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PETITIONER: M.S.ZAHED

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.  RAGHAVAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/12/1998

BENCH: S.B.MAJMUDAR, M.JAGANNADHA RAO,

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  JUDGMENT S.B.Majmudar. J. Leave grantecl. By  consent  of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal was finally heard and is being disposed  of  by  this judgment. A  few  reJevant tacts dealui.^ with this appeaJ cin speciaj leave under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of India, deserve to be noted at the outset BACKGROUND FACTS: The appellant before us  is  the  landlord  and  the respondent is  the  tenant.  The appellant is the owner of a residential  house  situated  in  Indiranagar  locality’  in Bangalore city.    The respondent is occupying a part of the ground floor  of  the  said  house  on  a  monthly  rent  of Rs.l70/-.  The present proceedings arise out of die suit for possession  filed  by  the  appellant against the respondent under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control  Act, 1961 (hereinafter  referred  to as the ’Act’).  For the sake of convenience, we shall  refer  to  the  appellant  as  the plaintiff  and die respondent as the defendant in the latter part of this judgment.  The case of die plaintiff is that he requires the suit premises in occupation of the defendant as the present accommodation available to him on the first  and the  ground  floors  of  (lie building is not sufficient for accommodating all the members of his  family  consisting  of himself and his wife, his three daughters and a sun and also his parents.    Invoking  Section  21  (1)  (h)  of the Act. proceedings were initiated by the plaintiff in the Court  of IV Additional  Judge  of  SmalI Causes, Bangalore.  The said provision reads as under :            "21.   Protection  of   tenants   against            eviction.            (1)  Nothwirhstanding  anything  to   the            contrary  contained  in  any other law or            contract, no  order  or  decree  for  die            recover"  of  possession  of any premises            shall be  made  by  any  Court  or  other            authority   in  favour  of  the  landlord            against the tenant;

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          Provided that the Court  may  on  an            application made to it, make an order for            the  recovery of possession of a premises            on one or more of the  following  grounds            only, namely :-            (h)that the premises are reasonably and            bona  fide  required  by the landlord for            occupation by himself or any  person  for            whose  benefit  the  premises are held or            where the landlord  is  a  trustee  of  a            public charitable   trust      that   the            premises are required for occupation  for            the purposes of the trust; or ......" The  case  of the plaintiff is to the effect that he is the sole  owner  of  the  house  including  the  tenanted premises having  bought  them in Feb.  1988 by availing of a housing loan from his  present  employer  Hindustan  Machine tools International  Limited.    According to the plaintiff, the defendant, who is occupying a part of the  ground  floor premises of the said building was an Assistant Engineer with Indian  Telephone  Industries  and  was already staying as a tenant when he purchased the property.    According  to  the plaintiff, the accommodation available with him on the first and  the ground floors of the building is not sufficient for comfortable stay of  all  the  members  of  his  family  and therefore the aforesaid suit. The defendant resisted the proceedings and contended that the plaintiff was in possession of substantial  portion of  the  ground  floor and was also having in his possession whole of the first floor of the building.  There  were  also two  rooms  available in the compound which were utilised as shops; one of them being let  out  to  a  tenant.    It  was further  contended  that  the  plaintiff,  his wife and four children were occupying the building in their possession and the accommodation with them was  quite  sufficient  to  meet their needs.    That  the  parents  of  the  plaintiff  were permanently residing at Mysore and were not staying with the plaintiff.   Consequently,  their  need  was  wrongly  being pressed in service by the plaintiff. The Trial Court after recording the evidence offered by  the  parties,  came to the conclusion that the available accommodation with the plaintiff was  insufficient  for  his family   and,  therefore,  his  requirement  for  additional accommodation was genuine and absolute and that  looking  to the  status  of  the  defendant and his economic position in life, he would not suffer any hardship if evicted  from  the suit  premises.  