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PETITIONER: MACHERLA HANUMANTHA RAOAND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH(with connected petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/09/1957

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA KAPUR, J.L. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1957 AIR  927            1958 SCR  396

ACT: Sessions  Trial-Commitment Proceeding instituted  on  Police report-Procedure, if makes for inequality before law-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) as amended by the Code of Criminal  Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (26 of 1955),  ss. 207, 207A-Constitution of India, Art.  14.

HEADNOTE: The point in controversy in this appeal was whether SS.  207 and 207A inserted into the Code of Criminal Procedure by the amending  Act 26 of 1955, violated the provision of Art.  14 of  the  Constitution and were, therefore, invalid  in  law. The  appellants  were committed for trial to  the  Court  of Session by the inquiring 397 Magistrate  in  a proceeding instituted against  them  on  a Police report and he followed the procedure laid down in  s. 207A  of  the Code as required by s. 207 Of the  Code.   The appellants  moved the High Court for quashing the  order  of commitment  on  the ground that the provisions  of  S.  207A introduced discrimination as against accused persons against whom proceedings were’ instituted on Police report and  were unconstitutional in character.  The High Court held  against them.   The contention was reiterated in this Court  and  it was sought to be made out that the provisions Of S. 207A  of the Code, in comparison and contrast to other provisions  of Ch.   XVIII  of  the Code, prescribed  a  less  advantageous procedure for the accused persons in a proceeding started on Police report than the procedure prescribed for other  cases in the succeeding sections of the chapter. Held,   that  ss.  207  and  207A  of  the  Code  were   not discriminatory  and  did  not contravene  Art.   14  of  the Constitution  and their constitutional validity  was  beyond question. Although  there can be no doubt that the  impugned  sections introduced substantial difference in the procedure  relating to  commitment proceedings applicable to the two classes  of cases,  they did not in any way affect the procedure at  the trial,  and the true test of the constitutional validity  of

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the classification they made, was whether it was  reasonable and  pertinent  to the object the Legislature had  in  view, namely,  a speedy trial of offences with the least  possible delay. So  judged there could be no doubt that the  Legislature  in prescribing  the two different procedures at the  commitment stage,  one for proceedings instituted on Police report  and the  other  for  those  that  were  not,  had  acted  on   a consideration  that  was reasonable and connected  with  the object it had in view. Budhan  Choudhry v. The State of Bihar, (1955) S.C.R.  1045, applied. Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India, (1950) S.C.R. 869,  The State  of  Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, (1951) S.C.R.  682,  The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) S.C.R. 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra, (1952) S.C.R. 435,  Lachmandas  Kewalram  Ahuja v. The  State  of  Bombay, (1952)  S.C.R. 710, Qasim Razvi v. The State  of  Hyderabad, (1953)   S.C.R.  581,  Habeeb  Mohamad  v.  The   State   of Hyderabad,  (1953)  S.C.R. 661 and The State  of  Punjab  v. Ajaib Singh, (1953) S.C.R. 254, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 57  of 1957 and Criminal Misc.  Petition No. 294 of 1957. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 28, 1956, of  the  former  Andhra High Court  at  Guntur  in  Criminal Revision Case No. 241 of 1956. 398 T.   V. Sarma, K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhury and T.   S. Venkataraman, for the appellants. T.   V. R. Tatachari and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and T.    M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India). 1957.  September 17.  The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-The only question that arises for determination  in this  appeal on a certificate granted by the High  Court  of Andhra  Pradesh  at Hyderabad, under Art. 134(1)(c)  of  the Constitution, is the constitutionality of the provisions  of ss.  207 and 207A, Code of Criminal  Procedure  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  Code),  which,  read  together,  were introduced  into  the  Code by Act XXVI  of  1955.   The  26 appellants  have  been committed to the  Court  of  Session, Guntur Division, to take their trial for offences punishable under  ss. 147, 148, 323, 324 and 302, read with ss. 34  and 149, Indian Penal Code.  They impleaded the State of  Andhra Pradesh as the sole respondent.  The Union of India has been allowed  to intervene on an application made in that  behalf in  view of the fact that the provisions of the Central  Act have been impugned as unconstitutional. For  the  purposes of this appeal, it is only  necessary  to state  the following relevant facts.  The local police  took cognizance of a serious occurrence of rioting with murder on December 22, 1955.  The local police investigated the  case, and  after  recording such evidence as it could  collect  in respect  of the occurrence, submitted a  charge-sheet  under the  aforesaid  sections of the Indian Penal  Code,  to  the magistrate  having jurisdiction to entertain the case.   The magistrate, following the procedure laid down in s. 207 A of the  Code committed the persons shown in the chargesheet  as the accused persons, to take their trial before the Court of

