REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3874 OF 2006

M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. … Appellant

Versus

S.U.T.N.I Sangam & Ors. … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5763, 5764, 5765 5766 AND 5767 OF 2006

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  4793-4794           OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.12682-12683 of 2007)

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

Leave granted in both the SLPs.

These  appeals  involving  common  questions  of  law  and  fact  were  

taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common  

judgment.

On the requisition of M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter  

called and referred to for the sake of brevity as the ‘SAIL’) for establishment  

of a steel plant at Salem commonly known as Salem Steel Plant, 3651 acres  

of land was acquired wherefor a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land  

Acquisition  Act,  1894 (hereinafter  called  and referred  to  for  the  sake  of  

brevity as ‘the Act’) was issued in the year 1964 and a declaration under  

Section 6 was published in 1969.

Land acquisition proceedings for preparation of awards were initiated  

in 1971 during the period 1971 to 1975.  305 awards were made.  A large  

number of landholders being satisfied with the quantum of compensation  

awarded to them by the Land Acquisition Officer received the same without  

protest.

Some of the land owners, however, at the time of passing of the award  

being not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded in their favour  

not only received the amount under protest but also filed applications for  

reference to the Land Acquisition Court in terms of Section 18 of the Act  

pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof references to the Civil Court  

were made.  Admittedly enhanced amount of compensation, as determined  

by the Land Acquisition Judge, have also been paid.  

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Some of the land owners, however,  filed applications for reference  

although they had not  accepted the amount of compensation with protest  

which was rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer.  Some of the awardees  

filed  their  applications  for  making  reference  after  the  period  prescribed  

therefor.  Those applications were also rejected.  

It is stated that most of the claim petitions were determined upto 1979.  

Some of the land owners, however, formed an association SUTNI Sangam  

{(hereinafter  called  and  referred  to  for  the  sake  of  brevity  as  ‘the  

Association’) for protecting the legal rights of the agriculturists whose lands  

were sought to be acquired.   

A gist of the circular letter directing reference of cases for the purpose  

of enhancement of compensation reads as under :

“POINT I

Awardees who received the compensation amount  with  protest  and  submitted  their  applications  requesting  a  reference  under  Section  18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  after  the  expiry  of  the  stipulated time.

POINT II

Awardees who received the compensation amount  without  protest  but  submitted  applications  requesting reference under Section 18 of the Land  Acquisition Act.

POINT III

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Awardees who received the compensation amount  without  protest  but  failed  to  submit  applications  under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.”

A clarificatory order, however, was issued by the said authority on or  

about 5.1.1983 stating that the earlier instructions issued by the Government  

were not intended to override the provisions of the said Act and they should  

be  meticulously  followed and,  thus,  if  a  person  had  accepted  the  award  

without protest, he would lose his right to claim any reference in terms of  

Section 18 of the Act.  

Respondent Association thereafter filed a writ petition before the High  

Court of Judicature at Madras marked as Writ Petition No.55144 of 1983  

praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs :

“…  a  WRIT  OF  MANDAMUS  or  any  other  appropriate  writ,  order  or  direction,  directing the  Respondents  to  give effect  to  the  instructions  of  the  2nd Respondent  contained  in  letter  No.  D.Dis.II/3748/80 dated 21.5.1981 and Section 18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  consequently  direct Respondents 4 to 8 to refer the cases of the  persons  included  in  Annexures  I,  II,  III  and  IV  herein  to  a  Civil  Court  for  grant  of  enhanced  compensation in respect of the lands acquired from  them  for  the  purpose  of  the  Salem  Steel  Project,…”

In the said writ  proceedings,  the State  Government filed  a  counter  

affidavit, inter alia, contending that in most of the cases the awardees and the  

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interested persons were served with notices under Section 12 (2) of the Act  

who were present during the land acquisition proceedings.  It is furthermore  

averred  that  the  awardees  in  any  view  of  the  matter  had  knowledge  

thereabout  and,  thus,  applications  of  those  awardees  who  had  accepted  

amounts of compensation under protest and filed requisite applications for  

reference, the matters at their instance had been referred to the Civil Court in  

terms of Section 18(2) of the Act.  Indisputably, the appellant herein was not  

initially impleaded in the said writ petition.  On or about 19.11.1984, it filed  

an  application  for  impleading  itself  in  the  said  writ  petition  which  was  

allowed.  By a judgment and order dated 6.3.1992, a learned Single Judge of  

the said Court allowed the said writ application directing that a mere protest  

or expression of dissatisfaction of the award without there being anything in  

writing would be sufficient for the concerned authorities to refer the matters  

to  the  Civil  Court.   On  the  said  premise,  the  Collector  was  directed  to  

complete the process of reference within a period of one year therefrom.   

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order dated  

6.3.1992, intra court appeals were preferred both by the State Government as  

also by the Appellant.  By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ appeal  

was dismissed, opining :

“15. In so far as the category of persons who did  not  receive  notices  under  Section  12(2)  are  

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concerned,  the  learned  Single  Judge  has  rightly  directed  the  Government  to  issue  notices  under  Section 12(2) of the Act to those persons and it is  for the said persons to consider whether they are  seeking reference in accordance with Section 18(2)  of the Act or not.

21. Having regard to this settled legal position  laid down by the Apex Court as well  as various  High  Courts  it  is  clear  that  mere  protest  or  expression  of  dissatisfaction  to  the  award  of  compensation  without  there  being  anything  in  writing  may  be  sufficient  and  that  the  authority  concerned is under an obligation to refer the matter  to the Court in accordance with Section 18(2) of  the  Act.   In  view  of  this  legal  position  various  categories  as  indicated  hereinabove,  expressing  their  protest  and  filing  their  applications  for  reference  and  some  having  not  even  received  notices under Section 12(2) of the Act, cannot be  denied the right  to refer  their  cases to the Court  under Section 18(2) of the Act and, therefore, we  do  not  find  any  ground  to  interfere  with  the  judgment of the learned Single Judge.  Writ appeal  is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.”

The other batch of Civil Appeals being Civil Appeal Nos.5763, 5764,  

5765, 5766 and 5767 of 2006 have been filed by the Tamil Nadu Housing  

Board  aggrieved  by  and  dissatisfied  with  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

14.7.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court affirming the order  

dated 30.6.2001 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Court allowing the  

writ applications filed by the respondent herein relying on or on the basis of  

the decision referred to in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra).   

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We may, however, before adverting to the common questions raised  

before us notice the broad facts from Civil Appeal No.5763 of 2006.   

The State of Tamil Nadu on a requisition made by the appellant herein  

for  acquiring  about  90  acres  of  land  for  the  purpose  of  building  houses  

through it issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on or about  

26.6.1985 and a declaration under Section 6 thereof on 4.9.1985.

Awards  were  passed  on  30.6.1988.   The  land  owners,  while  the  

awards  were  made  fixing  market  value  of  the  land  at  Rs.1,61,538/  per  

hectare  and  on  being  communicated  thereabout,  made  the  following  

statement before the Land Acquisition Collector :

“Award enquiry notice was served on the pattadar.  Pattadar  appeared  for  award  enquiry  and  gave  statement stating that the acquired lands belong to  him by inheritance.  The quantum of compensation  at Rs.1,61,538/- per Hectare to be awarded is too  low  and  the  lands  are  abutting  Salem  –  Dharmapuri National Highways and the adjoining  lands are being sold at Rs.25,00,000/- per acre and  hence compensation must be paid on that rate and  there is no proof.

He also stated that the compensation amount may  be paid to him and that he would receive the same  under protest.  For getting higher compensation, he  requested  to  make  reference  to  Sub-Court.   In  addition to make payment of compensation to the  pattadar, a reference under Section 18 of the Land  Acquisition Act will be sent to Sub-Court.”