Consequently,  the  Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff and ordered the  defendant  to  vacate the premises. The  defendant carried the matter in revision before the High Court invoking jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 50 of the Act.  During the pendency of the  revision proceedings,  the learned Single Judge of the High Court who was seized of the matter, appointed a Commissioner to go  on the  spot and report about the exact accommodating with them was quite sufficient to meet their needs.  That the  parents of  the  plaintiff  were  permanently residing at Mysore and were not staying with the plaintiff.    Consequently,  their need was wrongly being pressed in service by the plaintiff. The Trial Court after recording the evidence offered by  the  parties,  came to the conclusion that the available accommodation with the plaintiff was  insufficient  for  his family   and,  therefore,  his  requirement  for  additional accommodation was genuine and absolute and that  looking  to the  status  of  the  defendant and his economic position in

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life, he would not suffer any hardship if evicted  from  the suit premises.    Consequently,  the Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff and ordered the  defendant  to  vacate the premises. The defendant carried the matter in revision  before the High Court invoking jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 50  of the Act.  During the pendency of the revision proceedings, the learned Single Judge of the High Court  who was  seized of the matter, appointed a Commissioner to go on the spot and report about the exact accommodation  available to  both  the  landlord  and  the  tenant in the building in question.  The Commissioner, accordingly, went on  the  spot and inspected the premises occupied by the tenant as well as by  the  plaintiff-landlord  and  submitted his report along with a sketch showing  the  actual  accommodation  available with the plaintiff and defendant in the suit building.  Bent the  sides relying upon the said report of the Commissioner, submitted their rival contentions  before  the  High  Court. Ultimately,  the learned Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that looking to the size of the family  of the  plaintiff,  the  accommodation  available to him in the building consisting of a  substantial  part  of  the  ground floor  and the whole of the first floor was quite sufficient and, therefore, it could not be said that the plaintiff  had any  genuine  and bona fide need for any extra accommodation for  which  the  defendant  could  be  displaced  from   the premises.   As  a result of the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge, the revision application  of the  defendant was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed.  That is how the plaintiff has come to this court in the present appeal on  the  grant  of  special  leave  to appeal. RIVAL CONTENTIONS: Learned  senior  counsel,  Shri  S.S.Javali  for the plaintiff vehemently submitted that though Section 50 of the Act was widely worded, the nature of the  proceeding  before the  High  Court  was  by  way  of  revision and could not e treated to be a regular first appeal on facts.  The  learned Single Judge of the High Court had erroneously interfered in revision  by upsetting a pure finding of fact reached by the Trial Court on relevant evidence. He contended that the need of the landlord had to be examined from his own  view  point and not from the view point of the tenant and looding to the size  of  his family and also the need for accommodating his widowed mother, as his father had died during  the  pendency of   these  proceedings  it  could  not  be  said  that  the accommodation available with the plaintiff  was  sufficient. Our attention was also invited by learned senior counsel for the  plaintiff  to  three  decisions  of this court. We will refer to them hereinafter. It was  vehemently  contended  by learned senior counsel for the plaintiff that this was not a fit  case  in which the High Court should have interfered in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Shri  A.T.M.  Sampath,  learned  counsel   for   the defendant,  on  the other hand, submitted that the powers of revision available to the High Court under Section 50 of the Act are wider as compared  to  the  revisional  jurisdiction under   Section  115  of  the  C.P.C.  or  for  that  matter revisional powers of the High Court in other statutes  which permitted  the  High  Court  to  interfere only if the order sought to be revised was illegal or improper. That the  High Court had ample jurisdiction under Section 50 of the Act for correcting errors of facts and law committed by the Court of Small  Causes.  For supporting his submission, our attention was invited by learned counsel  to  two  decisions  of  this

