http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: MADHYA PRADESH INDUSTRIES LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/08/1965

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  671            1966 SCR  (1) 466  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1966 SC1922  (5)  R          1967 SC1606  (8,13,18,24)  F          1970 SC1302  (6)  O          1971 SC 862  (8,9)  AFR        1977 SC 567  (21,24,25)  R          1984 SC1361  (28)  F          1985 SC1121  (5)  R          1986 SC1173  (8)  R          1986 SC2105  (17)  RF         1990 SC1984  (23,26)

ACT: Mines  and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (67  of 1957), S. 17 and Mineral Concession Rules, r.  55-Revisional Jurisdiction  of  Central  Government--obligation  to   give reasons and personal hearing. Constitution   of   India,  1950,   Art.   136-Discretionary jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE: In  1959  on the application of the appellant for  a  mining lease in an area the then Government of Bombay made an order granting the entire area of the mines to the appellant;  but in  1960, the State of Bombay having been divided  into  the States  of  Maharashtra  and  Gujarat,  the  Government   of Maharashtra,  in  which State the mines fell,  reserved  the mines for exploitation in the public sector and informed the appellant  that  its  application for  a  mining  lease  was rejected.  The appellant’s revision application under r.  55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, was rejected by the Central Government.   Thereafter, the State Government  changed  its mind  and again called for applications for the grant  of  a mining  lease, and the appellant submitted its  application. Meanwhile,  the appellant filed an appeal under Art. 136  of the  Constitution, to this Court, against the order  of  the Central Government dismissing its revision application. In the appeal, the respondent urged that since the appellant had submitted a fresh application, it was not a fit case for the  exercise  of the jurisdiction of the Court  under  Art. 136,  and  the  appellant contended that the  order  of  the Central Government was bad because : (i) the mines could not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

be  placed in the public sector without complying  with  the provisions of s. 17 of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957; (ii) the Central Government  ignored the  final  order of the Government of Bombay  granting  the lease  of  the  mines to the appellant;  (iii)  no  personal hearing was given to the appellant; and (iv) no reasons were given in the order. HELD  (By Full Court) : (i) The appellant having  taken  the opportunity  to apply for the lease, it was not a  fit  case for interference under Art. 136. [475 B, C] (ii) Section 17 has no bearing on the question at issue,  as it has nothing to do with public or private sectors. [474 E- F; 475 C-D] (iii)     The order of the Government of Bombay, was only  a recommendation to the Central Government for the grant of  a mining lease to the appellant. [474 D; 475 D] (iv) The  appellant was not entitled to a. personal  hearing before the Central Government. [473 F; 475 C-D] Per   Subba   Rao.   J.-Rule  55,  requires   a   reasonable opportunity   to  be  given  to  the  applicant.   But   the opportunity  need  not necessarily be by  personal  bearing, even  if  it was asked for.  It could be by  written  repre- sentation.   It  depends on the facts of each  case  and  is ordinarily in the discretion of the tribunal. [473 G-H] 467 (v)  Per Mudholkar and Bachawat, JJ.The revision application was  rejected  by the Central Government because  it  agreed with the reasons given by the Government of Maharashtra, for refusing  the  appellant’s application for a  mining  lease. The Central Government acting under r. 55, was therefore not bound to give in its order, fuller reasons for rejecting the application. [476 B] Per Subba Rao, J. (Contra) : Neither the State  Government’s nor  the  Central Government’s order disclosed  reasons  for rejecting  the  appellant’s application, and  therefore  the Central Government’s order was vitiated. [473 E] The Central Government was acting judicially as a  tribunal, under r.  55,  and so its decision was subject to an  appeal to  the Supreme Court under Art. 136.  Therefore, it  should give  reasons for its order.  If tribunals can  make  orders without giving reasons, it may lead to abuse of power in the hands  of  unscrupulous  or  dishonest  officers.   But,  if reasons are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse,   as  the  order,  if  it  discloses  extraneous   or irrelevant  considerations,  will  be  subject  to  judicial scrutiny and correction.  A speaking order at its best  will be reasonable and at its worst plausible.  But, the  extent, and  nature of the reasons depend upon each case.   What  is essential is that reasons & hall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original tribunal. [471 D; 472 E-G; 473 C-D] Harinagar  Sugar  Mills Ltd., v Shyam  Sunder  Jhunjhunwala, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 464 of 1965. Appeal  by  special leave from the order dated  October  17, 1964,  of  the Government of India, Ministry  of  Steel  and Mines,  Department  of Mines and Metals  on  an  application under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960. G.  S.  Pathak,  S.  N.  Andley,  Rameshwar  Nath,  for  the appellant. S.   V.   Gupte,  Solicitor-General,  R.  N.  Sachthey   and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