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However, despite the same, no reference was made by the Collector  

suo  motu.   Representations,  therefore,  were  made  for  reference  by  the  

Association  on  or  about  10.6.1988.   Reminder  thereto  was  sent  on  

21.1.1991.  As despite such representations and reminders thereto, no action  

was  taken  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  to  make  references  under  

Section 18 of the Act, a writ petition was filed by the respondents herein  

praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs :

“…this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a  writ,  order  or  direction  or  any  other  writ  in  the  nature  of  a  Writ  of  Certiorarified  Mandamus,  calling  for  the  records  in  connection  with  the  impugned order of the 2nd respondent in Na.  Ka  No.549/96 dated 18.10.2000 quash the same and  direct  the  second  respondent  to  refer  for  higher  compensation to the competent Civil Court under  Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 in  respect of the lands belonged to the petitioners in  S.No.475/1B-0.09.5  hcs.  S.No.475/1AB-0.04.5  hcs,  S.No.475/1AF-0.05,  S.No.475/1ai-0.07.0,  S.No.475/1k-0.03.5 part, S.No.475/1L-0.03.5 hcs.,  S.No.475/1A-0,08.5,  S.No.475/1T-0.21.5,  S.No.475/1M-0.03.5,  S.No.475/1N-0.16.0,  S.No.475/1W-0.04.5,  S.No.475/1X-0.1.5,  S.No.475/1AA-0.01.0,  S.No.475/1AE-0.5.5,  S.No.475/1Z-0.106.0,  situated  at  A.  Jetty  Halli  Village, Dharamapuri Taluk and pass such further  or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit  and proper  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  thus render justice.

It is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be  pleased to direct the second respondent to refer for  higher compensation to the competent Civil Court  

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under  Section  18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  in  respect  of  the  lands  belonged  to  the  petitioners  in  S.No.475/1B-0.09.5  hcs.  S.No.475/1AB-0.04.5  hcs,  S.No.475/1AF-0.05,  S.No.475/1ai-0.07.0,  S.No.475/1k-0.03.5  part,  S.No.475/1L-0.03.5  hcs.,  S.No.475/1A-0,08.5,  S.No.475/1T-0.21.5,  S.No.475/1M-0.03.5,  S.No.475/1N-0.16.0,  S.No.475/1W-0.04.5,  S.No.475/1X-0.1.5,  S.No.475/1AA-0.01.0,  S.No.475/1AE-0.5.5,  S.No.475/1Z-0.106.0,  situated  at  A.  Jetty  Halli  Village,  Dharmapuri  Talum, pending disposal of the above writ petition  and  pass  such  further  or  other  orders  as  this  Hon’ble  Court  may  deem  fit  and  proper  in  the  circumstances of the case and render justice.”

It is stated that in the year 1996, the State Government made reference  

in about 80 matters the validity and/or legality whereof was not questioned  

by the appellant.  Representations, therefore, were again made for making  

reference in the rest  of  the cases  which were  rejected  by an order  dated  

18.10.2000, stating that the representations had been made after a period of  

12 years.

Questioning the validity  of the said order  dated 18.10.2000, a writ  

petition  was  filed  by  the  respondent  in  November  2000.   A prayer  was  

furthermore made for insurance of a direction upon the Land Acquisition  

Collector to refer those cases for grant of higher compensation before the  

Civil Court in terms of Section 18 of the Act.  By reason of a judgment and  

order dated 30.1.2001, the said writ petition was allowed.   

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We may place on record that the State Government did not raise any  

contention  with  regard  to  the  maintainability  of  the  orders  of  reference.  

Pursuant  to  or  in  furtherance  of  the  said  direction  issued  by the  learned  

Single  Judge,  references  were  made  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector.  

Appellant-Housing  Board  participated  therein  without  any  demur  

whatsoever.  By reason of a judgment dated 19.4.2003, the Reference Court  

enhanced  the  amount  of  compensation  from  Rs.1.50  per  square  foot  to  

Rs.6.00 per square foot.  Appellant preferred appeals thereagainst before the  

High  Court.   However,  by  an  order  dated  19.7.2004,  on  the  appellant’s  

failure  to  comply  with  the  directions  given  by  the  Division  Bench,  the  

appeals were dismissed.  The said order of the learned Single Judge dated  

30.1.2001, by reason of the impugned judgment,  has been upheld by the  

Division Bench of the High Court.

Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Steel  

Authority of India Ltd., would raise the following contentions :

1. The  provisions  of  Section  18(1)  of  the  Act  being  imperative  in  

character;  it  was  obligatory  on  the  part  of  the  land  owners  to  file  

appropriate  applications  strictly  in  terms  thereof  and  no  such  

application having been filed by them within a period of six weeks  

from the date of passing of the award in the cases where awardees  

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were  present  and  within  a  period  of  six  months  from the  date  of  

communication thereof in the cases where they were not present, the  

awards attained finality.   

2. Both the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench committed a  

manifest error of law insofar as they failed to take into consideration  

that even assuming that the land owners had constructive notice of the  

award in the year 1981, appropriate applications for references should  

have  been  filed  within  a  period  of  six  months  thereafter  and  not  

beyond the same.

3. In  view  of  the  fact  that  most  of  the  individual  land  owners  had  

received  the  amount  of  compensation  without  any  protest  were  

estopped and precluded from filing a writ  application through their  

Association or otherwise in view of the second proviso appended to  

Section 31 of the Act.   

4. The High Court  committed  a  serious  error  in  entertaining  the  writ  

petition  at  the  instance  of  the  respondent  association  which  was  

neither a ‘person interested’ within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the  

Act  nor  being  entitled  to  act  within  the  meaning  of  Section  3(g)  

thereof and that too after a long period of 20 to 25 years from the date  

of making of the award.

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5. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 being not applicable, the High  

Court  could not  have issued any writ  after  expiry of  the period of  

limitation or as specified in sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act.

6. The  reliefs  prayed  for  in  the  writ  petition  by  the  association  for  

enmass  reference  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  is  wholly  

impermissible  in  law  inasmuch  as  even  the  Land  Acquisition  

Collector  is  required  to  go  into  the  merit  of  each  individual  case  

independently.

7. Unless the impugned judgment is set aside, the appellant, which is a  

Public  Sector  Undertaking,  shall  incur  huge  financial  liabilities  

without any legal justification whatsoever.    

Mr.  V. Krishnamurthy,  learned counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the  

Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board,  adopted  the  said  arguments  of  Mr.  Ranjit  

Kumar.  He furthermore contended that Tamil Nadu Housing Board being a  

person interested in the matter of enhancement of compensation should have  

been  given  due  notice  by  the  Reference  Judge.   Had  such  notice  been  

granted in  the  writ  petition,  it  could have been pointed out  that  the  writ  

petition was not maintainable.

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Mr.  Jayant  Mukhraj,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent, on the other hand, urged :

1. The  provisions  contained  insub-section  (1)  of  Section  18  being  

procedural in nature, filing of an application for reference in writing is  

not imperative.

2. By reason of the representations made by the land owners that they  

were not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded in their  

favour,  they called upon him to  make a  reference  which has  been  

agreed upon by the Land Acquisition Collector and consequently the  

State Government and the appellant herein are estopped and precluded  

from contending that sub-section (1) of Section 18 is mandatory in  

nature.

3. The land owners of the area being poor agriculturists and having not  

been  informed  about  their  legal  rights,  no  illegality  has  been  

committed by the High Court in entertaining the writ petition of the  

respondent-Association.

4. The right of a land owner to obtain a fair market value of the land,  

being a  valuable  right,  the  same would prevail  over  the  procedure  

contained in Section 18 of the Act.   

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5. The High Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review is entitled  

to  issue  such  directions  which  are  necessary  for  doing  complete  

justice  to  the  parties,  keeping  in  view  the  ignorance  of  the  small  

farmers who are residents of remote villages.

