M. SUDAKAR Vs V.MANOHARAN .
Bench: HARJIT SINGH BEDI,CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-010319-010319 / 2010
Diary number: 22511 / 2009
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10319 OF 2010 (arising out of SLP(C)No.19040 of 2009)
M. SUDAKAR … APPELLANT
VERSUS
V. MANOHARAN & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
1. Petitioner happens to be a member of Aruppukkottai
Nadarkal Uravinmurai Pothu Abiruthi Trust and elected as its
President for two terms i.e. 2003-2006 and 2006-2009. By a
resolution of the General Body dated 7th January, 2007 he was
debarred from holding any post in Aruppukkottai Nadarkal
Uravinmurai Pothu Abiruthi Trust (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Trust’) for a period of 10 years. The aforesaid resolution
was sent to the Secretary to the Government, Revenue and
Registration Department, for its registration. Aggrieved by the
same petitioner filed Writ Petition (MD)No. 3414 of 2009 before
the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, inter alia, praying
to restrain the respondent from registering the same.
Petitioner further filed Writ Petition (MD) No.3657 of 2009 for
a direction to the third respondent in the writ petition to
enquire into the affairs of the Trust according to the provisions
of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, in the light
of the representations dated 5th May, 2008 and 28th
September, 2008. Petitioner filed another writ application
bearing W.P.(MD) No.4269 of 2009 for a direction to the third
respondent to consider his representation dated 22nd
December, 2008. In the representations dated 5th May, 2008
and 28th September, 2008 referred to above the petitioner
questioned the resolution passed by the General Body on 7th
January, 2007 and as also the authority of respondent Nos.6
and 7 of the writ petition to pass the resolution. In the
representation dated 22nd December, 2008, the petitioner
questioned the validity of the Governing Body itself.
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2. All the writ petitions were heard together and while
questioning the validity of the resolution dated 7th January,
2007 debarring the petitioner from holding any post in the
Trust for a period of 10 years, it was contended before the
learned Single Judge that the Trust is governed by bye-laws
and it does not empower either the General Body or Governing
Body to debar any person from holding any post for a
stipulated period. As observed earlier the prayer of the
petitioner was to restrain the respondents from registering the
resolution dated 7th January, 2007 but even before the writ
petition was filed the same was registered on 5th December,
2008. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge was of the view
that the said prayer has become infructuous but it proceeded
to mould the relief sought for by the petitioner and held that
the resolution dated 7th January, 2007 “debarring the
petitioner for a period of 10 years is patently illegal, the fact
that the resolution had been filed on 5th December, 2008 will
not have any legal sanction and the petitioner continues to be
the member of the Trust”. While granting the aforesaid relief
the learned Single Judge found that there is no provision in
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the bye-laws of the Trust to debar any person from holding
any post. Relevant portion of the judgment of the learned
Single Judge in this regard reads as follows:
“As stated supra, there is no provision in the bye-laws of the Trust enabling General Body or Governing Body to debar any person from holding any post. Therefore, when the bye-laws are silent about the power of the Trust to debar any person from holding any post, the resolution passed on 07.01.2007 debarring the petitioner from holding any post for a period of 10 years is patently illegal and therefore, even though the resolution has been registered by the District Registrar, the resolution has no legal sanction and it is not legal”.
3. Aggrieved by the same respondent Nos.4 to 7 in the writ
petition preferred Writ Appeal No.366 of 2009. The Division
Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the learned
Single Judge on its finding that the petitioner filed
representation to the Registrar on 5th May, 2008, that is after
16 months from the date of the resolution i.e. 7th January,
2007 and further having not approached the High Court or the
Civil Court the writ petition filed in April, 2009 after 27
months of the resolution deserves to be dismissed. The
Division Bench further observed that the learned Single Judge
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having held the writ petition as infructuous ought not to have
moulded the relief and set aside the resolution being contrary
to bye-laws. It further observed that the issue ought not to
have been decided in the writ petition and the petitioner ought
to have been relegated to the remedy of civil suit. The
observation of the Division Bench in this regard reads as
follows:
“But unfortunately, the petitioner made a representation to the Registrar after 16 months of the said resolution. The first representation was dated 05.05.2008. Even after the said representation, the first respondent neither came to this Court nor went to a Civil Court. He waited till April, 2009 to move a Writ Petition seeking to forbear the District Registrar from recording Form No.VII. At the time when the first respondent filed the Writ Petition in April, 2009 seeking to restrain the District Registrar from recording the resolution, a full period of about 27 months had passed. During this period of 27 months, the first respondent went into a slumber and did not come to this Court challenging the resolution. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the learned Judge was not right in adjudicating a question which was not actually before him. When the very prayer of the first respondent not to register the resolution was doubtful of being entertained, in view of the efflux of about 27 months, the first respondent would not have been entitled to the relief of setting aside the very resolution as being contrary to the bye-laws”.
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4. The petitioner assails the aforesaid order in this petition.
