http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: MADAN LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/08/1975

BENCH: GUPTA, A.C. BENCH: GUPTA, A.C. KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 2085            1976 SCR  (1) 442  1975 SCC  (2) 779  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC2101  (11)

ACT:      Indian Forest Act, 1927-S. 17-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      A notification was issued by the State Government under s. 4  of the  Indian Forest  Act,  1927  declaring  that  it decided to  constitute some  land as  a reserved forest. The appellant preferred a claim under s. 6 of the Act before the Forest Settlement Officer stating that he had sirdari rights over  certains   plots  of   the  land   included   in   the notification, to  which claim  the Divisional Forest officer filed an  objection. The  Forest Settlement Officer recorded an order  on May  9, 1955  that the appellant had proved his claim. The  respondent alleged  that the  order made  by the Forest  Settlement   Officer  admitting  the  claim  of  the appellant was  passed without  any notice  to it, and in its absence, and  that it came to know of the order on April 24, 1956 on  which date  the Forest  Settlement  Officer  passed another order.  The State filed an appeal under s. 17 of the Act "against  the order  dated 24th April, 1956". The prayer made in  the petition  was ’this  appeal be  allowed and the orders of  the Forest Settlement Officer admitting the claim of the  respondent be  set aside  with costs." The Appellate Tribunal, to  which the  appeal was preferred, held that the period of  limitation should run from April 24, 1956 and not from the date of the first order.      In a  petition under  Article 226  of the Constitution, the appellant challenged the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the  ground (i)  that the  order of  May 9,  1955 was set aside though  the appeal was directed not against that order but against  the order dated April 24, 1956 which was not an appealable order  under the Act and (ii) assuming the appeal was also  directed against  the earlier order, it was barred by limitation.  The High  Court held  that since  the prayer made in  the petition  of appeal  was for  setting aside the "orders" of  the Forest  Settlement Officer, the appeal must be held  to have  been preferred against both the orders and the appeal against the order recorded on May 9, 1955 was not barred by  limitation because  the said order must be deemed

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

to have  been passed  on April  24,  1956  when  the  forest Department came to know of it. Dismissing the appeal. ^      HELD : (1) Though the date of the earlier order was not mentioned in  the petition  of appeal, there can be no doubt that the  appeal was  also directed  against that order. The prayer made  in the  petition of appeal referred not only to ’orders’ in  the plural  but also  described them  as orders admitting the  claim of the respondent, though of course the order dated  April 24,  1956 was not one admitting the claim and as such, was not appealable. [496A-B]      (2) The  High Court  was  right  in  holding  that  the impugned order should be deemed to have been passed on April 24, 1956  when the  Forest Department came to know of it and the right  of appeal  granted to  the Department  should  be determined on that basis. [498C]      Section 17  provides a  right of  appeal from  an order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer under s. 11 and lays down a time limit of three months from the date of the order for presenting  the appeal.  In this case the order under s. 11 was  recorded by  the Forest Settlement Officer on May 9, 1955 and  the appeal  under s. 17 filed on July 20, 1956 was obviously long  out of  time if  the impugned order could be said to  have been made on May 9, 1955 when it was recorded. [494DE, H]      This section  does not  state what  would happen if the Forest Settlement  Officer made an order under s. 11 without notice to the parties and in their 493 absence. It  would be absurd to think that in such a case if the aggrieved  party came  to know  of the  order after  the expiry of the time prescribed for presenting the appeal from the order,  the remedy would be lost for no fault of his. It is a  fundamental principle  of justice  that a  party whose rights are affected by an order must have notice of it. This principle is  embodied in Order XX r. 1 of C.P.C. Though the Forest Settlement  Officer adjudicating  on the claims under the Act  is not a court, yet the principle which is really a principle of  fair play  and is  applicable to all tribunals performing judicial  or quasi-judicial  functions, must also apply to him. [497E-F]      Municipal Board,  Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan  &   Ors.  [1963]   Supp.  2   S.C.R.   373   held inapplicable.      Raja Harish  Chandra  Raj  Singh  v.  The  Deputy  Land Acquisition Officer, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 678 of 1968.      From the  judgment and  order dated the 9th May 1966 of the Allahabad  High Court  (Lucknow Bench)  in Writ Petition No. 150 of 1960.      S. C. Aggarwala and V. J. Francis, for the appellant.      G. N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana, for the respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      GUPTA, J.-This  appeal by  certificate granted  by  the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution has its origin in a proceeding under the Indian Forest  Act, 1927  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the Act).      Appellant Madan  Lal had preferred a claim under sec. 6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