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Session.   A number of applications in revision,  under  ss. 435 and 439 of the Code, were made on behalf of the  accused persons, to the High Court of 399 Andhra Pradesh, to quash the order of commitment, chiefly on the ground that the said order having been passed under  the provisions  of  s.  207A of the Code(  was  void,  as  those provisions  were unconstitutional for the reason  that  they introduced  discrimination  as against  accused  persons  in respect  of whom a police charge-sheet had  been  submitted. The revisional applications were heard by Krishna Rao J. who dismissed  them, holding that the provisions  impugned  were not  unconstitutional  and  that, therefore,  the  order  of commitment was valid in law.  The appellants applied for and obtained  the necessary certificate under Art. 134(1)(c)  of the  Constitution that the case was a fit one for appeal  to this Court. The arguments addressed to the High Court have been repeated in  this Court and are to the effect that ss. 207 and  207A, as  they now stand, provide for two separate  procedures  in the  committing  court,  namely, (1) in respect  of  a  case instituted  on  a  police report  for  which  the  procedure specified  in s. 207 A is prescribed, and (2) in respect  of any  other  proceeding,  the procedure laid  down  in  other provisions of Chapter XV111 is prescribed.  The argument  is that  a  comparison  and  contrast  of  the  two   different procedures  prescribed  in  respect of the  two  classes  of cases,  when  examined  in  their  details,  show  that  the procedure in respect of a case instituted on a police report is   less  advantageous  to  the  accused  than  the   other procedure.   Thus,  it is further argued,  in  the  sections following s. 207A in Chapter XVIII of the Code, the  accused have been granted facilities which are not available to them in  the  procedure  laid  down  in  s.  207A.   By  way   of illustration, it was urged that under s. 208(3), it is  open to  an  accused person to apply to the magistrate  to  issue process  to  compel  the attendance of any  witness  or  the production of any document, but sub-s. (2) of s. 207A, which corresponds  to the provisions of s. 208(3), speaks only  of the  prosecution  and  not of the  accused.   Again,  it  is pointed out that sub-s. (4) of s. 207A, makes reference only to  the prosecution evidence, whereas the  corresponding  s. 208(1) makes reference to the evidence that may be  produced in 200 support  of  the prosecution or on behalf  of  the  accused. Similarly,  it  has  been  pointed out  that  there  are  no ’provisions in s. 207A corresponding to those of s.  209(2), and  s. 213(2), empowering the magistrate to  discharge  the accused; nor is there any provision in the impugned s.  207A corresponding to s. 215 relating to quashing of commitments. Further, it was pointed out that whereas s. 209(1)  contains the  words  "  not sufficient  grounds  for  committing  the accused  person", sub-s. (6) of s. 207A has the words  "  no grounds  for committing the accused".  It has  further  been argued that in the new procedure adopted in the impugned  s. 207A,  the accused person has been deprived of the  benefits under ss. 162 and 215 of the Code, and under ss. 27, 101  to 106  and  114-1ll. (g) of the Evidence Act.  It  has,  thus, been  sought to be made out that the procedure laid down  in s. 207A in the matter of commitment is less advantageous  to the   accused  persons  than  the  one  prescribed  in   the succeeding sections of Chapter XVIII. We   shall   assume  for  the  purpose  of   examining   the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the  amended

