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PETITIONER: MADAN LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MST. GOPI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/08/1980

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1754            1981 SCR  (1) 594  1980 SCC  (4) 255  CITATOR INFO :  R          1990 SC 723  (8)

ACT:      Civil Procedure  Code, 1908,  Sec. 100-Findings of fact recorded by  the final Court of facts-Competency of the High Court to interfere with findings-when arises.

HEADNOTE:      A deed  of adoption was executed by one M on August 10, 1944 stating  that he  had adopted  the appellant. A suit to challenge this deed was filed contending that M was not in a fit state  of mind  when he  executed the deed. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and this order was confirmed by the District  Court. In  second appeal  the High  Court  set aside the  judgments of  the Courts  below and  decreed  the suit.      Earlier M  had executed  another deed  of  adoption  in favour of  the  appellant,  but  the  Registrar  refused  to register that deed on the ground that the executant appeared to him  to be  a lunatic.  The matter  was remanded  by  the Mahakma Khas  to the  Registrar with  a direction  that  the executant be  recalled and  the question decided afresh. The Registrar thereupon  examined the  executant and finding him unable to  understand the simplest questions put to him, and giving wholly incorrect answers to elementary questions like whom he  had adopted,  reaffirmed his  pre-remand  view  and refused to register the deed.      A Suit  was then  brought by the appellant on September 11, 1940  for the  compulsory registration  of the aforesaid deed of adoption. A written statement was filed on behalf of M admitting  the  appellant’s  claim  that  he  was  validly adopted.  The   authority  of  that  admission  having  been challenged, the High Court, in revision, examined the matter further and  directed that  an appropriate  issue  has  been framed on  the question.  After the remand, the Joint Kotwal passed an  order on  January 4,  1944 holding  M was  not of sound mind  and was  incapable of protecting his interest in the suit.  The High  Court agreed  with the  findings of the Joint Kotwal.      On appeal  by special leave, and dismissing the appeal, it was,

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^      HELD: (1)  Apart  from  the  bald  assertion  that  the appellant was  taken in  adoption, the deed does not mention the year,  the date  or the  place of  adoption. It does not either mention  the names of persons who were present at the time of adoption. In fact there is no evidence whatsoever to show when and where the adoption took place and even whether the necessary ceremonies were performed. [597 C-D]      (2) The real drift of the plaint is that M was not in a fit state  of mind  at the  relevant time,  that no adoption could have taken place in fact and that, therefore, the deed of adoption  cannot confer on the appellant the rights of an adopted son. [597 E] 595      (3) The argument that M was in a fit state of mind when he executed  the deed cannot be accepted. Indeed the halting evidence of  the doctor, one of the witnesses, throw a cloud on the  mental capacity  of M and renders it improbable that he could  perform or authorise the performance of the act of adoption  or   that  he  could  have  executed  it  with  an understanding mind.  His mental faculties were evidently too enfeebled to enable him to enter into a transaction which in law has a religious-cum-spiritual significance and which, in a wordly way, affects valuable rights to property. [597 F-H]      (4) The  trial court  and  the  District  Court  wholly ignored the  weight of  prepondering  circumstances  on  the record and  allowed their  judgments  to  be  influenced  by inconsequential matters.  The  High  Court  was,  therefore, justified in  re-appreciating the evidence and coming to its own independent  conclusion on  the basis  of that evidence. [H]      (5) The situation here was of an exceptional character, where evidence  which was  incapable of supporting more than one conclusion  was considered  as justifying  a  conclusion which no  reasonable Tribunal  could rationally  reach. This judgment will  not be a charter for interference by the High Courts with findings of facts recorded by the Final Court of facts. [598 B-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 219 of 1970.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Decree dated 30-4-1969  of the  Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 569/65.      S. M.  Jain, S.  K. Jain  and Indira  Makwana  for  the Appellant.      R. K.  Garg, V.  J. Francis  and Sushil K. Jain for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-A deed of adoption is alleged to have been executed  by one  Mansaram on  August 10, 1944, stating that he  had adopted  the appellant,  Madan Lal.  A suit  to challenge that  deed was  dismissed by  the trial Court. The learned District  Judge, Jodhpur,  confirmed the judgment of the trial  Court but  in second  appeal No.  569 of  1965, a learned single  Judge of  the Rajasthan High Court set aside the judgment  of the  Courts below  and decreed the suit. By this appeal  by special  leave, the  defendant questions the correctness of  the High  Court’s judgment  dated April  30, 1969.      The principal point of controversy involved in the suit was whether  Mansaram was  in a  fit state  of mind  when he