5. Leave granted.
6. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on
behalf of the appellant submits that the Division Bench of the
High Court ought not to have set aside the order of the learned
Single Judge on the ground that the appellant had approached
the High Court belatedly. He points out that the resolution
dated 7th January, 2007 debarred the appellant from holding
any post of the Trust for a period of 10 years and, therefore, it
had adverse effect on the day the writ petition was filed and
even continues till date. He submits that the appellant had
filed the writ petition to restrain the authority to register the
resolution and taking into account the fact that the resolution
has already been registered, the learned Single Judge moulded
the relief, which Courts having the power to issue prerogative
writs always possess. He further submits that the registration
of the resolution in the opinion of the learned Single Judge
rendered the writ petition infructuous and in the background
of the fact that the effect of the resolution was to continue for
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10 years it moulded the relief and the same ought not to have
interfered in appeal.
7. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of the respondents, however, submits that once the
learned Single Judge held the writ petition to be infructuous it
ought not to have gone into the merit of the case and held the
resolution to be bad. He further points out that inordinate
delay in filing the writ petition also disentitled the appellant to
the relief granted and, therefore, the Division Bench rightly set
aside the said order. Reliance has been placed on a decision of
this Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v.
Krishna Rice Mills, (1981) 4 SCC 148, in which it has been
held as follows:
“The High Court noted the assurance and on that observed that the writ petition would become infructuous. But the High Court did not stop there. It proceeded to consider the question on the merits whether the aforesaid transactions constituted a sale for the purpose of the Haryana General Sales Tax held that they did not Act and the Central Sales Tax Act. The High Court. Hence this appeal.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties, it seems to us that the High Court should not have proceeded beyond recording the assurance that the State Government would withdraw the instructions
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and holding that therefore the writ petition had become infructuous. In our opinion, no further question arose for consideration by the High Court.”
8. Mr. Sorabjee further points out that the General Body
resolved to debar the appellant from holding any office of the
Trust for 10 years because of the serious charges of financial
impropriety and removing 526 members of the Trust in block
and they could regain their membership by bringing an action
in the Court and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to
the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. We have bestowed our serious consideration to the
submissions advanced and we are of the opinion that the
Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the
order of the learned Single Judge. It is an admitted position
that the bye-laws which governs the Trust do not provide for
debarring any member of the Trust from holding a post for
specified period. Bye-laws provide for removal of the
membership in accordance with the procedure prescribed
therein in case a member is found to be indulging in activities
prejudicial to the Trust. The power to remove the member in
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our opinion shall not include power to debar the member from
holding an office of the Trust. As the resolution of the
Governing Body debarring the appellant from holding the
office of the Trust was valid and operative when the matter
was pending before the learned Single Judge, he did not err in
quashing the resolution. The power to mould relief is always
available to the Court possessed with the power to issue high
prerogative writs. In order to do complete justice it can mould
the relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the
case. In the facts of a given case a writ petitioner may not be
entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but this itself will
not preclude the Writ Court to grant such other relief which he
is otherwise entitled. Further delay and latches does not bar
the jurisdiction of the Court. It is a matter of discretion and
not of jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge had taken note of
the relevant facts and declined to dismiss the writ petition on
the ground of delay and latches.
10. True it is that the learned Single Judge had observed that
the writ petition had become infructuous and still proceeded
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to grant relief to the appellant. In our opinion, the learned
Single Judge may not be absolutely right in observing that the
writ petition had become infructuous as the resolution
debarring the appellant was still operative. In our opinion a
writ petition broadly speaking is held infructuous when the
relief sought for by the petitioner is already granted or because
of certain events, there may not be necessity to decide the
issue involved in the writ petition. Here in the present case
the resolution of the Governing Body was still holding the field
when the writ petition was heard and in fact was to operate for
a further period, hence it can not be said that the relief
claimed by the appellant had become infructuous. In any view
of the matter, as the effect of the order continued, the learned
Single Judge was right in moulding the relief. The act of the
appellant in removing a large number of members and
financial impropriety will not clothe the General Body to pass
resolution debarring the appellant from holding the post for 10
years, as no such power is conferred by the bye-laws. The
action being patently illegal, the learned Single Judge could
not have declined the relief taking into account the
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alleged action.
11. As regards the decision of this Court in the case of
Krishna Rice Mills(supra) relied on by Mr. Sorabjee, the
same has no bearing in the facts and circumstances of the
case. In the said case the instruction issued by the
Government was challenged and when the matter was taken
up it was conceded by the State that the State Government
would withdraw the instruction. In view of the aforesaid the
High Court observed that the writ petition has become
infurctuous and in that background this Court observed that
the High court ought not to have gone into the merit of the
case. In the present case the resolution debarring the
appellant was and still in force and, therefore, the learned
Single Judge rightly gone into its validity. Hence, the
judgment relied on in no way supports the contention of
the respondents.
12. For all these reasons the impugned order of the Division
Bench cannot be sustained and it is set aside and that of the
Single Judge is restored. However, this will not preclude the
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respondents from proceeding against the appellant for removal
of his membership in accordance with law.
13. In the result, the appeal is allowed the impugned order of
the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single
Judge restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case,
there shall be no order as to costs.
………………………………………J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)
………………………………………J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
NEW DELHI, DECEMBER 7, 2010.
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