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PETITIONER: MADHUSDAN SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/11/1983

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA THAKKAR, M.P. (J)

CITATION:  1984 SCR  (1) 849        1984 SCC  (2) 381  1983 SCALE  (2)856

ACT:      West Bengal  Land  Reforms  Act,  1955  as  amended  by Amendment Acts  of 1972  and 1977-Sections  14M, 17(c) 17(6) and 21B of constitutional validity of.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioners,  in this  round of  challenge assailed the validity  of Section  14M, 17(c),  17(6) and 21 B of the West Bengal  Land Reforms  Act, calling to their aid certain observations  made   by  this  Court  in  Sri  Sri  Kalimata Thakurani and  Sri Sri  Raghunath Jain & Ors etc v. Union of India &  Ors. [1981]  2 S.C.R.  950  and  the  decisions  in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.  [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206 and  Waman Rao  & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 1      The petitioners raised the following points:      (i) that  the total ceiling area allowed to be retained by the  1953 Act  in respect  of agricultural  land in  Khas possession of the Raiyats was drastically reduced;      (ii) that  although the status of Raiyats was conferred on     the  erstwhile  landlords  which  was  heritable  and transferable, the  institution of bargards was introduced in order to  enable the  raiyats to  cultivate their lands on a 50:50 basis and,      (iii) that  while the Amendment Act of 1972 had given a right to  the raiyats  to resume  the  lands  given  to  the bargardars for  their personal  cultivation; the  subsequent amendments took  away this  right and  made the right of the bargardar both  heritable and  transferable causing  serious detriment and prejudice to the raiyats.      Dismissing the petitions, the Court. ^      HELD :1.1  The impugned  amendments were manifestly and pointedly made  for the  purpose of  giving  effect  to  and securing the  objects of  Article 39(b)  because these  Acts clearly intended to distribute the material resources of the community viz,  the agricultural  lands to a large number of tillers of the soil in order to serve the common good on the aforesaid people.  The Amendments fall within the letter and spirit of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. 1 lie Acts have not  touched  the  non-agricultural  home  stead  lands,  or buildings of  the Land owners standing thereon but has taken

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over only a major portion of the agricultural lands, leaving with the landlords a portion prescribed within the 850 ceiling limit  and distributed  the excess to the tillers of the  soil  which  alone  constitute  their  main  source  of sustenance  and   livelihood.  The   claim  of  the  raiyats (erstwhile landlords)  that the  Acts amount to confiscation is  absolutely   untenable  and  amounts  only  to  shedding crocodile tears  and an  anathema or taboo. [860 H; 861 A-B; 860 G]      1.2 The  error regarding  the addition of Amending Acts as items  of Entry  in the  Ninth Schedule was inadvertently crept in  the decision  of Sri  Sri   Kalimata   Thakarani’s case. Even  if the  Acts were  not  included  in  the  Ninth Schedule  their   constitutional  validity   could  not   be questioned because  the provisions  are otherwise reasonable and give  full  effect  to  the  pragmatic  and  socialistic approach as contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution.      Sri Sri  Kalimata Thakurani  and Sri  Sri Raghunath Jew and Ors  v. Union  of India & Ors. [1981]2 S.C.R 950 Minerva Mills Ltd  v. Union  of India  and Ors  [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206; Waman Rao  & Ors  v Union  of India  & Ors [1981] 2 S.C.R. 1 Sanjeev Coke  Manufacturing Co v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd and Anr  [1983] 1  S.C.R. 147,  Sasanka Sekhar  Maity & Ors, Union of  India &  Ors, 1980;  4 S.C.C.  716, State of Tamil Nadu etc  v. L.  Abu Kavur Bai and Ors CA Nos 957-966 (N) of 1973 decided on 31-10-83 followed.      1.3  The   Amendment  Acts   cannot  be  challenged  as violative of  the doctrine  of nexus or involving no process of distributions;      State of  Karnataka v  Rangnatha Reddy  & Anr  [1978] 1 S.C.R. 641, Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India & Ors [1981] 2 S.C.R. 950, Sanjeeva Coke Manufacturing Co. v.  M/s Bharat Coking Coal  Ltd and  Anr [1983]  1 S.C.R. 147, and State of Tamilnadu etc  v. L. Abukavar Bai & Ors C.A. No. 957-966 (N) of 1973 decided on 31-10-1983 followed.      