of the  Act in  respect of  certain plots of land in village Khamaria, Pargana  Khairigarh,  District  Kheri  which  were included along  with other land in a notification under sec. 4 of  the Act  issued on  April 3,  1954 declaring  that the State Government  had decided  to constitute the said land a reserved forest.  The Divisional Forest Officer, North Kheri Division, filed  an objection  to the claim of the appellant that he  had Sirdari  rights in  the said  plots. An inquiry into the  claim was started by the Forest Settlement Officer under sec.  7 of  the Act  and evidence  of the  parties was concluded on  February 19,  1955. The case was adjourned for local inspection  to March 3, 1955. The local inspection was not however held on the due date and was made instead on May 3, 1955  when the Forest Settlement Officer further directed that the  case would  be put  up for  orders, but it was not stated when.  The record  of the  case shows  that on May 9, 1955 the  Forest Settlement  Officer recorded an order under sec. 11(1)  of the  Act that  the appellant  had proved  his claim, and directed the Divisional Forest Officer to "inform within 15  days whether  he wants  the land  on  payment  of compensation or not". Sec. 11(1) reads :           "In the  case of a claim to a right in or over any      land, other than a right-of-way or right of pasture, or      a right to forest-produce or a water-course, the Forest      Settlement-officer shall  pass an  order  admitting  or      rejecting the same in whole or in part." 494      Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 11 states:           "If such  claim is  admitted in  whole or in part, the Forest Settlement Officer shall either-           (i)  exclude such  land from  the  limits  of  the                proposed forest; or           (ii) come to  an agreement  with the owner thereof                for the surrender of his rights; or           (iii)proceed to  acquire such  land in  the manner                provided by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."      According to  the respondents  the order  made  by  the Forest  Settlement   Officer  admitting  the  claim  of  the appellant was passed without any notice to them and in their absence. The  respondents’ case is that they came to know of this order  on April  24, 1956  when the  Forest  Settlement Officer recorded another order stating:           "Claim has  been admitted  in this  case. The case      will be  included in  the list  to be  forwarded to the      Govt. When  information from  the Govt.  is received in      regard to  the acquisition of land, further action will      be taken under Section 11(2) (iii) of the Indian Forest      Act....." The first  respondent, State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  filed  an appeal through the Divisional Forest Officer (respondent No. 2) in  the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur-Kheri on July 20, 1956 under sec. 17 of the Act. Sec. 17 allows an appeal to  be preferred  by any  person who has made a claim under  the   Act  or  any  Forest-officer  or  other  person generally or  specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf,  against an  order passed  on such claim by the Forest  Settlement   Officer  under  sec.  11.  The  section prescribes a time limit of three months from the date of the order for  presenting the  appeal. The  petition  of  appeal under sec.  17 presented  in this  case shows  that  it  was directed "against  the order dated 24.4.1956" and the prayer made in  the petition  was : "This appeal be allowed and the orders of  the Forest Settlement Officer admitting the claim of  the  respondent  be  set  aside  with  costs.....".  The appellate tribunal  repelling a  contention  raised  by  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