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Code  that  there  are  differences  in  the  two  kinds  of procedure  envisaged in Chapter XVIII of the Code,  relating to commitment proceedings, but it is by no means clear  that the changes introduced by the amending Act XXVI of 1955  are always  to  the  disadvantage or  prejudice  of  an  accused person.   It  is  a well-known fact that  the  amending  Act aforesaid  introduced changes into the old Code with a  view to simplifying and expediting procedure relating to trial of offences  and  to inquiries preceding such trials.   It  has also  to be remembered that the Code has  always  prescribed different procedures for trial of offences varying with  the gravity  of the offences charged, or with the power  of  the court  before  which an accused person is placed  on  trial. Generally  speaking, minor offences have been  made  triable summarily,  or  the  same accused person in  respect  of  an offence  triable summarily, may be so tried by a  magistrate specially  empowered  in  that  behalf,  or  may  be   tried according to the ordinary procedure by a magistrate not so        401        empowered.  Less serious offences are triable by magistrates        and more serious offences are triable by a Court of  Session        or  by a High Court after there has been a  preliminary  in-        quiry  and investigation by a police officer, or an  inquiry        by  a magistrate, commonly described as commitment  proceed-        ings,  or,  after inquiry by a Civil or  Revenue  Court,  in        connection with certain specified offences committed in  the        course  of  or in relation to judicial  proceedings  or  in’        respect  of  proceedings  affecting  the  administration  of        justice.   The Code has further classified offences  triable        by  magistrates  of any class or by  magistrates  of  higher        classes.   There is, again, a cross-division of  cases  into        warrant  cases  and summons cases.  With  reference  to  the        powers of police officers, offences have been classified  as        cognizable offences and non-cognizable offences.  Thus,  the        principle  of  classification of offences and  of  different        categories  of cases relating to the trial of offences is  a        well-establisbed  rule  of criminal procedure.  It  is  true        that  for  the first time, the impugned sections  have  pre-        scribed  two different procedures in respect  of  commitment        proceedings  as already indicated, but we have  to  remember        that  there is absolutely no difference in the procedure  at        the trial in contra-distinction to the procedure relating to        the enquiry leading up to commitment of an accused person to        a  Court of Session or a High Court in cases triable  exclu-        sively  by  such a Court.  It must also be  remembered  that        every  case  involving  a serious offence  comes  under  the        category  of ’cognizable case’ in respect of which a  police        officer  may  arrest  a person named as  an  accused  person        without  warrant and investigate the case without any  order        of  a magistrate in that behalf Hence, ordinarily  speaking,        as  soon  as information of the commission of  a  cognizable        offence has been laid before a police officer in-charge of a        police  station,  it becomes his duty to  record  the  first        information; and even in the absence of such a first  infor-        mation if such an officer receives information reading to  a        suspicion  that a cognizable offence has been committed,  he        has to investigate the case and take all steps necessary for        the apprehension and        402        arrest  of the persons alleged to have been  concerned  with        the  crime.  Even in cases which are not, in the  first  in-        stance,  of  cognizable  nature, it becomes the  duty  of  a        police  officer to investigate such a case if he is  so  or-        dered  by a competent magistrate, taking cognizance  of  the        offence  under  s. 190 of the Code.  In all such  cases,  it