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court  to which we shall refer hereinafter. It was submitted by learned counsel for the defendant that the Commissioner’s sketch and report which were relied upon by both  the  sides in the High Court clearly indicate that there was sufficient accommodation with the plaintiff on the ground and the first floors   of  the  building.  That  even  assuming  that  the plaintiff wanted to accommodate his  widowed  mother,  still there  was  sufficient  accommodation  available  to his and consequently, the High Court was justified in upsetting  the decision  of  the  Trial  Court which clearly appeared to be incorrect. In view  of  the  aforesaid  rival  contentions  the following points arise for our determination :            1)Whether  the  High  Court  in revision            under Section 50 of the Act was entitled to            re-appreciate the evidence with a  view  to            finding  out whether the order of the Court            of Small Causes was legal or correct;            2)Whether the impugned order of the High            Court was even otherwise erroneous; and            3)What final order?            We shall deal with these points seriatim. Point No.1: In  order  to  consider  this  question,  it will be appropriate to refer to Section 50  of  the  Act.  The  said Section reads as under :            "50. Revision.   (1) The High Court may, at            any time call for  and  examine  any  order            passed or proceeding taken by [the Court of            Small  Causes  or the Court of Civil Judge]            under this Act or any order passed  by  the            Controller  under Sections 14, 15, 16 or 17            for the purpose of satisfying itself as  to            the  legality  or correctness of such order            or proceeding and may pass  such  order  in            reference thereto as it thinks fit." Now  a mere look at sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the Act shows that the High Court  in  exercise  of  its  revisional jurisdiction, can consider the question whether the order of the  Court  of  Small Causes, with which we are concerned in the present proceedings,  was  legal  or  correct.    It  is obvious that legality of the order of the Small Causes Court which  would  fall for consideration of the High Court would pertain to errors of law that might have been  committed  by the said Court.  But so far as the correctness is concerned, whether  the order sought to be revised was correct on facts or not will also fall for consideration of the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.  It is pertinent to note that the powers of revision available to the High Corut under Section  115  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  are circumscribed  and  only  errors of jurisdiction if detected from the order sought to be revised can be corrected by  the High  Court  for  considering  whether  the  orders of lower courts or authorities are legal or proper, would enable  the High  Court  to exercise jurisdiction that is wider than the one under Section 115 CPC but not so wide as to  enable  the High Court  to  correct  mere errors of facts.  But once the preset Act has enabled the  High  Court  to  look  into  the correctness of the orders sought to be revised, it cannot be said  that the High Court would be disabled from considering the question whether the findings of  fact  reached  by  the Court  of  Small  Causes were correct or not in the light of the evidence on record.  It  is  axiomatic  that  revisional power cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions  of  fact as Court of First Appeal.  Still the

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nature of the revisional  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court under  Section  50  of the Act will have to be considered in the  light  of  the  express  provisions  of   the   Statute conferring such  power.   On the express language of Section 50, sub-section (1) of the Act, therefore,  it  can  not  be said  that the High Court had no jurisdiction to go into the question of correctness of findings of fact reached  by  the Court of  Small  Causes  on relevant evidence.  In fact this question is no longer res integra.   In  the  case  of  M/s. Central Tobacco  Co.,  Bangalore vs.  Chandra Prakash, [U.J. (SC) 90 (1969) p.432], a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court, Shah & Mitter, J., interpreting the very same Section 50 of the Act, speaking through Mitter,J., clearly ruled  in para 3 of the Report as under :            "3.....Counsel for the appellant contended            first  that  it  was  not open to the High            Court  in  exercise  of  its   revisionary            jurisdiction to differ from the concurrent            view of the two lower courts ......... " In  this connection, it was observed that as the revisionary powers were counhed in very wide terms, the  court  was  not inclined  to  accept the aforesaid contention of the counsel for the appellant. The aforesid contention  of  the  counsel for  the  appellant.  