  what  we  have  to consider is whether there is equality before law, and  there the  question that has to be asked and answered  is  whether the  two  procedures  are  so  disparate  substantially  and qualitatively as to lead to unequal treatment. (1)-[1967] 3 S.C.R. 399 48 Equality before law cannot be denied to a person by  telling him "It is true that you are being treated differently  from others who are similarly situate with you and the  procedure to  which you are subjected is definitely more  drastic  and prejudicial as compared to the procedure to which others are subjected, but you should not complain because the procedure adopted against you is quite fair".  The question which such a person would legitimately ask is : " why am I being  dealt with  under the more drastic and prejudicial procedure  when others, similarly situate as myself are dealt with under the ordinary  procedure  which is less drastic  and  onerous  ?" There  would have to be a rational answer to this  query  in order  to  meet  the  challenge  of  article  14.   It   is, therefore, no argument on the part of the respondents to say that  the  special procedure set out in Chapter  VA  of  the Municipal  Act is fair and consequently it does not have  to stand the test of article 14. Having  cleared the ground, we may now proceed to apply  the principle which we have discussed above and consider whether the  impugned provisions in Chapter VA of the Municipal  Act and  the  Government  Premises Eviction  Act  are  void  and unenforceable as being discriminatory in character.  Now, as already  pointed  out, the differentiation of  occupiers  of Municipal  or  Government premises from occupiers  of  other premises for the.applicability of the special procedure laid down in the impugned provisions is based on an  intelligible principle  having a clear and reasonable relation  with  the object  of  the legislation, which is to ensure  speedy  and expeditious  recovery  of Municipal or  Government  premises from  unauthorised  occupiers  in public  interest  and  the impugned  provisions  cannot,  therefore,  be  condemned  as invalid  on the ground that they make unjust  discrimination between  occupiers of Municipal or Government  premises  and occupiers  of other premises.  But the question is and  that is  the  argument  we  must  consider-whether  the  impugned provisions   permit  discrimination  amongst  occupiers   of Municipal  or Government premises inter se and are  on  that account invalid.  Can it be said that the special  procedure laid  down  in  the impugned  provisions  and  the  ordinary

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procedure  of  a  civil suit operate on the  same  class  of occupiers  of Municipal or Government premises  without  any guiding   policy  or  principle  being  laid  down  by   the legislature  as to when one or the other procedure shall  be adopted  so that within the class of occupiers of  Municipal or   Government  premises,  some  may,  in   the   arbitrary uncontrolled  discussion  of the  Municipal  Corporation  or Municipal  Commissioner or Government, be proceeded  against under the special procedure, while others may be left to  be dealt  with under the ordinary procedure ? Do  the  impugned provisions vest absolute and unguided power in the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Commissioner or Government to  pick and  choose  some  occupiers  of  Municipal  or   Government premises  for being dealt with under the  special  procedure set  out  in the impugned provisions leaving  others  to  be dealt  with under the ordinary procedure of a civil  suit  ? The  majority  decision in Norther Indian Caterers  Ltd.  v. State  of Punjab(1) would seem to suggest that the  impugned provisions do suffer from this vice but that is not correct. There is a basic fallacy from which the majority decision in Northern India Caterers (1)  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399                              49 Ltd.  v.  State of Punjab (1) suffers and that  is  that  it overlooks  the  distinction  between  those  cam  where  the legislature  itself  makes  a  complete  classification   of persons  or  things  and applies to them the  law  which  it enacts and others where the legislature merely lays down the law to be applied to persons or things answering to a  given description or processing certain common characteristics and having  regard to the impossibility of making a precise  and complete  classification,  leaves it  to  an  administrative authority  to make a selective application of the law to  or things within the defined group, while laying down  standard or at least indicating clear terms the underlying policy and purpose, in accordance with, and in fulfillment of which the administrative  authority is expected to select the  persons or things to be brought within the operation of the law.  it must  be  remembered  that having  regard  to  the  manifold complexities of life, an infinite variety of situations  may arise which cannot be fitted into straight jacket formula or classified    into   rigid   inflexible    divisions.     No classification can be logically complete or accord with  the pattern  of  plumb line precision.  Life is not  capable  of being divided into wafer-tight divisions and categories  and it  is  not possible to force the teeming  multiplicity  and variety  of  human  activity  into  a  procrustean  bed   of symmetrical rules.  Absolute precision or complete  symmetry are unattainable and it is as well that it should be so, for otherwise  life  would be mechanical and lose  its  manifold variety.   