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PETITIONER: M. VEERABHADRA RAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TEK CHAND

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/10/1984

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR   28            1985 SCR  (1)1003  1984 SCC  Supl.  571     1984 SCALE  (2)608  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC1398  (4)

ACT:      Bar Council  of India  Rules 1975, Part VI, Chapter II- Standards of  professional conduct  and etiquette-Read  with Rules 34  and 40  of the  Civil Rules  of Practice framed by Andhra Pradesh  High Court-Advocate be attested affidavit in absence of deponent known to the advocate-Affidavit found to be forged  and led  to the commission of fraud and damage to deponent-Whether constitutes  professional  misconduct-Held- Yes.      Advocates Act,  1961-S.  35-Punishment  for  delinquent advocate-Punishment must  be commensurate  with  gravity  of misconduct.      Advocates  Act,   1961  as  amended  by  the  Advocates (Amendment) Act,  1973 (Act  60 of 1973)-S.38-Interpretation of-Jurisdiction of  Supreme Court to vary punishment awarded by  Disciplinary   Committee  of   Bar  Council   of   India comprehends jurisdiction  to vary  finding  of  Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India.

HEADNOTE:      Rule 34  of the  Civil Rules  of Practice framed by the Andhra Pradesh  High Court  sets out  officers authorised to administer  oath  for  the  purpose  of  affidavits  and  an Advocate or  Pleader other  than the Advocate or Pleader who has been  engaged in such a proceeding have been included in the list  of officers authorised to administer oath. Rule 40 of the  said Rules provides that ’the officer before whom an affidavit is  taken shall  state the  date on which, and the place where,  the same  is taken,  and  sign  his  name  and description at  the end,  as in  Form No.  14, otherwise the same shall  not be  filed or  read in any matter without tho leave of the Court. Form No. 14 which prescribes the form of affidavit  or   solemn   affirmation   requires   a   solemn affirmation  or   oath  before   the  person  authorised  to administer the  same and  then at  the  foot  of  which  the signature of  the deponent  must appear  and below  that the officer entitled  to administer  oath must put his signature in token  of both  that he  administered the  oath and  that deponent signed  in his  presence and  by his attestation he

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had subscribed to both the aspects.      Provisions contained  in Chapter  II in  part VI of the Bar Council  of India  Rules of 1915 prescribe ’Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette’. In the preamble to this part, it  is stated  that ’an  advocate shall, at all times, comport himself  in a  manner befitting  his  status  as  an officer of  the Court, a privileged member of the community. and a gentle- 1004 man, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who  is not  a member  of the Bar. Or for a member of the  Bar  in  his  nonprofessional  capacity  may  still  be improper for  an advocate.  It inter  alia includes  that an advocate shall  not act  on the  instructions of any persons other than his client or authorised agent.      Sub-sec. (3)  of Sec.  35 of  the Advocates  Act,  1961 prescribes the  various punishments that may be imposed upon a delinquent  advocate: They are: (a) reprimand the advocate (b) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem  fit, and  (c) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.      Respondent Tek  Chand filed  a  complaint  against  the appellant, an  advocate; under  Sec 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 before  the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The respondent  alleged that  one  Mr.  M.  Ram  Mohan  Rao, advocate, with  whom the  appellant was  working as a junior advocate, was  a tenant  of a house situated at Rashtrapathi Road, Secunderabad of which he was the owner. This house was agreed to  be sold  for Rs.  65,000 to  Premlata daughter of Shri Hastimal  Jain and  Rs. 10,000  were  paid  as  earnest money. The  sale deed was to be completed within a period of three  months   on  the   vendee  paying   the  balance   of consideration of  Rs. 55,000.  The vendee  did not  pay  the amount and  the respondent alleged that he had cancelled the agreement for  sale. It  was further  alleged  that  as  the consideration for  sale was  exceeding Rs.  50,000, tho sale deed could  not be registered unless an income-tax clearance certificate  was   produced,   but   as   the   balance   of consideration was  not paid, the agreement to sell the House was cancelled. However as the vendee Premlata wanted to grab the house  without paying  the balance  of consideration, in order to get the sale deed registered, it was decided to get the income  tax clearance  certificate and  with this end in view an  application purporting  to be  in the  name of  the respondent with  his signature  forged there  on bearing the date October  31,1972 and  with  an  incorrect  address  was prepared. As  an affidavit  was necessary  in support of the application, the same was prepared on a stamp paper of Rs. 2 with  the  signature  of  respondent  forged  thereon.  This affidavit Ex. A-1 was attested by the appellant as he was an advocate authorised to attest affidavits. On the strength of the forged  documents, an  income-tax clearance  certificate was obtained in the name of the respondent and the sale deed was got  registered. It  was specifically  averred that  the respondent neither  signed the  application  for  income-tax clearance  certificate  nor  swore  the  affidavit.  It  was alleged that  someone impersonated  the respondent  and this must be  known to  the appellant  because he knew respondent for many years prior to the attestation of affidavit. It was alleged that a suit had been filed by the respondent against Mr.  M.   Ram  Mohan  Rao,  senior  of  the  appellant,  for recovering the  arrears of  rent in the amount of Rs. 17,000 and obviously  to cause  damage to the respondent, appellant the junior  of Mr.  M.  Ram  Mohan  Rao  attested  a  forged signature  on  the  affidavit.  It  was  alleged  that  this

