M/S V.K.ENTERPRISES Vs M/S SHIVA STEELS
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,A.K. PATNAIK, , ,
Case number: SLP(C) No.-025144-025144 / 2009
Diary number: 25276 / 2009
Advocates: Vs
KAILASH CHAND
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(C) NO.25144 OF 2009
Ms. V.K. Enterprises … Petitioner Vs.
M/s. Shiva Steels … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. The short point involved in this Special Leave
Petition is whether the learned District and
Sessions Judge, Delhi, had rightly dismissed the
Petitioner’s application under Order XXXVII Rule 3,
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (C.P.C.) for leave to defend the suit
filed by the Respondent under Order XXXVII for
recovery of Rs.6,68,513/-, together with interest
@18% per annum and pendente lite and future
interest.
2. On account of business transactions, the
Petitioner purchased iron sheets on credit from the
Respondent on account whereof a sum of
Rs.4,42,724/- became due and payable by the
Petitioner to the Respondent. The Petitioner
settled the accounts and acknowledged the liability
in respect of the said amount. Thereafter, the
Petitioner issued a cheque for a sum of
Rs.3,50,000/- dated 11th October, 2006, towards
part-payment of the said dues which, according to
the Respondent, was signed by one Pyare Lal, the
sole proprietor of the Petitioner-firm. On
presentation, the said cheque was dishonoured and a
legal notice was, therefore, sent by the Respondent
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to the Petitioner for payment of the outstanding
dues. Since, despite such notice the Petitioner
failed to pay the said dues, the Respondent filed
Suit No.57 of 2008 in the Court of District and
Sessions Judge, Delhi, under Order XXXVII Rules 1
and 2 C.P.C. The Petitioner entered appearance in
the Suit and filed an application under Order
XXXVII Rule 3 C.P.C., which was dismissed, as
mentioned hereinabove.
3. In the said application for leave to defend the
suit, the Petitioner contended that the cheque in
question had been handed over by the Petitioner to
the Respondent-firm by way of security only and not
for presentation. Furthermore, the said cheque was
issued by the Petitioner on 11th October, 2000, but
the date of the cheque was, thereafter,
interpolated and altered from 11.10.2000 to
11.10.2006, and presented to the Bank. It was also
indicated that apart from the signature on the face
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of the cheque and the date mentioned therein, the
rest of the cheque was blank and an attempt was
made by the Respondent to misuse the same with the
intention of withdrawing or misappropriating the
amount subsequently inserted in the cheque. A
specific allegation was also made to the effect
that the date of the cheque issued on behalf of the
Petitioner firm for the month of October was always
written with the Roman numerical ‘X’, which was
altered and shown in ordinary numericals, which
clearly establish the fact that the cheque in
question had been doctored to obtain the benefit
thereof six years after the same had been issued.
4. In the said application, it was also denied
that any cheque of such a large amount had been
issued to the Respondent after 1992 in order to
bolster the case of the Petitioner that the cheque
in question had been forged. It was ultimately
stated in the complaint that the Respondent had
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concocted the story and the Bills placed on record
by the Respondent were also forged as the
Petitioner had neither purchased any material nor
counter-signed the last 4 bills as per the details
provided.
5. Before us, the same submissions were reiterated
and it was submitted that the learned trial court
had wrongly dismissed the Petitioner’s application
for leave to defend the suit, although, several
triable issues had been raised. It was contended
that the denial with regard to the validity of the
cheque and receipt of goods, were triable issues,
which could be decided only upon appraisal of the
evidence adduced by the parties. It was also urged
that since the cheque was issued in 2000, the claim
of the Respondent was also barred by limitation.
It was submitted that not only had the learned
District and Sessions Judge committed an error in
rejecting the Petitioner’s application under Order
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XXXVII Rule 3 C.P.C., but that the High Court had
also erred in affirming the said order.
6. On the other hand, it was the case of the
Respondent that the order of the High Court did not
call for interference having regard to the nature
of the disputes raised by the Petitioner before the
trial court. It was submitted that except for a
bare denial of the signatures on the ledger
accounts settled by the Petitioner and alleging
that the cheque issued had been forged, there is
nothing concrete in the Petitioner’s application
under Order XXXVII Rules 1 and 2 read with Section
151 C.P.C. to indicate any triable issue. Even as
far the forgery alleged in respect of the cheque is
concerned, the hollowness of such an allegation
would be revealed from the cheque itself which does
not show any signs of interpolation in any part
thereof.
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7. On consideration of the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties and on an
examination of the photocopy of the cheque itself,
it will be apparent that the allegations made in
the application filed by the Petitioner under Order
XXXVII Rule 3 C.P.C. were without any foundation.
As submitted on behalf of the Respondent, there is
no sign of any interpolation having been made on
the cheque and in particular, the date thereof
where the figure ‘10’ in Roman numericals had not
even been inserted. There are no signs of attempt
to erase any of the writings or figures on the
cheque to support the allegations made on behalf of
the Petitioner.
8. Order XXXVII C.P.C. has been included in the
Code of Civil Procedure in order to allow a person,
who has a clear and undisputed claim in respect of
any monetary dues, to recover the dues quickly by a
summary procedure instead of taking the long route
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of a regular suit. The Courts have consistently
held that if the affidavit filed by the defendant
discloses a triable issue that is at least
plausible, leave should be granted, but when the
defence raised appears to be moonshine and sham,
unconditional leave to defend cannot be granted.
What is required to be examined for grant of leave
is whether the defence taken in the application
under Order XXXVII Rule 3 C.P.C. makes out a case,
which if established, would be a plausible defence
in a regular suit. In matters relating to dishonour
of cheques, the aforesaid principle becomes more
relevant as the cheques are issued normally for
liquidation of dues which are admitted. In the
instant case, the defence would have been plausible
had it not been for the fact that the allegations
relating to the interpolation of the cheque is
without substance and the ledger accounts relating
to the dues, clearly demonstrated that such dues
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had been settled between the parties. Moreover, the
issuance of the cheque had never been disputed on
behalf of the Petitioner whose case was that the
same had been given on account of security and not
for presentation, but an attempt had been made to
misuse the same by dishonest means.
9. Against such cogent evidence produced by the
plaintiff/respondent, there is only an oral denial
which is not supported by any corroborative
evidence from the side of the Petitioner. On the
other hand, the ledger book maintained by the
Respondent and settled by the Petitioner had been
produced on behalf of the Respondent in order to
prove the transactions in respect of which the
cheque in question had been issued by the
Petitioner.
10. In our view, the defence raised by the
Petitioner does not make out any triable issue and
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the High Court, has dealt with the matter correctly
and has justifiably rejected the Petitioner’s
application under Order XXXVII Rule 3 C.P.C. and
the same does not call for interference by this
Court. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore,
dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
…………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
…………………………………………J. New Delhi (A.K. PATNAIK) Dated: 04.08.2010
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