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executed the  deed of  adoption. This,  substantially, is  a question of  fact but  we find  that the trial Court and the District Court  wholly ignored  the weight of preponderating circumstances on  the record  and allowed their judgments to be influenced  by inconsequential  matters. The  High  Court was, therefore, justified in reappreciating the evidence and in coming  to its own independent conclusion on the basis of that evidence. 596      Earlier, Mansaram  had allegedly  executed another deed of adoption  in favour  of the  appellant Madan  Lal but the Registrar refused to register that deed by his order Exhibit 2 dated  January 29,  1940 on  the ground that Mansaram, who presented the deed for registration, appeared to him to be a lunatic. The  matter was remanded by the Mahakma Khas to the Registrar with a direction that Mansaram be recalled and the question whether  the  deed  should  be  registered  decided afresh. The Registrar thereupon examined Mansaram and passed an order  Exhibit  3  dated  July  14,  1940,  stating  that Mansaram, no doubt, appeared to be a little better but that, while at  one time  he talked  like a same man, he would, on occasions, fall  into a  reverie and  was completely lost to the world.  The Registrar  noted that Mansaram was unable to understand the  simplest questions  put to him, that he took an unreasonably long time to answer those questions and gave wholly incorrect  answers to  elementary questions like whom he had  adopted  and  whether  he  himself  was  married  or unmarried. The  Registrar, therefore,  reaffirmed  his  pre- remand view and refused to register the deed.      A suit  was then  brought by the appellant on September 11, 1940  for the  compulsory registration  of the aforesaid deed of  adoption. The  Court of  Joint Kotwal  (No. 2),  in which the  suit was  filed, was, concededly, a regular Civil Court of  competent jurisdiction  at the  relevant  time.  A written statement  was filed  in that  suit by  one Shri Raj Narain,  advocate,  on  behalf  of  Mansaram  admitting  the appellant’s claim  that he  was validly adopted by Mansaram. The authority  of that admission having been challenged, the learned  Chief   Justice  of  the  High  Court,  sitting  in revision, made  an order  Exhibit 15  dated August 16, 1941, stating that  the  matter  did  not  appear  to  him  to  be "absolutely clear".  He observed that Mansaram claimed to be an M.A.  in English though, in fact, he did not understand a simple sentence  in  English.  The  learned  Chief  Justice, therefore, examined  the matter  further and  made an  order Exhibit 18  dated December  4, 1941, directing that an issue be framed on the question whether Mansaram was of sound mind and was  capable of protecting his own interest in the suit. After the  remand, the  learned Joint  Kotwal  recorded  the statement of  Mansaram on  December 14, 1943. That statement is at Exhibit 5. Mansaram’s wit and wisdom is reflected in a part of  that statement wherein he said that he was 65 years of age  and that his mother was about 50 years old. When the fundamental absurdity  of this hypothesis was pointed out to him, he  made a  feeble attempt to correct himself by saying that his  mother may  be of  70 years  of age.  In fact, the record of  the evidence  given by  Mansaram before the Joint Kotwal shows that he gave, at one time, an impression 597 that his  mother was alive and was living with him although, admittedly, she  had died  long since. In the circumstances, the Joint  Kotwal passed  an order on January 4, 1944 (which was the  only order  to pass)  that he  had no hesitation in holding  that  Mansaram  was  not  of  sound  mind  and  was incapable of  protecting  his  interest  in  the  suit.  The

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learned Judge  formed the  impression, which  he recorded in the proceedings,  that Mansaram  was tutored to make certain statements on  the questions arising in the suit and that he looked like a "frightened animal".      The deed  of adoption  dated August  10, 1944, which is impugned in the present suit, contains a bald assertion that Mansaram had taken the appellant Madan Lal in adoption. But, significantly, the  deed does not mention the year, the date or the  place of  adoption. It  does not  either mention, as adoption deeds  generally mention,  the names of persons who were present at the time of adoption. In fact, on the record of this  case there  is no  evidence whatsoever to show when and where  the adoption  took place  and  even  whether  the necessary ceremonies  were performed.  We cannot  accept the submission,  though   strongly  pressed   upon  us  by  Shri Sobhagmal Jain  who appears on behalf of the appellant, that what the  plaintiff had  challenged  in  the  suit  was  the validity of  the deed  of adoption  and not  the  factum  of adoption. On  a broad  and careful  reading of the plaint we are left  in no  doubt that  the real drift of the plaint is that Mansaram was not in a fit state of mind at the relevant time, that  no adoption  could have  taken place in fact and that, therefore,  the deed  of adoption cannot confer on the appellant the rights of an adopted son.      Relying on  the evidence  of Somdatt  D.W. 2,  Shri Raj Narain D.W.  6, a  lawyer, Moolraj  D.W. 9 and Dr. Umraomal, D.W. 10,  Shri Sobhagmal  Jain argues that Mansaram was in a fit state of mind when he executed the impugned deed. We are unable  to  accept  this  submission.  Indeed,  the  halting evidence of Dr. Umraomal itself throws a cloud on the mental capacity of Mansaram and renders it improbable that he could perform or  authorise the performance of the act of adoption or that  he could have executed the deed of adoption with an understanding mind.  His mental faculties were evidently too enfeebled to  enable him  to enter into a transaction which, in law has a religious-cum-spiritual significance and which, in a  worldly way,  affects valuable rights to property. The High Court  has examined  every facet  of the  evidence with great care  and we  are in  agreement with the learned Judge that Mansaram  was not  in a  fit  state  of  mind  when  he executed the deed of adoption. He could 598 not have,  possibly, understood  the nature and consequences of what he was doing.      In the  result, the  appeal fails  and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.      May we  add that  this judgment,  properly  understood, will not  be a  charter for  interference by the High Courts with findings of facts recorded by the final Court of facts. The situation,  here, was  of an exceptional character where evidence which  was incapable  of supporting  more than  one conclusion was  considered as  justifying a conclusion which no reasonable tribunal could rationally reach. N.K.A.                                     Appeal dismissed. 599