The legislature can, therefore, do no  more  than define broad categories and indicate the Policy and  purpose underlying  the  legislation  and  leave  it  to  a   stated authority  to  make  selective application  of  the  law  in accordance  with  such policy and purpose a  case  the  That would not be obnoxious to article 14 because in such a  case the  discretion to make the selection would be a guided  and controlled  discretion  and not an absolute  and  unfettered one.  Mukherjee,J.,  pointed  out in  Kathi  Raning  Rawat’s case92);"- if the legislative policy is clear and definite a as  an  effective  method of carrying  out  that  policy   a discretion  is  vested  by  the  statute  upon  a  body   of administrators or officers to make selective application  of the law to certain classes or  groups of persons, the statue itself  cannot  be  condemned  as  a  piece   discriminatory

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legislation.After  all " the law does all that is needed  at is  when  it does all that it can, indicates a  policy  -and seeks  to bring  within the lines all similarly situated  so far  as its means allow". (Vide Buck v. Bell,(3).   In  such cases, the power given to the executive body would import  a duty on it to classify the subject- matter of legislation in accordance  with the objective indicated in the statue.  The discretion   that is conferred on official agencies in  such circumstances  is not an unguided discretion; it has  to  be exercised in conformity with the policy to effectuate  which the  direction  is  given  and it is  in  relation  to  that objective  that  the propriety of the  classification  would have  to  he tested." It is, therefore, not correct  to  say that merely because the Municipal Corporation, or  Municipal Commissioner  or Government is not compellable to adopt  the special procedure set out in the impugned provisions against all  occupiers of Municipal or Government premises,  but  is vested  with  a  discretion in the  matter,  the  in  offend against article 14.  What we have to see is Whether there is any (1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399 (2) [1952] 3 S.C.R. 435. (3) 274 U.S. 200, 208. Ll31Sup.CI]75 50 standard  indicated or policy and purpose disclosed  in  the impugned provisions in accordance with and in fulfillment of which the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Commissioner or Government  is expected to select occupies of  Municipal  or Government  premises for being proceeded against  under  the special  procedure.   If  the discretion  conferred  on  the Municipal  Corporation or Municipal Commissioner or  Govern- ment to make selective application of the special  procedure is guided and controlled discretion, the impugned provisions would  be,  free from ,the vice of  discrimination.   It  is inevitable that when a special procedure is being prescribed for  a  defined  class  of  persons  such  as  occupiers  of Municipal  or  Government premises,  discretion,  of  course guided  and controlled by the underlying policy and  purpose of  the  legislature,  must  necessarily  be  left  in   the administrative authority to select occupiers of Municipal or Government  premises to be brought within the, operation  of the special procedure.  There may be endless variations from case   to   case  depending  on  the  peculiar   facts   and circumstances  of each case, and it may be that  some  cases are such, as for example involving complicated questions  of law or fact, where special procedure, which is comparatively of  a summary nature may not be found to be  appropriate  in the  interest  of  justice.   It would  indeed  be  odd  and certainly harsh and oppressive to the occupiers of Municipal or  Government  premises  if  the  Municipal-Corporation  or Municipal Commissioner or Government were to be compelled to adopt  the special procedure in such cases.  The  nature  of the  dispute,  the complexity of the questions  arising  for consideration  and the legal competence of the  adjudicating authority  to  decide such questions would all  have  to  be weighed  alongside with the need for speedy and  expeditious recovery of Municipal or Government premises for public uses which  is  the  basic  policy  and  purpose  underlying  the legislation  and  the  Municipal  Corporation  or  Municipal Commissioner   or  Government  would  have  to   decide   in accordance   with   the   guidance   furnished   by    these considerations whether in a given case the special procedure should be adopted or the occupier of Municipal or Government premises  should  be proceeded against  under  the  ordinary

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procedure.   There  is thus clear guidance provided  by  the legislature  as  to  when the special  procedure  should  be adopted  and  when a case should be left to  be  dealt  with under the ordinary procedure and the impugned provisions  do not suffer from the vice of discrimination. This  view,  which  we  are  taking  on  principle,  is  not something novel or unusual.  It treads the beaten path  laid out  by at least two decisions of this Court.  The first  is the  decision  in  Kedar  Nath  Bajoria  v.  State  of  West Bengal.(1) There also an argument was advanced that even  if the  Scheduled  offences and the persons  charged  with  the commission thereof could properly form a class in respect of which special legislation could be enacted, section 4(1)  of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949  was discriminatory and void inasmuch as it  vested  an unfettered discretion in the Provincial Government to choose any particular case of a person alleged to have committed an offence  falling under any of the specified  categories  for allotment to the special court to be tried under the special procedure, while other offenders of the same category  would be  left to be tried by ordinary courts.  