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PETITIONER: MADHU KISHWAR & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/04/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. KULDIP SINGH (J) PUNCHHI, M.M.

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1864            1996 SCC  (5) 125  JT 1996 (4)   379        1996 SCALE  (3)640

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH              WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 219 OF 1986 Juliana Lakra. V. State of Bihar.                       J U D G M E N T Punchhi, J.      In  these   two  petitions  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution, challenge is made to certain provisions of the Chota Nagpur  Tenancy Act,  1908, (hereafter  referred to as ‘the Act’)  which go  to provide  in  favour  of  the  male, succession to property in the male line, on the premise that the provisions  are discriminatory  and unfair against women and therefore,  ultra  vires  the  equality  clause  in  the Constitution. A  two-member Bench  hearing these  matters at one point of time on soliciting was conveyed the information that the  State of  Bihar had set up a Committee to consider the feasibility of appropriate amendments to the legislation and to  examine the  matter in detail. It was later  brought to its notice that the Committee ultimately had  come to the opinion that  the people  of the  area,  who    were  really concerned  with   the  question   of  succession,  were  not interested in having the law changed, and that if the law be changed or so interpreted, letting estates go into the hands of female  heirs, there  would be great agitation and unrest in the  area among  the  scheduled  tribe  people  who  have custom-based living.  The two-member  Bench then  ordered as follows:      "Scheduled tribe people are as much      citizens as  others  and  they  are      entitled   to    the   benefit   of      guarantees of  the    Constitution.      It may  be that the law can provide      reasonable   regulation    in   the

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    matter of  succession  to  property      with  a     view   to   maintaining      cohesiveness in regard to Scheduled      Tribes and  their  properties.  But      exclusion  from  inheritance  would      not  be   appropriate.  Since  this      aspect of  the matter  has not been      examined by  the State of Bihar and      the   feasibility   of   permitting      inheritance   and    simultaneously      regulating such inheritance for the      purpose  of   ensuring    that  the      property does  not go  out  of  the      family  by   way  of   transfer  or      otherwise we  are of  the view that      in the  peculiar facts  of the case      the  State   of  Bihar   should  re      examine  the   matter.   In   these      circumstances, instead of disposing      of the  two  writ  petitions  by  a      final  order,     we   adjourn  the      hearing thereof  for  three  months      and direct  the State  of Bihar  to      immediately take into consideration      our    order  and  under  take  the      exercise indicated  and  report  to      the court  by way  of an  affidavit      and along  with that  a copy of the      report  may  be  furnished  by  the      Committee to be set up by the State      of Bihar."      In pursuance  thereof, the State of Bihar has furnished an affidavit  to the  effect that  a meeting  of   the Bihar Tribal Consultative  Council was held on 31-7-1992, presided over by  the Chief  Minister and  attended   to by M.P.s and M.L.A.s of the tribal areas, besides various other Ministers and officers  of the  State,  who    on  deliberations  have expressed the view that they were not in favour of effecting any change  in the provisions of the Act, as the land of the tribals may  be alienated, which will not be in the interest of the  tribal community  at present.  The  matter  was  not closed, however,  because the  Council recommended  that the proposal may  widely be  publicized in  the tribal community and their  various sub-castes  may be prompted to give their opinion if  they would  like any change in the existing law. It is  in this  backdrop that  these petitions  were  placed before this three-member Bench for disposal.      We have  read with  great admiration the opinion of our learned brother  K, Ramaswamy,J.  prepared  after  deep  and tremendous research  made on  the conditions  of the  tribal societies in  India, leave  alone the State of Bihar, and in drawing a  vivid picture  of the distortions which appear in the  regulation   of  succession   to  property   in  tribal societies, when  tested on  the touchstone  of the  codified Hindu law  now existing  in the form of The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 etc.      It is  worth-while to  account some  legislation on the subject. The  Hindu Succession  Act governs  and  prescribes rules of  succession  applicable  to  a  large  majority  of Indians  being   Hindus,  Sikhs,   Buddhists,   Jains   etc. whereunder since  1956, if  not earlier,  the female heir is put at  par with a male heir. Next in the line of numbers is the Shariat  Law,  applicable  to  Muslims,  whereunder  the female heir  has an unequal share in the inheritance, by and large half  of what  a male  gets.  Then  comes  the  Indian