1.4 The provisions of the Amendment by which the raiyat is enjoined to reside in the village itself for a large part of the year cannot be said to be either harsh or arbitrary.      Sri Sri  Kalimata Thakurani  etc. v.  Union of  India & Ors. [1981]2 S.C.R. 950, applied.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 5545 of 1980.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)      Pankaj Malik and Mr. R. P. Singh for the Petitioners.      S. N. Kacker and Rathin Das for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. True  to the  spirit and  letter of  our Constitution and  in fulfilment  of the promises made by our national leaders  to the  people of  India,  the  Government sought to introduce agrarian 851 reforms so  as to  reserve the  lands to  the tillers of the soil giving marginal relief or compensation to the erstwhile landlords or  tenants  in-chief,  through  various  statutes passed by almost all the States in the country. I n order to hasten and  safeguard the  agrarian reforms the Constitution takes full  care by virtue of the insertion of the directive principles of  Stale policy- contained in part IV, which are undoubtedly the  heart and soul of our Constitution and have in  fact  been  complied  with  in  a  variety  of  spheres. Ceaseless attempts  made by  the landlords  to challenge the

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constitutional validity  of the  aforesaid reforms  met with little success.  Having failed in their attempts to undo the socialist reforms  passed for  the purpose  of  building  an egalitarian society and bringing about marked improvement in the condition  of the  poor suffering tillers by the various Acts passed  by the  States, the  landlords  left  no  stone unturned and  were always on the look out for an opportunity to ’  seize the lands from the tenants on one pretext or the other  through   manpowers  muscle-power   or   money-power. Nevertheless, the  constitutional validity  of most  of  the Acts came  up for  decision in  the High  Courts and in this Court and  by and  large each  one of  them was  held to  be constitutionally valid,  thus setting at naught the attempts of the  landlords to take back possession of the lands which should have  been given  to the  tillers of  the  soil  long before. The  landlords were  thus unable  to get hold of any opportunity to  pounce upon  the land  which went and should have gone to the actual tillers of the soil.      Thereafter, some  of the bigger landlords tried through their dextrous  methods aud  legal ingenuity  to defeat  the laudable social endeavour of the Government by making a show of the  so-called complete  destruction of  their assess and properties reducing  them to  starvation. This  case is  yet another glaring  illustration of such an adroit attempt made by the tenants-in-chief to deprive the actual tillers of the rights conferred  on them  by the  Land Reforms Acts of West Bengal passed  from 1953  to 1977.  In view, however, of the modern trends  of the  decisions of this Court, which always made a  practical and  pragmatic approach to any progressive step taken  by the Parliament, the attempts of the landlords ultimately proved to be a grotesque failure.      Coming now to the facts of the case, a brief history of the admirable  object of  the agrarian reforms introduced by the Government  of West Bengal may be necessary as a prelude to  our   discussion  of  the  subject,  In  fact,  all  the contentions  raised before us stand 852 concluded by  a recent  decision of  this Court  as we shall show hereafter.  Not content with the addition of Art.31C of the Constitution  which was  introduced by  the constitution (25th Amendment)  Act, 1971,  the petitioners  chose to call into aid  the decisions  of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union  of India  & Ors  and Waman  Rao & Ors. v. Union of Indian &  Ors, which  also proved to be an exercise futility because the  ratio of,  these cases  is in  no  way  of  any assistance to the petitioners.      In the  instant case,  we are  concerned with  agrarian reforms achieved from time to time by the Government of West Bengal in  order to  improve the  lot of  the tillers of the land by  giving them as many facilities as could be possible within the framework of the law and the Constitution. Having realised that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition ’Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred  to as  the ’1953  Act’) could  not be challenged the landlords waited for future litigations swoop down on  the validity  of the  West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter  referred to as the ’1955 Act’) as amended by the  West Bengal  Land Reforms  (Amendment) Act, 1972 and the West  Bengal Land  Reforms (Amendment)  Act,  1977  (for facility, to  be referred  to as the ’Amendment Act of 1972’ and ’Amendment Act of 1977’ respectively).      In the  first round  which was  the subject matter of a decision of  this Court  Sri Sri  Kalimata Thakurani and Sri Sri Raghunath  Jew &  Ors. etc.  v. Union of India & Ors. to which one  of us  Fazal Ali,  J.) was  a party,  this  Court negatived  the  constitutional  objections  and  contentions

