http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: MADANLAL MANOHARLAL AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/11/1989

BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1988 AIR  615            1988 SCC  (1) 615  JT 1988 (1)   138        1988 SCALE  (1)169

ACT:     Punjab  Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961:  Section 2(a)  and Schedule Item 4 I--Sheep hair--Whether covered  by wool (0on)" and consequently agricultural produce. Words and Phrases: Wool (0on)--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     These  writ petitions were filed by  licencesed  dealers who manufacture woollen fabrics and blankets. They  purchase sheep  hair and make them yarn for use in manufacturing  the above items. The challenge is against the insistence of  the State  Govt.  to treat sheep hair  as  agricultural  produce under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961  and requiring  the petitioners to obtain licence and pay  market fee for transactions in sheep hair.     It  has  been  contended by the  petitioners  that  even though  goat hair and camel hair are included in the  sched- ule, sheep hair is not included and hence sheep hair is  not agricultural  produce  within  the meaning of  the  Act.  As regards  item No. 41, Wool (0on) appearing in the  schedule, it  was contended that wool is a manufactured item of  sheep hair and not sheep hair itself and the word "wool" according to  its dictionary meaning is the soft undercoat of  various animals including sheep. Dismissing the writ petitions, this Court,     HELD:  1.1  Item No. 41 of the schedule after  the  word "wool" uses the word "0on" also within brackets which  indi- cates  as to what was really intended by the us of the  word "wool". Indeed, in the Hindi version of the Act item No.  41 of  the schedule uses the word ’ ’0on" only and does not  at all  use  the word "wool". The raw-material out of  which  a textile  fibre  is made is also described as raw  wool.  Not only  the  textile  fibre but also the  soft  under-coat  of various animals including sheep has itself been described as wool. Wool has almost invariably been used in the context of sheep hair. [295G; 296A] 294     1.2 Interpreting item No. 41 Wool (0on) of the  schedule in  the light of the above, there seems to be no  manner  of doubt that the word "wool" has been used therein only in the sense in which the word "0on" is understood in the trade  by the dealer and the consumer in the popular sense namely that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

which people conversant with the word ’0on’ would  attribute to it. This intention is apparent from the circumstance that care  has been taken to specifically include  goat-hair  and camel-hair  at  items 75 and 76 of the  schedule.  Had  wool (0on)  been used at item No. 41 in the comprehensive  sense, it  would have automatically included goat-hair  and  camel- hair and the specific inclusion of Goat-hair and  Camel-hair at  item No. 75 and 76 would have been  wholly  unnecessary. Thus  the word ’Wool (0on)’ has obviously been used  in  the popular  sense and not in the sense used in  scientific  and technical  terminology which the traders and  the  consumers are not normally supposed to know. [297D-H; 298A]     Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India, [1985] 3 SCC  284 and Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v.  Krishna Carbon Paper Co., [1989] 1 SCC 150, relied on. Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 23, relied on.