claimant that the appeal was barred by limitation observed:           "Since the order dated 9.5.55 was not delivered in      the presence  of the  parties or  after giving them any      notice of date it cannot be said to have been delivered      properly under  the law. It is obvious that in case the      Forest Settlement  Officer had decided to pass an order      determining the rights of the parties, it was incumbent      on him to have duly informed the parties concerned both      of the  date of  the  order  and  subsequently  of  its      content. This was clearly not done." In these  circumstances it  was  held  that  the  period  of limitation should  run from  April 24, 1956 and not from the date of  the  first  order.  On  the  merits  the  appellate tribunal found on a consideration 495 of the evidence that claim of ’Sirdari’ rights over the land in question had no basis and allowed the appeal by its order dated April  20, 1959.  The tribunal  also set aside another order releasing  the disputed land in favour of the claimant which was passed by the Forest Settlement Officer during the pendency of the appeal.      The claimant filed a writ petition in the High Court at Allahabad challenging the order of the appellate tribunal as without jurisdiction on two grounds: first, the order passed on May  9, 1955 was set aside though the appeal was directed not against that order but against the order dated April 24, 1956 which  was not  an appealable  order under the Act and, secondly, assuming  the appeal was also directed against the earlier order,  it was  barred by  limitation. On  the first point the  High Court  took the  view that  since the prayer made in  the petition  of appeal  was for  setting aside the ’orders’ of  the Forest  Settlement  Officer  admitting  the claim, the  appeal must  be  held  to  have  been  preferred against both  the orders.  As regards  limitation, the  High Court observed:           "In the  present case,  the facts  found show that      though this order was purported to be passed on the 9th      May, 1956 on that date the parties were not present and      no notice  of that  date had been given to the parties.      The finding  of the  Deputy Commissioner  is  that  the      Divisional Forest Officer actually came to know of that      order only  on the  24th April, 1956 and this fact does      not appear  to have  been challenged  on behalf  of the      petitioner.......  In  these  circumstances,  we  think      that, on the principles governing the administration of      justice, it  should be  held that  so far as the Forest      Department was concerned, the order should be deemed to      have been  passed on the 24th April, 1956 and the right      of  appeal   granted  to   the  Department   should  be      determined on  that very  basis. This  is actually what      the Deputy  Commissioner did.  If we were to accept the      submission  on   behalf  of  the  petitioner  that  the      limitation for  filing the appeal must be computed from      the date  put down  by the Forest Settlement Officer in      the order  itself, it  can result in material injustice      to the  parties because  there can  be  cases  where  a      Forest Settlement  Officer may  make an  order, sign it      and keep  it in  his own custody without pronouncing it      or informing  the parties  concerned. The order may see      that light of day only after the expiry of three months      and  thus  this  interpretation  would  result  in  all      concerned parties being deprived of the right of appeal      altogether." The learned Judges of the High Court added, "even if we were to  hold   that  the   appeal  was   time-barred",  in   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

circumstances stated  above, they  would still  not consider this to  be "a  fit case  for interference  by this Court in exercise of  its  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution." On  this view  the High  Court dismissed  the writ petition on May 9, 1966. The appellant had also filed a revisional application  to the  State Government  under sec. 18(4) of the Act against the order of the appellate tribunal which the State Government rejected by its 496 order dated  March 9, 1960. The writ petition refers to this unsuccessful revisional  application in  stating the  facts, but it  contains no prayer for quashing or setting aside the order of the State Government.      In the  appeal before  us, counsel  for  the  appellant pressed the  same two  grounds urged  before the High Court, and also  sought to  raise several  questions  of  fact  and further made  a grievance that the order passed by the State Government on  the revision  application did  not state  the reasons for  rejection. On  the question  whether the appeal presented under  sec. 17 of the Act covered the order passed by the  Forest Settlement Officer on May 9, 1955, it appears that the  prayer made  in the  petition of appeal refers not only to  ’orders’ in  the plural, but also describes them as orders admitting  the claim  of the  respondent, though,  of course, the order dated April 24, 1956 was not one admitting the claim  and as  such was  not appealable. Thus though the date of  the earlier order was not mentioned in the petition of appeal,  there can  be no  doubt that the appeal was also directed against that order.      The other  question is  whether the appeal was in time. Sec. 17  provides a  right of appeal from an order passed by the Forest  Settlement Officer under sec. 11 and lays down a time limit  of three  months from  the date of the order for presenting the  appeal. In this case the order under sec. 11 was recorded  by the  Forest Settlement  Officer on  May  9, 1955, and  the appeal  under sec.  17 filed on July 20, 1956 was obviously  long out  of time if the impugned order could be said  to have  been made  on May  9,  1955  when  it  was recorded. Counsel  for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court,  Municipal  Board  Pushkar  v.  State  Transport Authority, Rajasthan  & Ors.(1)  as  an  authority  for  the proposition that  equitable considerations  have no place in interpreting provisions of limitation. This was a case under the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939. Sec. 64A of that Act provides a right  of revision from an order made by a State Transport Authority or  Regional  Transport  Authority  to  the  State Transport Appellate  Tribunal and  adds that  no  revisional application shall  be entertained  by  the  State  Transport Appellate Tribunal  "unless the  application is  made within thirty days  of the  date of the order." This Court observed that the  words "date  of the order" could not mean the date of the  knowledge of  the order  in  the  absence  of  clear indication to  that effect. If the decision stopped with the above observation  it would have undoubtedly lent support to the appellant’s  contention, but  the Court  having made the observation went  on  to  consider  the  question  what  the expression "date of the order" meant. This is what the Court said :           "This still  leaves  open  for  investigation  the      problem as  to what is the date of the order. According      to the  appellant the  date when the Regional Transport      Authority passed  the resolution  is the  date  of  the      order. Against  this it  is urged  on behalf of the bus      operators that  it is the date when that resolution was      brought  into   effect  by   the  publication   of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