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raised by  the landlords  against the  reforms introduced by the  1955   Act  and  the  1972  and  1977  Amendment  Acts. Unfortunately, however,  there  appears  to  be  some  small lacuna  in  the  above  judgment  which  was  unhesitatingly exploited by the petitioners so as to attempt to destroy the progressive amendments  of 1972 and 1977 particularly taking advantage of certain observations made in that case to which we shall come later.      To begin  with, in the 1953 Act which was enforced with effect from 12th February, 1954, Section 4 introduced a more or less radical reform for the benefit of the actual tillers by abolishing the rights of 853 the intermediary  (ex-landlords). By  virtue of this section all estates and the rights of every intermediary was to vest in  the  State  free  from  all  encumbrances  from  a  date mentioned in  a notification  issued by  the Government.  In order, however,  to  be  just  and  fair  to  the  erstwhile landlords they  were conferred  the  status  of  raiyats  or tenants. By  virtue of  s. 6  they were  entitled to  retain certain categories  of lands  like lands  comprised in home- steads or’  appertaining to  buildings and structures, etc., of non-agricultural  land in  khas possession.  Section 6(d) expressly provided that so far as agricultural land in khas, possession was  concerned it  would not  exceed twenty  five acres in  area to  be chosen  by the  landlord.  No  serious grievance was  made before  us regarding  the provisions  of sections 4  to 6  excepting that  the ceiling of twenty five acres was  not sufficient  for the  landlords to  make  both their ends  meet and  enable them  to earn  their livelihood Such a plea has to be stated only to be rejected because the landlords who  had huge lands comprising home-stead lands or those appertaining  to  buildings  or  structures  and  non- agricultural lands  in  khas  possession  were  not  at  all touched by the 1953 Act. In these circumstance therefore, we do not  take any  serious notice  of this grievance which in fact was not pressed before us.      Realising the current trends in the social, approach of the agrarian reforms made by the courts, the counsel for the petitioners confined his arguments to three infirmities from which the  1953 Act  and the  1972 and  1977 Amendment  Acts suffered.  However,  during  the  course  of  arguments  the challenge  remained   confined  only   to  certain  specific amendments made  by the 1972 and 1977 Amendment Acts and the points raised before us may be summarised thus: -      (1)  that the total ceiling area allowed to be retained           by the 1953 Act in respect of agricultural land in           khas possession  of the  raiyats  was  drastically           reduced,      (2)   that although the status of raiyats was conferred           on the erstwhile landlords which was heritable and           transferable, the  institution of  bargardars  was           introduced in  order  to  enable  the  raiyats  to           cultivate their lands on a 50:50 basis, and ’      (3)   that while  the Amendment Act of 1972 had given a           right to  the raiyats to resume the lands given to           the 854           bargardars for  their  personal  cultivation,  the           subsequent amendments  took away  this  right  and           made the right of the bargardar both heritable and           transferable   causing   serious   detriment   and           prejudice to the raiyats.      We now  proceed to refer only to those provisions whose constitutional validity has been seriously challenged by the

