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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  8489 of 2001

PETITIONER: M/s Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd.               

RESPONDENT: Vs. Nashik Workers Union & Ors.                      

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/07/2003

BENCH: K.G. BALAKRISHNAN & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.

Whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under  Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India was justified in reversing  the award of the Industrial Court of Maharashtra and directing  reinstatement of 72 workers? That is the question which is presented  before us.

Three complaints filed before the Industrial Court under the  Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair  Labour Practices Act (for short ’the Act’)â\200\224two of them by the workers  unions and the other by the Management of the industryâ\200\224both  alleging unfair labour practices under various clauses of the  schedules to the Act, have eventually led to these appeals. It is apparent from the record  that the persons concerned (who,  according to the Management, were only trainees) were not allowed  to resume work on and from 14.8.1989 unless an undertaking on the  terms imposed by the employer was given. According to the  Management, their ’traineeship’ was terminated with effect from  15.11.1989. Some other workmen were later on employed by the  appellant. The details of allegations and counter allegations as to  what prompted the Management to dispense with their services need  not be gone into. Each side tried to shift the blame on the other for  the ultimate action taken. It should however be noted that despite the  interim order dated 25.4.1990 passed by the Industrial Court, the  appellant did not take them back to duty, as seen from the report of  Investigation Officer appointed by the Industrial Court. The core question before the industrial Court as well as the  High Court was whether the persons whose engagement was  terminated were the employees within the meaning of Section 3(5) of  the Act read with Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The  industrial Court  upheld the plea of the Management that they were  trainees. In recording the conclusion that they were trainees, the  industrial Court adverted to two factors: (1) Neither the Complainant  Union nor the Management had placed on record the appointment  letters that would have been issued when the concerned persons  were recruited in 1988. (2) On the Complainant Union’s own showing,  the Management started issuing appointment letters appointing them  as trainees only after 23.6.1989, which itself would negative the case  of the Union that they were employed as labourers. The learned  presiding officer of Industrial Court then observed thus: "I may say  that merely because the trainees were employed for performing  regular nature of work, would not by itself make them workmen".

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Then, the Court observed that a trainee is not equivalent to a  workman "unless there is sufficient evidence of existence of  employer-employee relationship". The Industrial Court ultimately held  that the Management’s action terminating the training programme  resulting in their unemployment from 14.8.1989 cannot confer on  them the right to resume work and claim back wages. On these findings/observations, the complaints of the workers’  union were dismissed. The complaint petition filed by the  Management was also dismissed.

The High Court, conscious of its limitations under Article  226/227 of the Constitution of India, went into the question whether  the conclusions reached by the Industrial Court were legally  sustainable. Incidentally, it went into the question whether the  Industrial Court ignored the material evidence on record. The one and  only view that could be taken on the basis of the evidence on record,  according to the High Court, is that the concerned persons whose  engagement was terminated were not trainees but they were  ’Workmen’ and therefore, their services could not have been  terminated without following the due procedure. The High Court held  that the action taken by the Management was an unfair labour  practice within the meaning of the Act and directed reinstatement  without backwages.

The learned senior counsel for the appellant has contended  that it was not open to the High Court to appreciate the evidence and  take its own view on the crucial factual aspects emerging in the case.  The learned counsel also submitted that there is no legal error  apparent on the face of the order passed by the Industrial Court and  reminded us of the proposition that even a grossly erroneous finding  of fact reached by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with by High  Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the  Constitution of India. In this context, the learned counsel has  endeavoured to draw support from the observations in Syed Yakoob  Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others [(1964) 5 SCR 64].  We are of the view that the High Court has not transgressed the  limitations inherent in the grant of the writ of certiorari. The High Court  had rightly perceived of patent illegality in the impugned award  warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The High  Court is right in pointing out that the material evidence especially the  admissions of the witness examined on behalf of the Management  were not considered at all. Moreover, the conclusions reached are  wholly perverse and do not reasonably follow from the evidence on  record. For instance, the fact that no appointment letters were issued  or filed does not possibly lead to the conclusion that the  Management’s version must be true. Similarly, if the workers’ unions  had taken the stand that ante-dated appointment letters were issued  describing the employees as trainees after the dispute had arisen, it  is difficult to comprehend how that would demolish the case of the  Union that the concerned persons were really employed as workmen  (helpers) but not as trainees. The Industrial Court makes a bald  observation that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to  suggest that these persons were employed by the respondents as  ’regular’ employees at any point of time. This bald  conclusion/observation, as rightly pointed out by the High Court,  ignores the material evidence on record. In fact, the evidence has not  been adverted to at all while discussing the issues. There was total  non-application of mind on the part of the Tribunal to the crucial  evidence. The Management’s witness categorically stated that the  concerned workers were engaged in production of goods and that no  other workmen were employed for production of goods. In fact, one of  the allegations of the Management was that they adopted go-slow  tactics and did not turn out sufficient work. According to the Industrial  Court, the fact that the ’trainees’ were employed for performing the  regular nature of work would not by itself make them workmen. The

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question then is, would it lead to an inference that they were  trainees? The answer must be clearly in the negative. No evidence  whatsoever was adduced on behalf of the Management to show that  for more than one and half years those persons remained as  ’trainees’ in the true sense of the term. It is pertinent to note the  statement of the Management’s witness that in June-July, 1989, the  Company did not have any permanent workmen and all the persons  employed were trainees. It would be impossible to believe that the  entire production activity was being carried on with none other than  the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been  trainers too.  The Management evidently came forward with a false  plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to  summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts  and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable that  the appellant-employer resorted to unfair labour practice. There  would have been travesty of justice if the High Court declined to  interfere with the findings arbitrarily and without reasonable basis  reached by the Industrial Court.

Before parting with the case, we may record that opportunity  was given to the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement. But it has  been reported that the quantum of compensation offered by the  Management is utterly inadequate and therefore the settlement could  not be reached.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find no legal infirmity  in the order of the High Court. The appeal is therefore dismissed. No  costs.