B.R.G.K. Achar, for the respondents. Subba Rao, J. delivered a separate Opinion.  The Judgment of Mudholkar and Bachawat, JJ. was delivered by Bachawat, J. Subba  Rao,  J.  This appeal by special  leave  is  directed against  the order of the Government of India rejecting  the revision  filed  by the appellant against the order  of  the Government of Maharashtra. The  appellant,  the Madhya Pradesh Industries  Ltd.,  is  a public limited company engaged in mining manganese ore.   On February 5, 1941, one Rai Bahadur Bansilal Abirchand took  a lease  of  a land of extent 216 acres and 92  cents  in  the Government Forest, East Pench Range, in the Tahsil of Ramtek in  the  District of Nagpur, from the  Governor  of  Central Provinces and Berar for 468 a  term  of  15 years commencing from  September  10,  1940. Under  an  indenture  dated March  4,  1952,  the  appellant obtained a transfer of the said leasehold interest from  the successors  in  interest  of the  said  Bansilal  Abirchand. After the transfer, the appellant entered into possession of the  said extent of land and is alleged to have spent  about Rs.  10,00,000  for the purpose of developing  the  area  to carry  out  the  mining operation.  The said  lease  was  to expire  on  September 9, 1955.  On the expiry  of  the  said lease the appellant applied for the renewal of the lease for a  further period of 20 years to the appropriate  authority, namely, the Secretary to Government, Commerce and Industries Department,  Madhya  Pradesh, Nagpur.   After  a  protracted correspondence covering a period of about 3 years, the offer on  special  duty, Industries and  Co-operation  Department, State  of  Bombay, informed the appellant  by  letter  dated September  2,  1958,  that the said  renewal  could  not  be granted.  The appellant filed a revision against that  order to  the  Central  Government,  but  that  was  dismissed  on December  14, 1958.  On April 9, 1959, the State  of  Bombay issued  a  notification calling for  applications  from  the public  in respect of the least of the said mines.   On  May 15,  1959, the appellant filed an application for the  grant of  a lease for a period of 20 years in respect of the  said mines.   Presumably others also filed similar  applications. On  July  8, 1959, the Government of Bombay  made  an  order -ranting the entire area of the said mines to the  appellant and by letter dated July 14, 1959, informed him of the same. During  the  year 1960 the territories forming part  of  the State  of Bombay were divided and the State  of  Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat came into being and the said  mines fell  in  the Maharashtra State.  On August  25,  1960,  the Maharashtra   Government  issued  a  notification  for   the information of the public that the said mines were  reserved for  the  exploitation  of minerals in  the  public  sector. Thereafter  on  January 16, 1961, the  Collector  of  Nagpur informed  the appellant that its application for the  ],ease of the mines was rejected as the mines in question fell in a block  reserved for State exploitation.  On March 11,  1961, the  appellant  filed a revision to the  Central  Government against  the  said  order.  On June 22,  1961,  the  Central Government informed the appellant that instructions had been issued  to  the Government of  Maharashtra,  Industries  and Labour Department, Bombay, for reconsidering its application and,  therefore,  it might pursue the matter with  the  said Government.   Accordingly, the appellant took up the  matter with  the Maharashtra Government.  By letter dated  December 19,  1961,  the  Government  of  Maharashtra  informed   the appellant 469

