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PETITIONER: MADAN LAL PURI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SAIN DAS BERRY

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/07/1971

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAY, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  585            1971 SCR  935  1971 SCC  (2) 535  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC2229  (14)  RF         1980 SC1253  (4)

ACT: Delhi  Rent  Control  Act, 1958,  ss.  14(1)(e)  and  39(2)- Jurisdiction of High Court.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent, who was the landlord of  certain  premises, filed  an  application under s. 14(1)(e) of the  Delhi  Rent Control  Act, 1958, for the eviction of the  appellant,  who was  the  lessee,  on  the  ground  inter  alia,  that   the respondent required the premises bonafide for his occupation as a residence for himself and his family members.  The Rent Controller  found that the requirement of the  landlord  was not  bonafide and dismissed the application.  The order  was confirmed  in  appeal  by the Rent  Control  Tribunal.   The respondent filed an appeal to the High Court under s.  39(2) of the Act.  Before the High Court both parties agreed  that the case should be remanded to the Tribunal for a finding on the  question  whether  the  premises  available  with   the respondent  could be considered to be  ’reasonably  suitable residential  accommodation’ as contemplated by s.  14(1)(e). On  remand, the Tribunal reported that the premises  in  the occupation of the respondent were not reasonably  sufficient for  the respondent and his family.  The  appellant  however contended  before the High Court, ignoring this  finding  of the Tribunal that on the concurrent findings of the two sub- ordinate authorities that the landlord’s requirement was not bonafide,  there was no question of law involved and so  the High  Court had no jurisdiction under s. 39(2)  to  consider the correctness of those findings.  The High Court  rejected the  contention  and held, that, in view of the  finding  on remand   the   decision  of  the   subordinate   authorities dismissing the respondent’s application was erroneous. In appeal to this Court, HELD:This  Court in Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal  Mehra,  C.A. No. 2150 of 1966 dated 26-9-1969 held that a finding on  the issue whether the requirement of a landlord is bonafide is a finding on mixed questions of law and fact and not on  facts only.   Therefore,  it  was open to  the  High  Court,  when

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exercising  jurisdiction  under  s. 39(2),  to  consider  in proper cases the correctness of such a finding. [939E-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 848 of 1971. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated December 7, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 110-D of 1966, Hardev  Singh, K. P. Kapur and H. L. Kapur, for  the  appel- lant. S.K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the  res- pondent. 936 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam,  J.-In this appeal, Mr. Hardev Singh,  learned counsel  on behalf of the tenant-appellant,  challenges  the judgment and order dated December 7, 1970 of the Delhi  High Court  in S.A.O. No. 110-D of 1966.  Special leave has  been granted  by this Court limited to the question  whether  the High  Court was justified, in view of S. 39(2) of the  Delhi Rent  Control  Act,  1958 (hereinafter called  the  Act)  in setting   aside  the  decisions  of  the   two   subordinate authorities,   dismissing  the  application  filed  by   the respondent-landlord for evicting the appellant. The  facts leading up to this appeal may be briefly  stated. The appellant took on lease, the first floor of the premises in  question  from the respondent on January 22, 1964  on  a monthly  rent of Rs. 250.  The respondent who was the  owner of the entire premises was then occupying the ground  floor. The   landlord  filed  an  application,  before   the   Rent Controller on November 26.1964 for eviction of the appellant from  the  portion  in  his occupation  as  lessee,  on  two grounds;  (a)  that  the tenant has sub-let a  part  of  the premises,  and (b) that he required the premises  bona  fide for  his  occupation as a residence himself and  his  family members.   The latter claim was based under cl. (e)  of  the proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 14 of the Act, which is  as follows:-               "that   the  premises  let   for   residential               purposes   are  required  bona  fide  by   the               landlord  for  occupation as a  residence  for               himself  or  for  any  member  of  his  family               dependent on him, if he is the owner  thereof,               or  for  any  person  for  whose  benefit  the               premises  are  held and that the  landlord  or               such  person has no other reasonably  suitable               residential accommodation;" The  tenant  opposed the claim of the landlord on  both  the grounds.  He denied the allegation of sub-letting.  He  also contended that the landlord’s requirement for his occupation was not bonafide.  The tenant’s plea was that the portion of the  premises  in  his occupation  was  sufficient  for  his purpose.   The  Rent  Controller accepted the  plea  of  the tenant  that there was no subletting.  He also accepted  his plea that the requirement of the landlord for his occupation was  not  bona  fide.  On  these  findings,  the  landlord’s application  was  dismissed.  These two findings  were  also confirmed  in  the appeal filed by the landlord  before  the Rent Control Tribunal.  The question. regarding sub-letting, having  been  decided  against  the  landlord  by  both  the Tribunals,  no longer survives and it was also not  agitated before the High Court.  It may be stated at this stage  that the  findings  of  both the tribunals  on  the  question  of

