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PETITIONER: MADHYA PRADESH MINERAL INDUSTRYASSOCIATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONERJABALPUR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/04/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR 1068            1960 SCR  (3) 476  CITATOR INFO :  F          1966 SC 189  (10)  R          1972 SC1177  (5,12,15,20)

ACT:        Minimum Wages, Fixation of-Notification by State  Government        prescribing  minimum  rates  for  stone-breaking  or  stone-        crushing  in mines - Validity - Minimum Wages Act, 1948  (11        of 1948), SS. 5 (2), 27, Sch., Part 1 item 8.

HEADNOTE: The Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under s. 5  (2)  of  the  Minimum  Wages  Act,  1948  (II  of  1948), prescribing 477 the minimum rates of wages for employment in stone  breaking and  stone  crushing  operations  carried  on  in  mines  in exercise  of the authority delegated to it by the  President by  a notification under Art. 258 of the Constitution.   The appellant  company,  engaged in manganese  mining  industry, challenged  the validity of the said notification by a  writ petition  filed in the High Court and its case was that  the said  notification was ultra vires s. 5(2) of the Act.   The High  Court  found against the appellant  and  rejected  the petition.   The  question for determination in  the  appeal, therefore,  was whether item 8 in Part 1 of the Schedule  to the  Act,  properly construed, included stone  breaking  and stone crushing operations in a mining industry: Held,  that item 8 in Part 1 of the Schedule to the  Minimum Wages  Act, 1948, was not intended to cover the breaking  or crushing of stones incidental to mining operations and  must be  limited to stone breaking and stone crushing  employment in  quarries.   The impugned  notification  was,  therefore, ultra vires s. 5(2) of the Act and could not be enforced. It  would,  however,  be open to the Government,  if  it  so desired, to achieve the object it had in view in issuing the impugned  notification  by adding appropriate items  to  the Schedule in exercise of its power under s. 27 of the Act : Held,  further, that it was not necessary for the  appellant to  challenge the vires of the Presidential notification  in the  first  instance  in  order that  he  might  impugn  the notification in question.

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A.   Thangal  Kunju  Musaliar  v.  M.  Venkitachalam  Potti, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196, referred to,

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1959.        Appeal  from the judgment and order dated October 25,  1957,        of  the Bombay High Court at Nagpur in Misc.   Petition  No.        476 of 1956.        A.   S. Bobde and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant.        H.   J. Umrigar K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent        No. 2.        1960.  April 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises -from a writ  petition        filed  by  the appellant, Madhya  Pradesh  Mineral  Industry        Association, in which the appellant challenged the  validity        of  the  notification  issued by the  Madhya  Pradesh  State        Government  on March 30, 1952, under S. 5(2) of the  Minimum        Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act).        The High Court of Bombay at Nagpur dismissed the appellant’s        petition but has granted the appellant        61        478        a  certificate  of  fitness  under  Art.  133(1)(c)  of  the        Constitution.   It  is with the said  certificate  that  the        present appeal has been brought to this Court.        The  appellant  is a non-profit making  company  limited  by        guarantee and registered under s. 26 of the Indian Companies        Act, 1913.  It has been formed with the object of protecting        and  promoting the interest of its members-shareholders  who        are  engaged  in the mining industry by all  legitimate  and        constitutional means.  It appears that under Art. 258 of the        Constitution  the  President of India  by  Notification  No.        S.R.O.  2052  published  on  December  11,  1951,  entrusted        Governments  of  . certain States including  Madhya  Pradesh        with  their consent the functions of the Central  Government        under  the  Act in so far as such functions  relate  to  the        fixation  of minimum rates of wages in respect of  employees        employed  in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing  operations        carried on in mines situated within their respective States.        Pursuant   to  the  said  delegation  the   Madhya   Pradesh        Government  issued the impugned notification  purporting  to        act  under  s.  5(2)  of the  Act.   This  notification  has        prescribed  the  minimum rates of wages  for  employment  in        stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in        mines.  The rates thus prescribed were inclusive of dearness        allowance or compensatory cost of living allowance.        The   Regional   Labour  Commissioner   (Central),   Nagpur,        Respondent  1, wrote to the appellant for the first time  on        June  20,  1956, stating that the State of  Madhya  Pradesh,        Respondent  2, had considered the question whether  the  Act        was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had come        to the conclusion that it was so applicable; that is why the        appellant’s members were asked by respondent 1 to  implement        the  Act within a fortnight from the receipt of his  letter.        The  appellant made several representations to respondent  1        urging that the Act was inapplicable to the manganese mining        industry;  nevertheless respondent 1 threatened  large-scale        prosecution of the appellant’s members on the basis that the        Act applied to them, and its provisions bad been contravened        by them.  The appellant was thus driven to file the        479        present  petition because it alleged that it had  no  alter-        native  remedy, at any rate equally speedy and  efficacious,