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

that its application for the mining lease had been rejected. Thereafter,  the  appellant on or about February  17,  1962, filed  a revision application before the Central  Government against the said order of the Government of Maharashtra.  On October  17,  1964,  the  Central  Government  rejected  the revision application.  It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed  by  the  Central  Government  that  subsequently  the Government  of Maharashtra, after obtaining the  consent  of the  Central  Government, had issued  a  notification  dated March  26, 1965, inviting applications from the  public  for the  grant of mineral concessions in the said area.   It  is also  stated  therein that the appellant has  submitted  its application for the -rant of mining lease in respect of  the said area in response to the said notification.  This is not disputed.   The appellant filed the present  appeal  against the order of the Central Government dated October 17,  1964, dismissing  its revision petition against the order  of  the Government  of  Maharashtra.  To that  appeal,  the  Central Government is made the first respondent; the Under Secretary to  the  Government of India in the Ministry  of  Steel  and Mines, who made the said order, the second respondent-,  and the State of Maharashtra, the third respondent. Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant raised  before us the following points: (1) The order passed by the Central Government  is bad, because, though it is a judicial  order, no  reasons  are  given for rejecting the  revision  of  the appellant.  (2)  The order is bad also because  it  has  not complied with the principles of natural justice, namely, (i) though  the appellant requested for a personal  hearing,  it was  not  acceded to; and (ii) the  Central  Government  had taken  into consideration extraneous matters without  giving an  opportunity  to the appellant to explain them.  (3)  The order  of  the  Central Government is  illegal,  because  it ignored  the  final  order  made  by  the  State  Government granting  the lease of the mines to the appellant  and  also because  it  should have held that  the  Central  Government could  not  place the mines, in the  public  sector  without complying  with  the provisions of s. 17 of  the  Mines  and Minerals  (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Act 67  of 1957), hereinafter called the Act. The  learned  Solicitor  General,  while  controverting  the legality  of the said contentions, points out that  this  is not  a  fit  case  for the  exercise  of  the  discretionary jurisdiction   of   this  Court  under  Art.  136   of   the Constitution inasmuch as the Maharashtra Government has  now called for fresh applications for the granting of licence in respect  of  the said mines and the  appellant,  along  with others. has put in its application to the said Government. 470 To  appreciate the first point it will be convenient at  the outset  to read the relevant provisions of the Act  and  the Rules  made  thereunder.  Under s. 5 of the Act,  no  mining lease  shall be granted by a State Government to any  person unless he satisfied the conditions laid down therein.  Under s.  8(2) thereof, no mining lease can be granted in  respect of  manganese  ore,  among  ,others,  without  the  previous approval  of the Central Government.  Section 10  prescribes that  an  application for a mining lease in respect  of  any land  in which the minerals vest in the Government shall  be made  to  the State Government concerned in  the  prescribed manner.  Section 30 confers on the Central Government  power to  revise  any order of the State Government either  on  an application  made  by an aggrieved party or  suo  motu.   In supersession  of the earlier rules, the Central  Government, in  exercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 13  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

Act,  made  rules for carrying out the purpose of  the  Act. Chapter  IV  of the Rules provides for the grant  of  mining leases  in respect of land in which the minerals  belong  to Government  and also the manner of disposal of  applications for a mining lease or for the renewal of mining lease by the State  Government.   Rule  26  says  that  where  the  State Government  passes  any order refusing to grant or  renew  a mining  lease, it shall communicate in writing  the  reasons for  such  order to the person against whom  such  order  is passed.  Under r. 54, any person aggrieved by any order made by the State Government may within two months from the  date of  tile  communication  of the order to him  apply  to  the Central Government for the revision of the order.  A  court- fee is prescribed for the said revision.  Rule 55., which is the crucial rule, reads               "Where a petition. for revision is made to the               Central Government under rule 54, it may  call               for  the  record of the case  from  the  State               Government, and after considering any comments               made  on the petition by the State  Government               or  other authority, as the case may  be,  may               confirm. modify or set aside the order or pass               such  other order in relation thereto  as  the               Central Government may deem just and proper :               Provided that no order shall be passed against               an  applicant  unless  be has  been  given  an               opportunity   to  make   his   representations               against  the comments, if any.  received  from               the State Government or other authority." A  perusal of the said provisions makes it abundantly  clear that  the State Government exercising its powers  under  the Act  and  the  Rules  made  thereunder  deals  with  matters involving great 471 stakes;   presumably  for  the  said  reason,  the   Central Government  is  constituted as an authority  to  revise  the order of the State Government.  Rules 54 and 55 lay down the procedure  for  filing a revision against the order  of  the State  Government and the manner of its disposal.  Under  r. 54,  a  revision  application  has  to  be  filed  with  the prescribed   court-fee;  and  under  r.  55,   the   Central Government,  after  calling for the records from  the  State Government  and after considering any comments made  on  the petition by the State Government or other authority, as  the case  may  be, may make an appropriate order  therein.   The proviso  expressly says that no order shall be  made  unless the  petitioner  has been given an opportunity to  make  his representations  against  the  said  comments.   The  entire scheme  of  the rules posits a judicial  procedure  and  the Central  Government is constituted as a tribunal to  dispose of  the  said  revision.   Indeed,  this  Court  in   Shivji Nathubhai  v. The Union of India(1) ruled that  the  Central Government,  exercising its power of review under r.  54  of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, was acting judicially as a  tribunal.   The new rule, if at all, is clearer  in  that regard   and  emphasizes  the  judicial  character  of   the proceeding.  If it was a tribunal, this Court under Art. 136 of  the  Constitution can entertain an  appeal  against  the order  of  the Central Government made in  exercise  of  its revisional powers under r. 55 of the Rules.  This Court in a later decision in M/S.  Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v.  Shyam Sundar  Jhunjhunwala(2) went further and held that,  as  the decision of the Central Government was subject to an  appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, the Central Government should give reasons for its order.  It is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