The State exercises its power of eminent domain for the purpose of  

acquisition  of  private  land  as  also  its  own  land.   Such  acquisition  is  

permissible  not  only  for  a  public  purpose  but  also  for  a  company.   The  

Parliament as also the State Legislatures enacted a large number of statutes  

with  a  view to  give  effect  to  its  power  of  eminent  domain vis-à-vis  the  

constitutional  safeguard provided to the owners of the land,  as envisaged  

under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

While a land is acquired in terms of the provisions of the Act not only  

a public purpose therefor must exist, acquisition must also take place within  

a  required  time-frame.   Provisions  have  been  made  for  grant  of  

compensation, procedures wherefor have been laid down in the statute itself.  

Unlike some other statutes, the Act makes elaborate provisions for payment  

of compensation.  The constitution of forums had several hierarchical levels  

including  appellate  forums.   A  land  acquisition  collector  is  a  statutory  

authority.   He may or  may not  be a collector  within the meaning of  the  

provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act.   

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If he is not a collector within the meaning of the provisions of the Act,  

he, subject to the just exceptions to which we would refer to a little later,  

would not be entitled to act as a collector for the purpose of Part III of the  

Constitution of India.

Section 4(1) of the Act provides for the publication of the preliminary  

notification  for  acquiring  any  land  in  three  modes  viz.  in  the  Official  

Gazette, in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality — of which one  

shall be in the regional language, and at convenient places in the locality  

where the Collector is enjoined to publish a substance of the notification.  

Section 12(1) of the Act reads as follows:  

"12.  Award  of  Collector  when  to  be  final.—(1)  Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office  and shall, except as hereinafter provided,  be final  and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector  and  the  persons  interested,  whether  they  have  respectively appeared before the Collector or not,  of  the  true  area  and  value  of  the  land,  and  the  apportionment  of  the  compensation  among  the  persons interested."  

The  finality  of  the  awards  is,  however,  subject  to  review  by  the  

Reference Court under Section 18 read with Section 31(2) or Section 30 of  

the Act. Except for the finality of these three factual matters, there is nothing  

in the Act making the award final as regards its legality. Moreover, the use  

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of the word "final" in the statute only means that there would be no appeal.  

The use of the expression "final" or "conclusive" in a statutory provision has  

been interpreted by Lord Denning, M.R. in  R. v.  Medical Appeal Tribunal  

(1957) 1 QB 574, 583  in the following words:  

"The word 'final' is not enough. That only means  'without appeal'. It does not mean 'without recourse  to  certiorari'.  It  makes  the  decision  final  on  the  facts, but not on the law. Notwithstanding that the  decision is by a statute made 'final', certiorari can  still issue for excess of jurisdiction or for error of  law on the face of the record."

For the purposes of Land Acquisition Act, proceedings are carried on  

by  an  officer  appointed  by  the  Government  known as  Land  Acquisition  

Collector.  The proceeding under  the  Land Acquisition Collector  is  of  an  

administrative nature and not of a judicial or quasi judicial character. When  

a  Government  intends  to  occupy a  land in  any locality  it  has to  issue a  

notification under Section 4 in the official gazette as also newspaper and  

give a public notice which entitles anyone on behalf of the Government to  

enter  into  the  land  for  the  purposes  of  digging,  taking  level,  set  out  

boundaries  etc.  The  notification  puts  forward  the  intention  of  the  

Government to acquire the land, in terms whereof the government officials  

became entitled to investigate and ascertain whether the land is suitable for  

the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. The section also  

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makes it mandatory for the officer or person authorised by the Government  

to  give  a  notice  of  seven  days  signifying his  intention  to  enter  into  any  

building or enclosed court or garden in any locality. This is a mandatory  

provision of the process of land acquisition

An  officer  or  authorised  person  of  the  Government  has  to  tender  

payment for all necessary damage,  and all  disputes as to insufficiency of  

amount lie before the Collector. Under Section 5(a) any person interested in  

land which is notified under Section 4 (who is entitled to claim an interest in  

compensation) can raise an objection, in writing and in person. The collector  

after  making  inquiry  to  such objections  has  to  forward the  report  to  the  

Government whose decision in this respect would be final. After considering  

such report made by the collector under Section 5A the Government may  

issue a declaration within one year of the notification under Section 4 to  

acquire  land  for  public  purposes  or  company  and  this  declaration  is  a  

mandatory requirement of the acquisition.

After the declaration under Section 6, collector has to take order from  

the appropriate Government whether State or Central for the acquisition of  

land in terms of Section 7. The next step in the process of acquisition is that  

Collector has to cause land to be marked out, measured and appropriate plan  

to be made accurately , unless it is already done. Requirement of this section  

17

deals only with approximation and does not require exact measurement. An  

important process that takes place under this section is demarcation which  

consists of marking out boundaries of land to be acquired, either by cutting  

trenches or fixing marks as posts. Object is to facilitate measurement and  

preparation of acquisition plan and also let the private persons know what  

land  is  being  taken.  It  is  to  be  done  by  requiring  a  body  that  is  the  

Government  department  or  company  whichever  be  the  case.  Obstruction  

under Section 8 and Section 4 are offences punishable with an imprisonment  

not exceeding one year and with fine not exceeding fifty rupees.

Section 9 requires the collector to cause a public notice displayed at  

convenient places expressing the Government’s intention to take possession  

of the land and requiring all persons interested in the land to appear before  

him personally and make claims for compensation before him. In effect this  

section requires the Collector  to issue two notices;  one in the locality  of  

acquisition and other to occupants or people interested in the lands to be  

acquired.  It is a mandatory provision.

Next step in the process of acquisition requires a person to deliver  

names or information regarding any other person possessing interest in the  

land to be acquired and the profits out of the land for the last 3 years. It also  

binds  the  person  by  requiring  him  to  deliver  such  information  to  the  

18

collector by making him liable under Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian  

Penal Code.  

The Final stage of the proceedings before the Collector involves an  

enquiry by him into the objections made by the interested persons regarding  

the proceedings under Sections 8 and 9 and making an award to persons  

claiming compensation as to the value of land as on the date of notification  

under  Section  4.  The  enquiry  involves  hearing  of  parties  who appear  in  

response to the notices, investigate their claims, consider the objections and  

take  all  the  information necessary for  ascertaining  the  value of  the  land.  

Such an enquiry can be adjourned from time to time as the collector thinks  

fit. An award is to be made at the end of the enquiry. The award made must  

be under the following three heads:

• Correct area of land

• Amount  of  compensation  he  thinks  should  be  given

• Apportionment of compensation, if any.

Section 11 makes it obligatory on the part of the collector to safeguard  

the  interests  of  all  persons  interested,  even  though  they  might  not  have  

appeared  before  him.  In  awarding  compensation  the  Land  Acquisition  

Collector  should  look  into  the  estimate  value  of  land  and  give  due  

19

consideration to the other factors specified therein. Value of the property in  

the neighbourhood can be used as a criterion. The award should be made  

within a period two years.

A  perusal  of  the  provisions  of  Sections  12,  18,  30,  31  and  the  

procedure  for  reference  as  contained  in  Part  III  of  the  Act,  reveals  that  

except for the right of reference on the said three factual matters, the Act  

does not provide for appeal from the award of the Collector. Of course, an  

appeal  lies  under  Section  54  to  the  High  Court  from  an  award  of  the  

Reference Judge made under Section 26 of the Act, and a second appeal lies  

to the Supreme Court from the decision of the High Court. But the remedy  

of appeal is restricted only to the questions relating to the aforesaid three  

factual  matters. At most,  therefore, the Act can be said to be a complete  

code, only for the special purpose of adjudicating any dispute with respect to  

the three factual matters of the area, value of the land and the apportionment  

of the compensation among the interested persons.  

Besides the same, there exists neither any express provision that no  

order or proceeding taken under the Act shall be called in question in any  

court, nor any implied intendment barring the jurisdiction of the civil court.  