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      and so it was urged on its behalf that the High Court should        issue  a  writ quashing the impugned notification  as  ultra        vires.  In its petition the appellant had also alleged  that        the notification issued by the President of India under Art.        258  cannot  fasten upon the manganese mining  industry  the        character of employment in stone-breaking or  stone-crushing        and  if that was the object of the said notification it  was        invalid.        The respondents disputed the correctness of the  appellant’s        contention  that the impugned notification is  invalid.   It        was  urged  on their behalf that any  industry  wherein  the        workers are employed in operations involving  stone-breaking        or stone-crushing is governed by the Act.  In their  written        statement  they  described  the  details  about  the  mining        operations  and contended that the mining of  manganese  ore        mainly consists of development work or the removal of  over-        burden,  breaking of big mineral stones like boulder ore  or        bed  ore  to manageable sizes, dressing of  ores  to  remove        impurities,  etc.   According  to  the  respondents,  having        regard  to the nature of the manganese mining  industry  the        Act   applied  to  the  stone-breaking   or   stone-crushing        operations connected with it.        The  High Court has accepted the respondent’s plea  and  has        rejected the appellant’s prayer that a writ should be issued        in its favour prohibiting the respondents from enforcing the        provisions  of the Act against its members.   Unfortunately,        on  two  important  points the High  Court  has  misdirected        itself.   It  appears  to have  assumed  that  the  impugned        notification has added an entry in the Schedule to the  Act,        and  has observed that as a result of the said addition  the        provisions  of the Act came to be applied to the  employment        in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on        in  the mines.  The High Court has made this observation  in        setting  out the appellant’s case and it is on the basis  of        this  observation  that  the High  Court  has  proceeded  to        examine the validity of the appellant’s contention.  It  is,        however,  clear  that  the impugned  notification  does  not        purport to add any        480        item  in  Schedule I and that was also not the case  of  the        appellant.   Thus the assumption made by the High Court  on,        both the points is, with respect, erroneous.        In  its judgment the High Court has also observed  that  the        vires of the impugned notification, though challenged in the        petition,  was not challenged before -the High Court and  so        the only question that remained for its decision was one  of        interpretation  of  the  relevant provisions  of  the  entry        introduced  by the notification.  This statement again  does        not  appear to be entirely correct.  The principal,  if  not        the  sole, ground on which the appellant sought for  a  writ        from  the High Court was that the impugned notification  was        ultra vires s. 5(2) of the Act.  If the validity of the said        notification  had  been conceded by the appellant  its  writ        petition  would have immediately become ineffective  because        if   the  notification  is  valid  then  the   question   of        construction of the material entry can present no difficulty        whatever.   In  terms the stonebreaking  and  stone-crushing        operations  carried  on  in  mines  are  specified  and  the        appellant   could  not  possibly  urge  that  the   relevant        activities  carried  on by its members did not  attract  the        said  description.  In view of the fact that the High  Court        has  made a clear statement to the effect that the vires  of        the impugned notification had not been challenged before  it        we  were at first not inclined to allow Mr. Bobde,  for  the        appellant,  to  argue that point before us;  however,  after