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constituted  a  very  serious  professional  misconduct  and necessary enquiry  be made  and appropriate action be taken. The appellant  admitted  that  the  affidavit  Ex.  A-1  was attested by  him; that  the respondent  did  not  affix  his signature in his presence on the affi- 1005 davit  Ex.  A-1  but  admitted  the  same  in  his  presence whereupon he attested the same.      The Disciplinary  Committee of  the State  Bar  Council found that the appellant advocate attested the affidavit Ex. A-1 knowing  that the  respondent-complainant had  not sworn the affidavit  in his  presence nor  was it  signed  in  his presence  by  the  respondent  and  therefore  this  act  of attestation of the affidavit giving a misleading information was improper  and came  with the  mischief  of  professional misconduct and  contrary to  the norms  of some professional etiquette. Having  found the  appellant  guilty  of  serious misconduct,  the  Committee  imposed  a  ludicrously  paltry punishment of reprimand.      The appellant  filed an  appeal before the Disciplinary Committee  of   the  Bar   Council  of  India.  (  Appellate Committee’ for  short.) The Appellate Committee affirmed the order made  by the State Committee imposing he punishment of reprimand and  conveying a  warning to the appellant that he should be  careful in  future in such matters. The Appellate Committee expunged  the observation  of the  State Committee that the  appellant had not attested Ex. A-1 in the presence of the  complainant and  that this  act of the appellant was improper and  comes  within  the  mischief  of  professional misconduct  and   contrary  to  the  norms  of  professional etiquette  on   the  ground  that  these  observations  were uncalled for.  Encouraged by  the ludicrous  punishment, the appellant  filed   this  appeal  under  section  38  of  the Advocates Act, 1961.      Dismissing the  appeal and  enhancing  the  punishment, this Court, ^      HELD: Both  the fact  finding authorities  concurrently recorded the  finding that  the respondent  did not  put his signature on  the affidavit,  Ex. A-1 in the presence of the appellant  and   yet  the   appellant  by  contributing  his attestation to  the affidavit  made a  declaration that  the signature was  of the  appellant made  in his  presence.  We consider this unambiguous finding wholly incontrovertible in the facts  of this  case that  the appellant  never appeared before the respondent either on October 31, 1972 or November 1, 1972. [1014 D-E]      The  tell   tale  circumstances   on  record   and  the cumulative effect of the various pieces of evidence accepted as wholly  reliable  and  practically  uncontroverted  would clearly render  this finding  unassailable. The stark alocit unpalatable conclusion that flows is that the appellant is a party to  a document  which is not genuine. It can be safely said that  it was  a false  document purporting to be in the name of  the respondent.  It would  in law  became a  forged document. The  appellant by  attesting the  signature to  it gave a  solemnity which  is being  relied upon by the Income Tax Officer  on  which  a  very  valuable  document  namely, income-tax   clearance    certificate   was   issued   which facilitated registration  of a sale deed in respect of which the contention  is that  the consideration has not been paid to the respondent. The appellant thus facilitated commission of a  fraud by  becoming a party to the forged document. The appellant has  thus violated his statutory duty conferred by the Oaths Act, 1969, He has also

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1006 acted in  a  manner  unbecoming  of  a  member  of  a  noble profession. He  has knowingly  become a party to the forgery of a  very valuable  document and  he  has  by  his  conduct facilitated the  commission of  a fraud  which would to some extent benefit  his senior  Mr. M.  Ram Mohan Rao. Does this conduct constitute professional misconduct ? [1018 G-H; 1019 A-B; 1019 D-E]      One can  legitimately expect  an advocate  of 10  years standing to  know that  under Rule 34, the appellant was not entitled   to    attest   an    affidavit   which   includes administration of  oath which  was likely  to be  used in  a proceeding and  yet he  pretended  to  act  in  his  assumed capacity, arrogated to himself the jurisdiction which he did not possess  and attested  the  affidavit  in  the  name  of someone whom  he knew  personally and  who was  not  present before him  personally and  successfully mislead  the Income Tax Officer  to issue  the income-tax clearance certificate. Add to  this that he made a blatantly false statement in the proceedings of  disciplinary enquiry that the respondent had appeared before  him and admitted his signature. This is not only a  false statement but it is false to his knowledge. If this is  not professional  misconduct, it  would be  time to wind up  this jurisdiction. The appellant is guilty of gross professional misconduct. [120 E-G]      The Appellate  Committee clearly  committed an error in deleting some of the observations of the State Committee and that shows not only not-application of mind but a conclusion contrary to record which is wholly unsustainable. [1021 A]      By Act 60 of 1973, specific power has been conferred on this Court  that in an appeal by the person aggrieved by the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India  to  this  Court,  this  Court  may  pass  such  order including the  order varying  the punishment  awarded by the Disciplinary Committee  of the  Bar Council of India thereon as it  deems  fit  This  jurisdiction  will  comprehend  the jurisdiction to vary the finding of the Appellate Committee. [1021 C-D]      In the  instant  case,  having  given  the  matter  our anxious  consideration,   looking  to  the  gravity  of  the misconduct and keeping in view the motto that the punishment must be  commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, we direct that  the appellant  shall be suspended from practice for a  period of  five years  that is  upto and inclusive of October 31, 1989. [1024 D-E]      Krishan Chander  Nayar v. The Chairman, Central Tractor Organisation and  Ors, [1962]  3 SCR  187,  Bar  Council  of Maharashtra v.  M.V. Dabholkar etc. etc, [1976] 1 SCR 306 at 322, P.J. Ratnam v D. Kanikram and Ors., [1964], 3 SCR 1 and V.C. Rangadurai  v D.  Gopalan and  Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 1054, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1019 of 1978.      Appeal Under  Art. 38  of the  Advocates Act  from  the Order 1007 dated the  4th February,  1978 of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India in D.C. Appeal No. 6 of 1976.      P. Gobindan Nair and B. Parthasarthi for the Appellant.      V.A. Bobde for Respondent.      T.S.  Krishnamurthi   Iyer  and   A.  Subba   Rao   for

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Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  The appellant was ill-advised in filing this appeal because  the more  the learned  counsel appearing for the appellant  dived deep into a veritable dustbin of facts, the further  hearing caused  deep anguish more on account of the realisation  as to how occasionally, and we are happy to record very  occasionally, a  member of the noble profession sinks to  the lowest  and to  vindicate his actions tries to clutch at the highest.      One M.  Ram Mohan Rao, who was described as a senior of appellant M.  Veerabhadra Rao has been a practising advocate at Hyderabad.  Appellant M.  Veerabhadra Rao was enrolled as an advocate  in the  year 1961 as stated in his evidence. He joined the chamber of his senior and at the relevant time he was working  in the chamber of his senior. Shri M. Ram Mohan Rao was  a tenant of the premises bearing Municipal No. 3242 situated at  Rashtrapathi Road,  Kingsway,  Secunderabad  of which respondent  Tek Chand  son of  Lala Moti  Ram was  the owner. It  is alleged  that the  respondent, his wife Mohini and son  Subhash Chandra  sold and  conveyed  the  house  in question by  a deed of conveyance in favour of Premlata wife of Sohan  Lal Saloot  and daughter  of Hustimal  Jain for  a consideration  of   Rs.  65,000.  As  the  sale  was  for  a consideration of more than 50,000 the vendor was required to produce an  Income-tax Clearance  Certificate as required by Sec. 230  of the  Income-tax Act,  1962 before the sale deed could be  registered. It  may  be  mentioned  that  sometime before the  alleged transaction of sale, a suit was filed by respondent Tek  Chand against  Shri M.  Ram Mohan  Rao,  the tenant for  eviction on  the ground  of non-payment  of rent etc. This  suit had  ended in  a decree  and at the relevant time, an  appeal preferred  by Shri  M. Ram  Mohan  Rao  was pending. To  resume the  narrative  Tek  Chand  had  already obtained the  necessary Income-tax  clearance certificate on July  5,   1972.  When  the  sale  deed  was  presented  for registration, the  Registrar of  Conveyances asked  for  the Income-tax clearance  certificate and  respondent Tek  Chand said that on payment of the 1008 full consideration,  the same will be produced. From thereon the distressing events leading to the present appeal started      Respondent Tek  Chand filed  a complaint No. 14 of 1974 under Sec.  35 of  the Advocates  Act, 1961  before the  Bar Council of  the State  of Andhra  Pradesh alleging  that one Mr. M.  Ram Mohan  Rao, advocate  was a  tenant of  a  house situated at  Rashtrapathi Road, Secunderabad of which he was the owner.  This house  was agreed to be sold for Rs. 65,000 to Premlata  daughter of  Shri Hastimal  Jain and Rs. 10,000 was paid as earnest money. The sale deed was to be completed within a  period of  three months  on the  vendee paying the balance of  consideration of  Rs. 55,000. The vendee did not pay the  amount and  the  respondent  alleged  that  he  had cancelled the  agreement for  sale. It  was further  alleged that as the consideration for sale was exceeding Rs. 50,000, the sale  deed cannot  be registered  unless  an  Income-tax clearance certificate  is produced,  but as  the balance  of consideration was  not paid, agreement to sell the house was cancelled. However as the vendee Premlata wanted to grab the house without  paying the balance of consideration, in order to get  the sale  deed registered, it was decided to get the Income-tax clearance  certificate and  with this end in view an  application   purporting  to  be  in  the  name  of  the respondent with  his signature  forged thereon  bearing  the date October  31, 1972  and with  an incorrect  address  was