There is no finality attached to any of the proceedings taken under the Act or  

as to the validity of the award, which cannot be called in question in a court  

20

of law on any judicially recognized grounds. A perusal of the scheme also  

reveals  that  there  is  no  machinery  for  determining  all  questions  of  law,  

which may conceivably arise under the Act. The Act also does not contain a  

machinery for restoration of any land, which may be unauthorizedly taken  

away.  

Even those who had not made any application for reference in terms  

of Section 18 of the Act have, however, a right to obtain a similar amount of  

compensation in terms of Section 28A thereof.  Thus, only because at one  

stage, a holder of a land does not file any application for reference, the same  

would not mean that they do not have any further remedy at all.  Section  

28A of the Act seeks to deal with a situation where a person because of  

ignorance  of  his  right  was  not  in  a  position  to  file  any  application  for  

enhancement  of  compensation.   It  provides  that  even in  such a  case,  he  

should receive a just amount of compensation.

The provisions of the Act must be read in their entirety.  A holistic  

approach  is  required  to  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  interpretation  of  

application of the provisions of the Act and so given, we are of the opinion  

that the provisions thereof meet the tests of Article 300A of the Constitution  

of  India.   The  Act  provides  for  a  fair  procedure.   The  Parliament  in  its  

wisdom is entitled to lay down conditions for application of other or further  

21

relief.  While it does so, it is entitled to lay down a procedure therefor in  

respect thereof.  Such a procedure although meets the tests of fairness and  

reasonableness for the purpose of determining the constitutionality thereof,  

ordinarily, the mode and manner in which the provisions are required to be  

applied should be adhered to.  The same shall, however, be subject to the  

interpretation of the statute as to whether the procedures laid down therein  

would be treated to be mandatory or directory.  From the scheme of the Act,  

as  noticed  hereinbefore,  the  mode  and  manner  in  which  the  amount  of  

compensation is required to be determined is in several phases, i.e., notice to  

the  persons  interested,  making  of  an award,  the  period for  doing so  and  

publication of the award itself.   

Section 12 of the Act provides that the award of Collector is to be  

final.  It also provides for a duty upon the Collector to issue notice of his  

award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by  

their representatives when the award is made.  Knowledge of making and/or  

publication of the award, therefore, plays an important role.   

For  the  purpose  of  invoking  Section  18  of  the  Act,  the  person  

interested is required:

(i) not to accept the award;

22

(ii) that the matter may be referred to the Collector for determination  

by the court by way of a written application inter alia pointing out  

his  objection  with  regard  to:  (a)  amount  of  compensation,  (b)  

person to whom it is payable or (c) apportionment thereof amongst  

the persons interested.

Reference,  thus,  may  be  made  by  the  Collector  on  receipt  of  the  

application in writing keeping in view the objections of the land owners or  

land holders in regard to one or all the matters as enumerated hereinbefore.

The law does not contemplate that even before an award is made, a  

general or vague objection can be entertained by the Collector.  Objection to  

the award, therefore, must be specific.  When a reference is made, the court  

shall  ordinarily  be  bound by the  terms  of  the  reference.   The  Reference  

Court does not have a plenary jurisdiction.  It does not have any original  

jurisdiction to entertain an application directly from the Collector or from  

the land holders.

Once  an  award  is  made,  having  regard  to  the  conclusiveness  and  

finality  attached  thereto,  the  Collector  has  also  a  statutory  duty  to  offer  

payment of  the awarded amount subject,  of  course,  to the provisions for  

reference.  For the aforementioned purpose, Section 18 of the Act is required  

to be read with the provisos appended to Section 31 of the Act.  The person  

23

interested may question the correctness or legality of the award on one or the  

other grounds specified in Section 18 of the Act.  He, even, for the purpose  

of  payment  of  the  amount  of  compensation  and/  or  acceptance  thereto,  

would  be  governed  by  the  provisos  appended  to  Section  31  of  the  Act.  

When payment of awarded amount is tendered, under the common parlance,  

a person may not accept the same, if he objects thereto.  Section 31 of the  

Act,  however,  enables  the  person  interested  to  accept  the  award  under  

protest.   Acceptance  of  such  an  award  under  protest,  however,  is  

circumscribed by the conditions laid down in the provisos appended both to  

Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act as also Sub-section (2) of Section  

31 thereof.

The said provisos,  therefore,  circumscribe the rights of the persons  

interested.   The  right  to  receive  compensation,  thus,  having  been  

circumscribed by the conditions attached, ordinarily, they should be held to  

be imperative in character.   

When the statute provides for a law of limitation, compliance thereof  

is  mandatory.   For  the  purpose  of  applying  the  statute  of  limitation,  the  

courts should, however, be liberal in their approach.   

24

Section 18 (2) (b) of the Act provides for the maximum period of six  

months  from  the  date  of  the  Collector’s  award.   It  was,  therefore,  

impermissible to direct references to be made after a long period particularly  

when the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be said  

to have any application.   

In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr. v. Shah Manilal  

Chandulal & ors. [1996 (9) SCC 414], this Court held:

“8. The right to make application in writing is  provided under Section 18(1). The proviso to sub- section (2) prescribes the limitation within which  the said right would be exercised by the claimant  or dissatisfied owner. In Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State  of  Maharashtra, this  Court  was  called  upon  to  decide in a reference under Section 18 made by the  Collector  to  the  court  beyond  the  period  of  limitation,  whether  the  court  can  go  behind  the  reference and determine the compensation, though  the application for reference under Section 18 was  barred by limitation? This Court had held that the  Collector is required under Section 18 to make a  reference on the fulfilment  of  certain  conditions,  namely, (i) written application by interested person  who has not accepted the award; (ii) nature of the  objections taken for not accepting the award; and  (iii)  time  within  which  the  application  shall  be  made.  In  paragraph  22  after  elaborating  those  conditions as conditions precedent to be fulfilled, it  held  that  the  power  to  make  a  reference  under  Section 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid  down therein and one such condition is a condition  regarding  limitation  to  be  found  in  the  proviso.  The Collector acts as a statutory authority. If the  application is not made within time, the Collector  

25

will not have the power to make reference. In order  to determine the limitation on his own power, the  Collector  will  have  to  decide  whether  the  application presented by the claimant is or is not  within time and specify the conditions laid down  under Section 18. Even if the reference is wrongly  made  by  the  Collector,  the  court  will  have  to  determine the validity of the reference because the  very jurisdiction of the court  to hear  a reference  depends upon a proper reference being made under  Section 18. If the reference is not proper there is  no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It  was, therefore, held that it is the duty of the court  to  see  that  the  statutory  conditions  laid  down in  Section 18 including the one relating to limitation,  have been complied with and the application is not  time-barred. It is not debarred from satisfying itself  that the reference which it is called upon to hear is  a valid reference.  It  has to proceed to determine  compensation  and  if  it  is  time-barred,  it  is  not  called  upon to  hear  the  same.  It  is  only  a  valid  reference  which  gives  jurisdiction  to  the  court.  Therefore, the court has to ask itself the question  whether  it  has  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  reference. If the reference is beyond the prescribed  period by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section  18 of the Act and if it finds that it was not so made,  the  court  would decline  to  answer the reference.  Accordingly, it  was held that since the reference  was  made  beyond  the  limitation,  the  court  was  justified in refusing to answer the reference.

9. It  would  thus  be  clear  that  one  of  the  conditions precedent to make a valid reference to  the court is that the application under Section 18(1)  shall be in writing and made within six weeks from  the  date  of  the  award  when  the  applicant  was  present either in person or through counsel, at the  time  of  making  of  the  award  by  the  Collector  under clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2). The  Collector, when he makes the reference, acts as a  statutory authority.”