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Succession Act  which applies to Christians and by and large to  people   not  covered  under  the  aforesaid  two  laws, conferring in  a certain  manner heirship on females as also males. Certain  chapters thereof  are not made applicable to certain communities.  Sub-section (2)  of section  2 of  the Hindu Succession  Act significantly  provides  that  nothing contained in  the Act  shall apply  to the  members  of  any Scheduled tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of  the Constitution,  unless otherwise  directed by the Central  Government  by  means  of  a  notification  in  the official gazette.  Section 3(2) further provides that in the Act, unless  the context otherwise requires, words importing the masculine  gender shall not be taken to include females. (Emphasis   supplied). General  rule of legislative practice is that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,  words  importing  the  masculine  gender  used  in statutes are  to be  taken to  include females. Attention be drawn to  Section 13  of the  General Clauses  Act.  But  in matters of  succession the  general rule  of plurality would have to  be applied with circumspection. The afore provision thus appears  to have  been inserted  ex abundantl  cautela. Even under  Section 3 of the Indian Succession Act the State Government is  empowered to  exempt any  race, sect or tribe from the  operation of  the Act  and the  tribes of  Mundas, Oraons, Santals etc. in the State of Bihar, who are included in our  concern, have  been so  exempted. Thus  neither  the Hindu Succession  Act, nor  the Indian  Succession Act,  nor even the  Shariat Law  is applicable  to the custom governed tribals. And  custom, as  is well  recognized,  varies  from people to people and region to region.      In face  of these  divisions and visible barricades put up by the sensitive tribal people valuing their own customs, traditions and  usages, judicially  enforcing  on  them  the principles of  personal laws  K applicable  to others, on an elitist approach  or  on  equality  principle,  by  judicial activism, is  a difficult  and mind-boggling effort. Brother K. Ramaswamy,  J. seems  to have  taken the view that Indian legislatures  (and   governments  too)   would  not   prompt themselves  to   activate  in   this  direction  because  of political reasons  and in this situation, an activist Court, apolitical as  it avowedly  is, could  get into  action  and legislate  broadly   on  the   lines  as  suggested  by  the petitioners in their written submissions. However, laudable, desirable and attractive the result may seem, it has happily been viewed   by  our learned brother that an activist court is  not   fully  equipped  to  cope  with  the  details  and intricacies of  the legislative  subject  and  can  at  best advise and  focus attention  on  the  State  polity  on  the problem and shake it from its slumber, goading it to awaken, march and  reach the  goal. for  in whatever  measure be the concern of  the court,  it compulsively    needs  to  apply, somewhere  and  at  sometime,  brakes  to  its  self-motion, described in  judicial parlance  as self restraint. We agree therefore with  brother K. Ramaswamy, J. as summed up by him in the  paragraph ending  on page  36 of  his judgment  that under the  circumstances it  is not desirable to declare the customs of  tribal inhabitants  as offending Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution v  and each case must be examined when full facts are placed before the Court.       With regard to the statutory provisions of the Act, he has proposed to the reading down of section 7 and 8 in order to  preserve   their  constitutionality.  This  approach  is available from  page 36  onwards of  his judgment. The words "male  descendants"     wherever  occurring,  would  include "female descendants".  It is  also proposed that even though