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bonafide requirement were recorded against the landlord,  on the sole ground that the landlord must                             937 have  foreseen his requirement for additional  accommodation even  at the time when he let out a part of the premises  on January  22, 1964 to the appellant and therefore he was  not entitled to ask for eviction under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Act.  It is the view of both the Tribunals that when eviction is asked for within about I I months of the letting, the claim of the landlord cannot be considered to be bonafide. The  landlord carried the matter in appeal before  the  High Court under s. 39 of the Act.  That section runs as  follows :-               "39(1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-               section  (2), an appeal shall lie to the  High               Court  from  an  order made  by  the  Tribunal               within sixty days from the date of such  order               ;               Provided that the High Court may entertain the               appeal after the expiry of the said period  of               sixty  days,  if  it  is  satisfied  that  the               appellant  was prevented by  sufficient  cause               from filing the appeal in time.               (2)No  appeal shall lie  under  sub-section               (1),   unless   the   appeal   involves   some               substantial question of law.          Before  the  High Court, counsel for  both  parties          made   a  representation  that  the  Rent   Control          Tribunal has not recorded a finding on the question          whether the premises avaiable with the landlord can          be   considered   to   be   "reasonably    suitable          residential  accommodation" as contemplated by  cl.          (e) of the proviso to s. 14 (1).  Hence they made a          joint  request to remand the case to  the  Tribunal          for a finding on the said question on the basis  of          the  evidence  already on record.   Accepting  this          joint request, the learned Judge remanded the  case          to the Tribunal.  The latter, after a consideration          of the materials on record as well as the extent of          the premises in the occupation of the landlord  and          also  having  due regard to the  number  of  family          members living with the latter, held, in his report          dated May 4, 1970, that the portion of the premises          in  the occupation of the landlord was  not  reaso-          nably  sufficient  for a family consisting  of  the          landlord,  his wife, his son, son’s wife and  their          children.   On  this basis, he recorded  a  finding          that   the  premises  in  the  occupation  of   the          respondent  were  not reasonably suitable  for  his          residence.          So  far as we could see, the correctness  of  these          findings recorded by the Rent Control Tribunal,  in          favour of the landlord, do not appear to have  been          challenged by the tenant before the High Court when          the appeal came up for final hearing.  On the other          band,  we find that the same contentions that  were          raised  regarding the bonafide requirement  of  the          landlord and which found          938          acceptance at the hands of the Rent Controller  and          the Tribunal before remand were again raised by the          tenant-appellant  before the High Court.  That  is,          in  short,  the  appellant  herein  was  contesting          before the High Court, the appeal of the  landlord,

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        ignoring the findings of the Tribunal dated May  4,          1970.   The  main  point  that  was  urged  by  the          appellant before the High Court was that as the two          subordinate  Tribunals  have  recorded   concurrent          findings  negativing  the  claim  of  the  landlord          regarding his bonafide requirement of the premises,          the  appeal filed by the landlord did  not  involve          any substantial question of law.  On this basis the          appellant   pressed  for  the  dismissal   of   the          landlord’s   appeal.   On  the  other   hand,   the          respondent   urged   that  both   the   subordinate          Tribunals have not properly considered the question          of   the  landlord’s  requirement;  and  that   the          findings  recorded against him were  on  irrelevant          consideration.   According  to  the  landlord   the          various  material  factors which have to  be  taken          into  account for adjudicating upon such  a  claim,          have  not been properly borne in mind by  both  the          Tribunals.   Quite  naturally the  landlord  placed          considerable  reliance on the findings recorded  on          May 4, 1970 in his favour by the Tribunal.          The  High  Court  rejected the  contention  of  the          appellant  that it has no jurisdiction to  consider          the  correctness of the findings. recorded  by  the          two  subordinate  authorities especially  when  the          relevant  matters  to  be taken  into  account  for          deciding  such  a question have not been  borne  in          mind  by those authorities.  The High Court  is  of          the view that the rejection by the Rent  Controller          and  the Tribunal of the claim of the  landlord  on          the sole ground that he should have anticipated his          requirement  for the, next 10 or II months when  he          let out the premises on lease on January 22,  1964,          was erroneous.  The High Court has further observed          that none of the subordinate authorities have  held          that after letting out the premises on January  22,          1964 and before filing the application for eviction          on  November  26, 1964, the landlord has  made  any          demand from the tenant for payment of higher  rent.          Finally,  the High Court having due regard  to  the          above  circumstances and the size of the family  of          the  landlord  and  the findings  recorded  by  the          Tribunal on May 4, 1970 held that the, decision  of          the  two  subordinate  authorities  dismissing  the          landlord’s application was erroneous.  On the other          hand, the learned Judge held that the landlord  has          made out his claim under cl. (e) of the proviso  to          S. 14(1) of the Act.  On this reasoning the learned          Judge reversed the decision of the Rent  Controller          and the Tribunal and allowed the application of the          landlord  for  eviction  of  the  appellant.    The          appellant  was given six months’ time for  vacating          the premises.          Mr.   Hardev   Singh,  learned  counsel   for   the          appellant,  has very strenously urged that in  view          of the concurrent findings"                                  939          recorded  by the two subordinate  tribunals,  there          was  no  question of law, much less  a  substantial          question  of law arising for  consideration  before          the High Court in the appeal filed by the          landlord.  Hence he urged that the interference  by          the  High  Court with the  concurrent  findings  so          recorded   was  not  justified.   Learned   counsel          further pointed out that the landlord has not  made