JUDGMENT:     ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1695 of 1987 Etc. Etc. (Under Article ,’ 23 of the Consitution of India). Govind Mukhotey, J.D. Jain and B.B. Sinha for the  Petition- ers.     Dr.  Y.S. Chitale, Mahabir Singh, K.B. Rohtagi and  Sha- shank Shekhar for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     OJHA,  J.  The petitioners in these writ  petitions  are licenced dealers having factories and manufacturing units at Panipat  in the State of Haryana and consume sheep hair  for manufacturing  woollen  fabrics and blankets.  In  order  to carry  on their trade they purchase sheep-hair to  get  yarn manufactured out of it for being used in its turn for  manu- facturing woollen fabrics and blankets.     The only question urged in these writ petitions is as to whether  sheep-hair was an agricultural produce  within  the meaning of the said 295 term as defined under Section 2(a) of the Punjab Agricultur- al Produce Markets Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) so as to attract the provisions of the said Act to  it. The term "agricultural produce" according to its  definition contained  under Section 2(a) of the Act means all  produce, whether  processed  or not,  of  agriculture,  horticulture, animal  husbandry or forest as specified in the Schedule  to the Act. On its plain meaning, therefore, only such  produce as is specified in the Schedule to the Act shall fall within the  term  "agricultural  produce". Section 38  of  the  Act confers  power on the State Government, by notification,  to add  to the Schedule any other item of agricultural  produce or amend or omit any item of such produce specified therein. The  relevant  items in the Schedule on which  reliance  has been  placed by learned counsel for the petitioners in  sup- port  of the contention that sheep-hair was not an  agricul- tural  produce are items 41. Wool (Oon), 75.  Goat-hair  and 76. Camel-hair.     It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that even though Goat-hair and Camel-hair have been included in  the  Schedule, Sheep-hair had not been so  included  and consequently  sheep-hair  was not  an  agricultural  produce within  the  meaning of the Act and the  insistence  of  the authorities that the petitioners should obtain a licence and pay  market fee with regard to their transaction in  respect of  sheephair was unjustified. With regard to item No.  4  l

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

namely  Wool  (Oon), it was urged firstly that wool  is  the manufactured  item of sheep-hair and not  sheep-hair  itself and  secondly  the word ’wool’ according to  its  dictionary meaning  is the soft undercoat of various animals  including sheep.  Reference in this behalf has been made to  the  Dic- tionary of Scientific and Technical Terms--M.C.  Graw--Hill. According  to it wool is a textile fibre made from raw  wool characterised  by absorbency, resiliency and insulation.  It further  states that wool is the soft undercoat  of  various animals  such as sheep, angora, goat, camel, alpaca,  llamma and vicuna.     Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are not inclined to agree with the submission made by learned  coun- sel  for  the petitioners. Before dealing  with  the  matter further it would be useful to notice at this place that item No.  41 of the Schedule after the word ’wool’ uses the  word ’0on’  also within brackets which indicates as to  what  was really  intended by the use of the word ’Wool’.  Indeed,  in the  Hindi version of the Act, item No. 41 of  the  Schedule uses  the word ’0on’ only and does not at all use  the  word ’wool’.  Now to the submissions made by learned counsel  for the  petitioners, the first submission made by him that  the word ’wool’ contemplated manufactured item of 296 sheep-hair  and not sheep-hair itself, it believed  even  by the  dictionary meaning of the said word relied on  by  him. Firstly,  the raw-material out of which a textile  fibre  is made  is also described as raw wool. Secondly, not only  the textile fibre but also the soft undercoat of various animals including  sheep has itself been described as wool.  It  is, therefore, apparent that not only the textile fibre made out of  raw  wool  but even the soft undercoat  of  the  various animals including sheep, according to the dictionary  afore- said,  would  be wool. Encyclopaedia Britannica,  under  the heading wool in vol. 23, states: "Animal fibres are  usually spoken  of  as hair, with the exception of the coat  of  the sheep  which is usually termed wool". A perusal of what  has been  stated under the heading wool therein  would  indicate that wool has almost invariably been used in the context  of sheep-hair.     In  Indian  Aluminium  Cables Ltd. v.  Union  of  India, [1985]  3  SCC page 284 after referring to  several  earlier decisions of this Court it was held that in determining  the meaning  or connotation of words and expressions  describing an article in a tariff schedule those words and  expressions should  be construed in the sense in which they  are  under- stood in the trade by the dealer and the customer when goods are marketable. The same rule of interpretation was  reiter- ated  in  Collector  of Central Excise,  Kanpur  v.  Krishna Carbon Paper Co., [1989] 1 SCC page 150. It was held:               "It is well settled, as mentioned before, that               where no definition is provided in the statute               itself,  as in this case for ascertaining  the               correct meaning of a fiscal entry reference to               a  dictionary is not always safe. The  correct               guide,  it  appears  in such a  case,  is  the               context and the trade meaning               XXXXX               The trade meaning is one which is prevalent in               that particular trade where the goods is known               or traded. If special type of goods is subject               matter of a fiscal entry then that entry  must               be understood in the context of that  particu-               lar  trade,  bearing in mind  that  particular               word xxxxx