It was urged  that section 4(1) permitted the (1) [1954] S.C.R. 30 51 Provincial  Government  to  make  a  discriminatory   choice amongst  persons charged with the same offence  or  offences for  trial by special court and such absolute  and  unguided power of selection, though it had to be exercised within,the class or classes of offences mentioned in the Schedule,  was discriminatory.This  contention  urged  on  behalf  of   the petitioners  was  negatived  and  Patanjali  Sastri,   C.J., delivering majority judgment of the Court pointed out               "The   argument  overlooks   the   distinction               between  those  cases where,  the  legislature               itself  makes  a  complete  classification  of               persons or things and applies to them the  law               which   it   enacts,  and  other   where   the               legislature  merely  lays down the law  to  be               applied  to persons or things answering  to  a               given description or exhibiting certain common               characteristics,  but being unable to  make  a               precise and complete classification, leaves it               to  an  administrative  to  make  a  selective               application  of the law to persons  or  things               within  the defined group, while  laying  down               the standards or at least indicating in  clear               terms  the underlying policy and  purpose,  in               accordance  with, and in fulfillment of  which               the  administrative authority is  expected  to               select  the  persons or things to  be  brought               under  the operation of the law.   A  familiar               example  of  this type of legislation  is  the               Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which,  having               indicated  in  what classes of cases  and  for               what  purposes  preventive  detention  can  be               ordered,  vests in the executive  authority  a               discretionary   power  to  select   particular               persons to be brought under the law.   Another               instance  in point is furnished by those  pro-               visions  of the Criminal Procedure Code  which               provide  immunity  from  prosecution   without               sanction  of  the Government for  offences  by               public servants in relation to their  official               acts, the policy of the law being that  public               officials  should  not be unduly  harassed  by

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             private  prosecution unless in the opinion  of               the Government, there were reasonable  grounds               for  prosecuting  the  public  servant   which               accordingly  should  condition  the  grant  of               sanction.   It is not, therefore,  correct  to               say that section 4 of the Act offends  against               article 14 of the Constitution, merely because               the Government is not compellable to allot all               cases  of offences set out in the schedule  to               Special Judges but is vested with a  discretion               in the matter. Mr.  Chatterjee brought to  our               notice  in  the  course  of  his  argument   a               decision  of the Calcutta High Court in J.  K.               Gupta  v. The State(1) where a  Special  Bench               (Harries,  C.J.,  Das  and  Das  Gupta,   JJ.)               inclined  to the view that the Act  now  under               challenge  did  not create a  valid  class  or               classes of offences, and held that even if the               classification were held to be proper, section               4(1)  was  ultra  vires  article  14  of   the               Constitution in that a discretionary power was               given  to  the  State to allot  cases  to  the               Special Court or not               (1)   [1952] 56 C.W.N. 701,               52               as  the  State Government felt  inclined,  and               thus  to discriminate between persons  charged               with an offence falling within the same class.               We  are unable to share this view.  There  may               be endless variations from case to case in the               facts   and   circumstances   attending    the               commission of the same type of offence, and in               many of those cases there may be nothing  that               justifies or calls for the application of  the               provisions  of the special Act.  For  example,               sections 414 and 417 of the Indian Penal  Code               are   among  the  offences  included  in   the               Schedule to the Act, but they are triable in a               summary way under section 260 of the  Criminal               Procedure Code where the value of the property               concerned  does not exceed fifty  rupees.   It               would indeed be odd if the Government were  to               be compelled to allot such trivial cases to  a               Special  Court to be tried as a  warrant  case               with  an appeal to the High Court in  case  of               conviction.   