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      hearing him and after considering the rest of the record  we        are satisfied that the statement made in the judgment is not        accurate.   In  the  petition filed  by  the  appellant  the        validity of two notifications was challenged; the first  was        the notification issued by the President of India under Art.        258  of  the Constitution, and the second  is  the  impugned        notification under which proceedings are threatened  against        the  appellant’s members.  It is clear from the record  that        the  appellant did not and could not have pressed  its  case        against  the validity of the first notification, but it  did        press  its  objection  against the validity  of  the  second        notification ; and that would be clear from the  certificate        of fitness granted by the High Court itself.  The        481        certificate says that the questions raised by the  appellant        relate to the applicability of the provisions of the Act  to        persons   employed  in  stone-breaking   or   stone-crushing        operations carried on at various manganese mines.  Now it is        clear  that  this question can arise only if  the  appellant        seeks  to  challenge the validity of the  notification,  not        otherwise.   It  is because the employees in  question  are,        according  to the appellant, not employed under any  of  the        items  prescribed  in  the  Schedule to  the  Act  that  the        impugned  notification  is  invalid;  in  that  context  the        questions  posed  in the certificate would  arise.   If  the        notification  itself  is  valid then  the  solution  to  the        question  posed  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  fit  for   a        certificate  under  Art.  133(1)(c)  of  the   Constitution.        Besides, the appellant’s contention against the validity  of        the   impugned  notification  has  been  set  out   in   its        application  for certificate before the High Court  and  the        same  has been expressly repeated in the statement  of  case        filed by the appellant before us.  We must, therefore,  hold        that the High Court was in error in assuming that the  vires        of  the  impugned  notification had  been  conceded  by  the        appellant  before it.  This is another serious infirmity  in        the judgment of the High Court.        As a consequence of the two infirmities in the judgment  the        approach  which the High Court adopted in dealing  with  the        matter  has been considerably influenced.  It has  no  doubt        considered the meaning of the word " employment and "  stone        "  in connection with the expression stone-breaking " and  "        stone-crushing".   Even this part of the discussion’ in  the        judgment seems to assume that the impugned notification  has        really  added one item to the list in the Schedule.  It  has        apparently   not   been  realised  that   if   the   present        notification  purported to make an addition to the items  in        the  Schedule there would have been no  controversy  between        the parties.  According to the High Court employment  should        be  given its wider sense and should be held to mean  "  the        action  of employing or the state of being employed  ".  The        High  Court has also held that the word " stone " should  be        taken to mean " a piece of rock or hard mineral sub.  stance        (other than metal) of a small and moderate        482        size".   The interpretation of the two words adopted by  the        High  Court  has been taken by it from  the  Shorter  Oxford        Dictionary,  and  having assigned to the two words  the  two        respective meanings just stated the High Court has held that        stone-breaking  and stone-crushing operations carried on  in        mines would attract the provisions of the Act.        Before  dealing with the vires of the impugned  notification        it  would be material to examine the relevant provisions  of        the  Act.   The Act has been passed to provide  for  minimum        rates of wages in certain employments.  Section 2(b) defines

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      the  appropriate government as meaning, inter alia,  (1)  in        relation to any scheduled employment carried on by or  under        the authority of the Central Government or in relation to  a        mine  the  Central Government, and (2) in  relation  to  any        other  scheduled employment the State Government.  It  would        thus   appear  that  the  Legislature  intended   that   the        provisions of the Act may in due course be extended to mines        and so it has prescribed that in respect thereof the Central        Government  would  be the appropriate  Government.   Section        2(e) defines an employer as meaning, inter alia, any  person        who  employs whether directly or through another  person  or        whether on behalf of himself or any other person one or more        employees  in any scheduled employment in respect  of  which        minimum  rates  of  wages have been fixed  under  this  Act.        Section  2(g)  -defines scheduled employment as  meaning  an        employment  specified  in  the Schedule or  any  process  or        branch  of work forming part of such employment.  Section  3        authorises  the appropriate government to fix minimum  rates        of  wages in regard to the employments specified in Parts  I        and  II  of  the Schedule respectively  and  prescribes  the        procedure in that behalf.  Section 5 lays down the procedure        for the fixing and revising of minimum wages.  Section  5(2)        provides  that after following the procedure  prescribed  by        the  said  section  the  appropriate  government  shall   by        notification in the official gazette fix, or as the case may        be,  revise  the minimum rates of wages in respect  of  each        scheduled employment, and unless such notification otherwise        provides, it shall come into force on the expiry        483        of  three months from the date of its issue.  There is  only        one more section which needs to be mentioned; that is s.  27        which  empowers the appropriate government to add to  either        part  of the Schedule any employment in respect of which  it        is  of opinion that minimum rates of wages should  be  fixed        under  this Act after following the procedure prescribed  by        it, and the section adds that after the notification is thus        issued the Schedule shall, in its application to the  State,        be deemed to be amended accordingly.        It  is  thus  clear  that the whole scheme  of  the  Act  is        intended  to work in regard to the employments specified  in        Part  I and Part II of the Schedule and the Legislature  has        wisely  left it to the appropriate government to  decide  to        what  employments  the Act should be extended  and  in  what        areas.  Section 5(2) empowers the appropriate government  to        fix  or  revise  minimum  wages in  regard  to  any  of  the        employments in the Schedule to which the Act applies.   This        power can be exercised only if the employment in question is        specified   in  the  Schedule  and  the  Act  is   therefore        applicable  to it.  Section 27 confers a wider power on  the        appropriate  government, and in exercise of the  said  power        the  appropriate  government may add an  employment  to  the        Schedule.  The nature and extent of the-said two powers  are        thus  quite separate and distinct and there can be no  doubt        that  what  can  be done by the  appropriate  government  in        exercise  of its power under s. 27 cannot be done by  it  in        exercise of its power under s. 5(2).  It is significant that        the  impugned  notification has been issued  by  the  Madhya        Pradesh Government by virtue of the powers under s. 5(2)  of        the Act which have been delegated to it by the President  in        exercise  of  his  authority  under Art.  258  of  the  Con-        stitution.  The main argument urged by Mr. Bobde is that the        impugned notification is ultra vires s. 5(2) because  stone-        breaking and stone-crushing operations in manganese mines do        not  full under any of the items in Part I of the  Schedule.        The  dispute  thus raised really lies within a  very  narrow

