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PETITIONER: MADHU LIMAYE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/10/1977

BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. GOSWAMI, P.K. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR   47            1978 SCR  (1) 749  1977 SCC  (4) 551  CITATOR INFO :  F          1980 SC 258  (10)  E          1980 SC 962  (6,21,23,34,44,67,103,105,114)  F          1983 SC  67  (5)  RF         1992 SC 604  (97)

ACT: Code of Criminal Procedure, ( Act 11 1974), 1973 Ss. 397 (2)   &  482-Scope  of-Whether  the bar in  s.  397(2)  refers  to revisional  powers  of the High Court in all cases  or  only refers to revisional powers against interlocutory orders.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was prosecuted for  having  made  statements dafamatory  to  the then Law Minister of the  Government  of Maharashtra.   The  Government  decided  to  prosecute   the appellant for an offence tinder Section 500 of Indian  Penal Code  on  the ground that the Law Minister  was  defamed  in respect  of  his  conduct in the  discharge  of  his  public functions.   Sanction  was purported to have  been  accorded under section 199(4)(a).  Thereafter, the public  prosecutor filed  a  complaint  in the court  of  the  Sessions  Judge. Process  was  issued  against the appellant  upon  the  said complaint.   The appellant filed an application  to  dismiss the   complaint  on  the  ground  that  the  court  had   no jurisdiction  to  entertain the  complaint.   The  appellant contended  that  the  allegations  were  made  against  Shri Antulay  in  relation to what he had done  in  his  personal capacity  and  not  in  his capacity  as  a  Minister.   The appellant  challenged the jurisdiction of the court on  some other   grounds,  also  challenging  the  validity  of   the sanction.   The Sessions Judge rejected the  contentions  of the  appellant  and framed a charge  against  the  appellant under  section  500  of  the  Penal  Code.   The  appellant, thereupon,  filed a revision application in the High  Court. The  High Court without going into the merits held that  the revision  application  was  not  maintainable  in  view   of provisions of section 397(2). Allowing the appeal by special leave, HELD : 1. On a plain reading of section 482 it would  follow that nothing in the code which would include section  397(2) shall  be deemed to limit or affect the inherent  powers  of

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the  High Court.  However, it cannot be said that  the  said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent  power at  all  because it would be setting at naught  one  of  the limitation  imposed upon the exercise of revisional  powers. A happy and harmonious solution would be to say that the bar provided in section 397(2) operates only in, exercise of the revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that  the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory  order.   The inherent power would  come  into play  there  being no other provision in the  code  for  the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. in case the impugned order brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court or for the purpose of securing  the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,  then  nothing contained in  section  397(2)  can limit  of affect the exercise of the inherent power  by  the High  Court.  Such cases would be few and far between.   The High Court must exercise the inherent power very  sparingly. [753 H; 754 A-D] Amar Nath and Ors,. v. State of Haryana & Anr.  Crl.  A. No. 124  of  1977  decided  on  29th  July,  1977;  modified   & reiterated. R.   P.  Kapur v. The State of Punjab, [1960] 3 S.C.R.  388, referred to. 2.   Even if it is assumed that an order of the Court taking cognisance or issuing process is an interlocutory order, the bar  created  by section 397(2) will not  prevent  the  High Court  from exercising its inherent power for  stopping  the criminal   proceeding  as  early  as  possible  instead   of harassing the accused upto the end. [754 E] 3.   Ordinarily and generally the expression  "Interlocutory Order"  has been understood and taken to mean as a  converse of the term final order. [735 H]                             750 S. Kuppuswami Rao v.  The King, [1947] Federal Court Saleman V. Warner, (1881) 1 C.B. 734 referred to. The  strict test for interpreting the. words  ’Interlocutory Order’ cannot be applied while interpreting it as  appearing in  section 397(2).. The interpretation that what is  not  a final  order  must  be an  interlocutory  order  is  neither warranted  nor  justified.  If it were so, it  would  render almost  nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions  Court or  High  Court conferred by section 397(1).   