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

             It  is a well settled principle  of  construc-               tion, as mentioned before, that where the word               has a scientific or technical meaning and also               an  ordinary meaning according to common  par-               lance,  it  is in the latter sense that  in  a               taxing  statute the word must be held to  have               been used, unless contrary intention is clear-               ly expressed by the legislature. This princi-               297               ple  is well settled by a long line  of  deci-               sions  of Canadian, American,  Australian  and               Indian  cases.  Pollock,  J.  pointed  out  in               Grenfell  v. I.R.C., [1876] 1 Ex. D  242.  248               that  if a statute contains language which  is               capable of being construed in a popular sense,               such a statute is not to be construed  accord-               ing to the strict or technical meaning of  the               language  contained in it, but is to  be  con-               strud in its popular sense, meaning of course,               by the words "popular sense" that which people               conversant with the subject matter with  which               the statute is dealing would attribute to  it.               The  ordinary  words  in every  day  use  are,               therefore, to be construed according to  their               popular sense. The same view was reiterated by               Story, J. in 200 Chests of Tea (1824) 9  Whea-               ton  US  435,438 where he  observed  that  the               legislature does not suppose our merchants  to               be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists."     In  our  opinion, the aforesaid rule  of  interpretation would  apply even to the interpretation of the items of  the Schedule  to the Act keeping in view the nature and  purpose of the enactment. Interpreting item No. 41 Wool(Oon) of  the Schedule in this light there seems to be no mannner of doubt that the word ’wool’ has been used therein only in the sense in  which the word ’0on’ is understood in the trade  by  the dealer  and  the consumer in the popular sense  namely  that which people conversant with the word ’0on’ would  attribute to  it. If anyone goes to the market to purchase wool  (0on) he  would  be offered only sheep-hair and not  goat-hair  or camel-hair  or for the matter of that the hair of any  other animal. Indeed, there is intrinsic evidence in the  Schedule itself  of  the fact that in the English  version  the  word ’Wool (0on)’ and in the Hindi version ’0on’ only at item No. 41  has been used in the same popular sense namely  that  of sheep-hair.  This  intention is apparent  from  the  circum- stances  that  care has been taken to  specifically  include goat-hair and camel-hair at items 75 and 76 of the Schedule. Had Wool (0on) been used at item No. 41 in the comprehensive sense as canvassed by the learned counsel for the  petition- ers  it  would  have automatically  included  Goat-hair  and Camel-hair also and the specific inclusion of Goat-hair  and Camel-hair at items 75 and 76 would have been wholly  unnec- essary.  Consequently, their specific inclusion at items  75 and  76 is a clear indication of the awareness of  the  fact that  the  trade meaning of the word ’Wool (0on)’  which  is prevalent in the popular sense would be sheep-hair alone and as  such  unless goat-hair and camel-hair  are  included  as specific  items in the Schedule they will not be treated  as agricultural produce. The word 298 ’Woo1  (0on)’ has obviously been used at item No. 41 of  the Schedule in the aforesaid popular sense and not in the sense used  in  scientific  and technical  terminology  which  the traders and the consumers are not normally supposed to know.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

   In  view of the foregoing discussion, we are clearly  of the  opinion that sheep-hair falls under the item No. 41  of the Schedule namely "Wool (0on)" as contained in the English version and "0on" only as contained in the Hindi version  of the Act. Sheep-hair is consequently an agricultural  produce within the meaning of the Act so that the various provisions therein  with regard to agricultural produce are  applicable to sheep-hair also.     In the result, we find no merit in these writ petitions. They  are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances  of the case there shall be no order as to costs. G.N.                                          Petitions dis- missed. 299