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      becomes  the duty of a police officer in-charge of a  police        station, or of a superior officer if deputed to  investigate        a case, to follow the procedure laid down .in Chapter XIV of        the Code.  Under s. 169 of the Code, if, as a result of  the        investigation  under Chapter XIV, the police officer  making        the investigation, comes to the conclusion that there is  no        sufficient  evidence  or reasonable ground of  suspicion  to        justify  the forwarding of the accused to a  magistrate,  he        has to release the accused person if in custody.  If, on the        other  hand,  on such an investigation, it  appears  to  the        investigating  officer that there is sufficient evidence  or        reasonable  ground  of  suspicion, it becomes  his  duty  to        forward  the  accused to a competent magistrate to  try  the        accused or to commit him for trial.  Section 173 of the Code        requires  the  investigation  to be  concluded  without  any        unnecessary delay and the submission of a report  containing        the result of the investigation, to a competent  magistrate.        After the submission of the police report, the police  offi-        cer  in-charge of a police station, before the  commencement        of  the inquiry or trial by a magistrate, has to furnish  to        the  accused, free of cost, a copy of the report  aforesaid,        of  the first information report and of all other  documents        or relevant extracts thereof, on which prosecution  proposes        to  rely,  including  statements and  confessions,  if  any,        recorded  under  s. 164, and the statements  recorded  under        sub-s.  3  of s. 161, of all persons  whom  the  prosecution        proposes to examine as witnesses.        On receipt of the police report and the documents aforesaid,        under  s. 173 of the Code, the magistrate concerned  has  to        make up his mind whether the case has to be tried by him  or        by some other competent magistrate or by a Court of  Session        or  a High Court.  If the magistrate finds that the case  is        triable  exclusively by a Court of Session or a High  Court,        he has        403        to  follow  the new procedure laid down in s.  207A  At  the        commencement of the inquiry before the magistrate, when  the        accused  appears before him, the magistrate has  to  satisfy        himself  that the documents referred to in s. 173 have  been        furnished  to the accused and to have them furnished if  the        police  officer has not done his duty.  The magistrate  then        has  to record the evidence of such witnesses as  figure  as        eyewitnesses  to  the occurrence.- and are  produced  before        him.  ’He has also the power, in the interest of justice, to        record  such  other evidence of the prosecution  as  he  may        think  necessary, but he is not obliged to ’record any  evi-        dence.  Without recording any evidence but after considering        all the documents referred to in s. 173 and after  examining        the accused person and after hearing the parties, it is open        to  the  magistrate to discharge the  accused  person  after        recording  his  reasons that no ground  for  committing  the        accused  for trial has been made out, unless he  decides  to        try the accused himself or to send him for trial by  another        magistrate.   If, on the other hand, he finds that  the  ac-        cused  should  be committed for trial,, he  is  required  to        frame a charge disclosing the offence with which the accused        is  charged.  The accused is then required to submit a  list        of  persons whom he wishes to be summoned, to give  evidence        at his trial.  After all this, the case is placed before the        Court  of Session or the High Court for trial in  accordance        with the procedure laid down by the Code.        But if the investigating police officer, instead of  submit-        ting  a charge-sheet as required by a. 173, submits what  is        popularly called the "final report" to the effect that there        was no evidence in support of the prosecution case and  that