The  aforesaid  decision of this Court rendered in the light of the ecpress wording  of  this  very Section  50  of  the  Act,  therefore,  clinches  this issue against the plaintiff. The aforesaid decision of this  court has  been  consistently followed by the Karnataka High Court in various decisions  while  exercising  revisionary  powers under  Section  50,  sub-section  (1)  of the Act. This very question was once again examined by this Court in  the  case of  M/s  Bhoolchand  & Anr. Vs. M/s Kay Pee Cee Investmets & Anr. (AIR 1991 SC 2053). Verma, J (as he then was ) speaking for the two Judge Bench of this Court,  made  the  following observations in para 6 of the report:            "We  shall  first  take  up  the  question            relating  to  the landlord’s and bona fide            requirement which is a ground for eviction            under  clause  (h)  of  the   proviso   to            sub-section  (1) of Section 21 of the Act.            It may be recalled that  the  Trial  Court            had negatived the existence of this ground            while   the   High  Court  reversing  that            conclusion has held it to be proved.   The            question before us is whether there is any            infirmity  in the High Court’s reversal of            this finding  justifying  interference  in            these appeals.    Against  the decision of            the Trial Court,  the  provision  made  in            Section 50 of the Act is of a revision and            not an appeal to the High Court.  However,            the  power of revision is not narrow as in            S.115 CPC but  wider  requiring  the  High            Court  to  examine  the impugned order for            the purpose of satisfying itself as to the            legality or correctness of such  order  or            proceeding which enables the High Court to            pass such order in reference thereto as it            thinks fit’.    It  is clear that the High            Court in a revision under  Section  50  of            the  Act is required to satisfy itself not            only as to the legality  of  the  impugned            order   or  proceeding  but  also  of  its            correctness.  The power of the High Court,            therefore,  extends  to   correcting   not

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          merely  errors  of  law but also errors of            fact.  In other words, the High Court in a            revision under Section 50 of  the  Act  is            required to examine the correctness of not            only findings.    on  questions of law but            also on  questions  of  fact.      It   is            significant  that the revision provided is            directly against the Trial  Court’s  order            and  not  after  a  provision of appeal on            facts.   All  the  same,  the   power   in            revision  under  Section  50  of  the  Act            cannot be equated with the  power  of  the            Appellate  Court  under  Section 107(2) of            the Code of Civil Procedure which  is  the            same  as  that  of the original court; and            the revisionary power under Section 50  of            the Act even though wide as indicated must            fall  short of the Appellate Court’s power            of interference with  a  finding  of  fact            where  the  finding of fact depends on the            credibility of witnessed,  there  being  a            conflict of oral evidence of the parties." In  view  of  the aforesaid settled legal position, therefore, Point No.  1 will have  to  be  answered  in  the  affirmative against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant. Point No. 2. This  takes  us  to  the  moot  question  whether  the impugned decision of the High Court is otherwise erroneous and cannot be sustained.  We have to keep in view certain  salient features  of  the  case  which are well established on record. The plaintiff is a high officer being Deputy  General  Manager in Hindustan   Machine   Tools   International  Limited.    He purchased the suit  building  in  1988  and  started  residing therein.    Substantial   part  of  the  building  is  in  his possession and occupation.  His family  consists  of  himself, his  wife and four children being three daughters and one son. By now, the children are well-grown up.   When  the  suit  was filed  in  1989,  his  first two daughters were aged 15 and 12 years and his son was aged 8 years and the fourth child was  a daughter who  was  still  younger.    