Although  the words  occurring  in  a Particular  statute  are  plain  and unambiguous  they have to be interpreted in a ’manner  which would  fit  in the context of the other  provisions  of  the Statute   and  bring  about  the  real  intention   of   the legislature. There may be an order passed during the  course of a proceeding which may be not final but yet it may not be interlocutory  order pure or simple.  Some kinds  of  orders may  fall in between the two.  The bar of section 397(2)  is not  meant  to  be attracted to such  kind  of  intermediate orders.   They may not be final orders for the  purposes  of Article 134 of the Constitution yet it would not be  correct to  characterise  them as merely  interlocutory  within  the meaning of section 397(2). [756 F-H, 757 A--F, 759 E] Abdul  Rahman  v. D.  K. Cassim and Sons, (1933)  60  Indian Appeals,  76, Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors India  (P) Ltd.,  A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 406 and Parameshwari Devi  v.  State and  Anr.  [1977] 2 S.C.R. 160 and Prakash Chand  Agarwal  & Ors.  v.  M/s  Hindustan Steel Ltd.,  [1977]  2  S.C.R.  405 referred to. 4.If a complaint is dismissed under section 203 or 204(4) or  the court holds the proceedings to be void or  discharge the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of

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the  complainant or the prosecutor would be competent.   It. therefore, does not stand to reason why an accused will have no  remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke  its inherent  power  for the quashing  of  criminal  proceedings initiated on a complaint or otherwise. [760 C-E] The  court  allowed  the appeal, set aside  the  High  Court Judgment  and  remitted the case back to the High  Court  to dispose of on merits. 1760 F]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 81  of 1977. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated 10-1  1-75  of the Bombay High Court  in  Criminal  Revision Application No.:    180 of 1975. K. Rajendra  Chudhary and Mrs.  Veena Devi Khanna for  the appellant. M. N. Phadke and M.  N. Shroff for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA  J.-This  is an appeal by special  leave  from  the order of the Bombay High Court rejecting the application  in revision filed by the appellant under section 397(1) of  the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter to be  referred to  as the 1973 Code or the new Code, on the ground that  it was  not maintainable in view of the provision contained  in subsection (2) of section 397.  The High Court has not  gone into its merits. It  is not necessary to state the facts of the case  in  any detail for the disposal of. this appeal.  A bare skeleton of them will suffice.  In a press conference held at New  Delhi on  the 27th September, 1974 the appellant is said  to  have made certain statements and handed over a 751 press   hand-out"  containing  allegedly   some   defamatory statements  concerning  Shri  A. R. Antulay,  the  then  Law Minister  of  the  Government  of  Maharashtra.   The   said statements  were published in various newspapers. The  State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code as it was of  the view  that  the Law Minister was defamed in respect  of  his conduct in the discharge of his public functions.   Sanction in accordance with section 199 (4) (a) of the 1973 Code  was purported  to  have been accorded by the  State  Government. Thereupon  the  Public Prosecutor filed a complaint  in  the Court of the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay.  Cognizance  of the offence alleged to have been committed by the  appellant was  taken by the Court of Sessions without the  case  being committed  to  it as permissible under  sub-section  (2)  of section 199.  Process was issued against the appellant  upon the said complaint. The  Chief  Secretary to the Government of  Maharashtra  was examined  on  the 17th February, 1975 as a  witness  in  the Sessions  Court  to prove the sanction order  of  the  State Government.   Thereafter  on tile 24th February,  1975  Shri Madhu Limaye, the appellant, filed an application to dismiss the   complaint  on  the  ground  that  the  Court  had   no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.  The stand taken on behalf  of  the  appellant was that  allegations  were  made against Shri Antulay in relation to what he had done in  his personal capacity and not in his capacity of discharging his functions as a Minister.  Chiefly on that ground and on some others,  the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed  with  the trial was challenged by the appellant.