true  that in that case the Central Government reversed  the order  of  the Directors of a company refusing  to  register transfers. but that was not the basis of the decision.   The necessity for giving reasons was founded on the existence of an appeal to the Supreme Court against the said order. The  learned Solicitor General argues that, if  the  Central Government  is  to  give  reasons when  it  functions  as  a tribunal,  it will obstruct the work of the  Government  and lead to unnecessary delays.  I do not see any  justification for this contention.  The Central Government functions  only through  different officers and in this case  it  functioned through an Under Secretary.  The condition of giving reasons is only attached to an order made by the Government when  it functions judicially as a tribunal in a comparatively  small number of matters and not in regard to other (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775. (2) [1962] 2 S.C.-R. 339. Sup./65-2 472 administrative  orders it passes.  The delay in disposal  of can  be attributed to many reasons and certainly not to  the giving of reasons by tribunals. The question cannot be disposed of on purely technical  con- siderations.  Our Constitution posits a welfare State; it is not defined, but its incidents are found in Chapters III and IV thereof, i.e., the Parts embodying fundamental rights and directive principles of State Policy respectively.  "Welfare State’  as  conceived by our Constitution is a  State  where there  is prosperity, equality, freedom and social  justice. In the context of a welfare State, administrative  tribunals have  come  to  stay.   Indeed,  they  ,are  the   necessary concomitants of a welfare State.  But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State  itself. Self-dicipline  and  supervision  exclude  or  at  any  rate minimize  arbitrariness.  The least a tribunal can do is  to disclose its mind.  The compulsion of disclosure  guarantees consideration.   The condition to give  reasons.  introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimises arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory  court to keep the tribunals within ’bounds.  A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial ,disposal. The  conception of exercise of revisional  jurisdiction  and the  manner of disposal provided in r. 55 of the  Rules  are indicative  ,of  the scope and nature  of  the  Government’s jurisdiction.   If tribunals can make orders without  giving reasons,  the  said power in the hands  of  unscrupulous  or dishonest  officers may turn out to be a potent  weapon  for abuse of power.  But, if reasons for an order are given,  it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the  order, if  it  discloses extraneous or  irrelevant  considerations, will  be  subject to judicial scrutiny  and  correction.   A speaking  order will at its best be a reasonable and at  its worst be at least a plausible one.  The public should not be deprived of this only -safeguard. It is said that this principle is not uniformly followed  by appellate courts, for appeals and revisions are dismissed by appellate and revisional courts in limine without giving any reasons.  There is an essential distinction between a  court and an administrative -tribunal.  A Judge is trained to look at  things  objectively, uninfluenced by  considerations  of policy  or expediency; but, an executive  officer  generally looks   at  things  from  the  standpoint  of   policy   and expediency.   The habit of mind of an executive  officer  so formed  cannot  be  expected  to  change  from  function  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

