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PETITIONER: M/S.  SUNIL INDUSTRIES

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM CHANDER PRADHAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/11/2000

BENCH: S.N.Variava, S.R.Babu

JUDGMENT:

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J       J U D G M E N T S.  N.  VARIAVA, J.

     This Appeal is against an Order dated 7th May, 1997 by which  the  first  appeal filed by the  appellant  has  been dismissed  in  limine.   Briefly  stated the  facts  are  as follows:   The Petitioner is a sole proprietory concern.  It runs  its  workshop  of shaping steel  sheets  into  various shapes  and forms.  The 1st Respondent was, at the  relevant time,  working  as a press operator with the Appellant.   On 27th  January,  1993  while  working on  a  press,  the  1st Respondent  sustained injuries to his right index finger and thumb.  The Appellant rushed the 1st Respondent to the Civil Hospital  at  Gurgaon (Haryana).  The injuries  necessitated amputation  of 2.5 x 0.5 Cms.  of the index finger.  On 14th June,  1993,  the  1st Respondent filed a  claim  under  the@@                                                          JJJ Workmen’s  Compensation  Act, 1923 claiming compensation  in@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ the  sum  of Rs.  25,000/- with interest thereon @  16%  per annum.  The Appellant in his reply, inter alia, claimed that the  provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act would  not apply  to  his  establishment.   On 15th  October  1996  the Commissioner  held  that  the   Workmen’s  Compensation  Act applied   and  that  the  Appellant   was  liable   to   pay compensation   in  a  sum  of  Rs.29,814/-   together   with Rs.5,000/-  as  penalty and interest at 12% per annum.   The Appellant  preferred  an  Appeal  under Section  30  of  the Worken’s  Compensation Act before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.   That Appeal came to be dismissed in limine by the impugned order dated 7th May, 1997.  It is admitted that the 1st  Respondent  was  working as a press operator  with  the Appellant  at  the relevant time.  It is admitted  that  the accident  did  took place on 27th January, 1993 and that  it resulted  in injuries to the right index finger and thumb of the  1st Respondent and that this necessitated amputation of 2.5  x 0.5 Cms.  of the index finger.  Mr.  Vasdev  however, submitted  that the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not apply to the Appellant’s establishment.  He submitted that Section 2(n)  (ii) of the Wormen’s Compensation Act provides that  a workman  is  a  person employed in a capacity  specified  in Schedule  II.   He  then  referred to  Schedule  II  of  the Workmen’s Compensation Act and pointed out that under item 2 of  Schedule  II a person would be a workman provided he  is employed  in  any premises where a manufacturing process  as defined in clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act 1948

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was  being  carried on.  He submitted that this showed  that the  provisions of the Factories Act were being incorporated into the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  He submitted that this is  also clear from the fact that over the years there  have been  a  number of amendments to the Workmen’s  Compensation Act  incorporating therein provision of the Factories Act or provisions  similar  thereto.  He then referred  to  Section 2(k) and 2 (m) of the Factories Act and submitted that under the  Factories  Act the manufacturing process must be  in  a factory  where  ten  or  more workers are  working  (if  the manufacturing  process  is being carried on with the aid  of power)  or  twenty  or  more persons  are  working  (if  the manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power).   He  submitted  that a joint reading of  all  these provisions  makes it clear that even for the purposes of the Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  only  those  persons  who  are employed  in  a factory within the meaning of the  Factories Act,  1948  would  be  entitled to make a  claim  under  the Workmen’s  Compensation  Act.  We are unable to  accept  the submissions  of  the learned counsel.  It is true  that  the Workmen’s  Compensation  Act,  1923 has been  amended  on  a number of occasions.  However inspite of numerous amendments the  Legislature  has  purposely   omitted  to  specifically provide that only a workman who is employed in a factory, as defined  in the Factories Act, could make a claim.  All that has  been  done  is  that in Schedule II  of  the  Workmen’s Compensation  Act  it is inter alia clarified  that  persons employed,  otherwise  than  in a clerical capacity,  in  any premises  wherein  a  manufacturing process  as  defined  in clause  (k)  of  Section 2 of the Factories Act,  1948,  are workmen.  Significantly the definition of the term "Factory" as appearing in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act 1948 has not been incorporated in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.   Thus it is clear that for the Workmen’s  Compensation Act  to apply it is not necessary that the workman should be working  in a Factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. It  has  not been denied that the workshop of the  Appellant would  fall  under clause (k) of Section 2 of the  Factories Act.   Therefore,  the  1st Respondent would  be  a  Workman within  the meaning of the term as defined in the  Workmen’s Compensation  Act.  Under the circumstances, we see no merit in  the  Appeal.   The same stands dismissed.   There  will, however, be no order as to costs.