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prepared. As  an affidavit  is necessary  in support  of the application, the same was prepared on a stamp paper of Rs. 2 with the  signature of  respondent Tek Chand forged thereon. This affidavit  was attested  by the  appellant as  he is an advocate authorised to attest affidavits. On the strength of the forged  documents, an  Income-tax clearance  certificate was obtained in the name of respondent and the sale deed was got  registered.  It  was  alleged  that  the  signature  of respondent Tek  Chand was attested by the present appellant, the junior  of Mr.  M. Ram  Mohan Rao, on being paid Rs. 300 through one  Mulchand, Munshi  of Lalchand, who is the uncle of the  father of  Premlata, the vendee. It was specifically averred  that   respondent  Tek  Chand  neither  signed  the application for  income-tax clearance  certificate nor swore the affidavit.  It was alleged that someone impersonated Tek Chand and  this must  be known  to the  appellant because he knew respondent  Tek Chand  for  many  years  prior  to  the attestation of  affidavit. It  was alleged  that a  suit had been filed  by Tek  Chand against  Mr. M.  Ram Mohan Rao for recovering the  arrears of  rent in the amount of Rs. 17,000 and obviously  to cause   damage to Tek Chand, appellant the junior of  Mr. M.  Ram Mohan Rao attested a forged signature on the affidavit. The application 1009 with the  affidavit annexed  was submitted to the Income tax department on  the same  day, and  the Income-tax  clearance certificate was procured through Mulchand which was produced in the  office  of  Sub-Registrar,  Secunderabad.  Thus  the vendee Premlata got the sale deed registered on the strength of forged  documents to  which the appellant was a party and that wrongful  loss was  caused to  the  respondent  in  the amount  of   Rs.  1,35,000  which  was  facilitated  by  the appellant. It  was alleged  that  this  constitutes  a  very serious professional  misconduct and  necessary  enquiry  be made and appropriate action be taken.      The appellant  appeared and  filed a  counter affidavit denying all  the allegations  It was  specifically  admitted that the  affidavit. on the strength of which the Income-tax clearance certificate  was obtained  on November 2, 1972 was attested by  him. As  the decision  largely turns  upon  the explanation offered  by the  appellant his positive case may be extracted: Says he:           "Either on  31.10.72 or on 1.11.72 the complainant      (Tek Chand)  came to  this respondent with an affidavit      purporting to  bear his  signature and  requested  this      respondent to attest the same. The Complainant admitted      that the  signature appearing  on the affidavit as that      of his and therefore this respondent attested the same.      On this  admission of the complainant in person to this      respondent in  the office  of Mr.  M.  Ram  Mohan  Rao,      Advocate, this  respondent attested  the same  in  good      faith and  believing the  representations made  by  the      Complainant. This  respondent was aware that even prior      to the  date  of  attestation  of  the  affidavit,  the      Complainant had  issued a  notice to  this Respondent’s      then Senior  Shri M. Ram Mohan Rao attorning him to pay      rents to Premlata as the Complainant had sold the house      to the  said Premlata.  It is  therefore,  emphatically      denied that  this  respondent  received  Rs.  300  from      Moolchand  and   he  attested  a  forged  affidavit  as      alleged. It is only on the admission and representation      made by  the Complainant  himself in  person, that this      respondent attested the affidavit in good faith."      The State  Bar Council  referred the  complaint to  its Disciplinary Committee.  The complainant-respondent examined