By  now,  the  two elder daughters have reached the ages of 24 & 21 years, the son  has reached  the  age  of  17 years and the last daughter is still younger.  Though the plaintiff’s case  was  that  his  parents were  also  to  reside  with  him unfortunately his father has expired and now his widowed mother is staying with plaintiff’s at Mysore but we can proceed on the basis that  the  plaintiff would  be  justified  in  seeding  accommodation  for his aged widowed mother.    Thus,   the   legitimate   requirement   of accommodation  for  the plaintiff and his family would consist of sufficient number of rooms where he and his wife with  four grown-up children  and  his  mother can comfortably stay.  The Trial Court came to the conclusion that because of his  needs, the  accommodation  with him was not sufficient and therefore, the defendant was required to vacate the  premises.    With  a view  to finding out whether the plaintiff was in genuine need of additional  accommodation  in  the  building,  the  learned Single  Judge  in  the  revisional  proceedings, as aforesaid, appointed the Commissioner to go on the spot and find out  the exact  accommodation  available with the contesting parties in the building in question.  It is also pertinent to  note  that none  of  the  parties  raised  any contention before the High Court that such additional evidence should not be got recorded and Commissioner should not be got recorded  and  Commissioner should  not be appointed for going on the spot to find out the exact situation.  On the contrary, both the sides  acted  upon

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the  Court’s  order, co-operated with the Commissioner when he went on the spot and argued on the basis of the report and the sketch drawn by the Commissioner.  No contention was raised by either side that the proceeding  should  be  remanded  to  the Trial Court for consideration of this additional evidence.  On the contrary, both the sides tried to support their respective cases in the light of this additional evidence and invited the court’s decision  thereon.  Accordingly, it is in the light of the Commissioner’s report and  the  sketch  that  the  learned Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s  need  for additional accommodation is not genuine and his requirement is fully satisfied and met by the  present accommodation  available  to  him both on the ground floor and We have, therefore, to see whether the said finding of the High Court is justified on this  evidence  or  not.    The Commissioner’s  Report which is produced on the record of this proceedings  at  Annexure  R-1  by  learned  counsel  for  the defendant  shows  that the schedule premises in question are a part of the entire building situated in Indiranagar  measuring 59’ 6"  x 39’6".  The landlord is residing in the ground floor as well as the first floor and his tenant  is  residing  on  a portion  of  the  ground  floor  consisting of four rooms (one hall, one bed room, one dining hall and  one  kitchen)  and  a bathroom with  entrance  from  the  backyard.  The first floor consists of six rooms (two bed rooms one with attached toilet, one hall, one room, one kitchen one bath room).   The  portion in  occupation  of  the tenant in the gorund floor consists of four rooms (one hall, one bed room, onr kitchen and  one  bath room cum toilet).  The Commissioner also found that there were two  more  shops  in  the premises facing the road admeasuring approx.   6’x  8"  and  15’x10"  respectively  which  were  in occupation of    different    tenants.      Along   with   the Commissioner’s Report was annexed a  sketch  prepared  by  him during his  spot inspection.  When we turn to the said sketch, we find that on the gorund floor accommodation available  with the  plaintiff consists of one bed room admeasuring 10’ 9.5" x 11’ 4.5".  On the left hand side of the said bed room there is a hall admeasuring 14’10" x 9’5.5.  On  further  west  of  the said hall  is  a  dining room admeasuring 9’3"x7’ 10".  On the right side of the said kitchen is a bath  room  which  has  an opening on   the   western   side.    This  is  the  available accommodation with the plaintiff on the ground floor.  When we turn to the first floor accommodation, we find from  the  said sketch  that  there  is  a  bed  room  admeasuring  11’x11’8". Towards the west of that bed room is situated another bed room admeasuring 12’ 8" x 10’ 11.5.  On further west  is  a  toilet admeasuring  8’ x 3’ and towards the southern side of the said toilet is a bath room admeasuring  6’6"  x  5’  1".    On  the further  west of the bath room, is a small water closet, while on the southern side of the two bed rooms is situated  a  hall admeasuring 14’  10"  x 10’ 7".  Towards the west of that hall is another  room  admeasuring  10’  5.5"x  8’4.5  and  towards further west  is  a  kitchen admeasuring 6’10" x 6’.  