26

It was furthermore held:

“17. It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act  (68  of  1984)  was  enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise  the  power  under  Sections  4,  6  and  11  and  also  excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by  the  courts.  Taking  cognizance  of  the  limitation  prescribed in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section  18, the provisions of the Limitation Act were not  expressly extended.  Though Section 29(2) of the  Limitation Act is  available,  and the limitation in  proviso to sub-section (2)  of  Section 18 may be  treated to be special law, in the absence of such an  application by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act  (68  of  1984),  the  Act  specifically  maintains  distinction between the Collector and the court and  the Collector/LAO performs only statutory duties  under  the  Act,  including  one  while  making  reference  under  Section  18.  It  is  difficult  to  construe  that  the  Collector/LAO  while  making  reference under Section 18, as statutory authority  still acts as a court for the purpose of Section 5 of  the Limitation Act.

18. Though  hard  it  may  be,  in  view  of  the  specific  limitation  provided  under  proviso  to  Section 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered  view that sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot be  applied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section  18.  The Collector/LAO,  therefore,  is  not  a  court  when he acts as a statutory authority under Section  18(1). Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act  cannot  be applied for  extension of  the  period of  limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section  (2) of Section 18. The High Court, therefore, was  not right in its finding that the Collector is a court  under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

27

In State of Karnataka v. Laxuman [2005 (8) SCC 709], it was opined :

“9. As can be seen, no time for applying to the  court  in  terms of  sub-section (3)  is  fixed by the  statute.  But  since the  application  is  to the  court,  though under a special enactment, Article 137, the  residuary  article  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963,  would be attracted and the application has to be  made  within  three  years  of  the  application  for  making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after  the application...”

The  cause  of  the  owners  of  the  land  is  purported  to  have  been  

espoused by the respondent  – Association.   Association is  stated to have  

been registered under the Societies Registration Act in the year 1970.  There  

is,  however,  nothing  on  record  to  show  as  to  whether  it  had  filed  any  

application for reference before the Collector.

It is, however, a matter of some significance that mostly awards were  

passed during the period 1972 and 1974.  Only some awards were passed in  

the  years  1970,  1975,  1976,  1977  and  1978.   The  State  expressed  its  

helplessness to specify exactly the number of the persons who had received  

the  amount  of  award  under  protest  or  who  had  filed  applications  for  

reference.   

We  will,  however,  proceed  on  the  assumption  that  most  of  the  

awardees were poor and illiterate and they were not aware of their rights.  It  

28

is one thing to say that an Association, like the first respondent, takes up its  

cause but it would be another thing to say that only due to the said reason the  

mandatory provisions of the statutes would not be necessary to be complied  

with.

The Act uses the expression “person interested”.  The definition of the  

expression “person interested” as contained in Section 3(b) of the Act is an  

inclusive definition although not an exhaustive one.  Primarily it  includes  

“all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of  

the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be  

interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land”.

The expression “person interested” for the purpose of Section 18 of  

the  Act  may  be  given  a  restricted  meaning.   A  State  is  not  a  person  

interested.  A company or a local authority for whose benefit the lands are  

acquired, having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of  

the Act, is not entitled to file any application for reference.

The Collector is a statutory authority.  He, therefore, ordinarily must  

exercise  its  statutory  jurisdiction  within  the  four-corners  of  the  statute,  

although this would not mean that a superior court in exercise of its power of  

judicial review would be denuded of its power to interfere with an order of  

reference or issue a direction when the same has unjustly been withheld in  

29

appropriate cases, but, such a power as is well known should be exercised  

only  in  exceptional  situations  and  subject  to  the  condition  that  adequate  

grounds exist therefor.

The Association, therefore, could file a writ application representing  

its members but, stricto sensu, it  could not have filed any application for  

reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act.  For the purpose of making such  

an application,  indisputably,  the  period of  limitation provided for therein  

must be resorted to.  However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a  

statute of limitation should receive strict construction.

Reference  has  been  made  to  Karnataka  State  Road  Transport  

Corporation v. KSRTC Staff & Workers’ Federation & Anr. [(1999) 2 SCC  

687], wherein in regard to a matter relating to conditions of employment of  

the  workers  of  the  Karnataka  State  Road  Transport  Corporation,  the  

Association was held to have a locus standi to challenge the Government  

Order and consequent notification issued by the corporation, stating:

“9. So far as the locus standi of the Union in the  present proceedings is concerned, it must be kept  in  view  that  the  Corporation  itself  by  its  order  dated 24-12-1987 granted recognition to the Union  as the sole bargaining agent for its members. It was  noted  by  the  office  memorandum  of  the  Corporation dated 24-12-1987 that the Federation  having secured 53.04% of the votes polled at the  Corporation level in the referendum held on 11-12-

30

1987,  the  Corporation  was  pleased  to  accord  recognition  to  the  respondent-Federation  as  the  sole  bargaining  agent  at  the  Corporation  level.  However,  this  was  subject  to  the  conditions  stipulated under  the notification dated 30-4-1987  which prescribed four years’ period from the date  of  such  conferment  of  the  right  of  collective  bargaining  with  the  employer  by  the  Union  concerned.  It  is  also  not  in  dispute  between  the  parties that even in the subsequent referendum, the  respondent-Federation/Union  secured  61.07%  of  the votes polled at the Corporation level and the  Corporation, by its office memorandum dated 16- 7-1992, continued recognition to the Union as the  sole  bargaining  agent  subject  to  the  conditions  stipulated  in  the  earlier  notification  dated  3-12- 1991. It  is,  therefore,  not  in dispute between the  parties  that  till  16-7-1996,  the  respondent- Federation/Union  remained  a  recognised  Union.  We fail to appreciate how the said Union cannot  challenge  the  government  order  dated  10-9-1993  and  the  consequent  notification  issued  by  the  Corporation  on  21-9-1993.  On  both  these  occasions, the respondent-Union was admittedly a  recognised Union of the employees and had got the  benefit of the payroll check-off facility under the  settlement of 28-7-1988….”

In a land acquisition matter,  the question of a body of the persons  

being represented by Association does not arise.  The statute provides for  

filing of claim applications as also filing of objections by the land holders  

and not by and/or on behalf of the Association and that too an independent  

body corporate.  

31

An owner of a land has a right  to receive just  compensation.   He,  

having regard to his human right of access to justice as has been declared by  

the ICESCR on December 10, 2008 should be given an opportunity to make  

a reference.  A person may get an opportunity to get a reference only when  

he is informed about the making of an award.

We may notice that before the High Court it was conceded that in the  

cases where the award of the Collector was served on the claimant and yet  

reference  was  not  made  within  time,  prayer  for  reference  was  not  

maintainable.   

The High Court  in  its  judgment  had divided the  claimants  in  four  

categories.   So  far  as  the  first  category  of  claimants  is  concerned,  there  

cannot  be  any  doubt  that  their  applications  for  reference  would  be  

maintainable.  So far as the second category of claimants is concerned, their  

applications  being  barred  by  limitation,  the  same  could  not  have  been  

entertained by the Collector, being beyond his jurisdiction.  So far as the  

third category of claimants is concerned,  the time for making application  

would indisputably run from the date of communication thereof.  As far as  

the land holders belonging to the fourth category of claimants are concerned,  

the question being of some importance would be discussed a little later.   

We may notice a few precedents operating in the field.

32

In  Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v.  The Deputy Land Acquisition  

Officer and Another [(1962) 1 SCR 676], this Court referring to Section 12  

of the Act held:

“It  is  significant  that  the  section  requires  the  Collector to give notice of the award immediately  after making it. This provision lends support to the  view which we have taken about the construction  of the expression “from the date of the Collector’s  award” in the proviso to Section 18. It is because  communication  of  the  order  is  regarded  by  the  legislature  as  necessary  that  Section  12(2)  has  imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the  relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of  this statutory requirement it tends to show that the  literal  and  mechanical  construction  of  the  said  clause  would  be  wholly  inappropriate.  It  would  indeed be a very curious result that the failure of  the  Collector  to  discharge  his  obligation  under  Section  12  (2)  should  directly  tend  to  make  ineffective  the  right  of  the  party  to  make  an  application under Section 18, and this result could  not  possibly  have  been  intended  by  the  legislature.”