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      it was not a fit case for a trial either by a magistrate  or        by a Court of Session or High Court, the matter may not  end        there.   It  is  open to the first informant  or  any  other        person interested in prosecuting the accused person, to make        a  regular petition of complaint before a  competent  magis-        trate under s. 190 of the Code.  The magistrate, upon taking        cognizance  under that section, may start an inquiry of  his        own, notwithstanding the fact that the police        52        404        has  refused  to prosecute the case.  The magistrate,  in  a        case triable exclusively by a Court of Session or by a  High        Court,  has to follow the procedure laid down in s. 208  and        subsequent sections of Chapter XVIII.  The magistrate  natu-        rally  has  to make a record of the evidence  given  by  the        complainant  and such other witnesses as may have been  pro-        duced  in  support of the prosecution or on  behalf  of  the        accused  if  the accused chooses to adduce any  evidence  at        that  stage.  Ordinarily, an accused person does not  choose        to do so for the fear that he might disclose his defence too        early.   After recording the evidence adduced on  behalf  of        the  prosecution  as also on behalf of the accused,  if  ad-        duced, and examining the accused for the purpose of enabling        him  to explain any circumstances appearing in the  evidence        against him, the magistrate may either discharge the accused        person  if he finds that there is no sufficient  ground  for        committing  him  for trial after recording his  reasons,  or        direct him to be tried by himself or some other  magistrate.        The order of discharge may be made by the magistrate even at        an  earlier stage if he records the reasons for  considering        the  charge to be groundless, or, he may commit the  accused        for trial after framing a charge declaring the offence  with        which  the accused has been charged.  It is also open to  an        accused  person, if the magistrate in his discretion  allows        him to do so, to examine more witnesses.  If after examining        those additional witnesses, the magistrate is satisfied that        there are no sufficient grounds for committing the  accused,        he may cancel the charge and discharge the accused.        It  will, thus, be seen that where the  magistrate  conducts        commitment proceeding as on a complaint, the accused has the        advantage of three stages at which he may be discharged.  It        has, therefore,. been contended on behalf of the  appellants        that the procedure under s. 207A is less advantageous to the        accused  than the other procedure.  The answer to this  con-        tention is that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has proceed-        ed  on  the basis that it is primarily the function  of  the        State through its police officers who are charged with the                                    405        duty  of preventing the commission of crime and of  bringing        offenders  to  justice, to prosecute  criminals  or  alleged        criminals’ in serious cases, that is to say, cases involving        not only personal injury to the complainant but also  public        peace and order.  Such police officers have been enjoined by        law  to  see  to it that all persons alleged  to  have  been        concerned  in a crime of that character, should be  speedily        brought  to  justice.  Chapter XIV of the  Code,  as  stated        above, lays down the procedure which police officers have to        follow.  Hence, the Code has provided that all cases involv-        ing public peace and order, should be investigated by public        servants  who  are expected to be vigilant in  bringing  all        offenders  to justice without any avoidable delay.   If  the        police  have not thought it necessary or feasible to  do  so        after following the procedure laid down in Chapter XIV,  the        private party may figure before the magistrate as  complain-        ant  The magistrate has got, therefore, to be more  vigilant

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      in  seeing  that private vendetta and  considerations  other        than those of vindicating justice, are not allowed to inter-        fere with the administration of public justice.  Hence,  the        procedure laid down in section 208 and the sections  follow-        ing  that  section, naturally gives  greater  facilities  to        persons accused of an offence, to vindicate their character.        As indicated above, there is no doubt that there are materi-        al differences in the two procedures relating to  commitment        according  as the case has been investigated by a  competent        police officer who has submitted a charge-sheet and a report        under  section 173 of the Code, or, a  competent  magistrate        has  taken cognizance of an offence on a complaint.  In  the        latter case, the procedure before the committing  magistrate        is more elaborate.  But is it always to the advantage of  an        accused  person that there should be an elaborate  procedure        before  such a magistrate and not a summary one?  It is  the        avowed  policy of the Legislature and there can be no  doubt        that  it  is in the general interest  of  administration  of        justice,  that crimes should be investigated  and  criminals        brought to justice as expeditiously as circumstances of  the        case would        406        permit.   That  must also be in the interest of  an  accused        person himself if he claims not to be guilty of any offence.        Generally speaking, therefore, only a real offender would be        interested  in  prolonging  the inquiry or trial  so  as  to        postpone the day of judgment.  If a person has been  falsely        or wrongly accused of an offence, it is in his interest that        he should get himself declared innocent by a competent court        as  early  as possible.  In view  of  these  considerations,        there  cannot  be the least doubt that the  Legislature  has        been well-advised to amend the procedure relating to commit-        ment proceedings in cases which have been investigated by  a        competent  police  officer.   The  Legislature  has  rightly        retained  the old elaborate .procedure only in  those  cases        which  have not been investigated by such a public  officer,        or, after investigation, have been declared not to be fit to        be proceeded with in public interest.        Having  found that there are substantial differences  intro-        duced  by the impugned provisions, we have to  consider  the        question  of the constitutionality of those provisions.   At        the threshold, it is pertinent to observe that these  provi-        sions  have  not in any way affected the  procedure  at  the        trial.   After a case has been committed to a Court of  Ses-        sion,  the  procedure for the trial of  offences  in  either        class  of cases, remains the same.  Hence, all  those  cases        which  came up to this Court in which it was laid down  that        the  law introduced substantial changes in the procedure  at        the  trial, to the disadvantage of an accused  person,  have        absolutely  no  relevance  to the present  case.   The  main        attack on the constitutionality of those provisions is based        on Art. 14 of the Constitution.  This Court had to  consider        the provisions of that article in a series of cases, namely,        Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (1), The State        of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (2), The, State of West Bengal v.        Anwar  Ali  Sarkar (3), Kathi Raning Rawat v. The  State  of        Saurashtra(4), Lachmandas        (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.        (3) [1952] S.C.R. 284.        (2) [1951]S.C.R. 682.         (4) [1952] S.C.R. 435.                                    407        Kewalram  Ahuja v. The State of Bombay (1), Qasim  Razvi  v.        The  State of Hyderabad(2), Habeeb Mohamad v. The  State  of        Hyderabad(3)  The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh(4),        which were all referred to in the case of Budhan Choudhry v.        The State of Bihar(5), which is the nearest case to the case