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himself and  he examined  one Mohan  Lal as  his witness. He produced  four   documents  marked  Ext.  A-1  to  A-4,  The important document  is Ext. A-1, the affidavit dated October 31, 1972 purporting to be 1010 of  respondent   Tek  Chand.  Ex.  A-2  is  the  application addressed to  the Income-tax  Officer for issuing income-tax clearance certificate.  Ex. A-3  is the  reply of Income-tax Officer dated  March 8,  1973 to  the inquiry  made  by  the respondent. Ex.  A-4 is  another letter  from the Income-tax Officer dated  March 20, 1973 to the respondent. Ex. A-1 (a) and  Ex.   A-1  (b)  are  the  disputed  signatures  of  the respondent   on    the   affidavit   and   the   application respectively.  The   appellant  himself  gave  evidence  and examined Mr.  N. Satyanarayana,  advocate  who  was  another junior of  Mr. M.  Ram Mohan Rao as his witness and produced documents marked Ext. B-1 to B-4.      The Disciplinary  Committee of  the State  Bar  Council (’State Committee’  for short)  to whom  the  complaint  was referred for  disposal after minutely analysing the oral and documentary evidence,  rejected the  evidence of  PW-2 Mohan Lal witness  examined by  the complainant  and RW-2  Mr.  N. Satyanarayana,  advocate   examined  as   witness   by   the appellant, observing  that both  were partisan  on witnesses and  no  credence  can  be  given  to  their  evidence.  The Committee also  rejected the  allegation that  the appellant was paid Rs. 300 by Mr. Hastimal for attesting affidavit Ex. A-1, observing  that there  was no  cogent and unimpeachable evidence  in  support  of  this  allegation.  The  Committee further held that complainant Tek Chand never approached the appellant with Ex. A-1 and therefore, the explanation of the appellant that  he attested  the affidavit  on the statement made by the respondent that it bears his signature cannot be accepted. The  Committee concluded  that the  attestation of Ex. A-1  amounts to  witnessing the  fact that  the deponent affirmed the truthfulness and genuineness of what was stated in the  affidavit and signed in his presence, but this would be untrue  without the  presence of  deponent Tek  Chand and therefore, the  endorsement becomes  false and  rendered the attestation  invalid.   The  Committee  concluded  that  the appellant  advocate  attested  Ex.  A-1  knowing,  that  the respondent-complainant had  not sworn  the affidavit  in his presence nor was it signed in his presence by the respondent and therefore,  this act  of attestation  of  the  affidavit giving a misleading information is improper and comes within the mischief  of professional misconduct and contrary to the norms of the professional etiquette The State Committee also concluded that  on account of this misconduct on the part of the appellant, income-tax clearance certificate was obtained and therefore,  the appellant  was  guilty  of  professional misconduct. Having  found the  appellant guilty  of  serious misconduct, namely, attesting an affi- 1011 davit which appears to be a forged one and which was used to obtain an  unfair advantage by Premlata by obtaining Income- tax clearance  certificate on  the strength of Ex. A-1 which did not  appear to  be genuine  to the  Committee, and which caused  wrongful  loss  to  the  respondent,  the  Committee developed  cold   feet  and  imposed  a  ludicrously  paltry punishment of  reprimand  which  is  no  punishment  stricto sensu.      Emboldened   by   this   timid   performance   of   the Disciplinary  Committee   of  the  State  Bar  Council,  the appellant filed   D.C.  Appeal No.  6  of  1976  before  the Disciplinary  Committee   of  the   Bar  Council  of  India.

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(’Appellate Committee’  for short).  The Appellate Committee held that  the explanation of the appellant that he attested the affidavit  on the  strength of the statement made to him by the respondent that the affidavit bears his signature and that there  was nothing  improper in attesting the affidavit on the  acknowledgement  made  by  the  deponent  about  his signature  cannot  be  accepted  because  the  affidavit  in question categorically  states that  the party  deponent put his signature  before the  attesting advocate,  when it  was common ground that it was not so done and the affirmation by the advocate  clearly amounts  to  a  false  statement.  The Appellate Committee then became fictitious and observed that it would  take a  serious and  strict view of the matter and hold that  an advocate  should not  be a  party to  such  an irregular procedure amounting to a false declaration by him. After so  observing the Committee affirmed the order made by the State Committee imposing the punishment of reprimand and conveying a  warning to  the appellant  that  he  should  be careful in  future in  such matters. The Appellate Committee then proceeded  to accept  one contention  on behalf  of the learned advocate  appearing for  the appellant  and expunged the observation  of the  State Committee  that the appellant had not attested Ext. A-1 in the presence of the complainant and that  his act  of the  appellant was  improper and comes within the mischief of profession misconduct and contrary to the norms of professional etiquette on the ground that these observations were  uncalled for  especially in  view of  the fact that  the Committee  disbelieved the evidence of P.W. 2 on the  question of  payment of  Rs. 300 and presentation of affidavit by  Mool Chand.  It would be presently pointed out that the  expunging of  those remarks  was uncalled  for and betrays total non-application of mind while disposing of the appeal.      Undaunted by  two failures but presumably encouraged by the 1012 ludicrous punishment,  the appellant  filed this  appeal  in this Court  under Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. By the order made  on August  7, 1978,  the appeal was admitted and directed to be included in the list of short matters.      The respondent  on being  served,  appeared  and  filed cross objections  inter alia  contending that  there  was  a conspiracy between  M. Ram  Mohan Rao, senior of the present appellant and  vendee Premlata  as well as Hustimal to cause wrongful loss to the respondent. To this conspiracy even the appellant was a party. M. Ram Mohan Rao, who was a tenant of the house  which Premlata claims to have purchased was under a decree  of eviction  and in  order to thwart it he hatched the plot  to which  the appellant  lent  his  assistance  by purchasing two  stamp papers of Rs 2 each in the name of the respondent and  after drawing  up a  false affidavit  in the name of  the respondent  a signature  was forged  thereon to which the appellant lent his attestation so as to give it an appearance that the forged signature was a genuine signature of the  respondent knowing full well that on the strength of this forged  affidavit an  income-tax clearance  certificate was to  be obtained  which would  facilitate registration of the sale deed which Premlata claimed to have taken and which was objected  to by  the respondent. It was alleged that for rendering such service he charged and accepted Rs 300 in the presence of PW 2 witness Mohan Lal. It was alleged that this forged affidavit  was submitted to the Income-tax Officer on the strength  of which  an income-tax  clearance certificate was obtained  which enabled M. Ram Mohan Rao and Premlata to get registration of the sale deed. The respondent prayed for

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enhancement of punishment imposed upon the appellant.      The  appellant   filed  his   rejoinder  to  the  cross objections filed  by the  respondents Inter  alia contending that in  the absence  of any provision in the Advocates Act, 1961,  the   respondent  is   not  entitled  to  file  cross objections. It  was submitted  that if  the  respondent  was aggrieved by  the  order  of  the  State  Committee  or  the Appellate Committee,  it was open to him to prefer an appeal but that  having not  been done, the cross objections cannot be entertained.      The appeal  came up  for hearing  on September 23, 1980 before a Bench comprising A.C. Gupta and A.P. Sen, JJ. After hearing Mr.  Vepa P.  Sarthay, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,  the Court  proceeded to  hear Mr. V.A. Bobde who appeared  amicus curie for the respondent. After hearing both the sides, the Court made the following order: 1013           "Issue notice  to the  appellant in this appeal as      to why   having  regard to the findings recorded by the      State Bar Council and the other facts and circumstances      of the  case the  punishment awarded against him should      not be  enhanced. This  appeal will be heard along with      cross objection  filed  by  the  respondent.  C.A.  No.      1019/78 to be treated as P.H."      Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant submitted  that the  facts found both by the State Committee and  the Appellate  Committee would not constitute professional misconduct  for which the appellant may incur a penalty.      Before  we   proceed  to   examine   what   constitutes professional misconduct,  we may briefly point out the facts concurrently found  by the State Committee and the Appellate Committee.      After extensively  reproducing the  evidence led in the case and  after rejecting  the evidence of PW-2 Mohan Lal, a witness examined by the respondent and RW-2 N.Satyanarayana, a witness  examined by  the appellant,  the State  Committee concluded that  the affidavit  Ext. A-1 was not taken to the appellant by  the respondent  nor did he admit his signature on the  affidavit Ext. A-1 in the presence of the appellant. The affidavit  Ext. A-1 contains certain obviously incorrect statements in that even though respondent was aged more than 60 years,  his age  was shown to be 45 years in Ext. A-1 and that the address of the respondent shown in the affidavit on the date  of the  affidavit was incorrect because he was not residing  in   the  House   No.  3242,   Rashtrapathi  Road, Secunderabad as  set out in Ext. A-1 but has residing at Red Hills Hyderabad.  It was  also found that the respondent did not go to the office of advocate Shri M. Ram Mohan Rao where the appellant  was at  the relevant time sitting for getting Ext.  A-1  attested.  It  was  noticed  that  the  appellant admitted that  Exts. (a)  and A-1 (b) were not signed by the respondent in  the presence  of the  appellant and  that  he attested the  same  on  the  statement  of  the  respondent- complainant. It was found as a fact that the affidavit bears the date  October 31,  1972 and  was filed in the Income-tax department on  the same  date, while  the attestation of the appellant thereon  bears the  date November  1, 1972. It was concluded that either without the presence of the respondent or his  so-called admission  of his  signature the appellant should not  have attested  his signature on an affidavit and therefore  the   attestation  was  invalid.  And  that  this constitutes professional misconduct. 1014      The Appellate  Committee in  a cryptic  albeit  loconic