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the provisions  of the  Hindu Succession  Act, 1956  and the Indian Succession  Act, 1925 in terms would not apply to the Scheduled Tribes,  their  general  principles  composing  of justice, equity  and fairplay  would apply  to them. On this basis it  has been  proposed  to  take  the  view  that  the Scheduled  Tribe  women  would  succeed  to  the  estate  of paternal parent,  brother or  husband as  heirs by intestate succession and inherit the property in equal shares with the male heir  with absolute  rights as  per the  principles  of Hindu Succession  Act as  also the  Indian  Succession  Act. However much  we may  like the  law to  be so  we regret our inability to  subscribe  to  the  means  in  achieving  such objective. If  this be  the route  of return  on the Court’s entering the  thichet, it  is for better that the court kept out of  it. It is not far to imagine that there would follow a bee-line  for similar  claims in  diverse situations,  not stopping at  tribal definitions,   and a deafening uproar to bring other systems of law in line with the Hindu Succession Act and  the Indian  Succession  Act  as  models.  Rules  of succession are  indeed susceptible of providing differential treatment, not  necessarily equal. Nonuniformities would not in all  events violate  Article 14. Judge-made amendments to provisionary  over  and  above  the  available  legislature, should normally  be avoided. We are thus constrained to take this view, even though it may appear to be conservative, for adopting a  cautious approach,  and  the  one  proposed  our learned brother is, regretfully not acceptable to us.       The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act was enacted in 1908. It’s preamble suggests that it was a law to amend and consolidate certain enactments  relating to  the  law  of  landlord  and tenant and  the settlement  of  rent  in  Chota  Nagpur.  It extends  to  North  Chota  Nagpur  and  South  Chota  Nagpur divisions, except  areas  which  have  been  constituted  as municipalities under  the Bihar and Orissa Municipality Act, 1922. Chapter  II,  thereof  providing  classes  of  tenants containing Sections 4 to 8 is reproduced hereafter: CHAPTER II Section 4:      CLASSES OF  TENANTS -  There  shall      be, for  the purposes  of this Act,      the following  classes of  tenants,      namely :      (1) tenure-holder, including under-      tenure-holders,      (2) raiyats, namely :      (a) occupancy-raiyats,  that is  to      say,  raiyats  having  a  right  of      occupancy in the land held by them,      (b) non-occupancy  raiyats, that is      to say,  raiyats not  having such a      right of occupancy, and      (c)  raiyats   having   khunt-Katti      rights.      (3) under  raiyats, that is to say,      tenants      holding,       whether      immediately or  immediately,  under      raiyats, and      (4) Hundar Khunt-kattidars." Section 5:      "MEANING   OF   ’TENURE-HOLDER’   -      Tenure-holder  means   primarily  a      person who  has acquired  from  the      proprietors or from another tenure-      holder, a  right to  hold land  for      the purpose  of collecting rents or

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    bringing At  under  cultivation  by      establishing  tenants  on  it,  and      includes      (a) the  successors-in-interest  of      persons who  have Acquired  such  a      right,  and      (b) the  holders of tenures entered      in  any   register   prepared   and      confirmed under  the  Chota  Nagpur      Tenures Act, 1861,      but  does  not  include  a  Mundari      khuntkattidar. Section 6:      "MEANING OF  RAIYAT  -(1)  ’Raiyat’      means primarily  a person  who  has      acquired a  right to  hold land for      the purpose  of cultivating  it  by      himself,  or   by  members  of  his      family, or  by hired  servants,  or      with  the   aid  of  partners;  and      includes the successors-in-interest      of persons  who have  acquired such      a right,  but does  not  include  a      Mundari khunt-kattidar.      Explanation- Where a tenant of land      has the  right to  bring  it  under      cultivation, he  shall be deemed to      have acquired  a right  to hold  it      for  the  purpose  of  cultivation,      notwithstanding that he uses it for      the  purpose   of   gathering   the      produce of  it or of grazing cattle      on it.      (2) A person shall not be deemed to      be a  raiyat unless  he  holds  and      either    immediately    under    a      proprietor or  immediately under  3      tenure-holder or  immediately under      a mundari khunt-kattidar.      (3) In determining whether a tenant      is a tenure-holder or a raiyat, the      court shall have regard to           (a) local custom, and           (b) the  purpose for which the      right  of  tenancy  was  originally      acquired. Section 7:      "(1)  MEANING   OF  ’RAIYAT  HAVING      KHUNT-KHATTI   RIGHTS’   "   Raiyat      having--khunt katti rights’ means a      raiyat in  occupation of, or having      any  subsisting   title  to,   land      reclaimed  from   jungle   by   the      original founders of the village or      their descendants in the male line,      when such raiyat is a member of the      family which founded the village or      a descendant  in the  male line  of      any member of such family:           Provided that  no raiyat shall      be  deemed   to  have  khunt  katti      rights in  any land  unless he  and      all his  predecessors-in-title have      held such  land or obtained a title      thereto by  virtue  of  inheritance