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      now  before  us, with this distinction that  in  that  case,        there  was a difference at the trial stage itself.  In  that        case,  the  same accused person in respect of the  same  of-        fence,  could  be tried under section 30 of the  Code  by  a        magistrate  empowered under that section, and by a Court  of        Session,  if the offence happened to have taken place  in  a        jurisdiction  to which section 30 had not been applied.   In        that  case, this Court upheld the constitutionality of  that        section  of the Code, and repelled the Contention  that  the        provisions  of that section infringed the fundamental  right        to  equality guaranteed by art. 14 of the Constitution.   In        the course of his judgment, Das J. (as he then was) made the        following observations which apply to the case in hand  with        full force :        "......... It is now well-established that while article  14        forbids  class  legislation, it does not  forbid  reasonable        classification  for the purposes of legislation.  In  order,        however, to pass the test of permissible classification  two        conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classifi-        cation must be founded on an intelligible differentia  which        distinguishes  persons or things that are  grouped  together        from others left out of the group and (II) that that differ-        entia must have a rational relation to the object sought  to        be achieved by the statute in question.  The  classification        may be founded on different basis; namely, geographical,  or        according  to objects or occupations or the like.   What  is        necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of        classification  and the object of the Act  under  considera-        tion.  It is also well-established by the decisions of  this        Court that article 14 condemns        (1)  [1952] S.C.R..710.        (2)  [I953] S.C.R. 581.        (3)[1953] S.C.R. 661.        (4)  [1953] S.C.R. 254.        (5)  [1955] 1 S.C. R. 1045, 1049.        408        discrimination  not only by a substantive law but also by  a        law of procedure."        The later case before this Court dealing with. the  question        of  discrimination in respect of provisions of the  Code  is        the one reported in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari(1).  In that        case, the constitutionality of section 197 of the Code,  was        questioned.  The contention raised in that case was that the        section vested arbitrary power in the Government to grant or        withhold sanction which could be withheld or granted at  the        sweet  will  of the Executive.  This  Court  overruled  that        contention and held that a discretionary power is not neces-        sarily discriminatory.        Applying the principles laid down by this Court to the  case        in hand to judge whether or not there has been objectionable        discrimination, there could not be the least doubt that  the        Legislature has provided for a clear classification  between        the  two kinds of proceedings at the commitment stage  based        upon  a very relevant consideration, namely, whether or  not        there  has been a previous inquiry by a  responsible  public        servant  whose  duty it is to discover crime  and  to  bring        criminals  to speedy justice.  This basis of  classification        is clearly connected with the underlying principle of admin-        istration  of  justice that an alleged  criminal  should  be        placed  on  his trial as soon after the  commission  of  the        crime  as  circumstances  of the case  would  permit.   This        classification cannot be said to be unreasonable and not  to        have any relation to the object of the legislation,  namely,        a more speedy trial of offences without any avoidable delay.        For  the reasons given above, it must be held that there  is

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      no discrimination and that the provisions of Art. 14 of  the        Constitution  have not been contravened.  The provisions  of        the Code, impugned in this case, must, therefore, be held to        be constitutional.  The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.        Appeal dismissed.        (1) 1955] 2 S.C.R. 925.                                    409