    notification which  should be considered to be the date      of  the   order.  In   our  opinion,  the  respondents’      contention should  be accepted. For, it is a fallacy to      think that the date when the 497      Regional Transport  Authority passed the resolution was      the date  on which the fixation of the new-bus-stand or      the discontinuance of the old bus stand was ordered. It      has to  be remembered  in this connection that Rule 134      itself contemplates  that the fixation or alteration of      bus stands  would be made by a notification. It is only      on such  notification that  a notified  but stand comes      into existence. So long as the notification is not made      there is  in law  no effective  fixation of  a new  bus      stand or discontinuance of the old bus stand           The matter  may be considered from another aspect.      Section 64A provides for an application for revision by      a person aggrieved by an order. It is the making of the      order which  gives rise  to the grievance. In this case      it is  the fixation  of  the  new  bus  stand  and  the      discontinuance of  the old   bus stand by which the bus      operators claim  to have  been aggrieved. It is easy to      see that there is no real cause for grievance till such      fixation and  discontinuance of  bus stands  have  been      made by a notified order. In other words, the order has      not  been   "made"  till   the  notification  has  been      published. Before  that it is only an intention to make      an order that has been expressed."      It is  clear that  the publication  of the notification serves as  notice to  the aggrieved party and enables him to make an  application under  sec. 64A  within the  prescribed time  limit.  This  case  therefore  does  not  support  the appellant.      The Act we are concerned with does not state what would happen if  the Forest Settlement Officer made an order under sec. 11  without notice to the parties and in their absence. In such  a case,  if the aggrieved party came to know of the order after the expiry of the time prescribed for presenting an appal  from the  order, would  the remedy  be lost for no fault of  his ?  It would  be absurd  to think  so. It  is a fundamental principle  of justice  that a party whose rights are effected  by an  order must  have  notice  of  it.  This principle is  embodied in  Order 20,  Rule 1  of the Code of Civil  Procedure;   though  the  Forest  Settlement  Officer adjudicating on the claims under the Act is not a court, yet the principle  which is  really a principle of fair play and is applicable to all tribunals performing judicial or quasi- judicial functions  must also  apply to  him. The  point has been considered  and decided  by this  Court in  Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer(1). This was a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Court was  considering the  question of limitation under the proviso to  sec. 18  of that  Act. Under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition  Act   a  person   who  has   not  accepted  the Collector’s award  can apply  to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter for the determination of the court. This application has  to be  made within Six months from the date of the Collector’s award in the case where person interested was not  present or  represented before the Collector at the time when  he made  his award or had received no notice from the Collector  of the  award. Construing the expression "the date of the 498 award" this Court observed:           "The knowledge of the party affected by the award,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

    either  actual  or  constructive,  being  an  essential      requirement  of   fairplay  and   natural  justice  the      expression "the  date of the award" used in the proviso      must  mean   the  date   when  the   award  is   either      communicated to  the party  or is  known by  him either      actually or  constructively. In our opinion, therefore,      it would  be unreasonable  to construe  the words "from      the date  of the Collector’s award" used in the proviso      to s. 18 in a literal or mechanical way.           .... where  the rights of a person are affected by      any  order   and  limitation   is  prescribed  for  the      enforcement of  the  remedy  by  the  person  aggrieved      against the  said order  by reference  to the making of      the order  must  mean  either  actual  or  constructive      communication  of   the  said   order  to   the   party      concerned."      The High  Court in  the case  before us  was  therefore right in holding that the impugned order should be deemed to have  been   passed  on  April  24,  1956  when  the  Forest Department came  to know  of the  order and  "the  right  of appeal granted  to the  Department should  be determined  on that very basis."      Counsel for  the appellant  sought to  argue  that  the appellate  authority   was  wrong   in  finding   that   the respondents had  no notice of the order passed by the Forest Settlement  Officer.  We  cannot  permit  the  appellant  to question the findings of fact in this appeal. As regards the order  passed  by  the  State  Government  on  the  revision petition filed  by the appellant, it appears that though the appellant referred  to the  said order  in the writ petition there is  no prayer  in the  petition for  setting aside  or quashing that  order. As  the validity of this order was not questioned before  the High  Court, the  appellant cannot be allowed to raise the question at this stage.      In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 499