Similar observations have been made in State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar  

Jehan Begum & Anr.  [(1964) 1 SCR 971, thus:

“…Now knowledge of the award does not mean a  mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been  made. The knowledge must relate to the essential  contents  of  the  award.  These  contents  may  be  known  either  actually  or  constructively.  If  the  award is  communicated to a party under Section  

33

12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed  with  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  the  award  whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party  is present in court either personally or through his  representative  when  the  award  is  made  by  the  Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the  contents  of  the  award.  Having  regard  to  the  scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the  award  must  mean  knowledge  of  the  essential  contents of the award. Looked at from that point of  view, we do not think that it can be inferred from  the  petition  dated  December  24,  1954  that  the  respondents had knowledge of the award.”

The said decision, therefore, itself is an authority for the proposition  

that  constructive knowledge would also subserve the purpose of the Act.  

Whether a person had the actual or constructive knowledge of the contents  

of a document is essentially a question of fact.  The onus would be on the  

landholder to show that he did not have any knowledge of the contents of the  

award.

We may furthermore notice that in a case where communication gives  

rise to a cause of action, the same must be held to be mandatory in nature.

{See State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika  [AIR 1966 SC 1313]}

But in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram [(1969) 3 SCC 28 : AIR 1970  

SC 214], it was stated :

34

“16. The last decision cited before us was that  of  State  of  Punjab v.  Amar Singh Harika  where  one  of  the  questions  canvassed  was  whether  an  order of dismissal can be said to be effective only  from  the  date  when  it  is  made  known  or  communicated  to  the  concerned  public  servant.  The facts of the case show that though the order of  dismissal was passed on June 3, 1949, and a copy  thereof  was  sent  to  other  6  persons  noted  thereunder,  no  copy  was  sent  to  the  concerned  public  servant  who came to  know of  it  only  on  May 28, 1951, and that too only through another  officer. On these facts, the Court held, rejecting the  contention that the order became effective as soon  as it was issued, that the mere passing of the order  of dismissal would not make it effective unless it  was published and communicated to the concerned  officer.”

In  Land Acquisition officer v.  Shivabai  and Others [(1997) 9 SCC  

710], this Court held :

“…The limitation begins to run from the date of  the notice as per the proviso to Section 18(2). The  date of the award and the date of the receipt of the  compensation  were  incidentally  the  same.  Under  these circumstances, it must be presumed that they  were present on the date when the award was made  and  the  compensation  was  received  without  any  protest.  Under  these  circumstances,  they  are  not  entitled to seek any reference.”

35

In  Parsottambhai  Maganbhai  Patel  and  Others v.  State  of  Gujarat  

Through Dy. Collector  Modasa and Another [(2005) 7 SCC 431],  it  was  

observed :

“7.  This  Court,  therefore,  held  that  the  limitation under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b)  of the Act has to be computed having regard to the  date on which the claimants got knowledge of the  declaration  of  the  award  either  actual  or  constructive.  This  principle,  however,  will  apply  only to cases where the applicant was not present  or represented when the award was made, or where  no  notice  under  Section  12(2)  was  served  upon  him. It will also apply to a case where the date for  the pronouncement of the award is communicated  to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on  the date previously announced by the Court, even  if, the parties are not actually present on the date of  its pronouncement.”

The State issued a notification directing the Collector to exercise its  

jurisdiction  under  Section  18  of  the  Act.   Such a  notification,  therefore,  

would amount to a constructive knowledge.  It was obligatory on the part of  

the  land  owners  to  file  an  appropriate  application  within  the  prescribed  

period.

The  State,  however,  clarified  the  said  notification  on  or  about  

25.01.1983 stating that its earlier notification of the year 1981 would not  

mean  that  the  statutory  period  of  limitation  provided  for  under  the  Act  

36

should be given a complete go-by.  It is only on or about 2.12.1983 that the  

writ petition was filed.

Indisputably, pursuant to or in furtherance of the notification of the  

State of Tamil Nadu issued in the year 1981, no reference was made as the  

awards were made principally during the period 1972 to 1974.   

The writ petition, therefore, was also filed after inordinate delay.

In Mirza Majid Hussain v. State of M.P. and Another [(1995) 2 SCC  

422], this Court held:

“4. Then we have to see whether the appellant  was justified in approaching the High Court after  an inordinate delay of more than 10 years from the  date  of  the  order  of  the Collector  or  at  any rate  from the date of the order passed by the District  Judge.  The  High  Court  exercised  its  jurisdiction  under Article 226 but not under Section 115 CPC.  Even if it  is  to be converted as a revision under  Section 115 CPC, the order of the High Court is  not vitiated by any error of jurisdiction or material  irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The  High  Court  has  rightly  refused  to  exercise  its  discretionary jurisdiction after an inordinate delay  of more than 5 years from the date of the order of  District  Judge and more  than  10  years  from the  date  of  the  order  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector.  Under these circumstances,  we do not  think that  it  is  a  case warranting interference by  this Court under Article 136.”

37

Indisputably,  those who received compensation without  any protest  

keeping in view the second proviso appended to Section 31 must be held to  

have expressed no reservation in regard thereto whatsoever.   

Objections,  however,  appeared to  have been filed in  printed  forms  

contending that  all  awards should be subject  to objections  and payments  

would be received on protest.  Raising of such an objection in response to a  

notice under Section 9 of the Act,  in our opinion, cannot have the same  

effect as if an application has been filed for reference under Section 18 of  

the Act.   

We may, however, notice that in terms of the proviso (b) appended to  

sub-Section (2) of Section 18, the maximum period fixed for filing of an  

objection is six months from the date of the Collector’s award.  The statute,  

therefore, imposed a duty on the owner of land to keep track as to what has  

happened to his objection.  

The learned counsel, however, invited our attention to take recourse to  

the  purposive  interpretation  doctrine  in  preference  to  the  literal  

interpretation.  It is a well settled principle of law that a statute must be read  

as a whole and then chapter by chapter, section by section, and then word by  

word.  For the said purpose, the Scheme of the Act must be noticed.  If the  

principle of interpretation of statutes resorted to by the court leads to a fair  

38

reading of the provision, the same would fulfil the conditions of applying the  

principles of purposive construction.   

In  New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.  Nusli Neville Wadia [(2008) 3  

SCC 279], this Court held:

“49. Section  5  of  the  Act,  on  a  plain  reading,  would place the entire onus upon a noticee. It, in  no uncertain terms, states that once a notice under  Section  4  is  issued  by  the  Estate  Officer  on  formation of his opinion as envisaged therein it is  for the noticee not only to show cause in respect  thereof  but  also  adduce  evidence  and  make  oral  submissions in support of his case. Literal meaning  in  a  situation  of  this  nature  would  lead  to  a  conclusion  that  the  landlord  is  not  required  to  adduce any evidence at all nor is it required even  to  make  any  oral  submissions.  Such  a  literal  construction would lead to an anomalous situation  because  the  landlord may not  be heard at  all.  It  may not even be permitted to adduce any evidence  in rebuttal to the one adduced by the noticee nor it  would be permitted to advance any argument.  Is  this  contemplated  in  law?  The  answer  must  be  rendered in the negative. When a landlord files an  application, it in a given situation must be able to  lead evidence either at the first instance or after the  evidence is led by the noticee to establish its case  and/or  in  rebuttal  to  the  evidence  led  by  the  noticee.”