The  gravity of  the  particular               clime,  the  advantage to be  derived  by  the               State  by  recoupment of its loss,  and  other               like  considerations  may have to  be  weighed               before  allotting a case to the Special  Court               which  is  required to impose  a  compensatory               sentence  of fine on every offender tried  and               convicted  by  it.  It  seems  reasonable,  if               misuse  of the special machinery provided  for               the  more  effective  punishment  of   certain               classes  of offenders is to be  avoided,  that               some  competent authority should  be  invested               with  the  power to make a  selection  of  the               cases  which  should be dealt with  under  the               special Act." The other decision to which we may refer in this  connection is  A Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M.  Venkitachalam  Potti.(1) There  the  constitutional validity of section 5(1)  of  the Travancore  Taxation  on Income  (Investigation  Commission) Act,  1124  was  challenged mainly on the  ground  that  the

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procedure for assessment prescribed by it was discriminatory as  compared with the procedure prescribed under section  47 of  the  Travancore Act XXIII of 1121.  This  challenge  was repelled  on  the  view that the persons  dealt  with  under section 5(1) formed a distinct class of substantial  evaders of income-tax who required to be specially treated under the drastic  procedure  provided by the Travancore  Taxation  on Income  (Investigation  Commission Act, 1124.   But  it  was urged  as an alternative argument that even if  the  persons who  could be proceeded against under section 5(1) formed  a distinct   class  by  themselves  and  there  was   rational justification for providing special procedure for  assessing them,  "it would be open to the Government within the  terms of  section 5(1) of the Act itself to  discriminate  between persons  and  persons  who fall within  the  very  group  or category;  the Government might refer the case of A  to  the Commission  leaving  the case of B to be dealt with  by  the ordinary procedure laid down in the Travancore Act, XXIII of 1121".   This was an identical argument as the one  advanced before us and it challenged the  validity of section 5(1) on the ground that it was discriminatory a between persons  who fall  within the category of substantial evaders of  income- tax.   This  Court however negatived the argument and  N.  H Bhagwati, J.,, speaking on behalf of the Court observed (1)  (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196                              53               The   possibility   of   such   discriminatory               treatment  of persons falling within the  same               group or category, however, cannot necessarily               invalidate this piece of legislation. it is to               be  presumed, unless the contrary were  shown,               that  the administration of a  particular  law               would  be  done  "not with  an  evil  eye  and               unequal  hand" and the selection made  by  the               Government  of  the  cases of  persons  to  be               referred  for investigation by the  Commission               would not be discriminatory."               The   learned  Judge  then  referred  to   the               decisions  of  this  Court  in  Kathi   Raning               Rawat’s case (supra) and Kedar Nath  Bajoria’s               case (supra) and concluded by saying :               "It therefore, follows that the mere fact that               the Government is entrusted with the power  to               select  cases  of persons falling  within  the               group  of category of substantial  evaders  of               income-tax  for  reference to  the  Commission               would   not   render   section   5   (   1   )               discriminatory and void...... The selection of               the  cases  of  persons  falling  within  that               category   by   the   Government   cannot   be               challenged  as discriminatory for  the  simple               reason that it is not left to the unguided  or               the    unconditional   discretion    of    the               Government.   The, selection is guided by  the               very  objective which is set out in the  terms               of section 5 (1) itself and the attainment  of               that  object controls the discretion which  is               vested  in  the  Government  and  guides   the               Government in making the necessary selection of               cases   of   persons  to   be   referred   for               investigation  by the Commission.  It  cannot,               therefore,  be disputed that there is a  valid               basis of classification to be found in section               5(1) of the Act." These  passages  from the decisions in  Kedarnath  Bajoria’s