It is in the light of this accommodation admittedly available with  the plaintiff that  his  need  will have to be examined.  As noted earlier, he has got two grown-up daughters, one minor son  and one minor  daughter.    In addition to plaintiff and his wife, plaintiff’s old widowed mother as and when she comes and stays with the plaintiff would require to  be  accommodated  in  the available  accommodation  and  if  all  of  them  are not in a position to stay comfortably in the  available  accommodation, the  need  for  extra  space  would  arise  for the plaintiff. However, the aforesaid details of accommodation available with the plaintiff show that on the first floor two bed  rooms  are available.   Even if one bed room is utilised by the plaintiff

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and his wife, the other bed room can confortably  be  utilised by his  two grown-up daughters.  On the first floor there is a big hall wherein he can entertain his foreign  guests  as  and when they come.  The room towards the western side of the hall on  the first floor is utilised as a dining room which is just on the cast of the kitchen.  As plaintiff’s is a well-knit one family, he would require only one kitchen and one dining  room for the  entire  family.    Thus,  the need to accommodate his guests, he being a high ranking officer of the HMT Company and who some times have to invite foreign guests at his house, can also be met from the first floor  accommodation.    Hence  the first  floor can fully accommodate the plaintiff and his wife, his two grown-up daughters and can also meet  his  requirement of entertaining his guests as and when they come to visit.  In addition  to  this  occupation, the first floor area meets the requirement of the plaintiff’s  family  for  having  a  common dining room  and  kitchen.    When we turn to the ground floor accommodation with the landlord, we find that there is one bed room admeasuring 10’9.5" x 11’4.5"  situated  on  the  eastern side of   the   ground  floor.    That  bed  room  can  easily accommodate his minor daughter and widowed mother as and  when she comes  and  stays  with  him.   Still there will be left a large hall admeasuring 14’ 10" x 9’5.5" situated on the  south of the  said  bed  room  on  the  ground floor.  That hall can obviously be utilised by his minor son, now of 17  years’  age and who is likely to become a major in near future.  Still two more  rooms  are  left with the plaintiff on the ground floor. Though the sketch mentions them as dining and kitchen,  it  is obvious  that plaintiff’s being one unit and well-knir family, the plaintiff, his wife and his children and even his  widowed mother would require amongst them only one dining room and one kitchen.   Both  these  rooms are already available to them on the first floor as seen earlier.    Consequently,  the  ground floor  dining room admeasuring 9’3" x 7’10" can be utilised by the plaintiff’s son for his study and which  can  be  utilised also by his daughters for their study or any other work.  Even that  apart, still there will be one more room on further west of the aforesaid room which is shown as a  kitchen  but  which would  be  available  as an extra study room for his children. Thus, the existing accommodation with  the  plaintiff  on  the ground  floor and first floor of the building is sufficient to cater to the needs of all the family members of the plaintiff. Consequently, there  would  remain  no  occasion  for  him  to legitimately  process  his  claim  for extra accommodation for ousting the defendant who stays squeezed in one bed  room  and one hall. The defendant’s family consists of himself, his wife and  his  four  children as well as his unemployed brother and his mother in all eight persons. His accommodation consists of a hall admeasuring 7’2" x 10’10" and a  bed  room  admeasuring 10’.5"  x 5’5". In addition thereto he has got a small kitchen admeasuring 6’ 10" x 4’ 10" and one samll  toilet  admeasuring 4"10"x3’. It is of course true that the defendant is also well placed  in  life and is drawing substantial gross salary of at least Rs. 8,000/- and  odd  p.m.  as  stated  by  him  in  his counter,  but  the  accommodation  with  him  is so small that partial eviction is out  of  question  while  the  plaintiff’s need,  as  seen  above  is  fully  satisfied  by  the existing accommodation with him. Consequently, we cannot find any fault with the reasoning of  the  High  Court  to  the  effect  that looding  at  the accommodation available with the plaintiff on the ground floor and the first floor of the building,  he  had no   genuine   existing   need   for  the  suit  premises  and consequently, it could not be said that the plaintiff had made out any case under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. In the light of the available accommodation with the plaintiff,  it  cannot