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    from the  original founders  of the      village.      (2)  Nothing   in  this  Act  shall      prejudicially affect  the rights of      any   person   who   has   lawfully      acquired  a   title  to   a   khunt      kattidari   tenancy    before   the      commencement of this Act. Section 8:      "MEANING OF  MUNDARI KHUNT-KATTIDAR      ’Mundari  khunt-kattidar’  means  a      Mundari who has acquired a right to      hold jungle land for the purpose of      bringing suitable  portions thereof      under cultivation  by himself or by      male members  of  his  family,  and      includes -      3. (a)  the heirs  male in the line      of any  such Mundari, when they are      in possession  of such land or have      any subsisting title thereto; and      (b) as regards any portions of such      land    which     have     remained      continuously in  the possession  of      any   such   Mundari   and      his      descendants in  the male line, such      descendants.      At this  place, Section  76 alongwith its illustrations would also need reproduction:      "76. SAVING  OF CUSTOM - Nothing in      this Act  shall affect  any custom,      usage  or   customary   right   not      inconsistent with, or not expressly      or   by    necessary    implication      modified  or   abolished  by,   its      provisions.                ILLUSTRATIONS      I. A  custom  or  usage  whereby  a      raiyat obtains a right of occupancy      as soon    as  he  is  admitted  to      occupation of  the tenancy, whether      he  is  a  settled  raiyat  of  the      village  or  not,  is  inconsistent      with, and  is not  expressly or  by      necessary implication  modified  or      abolished  by,  the  provisions  of      this Act.  This  custom  or  usage,      accordingly,  wherever  it  exists,      will not be affected by this Act.      II. A  custom or  usage by which an      under  raiyat   can  obtain  rights      similar to  those of  an  occupancy      raiyat    is,     similarly,    not      inconsistent  with,   and  is   not      expressly    or     by    necessary      implication modified  or  abolished      by, the provisions of this Act, and      will not be affected by this Act.      III. A  custom or  usage whereby  a      raiyat   is    entitled   to   make      improvements on  his tenancy and to      receive  compensation  therefor  on      ejectment is not inconsistent with,      and  is   not   expressly   or   by      necessary implication  modified  or

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    abolished by the provisions of this      Act.   That    custom   or    usage      accordingly, where  it exists, will      not be affected by this Act.      IV.  A   custom  or  usage  whereby      korkar is held, -      (a)    during    preparation    for      cultivation, rent-free, or      (b) after preparation, at a rate of      rent less than the rate payable for      ordinary raiyati  land in  the same      village, tenure or estate,      is not  inconsistent with,  and  is      not  expressly   or  by   necessary      implication   modified or abolished      by, the  provisions  of  this  Act.      That custom  or usage  accordingly,      wherever it  exists,  will  not  by      affected by this Act,"      A bare  outline of  these provisions  goes to show that these have  been enacted  to identify  classes  of  tenants. These provisions  have no  connection with  the ownership of land. Section  3(XXVI) defines ’tenant’ to mean a person who holds land  under another  and is,  or  but  for  a  special contract would  be. liable to pay rent for that land to that other person.  Sub-section (1)  of Section 4 is plainly tied up with  Section S.  Subsection (2)(d) & (b) of Section 4 is tied up  with Section  6 and sequally with Section 76. Local customs, as the illustrations under Section 76 show, are for the purpose of streamlining the tenancy rights and landlord- tenant relationship.  Sub-section (2)(c) of Section 4 in the same pattern  is tied  up with Section 7. Lastly sub-section (4) of  Section 4  is tied  up with  Section 8  relating  to "Mundari Khunt-kattidhar".  All these tenants as classified, do not  own the  tenanted lands, but hold land under others. Their tenancy  rights are  identified and  regulated through these provisions.  The personal  laws of the tenants nowhere figure in the set up.      The solitary  decided case available under section 8 of the Act and where personal law of the Mundari was allowed to intrude is  Jitmohan  Singh  Munda  v.  Ramratan  Singh  and Another [1958  Bihar Journal Reports 373], There the learned Judges of the High a Court comprising the Bench seem to have differed on  the applicability  of section  8 but not on its scope. The case there established was that the Mundari Khunt Kattidar deceased  was of  Hindu religion and on that  basis it was  held that  his widow  could retain possession of the tenancy rights of her deceased husband during her life time. The right  of the  male collateral  to take  possession  was deferred by  the intervening  widow’s life estate. This case could, in a sense, be taken as stare decisis, when none else is in  the field, in order to take the cue that personal law of a  female descendant  of a  Mundari  Khunt Kattidar could steal  the   show  and  be  section  8  would  have  to/read accordingly. But  this case  is  decided  on  misreading  of section 8.  The earlier  part of it providing the meaning of Mundari Khunt  Kattidar has  been overlooked.  It  has  been assumed, on the basis of the latter part that the expression has an  inclusive definition  and thus would not exclude the Mundari’s widow  governed by  Hindu Law.  The High  Court at page 375 of its report observed as follows:-      "The contention  based on section 8      also  terminologically   cannot  be      accepted. In  the first  place,  in      defining Khunt Kattidar interest as