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petitioners. It  appears that  by  the  1972  Amendment  Act certain  changes   were  made   and  a  reference  was  made particularly to s. 14M which may be extracted thus           "14M. Ceiling area-(1) The ceiling area shall be,-           (a)   in the  case of  a raiyat,  who is  an adult                unmarried person, 2.50 standard hectares;           (b)   in the  case of  a raiyat,  who is  the sole                surviving member  of a  family, 2.50 standard                hectares;           (c)   in the  case of  a raiyat  having  a  family                consisting of  two or  more but not more than                five members, 5.00 standard hectares;           (d)   in the  care of  a raiyat  having  a  family                consisting of  more than  five members,  5.00                standard hectares, plus 0.50 standard hectare                for  each  member  in  excess  of  five,  so,                however that  the aggregate  of  the  ceiling                area for  such raiyat shall not, in any case,                exceed 7.00 standard hectares,           (e)   in  the  case  of  any  other  raiyat,  7.00                standard hectares;      (2)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section           (1), where,  in the  family of a raiyat, there are           more raiyats  than one,  the ceiling  area for the           raiyat, together  with the ceiling area of all the           other raiyats  in the  family shall  not,  in  any           case, exceed,-           (a)   where the  number of  members of such family                does not exceed five, 5.00 standard hectares; 855           (b)  where such number exceeds five, 5.00 standard                hectares, plus 0.50 standard hectare for each                member in  excess of  five, so, however, that                the aggregate  of the ceiling area shall not,                in any case, exceed 7.00 standard hectares.      (3)   For the purpose of sub-section (2), all the lands           owned individually  by the  members of a family or           jointly by  some or all the members of such family           shall be  deemed to be owned by the raiyats in the           family."      It was submitted that the drastic reduction of the area of the  raiyat has  been reduced  to 2.50  standard hectares being the  minimum and  7.00  standard  hectares  being  the maximum according  to  the  nature  of  cases  mentioned  in cls.(a) to  (e) of  s. 14M(I)  and cls.(a)  and  (b)  of  s. 14M(2), as  extracted above,  which worked serious injustice to the tenants.      A strong  exception was  taken to the amendment of s.17 of the  1955 Act  particularly the  substitution of s.17.(c) and the  various - provisos to that section. The validity of s.17(6)  was   also  challenged   on  the  ground  that  the legislation was confiscatory.      The provisions of the proviso to cl.(8) of s.2 added by the 1977  Amendment  Act  to  the  1955  Act  was  seriously assailed. The said proviso runs thus:           "Provided that such person or member of his family      resides for  the  greater  part  of  the  year  in  the      locality where  the land  is situated and the principal      source of his income is produced from such land."      A similar  challenge was  made to the addition of s.21B in the   1955  Act by  the 1977  Amendment Act.  On  similar grounds the aforesaid provisions were also challenged in the decision of  this Court in Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case -(supra) which  did not  meet  with  any  success.  It  was, however, pointed out by the counsel for the petitioners that

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this Court  did not  accept the arguments of the petitioners in that  case because  it was  under an erroneous impression that the  1955 Act  and the  Amendment Acts of 1972 and 1977 were added  to the  Ninth Schedule  in the  Constitution  of India and were 856 therefore, immune from challenge. To some extent the counsel is right  in his  statement that such an inadvertent mistake has crept  in due  to oversight because the 1955 Act and the Amendment Acts  of 1972  and 1977  were added  to the  ninth Schedule by  the 4th  Amendment of  the Constitution of 1976 being  entry  numbers  181  to  185.  Hence,  it  could,  be reasonably argued  that the  constitutional validity’ of the provisions, mentioned  above, was  justiciable and  could be gone into.  Before dealing  with these  arguments it  may be necessary to  extract certain  portions of  the decision  of this Court  in Sri  Sri Kalimata  Thakurani’s  case  (supra) where this  Court after dealing with the various provisions’ observed thus:           "In the  instant case,  it is  clear that the 1955      Act as also the Amendment Act of 1972 were added to the      Ninth Schedule,  being entry  Nos. 80  and 81, prior to      April 24,  1973. In these circumstances, it is manifest      that the  aforesaid Acts  are  completely  immune  from      challenge on  the ground that they are violative-of any      of  the   rights  enshrined   in  Part   III   of   the      Constitution. The  learned counsel  for the petitioner,      therefore, was fully justified in making the concession      before us."      