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be   said   that  his  requirement  for  additional  spece  is reasonable though it cannot be doubted that it is a bona  fide one.  However,  for  the  purpose  of  applicablity of Section 21(1)(h), the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord has to  be both bona fide and reasonable. If any of these two elements of requirement is missing or both the elements are missing on the facts  of  the case, no decree for possession can be passed in favour of the landlord under this  provision.  The  conclusion reached  by  the learned Single Judge of the High Court on the aforesaid evidence cannot be said to  be  suffering  from  any error.  On  the contrary, it remains well sustained on record. Consequently, no  case  is  made  out  by  the  plaintiff  for interference   of   this   Court  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution of India. Berore parting, we may mention that the learned senior counsel for the  plaintiff  invited  our  attention  to  three decisions  of this court in support of his contentions. In the case  of  Dattonpant   Gopalvarao   Devakate   vs.   Vithalrao Maruthirao  Janagaval,  (1975  (2)  SCC 246), Krishna Iyer, J, speaking for a Bench of two  learned  Judges  of  this  Court, observed:         "...  It is true that the power conferred on the         High Court under Section 50 of the  Mysore  rent         Control  Act  1961,  is  not  as  narrow  as the         revisionary power under Section 115 of the  Code         of  Civil  Procedure. But at the same time it is         not wide enough to make the High Court a  second         court of first appeal ............ ". On  facts, it was held in that case that there were no pressing grounds which would justify the Supreme Court in upsetting  the views of the High Court confirming those of the lower appellate court.  It  cannot  be  disputed  that  revisionary power under Section 50 is not  an  appellate  power  as  available  to  the appellate  court under Section 96 of the CPC. The same view, as noted earlier, was taken by this court in M/s Bhoolchand’s case (supra). Learned senior counsel for the plaintiff also  invited our  attention  to  the case of Meenal Eknath Kahirsagar (Mrs.) vs. Traders & Agencies & Anr. (1996 (5) SCC 344). Nanavati,  J, in  that  case, speaking for the Bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed as under :         "It is for the landlord to decide how and in what         manner he should live and he is the best judge of         his  residential  requirement.  If  the  landlord         desires  to  beneficially  enjoy his own property         when the other property  occupied  by  him  as  a         tenant  or  on any other basis is either insecure         or inconvenient it  is  not  for  the  courts  to         dictate   to  him  to  continue  to  occupy  such         premises". In  the said case it was found as a fact that the plaintiff had no other premises except the  suit  premises  in  the  city  of Bombay  and  earlier  she  was staying in the premises with her husband who was a tenant thereof but even that  possession  was parted  with and the tenanted accommodation was occupied by her husband’s brother.  Thus, the position of the  landlord  was  a precarious one.     In  these  peculiar  facts,  the  aforesaid observations were made by this  Court.    It  is  difficult  to appreciate  how  the  said decision can be of any assistance to the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff  as  it  has  been found  in the present case that the plaintiff is staying in his own house and a substantial  portion  thereof  is  in  his  own occupation  and only a small portion of the ground floor in the said building is  occupied  by  the  tenant.  The  evidence  on record,  as  noted  earlier,  shows that there is on genuine or felt need of the plaintiff to have any  extra  accommodatio  in

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this  very  building  occupied  by  him  as  owner thereof. Our attention was then invited to a three Judge Bench  judgment  of this  Court  reported in the same volume in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt.) vs T.V.Krishnan, (1996 (5) SCC 353). In  that  case an aged landlord was staying with her friend and was in need of the suit premises where the tenant was residing. The High Court in that case had taken the view that "looking to the age of the landlord,  she  could  continue  to stay with her friend rather than occupy the suit premises". Upsetting that decision, it was held in the aforesaid case that :         "The  landlord  is  the   best   judge   of   his         residential   requirement.   