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    quoted above,  the 14  word used is      ’includes’ whereaftar occur clauses      (a) and (b) containing reference to      the male  line of  a  Mundari.  The      word includes’  cannot be  taken to      be exhaustive."      Jitmohan  Singh’s  case  can  not  thus  be  a  guiding precedent. It  is at best a decision on its own facts. There is no scope thus in reading down the provisions of section 8 and  even  that  of  section  7  so  as  to  include  female descendants alongside the male descendants in the context of section 7 and 8. It is only in the larger perspective of the Constitution can the answer to the problem be found.      Life is  a precious gift of nature to a being. Right to life  as   a  fundamental  right  stands  enshrined  in  the Constitution. The right to livelihood is born of it. In Olga Tellis &  Ors. v.  Bombay Municipal  Corporation and  Others [AIR 1986  SC 180]  this Court  defined it in this manner in para 32 of the report:      ".............The  sweep   of   the      right to  life conferred by Article      21 is  wide  and  far-reaching.  It      does  not  mean  merely  that  life      cannot  be  extinguished  or  taken      away  as,   for  example,   by  the      imposition  and  execution  of  the      death sentence, except according to      procedure established  by law. That      is but  one aspect  of the right to      life. An  equally important fact of      that  right   is   the   right   to      livelihood because,  no person  can      live without  the means  of living,      that is,  the means  of livelihood.      If the  right to  livelihood is not      treated  as   a  part   of      the      constitutional right  to life,  the      easiest way  of depriving  a person      of his   right  to life would be to      deprive  him   of  his   means   of      livelihood   to    the   point   of      abrogation. Such  deprivation would      not only  denude the  life  of  its      effective        content        and      meaningfulness but  it  would  make      life impossible  to live.  And yet,      such deprivation  would not have to      be in accordance with the procedure      established by law, if the right to      livelihood is  not  regarded  as  a      part of  the right  to life.  That,      which alone  makes it  possible  to      live, leave  aside what  makes life      liable, must  be deemed  to  be  an      integral component  of the right to      life. Deprive a person of his right      to livelihood  and you  shall  have      deprived him  of his  life. Indeed,      that explains the massive migration      of  the  rural  population  to  big      cities. They  migrate because  they      have no means of  livelihood in the      villages. The  motive  force  which      propels their  desertion  of  their      hearths and homes in the village is

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    the struggle for survival, that is,      the   struggle    for   life.    So      unimpeachable is  the  evidence  of      the  nexus  between  life  and  the      means of   livelihood. They have to      eat to  live:   Only a  handful can      afford the  luxury of    living  to      eat. That they can do, namely, eat,      only if  they  have  the  means  of      livelihood. That  is the context in      which it  was said by Douglas J. in      Baksey, (1954)  347 M.D.  442  that      the right  to   work  is  the  most      precious    liberty     that    man      possesses. It  is the most precious      liberty because,  it  sustains  and      enables   a man  to  live  and  the      right  to   life  is   a   precious      freedom.  "Life",  as  observed  by      Field,  J.  in  Munn  v.  Illinois,      (1877) 94  US 113,  means something      more than mere animal existence and      the    inhibition    against    the      deprivation of life extends  to all      those limits and faculties by which      life is  enjoyed. This  observation      was quoted  with approval  by  this      Court in   Kharak Singh v. State of      UP [1964(1) SCR 332].      And then in para 33:      "Article 39(a) of the Constitution,      which is  a Directive  Principle of      State  Policy,  provides  that  the      State shall, in  particular, direct      its policy  towards   securing that      the   citizens,   men   and   women      equally,  have   the  right  to  an      adequate     means  of  livelihood.      Article  41,   which   is   another      Directive   Principle,    provides,      inter alia,  that the  State shall,      within the  limits of  its economic      capacity  and    development,  make      effective  provision  for  securing      the  right  to  work  in  cases  of      unemployment  and   of   undeserved      want.  Article 37 provides that the      Directive  Principles,  though  not      enforceable  by   any  Court,   are      nevertheless  fundamental   in  the      governance  of   the  country.  The      Principles contained  in Arts.39(a)      and 41  must be regarded as equally      fundamental   in the  understanding      and interpretation  of the  meaning      and content  of fundamental rights.      If there  is an obligation upon the      State to  secure to the citizens an      adequate means  of  livelihood  and      the right  to  work,  it  would  be      sheer pedantry to exclude the right      to livelihood  from the  content of      the right  to life.  The State  may      not. by  affirmative action,  be  v      compellable  to   provide  adequate