The error  is undoubtedly there but neither the counsel for the  petitioners nor the counsel for the respondent drew our attention  to this  omission. Even  if the Acts were not included in the Ninth Schedule their constitutional validity could not  be questioned because this Court has clearly held in Sri  Sri Kalimata  Thankurani’s case  that the provisions are  otherwise  reasonable  and  give  full  effect  to  the pragmatic and  socialistic  approach,  where  the  following observations were made:           "It would be seen that s.17 permits the cultivator      to terminate  the Cultivation  of the land by bargardar      and resume  possession under his own cultivation if the      conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (d) of sub      section (l)  of s.  17 are satisfied. Clause (d) may be      extracted thus:-           "That the  person  owning  the  land  requires  it      bonafide for bringing it under personal cultivation."           "Thus, the cultivator has a, right to get back the      land for personal cultivation if he requires it for his      bona fide 857      use and  proves the  some to  the satisfaction  of  the      authority appointed under s.17(1)."       Referring  to some  of  the  provisions  of  the  1972 Amendment Act  this Court  held that  the provision by which the right  of bargardar  was protected  and  made  heritable could not  be challenged  as being  either unconstitutional, unreasonable  or   arbitrary.’  But  this  Court  made  some observations which  were in  favour of  the  petitioner  and which may be extracted as follows .           "But when  the  Bargardor  on  his,  own  volition      surrenders or abandons the land, there is no reason why      the  tenant   should  not   be  allowed   to  resume  ’      cultivation and  instead be  compelled to  get the land      cultivated  by  some  other  person  nominated  by  the      authority concerned  under s.49  of the  1955 Act. This

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    provision therefore appears to us to be extremely harsh      and works  serious  injustice  to  the  rights  of  the      tenants particularly  after  the  ceiling  are  of  the      tenant has  been considerably  reduced by the Amendment      Act of  1972. Thus,  the tenant  having  a  small  area      guaranteed to him for his unit, he should have at least      fuller and  more effective  rights  to  get  that  area      cultivated by him or even ’by a bargardar of his choice      subject  to   resuming  the   same,  if  the  bargardar      surrenders or  abandons the land........ Unfortunately,      however, though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4)      and (5)  of s.20B,  which  is  only  a  penal  section)      perilously  border  on  arbitrariness  and  amounts  to      serious  curbs   on  the   fundamental  right   of  the      cultivator to  pursue his occupation, we cannot however      strike down these provisions because they are contained      in the  Amendment Act  of 1972 which has been placed in      the  Ninth  Schedule  prior  to  April  54,  1973,  and      therefore fall  within the  protective umbrella and are      immune from challenge."      A  capital   was  therefore   made  out  of  the  above observations  in   Sri  .  Sri  Kalimata  Thakurani’s  case. Reliance was  also placed  on a  decision of  this Court  in Sasanka Sekhar  Maity &  Ors, v  Union of  India & Ors where A.P. Sen,  J., speaking  for the  Court, made  the following observations: - 858           In order,  therefore, to reconcile the fundamental      rights of  the community as a whole with the individual      rights of  the more fortunate section of the community,      it   was fundamentally  necessary to  make the impugned      legislation to secure to a certain extent the rights of      that  part   of  the  community  which  is  denied  its      legitimate share in the means of livelihood.           "The broad objectives or any, legislation relating      to agrarian  reforms are  materially four, viz., (I) to      maximise the  agricultural output and productivity, (2)      a fair  and  equitable  distribution,  of  agricultural      income, (3(  increase in  employment opportunities, and      (4) a  social or ethical order. Though the abolition of      the zamidari  system in the State of West Bengal was an      important step  forward, the  feudal structure remained      so far as the peasants were concerned. These objectives      have been achieved through progressive legislation "      These observations  put the  petitioners completely out of court  demolish the  contentions advanced  before us. The four objectives mentioned by Sen,J. in the passage extracted above are  clearly brought  out and implemented by virtue of the impugned amendments in the 1955 Act.      