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      compass:  Does  employment in stone-breaking  or  in  stone-        crushing  operations  carried on in mines specified  in  the        impugned notification amount to employment in stone-breaking        484        Schedule  to  the  Act?   It  is  common  ground  that   the        employment in question does not fall under any other item in        Part I.        It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act  are        intended  to achieve the object of doing social  justice  to        workmen employed in the scheduled employments by prescribing        minimum  rates of wages for them, and so in  construing  the        said  provisions  the court should adopt what  is  sometimes        described  as  a beneficent rule of  construction.   If  the        relevant  words are capable of two constructions  preference        may be given to that construction which helps to sustain the        validity  of  the impugned notification; but it  is  obvious        that an occasion for showing preference for one construction        rather  than the other can legitimately arise only when  two        constructions are reasonably possible, not otherwise.   Now,        does  employment  in  stone-breaking  or  stone-crushing  as        specified  in  Part  I  of  the  Schedule  on  a  reasonable        construction   include  stone-breaking   or   stone-crushing        operations in a mining industry ? In answering this question        it would be necessary to bear in mind that the scheduled em-        ployment  under s. 2(g) covers the employment  specified  in        the  Schedule or any process or branch of work forming  part        of  such employment.  It is conceded before us by  both  the        parties  that  the  provisions  of  the  Act  apply  to  the        scheduled  employments in all branches of their  work  which        may  be incidental to the main scheduled  employments.   The        impugned  notification, on the other hand, applies  only  to        the  stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations carried  on        in  mines and it does not cover other  operations  connected        with   the  manganese  mining  works.   This   position   is        inconsistent  with the scheme of the Schedule and that is  a        point  which  prima facie is in favour  of  the  appellant’s        contention.        It  is, however, urged by Mr. Umrigar, for the  respondents,        that  the word " employment " as well as the word " stone  "        used  in item 8 should receive their widest denotation,  and        that,  according  to him, would  include  stone-breaking  or        stone-crushing operations        485        carried on in mines.  It is conceded that stone-breaking  or        stone-crushing operations have to be carried on in regard to        the  work  in manganese mines.  Stones are beaten  to  small        pieces  by means of a hammer and they are washed and  passed        through  sieves  of  different meshes  before  manganese  is        obtained.  When  the Schedule refers to  the  employment  of        stone-breaking  or  stone-crushing  does  it  refer  to  the        incidental stone-breaking or stone-crushing in        connection  with manganese mine operations ?  In a  chemical        or a geological sense stones may include manganese and  that        is  one  of the meanings given to the word  in  the  Shorter        Oxford Dictionary.  On the other hand, the word " stone " as        popularly understood in ordinary parlance particularly  when        it  is  coupled with the word " breaking " or "  crushing  "        would exclude manganese.  When we speak of stone-breaking or        stone-crushing  normally we refer to stone in the  sense  of        "piece   of   rock"  and  that  would   exclude   manganese.        Employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing in this sense        would  refer to quarry operations.  Thus whether or not  the        word " stone " should be understood in the wider sense or in        a  limited sense must depend upon the context in  which  the        word  is used.  The intention which is reasonably  deducible