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    means of  livelihood or work to the      citizens. But,  any person,  who is      deprived of his right to livelihood      except according  to just  and fair      procedure established  by law,  can      challenge   the    deprivation   as      offending  the   right,   to   life      conferred by   Article 21."      Agriculture is  not a  singular vocation.  It is,  more often than  not, a  joint venture,  mainly of   the tiller’s family members.  Some of  them have  to work   hard  and the ethers harder  still. Everybody,  young or    old,  male  or female, has  chores allotted  to perform;  a   share in  the burden  of   toil.  Traditionally   and  historically,   the agricultural family  is identified by the male head and this is what  Section 7  and 8  recognize. But  on his death, his dependent  family   females,  such  as  his  mother,  widow, daughter, daughter-in-law,  grand-daughter, and others joint with him  have, under Section 7 and 8, to make way to a male relatives within  and outside  the family  of  the  deceased entitled thereunder,  disconnecting them  from the  land and their means of livelihood. Their right to livelihood in that instance gets affected, a right constitutionally recognized, a right  which the  female enjoyed  in common  with the last male holder  of the  tenancy. It  is in  protection of  that right to  livelihood, that the immediate female relatives of the last  male tenant have the constitutional remedy to stay on holding  the land  so long as they remain dependent on it for earning  their livelihood, for otherwise it would render them destitute.  It is  on the exhaustion of, or abandonment of land  by, such  female descendants  can the  males in the line of  descent take over the holding exclusively. In other words, the  exclusive right  of male succession conceived of in section 7 and 8 has to remain suspended animation so long as the right of livelihood of the female descendant’s of the last male  holder remains  valid and in vogue. It is in this way only  that the  constitutional right  to livelihood of a female can  interject in  the provisions.  to be  read as  a burden to  the statutory right of mala succession, entitling her   to    the   status    of   an    intervening   limited dependent/descendents under  section 7 and 8. In this manner alone,    and     upto    this     extent     can     female dependents/descendents be given some succour so that they do not become  vagrant and  destitutes. To this extent, it must be so held. We would rather, on the other hand, refrain from striking down  the provisions  as such  on the touchstone of Article 14 as this would bring about a chaos in the existing state   of    law.   The   intervening   right   of   female dependents/descendents under  section 7 and 8 of the Act are carved out to this extent, by suspending the exclusive right of the  male succession till the female dependent/descendent chooses other  means of livelihood manifested by abandonment or release of the holding kept for the purpose.      For the  afore-going reasons,  disposal of  these  writ petitions is  ordered with  the above  relief to  the female dependents/descendents. At the same time direction is issued to  the  State  of  Bihar  to  comprehensively  examine  the question on  the premise of our constitutional ethos and the need voiced to amend the law. It is also directed to examine the question  of  recommending  to  the  Central  Government whether the  later would  consider it  just and necessary to withdraw the exemptions given under the Hindu Succession Act and the  a Indian Succession Act at this point of time in so far  as   the  applicability  of  these  provisions  to  the Scheduled Tribes  in the  State of Bihar is concerned. These

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writ petitions  would on  these directions stand disposed of making absolute the interim directions in favour of the writ petitioners for their protection. No Costs.