In  Chairman,  Indore  Vikas  Pradhikaran v.  Pure  Industrial  Coke  &  

Chemicals Ltd.  [(2007) 8 SCC 705], this Court held:

39

“57. The  Act  being  regulatory  in  nature  as  by  reason thereof the right of an owner of property to  use  and  develop  stands  restricted,  requires  strict  construction.  An owner  of  land ordinarily  would  be  entitled  to  use  or  develop  the  same  for  any  purpose unless there exists certain regulation in a  statute or a statutory rules. Regulations contained  in  such  statute  must  be  interpreted  in  such  a  manner  so  as  to  least  interfere  with  the  right  to  property  of  the  owner  of  such land.  Restrictions  are  made  in  larger  public  interest.  Such  restrictions, indisputably must be reasonable ones.  (See  Balram Kumawat v.  Union of India;  Krishi   Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej   Ltd. and Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills   Ltd.)  The  statutory  scheme  contemplates  that  a  person and owner of land should not ordinarily be  deprived  from  the  user  thereof  by  way  of  reservation or designation.

58. Expropriatory legislation, as is well-known,  must be given a strict construction.

We may, however, hasten to add that we do not intend to lay down a  

law that  the  protest  in regard to making of  an award must  be done in a  

manner  specified  expressly.  When  an  application  for  reference  is  filed,  

protest to the award is implicit as has been held by this Court in Ajit Singh  

& ors. v. State of Punjab & ors. [(1994) 4 SCC 67]:

“5. Having  regard  to  the  contiguity  of  these  lands  the  High Court  is  correct  in  its  valuation.  Besides,  the  date  of  notification,  issued  under  Section 4 of the Act, is October 4, 1978 while Exh.  R-6 is  nearer  to it,  namely,  August  16,  1978,  in  comparison to Exh. A-6 dated January 14, 1977.  

40

Inasmuch  as  the  appellants  have  filed  an  application for reference under Section 18 of the  Act  that  will  manifest  their  intention.  Therefore,  the  protest  against  the  award  of  the  Collector  is  implied  notwithstanding  the  acceptance  of  compensation.  The  District  Judge  and  the  High  Court,  therefore,  fell  into patent error in denying  the enhanced compensation to the appellants.”

The learned counsel  for  the respondents  would,  however,  make an  

appeal that in a situation of this nature we should exercise our jurisdiction  

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the  

said purpose refers to a large number of cases.  We may notice some of  

them.

In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. [(1998) 4  

SCC 409], a Constitution Bench of this Court was dealing with a decision  

rendered in  Vinay Chandra Mishra,  Re [(1995) 2 SCC 584],  wherein the  

statutory provisions dealing expressly with the subject  were said to have  

been ignored by this Court while exercising power under Article 142 of the  

Constitution of India.   In that case itself, it was held:

“47. The  plenary  powers  of  this  court  under  Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the  court  and  are  complementary  to  those  powers  which are  specifically  conferred  on the  court  by  various  statutes  though  are  not  limited  by  those  statutes.  These  powers  also  exist  independent  of  the  statutes  with  a  view  to  do  complete  justice  

41

between the parties. These powers are of very wide  amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary  powers.  This  power,  exists  as  a  separate  and  independent  basis  of  jurisdiction,  apart  from the  statutes.  It  stands  upon  the  foundation,  and  the  basis for its exercise may be put on a different and  perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in  the process of litigation and to do complete justice  between  the  parties.  This  plenary  jurisdiction  is,  thus, the residual source of power which this Court  may draw upon as necessary whenever it  is  just  and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure  the  observance  of  the  due process  of  law,  to  do  complete  justice  between  the  parties,  while  administering justice according to law. There is no  doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other  powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction  and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of  the court to prevent "clogging or obstruction of the  stream of justice"…..”

In H.M. Kelogirao & ors. v. Govt. of A.P. & ors. [(1997) 7 SCC 722],  

this Court was dealing with a case where the appellants had not accepted the  

award which was put in issue by them in the Writ Petition.  It was in the  

aforementioned extraordinary situation and particularly having regard to the  

fact that they had filed writ petitions, this Court granted time to them to seek  

reference under Section 18 of the Act in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction  

as also in the interests of justice.  

A  foundational  fact,  therefore,  in  that  case  for  reference  has  been  

made out.   Such is  not  the position here.   As indicated hereinbefore,  no  

42

application for reference has been made in these cases either by the land  

holders or by the Association for a long time.  Therefore, in our opinion, no  

case for exercising our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the  

Constitution of India has been made out.   

Reliance  has  also  been  placed  on  Orissa  Industrial  Infrastructure  

Development Corpn. v. Supai Munda & ors.  [(2004) 12 SCC 306] wherein  

this  Court  was  dealing  with  a  case  where  State  Authorities  awarded  

compensation which was supported by convincing evidence.   It  was also  

furthermore  found  that  the  claimant  made  oral  protest  as  regards  the  

sufficiency of the amount of compensation which had been cowed down by  

resorting to coercive methods.  It is in the aforementioned situation, it was  

held that the benefit of the proviso appended to sub-Section (2) of Section 31  

of  the  Act  was  not  available  to  the  State  as  the  claimants  had  received  

compensation under duress.  The direction to proceed with the reference by  

this Court in the aforementioned situation was not made in exercise of its  

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India but  

on the principle that a decision obtained under coercion is no decision in the  

eye of law and was liable to be ignored.

43

Land Acquisition Collector is a statutory authority.  The proceeding  

before  the  Land Acquisition  Collector  is  a  quasi-judicial  Proceeding.   A  

party before it may waive its right.   

In  Jaya Chandra Mohapatra  v.  Land Acquisition Officer,  Rayagada  

[(2005) 9 SCC 123], this Court held:

“8. In law, there is no bar in filing applications  for review successively if the same are otherwise  maintainable  in  law.  The  Civil  Court  herein  admittedly  had  not  granted  to  the  Appellant  the  benefit  of  solatium  at  the  rate  of  30%  of  the  amount  of  enhanced  compensation  as  also  the  additional  amount  and  interest  as  contemplated  under  the  Amending  Act  of  1984.  To  the  said  benefits, the Appellant was entitled to in terms of  Section 23(1A), Section 23(2) as also Section 28  of the Act. It is one thing to say that the omission  to award additional amount under Section 23(1A),  enhanced interest  under Section 28 and solatium  under Section 23(2) may not amount to clerical or  arithmetical  mistake  in  relation  whereto  an  executing court will not be entitled to grant relief  but it is another thing to say that the grant thereof  would be impressible in law even if the Reference  Court on an appropriate application made in this  behalf and upon application of its mind holds that  the statutory benefits available to the claimant had  not been granted to him and pass an order in that  behalf by directing amendment of decree. In a case  of former nature, an executing court may not have  any  jurisdiction  to  pass  such  an  order  on  the  ground that it cannot go behind the decree, but in  law there does not  exist  any bar  on a Reference  Court to review its earlier order if there exists an  error apparent on the face of the record in terms of  

44

Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Such  a  jurisdiction  cannot  be  denied  to  the  Reference  Court.  The  Act  68  of  1984  is  a  beneficial  statute  and,  thus,  the  benefits  arising  thereunder  cannot  ordinarily  be  denied  to  a  claimant except on strong and cogent reasons.”  

In Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by LRs. & ors. [(2005) 12  

SCC 1]:

“104. It may not, thus, be correct to contend that  the said provisions are so imperative in character  that  waiver  thereof  is  impermissible  in  law  or  would be against public interest. Grant of interest  in terms of Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act  is  discretionary.  Only  rate  of  interest  specified  therein  is  mandatory.  Section  34  of  the  Act  ex  facie,  however,  appears  to  be  imperative  in  character  as  the  word  'shall'  has  been  used.  A  discretion vested in the court, it is trite, may not be  exercised where the right to claim interest has been  waived  expressly  by  the  parties  and/or  their  counsel.  Even a mandatory provision of a statute  can be waived.

xxx xxx xxx

108. It is not in dispute that if a person alters its  position pursuant to the representation made by the  other  side,  the  principles  of  estoppel  would  be  applicable  and  by  reason  thereof,  the  person  making the representation would not be allowed to  raise a plea contra thereto. In  Krishna Bahadur v.  Purna  Theatre  and  Ors. (2004)  8  SCC 229,  this  Court held: (SCC p. 233, paras 9-10)

"9. The  principle  of  waiver  although  is  akin  to  the  principle  of  estoppel;  the  

45

difference between the two, however, is that  whereas estoppel is not a cause of action; it  is a rule of evidence; waiver is contractual  and may constitute a cause of action; it is an  agreement between the parties  and a  party  fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to  assert a right for a consideration.

10. A right can be waived by the party for  whose  benefit  certain  requirements  or  conditions  had  been  provided  for  by  a  statute subject to the condition that no public  interest  is  involved  therein.  Whenever  waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading  the same to show that an agreement waiving  the  right  in  consideration  of  some  compromise  came  into  being.  Statutory  right, however, may also be waived by his  conduct."

[See  also  Vijay  Cotton  & Oil  Mills  Ltd. v.  The  State of Gujarat (1969) 2 SCR 60, SCR at p. 63].

109. Yet again recently in State of Karnataka and  Anr.  v.  Sangappa  Dyavappa  Biradar  and  Ors.(2005) 4 SCC 264, the principles of estoppel  was applied in relation to a consent award holding  that  once  a  consent  award  had been  passed,  the  claimants  were  precluded  from  applying  for  a  reference under Section 18 of the Act.”

In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. [(2008)  

7 SCC 353], this Court held:

“34.  Validity  of  the  notifications  on  the  ground  that  they  are  unreasonable  has  not  been  raised  

46

before the High Court.  We,  therefore,  cannot  go  into the issue. If that be so, it is difficult to agree  with  Mr  Parasaran  that  we  should  undertake  an  exercise to interpret the notifications in a manner  which would not lead to unreasonableness. For the  purpose  of  declaring  a  statute  unconstitutional,  foundational  facts  have  to  be  laid  therefor.  (See  Seema  Silk  &  Sarees  v.  Directorate  of  Enforcement11.) Grounds are required to be raised  therefor.  In  absence  thereof  it  would  not  be  possible  for  us  to  enter  into  the  debate  of  constitutionality  of  the  said  provisions.  The  Division Bench of the High Court had rightly or  wrongly  opined  that  the  doctrine  of  promissory  estoppel has no application. The fact that the said  doctrine may apply even in relation to a statute is  beyond any dispute as has been held by this Court  in  Mahabir  Vegetable  Oils  (P)  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Haryana12,  A.P.  Steel  Re-Rolling  Mill  Ltd.9,  Pawan Alloys and Casting (P) Ltd. v. U.P. SEB13  and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v.  Electricity Inspector & ETIO14.”

The appeals preferred by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, however,  

stand on a different footing.  Therein, the writ petition was allowed by a  

learned single judge of the High Court.  Pursuant thereto or in furtherance  

thereof,  reference was made.   A finding of  fact  had been arrived at.   A  

prayer was also made for reference to the Civil Court.  The Land Acquisition  

Officer assured them that a reference shall be made.  The promise, however,  

was not kept.  In the aforementioned situation, the writ petition was filed.  

47

The judgment of the Single Judge having been acted upon and Tamil  

Nadu Housing Board, having participated in the proceedings without any  

demur whatsoever, cannot be permitted to turn round and contend that the  

proceeding was illegal.  They not only participated in the proceedings but  

also  questioned  the  adduction  of  evidence  in  regard  to  the  quantum  of  

compensation and preferred appeals against the judgment and award of the  

Reference Judge.  The said proceedings having attained finality,  the writ  

appeals preferred by them should not have been entertained.   

In a case of this nature,  in the absence of any material  brought on  

record  by  the  State  and/or  the  appellant,  we  may  assume that  the  Land  

Acquisition Officer is a Collector within the meaning of Section 3(c) of the  

Act.  He was, therefore, bound by his promise.  

In  the  aforementioned  situation,  it  would  not  be  a  case  where  a  

statutory  authority  has  been  asked  by  a  higher  authority  to  perform his  

jurisdiction  in  a  particular  manner.   No  form  of  protest,  as  indicated  

hereinbefore, is prescribed under the Act.  No form of application in writing  

has also been prescribed.  In a given case, keeping in view the object and  

purport the statute seeks to achieve, a Collector being a statutory authority  

and having the jurisdiction to make a reference can waive the same.  We  

may consider it from another angle.  Had a reference been made pursuant to  

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the request made by the awardees, could it be held to be wholly illegal or  

without jurisdiction only because the protest made in regard to the quantum  

of compensation under the award is oral and not in writing?  The answer to  

the said question must be rendered in the negative.  The form, mode and  

manner of protest are procedural in nature.  The statute does not provide for  

a thing to be done in a particular manner.   

Submission  of  Mr.  Krishnamurthy  that  the  doctrine  that  where  a  

statute prescribes a thing to be done in a manner as prescribed or not at all is  

applicable where statutory authority is to perform his function in terms of  

the provisions of the statute.  It is not meant to be applied to a litigant.  A  

procedure, as is well known, is hand maid of justice. A substantive provision  

providing  for  substantive  right  or  a  statutory  provision  providing  for  a  

substantive right shall prevail over the procedural aspect of the matter.  In a  

situation of this nature, therefore, the Land Acquisition Collector could have  

been, having regard to the principles of promissory estoppel, held bound to  

fulfil his promise.  

In  Nagar Palika Nigam v.  Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti  & Ors. [2008  

AIR SCW 7114], this Court held:

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“8. The normal function of a proviso is to except  something  out  of  the  enactment  or  to  qualify  something  enacted  therein  which  but  for  the  proviso  would  be  within  the  purview  of  the  enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer  of Survey 1880 (5) QBD 170, (referred to in Shah  Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v.  Subhash  Chandra  Yograj  Sinha  (AIR  1961  SC  1596)  and  Calcutta  Tramways  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Corporation  of  Calcutta  (AIR  1965  SC  1728);  when one finds a proviso to a section the natural  presumption  is  that,  but  for  the  proviso,  the  enacting part  of the section would have included  the  subject  matter  of  the  proviso.  The  proper  function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a  case which would otherwise fall within the general  language of the main enactment and its  effect  is  confined to  that  case.  It  is  a  qualification of  the  Page 4544 preceding enactment which is expressed  in  terms  too  general  to  be  quite  accurate.  As  a  general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to  qualify  or  create  an  exception  to  what  is  in  the  enactment  and  ordinarily,  a  proviso  is  not  interpreted  as  stating  a  general  rule.  "If  the  language of the enacting part  of the statute does  not contain the provisions which are said to occur  in  it  you  cannot  derive  these  provisions  by  implication from a proviso." Said Lord Watson in  West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance  Co. 1897 AC 647 (HL). Normally, a proviso does  not  travel  beyond  the  provision  to  which  it  is  a  proviso.  It  carves  out  an  exception  to  the  main  provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso  and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje  Ram  Sheoram  and  Ors.  (AIR  1991  SC  1406),  Tribhovandas  Haribhai  Tamboli  v.  Gujarat  Revenue  Tribunal  and  Ors.(AIR 1991  SC 1538)  and  Kerala  State  Housing  Board  and  Ors.  v.  Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and Ors. (1994 (5) SCC  672).”

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For  the  reasons  aforementioned,  the  appeal  preferred  by M/s  Steel  

Authority of India Ltd. is allowed with no order as to costs and the appeals  

filed by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board are dismissed  

with costs. Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/- each.

..……………………………..J. ( S.B. SINHA )

..……………………………..J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi July 29, 2009

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