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order, bravity being its only merit, broadly agreed with the findings recorded  by the State Committee observing that the affidavit on  its own  face would  tend  to  show  that  the attestation  was  done  after  the  signatory  had  put  his signature in  the presence  of the  appellant and thereafter the appellant attested the signature while it is admitted by the  appellant  that  the  signature  was  not  put  by  the respondent on  the affidavit  in  his  presence  but  merely stated that  he had  signed the same. Therefore according to the Appellate  Committee the  affirmation of the same by the appellant clearly  amounts to a false statement and that the appellant was  a party to a false declaration and therefore, he is  guilty of  professional misconduct  as found  by  the State  Committee.   Curiously  thereafter,   the   Appellate Committee for  reasons which  are neither comprehensible nor convincing  deleted   the  observation  made  by  the  State Committee which  was  clearly  borne  out  by  the  evidence observing that  ’the finding was uncalled for in view of the fact that  the State  Committee disbelieved  the evidence of PW 2  on the  question of payment of Rs 300 and presentation of the  affidavit by Mool Chand.’ It has been very difficult for us  to appreciate this disjointed reasoning. However, it is crystal  clear that  both the  fact  finding  authorities concurrently agreed  that the  respondent did  not  put  his signature on  Ext. A-1  in the presence of the appellant and yet the  appellant by  contributing his  attestation to  the affidavit made  a declaration  that the signature was of the appellant made  in his  presence, and  admittedly  that  not being true the appellant was guilty of misconduct. Does this constitute professional misconduct is the question?      The narrow question that falls for our consideration in this case  is whether  the appellant,  an enrolled advocate, who was  authorised to  attest an affidavit that can be used in civil  or criminal  proceedings committed  impropriety in attesting an  affidavit which  attestation would  imply that the deponent  subscribed his  signature to  the affidavit in his presence  after taking  the requisite oath that ought to be administered  to him  because there is no dispute that an affidavit is a sworn statement of the deponent.      The expression ’affidavit’ has been commonly understood to mean  a sworn  statement in writing made especially under oath or  on affirmation  before an  authorised Magistrate or officer. Affidavit has been defined in sub-cl. (3) of Sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to include ’affirmation and declaration in  the case  of person by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing.’ The essential 1015 ingredients of  an affidavit  are  that  the  statements  or declarations are  made  by  the  deponent  relevant  to  the subject matter and in order to add sanctity to it, he swears or affirms  the truth of the statements made in the presence of a  person who  in law  is authorised either to administer oath or  to accept  the affirmation.  The responsibility for making precise  and accurate  statements in  affidavit  were emphasised by  this Court  in Krishan  Chander Nayar  v. The Chairman, Central  Tractor Organisation and Ors. The part or the role  assigned to the person entitled to administer oath is no  less sancrosanct.  Section 3  of the  Oaths Act, 1969 specifies persons  on whom  the power  to administer oath or record affirmation is conferred. It inter alia includes ’any Court, Judge,  Magistrate or person who may administer oaths and affirmations for the purpose of affidavits, if empowered in  this  behalf-(a)  by  the  High  Court,  in  respect  of affidavits for  the purpose  of judicial proceedings; or (b) by the  State Government,  in respect  of other affidavits.’

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The Schedule  to  the  Act  prescribes  forms  of  oaths  or affirmation that is required to be administered to the party seeking to  make his  own affidavit.  Rule 40  of the  Civil Rules of  Practice framed  by the  Andhra Pradesh High Court provides that ’the officer before whom an affidavit is taken shall state the date on which, and the place where, the same is taken,  and sign  his name and description at the end, as in Form  No. 14,  otherwise the  same shall  not be filed or read in  any matter  without the  leave of the Court.’ ’Form No.  14’   prescribes  the   form  of  affidavit  on  solemn affirmation. It requires a solemn affirmation or oath before the person authorised to administer the same and then at the foot of  which the signature of the deponent must appear and below that  the officer entitled to administer oath must put his signature in token of both that he administered the oath and  that  deponent  signed  in  his  presence  and  by  his attestation he  has subscribed  to both the aspects. Rule 34 of the  aforementioned rules sets out officers authorised to administer  oath  for  the  purpose  of  affidavits  and  an Advocate or  Pleader other  than the Advocate or Pleader who has been  engaged in such a proceeding have been included in the list  of officers  authorised to  administer  oath.  The appellant as  an advocate  enrolled by the State Bar Council was thus authorised to administer oath for the purpose of an affidavit and  attest the same. This was not disputed before us.      It is  not in  dispute that  Ext. A-1  is an  affidavit purporting to  have been  made  by  the  respondent  in  the presence of the appellant 1016 and attested  by him.  The appellant  admits in no uncertain terms that  Ext. A-1  bears his  attestation. If  the matter were to rest here it would mean that the respondent appeared before the  appellant with  his  affidavit.  Thereupon,  the appellant administered  oath to  him and  on the  respondent taking the  oath and  affirming the  truth of  the statement made in  the affidavit,  put his  signature on the affidavit in the  presence of  the appellant  and then  the  appellant subscribed his  signature to  the affidavit  in token of his having administered  the  oath  and  the  respondent  having affixed his  signature in  his presence.  The content of the affidavit clearly  spells out  the  purpose  for  which  the affidavit was  being made namely for obtaining an income tax clearance certificate  which the respondent as vendor had to produce before the Registrar of Conveyances acting under the Indian Registration  Act for  the purpose of registering the sale deed  which the respondent was alleged to have executed in favour  of Smt.  Premlata. To  narrow down  the  area  of controversy, it  may be  mentioned that the appellant admits that the  affidavit Ex.  A-1 is  attested by him. He further concedes that  the respondent did not affix his signature in his presence on the affidavit Ext. A-1 but admitted the same in  his  presence  whereupon  he  attested  the  same.  This statement of the appellant clearly shows dereliction of duty in two  aspects: (i)  that he did not administer any oath or did not call up the respondent to make an affirmation though Ext. A-1  purports to  be an  affidavit  and  secondly,  the respondent did  not subscribe  his signature in the presence of the  appellant and  the  appellant  merely  acted  on  an alleged statement of the respondent that the affidavit bears his signature. The enquiry therefore, in this case is a very narrow  one.   It  centres   round  whether  the  respondent personally appeared before the appellant when he was sitting in the  office of  his senior  M. Ram Mohan Rao and produced the affidavit Ext. A-1 for attestation by the appellant?