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The appellant raised three contentions in the Sessions Court and  later in the High Court assailing the validity and  the legality of the trial in question. They are :-               (1)   That even assuming the allegations  made               against  Shri  Antulay were  defamatory,  they               were  not  in respect of his  conduct  in  the               discharge  of his public functions  and  hence               the aggrieved person could file a complaint in               the Court of a competent Magistrate who  after               taking cognizance could try the case or commit               it to the Court of Sessions if so warranted in               law.   The  Court of Sessions could  not  take               cognizance  without the committal of the  case               to it.               (2)   The sanction given was bad in as much as               it  was not given by the State Government  but               was given by the Chief Secretary.               (3)   The Chief Secretary had not applied  his               mind to the entire conspectus of the facts and               had given the sanction in a mechanical manner.               The sanction was bad on that account too. The Sessions Judge rejected all these contentions and framed a  charge  against the appellant under section  500  of  the Penal Code.  The appellant, thereupon, challenged- the order of  the Sessions Judge in the revision filed by him  in  the High Court.  As already ’stated, without 752 entering into the merits of any of the contentions raised by the appellant, it upheld the preliminary objection as to the maintainability  of  the revision application.   Hence  this appeal. The  point which falls for determination in this  appeal  is squarely covered by a decision of this Court to which one of us (Untwalia was a party in Amar Nath and Others v. State of Haryana  & Anr But on a careful consideration of the  matter and  on  hearing  learned counsel for the  parties  in  this appeal  we thought it advisable to enunciate  and  reiterate the  view taken by two learned judges of this Court in  Amar Nath’s  case but in a somewhat modified and modulated  form. In  Amar  Nath’s case, as in this, the order  of  the  Trial Court issuing process against the accused was challenged and the  High Court was asked to quash the  criminal  proceeding either  in exercise of its inherent power under section  482 of the 1973 Code corresponding to section 561A of’ the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898-hereinafter called the 1898 Code or  the  old Code, or under section 397(1) of the  new  Code corresponding  to section 435 of the old Code.   Two  points were decided in Amar Nath’s case in the following terms :-               (1)   "While  we  fully  agree  with-the  view               taken  by  the  learned  Judge  that  where  a               revision  to the High Court against the  order               of  the Subordinate Judge is expressly  barred               under  sub-s. (2) of s. 397 of the  1973  Code               the inherent powers contained in s. 482  would               not  be available to defeat the bar  contained               in s. 397(2)."               (2    The  impugned order of  the  Magistrate,               however, was not an interlocutory order. For  the  reasons  stated  hereinafter  we  think  that  the statement  of  the  law apropos point no.  1  is  not  quite accurate  and  needs some modulation.  But we  are-going  to reaffirm the decision of the Court on the second point. Under  section 435 of the 1898 Code the High Court  had  the power to "call for and examine the record of any  proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court ’situate within the local

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limits  of  its jurisdiction for the purpose  of  satisfying itself  as to the correctness, legality or propriety of  any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed. and as to the regularity  of any proceedings of such inferior Court",  and then to pass the necessary orders in accordance with the law engrafted  in  any of the sections  following  section  435. Apart  from the revisional power, the High  Court  possessed and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised ex  debito justitiae  to do the real and the substantial  ’justice  for the administration of which alone Courts exist.  In  express language this power was recognized and saved in section 561A of  the  old Code.  Under section 397(1) of the  1973  Code, revisional  power  has been conferred on the High  Court  in terms  which are identical to those found in section 435  of the 1898 Code.  Similar is the position apropos the inherent powers of the High Court.  We may read the language (1)  Criminal  Appeal  No. 124 of 1977 decided on  the  29th July, 1977. 753 of  section  482 (corresponding to section 561A of  the  old Code) of the, 1973 Code.  