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case  (supra) and A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar’s  case  (supra) provide the most convincing refutation of the contention  of the petitioners/appellants based on discrimination. It may be pointed out that the aforesaid decisions in  Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal (supra) and A.  Thangal Kunju  Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti (supra)  were  not brought  to the attention of the learned Judges who  decided Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab (supra).  if their  attention had been drawn to these decisions, we  have no doubt that the majority judges would not have come to the decision  to  which they did.  We are of the view  that  the decision in Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of  Punjab (supra)  does  not  represent the correct law  and  must  be overruled.    The  challenge  against   the   constitutional validity  of  Chapter  VA  of  the  Municipal  Act  and  the Government   Premises  Eviction  Act  must  accordingly   be rejected. It would on this view appear to be unnecessary  to consider whether the special procedure set out in Chapter VA of  the  Municipal  Act is substantially  more  drastic  and prejudicial  than  the ordinary procedure of a  civil  suit. That is one more requirement which must be 54 satisfied  before the special procedure provided in  Chapter VA of the Municipal Act can be condemned as  discriminatory. We  would not have ordinarily preceded to  consider  whether this requirement is satisfied or not as it is unnecessary to do  so,  but since we find that there is some  confusion  in regard to this question which needs to be cleared up and the mist  of uncertainty surrounding this question needs  to  be dispelled,  we propose to deal with this question.   We  may point  at  the outset-and this must be constantly  borne  in mind,  for  otherwise  it is likely to  distort  the  proper perspective of article 14that mere minor differences between the  two  procedures  would  not be  enough  to  invoke  the inhibition  of  the equality clause.   The  equality  clause would become the delight of legal casuistry and be shorn  of its  real  purpose  which  is  to  provide  hope  of   equal dispensation  to the common man-"the butcher, the baker  and the  candle stick maker" if we indulged in weaving  gossamer webs out of this guarantee of equality or started meticulous hunt for minor differences in procedure.  What the  equality clause  is  intended to strike at are real  and  substantial disparities,  substantive  or  processor  and  arbitrary  or capricious actions of the executive and it would be contrary to the object and intendment of the equality clause to exalt delicate  distinctions, shades of harshness and  theoretical possibilities  of prejudice into  legislative inequality  or executive  discrimination.  Our approach to article 14  must be  informed by a sense of perspective and proportion  based on  robust  understanding  and  rejection  of   over-refined distinctions.   The  whole dimension of  protection  against discrimination  in the processor sphere relates to real  and substantial disparities in procedures.  What is necessary to attract  the inhibition of article 14 is that there must  be substantial  and  qualitative differences  between  the  two procedures  so  that one is really  and  substantially  more drastic  and  prejudicial  than  the  other  and  not   mere superfine  differences  which  in this  imperfect  world  of fallible  human  instruments  are bound to  exist  when  two procedures  are  prescribed.  We should avoid  dogmatic  and finish approach when handling life’s flexible realities. We may also observe that there is no magic formula by  which it  can  be said that one procedure  is  substantially  more drastic and onerous than the other.  It does not follow that merely  because one procedure provides the forum of a  civil

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court   while   the   other  provides  the   forum   of   an administrative  tribunal,  the latter  is  necessarily  more ,drastic  and onerous than the frontier.  We  cannot  accept such a bald proposition.  Indeed, not infrequently, the poor man  gets  lost when he is drawn into a regular  suit  in  a civil  court which, it is well known, has a long  drawn  out expensive  and  escalating  mitigative  system  which  often spells  ruin  to  the ordinary  man  and,  consequently,  by contrast, a prompt and inexpensive instrument, though manned by  administrative personnel untrained in the  sophisticated court methodology and unaided by long and intricate argument of counsel engaged on onerous term, may be preferred by many in  this  country.  The procedure of the  civil  court  also suffers  from many technicalities: It proceeds on  rules  of evidence which are sometimes highly technical, receives pro- 55 bative   material  only  when  placed  on   record   through prescribed  Procedures even though a better appreciation  of the  situation may perhaps be possible by other   means  and acts solely on the material brought on record excluding what commonsense and experience may sometime suggest as useful in reaching  the  truth.  Again, it functions on the  basis  of adversary  system  of administration of  justice  which  may bring  about inequality where, the opposing adversaries  are not evenly balanced.  It is quite. possible that in  certain types  of  cases  people may receive  better  justice  where judicial  formalism  is kept out and the procedure  Is  made informal.  The many-tiered system of appeals built into  the judicial pyramid often results in pyrrhic victory and  leads to  disenchantment with the end product of delayed  justice. We  cannot, therefore, accept as an axiomatic  exemption  or universal  generalisation that as between an  administrative tribunal   and   a  civil  court,  the  latter   is   always functionally better than the former.  We have grown up in  a system of administration of justice where civil courts  have been  the  primary  authority entrusted  with  the  task  of determination of disputes and, therefore, whenever a special machinery  is  devised by the Legislature  entrust  and  the power of determination of disputes to another authority  set up by the Legislature in substitution of courts of law,  our minds  which are conditioned by the historical existence  of courts  of law and which have therefore, acquired a  certain predilection for the, prevailing system of administration of justice  by  courts  of law,  react  adversely  against  the establishment of such an authority.  