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    The State  Committee clearly  recorded  an  unambiguous finding which  we consider  wholly incontrovertible  in  the facts of  this case that the appellant never appeared before the respondent  either on  October 31,  1972 or  November 1, 1972. There  are tell  tale circumstances  on  record  which would  clearly   render  this   finding  unassailable.   The appellant was  the junior of M. Ram Mohan Rao who claimed to be occupying  the very  house as  tenant of  the  respondent which was  the subject  matter of  the disputed sale and the respondent had  filed a  suit against  M. Ram  Mohan Rao for eviction on  the  ground  of  non-payment  of  rent  in  the aggregate amount of over Rs. 11,000 and the suit had already ended in a decree in favour of the respondent against M. Ram Mohan Rao and the matter was pending in 1017 appeal. There was thus no love lost between M. Ram Mohan Rao and the respondent. In this back-ground the respondent would never think  of going  to the  office of M. Ram Mohan Rao to contact his  junior the present appellant for the purpose of swearing the  affidavit. If  the Oath  Commissioners were  a scarce commodity,  one may  have to  go in  search of a rare commodity but the relevant rules 34 and 40 clearly show that every advocate  was authorised  to administer  oath for  the purpose of  affidavit and  attest the  same.  Secondly,  the affidavit was  for the  purpose of  obtaining an  income-tax clearance certificate.  Now there  is unimpeachable evidence on record  that  the  respondent  had  already  obtained  an income-tax clearance  certificate way  back on July 5, 1972. In his  examination-in-chief in  the course  of disciplinary proceedings, the  respondent stated that on July 5, 1972, he obtained income-tax  clearance certificate  from the income- tax officer. There is no cross-examination on this point. It clearly amounts  to an  acceptance of the fact that way back on July  5, 1972  the respondent  had  already  obtained  an income-tax  clearance  certificate.  Therefore,  it  is  not necessary for  him to  obtain any fresh income-tax clearance certificate. He  had therefore  no reason  to  approach  the appellant for  attesting the affidavit for the avowed object of obtaining  an income-tax  clearance certificate.  Add  to this the  circumstance that  the respondent  at the relevant time was  not staying  at House No. 3242, Rashtrapathi Road, Secunderabad and  this is  not in  dispute. If  he  was  not staying at  Rashtrapathi Road,  Secunderabad, the Income-tax Officer,  J.   Ward,  Circle  III,  Hyderabad  to  whom  the application appears  to have  been addressed  for income-tax clearance certificate  on October  31, 1972  would  have  no jurisdiction to  entertain the application. The appellant at the relevant  time was  staying at  Red Hills, Hyderabad. It was  obviously   not  necessary  for  him  to  approach  the appellant  at   such  a   long  distance  for  attesting  an affidavit, more  so in  view of the fact that he had already obtained an  income-tax clearance certificate. There is also a letter  on record  from the  Income-tax Officer,  J.  Ward Circle III,  Hyderabad dated April 21, 1973 addressed to the respondent in  which he  has categorically  stated that  the income-tax clearance  certificate issued on the basis of the affidavit dated  October 31,  1972 was  collected  from  his office by  one Mool  Chand and  let it be recalled that Mool Chand is none other than the person against whom allegations were made  that he  was acting  on behalf  of  Premlata  and Hustimal, and  whom the  appellant  knew  intimately  as  it transpired  from   his  statement   in  the  course  of  the investigation wherein  he has  stated that  if he remembered correctly Shri  Mulchand  and  one  Sohanlal  son-in-law  of Hustimal also followed Tekchand and were

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1018 present  while   he  (the   appellant)  was   attesting  the affidavit. Thus  the appellant  knew both the respondent and Mulchand and it is this Mulchand whom the I.T.O. referred as having taken away the income-tax clearance certificate which was issued  on the  basis of  a forged affidavit alongwith a forged application.  There is  further intrinsic evidence to show that  document Ext.  A-1 is either a forged one or fake one. Ext. A-1 the affidavit bears the date October 31, 1972. Attesting the same, the appellant appended his own signature which he  admits he  has put.  It bears the date November 1, 1972. Therefore,  one can say with reasonable certainty that this affidavit  Ext. A-1  was attested  by the  appellant on November 1,  1972, Now  if we  refer to  the letter Ext. A-2 addressed to  the Income-tax  Officer J  Ward,  Circle  III, Hyderabad  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  income-tax clearance certificate,  it bears  the date October 31, 1972. The Income  Tax Officer  in his letter Ext. A-3 addressed to the respondent  states that  an application for obtaining an income-tax clearance  certificate was  presented in the name of the  respondent on  October 31,  1972. If the application was thus made to the Income Tax Officer on October 31, 1972, it creates  a grave  doubt about  the existence of affidavit Ex. A-1 which has been attested by the appellant on November 1, 1972.  Of course,  we are  not inclined  to  attach  much importance to this aspect for the reason that the Income Tax Officer may  have committed  a mistake  in referring  to the application dated  October 31, 1972 by merely looking at the date on  the application  and not  the date  on which it was presented. Now the cumulative effect of these various pieces of evidence  accepted as  wholly  reliable  and  practically uncontroverted is  that the  respondent did not approach the appellant either on October 31, 1972 or November 1, 1972 nor did he  present any  affidavit for  attestation nor  did  he admit his signature on Ex. A-1 to the appellant.      What conclusion  can be  deduced from  the totality  of aforementioned evidence?  And this  bas to be ascertained in the context of the affirmative stand taken by the appellant. The appellant admits that he knew the respondent long before the attestation  on Ext. A-1. Therefore, one can easily rule out impersonation  or the  appellant being taken by some one for a  joy  ride.  If  the  appellant  knew  the  respondent intimately  before   the  date   of  Ext.  A-1  and  if  the incontrovertible conclusion  is that  the respondent did not appear before the appellant either on October 31, 1972 or on November 1,  1972 nor  did he  present any affidavit for the attestation by the appellant nor did he admit his signature, the stark albeit unpalatable conclusion that flows therefrom is that the appellant is 1019 a party to a document which is not genuine. It can be safely said that  it was  a false  document purporting to be in the name of  the respondent.  It would  in law  become a  forged document. The  appellant by  attesting his  signature to  it gave a  solemnity which  is being  relied upon by the Income Tax Officer on which a vary valuable document namely, Income Tax  clearance  certificate  was  issued  which  facilitated registration  of  a  sale  deed  in  respect  of  which  the contention is  that the  consideration has  not been paid to the respondent. The appellant thus facilitated commission of a fraud  by becoming  a party  to the  forged  document.  In reaching this  conclusion we  have completely  kept  out  of consideration the  opinion of  the handwriting  expert which was not  placed on  record in  the enquiry  proceedings  but which was  submitted  to  the  criminal  court  in  criminal