It says               "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit               or  affect  the inherent powers  of  the  High               Court to make such orders as may be  necessary               to  give effect to any order under this  Code,               or  to  prevent abuse of the  process  of  any               Court  or  otherwise  to secure  the  ends  of               justice." At  the  outset the following principles may be  noticed  in relation  to the exercise of the inherent power of the  High Court  which  have been followed ordinarily  and  generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions :-               (1)   That the power is not to be resorted  to               if  there is a specific provision in the  Code               for  the  redress  of  the  grievance  of  the               aggrieved party ;               (2)   That   it  should  be   exercised   very               sparingly  to prevent abuse of process of  any               Court  or  otherwise  to secure  the  ends  of               justice;               (3)   That  it  should  not  be  exercised  as               against  the express bar of law  engrafted  in               any other provision of the Code. In  most  of the cases decided during  several  decades  the inherent  power of the High Court has been invoked  for  the quashing  of  a  criminal proceeding on one  ground  or  the other.   Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of  the  High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of  relief by  challenging  the  order  taking  cognizance  or  issuing processes  or framing charge on the grounds that  the  Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with  the trial,  that the issuance of process was wholly  illegal  or void,  or that no charge could be framed as no  offence  was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced  in Court.  In the background aforesaid we proceed to examine as to  what is the correct position of law after the  introduc- tion of a provision like sub section (2) of section 397  in, the 1973 Code. As  pointed out in Amar Nath’s case (supra) the  purpose  of putting  a bar on the power of revision in relation  to  any interlocutory  order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial  or other  proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal  of the cases finally, More often than not, the revisional power of  the  High Court was resorted to in  relation  to  inter- locutory   orders  delaying  the  final  disposal   of   the

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proceedings.  The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this  delay by introducing sub-section (2), in section  397. On  the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the  High Court  (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise  of  the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order,  on the  other, the power has been conferred in almost the  same terms  as  it was in the 1898 Code.  On a plain  reading  of section  482, however, it would follow that nothing  in  the Code,  which  would include subsection (2)  of  section  397 also,  "shall  be  deemed to limit or  affect  the  inherent powers of the High Court".  But, if we were to say that the 754 said  bar is not to operate in the exercise of the  inherent power  at  all,  it will be setting at  naught  one  of  the limitations  imposed  upon the exercise  of  the  revisional powers.  In such a situation, what is-the harmonious way out ? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would  be to  say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of  section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power  of revision in relation to any  interlocutory  order. Then  in  accordance  with  one  of  the  other   principles enunciated  above, the inherent power will come  into  play, there  being no other provision in the Code for the  redress of  the grievance of the aggrieved party.  But then, if  the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could  be corrected in exercise of the revisional  power  of the  High  Court under the 1898 Code. the  High  Court  will refuse  to  exercise its inherent power.  But  in  case  the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is  an abuse  of  the process of the Court or for  the  purpose  of securing the ends of justice interference by the High  Court is  absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in  section 397(2)  can  limit or affect the exercise  of  the  inherent power  by the High Court.  But such cases would be  few  and far  between.   The High Court must  exercise  the  inherent power   very  sparingly.   One  such  case  would   be   the desirability  of  the  quashing of,  a  criminal  proceeding initiated   illegally,  vexatiously  or  as  being   without jurisdiction.   Take for example a case where a  prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction.  then  the trial of the accused  will  be  without jurisdiction  and  even after his acquittal a  second  trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine  of Autrefois   Acquit.   Even  assuming,  although   we   shall presently  show  that it is not so, that in such a  case  an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order. does it stand to reason to say  that inherent  power  of the High Court cannot be  exercised  for stopping  the  criminal  proceeding as  early  as  possible, instead  of harassing the accused upto the end ? The  answer is  obvious  that the bar will not operate  to  prevent  the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure, the ends of justice.  The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial.  The High Court can examine the  matter in  an  appropriate  case under its  inherent  powers.   The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power  of the  High Court in accordance with section 482 of  the  1973 Code.  even assuming. although not accepting, that  invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. In R. P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab (1) Gajendragadkar J.. as  he  then  was, delivering the  judgment  of  this  Court pointed out, if we may say so with respect, very  succinctly the  scope of the inherent power of the High Court  for  the purpose of quashing a criminal proceeding.  Says the learned