So far  as the decision in the case of Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani   (supra)   is   concerned,   in   view   of   the crystallisation of  the law  in  Minerva  Mills,  Waman  Rao (supra) and  Sanjeev Coke  Manufacturing Co.  v. M/S. Bharat Coking Coal  Ltd. &  Anr. cases which have been followed and amplified is  the recent  decision of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu  , etc v. L Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. the matter is no longer res  integra and  even if  there was  an  inadvertent error in  the observations of this Court in Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case,  the same  has  become  redundant  as  the impugned provisions  can be  supported as  squarely  falling within the  four corners of Art.39(b) of the Constitution as the intention  of the  Acts is  to secure  and  promote  the objectives contained  in Art.39(b).  In this  connection, we might extract  a few  observations from L. Abu Kavur Bai Ors (supra):

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859           "In  view   of  Art.31C,  which  gives  protective      umbrella  against  Art.31(2)  also,  the  Court  cannot      strike down the Act merely because the compensation for      taking over  the transport services or its units is not      provided for.  The reason  for this is that Art.31C was      not  merely  a  pragmatic  approach  to  socialism  but      imbibed a  theoretical aspect  by which  all  means  of      production, key  industries,  mines,  minerals,  public      supplies, utilities and services may be taken gradually      under public ownership. management and control."      It was further argued by the petitioners that there was no clear  nexus between the Act and the objectives contained in Art.39(b).  We are,  however, unable  to agree  with this argument because  the question  of nexus  has  been  clearly expounded by  this Court  both  in  the  Minerva  Mills  and Sanjeev Coke  Manufacturing Co.’s  cases as also in the case of L.  Abu Kavaur  Bai &  Ors. (supra)  where a Constitution Bench of  this Court,  speaking through  one  of  us  (Fazal Ali,J.), made the following observations: D           "Another important facet of Art.31C which has been      emphasised by  this Court  is that  there should  be  a      close  nexus   between  the   statute  passed   by  the      legislature and  the twin  objects mentioned in clauses      (b) and  (c) of Art.39. In approaching this problem and      considering the  question of  nexus a  narrow  approach      ought not  to be  made because  it is well settled that      the courts  should interpret a constitutional provision      in order  to suppress  the  mischief  and  advance  the      object of  the Act.  The doctrine  of nexus  cannot  be      extended to such an extreme limit that the very purpose      of Art.39(b)&(c) is defeated If the nexus is present in      the law then the protection of Art.31C becomes complete      and irrevocable."      It was  also argued  that  by  virtue  of  the  various amendments made  by the  1972 and  1977  Amendment  Acts  no process of distribution is involved. This argument cannot be accepted in  view of  the  observations  of  this  Court  by Krishna Iyer,J.  in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy & Anr. etc. where the learned Judge observed as follows: 860           "The next  question is whether nationalisation can      have nexus  with  distribution......  To  ’distribute’;      even in  its simple  dictionary meaning, is to allot to      divide into  classes or  into groups and ’distribution’      embraces   arrangement,    classification,   placement,      disposition, apportionment,  the way  in which items, a      quantity, or  the like  is divided  or apportioned; the      system of dispersing goods throughout a community.’’      The above  observations were  followed and amplified in L. Abu Kavur Bai’ case (supra) thus:           "It is  obvious, therefore,  in view  of the  vast      range  of   transactions  contemplated   by  the   word      ’distribution’  as   mentioned  in   the   dictionaries      referred to  above, it  will not be correct to construe      the word ’distribution’ in a purely literal sense so as      to mean  only division  of a  particular  persons.  The      words,    apportionment,     allotment,     allocation,      classification, clearly  fall within the broad sweep of      the  word   ’distribution’.  So   construed,  the  word      ’distribution’  as   used  in  Art.39(b)  will  include      various facets,  aspects, method  and terminology  of a      broad based concept of distribution      In view of the aforesaid observations, the challenge to the impugned provisions of the Acts no longer survives.