We must cast aside  our predilection  for the existing system of  administration  of justice  which has prevailed over a long period of time  and examine  the  special machinery set up  by  the  legislature objectively  and dispassionately, without  any  preconceived notion  or  prejudice against it, and find out  whether  the special  machinery is really and substantially more  drastic and  prejudicial than the age old machinery of Civil  court. When  we  say  this we do not wish to  underscore  the  high qualities   which   are,  the  inalienable   attributes   of administration   of   justice  by  civil   courts,   namely, detachment   and  impartiality,  objectivity  of   approach, sensitivity  and  regard for natural justice and  Skill  and expertise  in  sifting of evidence  and  interpretation  and application  of the law.  But we do wish to point  out  that the   machinery  of  an  administrative  tribunal   is   not necessarily  and  invariably more drastic and  onerous  than that of a civil court.  The two procedures would have to  be compared   objectively  and  dispassionately   without   any predilection or prejudice to determine whether one is really and  substantially  more drastic and  prejudicial  than  the

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other. If  we examine the question before us in the light of  these general  observations, it will be apparent that the  special procedure set out in Chapter VA of the Municipal Act is  not substantially   more  drastic  and  prejudicial   than   the ordinary. procedure of a civil suit.  The initial  authority to  determined  the liability to eviction is  no  doubt  the Municipal Commissioner who is the chief executive officer of the  Municipal Corporation and who, may not be possessed  of any  legal  training  but section 68 of  the  Municipal  Act provides  that  this  function  may  be  discharged  by  any Municipal officer whom the Municipal 56 Commissioner  may generally or specially empower in  writing in   that  behalf  and  the  Municipal   Commissioner   can, therefore,   authorise  a  Deputy   Municipal   Commissioner attached   to   the  Legal  Department  of   the   Municipal Corporation,  who  would be an officer trained  in  law,  to discharge this function and indeed we have no doubt that the Municipal Commissioner, if he is himself not trained in law, would do so.  The determination of the liability to eviction would, therefore, really in practice be made by a  Municipal officer  having  proper and adequate legal  training.   Then again,  the occupant against whom the special  procedure  is set  in  motion  would  have a right  to  file  his  written statement  and  produce documents and he would also  be  en- titled   to  examine  and  cross-examine   witnesses.    The Municipal Commissioner or other officer holding the  inquiry is given the power, to summon and enforce the attendance  of witnesses  and  examine them on oath and  also  require  the discovery and production of documents.  The occupant is also entitled  to appear at the inquiry by advocate, attorney  or pleader.   Thus, in effect and substance the same  procedure which is followed in a civil court is made available in  the proceeding  before  the  Municipal  Commissioner  or   other officer holding the inquiry.  Then there is also a right  of appeal against the decision of the Municipal Commissioner or other  officer and this right of appeal is to a  senior  and highly  experienced  judicial  officer and  not  to  a  mere executive authority.  The appeal lies to the Principal Judge of  the City Civil Court or such other judicial  officer  in Greater  Bombay of not less than ten years standing  as  the Principal  Judge may designate in that behalf and it -is  an appeal  both  on law and fact.  It is true that  a  revision application against the appellate order is excluded, but  if the  judicial  officer invested with  appellate,  power  has failed  to exercise his jurisdiction or acted in  excess  of his  jurisdiction or committed an error of law  apparent  on the  face  of the record or the decision given  by  him  has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, it is always  open to the aggrieved party to bring it up before the High  Court for  examination  under  article 226 or  article  227.   The ultimate  decision  is,  therefore, by  a  judicial  officer trained in the art and skill of law and not by an  executive officer.  It is difficult to see bow, in the context of  the need for speedy and expeditious recovery of public  premises for   utilisation   for   important   public   uses,   where dilatoriness of the procedure may defeat the very object  of recovery, the special procedure set out in Chapter VA of the Municipal  Act-and  this  applies  equally  to  the  special procedure  set out in the Government Premises Eviction  Act- can be regarded as really and substantially more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil suit.  We do  not think that the two procedures are  so  substantially and  qualitatively  disparate  as to  attract  the  vice  of

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discrimination. The  result is that all the appeals and writ petitions  fail and  are dismissed.  The petitioners in the  writ  petitions will  pay  one  set of costs.  So far  as  the  appeals  are concerned,  they will be posted for final disposal before  a Division Bench. V.P.S              Appeals and petitions dismissed. 57