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      from  the  context would decide whether it is  the  expanded        meaning  or  the  limited meaning of the word  that  can  be        accepted.   The  same  consideration  could  apply  to   the        denotation  of  the  word "  employment  We  have  carefully        considered all the items in the Schedule and have taken into        account the general beneficent policy of the Act but we  are        unable to hold that when item 8 refers to stone-breaking  or        stone-crushing  it is intended to cover the breaking or  the        crushing  of  stones  incidental  to  the  manganese  mining        operations.  The context seems to exclude the application of        the  wider  meaning of the word " stone " used  in  item  8.        Therefore,  our  conclusion is that  the  stone-breaking  or        stone-crushing operations which are carried on in mines  are        not  included in item 8 in the Schedule; and if that be  the        true position the impugned notification issued by the  State        Government under s. 5(2) is ultra vires,        62        486        The  High Court has referred to the fact that in  describing        some items in Part I the word " any " has been used  whereas        the  said  word has not been used in item 8.  For  instance,        item I refers to employment in any woollen carpet making  or        shawl weaving establishment, whereas item 8 merely refers to        employment   in  stone-breaking  and  stone-crushing.    The        absence  of  the word " any " according to  the  High  Court        indicates  that  the  word "stone" as well  as  the  word  "        employment" had been used in their wide denotation.  We  are        not  satisfied that this conclusion is right,.  In  fact  it        appears to us that if the word " any" had been used in  item        8  it might have helped to make its scope wider; that is  to        say,  if  item  8 bad read as " employment  in  any  ,stone-        breaking  or any stone-crushing operations " it  might  have        tended to make its scope wider.  As it stands the entry  is,        in  our  opinion,  confined  to  Stone-breaking  and  stone-        crushing employment in quarries and not in mines.        As we have already pointed out a notification under s.  5(2)        can  be  issued only in respect of  employments  which  fall        under  the  Schedule.  We would, however, like to  add  that        this conclusion merely helps to emphasise the fact that  the        appropriate government may, and can, act under s. 27 of  the        Act  if  it is desired that the employment in  mines  or  in        connection  with any operations incidental to mining  should        be  governed  by  the provisions of  the  Act.   Section  27        empowers  the  appropriate government to add  items  to  the        Schedule and it would be open to the appropriate  government        to  adopt  such a course if it is intended  to  achieve  the        object with which the impugned notification has been issued.        One more point still remains to be considered.  Mr.  Umrigar        attempted  to argue that the appellant cannot challenge  the        vires  of the impugned notification without challenging  the        vires  of  the  delegation  of  authority  effected  by  the        notification issued by the President of India under Art. 258        of   the  Constitution.   The  argument  is  that   if   the        notification  of  the  President is  valid  then  the  State        Government has merely exercised its authority as a  delegate        and its validity cannot be challenged in isolation from  the        principal        487        or parent notification which conferred the authority on  the        State  Government.  This contention has obviously  not  been        raised  before  the  High  Court.   Besides,  if  the  State        Government  purports to take action on the strength  of  the        impugned  notification which is invalid it would be open  to        the appellant to resist the threatened action on the  ground        that  the  notification  is invalid and  no  action  can  be

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      validly taken against the appellant for the contravention of        the provisions of the Act.  As this Court has observed in A.        Thangal  Kunju  Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam  Potti  (1),  "        there  can be no agency in the matter of a commission  of  a        wrong.  The wrong-doer would certainly be liable to be dealt        with  as  a  party directly  responsible  for  his  wrongful        action",  and it was added that " on the analogy of a  civil        wrong  the  tortfeasor could certainly not  protect  himself        against the liability on the ground of having committed  the        tort under the directions of his principal, and so the agent        could  in no event exculpate himself from the liability  for        the  wrongful act done by him and if he is amenable  to  the        jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  the  High  Court   could        certainly issue an appropriate writ against -him under  Art.        226".   By parity of reasoning it would follow that  if  the        impugned  notification  issued by the  State  Government  is        ultra  vires  it  cannot  fall  back  upon  the  President’s        notification in support of the plea that the action which it        proposes to take against the appellant would nevertheless be        justified.  We must accordingly hold that it is open to  the        appellant  to  claim  a writ against  the  respondents  oven        without   challenging   the  vires   of   the   Presidential        notification.         In the result we hold that the impugned notification issued        by  respondent  2 is invalid and cannot  be  enforced.   The        appeal is accordingly allowed, the order passed by the  High        Court  set aside and the application for a writ made by  the        appellant allowed with costs throughout.        Appeal allowed.        (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196,1211.        488