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    Moreover,  what  could  have  been  a  better  mode  of distribution contemplated by Art.39(b) than to take away the surplus agricultural lands from the landlords and distribute it amongst  the poor  suffering landless tillers of the soil who had suffered for centuries as vassals slaves of the rich zamindars, The  Acts have  not touched  the non agricultural homestead lands or buildings ’standing thereon but has taken over only a major portion of the agricultural lands, leaving with the  landlords a  portion prescribed within the ceiling limit, and distributed the excess to the tillers of the soil which along  constitute their  main source of sustenance and livelihood. The  claim of  the raiyats  (erstwhile landlords that the Acts amount to confiscation is absolutely untenable and, if  we  dare  say,  it  amounts  only  to  shedding  of crocodile tears  and  an  anathema    or  a  taboo.  We  are therefore  convinced   that  the  impugned  amendments  were manifestly and  pointedly made  for the  purpose  of  giving effect to and securing the 861 Objects of  Art.39(b) because these Acts clearly intended to distribute the  material resources  of toe  community, viz., the agricultural  lands to  a large number of tillers of the soil. in  order to  serve the  common good  of the aforesaid people. The  challenge to  the impugned  Acts and amendments must therefore fail as the amendments fall within the letter and spirit. Of Art.39(b).      Finally, it  was suggested  that the  provision of  the amendment by  which the  raiyat is enjoined to reside In the village itself  for a  large part  of the  year seems  to be harsh and  arbitrary. This  argument does not hold any water for two reasons-      (1)  that when  once it  is found that the Act is meant           to promote and effectuate the objectives contained           in Art.39(b),  which is no doubt the case here, no           other ground of challenge would survive because by           virtue of  Art.31C any  Act which  seems to secure           the objects  of  Art.39(b)  cannot  be  challenged           being violative of Art. 14, 19 or 31.      (2)  Secondly, the provision that the land-owner should           reside  in   the  village  is  both  salutary  and           beneficial, the  object being  that  if  a  raiyat           wants to  cultivate his  own land he must give his           whole-hearted attention  to the  said land instead           of  living  the  village  and  carrying  on  other           avocations of life.      One of  us, (Fazal Ali,J.) had clearly adverted to this aspect of  the matter  in Sri  Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case (supra) and observed h as follows:-           "The dominant  object of the proviso is to abolish      the age-old  institutions of  absentee  land-holder  by      insisting that  the cultivator to whom land is allotted      must give  full and  complete attention to the soil and      as a result of. which there will be maximum utilisation      of the  agricultural  resources  which  would  increase      production......... It  is obvious  that the tenant has      to remain in the village for the purpose of cultivating      the lands.  sowing the seeds, growing it and harvesting      it.  These   processes  would  doubtless  requires  the      presence of  the tenant  for a greater part of the year      which is that the proviso predicates. If 862      the tenant  is permitted  to leave the village for more      than half the year then the very purpose of giving such      a vast  area for cultivation to a tenant will be foiled      Moreover the  proviso merely  insists that  the  tenant

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    should remain  in the  village  or  its  periphery  for      ’greater part of the year’ which appears to be not only      responsible but absolutely essential if the land has to      be cultivated  in a scientific manner in order to yield      the maximum  possible production, which would result in      better  and   equitable  distribution  of  agricultural      products for the use of the people of the country."      For the  reasons given above all the contentions raised by the  petitioners fail  and the writ petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs. S.R.                                    Petitions dismissed. 863