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Judge at pages 392-93 :--               "Ordinarily  criminal  proceedings  instituted               against an accused person must be tried  under               the provisions of the Code, and the High Court               would be reluctant to interfere with the  said               proceedings at an interlocutory stage.  It  is               not possi- (1)  [1960] 3 SCR. 388. 755               ble,  desirable or expedient to lay  down  any               inflexible   rule  which  would   govern   the               exercise   of  this   inherent   jurisdiction.               However,  we may indicate some  categories  of               cases where the inherent jurisdiction can  and               should   be   exercised   for   quashing   the               proceedings.  There may be cases where it  may               be  possible  for the High Court to  take  the               view  that the institution or  continuance  of               criminal proceedings against an accused person               may amount to the abuse of the process of  the               court  or  that the quashing of  the  impugned               proceedings would secure the ends of  justice.               If  the criminal proceeding in question is  in               respect  of  an offence alleged to  have  been               committed   by  an  accused  person   and   it               manifestly  appears that there is a legal  bar               against the institution or continuance of  the               said  proceeding  the  High  Court  would   be               justified  in quashing the proceeding on  that               ground.   Absence  of the  requisite  sanction               may,  for instance, furnish cases  under  this               category.   Cases  may also  arise  where  the               allegations in the First Information Report or               the complaint, even if they are taken at their               face value and accepted in their entirety,  do               not  constitute the offence alleged;  in  such               cases  no  question of  appreciating  evidence               arises;  it is a matter merely of  looking  at               the complaint or the First Information  Report               to  decide  whether  the  offence  alleged               is  disclosed or not.  In such cases it  would               be legitimate for the High Court to hold  that               it  would  be manifestly unjust to  allow  the               process  of  the criminal court to  be  issued               against the accused person.  A third  category               of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of               the High Court can be successfully invoked may               also  arise.   In  cases  falling  under  this               category  the  allegations  made  against  the               accused   person  do  constitute  an   offence               alleged but there is either no legal  evidence               adduced  in  support of the case  or  evidence               adduced clearly or manifestly fails to.  prove               the  charge’.  In dealing with this  class  of               cases  it  is important to bear in-  mind  the               distinction  between a case where there is  no               legal  evidence  or where  there  is  evidence               which  is manifestly and clearly  inconsistent               with the accusation made and cases where there               is  legal evidence which on  its  appreciation               may  not support the accusation  in  question.               In exercising its jurisdiction under s.  561-A               the  High  Court  would  not  embark  upon  an               enquiry as to whether the evidence in question               is  reliable or not.  That is the function  of

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             the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it  would               not  be open to any party to invoke  the  High               Court’s inherent Jurisdiction and contend that               on  a reasonable appreciation of the  evidence               the accusation made against the accused  would               not be sustained." We think the law as stated above is not affected by  section 397(2)  of the new Code.  It still holds good in  accordance with ’.section 482. Ordinarily  and  generally  the  expression   ’interlocutory order’  has been understood and taken to mean as a  converse of  the  term  ’final order’.  In volume  22  of  the  third edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England at page 742,  however, it has been stated in para 1606 756               "....... a judgment or order may be final  for               one purpose and interlocutory for another,  or               final as to part and interlocutory as to part.               