function 473 or  from  act  to  act.   SO  it  is  essential  that   some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter  of passing  orders  affecting the rights of  parties;  and  the least  they Should do is to give reasons for  their  orders. Even in the case of appellate courts invariably reasons  are given,  except  when they dismiss an appeal or  revision  in limine and that is because the appellate or revisional court agrees  with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate  court or  there  are no legally permissible grounds  to  interfere with it.  But the same -reasoning cannot apply to an  appel- late  tribunal, for as often as not the order of  the  first tribunal  is  laconic and does not give any  reasons.   That apart, when we insist upon reasons, we do not prescribe  any particular form or scale of the reasons.  The extent and the nature  of the reasons depend upon each  case.   Ordinarily, the  appellate  or revisional tribunal shall  give  its  own reasons  succinctly; but in. a case of affirmable where  the original  tribunal  gives adequate  reasons,  the  appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may  be, agreeing with those reasons.  What is essential  is that  reasons shall be given by an appellate  or  revisional tribunal  expressly  or by reference to those given  by  the original  tribunal.  The nature and the elaboration  of  the reasons necessarily depend upon the facts of each case.   In the  present  case, neither the State Government’s  nor  the Central  Government’s order discloses reasons for  rejecting the application of the appellant.  In the circumstances  the Central  Government’s  order  is vitiated, as  it  does  not disclose any reasons for rejecting the revision  application of the appellant. As  regards the second contention, I do not think- that  the appellant is entitled as of right to a personal hearing.  It is  no  doubt a principle of natural justice that  a  quasi- judicial  tribunal  cannot make any decision  adverse  to  a party without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegations against him.  Indeed, r. 55 of  the Rules, quoted supra, recognize the said principle and states that  no order shall be passed against any applicant  unless he has been given an opportunity to make his representations against  the  comments,  if any,  received  from  the  State Government  or other authority.  The said  opportunity  need not  necessarily  be  by personal hearing.   It  can  be  by written representation.  Whether the said opportunity should be by written representation or by personal hearing  depends upon  the  facts of each case and ordinarily it  is  in  the discretion  of the tribunal.  The facts of the present  case disclose  that  a written representation  would  effectively meet the requirements of the principles of natural  justice. But there is some apparent justification in the 474 submission  that  the  Central  Government  had  taken  into consideration an extraneous matter that came into  existence subsequent  to  the  filing of the  revision,  namely,  that Messrs.   Manganese  Ore  (India) Ltd., which  is  a  public sector undertaking, had applied for the lease of the area in question on October 5, 1962, for the purpose of mining.  The appellant did not allege in its affidavit that this fact was not brought to its notice before the Central Government made the  order; indeed, it did not file any reply  affidavit  to the  effect that the said matter was kept back from  it.   I would  have pursued the matter a little further but for  the fact that I am refusing to interfere in this appeal on other grounds.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

There are no merits in the contention that the Government of Bombay by its order dated July 14, 1959, granted the  entire area of the said mines to the appellant; for, under the  Act the  State Government has no power to make such a  grant  of Manganese  Ore  except  with the previous  approval  of  the Central  Government.   Admittedly,  no  such  approval   was obtained.  The said order can, therefore, only be  construed at best to be a recommendation to the Central Government. Nor  can I agree with the contention of the learned  counsel based upon s. 17 of the Act.  The contention is that if  the State Government intended to entrust the exploitation of the said  mines to the public sector it could have done so  only in  strict  compliance with the provisions of s. 17  of  the Act.  Section 17 of the Act has nothing to do with public or private sector: it applies only to a specific case where the Central  Government  proposes to  undertake  prospecting  or mining  operations  in any area not already held  under  any prospering licence or mining lease.  In that event it  shall follow a particular procedure before undertaking the  mining operations.    In the present case there was no proposal  on the  part of the Central Government to undertake the  mining operation  in  the  area in  question.   That  section  has, therefore, no bearing on the question ’raised. I  have  already  noticed that after  the  disposal  of  the revision  by  the Central Government  the  State  Government again changed its mind and called for applications from  the public  for grant of mining licence in respect of  the  said area  and the appellant, along with others, has applied  for the  same.   Learned counsel for the  appellant,  though  he admits the said fact, contends that though the appellant has a fresh opportunity to apply for the lease of the mines,  it has  to meet competition from others who did not  enter  the field earlier.  But the people who entered the field earlier lid  not prefer any revision against the order of the  State Govern- 475 ment  aid, presumably, if we interfere at this stage,  there would be unnecessary complications and public interest might suffer, as it might turn out that the appellant would be the only  surviving  applicant in the field  among  the  earlier applicants.  Though the appellant has to compete with others who were not earlier in the field--this question we have  no precise information-it has certainly an opportunity to apply for  the  lease.  In the circumstances I do not  think  that this  is a fit case for our interference in the exercise  of our discretionary jurisdiction. The  appeal  is dismissed, but in the circumstances  of  the case, without costs. Bachawat  J. We agree that the appeal should  be  dismissed. We  agree that (a) this is not a fit case  for  interference under  Art. 136 of the Constitution, (b) the  appellant  was not  entitled to a personal hearing, (c) s. 17 of the  Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development Act, 1957 (Act  No. 67 of 1957) has no bearing on the question in issue, and (d) the order of the Government of Bombay dated July, ’14,  1959 was,  in effect, a recommendation to the Central  Government for the grant of a mining license to the appellant. But we are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Pathak that  the order of the Central Government dated October  17, 1964, rejecting the revision application under r. 55 of  the Mineral  Concession Rules, 1960 is bad, because it  did  not give any reasons.  By its order dated December 19, 1961, the State  Government  of Maharashtra rejected  the  appellant’s application for a mining lease for the reasons mentioned  in the order.  A reference to the order (annexure R) shows that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