He  has  a  complete         freedom in the matter. It is no  concern  of  the         courts  to  dictate  to  the landlord how, and in         what manner, he should live or to  prescribe  for         him a residential standard of their own. The High         Court  was rather solicitous about hte age of the         appellant and thought that because of her age she         needed to be looked after. That was a lookout  of         the  appellant  and  not  of  the High Court. The         gratuitous advice given by  the  High  Court  was         uncalled  for.  There is nothing to show that she         had any kind of right whatever  to  stay  in  the         house  of  the  family friend. On the other hand,         she was there merely by sufferance. There  is  no         law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial         enjoyment of his property.... " We fail to appreciate how the aforesaid decision can advance the case of the plaintiff.  In the present  case,  as  noted earlier,  the  plaintiff is already occupying his own house. He  has  possession  of  the  whole  of  first   floor   and substantial portion  of  ground floor.  He is not staying in any rented premises or at sufferance of any one.    Now  the question  is whether the accommodation available with him is so insufficient, looking to the size of the family  that  he badly   requires   additional   accommodation  in  the  same building.  This question has to be answered in the light  of the  available  accommodation with the landlord and the need of his family members.   For  deciding  this  question,  the observations  in  the  aforesaid  cases  cannot  be  of  any assistance to learned senior counsel for the plaintiff.  For all these reasons, therefore, point No.2  will  have  to  be answered in the negative against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant. Point No. 3. As  a  result of the aforesaid discussion, it has to be held that no case is made out by the  plaintiff  for  our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The  judgment  rendered  by the High Court is well sustained both on the ground of jurisdiction of the High  Corut  under Section 50(1) of the Act as well as on merits. As a result of our decision on the aforesaid points, the consequence would be that this appeal would be liable to fail. However, after this appeal was heard at length on 12th Aug. 1998, we reserved the orders with a view to finding out whether there was any possibility of  a  settlement  between the  parties. When the matter reached before us on 24th Nov. 1998 for the  aforesaid  purpose  a  telegram  sent  by  the respondent-tenant  addressed to Shri A.T.M. Sampath, Supreme Court Advocate, was brought  to  our  notice.  The  telegram reads as under :         "Ref  Slp  14370/1997-MR  Zaheed  Vs. Raghavank if 5         years time for vacating the Premis is given i  would         vacate  immediately  after  the  expiry of 5 years i         hope that quarters would be allotted to me  by  that

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       time         (K Raghavan)         Respondent" Shri   Sampath,   learned   counsel,  who  appeared  for  the respondent, confirmed by said telegram and  submitted  before us  that  the respondent will have no objection to vacate the suit premises immediately after the  expiry  of  5  years  as mentioned  in the telegram as he hopes that by that time some quarters will be made available to him by his employer.  Shri Sampath  also  stated,  on  instructions, that the respondent will stand by the aforesaid statement in the telegram even if he ultimately suceeds  in  these  proceedings  and  the  High Court’s  decision  in  his favour is confirmed by us. When we enquired from Shri Sampath whether lesser time to vacate than a period of 5 years would be acceptable to the respondent, he fairly stated  that  even  four  years  time  to  vacate  the premises  will  be  acceptable  to his client. We record this fair stand taken by the respondent through his  counsel  Shri Sampath. Consequently, even though the respondent succeeds in this  appeal  and the judgment of the High Court is confirmed by us, we deem it fit to exercise powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to direct the respondent as agreed to by him before us through his counsel  to  vacate the suit premises on or before 31st Dec. 2002. There shall be an  order  against  the respondent as aforesaid to vacate the suit premises by that time. Respondent shall file  a  written undertaking agreeing to vacate the suit premises on or before 31st  Dec.  2002  pursuant to our present order. Such written undertaking shall be filed within four weeks from today.  The written   undertaking  will  also  contain  the  usual  terms including clearance of all arrears of rent, if  any,  on  the basis of the agreed rent payable by him for the wuit premises and  will  continue to go on paying rent on that basis by way of mesne profits till he vacates the suit  premises  by  31st Dec. 2002.