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proceedings.      The appellant  is  thus  shown  to  have  violated  his statutory duty conferred by the Oaths Act, 1969. He has also acted in  a  manner  unbecoming  of  a  member  of  a  noble profession. He  has knowingly  become a party to the forgery of a  very valuable  document and  he  has  by  his  conduct facilitated the  commission of  a fraud  which would to some extent benefit his senior M. Ram Mohan Rao.      Does this  conduct constitute  professional misconduct. After  the   initial  enthusiasm   of  arguing   the  appeal evaporated  when  distressing  and  disturbing  dirty  facts started unraveling  from the  evidence and when Mr. Govindan Nair, learned  counsel for the appellant was requested by us to submit  his reply  to the  notice issued by this Court to the appellant  to show  cause  why  the  punishment  imposed should not be enhanced, he practically buckled up and almost conceded that  the conduct attributed to the appellant would certainly constitute  professional misconduct.  Let us  keep this concession aside and come to our own conclusion whether the actions indulged in by the appellant by becoming a party to the  forged documents  so as  to facilitate commission of fraud would constitute professional misconduct.      Provisions contained  in Chapter  II in  Part VI of the Bar Council  of India  Rules of 1975 prescribe ’Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette’. In the preamble to this part, it  is stated  that ’an  advocate shall, at all times, comport himself  in a  manner befitting  his  status  as  an officer of  the Court, a privileged member of the community, and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for  a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may 1020 still  be   improper  for   an  advocate.’   There   follows enumeration of  the conduct  expected of  a  member  of  the profession. It  is however  made clear  that  the  rules  in Chapter-II contain  canons of  conduct and etiquette adopted as general  guides; yet  the specific  mention thereof shall not be  construed as  a denial  of the  existence of  others equally imperative  though not  specifically  mentioned.  It inter alia  includes that  an advocate  shall not act on the instructions  of   any  person  other  than  his  client  or authorised agent.  If Mulchand  followed the  respondent  as admitted by  the appellant  to his  office and  if  Mulchand presented the  forged documents  to the  Income Tax Officer, one can say that the appellant has acted to the detriment of his client at the instance of an outsider whose interest was detrimental to  his client.  But apart  from anything  else, under Rule  34  of  the  Civil  Rules  of  Practice  if  the appellant was  authorised to  administer oath  in respect of affidavits to  be  used  in  judicial  proceedings,  in  the absence of any authorisation by the State of Andhra Pradesh, the appellant  could not  have subscribed  to  an  affidavit claiming to  be authorised  by Rule  34  in  respect  of  an affidavit not  likely to  be used in a judicial proceedings. An affidavit  to be  placed before an Income Tax Officer for claiming an  income tax  clearance certificate  could not be said to  be one  sworn in  for the  purpose of being used in judicial proceedings, under the Oaths Act, In the absence of any authorisation  from the  State Government, the appellant would not  have the power to attest an affidavit which could be used in a proceedings other than judicial proceeding. One can legitimately  expect an advocate of 10 years standing to know that  under Rule  34, the appellant was not entitled to attest an  affidavit which  includes administration  of oath which was  likely to  be used  in a  proceeding other than a

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judicial proceeding  and yet  be pretended  to  act  in  his assumed capacity,  arrogated  to  himself  the  jurisdiction which he  did not  possess and attested the affidavit in the name of  someone whom  he knew  personally and  who was  not present before  him personally  and successfully mislead the Income  Tax  Officer  to  issue  the  income  tax  clearance certificate. Add  to this  that  he  made  abundantly  false statement in  the proceedings  of disciplinary  enquiry that the respondent  had appeared  before him  and  admitted  his signature. This  is not  only a  false statement  but it  is false  to   his  knowledge.  If  this  is  not  professional misconduct, it would be time to wind up this jurisdiction.      Both the  State Committee  and the  Appellate Committee have  soft   pedalled  the  matter  when  imposing  adequate punishment. The  appellant is  guilty of  gross professional misconduct. 1021      The Appellate  Committee clearly  committed an error in deleting some of the observations of the State Committee and that shows not only non-application of mind but a conclusion contrary to  record  which  is  wholly  unsustainable.  This aspect is open to us for our consideration as this Court has issued a notice as contemplated by the proviso to Sec. 38 of the Advocates  Act, 1961 under which the appeal lies to this Court. This  Court has jurisdiction to vary the order of the Appellate Committee  which may even prejudicially affect the person aggrieved  subject to  this pre-requisite that it can do so  only after  a notice  to such person and after giving him an  opportunity of  being heard.  By  Act  60  of  1973, specific power  has been  conferred on this Court that in an appeal by  the person  aggrieved  by  the  decision  of  the Disciplinary Committee  of the  Bar Council of India to this Court, this  Court may  pass such  order including the order varying the punishment awarded by the disciplinary committee of the  Bar Council  of India  thereon as it deems fit. This jurisdiction will  comprehend the  jurisdiction to  vary the finding of the Appellate Committee.      The next  question is:  what  should  be  the  adequate punishment that  must be  imposed upon  the appellant  ? The ludicrously low  punishment frankly no punishment imposed by the State  Committee makes  a mockery  of its  finding.  The appellant has  merely been  reprimanded for his professional misconduct and this punishment has been upheld in the appeal of the appellant by the Appellate Committee.      Sub-sec (3)  of Sec.  35 of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961 prescribes the  various punishments that may be imposed upon a delinquent advocate: They are: (a) reprimand the advocate, (b) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem  fit, and  (c) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.      Adjudging the adequate punishment is a ticklish job and it has become all the more ticklish in view of the miserable failure of  the peers  of the appellant on whom jurisdiction was conferred  to adequately  punish a  derelict member.  To perform this  task may  be an  unpalatable and onerous duty. We,  however,  do  not  propose  to  abdicate  our  function howsoever disturbing it may be      Mr. Nair  urged that  there are certain extenuating and mitigating  circumstances   that  may   be  kept  in  proper prospective  before   this  Court  proceeds  to  review  the punishment  already  imposed  upon  the  appellant.  It  was pointed out  that by  the relevant time in October-November, 1972, the appellant had put in only ten years of 1022 practice at  the Bar.  He was  still attending the office of