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        out  his claim under cl. (e) of the proviso  to  s.          14(1) of the Act.  Mr. Hardev Singh referred us  to          certain  decisions of this Court dealing  with  the          question,  under what circumstances it can be  con-          sidered that a substantial question of law  arises.          We do not think it necessary, in the  circumstances          of  this case, to refer to those decisions,  as  in          our  opinion  they  have no bearing  on  the  short          question  that arises for consideration before  us,          namely, the power of the High Court under s. 39, to          consider  the  correctness of a  finding  regarding          bonafide  requirement under cl. (e) of the  proviso          to s. 14(1) of the Act.          As  we have already pointed out, the sole  question          that  has to be decided by us is whether  the  High          Court  in  reversing  the  decisions  of  the  Rent          Controller  and the Tribunal, in the  circumstances          of  this case, can be considered to  have  exceeded          its jurisdiction under s. 39(2).  We are  satisfied          that   the   High  Court  has  not   exceeded   its          jurisdiction in any manner.          The  argument  of Mr. Hardev Singh  that  the  High          Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under s.  39(2)          of the Act when it reversed the finding of the  two          subordinate authorities on the question of bonafide          requirement has, in our opinion, no substance.   In          Smt.   Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra(1),  this  Court          observed as follows:               "......   Whether  on  the  facts  proved  the               requirement  of  the landlord  is  bona  fide,               within the meaning of s. 14(1)(e) is a finding               on a mixed question of law and fact........ From  the above observations it is clear that  an  inference drawn by the subordinate authorities that the requirement of the  respondent was not bonafide, could not be  regarded  as conclusive.   The  High Court, in proper  cases,  has  ample jurisdiction  to interfere with that finding and record  its own conclusions on the basis of the materials on record. We  may  also  point  out that in the  case  before  us  the position  is  made worse for the appellant in  view  of  the finding  recorded by the Tribunal in favour of the  landlord on   May  4,  1970.   We  have  already  pointed   out   the circumstances  under which a finding was called for  by  the High, Court.  The High Court has accepted those findings and held in favour of the landlord that he has (1)  C. A. No. 2150 of 1966 decided on 26-9-1969.                             940 made out a case under cl. (e) of the proviso to S. 14(1)  of the Act. Mr.  Hardev Singh referred us to the decision of this  Court reported in Bhagwan Dass and another v. S. Rajdev Singh  and another(1), wherein it has been observed :               "A  second  appeal  lies  to  the  High  Court               against  the  decision  of  the  Rent  Control               Tribunal under Section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent               Control Act, 1958, only if the appeal involves               some  substantial question of law.   The  Rent               Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal, on a               consideration  of  the relevant terms  of  the               agreement   and   oral   evidence   and    the               circumstances found that a clear case of  sub-               letting  was established.  On that finding  no               question  of  law,  much  less  a  substantial               question of law, arose." The first part of the above extract lays down the nature  of

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the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under s.  39(2) of  the Act.  In that decision, on facts, it was found  both by  the  Rent  Controller and the Tribunal,  on  a  relevant consideration  of  the materials on record, that a  case  of sub-letting was established.  On such a finding concurrently arrived  at  by both the authorities, it was  held  by  this Court  that  no  question of law, much  less  a  substantial question  of  law arose for consideration  before  the  High Court. But the facts in the case before us are entirely  different. We  have already pointed out that the question that fell  to be  considered by the High Court was whether the claim  made by the landlord under cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1)  of the  Act was bonafide.  As already pointed out, this  Court, in  Smt.   Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra(1), has held  that  a finding  on such an issue is not one of fact alone but is  a finding  of mixed question of law and fact, and that it  was open  to  the High Court when  exercising  its  jurisdiction under  s. 39(2) of the Act, to consider the  correctness  or otherwise of such, a finding.  The findings recorded on such an issue by the subordinate tribunals are not conclusive. From  the above discussion, it follows that the  High  Court has not exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 39(2) of the Act. In  consequence, the appeal fails and is dismissed.  In  the circumstances  of  the  case, parties will  bear  their  own costs. V.P.S.                                                Appeal dismissed. (1)  A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 986. (2)  C. A. No 2150 of 1966 decided on 26-9-1969.                             941