The  meaning  of two words must  therefore  be               considered  separately  in  relation  to   the               particular purpose for which it is required."               In para 1607 it is said :               "In   general  a  judgment  or   order   which               determines the principal matter in question is               termed "final"."               In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find  the               words               "An  order which does not deal with the  final               rights of the parties, but either (1) is  made               before  judgment, and gives no final  decision               on the matters in dispute, but is merely on  a               matter  of  procedure, or (2)  is  made  after               judgment,   and   merely   directs   how   the               declarations  of right already given  in  the-               final judgment are to be worked out, is termed               "interlocutory".    An  interlocutory   order,               though not conclusive of the main dispute, may               be  conclusive  as to the  subordinate  matter               with which it deals." In S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King(1) Kania C. J.,  delivering the  judgment  of  the Court has referred  to  some  English decisions  at pages 185 and 186.  Lord Esher M. R.  said  in Salaman v. Warner(2) "If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter  in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it  is final.   On the other hand, if their decision, if  given  in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on,  then I  think  it is not final, but interlocutory." To  the  same effect are the observations quoted from the judgments of Fry L.  J.  and Lopes L. J. Applying the said  test,  almost  on facts  similar to the ones in the instant case, it was  held that the order in revision passed by the High Court (at that time, there was no bar like section 397 (2) was not a "final order"  within  the  meaning  of  section  205  (1)  of  the Government of India Act, 1935.  It is to be noticed that the test  laid  down therein was that if the  objection  of  the accused  succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but  not vice versa.  The order can be said to be a final order  only if, in either event, the action will be determined.  In  our opinion   if  this  strict  test  were  to  be  applied   in interpreting  the words ’interlocutory order"  occurring  in section  397(2),  then  the order taking  cognizance  of  an offence  by  a  Court, whether it is so  done  illegally  or without  jurisdiction, will not be a final order  and  hence

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will  be  an interlocutory one.  Even so, as  we  have  said above,  the inherent power of the High Court can be  invoked for  quashing  such  a  criminal  proceeding.   But  in  our judgment   such   an  interpretation   and   the   universal application of the principle that what is not a final  order must  be  an interlocutory order is  neither  warranted  nor justified  If it were so it will render almost nugatory  the revisional  power  of the Sessions Court or the  High  Court conferred  on  it  by section 397(1).   On  such  a  ’strict interpretation,. (1)[1947] Federal Court Reports, 180. (2)  [1891] 1 Q.B. 734. 757 only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on  the  final  determination  of the  action  but  are  not appealable  under Chapter XXIX of the Code.  This  does  not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the  one  in the, 1898 Code.  In what cases  then  the  High Court will examine the legality or the propriety of an order or  the legality of any proceeding of an  inferior  Criminal court ? Is it circumscribed to examine only such  proceeding which  is  brought  for  its  examination  after  the  final determination  and wherein no appeal lies ? Such cases  will be  very  few  and far between.  It  has  been  pointed  out repeatedly, vide, for example, The River Wear  Commissioners v.  William Adamson(1) and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla  v.  The Union  of India ( 2) that although the word occurring  in  a particular  statute are plain and unambiguous, they have  to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention  of  the  legislature.   On  the  one  hand,   the legislature  kept  intact the revisional power of  the  High Court  and,  on the other, it put a bar on the  exercise  of that power in relation to any interlocutory order.  In  such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of  the legislature was not to equate the expression  "interlocutory order"  as  invariably being converse of  the  words  "final order".  There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding  which may not be final in the sense  noticed  in Kuppuswami’s  case  (supra),  but,  yet it  may  not  be  an interlocutory order-pure or simple.  Some kinds of order may fall   in  between  the  two.   By  a  rule  of   harmonious construction,  we, think that the bar in sub-section (2)  of section  397 is not meant to be attracted to such  kinds  of intermediate  orders.  They may not be final orders for  the purposes  of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet  it  would not be correct to characterise them as merely  interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397(2).  It is  neither advisable,  nor possible, to make a catalogue of  orders  to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply  interlocutory  and which kinds of  orders  would  be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two.  The first two kinds are well-known and can be culled out from many decided cases.   We  may, however, indicate that the type  of  order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of subsection (2) of section 397.  In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type  falling in the middle course. In  passing,  for the sake of explaining ourselves,  we  may refer  to what has been said by Kania C. J. in  Kuppuswami’s case  at  page 187 by quoting a few words  from  Sir  George Lowndes  in  the case of Abdul Rahman V. D.  K.  Cassim  and