the  State  Government gave full reasons.  On  February  17, 1962, the appellant filed a revision application before  the Central Government against the order of the State Government under  r. 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.  By  its order  dated  October  17,  1964,  the  Central   Government rejected the revision application stating               I   am directed to refer to  your  application               No.  A/ 32/8163 dated 17-2-1962 on  the  above               subject,   and  to  say  that  after   careful               consideration  of the grounds stated  therein,               the  Central  Government  have  come  to   the               conclusion  that there is no valid ground  for               interfering   with   the   decision   of   the               Government   of  Maharashtra  rejecting   your               application for grant of mining lease for  man               manganese  over  an area of  216.92  acres  in               Government  Forest  East Panch  Range,  W.  C.               June-               476               wand,  Tahsil Ramtek, District  Nagpur.   Your               application   for  revision   is,   therefore,               rejected." The reason for rejecting the revision application appears on the  face of the impugned order.  The  revision  application was rejected, because the Central Government agreed with the reasons  given  by the State Government in its  order  dated December 19, 1961, and the application did not disclose  any valid  ground for interference with the order of  the  State Government.  In our opinion, the Central Government,  acting under  r.  55, was not bound to give in  its  order,  fuller reasons for rejecting the application. Mr. Pathak contended that the effect of Art. 136 of the Con- stitution is that every order appealable under that  Article must  be a speaking order and the omission to  give  reasons for  the  decision  is of itself  a  sufficient  ground  for quashing it.  We are unable to accept this broad contention. For  the  purposes of an appeal under Art.  136,  orders  of Courts and tribunals stand on the same footing.  An order of Court  dismissing  a  revision application  often  gives  no reasons,  but this is not a sufficient ground  for  quashing it.   Likewise,  an order of an  a  administrative  tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to  be invalid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for the rejection. In  support  of his contention Mr. Pathak  relied  upon  the following observations of Shah, J. in Harinagar Sugar  Mills Ltd. v.   Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala(1) :               "If the Central Government acts as a  tribunal               exercising judicial powers and the exercise of               that  power is subject to the jurisdiction  of               this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution,               we fail to see how the power of this Court can               be  effectively exercised if reasons  are  not               given by the Central Government in support  of               its order." In that case, it appears that the Central Government  acting as  an appellate tribunal, under s. 111(3) of the  Companies Act, 1956, had without giving any reasons for its order, set aside a resolution of the directors of a company refusing to register certain transfers of shares.  There was nothing  on the record to show that the Central Government was satisfied that the action of the directors in refusing to register the shares  was arbitrary and untenable, and, moreover,  on  the materials on the record (1)  [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339, 357.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

477 it  was  not possible to decide whether or not  the  Central Government  transgressed the limits of its restricted  power under  S.  1 1 1 (3).  The Central Government  reversed  the decision  appealed from without giving any reasons; nor  did the  record disclose any apparent ground for  the  reversal. In  this  context,  Shah, J. made  the  observations  quoted above,  and  held  that there was no  proper  trial  of  the appeals   and  the  appellate  order  should   be   quashed. Hidayatullah,  J. at p. 370 of the Report pointed  out  that there  was  no reason for the reversal and the  omission  to give  reasons led to the only inference that there was  none to  give.  There is a vital difference between the order  of reversal  by  the appellate authority in that  case  for  no reason  whatsoever  and  the  order  of  affirmance  by  the revising authority in the present case.  Having stated  that there  was  no valid ground for interference,  the  revising authority  was  not  bound to give fuller  reasons.   It  is impossible to say that the impugned order was arbitrary,  or that there was no proper trial of the revision application. Appeal dismissed.