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his senior  who may  have influenced  his decision.  Further there is no material to show that the respondent had already obtained an  income-tax clearance  certificate. It was urged that affirmance  of affidavit is a routine job and the court should not  view it  with such  seriousness as to charge the appellant with  dereliction of  duty. And  add to  this  the finding that  the allegation  of payment  of Rs.  300 is not held proved.  None of  these grounds  are  either  valid  or persuasive. If  the appellant  had been  in practice  for  a period of  ten years at the Bar at the relevant time, he had qualified not only for being appointed as a High Court Judge but as  a Judge  of this Court. This is sufficient to dispel arguments of  immaturity. It was said he may be acting under pressure from  his senior.  In fact  this itself should have awakened him  all the  more to  his responsibility  when  he attested the  affidavit. And  if he knew the respondent, one can only  say that  it was  not because he did not discharge the duty  with the  amount of seriousness expected of him in attesting the  affidavit, but  he was consciously becoming a party to  a serious  conspiracy. None  of the extenuating or mitigating circumstances appeal to us.      Legal profession  is monopolistic in character and this monopoly itself  inheres certain  high traditions  which its members are  expected to  upkeep and  uphold. Members of the profession claimed  that they are the leaders of thought and society. In the words of Justice Krishna Iyer in Bar Council of Maharashtra  v. M.  V. Dabholkar etc. etc the role of the members of the Bar can be appreciated. He said:           "The Bar  is not  a private  guilt, like  that  of      barbers, butchers  and candlestick-makers’ but, by bold      contrast, a  public  institution  committed  to  public      justice and  pro bono  publico service.  The grant of a      monopoly licence  to practice  law is  based  on  three      assumptions: (1)  There is  a socially  useful function      for  the  lawyer  to  perform,  (2)  The  lawyer  is  a      professional person who will perform that function, and      (3)  His   performance  as  a  professional  person  is      regulated  by   himself  and   more  formally,  by  the      profession as  a whole.  The central  function that the      legal profession  must perform is nothing less than the      administration of  justice (’The  Practice of  Law is a      Public Utility-The  Lawyer, the Public and Professional      Responsibility’ by 1023      Raymond Marks  et al-Chicago  American Bar  Foundation,      1972, p. 288-289). A glance at the functions of the Bar      Council, and  it will  be apparent  that a  rainbow  of      public utility duties, including legal aid to the poor,      is cast  on these  bodies in the national hope that the      members of  this monopoly will service society and keep      of nanons  of ethics  befitting an honourable order. If      pathological cases  of members  misbehavior occur,  the      reputation and  credibility of  the Bar suffer a mayhem      and who,  but the  Bar Council,  is more concerned with      and sensitive to this potential disrepute the few black      sheep bring  about ? The official heads of the Bar i.e.      the Attorney  General and  the Advocate-General too are      distressed if a lawyer ’stoops to conquer’ by resort to      soliciting, touting and other corrupt practices.      It these are the High expectations of what is described as a  noble profession,  its members  must set an example of conduct worthy  of emulation.  If he  falls from  that  high expectation, the  punishment has to be commensurate with the degree and  gravity of the misconduct. We need not reiterate the seriousness  of the  misconduct as  we  have  repeatedly

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pointed out  the same above. Usually, precedent minded as we generally are,  we searched  for some precedent to assist us in determining  adequate penalty.  In P.  J. Ratnam v. D. K. Kanikaram and Ors this Court upheld suspension from practice for a period of five years for a misconduct of not refunding the amount  which was taken by the advocate on behalf of his client observing that the Court was surprised at the request of the  learned counsel  for reducing  the punishment and in fact it  is a  case in  which the Court left to itself would have struck off the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates  The Court  concluded by saying that suspension of five  years errs  on the  side of leniency and no case is made out for interfering with the same. In Dabholkar’s case, the professional  misconduct charged  was that  the advocate Dabholkar stood  at the  entrance of  the Court House at the Presidency Magistrate’s  Court, Esplanade,  Fort, Bombay and solicited work  and generally  behaved at  that place  in an undignified  manner.  Frankly  speaking,  if  Dabholkar  was starving,  his   professional  misconduct  could  have  been overlooked because  between hunger  and soliciting work, the letter  is   less  pernicious.   However,  the  Seven-Judges Constitution Bench of this Court at that stage did not 1024 interfere with  the punishment of suspension from practising as advocate  for a  period of  three years.  Of course,  the Constitution Bench was concerned with the narrow point about the maintenance  of the  appeal by the Bar Council of India. In V.  C. Rangadurai  v. D.  Gopalan and  Ors the delinquent lawyer Rangadurai was charged with duping the complainant T. Deivasenapaths, an  old deaf  man aged 70 years and his aged wife  Smt.   D.  Kamalammal  by  not  filing  suits  on  two promissory notes.  The Disciplinary  Committee of  the State Bar  Council  had  imposed  a  penalty  of  suspension  from practice for  a period of six years. Sen, J. in his judgment had grave  reservations about the majority decision by which the period  of suspension  was reduced  and the advocate was directed to  work under an Official/Legal Aid Board in Tamil Nadu where his service free of charge were required. Justice Sen would dismiss the appeal without the slightest reduction in punishment.      Having given  the  matter  our  anxious  consideration, looking to the gravity of the misconduct and keeping in view the motto  that the punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of  the misconduct,  we direct that the appellant M. Veerabhadra Rao  shall be  suspended  from  practice  for  a period of  five years  that is upto and inclusive of October 31, 1989.  To that  extent we  vary the  order both  of  the disciplinary committee  of the  State Bar Council as well as the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.      Accordingly this  appeal fails and is dismissed and the punishment of reprimand imposed upon the appellant is varied and he is suspended from practice for a period of five years i.e. upto  and inclusive  of October 31, 1989. The appellant shall pay  the costs  of the  respondent  quantified  at  Rs 3,000. H.S.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 1025