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Sons(3).   The learned law Lord said with reference  to  the order under consideration in that case : "The effect of  the order  from  which it is here sought to appeal  was  not  to dispose  finally of the rights of the parties.  It no  doubt decided  an important, and even a vital, issue in the  case, but  it left the suit alive, and provided for its  trial  in the ordinary way.  Many a time a question (1)  [1876-77] 2 A.C. 743. (3)  [1933] 60 Indian Appeals, 76. (2) [1957] S.C.R. 930. 758 arose in India as to what is the exact meaning of the phrase "case  decided"  occurring in section 1 1 5 of the  Code  of Civil  Procedure.  Some High Courts had taken the view  that it  meant the final order passed on final  determination  of the  action.   Many  others had however,  opined  that  even interlocutory  orders were covered by the said  term.   This Court struck a mean and it did not approve of either of  the two  extreme lines.  In Baldevdas v. Filmistan  Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd.(1) it has been pointed out :               "A  case  may be said to be  decided,  if  the               Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit               some  right or obligation of the  parties  in               controversy :" We  may  give a clear example of an order in  a  civil  case which  may  not  be a final order  within  the  meaning  of Article  133  (1) of the Constitution, yet it  will  not  be purely or simply of an interlocutory character.  Suppose for example,  a defendant raises the plea of jurisdiction  of  a particular  Court to try the suit or the bar  of  limitation and succeeds, then the action is determined finally in  that Court.   But  if the point is decided against him  the  suit proceeds.   Of course, in a given case the point raised  may be  such that it is interwoven and interconnected  with  the other issues in the case, and that it may not be possible to decide  it  under  Order  14 Rule 2 of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure  as I preliminary point of law.  But, if it  is  a pure point of law and is decided one way or the other,  then the  order deciding such a point may not  be  interlocutory, albeit-may  not be final either.  Surely, it will be a  case decided,  as  pointed out by this Court in  some  decisions, within  the  meaning  of section 115 of the  Code  of  Civil Procedure.   We think it would be just and proper  to  apply the  same kind to test for finding out the real  meaning  of the  expression ’interlocutory order’ occurring  in  section 397(2). In Amar Nath’s case, reference has been made to the decision of  this  Court in Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v.  State  of Gujarat(2)  After an enquiry under section 476 of  the  1898 Code  an order was made directing the filing of a  complaint against  the appellant.  It was affirmed by the High  Court. The  matter  came to this Court on grant  of  a  certificate under  Article  134(1) (c).  A question  arose  whether  the order  was  a "final order" within the meaning of  the  said constitutional   provision.   Shelat  J.,   delivering   the judgment on behalf of himself and two other learned  Judges, said that it was a final order.  The dissenting judgment was given  by Bachawat J., on behalf of himself find  one  other learned  Judge.   In the majority decision four  tests  were culled  out  from some English decisions.  ’they  are  found enumerated  at page 688.  One of the tests is "If the  order in  question is reversed would the action have to go  on  ?" Applying that test to the facts of the instant case it would be  noticed that if the plea of the appellant  succeeds  and the  order of the Sessions Judge is reversed,  the  criminal

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proceeding as initiated and instituted against him cannot go on.  If, however, he loses on the merits of the  preliminary point  the  proceeding  will go on.  Applying  the  test  of Kuppuswami case such an order will (1) A. T. R. 1970 S.C. 406. (2) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 685. 759 not be a final order.  But applying the fourth test noted at page 688 in Mohan Lal’s case it would be a final order.  The real  point of distinction, however, is to be found at  page 693 in the judgment of Shelat, J.The passage runs thus :               "As   observed  in  Ramesh v.  Patni-[1966]  3               S.C.R. 198 the finality of that order was  not               to be judged by correlating that    order with               the controversy in the complaint,viz.  whether               the   appellant  had  committed  the   offence               charged  against him therein.  The  fact  that               that  controversy  still  remained  alive   is               irrelevant." The majority view is based upon the distinction pointed  out in the above passage and concluding that it is a final order within  the meaning of Article 134(1) (c).   While  Bachawat J.,  said at page 695 : "It is merely a preliminary step  in the prosecution and therefore an interlocutory orders." Even though  there  may  be  a  scope  for  expressing  different opinions  apropos  the nature of the order which  was  under consideration   in  Mohan  Lars  case,  in   our   judgment, undoubtedly,  an order directing the filing of  a  complaint after  enquiry  made  under a provision of  the  1973  Code, similar  to  section  476 of the 1898 Code will  not  be  an interlocutory  order within the meaning of ’section  397(2). The  order will be clearly revisable by the High Court.   We must,  however, hasten to add that the majority decision  in Mohan  Lal’s case treats such an order as an  order  finally concluding  the  enquiry  started  to  find  out  whether  a complaint  should be lodged or not, taking  the  prosecution launched  on  the  filing of the  complaint  as  a  separate proceeding.   From  that  point of  view  the  matter  under discussion  may  not be said to be squarely covered  by  the decision  of  this Court in Mohan Lal’s case.  Yet  for  the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in  coming to  the conclusion, after due consideration, that  an  order rejecting  the  plea of the accused on a point  which,  when accepted,  will  conclude the  particular  proceeding,  will surely  be not an interlocutory order within the meaning  of section 397(2). We  may  also  refer  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in Parmeshwari Devi v. State and Anr.(1) that an order made  in a criminal proceeding against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial and which adversely affected him is not an  interlocutory  order within the meaning of  section  397 (2).  Referring to a passage from the decision of this Court in  Mohan  Lals case- the passage which is to  be  found  in Halsbury’s  Laws of England, Volume 22, it has been said  by Shinghal  J., delivering the judgment of the Court, at  page 164 :               "It  may thus be conclusive with reference  to               the stage at which it is made, and it may also               be  conclusive  as to a person who  is  not  a               party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it               is directed." As already mentioned, the view expressed in Mohan Lal’s case may be open to debate or difference.  One such example is to be found in the (1)  [1977] 2 S.C.R. 160.

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760 decision  of this Court in Prakash Chand Agarwal &  Ors.  v. M/s  Hindustan  Steel Ltd.(1) wherein it was  held  that  an order of the High Court setting aside an ex-parte decree  in the  suit  and restoring the suit to the file of  the  Trial Court  is  not a final order within the meaning  of  Article 133.  It is to be noticed that if the High Court would  have refused to set aside the ex-parte decree, the proceeding for setting it aside would have finally ended and on some of the principles  culled out by the majority in Mohan  Lars  case, such  an  order  would have been a  final  order.   We  are, however,  not  under  any  necessity  to  enter  into   this controversial arena.  In our opinion whether the type of the order  aforesaid  would be a final order or not,  surely  it will  not  be an interlocutory order within the  meaning  of sub-section (2) of section 397 of the 1973 Code. Before  we  conclude  we may point out  an  obvious,  almost insurmountable, difficulty in the way of applying  literally the  test laid down in Kuppuswami Rao’s case and in  holding that  an order of the kind under consideration being  not  a final order must necessarily be an interlocutory one.  If  a complaint  is dismissed under section 203 or  under  section 204(4),  or  the Court holds the proceeding to  be  void  or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at  the instance  of  the  complainant or the  prosecutor  would  be competent,  otherwise  it will make section 398 of  the  new Code otiose.  Does it stand to reason, then, that an accused will  have no remedy to move the High Court in  revision  or invoke  its inherent power for the quashing of the  criminal proceeding initiated upon a complaint or otherwise and which is  fit  to be quashed on the face of it ?  The  legislature left  the power to order further inquiry intact in  ’section 398.   Is  it  not, then, in consonance with  the  sense  of justice  to leave intact the remedy of the accused  to  move the  High Court for setting aside the order  adversely  made against  him  in  similar circumstances  and  to  quash  the proceeding ? The answer must be given in favour of the  just and reasonable view expressed by us above. For  the  reasons stated above, we allow  this  appeal,  set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and remit the case  back to it to dispose of the appellant’s  petition  on merits,  in the manner it may think fit and proper to do  in accordance with the law and in the light of this judgment. P.H.P.                            Appeal allowed. (1) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 504. 761